[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 153 (Wednesday, November 5, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Page S11786]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                           SITUATION IN IRAQ

 Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, the United States is once again 
facing a decision about whether and how to respond to Iraqi 
intransigence over the issue of its continued development and 
concealment of weapons of mass destruction and their associated 
delivery systems. It is imperative that we not back down, as has 
already been the case to an alarming degree.
  All countries act out of their own economic self-interest. The United 
States is no exception. We should not, however, acquiesce in such 
conduct in the case of Iraq. Russia, which seeks compensation for 
weapons it sold to Baghdad during the Soviet era as well as the hard 
currency and access to oil that Iraq represents, and France, which 
similarly pursues contracts for the development of Iraqi oil, have led 
the way in arguing for a relaxation of the economic sanctions levied 
against Iraq as a result of its 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Countries like 
Egypt and Kenya have demonstrated growing sympathy for Iraq's economic 
situation.
  The reason why the United States should stand firm and not continue 
to adopt essentially meaningless positions on the question of sanctions 
is quite simple: Iraq has to a remarkable degree always held its 
destiny in its own hands. Little was asked of it other than to come 
clean on the extent of its efforts to develop weapon systems capable of 
threatening stability in the world's most volatile region. And, yet, it 
has consistently, for more than 6 years now, refused to do that, 
repeatedly challenging the international community and miscalculating 
the ramifications of its actions.
  With regard to its efforts at developing chemical, biological, and 
nuclear weapons and the missiles to deliver them, a particularly 
illuminating episode occurred back in August 1995. It was then that 
Saddam Hussein s sons-in-law, one of whom had been in charge of 
overseeing the development of those weapons, defected to Jordan. 
Anticipating the intelligence coup for the United Nations that was to 
come, the Iraqis decided to preempt the damage the defectors could 
cause by revealing a wealth of documents--over half-a-million pages--
detailing their biological weapons program. Mr. President, 150 steel 
trunks and boxes stuffed with documentation that was to have been 
turned over in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf war, yet would likely 
have remained hidden indefinitely had the defections not occurred, 
suddenly and miraculously appeared.
  Iraq's refusal to abide by the rules of civilized society and to test 
the will of the international community has been manifested in other 
ways also. In October 1994, it moved thousands of troops toward the 
Kuwaiti border, precipitating a costly but essential deployment of 
United States military forces to the region to deter a repeat of the 
1990 invasion. Whether Iraq intended to invade Kuwait at that time is 
highly unlikely; whether a failure to respond on the part of the United 
States would have emboldened Saddam is beyond dispute.
  Two years later, Iraq launched a large-scale concerted ground 
campaign against Kurdish enclaves in the country s north. Saddam was 
able to exploit longstanding, violent divisions within the Kurdish 
population to reestablish a measure of control over territory denied it 
since the Gulf war. In so doing, it sent a resounding message to the 
Kurdish population, including that part to which it allied itself 
during its military incursion, that it was willing and capable of 
asserting itself within its borders. Particularly disturbing, if 
totally in character for Saddam, his intelligence service utilized the 
opportunity to hunt down and execute Kurdish factions hostile to his 
brutal rule, including hundreds of individuals who had cast their lot 
with the United States.
  The Clinton administration's response to that incursion into 
territory supposedly under U.N. protection was to launch a small number 
of embarrassingly ineffectual cruise missile launches in an entirely 
different region and to expand the no-fly zone in the south. If our 
intent was to prevent a horizontal escalation of the conflict, we 
succeeded. The fact that there was not apparent intent on the part of 
Saddam at that time to conduct military operations in the south was 
purely academic.
  The most recent incident started out considerably more ambiguous, but 
is no less damaging to the U.N.'s ability to enforce its provisions 
over the protracted periods of time necessary to get results. Iraq 
clearly violated the no-fly zone, but only after Iranian attacks 
against bases of the People s Mojahedin of Iran situation on the Iraqi 
side of the border. There is a noticeable dearth of sympathetic parties 
here, but the bottom line is that the no-fly zone was violated, and the 
administration was correct to respond. Iraq s apparent retaliatory 
measures, in effect, the refusal to permit United States citizens to 
participate in the U.N. inspection teams enforcing Security Council 
resolutions, has been appropriately rejected by members of the Council.
  The problem lies in the political environment Council members France 
and Russia continue to create that encourages Saddam to believe he can 
act with impunity. It is absolutely imperative that the administration 
communicate to these countries, as well as to others sympathetic to the 
plight of the Iraqi people, that the sanctions must remain in place 
until Iraq finally does what it has resisted doing for 6 years: abide 
by the conditions of the cease fire. Saddam himself holds his country's 
welfare in his hands. All that is asked of him is to place that welfare 
above his drive to threaten his neighbors with chemical, biological, 
and nuclear weapons. The fact that he has been unwilling to accept that 
very basic condition illustrates the need to maintain the sanctions in 
perpetuity if necessary. The international community was willing to 
isolate South Africa for an indefinite period of time until fundamental 
changes were implemented. It is entirely reasonable, and essential for 
the future of our friends and allies in the Middle East as well as for 
our own economic well-being, that the international community 
demonstrate the same steadfastness in the case of Iraq that it did with 
South Africa. Morally and practically, it is the only option available 
to us.

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