[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 152 (Tuesday, November 4, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S11621-S11623]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                    UNITED STATES PRESENCE IN BOSNIA

  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, yesterday those who cover national 
security policy and issues within our Nation's press reported the best-
kept nonsecret in Washington; namely, what has already been discussed 
or leaked or trial ballooned or decided upon and reported for weeks in 
the United States and the international media has finally become 
public--sort of.
  In the last days of this session, the administration apparently will 
now consult with the Congress and today announce what has been obvious, 
and that is, Mr. President, that the United States has no intention of 
leaving Bosnia by the once stated deadline of the 8th of June of next 
year.
  President Clinton has not said this outright. The position to date is 
that he has not ruled out staying beyond June 8. However, given the 
overall goals of the Dayton accords in juxtaposition with the ongoing 
ethnic apartheid reality in Bosnia, the concern of our allies, the 
coming of winter in Bosnia, and the crucial and obvious need for U.S. 
and allied commanders to have enough time for central planning have all 
forced the administration's hand.
  Simply put, the clock is moving toward the stated deadline to have 
the SFOR mission in Bosnia completed. And simply put, whatever that 
mission is and despite recent and obvious changes under our stated 
mission, it is not complete.
  It is long past the time for the President and his national security 
team to simply tell it like it is. Despite the past promises to limit 
our engagement to 1 year, and then 2 years, and now indefinitely--I 
might add, promises that should not have been made and could not be 
kept--we are in Bosnia, for better or worse, for the long haul.
  First of all, our commanders and troops in the field know there are 
many actions that need to take place now or should have already taken 
place if, in fact, we are serious about ending the commitment in Bosnia 
in June 1998. From a military point of view, we have established 
significant infrastructure in Bosnia to support the SFOR troops, and 
unless we just intend at great cost to abandon what we have 
established--and we are not going to do that--the military needs a plan 
and time to remove equipment, to disassemble buildings, to conduct the 
environmental cleanup and a myriad of other tasks.
  Several months ago, I visited Bosnia, and I saw firsthand the extent 
of our involvement and developed an understanding of the complexity 
required to extract the SFOR troops should that decision be made. On 
that same trip, I visited Taszar, Hungary, the staging base for U.S. 
troops going into and coming out of Bosnia. Taszar also provides 
operational support for logistics in Bosnia.

  I asked the commanding general in Taszar, what is the drop dead time 
to support an orderly withdrawal from Bosnia and fully restore the 
facilities in country? And his answer was, 9 to 10

[[Page S11622]]

months to do the job right. Guess what? We are already past that 
deadline. We should have already made the decision and started to work. 
But apparently we have not because the President has not publicly 
admitted what is obvious to most people--we have no intention of 
leaving Bosnia in June 1998. All I am asking of the President and the 
administration is to be candid, come before the people and explain his 
intention concerning our commitment in Bosnia.
  Even a casual reading, Mr. President, of U.S. and European newspapers 
reveals numerous stories spelling out the need for continued presence 
of NATO forces past June 1998. These stories frequently quote U.S. 
administration and NATO ally decisionmakers. Let me give you an example 
of what I am talking about.
  New York Times, just last week: ``Policymakers Agree on Need to 
extend U.S. Mission in Bosnia.''

       The Clinton administration's top foreign policymakers have 
     reached a broad consensus on the need to keep some American 
     troops in Bosnia after their mission ends in June of next 
     year.

  The article further quoted the White House National Security Adviser, 
Sandy Berger: ``We must not forget the important interests that led us 
to work for a more stable, more peaceful Bosnia'' including European 
stability and NATO's own credibility, he said at Georgetown University. 
``The gains are not irreversible, and locking them in will require that 
the international community stay engaged in Bosnia for a good while to 
come.''
  In the Great Britain Guardian, also last week; ``Bosnia forces await 
US Green light.''

       Although the multinational NATO-led Forces are supposed to 
     disband next June, plans for a follow-on force--unofficially 
     the Deterrent force (D-Force)--

  We are going from IFOR to SFOR to DFOR--

       have already begun.

  The article continues:

       But senior military officials are reluctant to talk 
     openly--

  Let me repeat this, Mr. President--

       But senior military officials are reluctant to talk openly 
     until a skeptical United States Congress has been convinced 
     there is no alternative to staying on.

  The Financial Times as of Tuesday, October 14: ``Solana plea over 
Bosnia support.''

       Javier Solana, the NATO secretary general, made his 
     strongest plea to date for ``a long-term commitment'' by the 
     alliance to peacekeeping in Bosnia.

  Continuing, the article states:

       Following the lead of US administration officials who have 
     recently started to prepare public opinion for some residual 
     US role in Bosnia after the middle of next year, Mr. Solana 
     said: ``NATO troops cannot and will not stay indefinitely, 
     but NATO has a long-term interest in and commitment to 
     Bosnia.''

  The French Press Agency, 3 weeks ago: ``A `dissuasion' force to 
replace SFOR in Bosnia.''

       A ``dissuasion'' force will take over from the NATO-led 
     Stabilization Force in Bosnia. . ., Defense Minister Volker 
     Ruehe told the weekly Der Spiegel. The new ``Deterrent 
     Force'' will be significantly smaller than SFOR, which [now] 
     numbers 36,000 men. . .

  These, Mr. President, are but a few examples of reports of a debate 
and subsequent decisions that apparently have taken place on future 
actions in Bosnia involving NATO and United States forces. But the sad 
commentary is that the Congress and the American people have been left 
out of this important discussion.
  All I am asking, Mr. President,--I am referring to President 
Clinton--is for you to be candid. Let us have straight talk. Come 
clean. Come to the Congress. Tell us your plan. Let us know what your 
thoughts are and the forces required after June 1998.
  It is my understanding that this afternoon, at approximately 4:30, 
that many Members of Congress, the Senate, will go to the White House 
to enter into a discussion finally on the administration's decision in 
regard to Bosnia.
  I have tried to understand why the President is reluctant to directly 
engage the Members of this body on this vital foreign policy matter. 
Perhaps it is because there has been some misunderstanding or maybe 
even he has misled us on his intent in Bosnia for the past 3 years.
  ``We'll be out in just 1 year.'' That was the first statement that is 
starting to ring a little hollow on the Hill. Does he think that we are 
so naive that we will not notice that the term ``SFOR'' has been 
replaced by ``DFOR,'' and we will think he has kept his commitment to 
end SFOR in June 1998? I think not. Mr. President, the issue is not the 
name of the commitment but the commitment itself. The use of United 
States forces in Bosnia is what we are concerned about.
  Some have suggested that the reluctance on the part of the President 
is the concern of two events: NATO enlargement and the decision on 
Bosnia will happen at about the same time next year and that both will 
be negatively impacted in the debate in Congress. That certainly could 
happen.
  He could be right, if an examination into the commitment in Bosnia 
and the debate on enlarging NATO occurs at the same time--that debate 
should take place at about the same time-- and there will be troubling 
questions raised.
  But the fact remains that we are in Bosnia, SFOR ends in June 1998, 
and the administration has done much work on the follow-on forces in 
Bosnia. Again, however, the administration has failed to include the 
Congress in its decision process. That time is now.
  These questions are not difficult. They are challenging, but they are 
obvious.
  I would like to review the requirement added to the defense 
appropriations bill that requires the President to provide certain 
information on our Bosnian policy. This is a matter of law. These 
provisions are about being honest with the American public.
  I want to thank the distinguished chairman of the Senate 
Appropriations Committee for referring to these amendments as the 
Roberts amendment. We have had long talks about the need to become 
candid.
  Specifically, these provisions require the President to certify to 
Congress by May 15 that the continued presence of United States forces 
in Bosnia is in our national security interest and why. He must state 
the reasons for our deployment and the expected duration of deployment.
  He must provide numbers of troops deployed, estimate the dollar costs 
involved, and give the effect of such deployment on the overall 
effectiveness of our overall United States forces.
  Most importantly, the President must provide a clear statement of our 
mission and the objectives.
  And he must provide an exit strategy for bringing our troops home.
  If these specifics are not provided to the satisfaction of Congress, 
funding for military deployment in Bosnia will end next May. Let me 
repeat: We are requiring the administration to clearly articulate our 
Bosnia policy, justify the use of military forces, and tell us when and 
under what circumstances our troops can come home.
  I do not think that is asking too much.
  In my view, events of recent weeks make this an urgent matter, Mr. 
President. It has become increasingly clear that in the wake of the 
Dayton accords this administration has, to some degree, lost focus and 
purpose in Bosnia.
  Just consider the following:
  After drifting for months, and with elections on the near horizon, 
and the crippling winter only days away, I believe the mission has been 
changed. We have gone from peacekeeping, which is the stated goal, to 
peace enforcement with very dubious tactics.
  Item. Troop protection, refugee relocation, democracy building, and 
economic restoration and, the other policy goal, ``Oh, by the way, if 
we run across a war criminal, well, let's arrest him''--that has all 
been replaced.
  Today, we see increased troop strength--we are not revolving the 
troops home--have picked a United States candidate for president of 
Bosnia--we are no longer neutral--we have embarked upon aggressive 
disarmament and the location, capture and prosecution of war criminals.
  Is this mission creep or long overdue action? We do not know.
  The world was treated to the spectacle of American troops, the symbol 
of defenders of freedom, taking over a Bosnian television station in an 
effort to muzzle its news. And the troops were then stoned by angry 
citizens.
  In our new role as TV executives in Bosnia, we actually suggested 
what kind of programs could be run and what kind of programs could not 
be

[[Page S11623]]

run. We ordered TV stations to read an apology concerning their 
inaccurate and unfair broadcasting. We wrote the message for them and 
required they read it every day for 5 days.
  Gen. Wesley Clark is now a new TV executive in determining what goes 
on television and what does not.
  The Washington Times reported United States troops have become the 
butt of jokes in Bosnia because of pregnancies. It seems the pregnancy 
rate among our female soldiers is between 7.5 to 8.5 percent. The 
Bosnia media joked that the peacekeepers are breeding like rabbits 
while turning a blind eye to war criminals on the lam.
  In a country where any benevolent leader is very scarce, we have 
chosen up sides, we have picked our candidates, supporting the cause of 
one candidate over another. I might add, that candidate has lost 
support as a result.
  Elections were conducted, but to cast ballots, many citizens had to 
be bussed back to their homes, which they now cannot live in or may 
never occupy, and then bussed out.
  NATO forces, which include U.S. troops, have been cast into the role 
of cops on the beat, chasing war crimes suspects. Just to arrest Mr. 
Karadzic, we are told, try him for war crimes and our problems will be 
solved. But as the New York Times recently pointed out: ``[Mr.] 
Karadzic reflects widely held views in Serbian society.'' If you bring 
him to trial in The Hague, somebody else will take his place.
  Do these events reflect a sound and defensible Bosnian policy that is 
in our national interest? Or do they sound an ominous alarm as America 
is dragged down into a Byzantine nightmare straight out of a Kafka 
novel?
  Ask the basic question, ``Who's in charge and where are we heading?'' 
and to date there has been silence from the administration. But that 
silence speaks volumes, Mr. President, about the lack of direction and 
focus of our Bosnian policy.
  If the provisions of the defense appropriations bill do nothing else, 
they should force a major reexamination of our Bosnian involvement from 
top to bottom.
  As Chairman Stevens, the distinguished chairman of the Senate 
Appropriations Committee, will tell you, our involvement in Bosnia has 
come at a large price. There are approximately 9,000 American troops in 
Bosnia. That is closer to 15,000 today. That is nearly one-third of the 
NATO troops involved.
  Dollar costs are escalating. From 1992 until 1995, the United States 
spent about $2.2 billion on various peacekeeping operations in the 
Balkans. From 1996 through 1998, costs are estimated to be $7.8 
billion. That figure, too, is escalating.
  In justifying our policy in Bosnia, the administration must include a 
plan to fund the costs. Do they intend to take these rising costs out 
of the current defense budget, money we need for modernization, 
procurement, quality of life for the armed services to protect our 
vital national security interests? Or is the administration prepared to 
come clean and ask for the money up front?
  Finally, I offer these thoughts, Mr. President. All of us in this 
body desperately want lasting peace in Bosnia. I know it is easy to 
criticize, but we want the killing to stop. We all want that. We want 
stability in that part of the world. We do not want a Palestine in the 
middle of Central Europe. Permanent peace, permanent stability, but 
wishing--wishing--it does not make it so.
  Richard Grenier, writing for the Washington Times, put it this way:

       . . . generally speaking, Serbs didn't love Croats, Croats 
     didn't love Serbs, nor did either of them love Muslims. 
     Reciprocally, Muslims loved neither Croats or Serbs.
       What happened to the lessons we're supposed to have learned 
     in Beirut and Somalia? What happened to our swearing off of 
     mission creep? In Beirut we were intervening in Lebanese 
     domestic affairs, which led to the death of 241 U.S. Marines. 
     Our mission in Somalia, originally purely humanitarian, 
     expanded like a balloon as we thought, given our great 
     talent, we could build a new Somali nation. [We all saw] what 
     happened.
       But here we go again in Bosnia. Once again our goal was at 
     first laudably humanitarian: to stop the killing.

  We have done that, thank goodness.

       But it expanded as we thought how wonderful it would be if 
     we could build a beautiful, tolerant, multi-ethnic Bosnia, on 
     the model of American multiculturalism. . .

  Gen. John Sheehan, a Marine general, just stated in the press--and a 
remarkable candidate interviewed just this past week--we can stay in 
Bosnia for 500 years and we would not solve the problem. It is a 
cultural war. It is an ethnic war.
  The Bosnian situation is complex. And it is shrouded by centuries of 
conflict that only a few understand. They have had peace and stability 
and order and discipline only a few times in their history--the latest 
being with an iron fist by Marshal Tito.
  Is that what NATO is going to be all about? What we have seen in 
recent months is a lull in the fighting, unfortunately not its end. It 
is a fragile peace held together only by continued presence of military 
force. How long can that continue? Are we prepared to pay the price?
  National Security Adviser Sandy Berger said the United States must 
remain engaged in Bosnia beyond June of next year, but that continued 
American troop presence has not been decided.
  This afternoon, when Members of Congress meet at the White House, it 
is time to decide what the specifics of our Bosnian policy will be.
  Compare that statement of our National Security Adviser, Sandy 
Berger, with that of the advice of former Secretary of State Dr. Henry 
Kissinger, who wrote just this past week: ``America must avoid drifting 
into crisis with implications it may not be able to master'' and that 
``America has no [vital] national interest for which to risk lives to 
produce a multiethnic state in Bosnia.''
  Mr. President, no more drift. It is time for candor and clear 
purpose. Let the debate begin when the White House meets, finally, with 
Members of Congress this afternoon.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.

                          ____________________