[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 152 (Tuesday, November 4, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S11621-S11623]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
UNITED STATES PRESENCE IN BOSNIA
Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, yesterday those who cover national
security policy and issues within our Nation's press reported the best-
kept nonsecret in Washington; namely, what has already been discussed
or leaked or trial ballooned or decided upon and reported for weeks in
the United States and the international media has finally become
public--sort of.
In the last days of this session, the administration apparently will
now consult with the Congress and today announce what has been obvious,
and that is, Mr. President, that the United States has no intention of
leaving Bosnia by the once stated deadline of the 8th of June of next
year.
President Clinton has not said this outright. The position to date is
that he has not ruled out staying beyond June 8. However, given the
overall goals of the Dayton accords in juxtaposition with the ongoing
ethnic apartheid reality in Bosnia, the concern of our allies, the
coming of winter in Bosnia, and the crucial and obvious need for U.S.
and allied commanders to have enough time for central planning have all
forced the administration's hand.
Simply put, the clock is moving toward the stated deadline to have
the SFOR mission in Bosnia completed. And simply put, whatever that
mission is and despite recent and obvious changes under our stated
mission, it is not complete.
It is long past the time for the President and his national security
team to simply tell it like it is. Despite the past promises to limit
our engagement to 1 year, and then 2 years, and now indefinitely--I
might add, promises that should not have been made and could not be
kept--we are in Bosnia, for better or worse, for the long haul.
First of all, our commanders and troops in the field know there are
many actions that need to take place now or should have already taken
place if, in fact, we are serious about ending the commitment in Bosnia
in June 1998. From a military point of view, we have established
significant infrastructure in Bosnia to support the SFOR troops, and
unless we just intend at great cost to abandon what we have
established--and we are not going to do that--the military needs a plan
and time to remove equipment, to disassemble buildings, to conduct the
environmental cleanup and a myriad of other tasks.
Several months ago, I visited Bosnia, and I saw firsthand the extent
of our involvement and developed an understanding of the complexity
required to extract the SFOR troops should that decision be made. On
that same trip, I visited Taszar, Hungary, the staging base for U.S.
troops going into and coming out of Bosnia. Taszar also provides
operational support for logistics in Bosnia.
I asked the commanding general in Taszar, what is the drop dead time
to support an orderly withdrawal from Bosnia and fully restore the
facilities in country? And his answer was, 9 to 10
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months to do the job right. Guess what? We are already past that
deadline. We should have already made the decision and started to work.
But apparently we have not because the President has not publicly
admitted what is obvious to most people--we have no intention of
leaving Bosnia in June 1998. All I am asking of the President and the
administration is to be candid, come before the people and explain his
intention concerning our commitment in Bosnia.
Even a casual reading, Mr. President, of U.S. and European newspapers
reveals numerous stories spelling out the need for continued presence
of NATO forces past June 1998. These stories frequently quote U.S.
administration and NATO ally decisionmakers. Let me give you an example
of what I am talking about.
New York Times, just last week: ``Policymakers Agree on Need to
extend U.S. Mission in Bosnia.''
The Clinton administration's top foreign policymakers have
reached a broad consensus on the need to keep some American
troops in Bosnia after their mission ends in June of next
year.
The article further quoted the White House National Security Adviser,
Sandy Berger: ``We must not forget the important interests that led us
to work for a more stable, more peaceful Bosnia'' including European
stability and NATO's own credibility, he said at Georgetown University.
``The gains are not irreversible, and locking them in will require that
the international community stay engaged in Bosnia for a good while to
come.''
In the Great Britain Guardian, also last week; ``Bosnia forces await
US Green light.''
Although the multinational NATO-led Forces are supposed to
disband next June, plans for a follow-on force--unofficially
the Deterrent force (D-Force)--
We are going from IFOR to SFOR to DFOR--
have already begun.
The article continues:
But senior military officials are reluctant to talk
openly--
Let me repeat this, Mr. President--
But senior military officials are reluctant to talk openly
until a skeptical United States Congress has been convinced
there is no alternative to staying on.
The Financial Times as of Tuesday, October 14: ``Solana plea over
Bosnia support.''
Javier Solana, the NATO secretary general, made his
strongest plea to date for ``a long-term commitment'' by the
alliance to peacekeeping in Bosnia.
Continuing, the article states:
Following the lead of US administration officials who have
recently started to prepare public opinion for some residual
US role in Bosnia after the middle of next year, Mr. Solana
said: ``NATO troops cannot and will not stay indefinitely,
but NATO has a long-term interest in and commitment to
Bosnia.''
The French Press Agency, 3 weeks ago: ``A `dissuasion' force to
replace SFOR in Bosnia.''
A ``dissuasion'' force will take over from the NATO-led
Stabilization Force in Bosnia. . ., Defense Minister Volker
Ruehe told the weekly Der Spiegel. The new ``Deterrent
Force'' will be significantly smaller than SFOR, which [now]
numbers 36,000 men. . .
These, Mr. President, are but a few examples of reports of a debate
and subsequent decisions that apparently have taken place on future
actions in Bosnia involving NATO and United States forces. But the sad
commentary is that the Congress and the American people have been left
out of this important discussion.
All I am asking, Mr. President,--I am referring to President
Clinton--is for you to be candid. Let us have straight talk. Come
clean. Come to the Congress. Tell us your plan. Let us know what your
thoughts are and the forces required after June 1998.
It is my understanding that this afternoon, at approximately 4:30,
that many Members of Congress, the Senate, will go to the White House
to enter into a discussion finally on the administration's decision in
regard to Bosnia.
I have tried to understand why the President is reluctant to directly
engage the Members of this body on this vital foreign policy matter.
Perhaps it is because there has been some misunderstanding or maybe
even he has misled us on his intent in Bosnia for the past 3 years.
``We'll be out in just 1 year.'' That was the first statement that is
starting to ring a little hollow on the Hill. Does he think that we are
so naive that we will not notice that the term ``SFOR'' has been
replaced by ``DFOR,'' and we will think he has kept his commitment to
end SFOR in June 1998? I think not. Mr. President, the issue is not the
name of the commitment but the commitment itself. The use of United
States forces in Bosnia is what we are concerned about.
Some have suggested that the reluctance on the part of the President
is the concern of two events: NATO enlargement and the decision on
Bosnia will happen at about the same time next year and that both will
be negatively impacted in the debate in Congress. That certainly could
happen.
He could be right, if an examination into the commitment in Bosnia
and the debate on enlarging NATO occurs at the same time--that debate
should take place at about the same time-- and there will be troubling
questions raised.
But the fact remains that we are in Bosnia, SFOR ends in June 1998,
and the administration has done much work on the follow-on forces in
Bosnia. Again, however, the administration has failed to include the
Congress in its decision process. That time is now.
These questions are not difficult. They are challenging, but they are
obvious.
I would like to review the requirement added to the defense
appropriations bill that requires the President to provide certain
information on our Bosnian policy. This is a matter of law. These
provisions are about being honest with the American public.
I want to thank the distinguished chairman of the Senate
Appropriations Committee for referring to these amendments as the
Roberts amendment. We have had long talks about the need to become
candid.
Specifically, these provisions require the President to certify to
Congress by May 15 that the continued presence of United States forces
in Bosnia is in our national security interest and why. He must state
the reasons for our deployment and the expected duration of deployment.
He must provide numbers of troops deployed, estimate the dollar costs
involved, and give the effect of such deployment on the overall
effectiveness of our overall United States forces.
Most importantly, the President must provide a clear statement of our
mission and the objectives.
And he must provide an exit strategy for bringing our troops home.
If these specifics are not provided to the satisfaction of Congress,
funding for military deployment in Bosnia will end next May. Let me
repeat: We are requiring the administration to clearly articulate our
Bosnia policy, justify the use of military forces, and tell us when and
under what circumstances our troops can come home.
I do not think that is asking too much.
In my view, events of recent weeks make this an urgent matter, Mr.
President. It has become increasingly clear that in the wake of the
Dayton accords this administration has, to some degree, lost focus and
purpose in Bosnia.
Just consider the following:
After drifting for months, and with elections on the near horizon,
and the crippling winter only days away, I believe the mission has been
changed. We have gone from peacekeeping, which is the stated goal, to
peace enforcement with very dubious tactics.
Item. Troop protection, refugee relocation, democracy building, and
economic restoration and, the other policy goal, ``Oh, by the way, if
we run across a war criminal, well, let's arrest him''--that has all
been replaced.
Today, we see increased troop strength--we are not revolving the
troops home--have picked a United States candidate for president of
Bosnia--we are no longer neutral--we have embarked upon aggressive
disarmament and the location, capture and prosecution of war criminals.
Is this mission creep or long overdue action? We do not know.
The world was treated to the spectacle of American troops, the symbol
of defenders of freedom, taking over a Bosnian television station in an
effort to muzzle its news. And the troops were then stoned by angry
citizens.
In our new role as TV executives in Bosnia, we actually suggested
what kind of programs could be run and what kind of programs could not
be
[[Page S11623]]
run. We ordered TV stations to read an apology concerning their
inaccurate and unfair broadcasting. We wrote the message for them and
required they read it every day for 5 days.
Gen. Wesley Clark is now a new TV executive in determining what goes
on television and what does not.
The Washington Times reported United States troops have become the
butt of jokes in Bosnia because of pregnancies. It seems the pregnancy
rate among our female soldiers is between 7.5 to 8.5 percent. The
Bosnia media joked that the peacekeepers are breeding like rabbits
while turning a blind eye to war criminals on the lam.
In a country where any benevolent leader is very scarce, we have
chosen up sides, we have picked our candidates, supporting the cause of
one candidate over another. I might add, that candidate has lost
support as a result.
Elections were conducted, but to cast ballots, many citizens had to
be bussed back to their homes, which they now cannot live in or may
never occupy, and then bussed out.
NATO forces, which include U.S. troops, have been cast into the role
of cops on the beat, chasing war crimes suspects. Just to arrest Mr.
Karadzic, we are told, try him for war crimes and our problems will be
solved. But as the New York Times recently pointed out: ``[Mr.]
Karadzic reflects widely held views in Serbian society.'' If you bring
him to trial in The Hague, somebody else will take his place.
Do these events reflect a sound and defensible Bosnian policy that is
in our national interest? Or do they sound an ominous alarm as America
is dragged down into a Byzantine nightmare straight out of a Kafka
novel?
Ask the basic question, ``Who's in charge and where are we heading?''
and to date there has been silence from the administration. But that
silence speaks volumes, Mr. President, about the lack of direction and
focus of our Bosnian policy.
If the provisions of the defense appropriations bill do nothing else,
they should force a major reexamination of our Bosnian involvement from
top to bottom.
As Chairman Stevens, the distinguished chairman of the Senate
Appropriations Committee, will tell you, our involvement in Bosnia has
come at a large price. There are approximately 9,000 American troops in
Bosnia. That is closer to 15,000 today. That is nearly one-third of the
NATO troops involved.
Dollar costs are escalating. From 1992 until 1995, the United States
spent about $2.2 billion on various peacekeeping operations in the
Balkans. From 1996 through 1998, costs are estimated to be $7.8
billion. That figure, too, is escalating.
In justifying our policy in Bosnia, the administration must include a
plan to fund the costs. Do they intend to take these rising costs out
of the current defense budget, money we need for modernization,
procurement, quality of life for the armed services to protect our
vital national security interests? Or is the administration prepared to
come clean and ask for the money up front?
Finally, I offer these thoughts, Mr. President. All of us in this
body desperately want lasting peace in Bosnia. I know it is easy to
criticize, but we want the killing to stop. We all want that. We want
stability in that part of the world. We do not want a Palestine in the
middle of Central Europe. Permanent peace, permanent stability, but
wishing--wishing--it does not make it so.
Richard Grenier, writing for the Washington Times, put it this way:
. . . generally speaking, Serbs didn't love Croats, Croats
didn't love Serbs, nor did either of them love Muslims.
Reciprocally, Muslims loved neither Croats or Serbs.
What happened to the lessons we're supposed to have learned
in Beirut and Somalia? What happened to our swearing off of
mission creep? In Beirut we were intervening in Lebanese
domestic affairs, which led to the death of 241 U.S. Marines.
Our mission in Somalia, originally purely humanitarian,
expanded like a balloon as we thought, given our great
talent, we could build a new Somali nation. [We all saw] what
happened.
But here we go again in Bosnia. Once again our goal was at
first laudably humanitarian: to stop the killing.
We have done that, thank goodness.
But it expanded as we thought how wonderful it would be if
we could build a beautiful, tolerant, multi-ethnic Bosnia, on
the model of American multiculturalism. . .
Gen. John Sheehan, a Marine general, just stated in the press--and a
remarkable candidate interviewed just this past week--we can stay in
Bosnia for 500 years and we would not solve the problem. It is a
cultural war. It is an ethnic war.
The Bosnian situation is complex. And it is shrouded by centuries of
conflict that only a few understand. They have had peace and stability
and order and discipline only a few times in their history--the latest
being with an iron fist by Marshal Tito.
Is that what NATO is going to be all about? What we have seen in
recent months is a lull in the fighting, unfortunately not its end. It
is a fragile peace held together only by continued presence of military
force. How long can that continue? Are we prepared to pay the price?
National Security Adviser Sandy Berger said the United States must
remain engaged in Bosnia beyond June of next year, but that continued
American troop presence has not been decided.
This afternoon, when Members of Congress meet at the White House, it
is time to decide what the specifics of our Bosnian policy will be.
Compare that statement of our National Security Adviser, Sandy
Berger, with that of the advice of former Secretary of State Dr. Henry
Kissinger, who wrote just this past week: ``America must avoid drifting
into crisis with implications it may not be able to master'' and that
``America has no [vital] national interest for which to risk lives to
produce a multiethnic state in Bosnia.''
Mr. President, no more drift. It is time for candor and clear
purpose. Let the debate begin when the White House meets, finally, with
Members of Congress this afternoon.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
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