[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 152 (Tuesday, November 4, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S11617-S11621]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                    THE NOMINATION OF BILL LANN LEE


                            I. Introduction

  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I rise this morning to discuss the 
nomination of Mr. Bill Lann Lee of California to be President Clinton's 
Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights. Let me say at the outset 
that, in my 5 years as the senior Republican on the Judiciary 
Committee, I have been proud to have advanced no less than 230 of 
President Clinton's nominees to the Federal courts. After a thorough 
review of these nominees' views and records, I have supported the 
confirmation of all but two of them. In addition, I have also worked to 
ensure that President Clinton's Justice Department nominees receive a 
fair, expeditious, and thorough review. Without question, the Senate's 
advice and consent responsibility is one that I take very seriously. 
This nomination is no exception.
  While I have the highest personal regard for Bill Lann Lee, his 
record and his responses to questions posed by the committee suggest a 
distorted view of the law that makes it difficult for me in good 
conscience to support his nomination to be the chief enforcer of the 
Nation's civil rights laws. The Assistant Attorney General must be 
America's civil rights law enforcer, not the civil rights ombudsman for 
the political left. Accordingly, when the Judiciary Committee votes on 
whether to report his nomination to the full Senate, I will regretfully 
vote ``no''.
  At the outset, I want to say that no one in this body respects and 
appreciates the compelling personal history of Mr. Lee and his family 
more than I. Mr. Lee's parents came to these shores full of hope for 
the future. They believed in the promise of America. And despite meager 
circumstances and the scourge of bigotry, they worked hard, educated 
their children, and never lost faith in this great country.
  Yet, what we must never forget as we take up this debate is that the 
sum of our experiences says less about who we become than does what we 
take from those experiences. For example, my good friend Justice 
Clarence Thomas was, like Mr. Lee, born into a circumstance where 
opportunities were

[[Page S11618]]

unjustly limited. Nevertheless, Clarence Thomas worked hard, and has 
devoted his career to ensuring that the law protects every individual 
with equal force. The same can be said of another African-American, 
Bill Lucas, who was nominated by President Bush for the same position 
as Mr. Lee, but whose nomination was rejected by my colleagues on the 
other side of the aisle.
  Bill Lann Lee is, to his credit, an able civil rights lawyer with a 
profoundly admirable passion to improve the lives of many Americans who 
have been left behind. His talent and good intentions have taken him 
far. But his good intentions should not be sufficient to earn the 
consent of this body. Those charged with enforcing the Nation's laws 
must demonstrate a proper understanding of that law, and a 
determination to uphold its letter and its spirit. Unfortunately, much 
of Mr. Lee's work has been devoted to preserving constitutionally 
suspect race-conscious public policies that ultimately sort and divide 
citizens by race. To this day, he is an adamant defender of 
preferential policies that, by definition, favor some and disfavor 
others based upon race and ethnicity.
  At his hearing before the Judiciary Committee, Mr. Lee suggested he 
would enforce the law without regard to his personal opinions. But that 
cannot be the end of our inquiry. The Senate's responsibility is then 
to determine what the nominee's view of the law is. That question is 
particularly important for a nominee to the Justice Department's Civil 
Rights Division.


                       II. Civil Rights Division

  As I have made clear in the past, it is my view that the Assistant 
Attorney General for Civil Rights is one of the most important law 
enforcement positions in the Federal Government. No position in 
Government more profoundly shapes and implements our Nation's goal of 
equality under law.
  The Civil Rights Division was established in 1957 to enforce 
President Eisenhower's Civil Rights Act of 1957, the first civil rights 
statute since Reconstruction. Since the appointment of the first 
Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, Mr. Harold Tyler, the 
Division has had a distinguished record of enforcing the Nation's civil 
rights laws, often against perilous political odds. With great leaders 
like Burke Marshall, John Doar, and Stanley Pottinger, the Civil Rights 
Division emphasized the equality of individuals under law, and a 
commitment to ensuring that every American--regardless of race, 
ethnicity, gender, national origin, or disability--enjoys an equal 
opportunity to pursue his or her talents free of illegal 
discrimination. That is a commitment that I fundamentally share, and 
take very seriously as I consider a nominee to this important Division.
  Today, however, the Civil Rights Division, and the Nation's 
fundamental civil rights policies, stand at a crossroads. In recent 
years, the Nation's courts have underscored the notion that the 
constitutional guarantee of equal protection applies equally to every 
individual American. Consistent with that principle, they have placed 
strict limitations on the Government's ability to count among its 
citizens by race. Nevertheless, many among us who lay claim to the 
mantle of civil rights would have us continue on the road of racial 
spoils--a road on which Americans are seen principally through the 
looking glass of race. I regret to say that Bill Lee's record suggests 
that he too wishes the Nation to travel that unfortunate road.
  The country today, however, demands a Civil Rights Division devoted 
to protecting us all equally. It cannot do that when it is committed to 
policies that elevate one citizen's rights above another's. Let me 
share one example of what results from the race-consciousness that 
some, Bill Lann Lee among them, would have us embrace.
  Earlier this year, the Judiciary Committee held a hearing to examine 
the problem of discrimination in America. One story, that of Charlene 
Loen was particularly moving. Ms. Loen is a Chinese-American mother of 
two who lives in San Francisco. Ms. Loen's son Patrick was denied 
admission to a distinguished public magnet school in San Francisco, 
pursuant to the racial preference policy contained in a consent decree 
which caps the percentage of ethnic group representation in each of the 
city's public schools. The cap has the effect of requiring young, 
Chinese students to score significantly higher on magnet school 
entrance exams than students of other races. While young Patrick scored 
higher than many of his friends on the admissions exam, he was denied 
admission, while other children who scored less well were admitted. Ms. 
Loen sought to have Patrick admitted to several other public magnet 
schools in the city, and time after time she was told in no uncertain 
terms that because he was Chinese, Patrick need not apply.
  So you see, a policy that prefers one, by definition disfavors 
another. In this case, the disfavored other has a name, Patrick. The 
law must be understood to protect Patrick, and others like him, no less 
than anyone else. What matters under the law is not that Patrick is 
ethnic Chinese, but that he is American. Affirmative action policies as 
originally conceived embraced that ideal. Recruiting and outreach that 
ensures broad inclusion is one thing; racial and gender preferences 
that enforce double standards are quite another.
  But the case against Bill Lee is broader, and more fundamental, than 
his aggressive support for public policies that sort and divide by 
race. What Bill Lee's record fundamentally suggests is a willingness to 
read the civil rights laws so narrowly--and to find exceptions so 
broad--as to undermine their very spirit, if not their letter. Let me 
share a few cases to illustrate the point.


                              III. Adarand

  At his hearing, Mr. Lee was asked about the Supreme Court's holding 
in the case of Adarand Constructors versus Pech, in which the Supreme 
Court held that State-sanctioned racial distinctions are presumptively 
unconstitutional. When asked to state the holding of the case, Mr. Lee 
said that it epitomizes the Supreme Court's view that racial preference 
programs are permissible if ``conducted in a limited and measured 
manner.'' That is, arguably, a narrowly correct statement. But it 
purposefully misses the mark of the Court's fundamental holding that 
such programs are presumptively unconstitutional. Imagine if a nominee 
had come before this body and stated for the record that the Court's 
first amendment cases stand for the proposition that the state can 
interfere with religious practices if it does so carefully. Such a 
purposefully misleading view would properly be assailed as a 
fundamental mischaracterization of the spirit of the law. So, too, is 
Mr. Lee's view of the Supreme Court's statements about racial 
distinctions enforced by the Government.
  In addition, Mr. Lee stated for the record his personal opposition to 
Adarand. He then said that in spite of that, he would enforce the law, 
if confirmed. Fair enough. But, in response to a written question from 
Senator Ashcroft, Mr. Lee's narrow view of what the law is becomes 
astonishingly clear. Senator Ashcroft asked Mr. Lee whether the program 
at issue in the Adarand case is unconstitutional. Mr. Lee noted that 
the Supreme Court in Adarand remanded the case to the district court in 
Colorado. He further noted that the district court just this summer 
held that the programs in question are not narrowly tailored and are 
therefore unconstitutional. In so holding, the court stated in its 
opinion that

       [c]ontrary to the [Supreme] Court's pronouncement that 
     strict scrutiny is not ``fatal in fact,'' I find it difficult 
     to envisage a race-based classification that is narrowly 
     tailored.

  But despite the court's strong pronouncement, Mr. Lee asserts in his 
response to Senator Ashcroft that he believes ``this program is 
sufficiently narrowly tailored to satisfy the strict scrutiny test.'' 
Apparently, then, Mr. Lee is prepared to support racial preference 
programs until every possible exception under the law is unequivocally 
foreclosed by the Supreme Court, despite the Court's view that such 
programs are presumptively unconstitutional and may only be used in 
exceptional circumstances. Mr. Lee's view of the law, it seems to me, 
is exceedingly narrow and violative of the Court's rulings and 
holdings. We must expect more of the Nation's chief civil rights law 
enforcer.


                          IV. Proposition 209

  I realize that some still embrace policies that divide and sort by 
race. And

[[Page S11619]]

given the court's narrow exception in Adarand, I am willing to consider 
a nominee who believes such policies may be constitutional in limited 
circumstances. It is fair that that view is heard. Yet, it is quite 
another matter altogether when a nominee takes the position that the 
contrary view--that racial preferences should be prohibited--is 
unconstitutional. Such a view of the law effectively silences 
dissenting voices on this, the most important civil rights issue of our 
day.
  Mr. Lee and his organization, the Western Office of the NAACP Legal 
Defense & Educational Fund, have led the opposition to California's 
proposition 209, which said simply that no Californian can be 
discriminated against or preferred by the State on the basis of race, 
gender, or national origin. He has also challenged the University of 
California's efforts to comply with its colorblindness mandate, by 
complaining to the Federal Department of Education that the 
University's race-neutral use of standardized tests and weighted grade 
point averages violates the civil rights laws. Even the anti-209 
director of admissions at the UCLA School of Law, Michael Rappaport, 
has described the NAACP's complaint as ``frightening'' for universities 
wishing to employ rigorous academic standards. That complaint is only 
part of a comprehensive effort by Mr. Lee and his organization to 
undermine the people of California's political judgment that their 
government should respect the rights of citizens without regard to 
race.
  Soon after 54 percent of Californians voted to pass proposition 209, 
Mr. Lee's office filed a brief in the Federal court action challenging 
the constitutionality of the initiative, relying on the cases of Hunter 
versus Erickson--fair housing legislation--and Washington versus 
Seattle--busing--to allege that 209 was an unconstitutional 
restructuring of the political process because minorities are no longer 
permitted to petition local governments for preferential treatment. Of 
course, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals--perhaps the most liberal 
circuit court in the Nation--forcefully and unequivocally rejected that 
argument, noting that governmental racial distinctions are 
presumptively unconstitutional, and concluded:

       As a matter of ``conventional'' equal protection analysis, 
     there is simply no doubt that Proposition 209 is 
     constitutional. . . . After all, the ``goal'' of the 
     Fourteenth Amendment, ``to which the Nation continues to 
     aspire,'' is ``a political system in which race no longer 
     matters'' (citation omitted). . . . The Fourteenth Amendment, 
     lest we lose sight of the forest for the trees, does not 
     require what it barely permits.
       (Coalition for Economic Equity, et al. v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 
     692 [9th Cir. 1997].)

  Earlier this year, the Clinton administration filed an amicus brief 
in the ninth circuit supporting the constitutional challenge so 
decisively rejected by the appeals court. I asked Mr. Lee whether, 
given the Supreme Court's holding in Adarand and the forceful statement 
of law by the ninth circuit, he would argue against the 
administration's continued challenge to prop 209's constitutionality. 
He said he would support the administration's position.
  After Mr. Lee's hearing, I took it upon myself to offer an olive 
branch to the administration. I emphasized the fundamental problem I 
have with Mr. Lee's and the administration's view of the Constitution 
as it relates to racial matters. I suggested that if this White House 
could find its way to put aside the now-discredited argument that 
efforts like prop 209 actually violate the Constitution, that it would 
be much easier for my colleagues and me to support this nomination. It 
certainly would be something that would be helpful.
  On Wednesday of last week, I received a letter from Mr. Lee 
explaining that he would recuse himself from the administration's 
deliberations about its policy in the specific prop 209 case. And just 
yesterday, of course, the Supreme Court declined to grant certiorari in 
the 209 case. But, important as they are, those gestures do not lessen 
my fundamental concern about Mr. Lee's view on the matter. Those 
developments do nothing to preclude the administration from challenging 
future colorblindness efforts in the States, or in the Congress--
including my and Senator McConnell's Civil Rights Act of 1997; they do 
nothing to provide much needed leadership within the Department on this 
most important policy issue--creating yet another leadership void 
within the Department; and at bottom, Mr. Lee's letter seems little 
more than a cynical ploy by the administration to momentarily ease Mr. 
Lee's way to confirmation, while doing nothing to address my 
underlying, substantive concerns about his interpretation of the law. 
In the final analysis, my concerns about Mr. Lee's record are vastly 
broader than simply how he might counsel the administration in one 
discrete case.


                    V. Prison Litigation Reform Act

  Mr. Lee was also asked for his views on the Prison Litigation Reform 
Act, a piece of legislation that I sponsored and worked hard to pass in 
the last Congress. In response to written questions from Senator 
Abraham about the Department's enforcement of the PLRA, Mr. Lee either 
defended unjustified Department positions, or evaded the questions 
altogether.
  The PLRA establishes a 2-year limitation on most consent decrees 
governing prison operations. If after the 2 years, a constitutional 
violation continues to exist, the law provides that a prisoner may 
petition a court to extend the term of the decree. When asked whether 
the Department was correct to argue that PLRA places the burden of 
proof on a defendant seeking to be relieved from a prison consent 
decree to prove that constitutional violations no longer exist, rather 
than on a prisoner seeking extension of a decree to show that 
violations continue to exist, Lee argued that the Department's 
``approach seems sensible to me.'' But the Department's approach 
undermines the spirit of the law, which places limits on judicial 
control of our prisons absent proof of a continuing constitutional 
violation.
  Mr. Lee's support for the Justice Department's efforts to undermine 
the effectiveness of the Prison Litigation Reform Act further justify 
opposition to his nomination. This view is yet another example of Mr. 
Lee's approach to the law, which suggests that when confronted with a 
law he doesn't like, he creatively interprets the law in the narrowest 
possible fashion, to allow him to pursue his ends contrary to the 
spirit, if not the letter, of the law. That is unacceptable for one 
seeking to enforce the Nation's civil rights laws.


                  VI. Los Angeles Consent Decree case

  I am also troubled by Mr. Lee's involvement in an apparent effort to 
rush through a consent decree in Los Angeles that would have bound the 
city to racial and gender hiring goals for 18 years. Mr. Lee and other 
attorneys in the case sought to have the proposed consent decree 
approved by the city council and then by a magistrate judge on the very 
day that the citizens of California were voting on proposition 209. 
Proposition 209 would quite likely prohibit enforcement of the goals in 
the proposed decree. But by its terms, the proposition does not apply 
to consent decrees in force prior to its effective date. The decree was 
taken to the magistrate without notice to the district judge presiding 
over the case, as was required by local court rules; and more 
importantly in my view, Mr. Lee sought to have the decree approved 
without a fairness hearing to assess the impact of the decree on 
individuals who might in the future be affected by its terms, but who 
were not represented in the negotiations.
  It should be noted that even Los Angeles Mayor Richard Riordan, a 
supporter of Mr. Lee's nomination, and then-Los Angeles Police 
Commission President Raymond Fisher, the President's nominee to be 
Associate Attorney General, both opposed the proposed decree. Mayor 
Riordan expressed concern about the scope of outside enforcement 
authority under the decree, and Mr. Fisher called the decree 
``extremely intrusive to the operations of the [police] department.'' 
To seek even partial approval of a decree raising such concerns, 
without benefit of a fairness hearing, raises legitimate questions.
  The district court judge, learning of the parties' ploy through media 
accounts, resumed control over the case, citing the significance of a 
decree that would bind a government for 18 years, and remarked that the 
decree ``may present substantial constitutional questions.'' The judge 
later noted in a memorandum order that

       . . . the unusual procedures employed by the existing 
     parties in this case--seeking

[[Page S11620]]

     same-day approval of the Proposed Decree and requesting that 
     no fairness hearing be held--certainly raise alarm bells 
     about the adequacy of their representation [of potentially 
     affected individuals not represented in the negotiations].
  Mr. President, the very core of what we must expect of an Assistant 
Attorney General for Civil Rights is a steadfast concern that every 
individual be treated fairly--equally--under our laws. Mr. Lee's 
involvement in an effort to lock in 18-year racial hiring goals for 
public employment without an opportunity first to consider the impact 
of that race consciousness on individuals who may fall on the wrong 
side of those goals, suggests a willingness to place group 
representation above the rights of individuals to be treated equally 
under the law. As Senators sworn to uphold the Constitution, we have a 
responsibility to reject that priority for the Nation's defender of 
civil rights. While I do not question Mr. Lee's integrity, I am 
concerned about his commitment to serve every citizen of the Nation in 
equal measure.
  Selecting an Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights should not 
be a simple coronation of an effective civil rights litigator for a 
leading activist organization. Enforcing the Nation's laws on behalf of 
every American citizen is a profoundly different role. Despite that, 
Mr. Lee seems simply unable to distinguish his role as NAACP activist 
litigator, and the role of Assistant Attorney General. When asked by 
the Judiciary Committee to list cases he filed at the LDF which he 
would not file as Assistant Attorney General, Mr. Lee simply replied 
that, as a jurisdictional matter, he could not bring State law claims 
as Assistant Attorney General. Everything else is apparently fair game. 
Clearly then, Mr. Lee is unable to distinguish the substantive role of 
law enforcer for all citizens from that of a private activist litigator 
charged with pushing the limits of the law. That is unacceptable for an 
individual seeking to take the reins of the Civil Rights Division's 
massive enforcement apparatus.


             VII. Deval Patrick and Consent Decree Activism

  Mr. Lee's supporters have characterized him as a ``pragmatist''--a 
``practical litigator,'' rather than a pro-preference ideolog. That is 
a familiar tune in this debate. Three years ago, the President 
nominated another individual who was widely hailed as a pragmatist. 
Deval Patrick, another man for whom I have a high personal regard, was 
described by one paper as ``a practically oriented working lawyer.'' 
Based upon those assurances, I resolved to set aside my concerns about 
Mr. Patrick's views, gave him the benefit of the doubt, and supported 
his nomination.
  But upon assuming the reins of the Civil Rights Division, Mr. Patrick 
revealed himself to be a liberal civil rights ideolog. He used 
statistical racial imbalances and the vast resources of the Justice 
Department to extract race-conscious settlements from businesses and 
governments, large and small. For example, he undertook a credit-bias 
probe of Chevy Chase Savings & Loan in Maryland based largely on the 
fact that the bank had opened branch offices in the District of 
Columbia suburbs, but not in the city itself. There was no evidence 
that the bank had discriminated against qualified individuals seeking 
bank services. Nevertheless, Mr. Patrick entered into a consent decree 
that essentially forced the bank to open a branch in a low-income 
District neighborhood, and measures the bank's compliance with the 
decree by assessing whether the the bank achieves a loan market share 
in minority neighborhoods that is reasonably comparable to its share in 
nonminority neighborhoods. Mr. Patrick's Civil Rights Division took it 
upon itself to decide where a bank must do business, and then 
implemented dubious statistical measurements to determine whether the 
bank's efforts stayed clear of the division's view of the law.
  Mr. Patrick also forced municipalities across the country to abandon 
tests used to evaluate candidates for local police forces. In Nassau 
County, NY, Patrick entered into a consent decree that forced the 
county to abandon a rigorous test that yielded a differential passage 
rate for different ethnic groups. The test now used by the county, 
after the expenditure of millions of dollars in the action, is so weak 
that the reading portion of the exam is now graded on a pass/fail 
basis. A candidate passes the reading test if he or she reads at the 
level of the lowest 1 percent of existing officers. So much for high 
standards.
  In another case, Mr. Patrick ordered Fullerton, CA to set-aside 9 
percent of its police and fire department positions for African-
Americans, despite the fact that fewer than 2 percent of the city's 
residents are black.
  These cases suggest the damage that can be done when the resources of 
the Justice Department are brought to bear to force defendants into 
consent decrees. Such decrees are often attractive to both parties. 
Preference ideolog in the Justice Department win so-called voluntary 
commitments to undertake constitutionally suspect race-conscious action 
to eliminate racial disparities; defendants save millions of dollars in 
legal fees and receive a public disclaimer of liability. Everyone wins, 
except for consumers and individuals on the losing end of the racial or 
gender goals and preferences.
  Given Deval Patrick's excesses in the Department, I am unprepared to 
again give the benefit of the doubt to a liberal activist nominee 
described by political allies as a pragmatist and a conciliator. When 
asked at his hearing how he would differentiate his views from those of 
Mr. Patrick, Bill Lee was unable to muster a response.


                            VIII. Conclusion

  I am sad to say, Mr. President, that Bill Lann Lee has fallen victim 
to President Clinton's double-talk on the issue of racial and gender 
preferences. In the wake of the Adarand decision, the President pledged 
to ``mend it, not end it.'' In practice, however, the President's 
policy on preferences can more accurately be described as ``don't mend 
it, extend it.'' In fact, while the Congressional Research Service 
tells us that there are at least 160 Federal programs containing 
presumptively unconstitutional racial preferences, the President has 
seen fit to eliminate fewer than a handful of them. When Mr. Lee was 
asked to suggest real or hypothetical Federal programs that may not 
meet constitutional muster, he was able to come up with a whopping 
one--one that the Clinton administration had already seen fit to 
eliminate. In fact, the Clinton administration has sought to pitch Mr. 
Lee, and itself, as something they simply are not--centrists on civil 
rights policy.
  In the end, my decision today is an unhappy one. It brings me no 
pleasure to oppose the nomination of this fine activist lawyer and this 
very fine human being. But fine human beings--and certainly fine 
lawyers--can make mistakes. And they can approach the law in a way that 
is flawed, and that disserves the laws they are sworn to uphold. That 
is the case with this nomination. Bill Lann Lee's long record of public 
service must ultimately be reconciled with the role he seeks. The 
Assistant Attorney General is America's civil rights law enforcer, not 
an advocate for the political left.
  Unfortunately, Mr. Lee's understanding of the Nation's civil rights 
laws is sufficiently cramped and distorted to compel my opposition. The 
Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights must abide by the law. In 
matters ranging from racial preferences, to proposition 209, to the 
Prison Litigation Reform Act, Mr. Lee has demonstrated a decided 
reluctance to enforce our Nation's civil rights laws as intended, and 
in some cases his litigation efforts expose an outright hostility to 
it. The Civil Rights Division requires a better approach, and our 
courts, the Senate, and the Nation demand it. It is for that reason 
that I must oppose this unfortunate nomination.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be permitted to enter 
into the Record several items that echo my concerns about Mr. Lee's 
record. I would like to enter a letter from 16 Republican members of 
the California congressional delegation; a statement from California 
Gov. Pete Wilson; and letters from Mr. Ward Connerly of the American 
Civil Rights Institute in California, and Ms. Susan Au Allen, president 
of the U.S. Pan-Asian American Chamber of Commerce.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:


[[Page S11621]]




                                Congress of the United States,

                                 Washington, DC, October 30, 1997.
     Hon. Orrin G. Hatch,
     Chairman, Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
     Washington, DC
       Dear Mr. Chairman: We, the undersigned members of the 
     California Congressional delegation, wish to express our deep 
     concern regarding the confirmation of Mr. Bill Lann Lee as 
     the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights. This 
     confirmation is of particular concern to California.
       California Governor Pete Wilson said, ``All of the relevant 
     evidence suggests that Mr. Bill Lann Lee will not enforce the 
     civil rights laws as defined by the courts but as desired by 
     special interest advocates of unconstitutional and unfair 
     preferences. It is time we had a civil rights enforcer who 
     enforced the law, not distorted it.''
       We find it very disturbing that Mr. Lee has actively 
     advocated quotas and preferences. He attempted to force 
     through a consent degree mandating racial and gender 
     preferences in the Los Angeles Police Department. The 
     Washington, DC-based Institute for Justice issued a twenty-
     page report on Lee's litigation for the NAACP Legal Defense 
     Fund, which has furthered legal action challenging the 
     California Civil Rights Initiative and supported racial 
     preferences and forced busing. The study's author and 
     Institute director Clint Bolick stated, ``Lee's assault on 
     Proposition 209 and his support of racial preferences raises 
     serious questions about his suitability as the nation's top 
     civil rights official.'' Mr. Bolick further stated, ``Unless 
     Lee makes clear he will not transfer his personal agenda to 
     the Justice Department, the Senate should not confirm him.''
       It appears to be fundamentally incompatible for the Senate 
     to confirm as the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights 
     an individual with a record of advocating racial 
     discrimination through quotas and preferences. We 
     respectfully urge the Senate Judiciary Committee to carefully 
     and thoroughly review Mr. Lee's philosophy on basic civil 
     rights issues before voting on his confirmation.
           Sincerely,
     Howard ``Buck'' McKeon.
     Dana Rohrabacher.
     Ken Calvert.
     James E. Rogan.
     Ed Royce.
     Frank Riggs.
     Elton Gallegly.
     David Dreier.
     Jerry Lewis.
     Wally Herger.
     Ron Packard.
     Sonny Bono.
     John T. Doolittle.
     Brian Bilbray.
     Tom Campbell.
     ``Duke'' Cunningham.
                                                                    ____



                              American Civil Rights Coalition,

                                 Sacramento, CA, October 23, 1997.
     Hon. Orrin G. Hatch,
     U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Hatch: I watched with interest yesterday's 
     hearing on the nomination of Bill Lann Lee as Assistant 
     Attorney General for Civil Rights. Prior to the hearing, my 
     organization hesitated in taking a formal position on his 
     nomination.
       However, his comments of yesterday--namely, that he 
     believes Proposition 209 is ``unconstitutional'' and that he 
     disagrees with Adarand v. Pena--lead us to believe the most 
     powerful civil rights law enforcement position in the United 
     Stares belongs not to Mr. Lee, but to a nominee who respects 
     the law of the land.
       As of today, the American Civil Rights Institute is 
     formally opposing Mr. Lee's nomination to this post and 
     encourages your leadership in rejecting this nomination. An 
     individual who neither understands or respects the people's 
     and the court's commitment to race-neutral laws and policies 
     does not deserve this important position.
           Sincerely,
                                                    Ward Connerly,
     Chairman.
                                                                    ____

                                              State of California,


                             Governor's Communications Office,

                                               September 25, 1997.

                              [Memorandum]

     To: John Kramer, Institute of Justice.
     From: Kim Walsh.
     Subject: Statement from Governor Wilson.
       Summary: Below is a statement from Governor Pete Wilson 
     regarding the nomination of Bill Lann Lee as Assistant 
     Attorney General:
       ``All of the relevant evidence suggests that Mr. Bill Lann 
     Lee will not enforce the civil rights laws as defined by the 
     courts but as desired by special interest advocates of 
     unconstitutional and unfair preferences. It is time we had a 
     civil rights enforcer who enforced the law, not distorted 
     it.''
                                                                    ____

                                           United States Pan Asian


                                 American Chamber of Commerce,

                                 Washington, DC, October 28, 1997.
     Re: Nomination of Bill Lann Lee as Assistant Attorney General 
         for Civil Rights.

     Hon. Orrin Hatch,
     Chairman, Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
     U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Hatch: Please vote against the nomination of 
     Bill Lann Lee as Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights. 
     I enclose a copy of the actual testimony I gave at Mr. Lee's 
     nomination hearing before the Senate Committee on the 
     Judiciary Last week.
       Mr. Lee believes the California Civil Rights Initiative 
     (Proposition 209) is unconstitutional. Thus, he is the wrong 
     person to hold the nation's top civil rights enforcer 
     position.
       Proposition 209 mirrors the language of the Civil Rights 
     Act of 1964. Mr. Lee's latest assertions during his 
     nomination hearing, of his opposition against Proposition 
     209, adds to our apprehension that he will further divide 
     America along racial lines because of his conviction that 
     civil rights are not for all Americans, but select Americans 
     based on their race and gender. Should he become the nation's 
     top civil rights enforcer, he will have 250 lawyers to help 
     him do the job. This must not happen. America cannot afford 
     it.
       I ask you to vote against his nomination as the Assistant 
     Attorney General for Civil Rights.
           Sincerely,
                                                   Susan Au Allen.
  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. ROBERTS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Inhofe). The Senator from Kansas is 
recognized.


           WAIVING MANDATORY QUORUM IN RELATION TO H.R. 2646

  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent, pursuant to rule 
XXII, that the mandatory quorum in relation to H.R. 2646 be waived.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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