[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 152 (Tuesday, November 4, 1997)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E2170-E2171]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


 CONFERENCE REPORT ON H.R 1119, NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR 
                            FISCAL YEAR 1998

                                 ______
                                 

                               speech of

                        HON. JOHN M. SPRATT, JR.

                           of south carolina

                    in the house of representatives

                       Tuesday, October 28, 1997

  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I rise to express my concerns about two 
provisions in the conference report on H.R. 1119, the Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998. Although I was a member of the 
conference, I was not a conferee for these provisions and was not aware 
of their final resolution until the completion of the conference 
report.
  Sections 522 and 523 of H.R. 1119 mandates that the Secretary of 
Defense submit a plan to eliminate 4,350 nondual status military 
technicians. These are Federal civilian employees working for the 
National Guard and the Army Reserve, often in administrative and 
administrative support positions, who would not be required to report 
with their reserve units during a deployment. The bill directs the 
Secretary to recommend ways to convert the status of these employees if 
it is determined that their positions can not be eliminated or filled 
by dual status technicians.
  In many cases, these employees fill support positions which would be 
subject to high turnover if filled by dual status employees. Current 
nondual status employees have provided stability to these positions, 
often at low rates of pay. This provision appears to prejudge the need 
to eliminate these employees before it has been established whether 
such a move will provide a savings to the Government, or will improve 
national security. Further, I am

[[Page E2171]]

troubled that this provision gives the Secretary of Defense no 
direction on the need to provide for the protection of pension and 
other employee benefits in the conversion process, especially for those 
employees whose length of service would reasonably entitle them to 
expect such benefits.
  Second, I am sorely disappointed in the conference reports resolution 
in regards to a Senate amendment which would have elevated the Chief of 
the National Guard Bureau to a four-star ranking and made the Chief a 
member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS]. Although I did not support 
putting the Guard chief of the JCS, I do believe that there is 
currently a serious problem in resourcing for the Guard which can be 
improved by elevating the Chief of the Guard. I supported giving the 
Chief a fourth star and appointing him to the Joint Requirements 
Oversight Committee [JROC]. Sec. 901, H.R. 1119 instead creates two new 
assistants to the Chairman of the JCS: one for National Guard Matters 
and one for Reserve Matters.
  Two 2-stars do not make a four star, nor does it solve the real 
budget problem within the Army. When I and several of my colleagues 
wrote the Chairman of the National Security Committee to urge the 
inclusion of legislation that would elevate the Chief of the National 
Guard Bureau from 3-star to 4-star general and place him on the Joint 
Requirements Oversight Committee, I believe then, as I believe now, 
that this is the right thing to do.
  There are those critics that argue that making the Chief of the 
National Guard a four-star would be disruptive to the total force 
policy or is not justified. I disagree, because there is precedence, 
just look at the Marine Corps, the commandant of the Marine Corps at 
one point in time was a three-star general and did not have a seat on 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Marine Corps to my knowledge are to this 
day part of the Navy. The Marine Corps to this day is a shining example 
of the total force concept, fully integrated across the spectrum and 
fully funded. Another example is the Coast Guard, while not part of the 
Department of Defense in peacetime, they support the Navy in times of 
war. Currently, the Coast Guard has a four-star admiral and four three-
star vice admirals, for a $3.8 billion force of more than 75,000 active 
and reserve Coast Guard members across the country. The Coast Guard 
does a tremendous job of supporting maritime law and drug enforcement, 
maritime transportation support and disaster assistance in their 
domestic role. Now let's compare this to the National Guard. The 
National Guard has a three-star lieutenant general for $10 billion 
force of more than 466,000 full-time and part-time members in the Army 
and Air National Guard who are performing vital missions throughout the 
country and the world right this minute. This in itself is 
justification for the National Guard to have a four-star, not to 
mention that the National Guard has 54 percent of the Army's combat 
force structure and is located in over 2,700 communities in all States 
and territories.

  Finally, concerning sec. 411, end strengths for Selected Reserve, 
where the Army National Guard was reduced in endstrength by 5,000 
spaces. I do not support reducing the Army National Guard endstrength. 
The bottomline here is that the Army National Guard is the only service 
component, active or reserve, to be reduced below the President's 
budget request. The conference report cites the Army off-site of June 
5, 1997 as the reason for reducing the endstrength of the Army National 
Guard. As I understand the results of the off-site, the active Army 
should have been reduced by 5,000 spaces as well, but that was not 
included in this bill. In fact the Army is not able to meet its 
endstrength. In fact the Army National Guard is currently meeting its 
endstrength goals. It makes it very difficult to justify reducing the 
Army National Guard, in essence punishing them for meeting their 
strength.
  In conclusion, I believe that the provisions I have mentioned do 
nothing to enhance the resourcing and readiness issues faced by the 
National Guard and Reserve. I do believe that we should revisit these 
provisions next year as we prepare the fiscal year 1999 Defense 
authorization bill.

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