[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 149 (Thursday, October 30, 1997)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E2127-E2128]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                CHINA'S NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION POLICY

                                 ______
                                 

                        HON. FORTNEY PETE STARK

                             of california

                    in the house of representatives

                      Wednesday, October 29, 1997

  Mr. STARK. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to commend my colleagues, Mr. 
Markey, Mr. Gilman, and Mr. Cox, for their bipartisan efforts to shed 
light on China's pending nuclear nonproliferation certification in this 
morning's Washington Post. These distinguished gentlemen present us 
with the facts on China's most recent and egregious nonproliferation 
violations. Now it's up to President Clinton to face

[[Page E2128]]

the facts and deny certification to China as a responsible member of 
the international nonproliferation community.
  The Central Intelligence Agency released its biannual report to 
Congress this past summer and listed China as one of the two biggest 
nations to export nuclear materials to Iran and Pakistan. Now, less 
than 4 months later, China is pledging to limit its exports to Iran and 
end nuclear cooperation with the rogue nation. This agreement arrives 
at the dawn of ``new and improved'' United States-China relationship. 
As a nuclear weapons state and party to the Nonproliferation Treaty, 
China is obligated to promote ``the fullest possible exchange of 
equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for 
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.'' If China can break its pledge 
made in an international treaty, it certainly has the capability of 
breaking its pledge made to the Clinton administration. What evidence 
does the United States have that China will keep its promise to curb 
sales of nuclear materials to its largest consumers?
  None. China's Government has denied accusations of selling nuclear 
technology and material to rogue nations. It has been barred from 
receiving United States technology for over 10 years for these 
transactions and now we're supposed to believe that China will reverse 
its current policy. I hope the Clinton administration doesn't expect 
Congress to buy this bogus change of heart. The administration has 
delinked human rights from trade and now it wants to ignore its own 
intelligence reports on nuclear proliferation. If the United States 
agrees to sell nuclear technology to China, it will open up the nuclear 
arms market to Iran and Pakistan. This is irresponsible, unacceptable, 
and goes beyond a policy of engagement.
  China has not given any substantive signs of changing its current 
nuclear sales to Iran, yet the administration acquiesces on all 
requests for cooperation. China's leader, Jiang Zemin, insisted upon a 
fanfare welcome from the United States and his request was granted. 
However, compliance of the warm welcome should not set the tone for the 
upcoming discussions between the two leaders. President Clinton must 
send a clear, firm message regarding U.S. nuclear nonproliferation 
policy. The United States must lead by example and show China--and the 
world--that we are not open to sending nuclear technology to Iran via 
China.
  The following article appeared in today's Washington Post:

                     China and Nuclear Trafficking

     (By Edward J. Markey, Benjamin A. Gilman and Christopher Cox)

       During Chinese President Jiang Zemin's visit this week, 
     President Clinton is expected to activate a 1985 Nuclear 
     Cooperation Agreement with China. American companies would 
     then be authorized to start selling nuclear reactors and fuel 
     to a country that has been identified by the CIA as ``a key 
     supplier of most destructive arms technology'' to rogue 
     regimes such as Iran's. We believe that providing access to 
     American technologies that could end up assisting Iran's 
     nuclear weapons programs would constitute an intolerable risk 
     to U.S. national security.
       When the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement was finalized in 
     1985, Congress placed conditions on the resolution approving 
     it that required the president to certify that China had 
     become a responsible member of the international 
     nonproliferation community before the agreement could go into 
     effect. No U.S. president, not Regan, not Bush and until now 
     not Clinton, has made such a certification. A glance at the 
     record quickly shows why.
       Communist China's nuclear, chemical, biological and missile 
     proliferation has made it the Wal-Mart of international 
     nuclear commerce. Consider the following list of only the 
     worst and most recent of China's nonproliferation violations:
       In February 1996 the People's Republic of China was 
     discovered to have sold 5,000 ring magnets to Pakistan for 
     use in Pakistan's secret uranium enrichment facility, though 
     it publicly denied doing so.
       In May 1997 the State Department cited seven Chinese 
     entities for exporting chemical weapons technology to Iran.
       In June 1997 Time magazine reported that China had not only 
     transferred nuclear-capable missiles to Pakistan but was also 
     helping Pakistan build missiles of its own.
       In July 1997 the CIA identified China as being ``the most 
     significant supplier of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)-
     related goods and technology to foreign countries.''
       In August 1997 Israeli intelligence reports confirmed that 
     China is supplying long-range nuclear missile technologies to 
     Iran.
       In September 1997 the U.S. Navy reported that China is the 
     most active supplier of Iran's nuclear, chemical and 
     biological weapons programs.
       This record speaks for itself. China has continually assure 
     the United States that it would stop providing technologies 
     for weapons of mass destruction to countries such as Iran and 
     Pakistan. China has continually failed to live up to its 
     promises. Before implementing the 1985 agreement, we need to 
     be certain that this time the promises are for real.
       The 1985 agreement requires the president to certify that 
     China has made sufficient progress in halting proliferation. 
     President Clinton, however, seems to believe that China's 
     past proliferation record is irrelevant, and that we should 
     blindly trust the vague and untested promises China has made 
     to implement its own export controls and regulations. China 
     has yet to make a tangible demonstration of its commitment to 
     cease its sales of WMD technologies. Implementation of the 
     Nuclear Cooperation Agreement is profoundly ill advised, at 
     least until the following criteria are met:
       (1) China must join the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG). The 
     NSG members have agreed not to sell nuclear technologies to 
     any country that does not allow international inspections of 
     all of its nuclear facilities all of the time, a criterion 
     known as ``full-scope safeguards.'' A 1993 statement by then 
     Secretary of State Warren Christopher calls the NSG ``a 
     fundamental component of the international nonproliferation 
     regime,'' and says that ``the United States has been a strong 
     proponent of requiring full-scope International Atomic Energy 
     Agency safeguards as a condition for significant new nuclear 
     supply commitments.'' Christopher's first statement remains 
     true, but the Clinton administration is considering reversing 
     itself on the second. Why should countries such as Canada and 
     Switzerland, both NSG members, be held to a higher 
     nonproliferation standard than Communist China?
       (2) China must cease all proliferation of weapons of mass 
     destruction, including missiles and chemical and biological 
     weapons. A promise to cease nuclear proliferation without 
     similar assurances to cease the proliferation of other mass 
     destruction technologies is a lot like an alcoholic's 
     swearing off scotch without bothering to stop drinking beer 
     or wine.
       (3) China must follow through with its promise to implement 
     an export controls system, but it must be proved to be 
     effective. This can be accomplished only through the passage 
     of time. With such a long legacy of transgressions and broken 
     promises, we need to see evidence of true reform before 
     moving forward with certification.
       President Clinton has an opportunity, as well as an 
     obligation, to require that the People's Republic of China 
     demonstrate its compliance with global nonproliferation norms 
     (as opposed to mere promises) by resisting pressure from the 
     Chinese government (and the American nuclear industry). But 
     if the president certifies China as a nonproliferator, 
     despite the record we have outlined and without a 
     demonstrated change of behavior on the part of Beijing, he 
     will have eviscerated U.S. nonproliferation policy and 
     compromised U.S. national security.

     

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