[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 148 (Wednesday, October 29, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S11317-S11321]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                       DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BILL

  Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, I will yield the floor when the majority 
leader arrives. He will deal with a series of issues. One of those 
issues will have to do with the Defense authorization bill. We will 
have a series of motions and a flurry of activity related to that bill. 
I thought that while we were waiting for the majority leader, I could 
save time for our colleagues by simply talking about the underlying 
issue.
  Let me begin by saying that while there is a deep division over the 
Defense authorization bill, while there are very strong feelings 
related to this bill that are held by individual Senators, both 
Democrats and Republicans, while several of my colleagues and I feel so 
strongly that we are going to do everything we can to prevent this 
conference report from being adopted, and while the President has 
issued a letter saying that he will veto this bill if this bill is 
presented to him in its current form, I want to make it clear that 
despite all of these strongly held views, I think all Members of the 
Senate and the House have acted honorably.
  I think this is a matter where there is just a disagreement on an 
issue which is partly principle, partly parochialism, perhaps on both 
sides, but it is critically important to me and to several of my 
colleagues.
  I think when the Founders wrote the Constitution, when they 
established the Senate, their purpose was to guarantee a full debate. 
Some of you will remember that Jefferson was the Ambassador to France 
when the Constitution was written. When he came back from France, he 
went to Mount Vernon and visited with Washington who had been the 
Presiding Officer at the Constitutional Convention. He said to 
Washington, ``What is the Senate for?'' We had established a bicameral 
Government. We had the House of Representatives, and we had the Senate. 
So Jefferson's question was, ``What is the Senate for?''
  Washington, being a southerner, did something that southerners did, 
and to this day some still do. Southerners, especially when I was 
growing up, perhaps like when the Presiding Officer was, would 
sometimes pour their coffee into their saucer to let it cool and then 
pour it back and drink it. So Washington poured his coffee into the 
saucer, and he said to Jefferson that ``The Senate will be like this 
saucer; the House, being elected every 2 years, will be caught up in 
the passion of the moment, but the Senate will be the place where those 
passions cool in the light of reason.''
  So today, to the extent we can, we are trying to allow these passions 
to cool because of our very strong feelings about this bill.
  I would like to begin, Mr. President, by asking unanimous consent 
that a letter from the President's OMB Director stating the policy of 
the administration to veto the bill be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

         Executive Office of the President, Office of Management 
           and Budget,
                                 Washington, DC, October 28, 1997.
     Hon. Trent Lott,
     Majority Leader, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Leader: The Administration appreciates the efforts 
     you and your colleagues have made to craft an FY 1998 
     National Defense Authorization bill that supports our 
     military strategy and our men and women in uniform. The bill 
     recently reported by the Conference Committee successfully 
     addresses many of the concerns voiced by the Administration 
     about earlier versions passed by the House and Senate. 
     Unfortunately, the bill includes provisions that severely 
     limit the Department of Defense's ability to compete weapons 
     maintenance workload between public and private sector 
     depots, a key concern identified in Statements of 
     Administration Policy.
       The bill includes provisions whose intent is to protect 
     public depots by limiting private industry's ability to 
     compete for the depot-level maintenance of military systems 
     and components. If enacted, these provisions, which run 
     counter to the ongoing efforts by Congress and the 
     Administration to use competition to improve DoD's business 
     practices, would severely limit the Department's flexibility 
     to increase efficiency and save taxpayer dollars.
       Both the Quadrennial Defense Review and the National 
     Defense Panel recommended repeal of current laws that 
     constrain DoD's efforts to competitively outsource depot 
     maintenance workload. Rather than facilitating DoD's use of 
     competitive outsourcing, the bill attempts to further 
     restrict it.
       The bill could reduce opportunities to use industry to 
     maintain future weapons systems. DoD could be forced to add 
     to its expensive public infrastructure in ways that duplicate 
     what already exists in the private sector. Future weapons 
     systems will rely increasingly on commercial technology, in 
     order to exploit commercial industry's rapid rate of 
     innovation and market-driven efficiencies. But by limiting 
     industry's role in maintaining future weapon systems, and in 
     other ways, the bill could frustrate this revolutionary 
     change.
       The bill seeks to impose unique and inappropriate 
     requirements on DoD's process for allocating the work now 
     performed at the closing San Antonio and Sacramento Air 
     Logistics Centers. The Department is conducting a fair and 
     open competition to determine the most efficient and cost-
     effective way to perform this work in the future. Both 
     private contractors and public depots are competing for the 
     work. By dictating how DoD should treat certain competitive 
     factors, the bill seeks to skew any competition in favor of 
     the public depots.
       If the numerous problems cited above cannot be overcome, 
     the impact on the Department's costs and on our Nation's 
     military capacity would be profound; the President's senior 
     advisers would recommend that he veto the bill.
       We need to encourage more competition from private 
     industry, not less. Billions of dollars in potential savings 
     are at issue. These resources should be used to maintain the 
     U.S. fighting edge, not to preserve excess infrastructure.
       Finally, we strongly object to the bill's provisions on 
     high performance computer controls. The bill would severely 
     limit the President's flexibility to conduct foreign policy 
     by mandating permanent controls on the export of high 
     performance computers to specific countries, and would limit 
     the President's ability to adapt computer export controls to 
     changing security needs and technology trends. The bill would 
     also impose unrealistic Congressional notification, licensing 
     and post-shipment verification requirements that would have 
     the unintended effect of decreasing our ability to identify 
     and prevent exports of real national security concern. 
     Current law provides adequate authority to adjust controls 
     appropriately and to deal with any problem exports that may 
     occur.
           Sincerely,
                                               Franklin D. Raines,
                                                         Director.

  Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, let me try to define the issue. I know that 
we have several Members on both sides who know more about this issue 
than they want to know, but many of our colleagues don't know anything 
about the issue because they don't at least superficially appear to 
have a dog in the fight. This has kind of come up suddenly, so let me 
try to explain it. I will give you a little history, and let me repeat, 
as soon as the majority leader is ready to start, I will yield the 
floor.
  We had a Base Closing Commission. I was an original cosponsor of it. 
I voted

[[Page S11318]]

for its establishment. We have had three Base Closing Commission 
reports. Each of them have closed facilities in my State. I voted to 
enforce each and every one of them. In fact, I was one of the few 
members who voted to have another Base Closing Commission.
  While I hate them, the plain truth is that we have cut defense by a 
third, and we have reduced defense overhead by 20 percent. We have more 
nurses in Europe than combat infantry officers, and we have a huge 
overhang of bureaucracy.
  I have been supportive of the process to try to reduce overhead. I 
have voted for Base Closing Commission reports that have closed very 
large bases in my State, because the process is one that the country 
and, therefore, the people of Texas benefit from.
  As many of my colleagues will recall, one of the bases closed by the 
last Base Closing Commission was Kelly Air Force Base, which is a giant 
maintenance facility that does logistics work for the Air Force. It is 
a huge employer, a very important facility to San Antonio, to the 
State, and I believe to the Nation. The Base Closing Commission report 
called for closing Kelly Air Force Base.
  I voted for the Base Closing Commission report. I did not like the 
results. I did not agree with it. But it was part of the process. And I 
supported the process. But what the Base Closing Commission report said 
is that the work at Kelly should either be transferred to another Air 
Force logistics center or it should be privatized, perhaps in the 
private facility which would take over when this base was closed.
  So the Base Closing Commission report itself called for, as one of 
the options, private contractors to do the work that Kelly is currently 
doing. If after the base was closed, the flag taken down, and the 
military personnel removed, a private contractor bids for the work and 
the private contractor chooses Kelly Air Force Base as a site to do the 
work, then that work would be done by private contractors in San 
Antonio, on private facilities that would operate where this Air Force 
base used to operate.
  What this bill does that I very strongly object to is this bill 
undercuts the ability of the Secretary of Defense to conduct price 
competition so that we can have bidding on this work. The taxpayer 
could potentially save hundreds of millions of dollars by bringing 
competition to bear on the contracts that will flow from the fact that 
we are closing Kelly and other bases around the country.
  Some of our colleagues in the House who represent depots, which are 
Government facilities that do maintenance work, wrote into their bill 
for all practical purposes redundant provisions that would have 
forbidden the Department of Defense from having competitive bidding. 
Their basic approach, when you cut through all the legalese, was that 
all the work for maintaining military equipment will be done in depots 
by Government employees and that for all practical purposes there would 
be no competition, no ability for private companies to compete. And 
that was the provision in the House.
  Those of us who feel strongly about this issue have strongly 
resisted. And as the distinguished chairman, the ranking member, and 
our colleagues from States that are affected know, this has been a long 
and bitter struggle. The bottom line is that the committee, in 
conference with the House, has written language--30 pages of language--
that has to do with limiting the capacity of the Defense Department to 
engage in price competition to determine who gets maintenance 
contracts.
  In fact, I think it probably was put best in an article that ran in 
one of the Nation's newspapers where the point was made that while 
technically the language in this bill does not specifically prohibit 
price competition, the new language would likely keep private 
contractors from wanting to bid on the work.
  The Defense Department has looked at this language. Several of our 
colleagues have looked at the language. The Defense Department has 
concluded, as the administration says in its letter, that if this 
language were adopted that they would not have the capacity to have a 
price competition for this procurement. They would be forced to do this 
work under monopoly circumstances in a Government depot, that the cost 
of doing that would be substantially above those levels that might be 
achieved through competitive bidding.
  In fact, there was a competitive bid for the first work that was 
moved from Kelly Air Force Base. Interestingly enough, the winner of 
that contract was a Government depot. But the important thing is the 
price was substantially lower than the cost that the Government was 
paying. In fact, by having a competition, even though a Government 
depot won the competition, the bid was $190 million below what the 
taxpayer was paying; and the depot miraculously discovered that in 
their overhead they had hundreds of workers who could be released from 
overhead to do this work for $190 million less. Isn't it wonderful what 
competition does even to Government?

  Now we are in the process of beginning to move toward competitive 
bidding for many other functions at these closed bases. Those 
competitions will occur this spring. It is the intention of the Defense 
Department to put this work out for bids, and if a private company can 
do it cheaper, it gets the bid. If a depot can do it cheaper, it gets 
the contract. And the net result will be literally hundreds of millions 
of dollars of savings for the taxpayer.
  This is a principle that is well-established in our economy: If you 
have competition, you tend to get higher quality and you tend to get 
lower cost.
  We have provisions in this bill that will disrupt that process, that 
will make it very difficult, if not impossible, for private contractors 
to bid on and potentially win these contracts. The net result will be 
that rather than the taxpayer benefiting from the cost savings that 
would come from competition, now this work is going to be dedicated to 
the Federal Government and its various entities and no such competition 
would occur under this language.
  Granted, this language is 30 pages of mumbo jumbo, but the thrust of 
it, the focus of every word, the focus of every sentence is to inhibit 
competition.
  Let me tell you what I see happening. I am not referring to any of my 
colleagues. In fact, the people on the other side of this issue are 
people that I have deep affection for. There is no one that I love more 
than the distinguished senior Senator from South Carolina who is 
chairman of the committee and who has done his best to work something 
out here that we could all live with. In the final analysis, he could 
not get the House to take language that we could have unanimity on in 
the Senate. But in any case, here is what is happening. I want to alert 
the Senate and the American people to it.
  We have cut defense now since 1985 by over a third. As a result, we 
are dramatically reducing our funds to maintain our military equipment 
and to procure new military equipment.
  In this environment, there is sort of two ways you could go. One way 
would be to say, ``Well, listen, with these huge defense cuts, we've 
got to get the most we can for our money.'' So we want more competitive 
bidding. We want to put almost everything we do--within the constraints 
of this being defense and with its special needs--out for competitive 
bidding and try to get--to quote McNamara--probably not a good source 
to quote--``the biggest bang per buck.'' That would be one way to go. 
Quite frankly, that is the way we should go, in my humble opinion.
  The other way to go, and the way we are going, is to take the very 
parochial view that defense is like welfare, and that agencies of the 
Government that have always had these contracts are entitled to them, 
whether they can do the work best or not, whether they can do it 
cheapest or not, and that since defense is being cut back, we have all 
got to grab what piece of it we can and hold it to our bosom and 
protect our own individual facilities.
  We are masters at coming up with rationalizations for the things we 
do. You can argue that only Government employees can really understand 
an F-100 engine, even though private employees built the F-100. You can 
come up with many rationalizations and not all of them without merit.
  But the bottom line is that what we are doing in this bill is that we 
are impeding competition and we are stopping the Secretary of Defense 
from doing what he believes is in the vital

[[Page S11319]]

national security interest of the United States, and that is having the 
capacity to put contracts out for competitive bidding.
  I want competition. I would like to say--not that any of us ever have 
to justify what we do; the one thing that we try as Members of the 
Senate to do is to show each other the courtesy of not impugning one 
another's motives--but I would like to make a point that at least it is 
important to me. I had the privilege of serving on the Armed Services 
Committee for 4 years. It was a great privilege. And I had in that 
capacity the opportunity to work with real giants. I have served with, 
in the Senate, Senator Goldwater, a hero of mine who I voted for 
President in 1964, and I have served with Strom Thurmond.

  But I think anyone who has served with me, if they will remember from 
my initial debate with Congressman Nichols, who was a Congressman from 
Alabama and who represented a big defense logistics facility, that from 
the first year I was on the committee I have fought this business of 
denying competitive bidding and price competition.
  I do not believe that I have ever deviated from my support, in terms 
of defense procurement, of the principle that where the objective is to 
get the lowest possible cost and the best quality, that we should have 
price competition.
  I have objected to efforts to try to prevent us from forcing 
prisoners to work. I believe prisoners ought to work like taxpayers. 
But that is a subsidiary issue and has no part in this debate. But the 
point I want to make is, in my State we do have a closed military base 
which I voted to close as part of the base-closing process.
  Nothing I am trying to do is trying to reverse the base-closing 
process. That base is going to be closed. The clock is running. 
Functions are already being shifted. Military personnel have got their 
orders to move off. I am not trying to reverse that.
  But under the Base Closing Commission, one option that was open to 
the Pentagon was competitive bidding, with the winner of the bid, if it 
was a private company, having the option to chose where they wanted to 
do the work.
  Privitization is an option that is explicitly, specifically outlined 
in the Base Closing Commission report.
  The Defense Department wants to follow that procedure. The bill 
before us will, for all practical purposes, prevent that from 
happening.
  Some of our colleagues, in debating this issue, have brought in 
President Clinton. I want to address that issue, if I may.
  When the Base Closing Commission report came out closing huge 
logistics centers in San Antonio and in California, President Clinton, 
who has never been accused of not being a good politician, immediately 
did what any red-blooded politician would do, and that is he lamented 
the fact. In fact, he went to great lengths to talk about how terrible 
it was. I thought at one point he might put himself down in front of 
the gate at McClellan, and just as a bulldozer was getting ready to run 
over him, he would have a trusty aide come in and have the Secret 
Service drag him out.

  It is also true that he said we will try to find a way to keep some 
of this work at Kelly and McClellan. If the assertion is that Bill 
Clinton was playing politics in the 1996 Presidential election, I am 
sure he would plead guilty, and he clearly was playing politics.
  But as is true of so much that our President says, he said it but he 
didn't do it. He flirted with the idea of vetoing the base closing 
report, but he didn't. He talked about helping these two bases and 
their thousands of employees, but in the final analysis, he didn't do 
anything special to help them. He did what virtually any politician 
would do, and that is he felt their pain. He feels it better, or at 
least convinces people he feels it better, than most.
  Now, when the Defense Department, using the exact language of the 
Base Closing Commission, is trying to move ahead with competitive 
bidding to decide whether to transfer functions from these closed bases 
or to give them to private companies if they can do it better, cheaper, 
or both, people who don't want this competition say President Clinton 
played politics with the process.
  The point I want to make is that any politician, whether running for 
President, dog catcher or whatever, is going to talk about feeling 
people's pain when 22,000 people are being put out of work. There is no 
doubt about the fact that the President actually had people recommend 
to him that he override the Base Closing Commission. But the bottom 
line is he did not override the Base Closing Commission report. The 
bases are being closed. Nor did he intervene to try to say you have to 
give the contracts to private contractors who will use these old 
facilities.
  What the Defense Department is trying to do and what this bill before 
the Senate seeks to prevent being done is to have a competition, where 
if the depots that are being protected by this language win the 
competition, they get the work, while if a private contractor wins they 
get the contract. This is what happened with the depot in Macon. The 
first competition saved the taxpayers $190 million by miraculously 
discovering hundreds of workers who were not so busy they couldn't do 
this work. Yet there are still many who say there couldn't possibly be 
a fair competition. It is very hard to convince people who don't want 
to be convinced.
  Now, where are we and what is the issue here? Where we are and what 
the issue is here is the following: We have 30 pages of language in the 
bill that basically have as their aim stopping competition. I have the 
language here for people to see and I have given it to both the 
Republican and the Democrat leaders. We had a meeting with the Pentagon 
and a meeting with the White House and have gone through these 30 
pages.
  In the entire 30 pages we have come up with three major changes, one 
of which is changing a word, another of which is putting back in the 
bill language that was critically important to the Pentagon, critically 
important to the White House, critically important to those of us who 
oppose this language, but which the staff dropped, saying it was a 
technical thing. It was technical. When Senator McCain said, ``Great, 
great, we can solve this problem. If it was technical, put it back 
in.'' Well, it may have been technical when they took it out, but when 
we asked it be put back in, it was not technical.
  Now, in addition, when the Pentagon was trying to negotiate with the 
staff of the committee, the Pentagon and the staff reached a tentative 
agreement to strike some of the language. Not very much of it. As you 
can look at this bill, you can go many pages without seeing a single 
mark of anything that would be changed.
  But what happened, and again nobody is blaming anybody for it, but in 
addition to taking out language that was critically important to the 
Secretary of Defense--saying it was technical when they took it out, 
and that it didn't matter, but now it is critical and can't be put back 
in--in addition to that, there were a lot of provisions, little bitty 
piddly things that were agreed on to take out of the bill. But then 
suddenly right at the last minute, it was discovered that that language 
had been put in the report and that the report language has the effect 
of law. Part of our dispute and I think one of the reasons for the 
strong commitment to try to do something here is a belief that we were 
on the verge of a deal, that language had been struck from the bill in 
good faith, and then we discover at the last minute that the language 
has been put back. Our language was in the bill and then we discover at 
the last minute that it has been struck.

  So what those of us who vigorously oppose the bill in its current 
form have done is reduced our changes down to one page. It would take 
17 hours to read the defense authorization bill, and we may well have 
the opportunity to hear it read before this debate is over. I think 
that would be therapeutic because I think if people heard all this 
noncompetitive language, they would be against it. But in trying always 
to be reasonable, in trying to follow the saintly principle of trying 
to accommodate other people and their legitimate needs and concerns, in 
working with the Pentagon and the White House we have come up with one 
page of changes--one page. In a bill that would take 17 hours to read, 
we have one page of changes that would apply to 30 pages

[[Page S11320]]

of language that is aimed at trying to prevent price competition. We 
have one page of changes, and two of the three changes have to do with, 
one, putting back in language that we thought had already been agreed 
to leave in the bill; and two, taking out language that had already 
been agreed to take out. Only we find that it has been put in the 
report language and, therefore, for all practical purposes, has the 
same effect.
  So, of the things we are asking for, far more than half are things 
that were already agreed to.
  So it seems to me that even though the House has acted, we can try to 
have a simple motion to amend this language in the bill. There is 
already an effort underway to have a similar motion to fix an 
inadvertent change in language for Senator Domenici, and if we could, 
through a technical correction amendment, simply get this one page of 
simple changes, half of which go back to what was already agreed on but 
which subsequently was changed at the last minute without our knowing 
about it, if we could do this, two things could happen, and both of 
them are good.
  First, those Senators who are opposed to the bill could graciously or 
ungraciously step aside and allow the bill to pass. Second, the 
President could sign the bill instead of vetoing the bill. But in order 
to do that, we are going to have to put back in language that was 
previously agreed on and then later taken out. We are going to have to 
take out language that was taken out and then later put back. Then we 
are going to have to reach an agreement on a couple of points that are 
technical but are important to the Secretary of Defense in meeting the 
national security needs of the United States.
  So I want to say to my colleagues we are at this unhappy state where 
we have at least four and probably more of our colleagues who are going 
to try to the best of their ability to prevent this conference report 
from being adopted in this session of Congress. We want to work out an 
agreement. We want to pass this bill. There are things in this bill 
that are provisions that I wrote, that I am for. We have a provision of 
this bill to guarantee the status of senior military colleges. That is 
important. That is important to Texas A&M. I love Texas A&M, other than 
my family, more than anything else in the world. I want that language 
to become law. There are a lot of things in this bill that I care 
about.
  So I would like to work out an agreement. So would my colleagues--my 
colleague from Texas, my two colleagues from California. But if we 
can't work this out, we are tired of being run over. We are tired of a 
small group of Members of the House who have to have it their way, even 
if it means hundreds of millions of dollars of additional cost for the 
taxpayer, even if it means a weaker national defense. They have 
literally distorted this whole process, and for 3 years we have been 
engaged in a struggle where they have pursued their own individual 
interest to protect their facilities at the expense of the taxpayer and 
at the expense of national security. If the alternative is to let them 
prevail, then we have no alternative except to resist. Again, obviously 
it is very difficult to resist a conference report, but we intend to do 
the best we can in trying to do that.

  Our intention, our hope, is that we can make these small changes. I 
will give you one of the three things that we need changed. On page 5, 
line 8, of this 30 pages of anticompetitive language that is aimed at 
preventing price competition and, in the process, making taxpayers pay 
more, there is a word that creates a tremendous problem for the Defense 
Department, and that word is ``ensure.'' Now, what the Secretary of 
Defense has said is that he could live with all of this language--I am 
tempted, and if I were in a more expansive mood, I would say ``rotten 
language'' but I am not going to say it--if another word were used 
instead of saying ``ensure.'' The sentence says,

       The Secretary of Defense shall require the performance of 
     core logistic workloads necessary to maintain the core 
     logistics capacities identified under paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 
     at Government-owned, Government-operated facilities of the 
     Department of Defense (including Government-owned, 
     Government-operated facilities of a military department) and 
     shall assign such facilities sufficient workload to ensure 
     cost efficiency and technical competence in peacetime, while 
     preserving the surge capacity and reconstitution capabilities 
     necessary to support fully strategic and contingency plans 
     referred to in paragraph 3.

  In other words, all the work goes to them.
  Now, the Secretary of Defense, in trying to reach a compromise, says 
he could live with promoting it but he can't live with ensuring it. 
Now, is it worth risking killing the whole bill over one word? Well, it 
is if you believe that one word is going to mean higher cost and less 
effective defense and if you believe that this is part of a continued 
effort of a small group of Members of the House to impose their will on 
the whole process.
  So I think we have come up with one page of changes in a bill that 
takes 17 hours to read, many of which are just one word. If we could 
work this out, we could get out of the way and this bill could be 
signed by the President instead of being vetoed.
  A final point, and I will yield the floor. We have already passed the 
appropriations bill for the Defense Department. We are here trying to 
pass the authorization bill after the appropriations bill has already 
passed. We don't have to pass this bill. I would like to pass it. But I 
would just like to remind my colleagues that we are here today, instead 
of being here 2 months ago, or a month ago, because of this one issue, 
and this one issue is that principally Members of the House are saying, 
``You are either going to protect my depot from competition, or else I 
am not going to support defense.'' That is basically what the House 
depot caucus, as it is called, is saying.
  What will happen if this small number of Members of the Senate who 
are today opposing this conference report lose is, first of all, we 
will be unhappy about it. But second, the President is going to veto 
the bill anyway and you are not going to be able to override the veto. 
So the bill is not going to become law in any case. What we are asking 
for, once again--and I would like to renew this request, and I would 
like to try to get this material to our distinguished chairman and to 
people who are interested--is to make one page of changes in a bill 
that would take 17 hours to read and that gives totally unfair 
advantage to depots as compared to private companies. If we must, we 
will accept tilting the competition toward depots and away from private 
companies, even though it will mean higher costs and lower quality 
defense, in order to reach a compromise. We are not willing to accept a 
prohibition against competition. I am sure we can all defend our 
positions, and probably will as this debate goes on.
  I am happy that my position is in favor of competition. If companies 
bidding to do this work and wanting to do it in San Antonio, TX, can't 
do it cheaper and better, don't give them the work. But if they can do 
it cheaper, if they can do it better, to the extent that I have power 
as just 1 of the 100 Members of the Senate, I cannot and will not step 
aside while other Members of the Senate in essence say, even if private 
contractors in San Antonio or California can do it better, even if they 
can do it cheaper, even if it saves hundreds of millions of dollars, we 
don't care, and we won't let competition occur because we are going to 
run over people because we have a large enough number of people. We are 
going to say forget the taxpayers, forget competition, we want this for 
ourselves. We have earned it. We have these depots and it is our right 
to have this work.
  Well, I reject that. I think it is wrong. I believe I would reject it 
if there were no people in my State who wanted to compete for these 
contracts. Now, there are people who want to compete for these 
contracts, and I just want to repeat, in concluding, that I am not 
trying to put any language in the bill that says give it to my people 
in Texas. I am not trying to put any language in this bill that says 
tilt the playing field toward the private sector.
  I am willing to accept 30 pages of language that does everything it 
can to prevent competition from ever occurring if they will make one 
page of changes. But I cannot and will not accept the position that 
people in my State who want to do this work and who have been doing it 
for years, who helped win the cold war and tear down

[[Page S11321]]

the Berlin wall and liberate Eastern Europe and free more people than 
any victory in any war in the history of mankind, now all of a sudden, 
because a few Members who because of their numbers have dominated this 
process, say, ``Don't let people compete for my jobs,'' will not be 
able to compete to keep some of their work. I cannot step aside and let 
that happen willingly. I may not be able to prevent it, as we will find 
out as this process goes along, but I have an obligation to fight it 
because it is fundamentally wrong for America to be preventing 
competition.
  Almost as if on cue, our distinguished majority leader is here. I 
yield the floor.
  Mr. INHOFE addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma is recognized.
  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, first of all, let me say that it seems 
customary on this floor to say how much you appreciate and love 
somebody and respect them. Of course, there is no better evidence of my 
affection for the senior Senator from Texas than the fact that back 
when--some may have forgotten that he ran for President. In the 
primary, he ran against the then majority leader Bob Dole. I openly 
supported the senior Senator from Texas over Senator Bob Dole, which 
was politically pretty dumb for me to do. But I did it because I felt 
he is a very capable individual.

  Having said that, I would like to respond to the items that he has 
stated in his statement. Let me cover a couple of things that the 
distinguished Senator from Texas talked about.
  For openers, the Senator from Texas stated that the BRAC Commission, 
during their process in 1995, offered as an alternative to privatize in 
place. Let me suggest to you, Mr. President, that is not the case. It 
was the case in Newark, it was the case in Louisville, it was the case 
in the Naval Air Warfare Center in Indianapolis; but it was not the 
case in either McClellan Air Force Base or Kelly Air Force Base. The 
reason I say that is that, specifically in those first three instances 
where they did privatize in place, the BRAC report said specifically 
``privatize in place.'' Contrary to that, in the 1995 round, it 
specifically said that whatever happens, whether it is privatization or 
anything else, you have to move the required equipment and any required 
personnel to the receiving locations.
  I think we all know why that is the case. If you have five air 
logistic centers, each one operating at 50 percent capacity and you 
close the two least efficient ones, according to the BRAC Commission, 
you then would transfer that workload, and if you didn't transfer that 
workload, you would have to somehow account for paying for 50 percent 
of overhead that isn't being used.
  Now, when we talk about what this bill does, it is true that we are 
including in any competition a value for the vacancy that occurs, or 
the 50 percent capacity that is not being used in the remaining ALC's. 
There would be three remaining. That is only reasonable because there 
is a tremendous value to that.
  Second, we are also providing a value of the actual real estate value 
of the facilities that would be used. For example, if the Senator from 
Texas wanted competition to come in and use Kelly Air Force Base, it 
would not be fair competition to say, fine, you could have it for $1 a 
year. Instead, the bill provides that it would have to be for the value 
of that institution. Those are dollars that otherwise would be spent on 
our defense system.
  Third, I mention the question as to whether or not President Clinton 
made a political statement when he suggested out in Sacramento, CA, 
that they were going to leave that alone, I would like to read his 
statement to you. It says:

       On July 1, you were dealt a serious blow when the 
     independent Base Closing Commission said that we ought to 
     shut Kelly down. At my insistence and my refusal to go along 
     with that specific recommendation, the Air Force developed 
     the privatization in place plan that will keep thousands of 
     jobs here at this depot.

  That is right before the Presidential election. If you look at this 
one sentence which says, ``At my insistence and my refusal to go along 
with that specific recommendation * * * '' that in and of itself is a 
very clear violation of both the intent and the letter of the BRAC 
process.
  I yield to the majority leader.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I know there is a lot more debate that we 
will hear on this subject. We would like to start a process that would 
get us on the DOD authorization conference report.

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