[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 148 (Wednesday, October 29, 1997)]
[House]
[Pages H9709-H9711]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


    INSTABILITY IS THE ENEMY AND IT REQUIRES STRONG MILITARY FORCES

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the 
gentleman from Missouri [Mr. Skelton] is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, recently the aircraft carrier Nimitz sailed 
into the Persian Gulf ahead of its scheduled rotation. The purpose of 
the deployment was to warn Iran and Iraq against sending aircraft into 
the no-fly zone that the United Nations has mandated in southern Iraq 
since the end of the Persian Gulf War.
  Two weeks earlier, Iran defied the ban and sent aircraft into Iraq to 
attack sites that anti-Iranian insurgent groups were using to stage 
raids. Iraq, in turn, was threatening to put up its own aircraft to 
defend its sovereignty against any further Iranian attacks. A strong 
word of U.S. caution, backed up by a show of military strength in the 
region, was necessary to keep Saddam Hussein in his box and to deter 
further Iranian adventurism.
  Apparently, despite vocal protests from both sides, the mission has 
been accomplished since there have been no more egregious violations of 
the no-fly zone.
  Mr. Speaker, such a use of U.S. military power to enforce stability 
in a tense part of the globe is not an isolated case. Just a year and a 
half ago the United States sent the Nimitz into the Taiwan Straits in 
response to China's threatening missile tests at the time of the 
Taiwanese election.
  In recent months, the United States has carried on a large 
peacekeeping operation in Bosnia and a smaller mission in the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; continued to guard against illegal arms 
shipments into the former Yugoslavia; sent forces to evacuate 
noncombatants from Zaire and Sierra Leone; supplied airlift for African 
peacekeeping troops in Liberia; sent forces to demine areas in Namibia; 
continued to provide humanitarian assistance to Kurdish evacuees from 
northern Iraq; and engaged in counternarcotics operations in South 
America.
  Except for Bosnia, which appears destined to remain in the headlines 
for the foreseeable future, most of these operations get no more than 
an occasional article on the back page of the Washington Post. Many 
ongoing activities, perhaps equally important in bolstering 
international stability, do not even get that much attention unless 
something goes wrong, activities like support for mine clearing in 
Namibia, which was the mission of personnel who were tragically lost 
when their aircraft crashed on its return flight a few weeks ago.
  Today, the U.S. military is carrying out scores of what have come to 
be called ``engagement missions,'' joint exercises with foreign 
military forces, humanitarian operations of various kinds, port visits 
by U.S. ships, officer exchanges, sharing of intelligence, and many, 
many other activities.
  Collectively, all of these activities come at a high cost both in 
money and in the demands on the U.S. military personnel around the 
globe.
  The benefits of these missions, however, are far greater than their 
costs. As my fellow Missourian Harry Truman once said, ``We must be 
prepared to pay the price for peace or surely we will pay the price of 
war.''
  Today the price of peace is this: That the United States must 
continue to play the leading role in building and maintaining 
international stability. In order to fulfill that responsibility, the 
Nation must maintain substantial, well-trained, well-equipped military 
forces capable of engaging in military actions across the entire 
spectrum of missions from delivering humanitarian supplies, to showing 
the flag, to peace enforcement operations that may be as intense as a 
major theater war.
  Unfortunately, I do not think that the need for the United States to 
play this role and to maintain sufficient military strength to do it is 
fully understood either in this Congress or among the public as a 
whole. Moreover, I do not think that either the Clinton administration 
or the Bush administration has done a particularly good job of 
explaining the missions of U.S. military forces in the post-Cold War 
world.
  Today, I want to address one of the principal reasons for maintaining 
U.S. military strength, that global instability will present dire 
threats to American interests unless the United States actively 
addresses it.
  Since the end of the Cold War, many people have questioned the need 
for the United States to maintain strong military forces and to 
preserve its military abroad. Now that the Soviet Union is gone, they 
say, where is the enemy? And why do we need to spend so much money on 
defense when no single powerful foe or group of foes can easily be 
identified?
  My answer is that there is indeed an enemy and it may be more 
insidious than ever precisely because it is so difficult to perceive 
clearly. The enemy is instability and requires as much vigilance as any 
more conventional foe has ever required.
  Mr. Speaker, let me begin by drawing a simple lesson from the recent 
events in the Persian Gulf and from my last year's stare-down with 
China. In the Persian Gulf, the rules are clear. Both Iran and Iraq 
know that a no-fly zone remains in place south of the 33rd parallel and 
that any military aircraft flying into the area may be shot down 
without warning.
  In Asia, the formula for addressing the status of Taiwan that has 
been accepted by the United States and others for many years is to say 
that both the government of Beijing and the government of Taipei regard 
Taiwan as part of China and that the status of Taiwan will not be 
resolved by force. The rules with regard to Taiwan, therefore, are also 
clear. China has undertaken not to use force, and the United States has 
not supported Taiwan's independence.
  Even though the rules are clear in the Persian Gulf and in Taiwan, 
however, recent events illustrate a simple point--that in international 
affairs, the rules are not self-enforcing. On the contrary, without 
constant, direct U.S. attention and leadership, the forces of 
disorder--always testing the limits--would eventually prevail. In the 
Persian Gulf, Iran and Iraq would soon drive the region into chaos and 
hope to benefit from the disruption of oil supplies to the rest of the 
world. In Asia, China would prefer to have a free hand to dominate the 
region, which is not a prescription for peace. Peace and stability are 
not the natural order of things. On the contrary, instability will 
always rise, like entropy in the realm of physics, unless energy is 
constantly applied to preserve order.
  This lesson is an obvious one--and the use of the Nimitz to support 
U.S. security objectives is a clear and evident example of the 
importance of U.S. military power. But U.S. military power is also 
important in a host of other, less apparent ways.
  Consider, for example, the implications of the recent U.S. agreement 
with Japan on defense cooperation. What is important about the 
agreement is not in the details--how Japan will provide support for 
U.S. military operations, whether Japan can opt out of supporting U.S. 
forces in certain cases, whether more should have been agreed on issues 
like missiles defense, and so on. What is most important is the fact of 
the agreement itself. The agreement reaffirms the fact that Japan sees 
its security relationship with the United States as the bulwark of a 
secure international order in Asia even after the Cold War has ended.
  That the Clinton Administration was able to reach this agreement with 
Japan is, it seems to me, a triumph for American security of no small 
order. It came after several years of conflict with Japan over trade 
issues, during a time when China is beginning to flex muscles and is 
starting to build up its military capability, and in the face of grave 
doubts around the world that the United States would maintain its 
international leadership. Any or all of those factors could have led 
Japan to conclude that the security treaty with the United States was 
too weak a pillar on which to continue to rest its security policy. The 
agreement was the result of several years of effort on the part of 
senior officials in the Defense Department and in the Department of 
State, beginning with the so-called ``Nye report'' of 1995, named after 
former Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye, which forcefully 
reasserted the U.S. security interested in Asia and promised a 
continued, large and powerful U.S. military presence in the region.
  I believe that the new U.S.-Japan security cooperation agreement is a 
cornerstone of stability in Asia precisely because it binds the United 
States and Japan together more closely. It means that Japan will not 
feel itself forced to develop an independent military capacity that 
would be threatening to others in the region. It means that North Korea 
will be discouraged from thinking that it can divide South Korea's 
allies. It means that China will have less reason to believe that it 
can use military strength to build a position of dominance of the in 
the Region. It means that for other nations in the region, the United 
States

[[Page H9710]]

will remain, for the foreseeable future, the ally of choice in 
determining whom to support if tensions rise over any number of issues. 
As a result, a great deal has been accomplished to prevent instability 
in the region from growing.

  All of this, it seems to me, has been achieved only because the 
United States made its commitment to the region so clear, both in the 
words of the Nye report and in the substance of the continued U.S. 
military presence in the region.
  Contrast the positive Japanese view of its alliance with the United 
States with the attitude of France, another key ally. The French for 
many years have been of the view that the United States will eventually 
turn away from its active leadership in international security affairs 
and leave Europe to the Europeans. I believe that judgment is wrong, 
but it appears nonetheless to guide French foreign policy, and the 
result has often been troublesome. Most recently, for example, the 
French have backed away from their commitment to rejoin the NATO 
military command structure because they object to continued U.S. 
command of the NATO southern region. More distressing to me is that 
President Chirac has made recent trips to China and to Russia in which 
he has said that France's interests and the interests of other nations 
would be served by the evolution of a multipolar world in which France 
would maintain close bilateral ties with other coequal powers. This is, 
of course, a very thinly veiled criticism of a unipolar world 
presumably dominated by the United States.
  Fortunately, other major U.S. allies in Europe understand that the 
United States is not a domineering, lone, superpower, but rather the 
bulwark of an international effort in which the realm of peace and 
prosperity can grow and the realm of conflict and impoverishment can be 
contained. Most importantly, other allies also believe that the United 
States will continue to play a leadership role in building and 
maintaining a new post-Cold War security system throughout Europe and 
will be active in the rest of the world as well. The key to preventing 
destabilizing conflicts in Europe and elsewhere is to maintain a system 
of alliances in which the United States is inextricably involved. And 
in order to maintain such alliances, the United States must continually 
show the allies that it is resolved to stay involved and to maintain 
its military capabilities.
  In emphasizing the critically important role that U.S. military 
strength plays in promoting stability, I am not, of course, suggesting 
that the United States can or should try to respond to every conflict 
around the world. As every president in recent years has affirmed, we 
are not a global policeman. It is important, however, first, that we 
understand how instability even in remote parts of the world may 
threaten our security and, second, that we continue to devote 
sufficient resources to defense to continue our active leadership role.
  For much of it history, the United States thought of itself as being 
insulated from conflicts abroad by our favored geographical position as 
a rich continental nation protected by wide oceans. The one permanent 
goal of U.S. policy was to ensure freedom of navigation. The 
twentieth century, however, has brought our relative isolation to an 
end. Ever since Pearl Harbor, Americans have understood that our 
security cannot be separated from the security and stability of key 
regions overseas.

  In recent years, every major development in technology, 
communications, transportation, and even in culture has served to 
shrink the globe still further. Today, the security of America is 
affected, directly or indirectly, by all kinds of developments 
overseas. We understand, of course, that stability in Europe, East 
Asia, and the oil producing areas of the Middle East is critical to our 
security and our economic well-being. Many, many areas of the globe 
that we once considered of only remote interest, however, are becoming 
increasingly important as well.
  North Africa is a case in point. With the World Trade Center bombing, 
terrorism fostered by religious extremism in North Africa came directly 
to the United States. Moreover, we have struggled for years with the 
threats posed by the Government of Libya and now by the extremists in 
charge in the Sudan as well. The same Islamic extremists as in Sudan 
murdered the late Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and continue to 
threaten President Hosni Mubarak and destabilize Egypt. The combination 
of poverty, explosive population growth, and ideological warfare that 
is plaguing the southern rim of the Mediterranean, therefore, is not 
something we can safely ignore. Instability in that part of the world 
will inevitably affect the prosperity and the safety of Americans 
unless its consequences are addressed. A secure and economically 
advanced North Africa would be a great boon to Europe and to the rest 
of the world, while a North Africa descending into chaos will threaten 
us all. What we can do to resolve the horrible civil war in Algeria may 
be limited. We are working with our allies to help broker peace, and we 
should continue to do so. Most importantly, we must continue to be 
engaged with Egypt and other critically important, friendly nations in 
the area to help bolster their security.
  In an even more distant part of the world, Central Asia, U.S. 
interests are also more and more obviously at stake. Azerbaijan, 
Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan have inherited some of the largest as yet 
unexploited reserves of gas and oil in the world. For these emerging 
nations, such resources may be a source of wealth that can spur 
economic growth and bring full integration into the world community. 
But such resources may also occasion internal conflict and incite 
external exploitation. Our principal goal is to ensure that the 
resources of the area are not dominated by a hostile power and that 
access is free and open. Thus, the United States clearly has an 
interest in promoting peace in the region, in strengthening the fragile 
governments of the area, and in building regional security. Much of the 
work to be done is diplomatic and economic in nature, but a military 
component is important as well. Military-to-military ties are 
potentially of immense value. Recently, the United States Central 
Command carried out a joint exercise with Kazakh armed forces that 
received a great deal of positive attention in the area. Most 
importantly, U.S. leadership is critical in building the institutional 
framework which will bind the emerging nations of the region to the 
prosperous, secure part of the world. All of these nations have 
participated in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, the Partnership 
for Peace, and the strengthening Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe. The United States had the vision and the 
international stature to forge these new institutions, and only 
continued U.S. military engagement in such organizations can keep them 
vital.

  Finally, U.S. interests are affected by developments in distant parts 
of the world because of the global nature of challenges ranging from 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and weapons delivery 
systems, to terrorism, to information sabotage and warfare, to the 
narcotics trade and other international criminal activities. There are 
no simple technological fixes to any of these problems that will allow 
the United States the luxury of disengagement from potentially messy 
conflicts throughout the world. The main cause of proliferation lies in 
regional conflicts which lead both would-be aggressors and threatened 
victims to seek security by gaining access to advanced weapons. 
Terrorism is, in large part, an outgrowth of local conflicts and social 
disintegration. Threats to information security may come from many 
sources, including systematic efforts to disrupt western economies by 
rogue states or by small non-state groups. Narco-terrorism has 
undermined democracy in parts of Latin America. Colombia is close to 
collapse. If it goes, several nations may follow--for example, 
Venezuela, which provides the U.S. three million barrels of oil daily. 
International criminal activity is a threat of free economic activity 
in large parts of the world, and it may damage U.S. security by 
undermining economic stability in many newly emerging nations.
  While none of these challenges can be decisively defeated by a swift 
military strike, U.S. economic, political, and military engagement 
throughout the world is essential to combat the most serious threats. I 
am concerned, however, that we may, over time, fail to maintain the 
level of engagement that is necessary. Two potential failures, in 
particular, worry me.
  One is a failure of understanding. Too often the debate about U.S. 
military spending and about the role of U.S. military forces in the 
world seems to me to miss the key point. As I said earlier, many of my 
colleagues too easily dismiss concerns about the state of our armed 
forces simply by asking ``who is the enemy?'' Others oversimplify the 
debate by pointing out that the United States now spends vastly more on 
the military than various combinations of potential foes. Both of these 
arguments are entirely beside the point. Today, instability is the 
enemy, and it is a very dangerous and pernicious enemy. As a result, 
how much we need to spend on the military is not a function of how much 
or how little others spend. Our defense requirements are determined by 
the strategy we need to follow to cope with a world full of uncertainty 
and danger. We need sufficient forces, fully engaged around the world, 
to prevent conflict with arising where possible, to deter conflict if 
it appears about to break out, and to prevail if conflict does arise. 
If this costs more than North Korea or Libya spends on the military, it 
should not be surprising.
  Another failure of understanding is to argue that the United States 
should no longer have to play as active a leadership role as it did 
during the Cold War. Many of my colleagues argue that the allies should 
be required to bear a larger part of the burden of ensuring 
international security, especially in responding to regional conflicts 
that require peacekeeping forces or a constant military presence. Some 
say that the United States should focus on preparing for large scale 
regional conflicts and should leave smaller scale operations to others. 
My view is precisely the opposite--that

[[Page H9711]]

the United States may have to play a more active leadership role than 
ever now that threats to international security are more ambiguous. As 
I explained earlier in this speech, the reasons ought to be apparent--
only the United States has the ability to project power sufficient to 
deter threats to the peace in regions like the Persian Gulf or the 
Taiwan straits; only the promise of continued, active U.S. military 
engagement in key regions will gain cooperation from major allies and 
maintain the U.S. position as the ally of choice when conflicts arise; 
U.S. security interests are directly threatened by challenges even in 
distant parts of the globe, and only U.S. leadership can build the 
institutional framework needed to bring stability; and new global 
challenges across a wide spectrum threaten the United States in ways 
that require direct involvement.
  Let me make one other point to those who are concerned about 
burdensharing. I agree that we should expect allies to contribute fully 
and fairly in maintaining international stability. But I also believe 
that only American leadership can ensure effective allied cooperation. 
In Bosnia, for example, the allies were willing to commit forces for 
several years, but without bringing about a peace settlement. Only when 
the United States became directly involved was a resolution achieved. 
Moreover, no other nation could design the architecture of a new 
regional security order as the United States has done in Europe and is 
working to do in Asia. In a way, there is a paradox to burdensharing--
if we want the allies to do more, then we probably have to do more too.
  The final failure with which I am concerned is a failure to provide 
adequate resources. I began this speech by making note of the role the 
aircraft carrier Nimitz has played in deterring conflicts. Today, we 
are running on the very edge of sufficiency in the number of carriers 
we keep in the force. We no longer maintain a permanent carrier 
presence in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean--instead, we swing 
carriers periodically from one area to the other, and we surge into a 
region if circumstances require. At best, this is barely adequate. I am 
concerned that long-term budget pressures will erode the size of the 
Navy to a level that will not allow even the current amount of 
coverage. Even if we do not reduce the number of carriers, we are 
reducing the number of other ships in the Navy--within five years, we 
will be down to 300 ships, substantially below the level of about 330 
that the Clinton Administration said was needed when it first came into 
office, and the currently planned pace of shipbuilding will support no 
more than a 200 ship fleet in the long run. Our military presence in 
Asia--a presence that gave Japan confidence enough to revitalize the 
alliance--will be in danger.
  Moreover, throughout this statement, I have emphasized, time and 
again, the value of U.S. military engagement all around the world. But 
one outcome of the Pentagon's recent Quadrennial Defense Review--the 
``QDR''--was to acknowledge the strain that the current high pace of 
military operations is placing on our troops, especially on those based 
abroad in Europe and elsewhere. As one way to reduce the strain, the 
QDR called for a limit on the number of ``engagement'' exercises that 
the regional military commanders had earlier been free to undertake. I 
am not arguing that this is the wrong thing to do--on the contrary, I 
strongly support the Defense Department's efforts to reduce the 
pressure on military personnel. But the need to limit such exercises 
points to the simple fact that the size of the force today is, at best, 
barely adequate to meet peacetime requirements while preparing for 
major regional conflicts. Defense budget constraints, I fear, will 
force further cuts in the size of the force in the future, with a 
devastating effect on our ability to cope with instability around the 
world.
  Mr. Speaker, today the United States has an opportunity to promote a 
more peaceful, stable world than those of us who lived through the 
troubling middle years of the 20th Century would ever have thought 
possible. To do so, however, requires constant vigilance and permanent 
U.S. engagement abroad. The world will never be entirely at peace. With 
continued American leadership, however, the threats to peace can be 
contained, and the realm of peace and prosperity can grow. This 
requires that the citizens of the United States and the Members of this 
Congress understand that instability is the enemy and that sufficient 
resources are needed to combat it.

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