[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 144 (Thursday, October 23, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S11037-S11041]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. LOTT (for himself, Mr. Lieberman, Mr. McConnell, Mr. Reid, 
        Mr. D'Amato, Mrs. Boxer, Mr. Coverdell, Mr. Helms, Mr. Durbin, 
        Mr. McCain, Mr. Brownback, Mr. Bennett, Mr. Campbell, Mr. 
        Feingold, Mr. Mack, Mr. Shelby, Mr. Wyden, Mr. Hutchinson, Mrs. 
        Feinstein, Mr. Hollings, Ms. Mikulski, Mr. Nickles, Mr. 
        Cleland, Mr. Inouye, Mr. Dorgan, Mr. Bryan, Mr. Abraham, and 
        Mr. Reed):
  S. 1311. A bill to impose certain sanctions on foreign persons who 
transfer items contributing to Iran's efforts to acquire, develop, or 
produce ballistic missiles; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.


          the iran missile proliferation sanctions act of 1997

  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Iran Missile 
Proliferation Sanctions Act of 1997. I am pleased to be joined in this 
bipartisan effort by Senator Lieberman, as well as Senators McConnell, 
Reid, D'Amato, Boxer, Coverdell, Helms, Durbin, McCain, Brownback, 
Bennett, Campbell, Feingold, Mack, Shelby, Wyden, Hutchinson, 
Feinstein, Hollings, Mikulski, Nickles, Cleland, Inouye, Dorgan, and 
Bryan.
  This is very important legislation which addresses a serious threat, 
in my opinion, to American security: Iran's relentless efforts to 
acquire ballistic missile technology. There is no doubt that Iran is 
the major proliferation danger in the world today. Iran is committed to 
developing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and the means to 
deliver them.
  The consequences of Iran's ballistic missile development would be 
disastrous. Iran actively supports terrorist groups around the world. 
Earlier this year, a German court found Iran's intelligence services 
responsible for assassinations on German soil. There is a very real 
possibility that Iran was behind the murder of 19 Americans in the 
Khobar Towers bombing on June 25, 1996.
  News reports now indicate that Iran is developing two missiles with 
ranges of 800 or more than 1,200 miles. Such missiles would be able to 
reach American forces stationed in the Persian Gulf. They would be able 
to reach Israel. They would be able to reach our NATO ally, Turkey. 
They would be able to reach all the way into Central Europe, as a 
matter of fact.
  The terrorist regime in Iran has already demonstrated its willingness 
and ability to use bombings and hit squads to support its radical 
agenda in the Middle East and in Europe. We cannot sit back and allow 
Tehran to acquire ballistic missile capability that could hit even more 
targets with the push of a button, possibly even with nuclear warheads.
  This administration's track record on dealing with Iran is not 
encouraging. We are always anxious to work with the administration in 
these important foreign policy issues. In 1995, with great fanfare, the 
administration announced it was strongly opposed to the sale of Russian 
nuclear reactors to Iran and the issue would be handled in the 
commission headed by Vice President Gore and Russian Prime Minister 
Chernomyrdin. In the intervening 2 years there has been no progress in 
halting that sale, or sales of this type.
  In 1995 the administration gave a green light to Iranian extremists 
who gained a foothold in Europe by arming the Bosnian Government. The 
residue of that green light still affects the situation in Bosnia 
today. So, there are problems, obviously, in this area.
  When the news reports in the Washington Times over the last month 
indicated that there were very serious concerns about Russian support 
for Iran's missile technology programs, many of us on Capitol Hill 
looked for action. Vice President Gore, we were told, would raise the 
issue with the Prime Minister when he was in Russia, but the response 
that he received apparently was to call the news report ``stupid'' and 
``not worthy of comment.''
  I think, after consultation with the administration, that this 
legislation is necessary because not enough has been done to address 
this Iranian missile development. I believe it is clear that existing 
United States law has been broken by Russian entities. Emissaries have 
gone to Moscow, information has been shared. Yet, no sanctions action 
has been taken by the administration.
  This legislation is necessary because it is time to act. Many have 
recently expressed concern about Congress imposing ``unilateral'' 
sanctions. My response is that Congress will step into a vacuum and 
take unilateral action when inadequate action is being taken in other 
areas.
  The legislation is quite simple. It requires the President to report 
in 30 days, and every 180 days thereafter, on entities that have 
transferred or attempted to transfer goods, technology, technical 
assistance or facilities that contribute to Iran's efforts to acquire, 
develop or produce ballistic missiles.
  The legislation requires three sanctions on any such entities: No 
export of American arms, no export of restricted dual-use items, and no 
American Government assistance. So it is a targeted sanction, aimed at 
the entities involved in these actions.
  Congress has established with successive administrations, special 
criteria in existing law for each of these three things. Our 
legislation simply says if you help Iran acquire ballistic missile 
capability, you will not get arms, controlled exports, or taxpayer-
financed aid.
  Similar bipartisan legislation is being introduced in the House 
today. I refer back to my opening remarks. There are already, I believe 
some 26 Senators who are cosponsoring on both sides of the aisle, from 
all regions of the country and all philosophical spectrums.
  I hope the Senate will take action on this legislation before the end 
of the session. Certainly, it will provide, hopefully, some additional 
impetus for the administration to aggressively address this issue. A 
number of changes have been made in the legislation to meet policy and 
legal concerns of the administration, and I hope the administration 
will see the merits of imposing these serious and rapid sanctions on 
entities which aid Iran's efforts to threaten American forces and 
American allies.
  We cannot stand mute. We cannot ignore this very serious matter. We 
will continue to work with the administration and support any 
aggressive efforts that they care to use. But after serious 
consideration, and after consultation particularly with Senator 
Lieberman, I thought it was important that we go ahead and introduce 
this legislation today, and explain why we are doing it.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 1311

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Iran Missile Proliferation 
     Sanctions Act of 1997''.

     SEC. 2. REPORTS ON MISSILE PROLIFERATION TO IRAN.

       (a) Reports.--Except as provided in subsection (c), at the 
     times specified in subsection (b), the President shall submit 
     to the Committee on International Relations of the House of 
     Representatives and the Committee

[[Page S11038]]

     on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report identifying every 
     foreign person with respect to whom there is credible 
     evidence indicating that that person, on or after August 8, 
     1995--
       (1) transferred goods or technology, or provided technical 
     assistance or facilities, that contributed to Iran's efforts 
     to acquire, develop, or produce ballistic missiles; or
       (2) attempted to transfer goods or technology, or attempted 
     to provide technical assistance or facilities, that would 
     have contributed to Iran's efforts to acquire, develop, or 
     produce ballistic missiles.
       (b) Timing of Reports.--The reports under subsection (a) 
     shall be submitted not later than 30 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, not later than 180 days after such 
     date of enactment, not later than 360 days after such date of 
     enactment, and annually thereafter.
       (c) Exception for Persons Previously Identified or 
     Sanctioned or Subject to Waiver.--Any person who--
       (1) was identified in a previous report submitted pursuant 
     to subsection (a);
       (2) has engaged in a transfer or transaction that was the 
     basis for the imposition of sanctions with respect to that 
     person pursuant to section 73 of the Arms Export Control Act 
     or section 1604 of the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act 
     of 1992; or
       (3) may have engaged in a transfer or transaction, or made 
     an attempt, that was the subject of a waiver pursuant to 
     section 4,
     is not required to be identified on account of that same 
     transfer, transaction, or attempt, in any report thereafter 
     submitted pursuant to this section.

     SEC. 3. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.

       (a) Requirement To Impose Sanctions.--
       (1) Requirement to impose sanctions.--The sanctions 
     described in subsection (b) shall be imposed on--
       (A) any foreign person identified under subsection (a)(1) 
     of section 2 in a report submitted pursuant to that section; 
     and
       (B) any foreign person identified under subsection (a)(2) 
     of section 2 in a report submitted pursuant to that section, 
     if that person has been identified in that report or a 
     previous report as having made at least 1 other attempt 
     described in subsection (a)(2) of that section.
       (2) Effective date of sanctions.--The sanctions shall be 
     effective--
       (A) 30 days after the date on which the report triggering 
     the sanction is submitted, if the report is submitted on or 
     before the date required by section 2(b);
       (B) 30 days after the date required by section 2(b) for 
     submitting the report, if the report triggering the sanction 
     is submitted within 30 days after that date; and
       (C) immediately after the report triggering the sanction is 
     submitted, if that report is submitted more than 30 days 
     after the date required by section 2(b).
       (b) Description of Sanctions.--The sanctions referred to in 
     subsection (a) that are to be imposed on a foreign person 
     described in that subsection are the following:
       (1) Arms export sanction.--For a period of not less than 2 
     years, the United States Government shall not sell to that 
     person any item on the United States Munitions List as of 
     August 8, 1995, and shall terminate sales to that person of 
     any defense articles, defense services, or design and 
     construction services under the Arms Export Control Act.
       (2) Dual use sanction.--For a period of not less than 2 
     years, the authorities of section 6 of the Export 
     Administration Act of 1979 shall be used to prohibit the 
     export of any goods or technology on the control list 
     established pursuant to section 5(c)(1) of that Act to that 
     person.
       (3) United states assistance.--For a period of not less 
     than 2 years, the United States Government shall not provide 
     any assistance in the form of grants, loans, credits, 
     guarantees, or otherwise, to that person.

     SEC. 4. WAIVER.

       The President may waive the imposition of any sanction that 
     otherwise would be required to be imposed pursuant to section 
     3 on any foreign person 15 days after the President 
     determines and reports to the Committee on International 
     Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee 
     on Foreign Relations of the Senate that, on the basis of 
     information provided by the person, or otherwise obtained by 
     the President, the President is persuaded that the person did 
     not, on or after August 8, 1995--
       (1) transfer goods or technology, or provide technical 
     assistance or facilities, that contributed to Iran's efforts 
     to acquire, develop, or produce ballistic missiles; or
       (2) attempt on more than one occasion to transfer goods or 
     technology, or to provide technical assistance or facilities, 
     that would have contributed to Iran's efforts to acquire, 
     develop, or produce ballistic missiles.

     SEC. 5. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING ACTIONS BY 
                   GOVERNMENT OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION.

       As part of each report submitted pursuant to section 2, the 
     President shall include the following information with 
     respect to each person identified in that report:
       (1) A statement regarding whether the government of primary 
     jurisdiction over that person was aware of the activities 
     that were the basis for the identification of that individual 
     in the report.
       (2) If the government of primary jurisdiction was not aware 
     of the activities that were the basis for the identification 
     of that individual in the report, an explanation of the 
     reasons why the United States Government did not inform that 
     government of those activities.
       (3) If the government of primary jurisdiction was aware of 
     the activities that were the basis for the identification of 
     that individual in the report, a description of the efforts, 
     if any, undertaken by that government to prevent those 
     activities, and an assessment of the effectiveness of those 
     efforts, including an explanation of why those efforts 
     failed.
       (4) If the government of primary jurisdiction was aware of 
     the activities that were the basis for the identification of 
     that individual in the report and failed to undertake 
     effective efforts to prevent those activities, a description 
     of any sanctions that have been imposed on that government by 
     the United States Government because of such failure.

     SEC. 6. DEFINITIONS.

       In this Act:
       (1) Government of primary jurisdiction.--The term 
     ``government of primary jurisdiction'' means the government 
     under whose laws a foreign person is organized, or the 
     government of the place where a foreign person is 
     headquartered or habitually resides.
       (2) Foreign person.--The term ``foreign person'' means a 
     natural person as well as a corporation, business 
     association, partnership, society, trust, any other 
     nongovernmental entity, organization, or group, and any 
     governmental entity operating as a business enterprise, and 
     any successor or subsidiary of any such entity that is 
     organized, headquartered, or habitually resides outside the 
     United States.

  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I am pleased to join my friend and 
colleague Senator Lott, and the other cosponsors, in offering this bill 
which addresses what I believe is one of the most serious and urgent 
national security threats facing this country. Ballistic missiles in 
the hands of a nation that has been our most implacable foe in the 
recent past and that has been the single most intransigent supporter of 
terrorism against this Nation and our allies should fill any right 
thinking person anywhere with the most profound fear and concern. 
Indeed, we here in this body have often expressed our concern. We have 
given the administration the tools to address this problem, 
specifically in the Arms Export Control Act and in the Iran-Iraq 
Sanctions Act. Regrettably, our concern and these tools have not yet 
resolved this threat. In fact, it is widely and reliably reported that 
persons in Russia continue to provide both technology and assistance to 
Iran such that Iran may be now only 8 months from acquiring ballistic 
missiles that could be combined with weapons of mass destruction to 
threaten United States forces and our allies and friends in the Middle 
East. And soon after that, our forces and allies throughout Europe.
  This would be a profound change in the balance of power in the 
region, and strike a serious, perhaps fatal blow to our ability to 
contain Iran until it becomes a responsible member of the community of 
nations. It would allow Iran to threaten friendly Arab states, making 
it harder for them to cooperate with the United States. It would raise 
the risks to U.S. military forces in the region. And it would threaten 
the free flow of oil in this critical region, which could create crises 
in places far from the Persian Gulf.
  We must act to try to prevent this from happening. We must tell 
Russia in no uncertain terms that we are serious, and that the time for 
slow progress in shutting off Russian assistance is past.
  Many of us are aware that the degree of government control over 
dangerous technology in the former Soviet Union has eroded 
considerably. While trying to remedy this potentially frightful 
situation, the Russian Government must contend with other pressing 
internal issues. The results are that persons or groups within Russia 
have had the latitude to transfer technology to rouge states such as 
Iran.
  We have the opportunity as well as the obligation to stand up, be 
counted, and take reasonable steps to deter this type of potentially 
cataclysmic activity. While we cannot expect to prevent all such 
technology transfers to rogue states, we do have the ability to check 
the flow of it through sanctions aimed at persons engaged in such 
activity. We also are able and must take appropriate action against 
those governments that condone such activity, whether they are 
organizing and abetting such transfer or merely looking the other way 
when their citizens engage in these activities.
  For many years, the United States and the few other members of the 
missile club of nations could be reasonably

[[Page S11039]]

assured that these missiles armed with nuclear weapons would not be 
used. That was because the leaders of these nations were generally 
reasoned individuals who shared many of the same goals. As this 
technology has spread to other countries--and continues to expand at an 
alarming rate--some of the leaders share very different views on 
methods to solve confrontation. We have to actively guard against these 
weapons becoming available to what most of the world considers to be 
unstable states governed by leaders whose thinking is outside the 
mainstream.
  We have been engaged in dialogue across a wide spectrum with our 
friends and allies in trying to prevent this from happening. As I 
mentioned earlier, the prospect of a nuclear capable, militarily 
powerful Iran armed with ballistic missiles, is clearly not in our 
national interests. Our efforts at putting controls on the flow of 
technology to rogue states have been laudable, but the sieve has been 
leaking.
  The sanctions we are proposing will further stop the diffusion of 
technology and lead toward a more stable Middle East. I fully support 
this effort because it will help prevent further technology transfer 
into an area that has seen several major wars in the last thirty years 
and that remains a region of vital national interest not only to us but 
to most of the industrial world.
  In closing, I want to take this opportunity to express my thanks to 
Senator Lott for his leadership in this matter. This is an important 
step toward a safer world.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, the subject of the transfer of sensitive 
missile, weapons of mass destruction, and advanced conventional weapons 
technology to Iran is far more complicated than most of us would like 
to admit. As neighbors in a volatile region, Russia and Iran have a 
long history of mutual antipathy alternating with periods of intense 
cooperation. The official atheism of the former Soviet Union was 
anathema to the Islamic tenets of revolutionary Iran. The former 
enjoyed the benefits of a sizable buffer between Russia proper and the 
Persian kingdom-turned-fundamentalist regime.
  With the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. and the emergence of 
independent Islamic governments along its southern frontier, Russia no 
longer enjoys the security it once maintained. Certainly, the absence 
of the kind of domestic and foreign security apparatus characteristic 
of its totalitarian past has exacerbated the problem of stemming 
Islamic influence, and Russia has sought to maintain an active military 
role in the region to prevent the spread of such influence, as well as 
of the kind of fighting that ravaged Tajikistan for years. The state of 
its economy, combined with its desire to maintain the best possible 
relations with Iran, have led Russia to pursue policies thoroughly 
inimical to vital United States interests in the Middle East.
  Herein lies the problem. It is in the interests of the United States 
for Russia to develop economically, obviously through free market 
mechanisms. It is in Russia's interest to have access to Iranian oil, 
to the revenue generated by sales to Teheran of whatever the latter 
will buy, and to be able to maintain cordial relations with a regime 
that possesses, albeit less so since its presidential election, the 
wherewithal to destabilize the region. Consequently, any decision to 
impose sanctions on Russia for its sale of missile and other advanced 
weapons technologies to Iran understandably should come only after an 
extraordinarily cautious appraisal of the potential ramifications of 
doing so.
  I stand before the Senate today to state as emphatically as I can 
that such sanctions must be imposed. While news reports of missile 
technology sales, in violation of both the 1987 Missile Technology 
Control Regime and the 1992 Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act, have 
appeared in great numbers over the past several months, the problem 
clearly has history going back years that the administration continues 
to ignore at our and our allies peril. Were the problem not one of such 
duration, the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act, of which I was a 
principal sponsor along with then-Senator Al Gore, would not have been 
necessary 5 years ago. Were the problem a recent manifestation of 
Iranian ambitions and Russian inability or unwillingness to control the 
flow of militarily sensitive technologies, I would be willing to 
respect the administration's prerogative in the conduct of United 
States foreign policy.

  Such, however, is not the case. Developments involving Russia and 
Iran--and I am not intending to ignore China, simply focusing on a more 
immediate and larger scale problem of the moment--are indicative of a 
more systemic problem not conducive to quiet diplomacy and seemingly 
endless patience. The Teheran Times boasted in November 1995 of 
Russia's intransigence in the face of United States efforts at 
dissuading it from providing Iran with nuclear technology. Earlier that 
year, Russia's Minister for Atomic Energy, Viktor Mikhailov, spoke of 
his Government's intention to sell Iran a centrifuge for the enrichment 
of used nuclear fuel. More recently, reports of contracts being signed 
between Russian companies and research institutes--organizations with 
which the Government maintains an integral relationship--for the 
provision of missile components, including guidance systems, laser 
equipment, wind tunnels for the testing of warheads and missiles, and 
militarily sensitive materials like tungsten-coated graphite, all 
illuminate a problem of enormous magnitude that, Moscow's protestations 
notwithstanding, nevertheless reflect minimal effort on that 
government's part to impede the flow of such technology to Iran.
  Russia sees its economic interests as lying very much in closer 
relations with Iran. Pipelines transporting Caspian Sea oil and natural 
gas present Russia with potential revenue in the hundreds of millions 
of dollars, should it prevail in dictating future pipeline routes. 
Iran's announcement last year of a joint shipping venture with Russia 
similarly illuminated the depth of the growing economic relationship 
between the two countries. The economic importance of Iran to Russia 
and Russia's lack of viable exports other than the very weapon systems 
that threaten United States interests in the Middle East have created a 
dilemma, but one with which we must come to grips.
  Moscow, similarly, must confront the implications of its actions or 
inactions with respect to the transfer of militarily sensitive 
technology. It clearly places enormous economic importance on its 
relationship with Iran, but it needs to be reminded that it fails 
within the range of the very missiles it is helping Iran to develop. 
Russia may, in the end, find itself selling Teheran the rope with which 
to hang itself.
  The administration must comply with existing United States laws. It 
must take Russia to task, in the form of economic sanctions, for the 
continuing problem of missile technology transfer to Iran. Russia must 
be made to see that its economic well-being does not lie with 
transactions that threaten United States interests. Russia desperately 
wants recognition as a major global player despite its inability to 
influence events militarily or economically far beyond its borders. 
When the United States, Germany, or Japan coughs, much of the 
industrialized world catches cold. When Russia coughs, Moscow catches 
cold. If Russia wants to see the Group of Seven be permanently enlarged 
by one, it must accept that its economic future lies with the 
democracies of North America, Europe, and Asia--not with rogue regimes 
that seek to threaten the interests of those nations.
  The Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act mandates sanctions against 
both foreign companies and governments for the transfer of missile, 
chemical, biological and nuclear weapon technologies as well as 
advanced conventional systems. It further provides for discretionary 
sanctions. Russia has thoroughly violated the act, as well as the MTCR. 
Not only has it transferred to Iran missile and nuclear technology, it 
has sold to Teheran advanced surface-to-air missile systems, three 
Kilo-class attack submarines with which Iran fully intends to asserts 
its control over the vital Strait of Hormuz, modern T-72 main battle 
tanks, and MiG-29 fighter and Su-24 strike aircraft. If the cumulative 
effect of these weapon sales does not violate both the MTCR and the 
Iran-Iraq Act, then nothing does. And, Mr. President, as a principal 
sponsor of the latter legislation, I can personally attest that, 
irrespective of administration determinations constructed to suit its 
policy preferences,

[[Page S11040]]

these transfers from Russia do violate both the letter and the intent 
of the law.
  The administration must act on this issue of utmost importance to 
United States national security interests. The Middle East lies at the 
center of our National Security Strategy and the force structure 
exercises that repeatedly postulate the likelihood of future conflict 
in that strife-torn region. The administration has not presented to 
Congress any reason, compelling or otherwise, for its refusal to abide 
by Public Law 102-484 and the MTCR. Congress must demand that it do so, 
or impose sanctions accordingly. Its failure to do so is inexcusable. 
The ramifications of that failure will be serious indeed, and the costs 
will inevitably be paid in American blood.
  That is why we are introducing legislation to toughen existing 
statutes by making the imposition of sanctions more certain and 
requiring that the administration report to Congress information on 
weapons sales that will better enable the legislative branch of 
Government to determine for itself whether past failures to impose 
sanctions have been warranted. Governments must be held accountable 
when entities within their borders act dangerously irresponsible.
  The administration must comply with the law, or sacrifice its role in 
the formulation of U.S. foreign policy in one of the most important 
regions of the world.
  Mr. WYDEN. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the Iran Missile 
Proliferation Act of 1997, introduced by Senators Lieberman and Lott. 
This legislation is critically needed because of dangerous recent 
developments in the Middle East, namely disturbing reports that 
indicate Iran is acquiring terrifying weapons of mass destruction at an 
alarming pace.
  Iran has become the most serious threat to stability in the Middle 
East and is rapidly developing the means to strike Israel. Very 
recently, Israeli and American intelligence have discovered that, due 
largely to technology obtained from Russia, Iran may soon have the 
capability to begin assembling and testing ballistic missiles capable 
of reaching Israel and other vital targets in the Middle East.
  Russian companies are providing Iran with crucial technologies, 
including wind tunnels for the design of missiles, lasers, and special 
materials for missile construction. There are even reports of over 
9,000 Russian advisers working in Iran on a variety of military 
projects, and Iran earlier this year tested a Soviet-designed rocket 
engine.
  Iran, one of America's foremost self-proclaimed enemies, has been 
linked to numerous anti-Israel terrorist attacks ranging from taking 
hostages and hijacking airlines to carrying out assassinations and 
bombings. These incidents include the taking of more than 30 Western 
hostages in Lebanon from 1984 through 1992, the bombings of the United 
States Embassy and the French-United States Marine barracks in Beirut 
in 1983 and the Buenos Aires terrorist attacks on the Israeli Embassy 
in 1992 and on the Argentine Jewish communal building in 1994. An 
Iranian ballistic missile capability would have enormous strategic 
repercussions for the Persian Gulf and the Middle East. Iran possesses 
chemical weapons, and quite possibly could be only a few years away 
from acquiring nuclear weapons.
  Clearly, the United States must adopt a stronger approach toward 
Russia. To its credit, the administration has tried every diplomatic 
effort with Russia. Vice President Gore and other senior officials have 
addressed this issue at the most senior levels of the Russian 
Government, including with President Yeltsin and Prime Minister 
Chernomydrin, but these efforts have met with little success. Further 
discussions are set for November, however, and I believe Congress must 
act now to enact a more forceful policy which will ensure Russian 
cooperation.
  The Lott-Lieberman legislation requires the President to submit a 
report to Congress 30 days after enactment, providing a list of the 
entities that have been implicated in the transfer or attempted 
transfer of goods, technology, or technical assistance that has 
contributed to Iran's efforts to acquire, develop, or produce ballistic 
missiles. Highly targeted sanctions will be imposed on these entities 
30 days after the submission of the report, unless the President waives 
them under limited circumstances.
  I urge my colleagues to support this vital measure which takes 
concrete steps to halt the spread of ballistic missile technology to 
Iran and to preserve peace and stability in the Middle East.
  Mr. BENNETT. I am pleased to join with the Distinguished Majority 
Leader in sponsoring S. 1311 regarding arms sales to Iran. This is very 
critical legislation. If the relevant governments cannot regain control 
over their weapons sellers, Iran will have a ballistic missile 
capability within months instead of years.
  Mr. President, on Tuesday, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright told 
me, ``Dealing with proliferation is the highest priority item of this 
administration.'' In the national security field, she has the right 
sense of priority. And certainly, Iran is the leading problem country.
  The legislation we are introducing today calls on the administration 
to report on which foreign entities are contributing to Iran's missile 
ambitions. For example, the Washington Times has recently reported on a 
number of important Russian organizations involved in this trade. 
Special metals and associated technology are said to be involved. If 
necessary, sanctions against the named entities will be imposed.
  I hope sanctions will not be necessary. I have some confidence that 
foreign government leaders will fulfill their commitments. But it may 
become necessary. We already know Iran has a chemical warfare 
capability and we suspect it has nuclear and germ warfare ambitions. We 
cannot allow a sponsor of state terrorism like Iran to obtain a 
ballistic missile delivery system.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that an article from the 
October 20, 1997, issue of the Washington Times be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                    Russia Sells Iran Missile Metals

                            (By Bill Gertz)

       A secret Russian production center completed a deal with 
     Iran late last month to supply high-strength steel and 
     special foil for Iran's long-range missile program, The 
     Washington-Times has learned.
       According to a classified United States intelligence 
     report, the Russian Scientific and Production Center Inor 
     concluded an agreement in late September to provide an 
     Iranian factory with four special metal alloys used in long-
     range missiles.
       The report contradicts assurances made by Russian officials 
     only days before the report that Russia had no involvement 
     with the Iranian missile program.
       The report, labeled ``secret,'' says a two-month effort by 
     Inor to market four alloys to Iran's Instrumentation 
     Factories Plan, part of the Iranian Defense Industries 
     Organization, has ``borne fruit'' with the Iranian agreement 
     to buy the material.
       ``With an eye to establishing a long-term business 
     relationship, the Russian firm offered to give the Iranian 
     firm a discount on the total value of the invoice,'' the 
     report states.
       The deal, worked out between Inor Director L.P. Chromova 
     and the Iranian factory director identified as A. 
     Asgharzadeh, amounted to $48,000 for 620 kilograms of alloy, 
     plus several hundred dollars in shipping and packaging costs.
       Efforts to locate and contact Inor were unsuccessful, and a 
     U.S. official said details about the facility are known only 
     to the CIA.
       A CIA spokesman declined to comment.
       The deal includes Inor's offer to provide ``thermal 
     treatment'' for the alloys ``so that the Iranians could 
     process the material themselves,'' the report said.
       The Iranians have bought 240 kilograms of the high-strength 
     steel alloy known as ``21HKMT'' for $24,000, the report said. 
     The steel will be sent in bars that U.S. officials say the 
     Iranians will shape for missile-casing material.
       The remaining materials are alloy foil designated by Inor 
     as ``49K2F,'' ``CUBE2'' and ``5ON'' that are being sold in 
     sheets 0.2 millimeter and 0.4 millimeter thick.
       The special foil is used to shield guidance equipment in 
     missiles--material that is needed only for longer-range 
     missiles.
       ``This gets into the whole business of the longer-range 
     ballistic missiles that they are seeking to develop,'' said 
     one Clinton administration official familiar with the issue. 
     ``There are a number of countries that are very, very 
     concerned about these Shahab-3 and Shahab-4 missiles.''
       During meetings with Vice President Al Gore in Moscow Sept. 
     19 and 20, senior Russian officials, including Russian 
     President Borris Yeltsin and Prime Minister Victor 
     Chernomyrdin, provided the administration with 
     ``commitments'' that Russia is not assisting Iran's missile 
     program, according to a senior White House official.

[[Page S11041]]

       Asked if the administration believes those commitments have 
     halted the missile trade, the senior officials said: ``The 
     answer is, we are not satisfied. We're still concerned about 
     ongoing activities.''
       The official declined to comment on the Inor case, but 
     said, ``to the extent that we see activities going on that we 
     think are contrary to the assurances we've gotten from the 
     Russians, we are making an effort to bring that to their 
     attention and asking them to follow up.''
       One official said ``21HKMT'' is a specialty steel that Iran 
     does not produce. The steel is a key material used by North 
     Korea and Iran for missiles, but it is not controlled under 
     the 31-nation Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
       The Clinton administration has sought to add the alloy to 
     the MTCR control list, but those efforts have been blocked by 
     Russia and France, the official said.
       Inor is one of several Russian scientific and production 
     centers identified by U.S. intelligence agencies as being 
     involved in Iran's development of a liquid-fuel missile 
     similar in design to North Korea's Nodong missile.
       In 1996, Inor prepared several contracts with Iran's Shahid 
     Hemmat Industrial Group, which is in charge of Iran's liquid-
     fuel missile program. Inor brokered deals to supply the 
     Iranians with laser equipment, special mirrors used in 
     missile testing, maraging steel used in missile casings and 
     composite graphite-tungsten material.
       Russia's Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute has been 
     helping Iran build a wind tunnel.
       The Times disclosed last month that several Russian 
     entities were involved in Iran's program to build two 
     derivatives of the Nodong missile, the Shahab-3 and Shahab-4, 
     that will be fielded within three years.
       According to an Israeli military intelligence report 
     provided to the CIA and the Pentagon in January, the Iranians 
     have worked closely with the Russian Space Agency; 
     Rosvoorouzhenie, the Russian government arms-export agency; 
     the Bauman Institute; the missile manufacturer NPO Trud; a 
     firm called Polyus and other institutes.
       The Israeli intelligence report identified Yuri Koptev, 
     head of the Russian Space Agency, as being connected to the 
     project. Mr. Koptev is Mr. Yeltsin's representative in talks 
     with the United States on the issue.
       Asked about Mr. Koptev's role in the Iranian program, the 
     senior White House official said Mr. Koptev was ``irate'' 
     during the meetings in Moscow and felt disclosure of his role 
     was ``an unfair slam.''
       The official said Mr. Koptev has been helpful in seeking to 
     resolve U.S. concerns.
       Mr. Koptev told U.S. officials attending the Moscow meeting 
     that he did not want U.S. aid to the Russian space program to 
     ``collapse'' because of U.S. opposition to the Russia-Iran 
     cooperation, which Mr. Koptev described as ``important in my 
     world, but a secondary issue,'' the official said.
       The official said he believes the Shahab-3 is ``within 
     Iran's basic technical capabilities.'' For the Shahab-4, ``I 
     think the Iranians are more heavily dependent on external, 
     and in particular, Russian, assistance'' to field the system.
                                 ______