[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 144 (Thursday, October 23, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S11034-S11042]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS
By Mr. FORD (for himself, Mr. Helms, Mr. Faircloth, Mr. McConnell,
Mr. Cleland, Mr. Hollings and Mr. Thurmond):
S. 1310. A bill to provide market transition assistance for tobacco
producers, tobacco industry workers, and their communities; to the
Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry.
THE LONG-TERM ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FOR FARMERS ACT
Mr. FORD. Mr. President, on June 20, the attorneys general of several
States emerged from a Washington hotel conference room to announce a
proposed national tobacco settlement. The announcement sent Washington
spin doctors to work, pronouncing the defeat of public enemy number
one--the tobacco industry. Press release after press release painted a
picture of fat cat tobacco executives, rich at the expense of public
health, finally being called to account.
But this picture of tobacco is not what I see when I go home to
Kentucky. There I see hard-working farmers trying to make an honest
living off a crop that has helped hundreds of communities in my State
thrive for centuries.
Maybe you've forgotten about the farmer. That wouldn't surprise me.
They weren't in the room during the tobacco negotiations. They were not
included in the final settlement, and to date, the only plan that
mentions them would put them out of business.
Mr. President, it is as if the thousands of men and women who have
been the bedrock of hundreds of communities simply no longer have any
value.
Sixty thousand farm families produce tobacco in 119 of 120 counties
in my State. While tobacco uses only 1 to 2 percent of their acreage,
it produces 20 to 25 percent of their farm income. Along with these
farm families are tens of thousands of workers who warehouse, process
and manufacture tobacco. They all live in communities where every
tobacco dollar has a multiplier effect on the local economy, rolling
over three to four times.
And they're the reason I am here today.
Mr. President, I am pleased to join several of my colleagues in
introducing legislation which addresses the needs of tobacco farmers,
tobacco workers, and their communities and should provide the framework
for taking care of them in any comprehensive legislation.
First and foremost, ``taking care of them'' means protecting the
tobacco program.
Opponents of the program claim they're not attacking farmers, but
with the program goes stability, with the program goes the small family
farmer, and with the program goes hundreds of small rural communities.
Mr. President, the program is the key to preventing fence row to
fence row production.
It is the key to keeping tobacco prices high.
And it is the key to keeping tobacco production in the hands of small
family farms and keeping rural communities alive.
Without the program, look for cheap cigarettes, look for the size of
farms--at the very least--to triple in size. Look for family farms to
go out of business, and look for the rural communities they sustain, to
shut down.
What are the benefits of killing the program? For hard-working family
farmers there simply are none.
That is why killing the program is a nonstarter. And even though
criticisms are based either on misconceptions or misrepresentations of
the program, we're willing to address them by covering all these costs
with our legislation. But make no mistake, we're not willing to
eliminate the program.
The legislation we're introducing today follows the principles every
one of my colleagues went on record supporting in a September 9 Sense
of the Senate amendment. We all agreed that tobacco growers should be
fairly compensated as part of any Federal legislation to implement the
tobacco settlement. We all agreed tobacco growing communities should be
provided sufficient resources to adjust to the economic impact of any
settlement legislation. We all agreed compensation to farmers and their
communities should come from funds provided within the parameters of
the national settlement, as paid by tobacco manufacturers. And we all
agreed the tobacco program should be maintained and operated at no net
cost to the taxpayer.
These four simple principles will mean the difference between a
productive future for tobacco farmers and a ``for sale'' sign up at the
end of the driveway--the difference between communities where a
farmer's children stay to raise their children and a ghost town.
At the core of the legislation is the establishment of a Tobacco
Community Revitalization Trust Fund. The trust fund will provide
compensation for farmers, investment funds for communities, and
education and retraining funds, all within the parameters of the
tobacco program and the national tobacco settlement dollar figure.
First, the fund will provide tobacco quota holders with ``Payments
for Lost Tobacco Quota'' based on the drop in the amount of tobacco
they can grow. The national tobacco settlement could cause consumption
to drop substantially, which would translate into deep cuts in each
farm's tobacco quota and each farmer's income. Under our bill, quota
holders will receive $4 per pound per year for every pound by which the
[[Page S11035]]
quota drops below their base quota. A maximum lifetime limit on
payments will be set for quota holders at $8 times the number of pounds
in their base quota. Those who lease quota or grow tobacco as a tenant
farmer will receive $2 per pound, with a life time cap of $4 per pound.
Second, the trust fund will make payments to cover all administrative
costs associated with the production of tobacco. This will include
salaries at USDA to administer the tobacco program, and any shortfall
in the provision of crop insurance for tobacco farmers. This should
finally put a stop to false claims that tobacco growers receive
subsidies from the Federal Government.
Third, the trust fund will provide Farmer Opportunity grants for
higher education. Tobacco farmers and their dependents will be eligible
for higher education grants of up to $1,700 per year--which is the
current average size of a Pell grant--to attend a university, community
college, vocational school, or other recognized institution. Academic
eligibility standards will be modeled after Pell grants, including
requirements that students maintain satisfactory progress toward the
completion of their degree, and maintain at least a C average. Funding
will be provided to cover up to 25,000 individuals from tobacco farm
families.
Mr. President, the tobacco program has long meant the difference
between whether a family can afford to send their children to college
or whether their education stops after grade 12. We need to do
everything we can to preserve a farm family's ability to provide their
children with access to higher education opportunities.
Fourth, the fund will provide benefits to displaced workers from
tobacco warehousing, processing, and manufacturing operations. This
program is modeled after the NAFTA Trade Adjustment Assistance Program
for Displaced Workers. Under these provisions, workers who lose their
jobs can receive tobacco readjustment allowances, employment services,
job training, job search allowances, and relocation allowances, all of
which are modeled after the NAFTA benefits and services.
And fifth, the fund will provide economic development assistance to
tobacco growing communities hit hard by the national tobacco
settlement.
The economic development fund will begin at $400 million per year
minus the amount used for administrative costs of the tobacco program,
distributed through block grants to tobacco growing States.
States can use the funding to provide several types of assistance
including rural business enterprise grants, farm ownership loans,
activities which create farm and off-farm employment, activities which
expand infrastructure facilities, and services which help diversify
local economies, long-term business technical assistance, grants to
agricultural organizations to help tobacco growers find supplemental
agricultural activities, and activities which create or expand locally
owned value-added agricultural processing and marketing operations.
Providing stability, preserving traditions, keeping farms in the
hands of families, protecting hundreds of communities, Mr. President, I
believe this legislation will give tobacco farmers, tobacco industry
workers and tobacco growing communities the resources to deal with the
national tobacco settlement likely to impact them.
With the tobacco program completely funded by tobacco growers or the
industry itself, antitobacco advocates can no longer take aim at the
farmer under the pretense of fiscal responsibility. And with a sense of
stability and predictability, farmers can begin to prepare for the
future in a responsible and thoughtful way.
I plan on sharing this proposal with my colleagues involved in
writing comprehensive legislative proposals to implement the national
tobacco settlement, but I hope all my colleagues interested in this
issue and interested in preserving a farming tradition will take a
close look at this program so that we can move forward in helping
tobacco farm families and their communities.
Mr. President, we have not just singled out the farmer. We have
included the total community, from education to job opportunity,
whatever it might be, so we have taken in the whole community. I am
very pleased with the hard work and support that has been given to me
by Senator McConnell, Senator Faircloth, Senator Helms, and others to
make this introduction so important today.
Mr. FAIRCLOTH. Mr. President, I rise as an original cosponsor of this
bill, the LEAF Act. I want to thank Senator Ford for the hard work and
the leadership role he has taken over his years in the Senate on this
bill and in support of the tobacco industry as a whole and, especially,
the farmers involved in it.
There has been a lot of talk on this floor about farmers. Everyone is
against tobacco, but they are for farmers. Everyone pledges to help the
farmers. This bill is a blueprint for that help. This plan offers
assistance to the tobacco community across North Carolina, Kentucky,
and the entire producing area, including Virginia, South Carolina,
Georgia, and Tennessee. These people are the men and women in tobacco
fields and cigarette factories and their communities.
There are 18,000 tobacco farmers in North Carolina and thousands more
throughout the Southeast. The farmers of my State collect more than $1
billion in receipts each year from tobacco alone. That is a big number,
but it is spread over many small farms. Everyone in Washington talks
about the small farmer, the family farm, but North Carolina is the
State of small farms. The average farm size in North Carolina is just
159 acres, one-third of the national average, which is 469 acres. It is
difficult at best to make a living on a small farm. Tobacco kept these
people alive on small farming operations over the last 60 years.
Tobacco produces roughly $1,200 an acre in net profit. There isn't
anything else they can plant that comes close to this, even remotely
close. Tobacco keeps the family farm together, and, Mr. President, it
keeps the family on the farm. That is why we are here with this bill
and the reason I am here this morning.
The impact of this proposed tobacco settlement would throw thousands
of small farmers off their land and immediately into bankruptcy. It is
up to us to step up and to help them through this transition.
I have talked about farmers so far and only farmers, but the economic
impact of tobacco and this proposed settlement is not limited to
farmers. There are 20,000 working people in factories across North
Carolina manufacturing tobacco products. They pay mortgages, buy
groceries and struggle to meet tuition bills. They are simply middle-
class American people. However, tobacco is their livelihood, and
Congress has set its sights on destroying their livelihood. That is
simply what has happened here.
The entire tobacco sector employs 100,000 people in North Carolina.
That is $7 billion in business in the State. It is 8 percent of the
work force and represents a lot of families. I am here to attempt to
stand up for these people.
Next year the Congress will take up an agreement that deals a real
blow to the livelihood of these thousands of people. Tobacco production
is expected to drop significantly under the proposed agreement. The
farmers and factory workers are in the cross hairs of the tobacco
settlement, and whether the antitobacco crowd is aiming at them or not,
they are the ones who are going to be hit. This bill tells them that
Congress will try to lessen the effects on the innocent parties, the
hard-working men and women in the tobacco fields and on the factory
floor.
Senator Ford explained these transition payments to farmers. The
Freedom to Farm Act moved farmers to an unregulated market and included
substantial transition payments to assist them through this change.
However, there was nothing in that bill designed to cut production of
corn, wheat or any other crop. This proposed tobacco settlement takes
aim at this crop, however, so the transition payments are a necessity.
The amount of money in this bill for the farmers and factory workers
is modest compared to the amount of money that others seeking from the
settlement. Somewhere in the neighborhood of $28 billion would be
involved in Senator Ford's bill. Now, it might interest you to know
that the hundreds of trial lawyers involved in this potential
settlement expect to receive up to
[[Page S11036]]
$45 billion, almost two times as much as we are asking for the more
than 150,000 people effected by this settlement.
The farmers face a situation where the Government will target their
crop and cut its production. We need the transition money. How many
people, farmers or not, could stand a quick reduction of 30 percent of
their income due to the intended actions of the Federal Government?
That is simply what we are talking about here--reducing the tobacco
farmer's income by 30 percent. This bill is about the future of
communities and literally big sections of our State. The bill includes
farm opportunity scholarships to allow the farmers and their children
additional educational opportunities. It also provides for rural
development to enable these communities to survive the transition. This
bill tells farmers that Congress is not leaving them without any
options for the future. It tells them the rhetoric against tobacco is
not really against them. At this moment they believe that it is and
have every reason to think so.
This bill is a chance to back up all the rhetoric about being against
tobacco but for farmers. If we are for farmers, we will pass this bill.
I hope my colleagues will join me, Senator Ford, Senator McConnell, and
Senator Helms in support of this bill.
Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I thank Senator Ford for his important
work and his leadership on this issue. It is so vital to the State we
jointly represent.
I am pleased to be on the floor of the Senate today to talk about an
industry that has played an integral role in our country's history and
continues to shape the cultural and economic landscape of the
Commonwealth of Kentucky. The industry, of course, is tobacco. And for
the next few minutes I want to discuss tobacco and the shifting
political terrain that will affect the 136,000 farmers who produce this
agricultural commodity.
This summer a group of States attorneys general, representatives of
the major tobacco companies, and public health officials negotiated an
agreement that would limit the companies' legal liability in exchange
for their promise to help reduce smoking and compensate States for past
damages caused by use of their product. This agreement obviously must
be passed by the Congress and signed by the President to have the force
of law, and that process is now what best could be described as in its
initial stages.
To my deep disappointment, tobacco farmers were not included in these
negotiations. They had no seat at the table. Not surprisingly, there is
not a single penny in this $368 billion pool of money for tobacco
farmers, even though they will be the ones most directly impacted by
the agreement. On the other hand, the agreement allows for the
compensation of well-heeled sporting enterprises such as auto racing
and rodeos in the event they lose sponsorship dollars but not a penny
goes to the hard-working tobacco farmers who may well be driven off
their family farms because of an agreement to which they were not a
party.
Today, along with Senator Ford, the principal craftsman of this bill,
Senator Helms and Senator Faircloth, I propose to right that wrong by
supporting a package that will provide for these farmers' well-being.
Today, my colleagues and I are introducing the Long-term Economic
Assistance for Farmers Act, what we call the LEAF Act, which creates an
umbrella ``Tobacco Community Revitalization Fund.'' The fund, to be
paid for from moneys within the existing $368-billion settlement, will
stabilize the incomes of tobacco farmers by providing payments for lost
tobacco quota to tobacco quota holders, tenants and those who lease
quota. Quota holders who produce their own tobacco will be paid $4 a
pound in any given year for every pound their quota falls behind their
average 1994-1966 quota level. In the case of leased tobacco and tenant
farmers, payments will be $2 a pound.
A portion of the fund will also be used for Tobacco Community
Economic Development Grants which will help transition tobacco
dependent communities to a more diversified economic base. The economic
development grants will be used for costs incidental to the tobacco
program, economic development grants to States, farmer opportunity
grants for education and training, and assistance for displaced tobacco
industry workers.
Mr. President, most agree that tobacco farmers and their communities
should not bear the brunt of the agreement's dislocating effects. For
instance, Minority Leader Daschle has said that ``We need to address
some of the concerns that were not addressed in the agreement * * *
especially those dealing with small farmers.'' The President himself
has said, ``Any tobacco legislation must protect tobacco farmers and
their communities.'' Even tobacco's most committed foes such as former
FDA Commissioner David Kessler recognize that, as he put it, ``farmers
should not be left out'' of the agreement. The LEAF Act does provide
for farmers. It provides compensation for reduced quota to owners and
those who produce the tobacco. It provides opportunities for tobacco
farmers to diversify their crops. It provides economic stability for
small tobacco farmers and their tobacco communities. It provides
education and training opportunities for tobacco farmers and their
dependents. It keeps farmers like mine in Kentucky in the business of
producing this legal agricultural commodity.
So, Mr. President, I rise in support of the LEAF Act. I thank Senator
Ford for his leadership and tireless efforts to protect our tobacco
growers and their communities. I believe Senator Ford's bill provides
the best alternative for our growers.
Having said that, I realize we face an uphill battle. Today's
political environment for tobacco interests is darkened mightily. In
today's Senate, outrageously unfair amendments that deny basic crop
insurance to tobacco farmers are only narrowly defeated. The ceaseless
assault on tobacco has left the tobacco grower imperiled. In this
context it may be difficult to sustain the political support necessary
to enact all of the bill's provisions. I personally will fight for the
Ford package, but I also will be cognizant of political reality. It is
my fervent hope that we can incorporate the LEAF Act into any
settlement legislation.
If that is not achievable, I will not be discouraged from pursuing
alternative ways to best provide tobacco farmers' needs.
Finally, Mr. President, as Congress discusses the proposed tobacco
settlement, I urge my colleagues to remember that our decisions will
not affect some nameless, faceless machine. Rather, our actions here
will bear directly on thousands of hard-working tobacco farmers, men
and women who pay their taxes, go to church, raise their families, and
do their best to provide for future generations. We owe it to them to
ensure that today's changes in the tobacco culture leave them with a
stable future as well.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. FORD. Let me thank my colleagues for their remarks. One of the
things that we have to take into consideration is that this bill is a
bill that looks not only to the farmer but to his family, his children
for education, and economic development in the community. I hope people
understand, I hope my colleagues understand, that this bill
incorporates payment for everything, even the shortfall in the crop
insurance. So there should not be these so-called cheap shots, as my
colleague from Kentucky explained, as it relates to the tobacco farmer,
under this proposal. If you take a look, I would hope Senators will
understand that. We have worked very hard putting this package together
and hopefully it will be accepted within the parameters of any
agreement.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I too am pleased to be an original
cosponsor of Senator Ford's bill, titled the Long-term Economic
Assistance for Farmers Act (S. 1310). The able senior Senator from
Kentucky is to be commended for offering this legislation.
Mr. President, as farmers and rural communities in tobacco-growing
States come to terms with the national tobacco settlement, this bill
will address some of the needs sure to arise during this critical
economic adjustment period. I believe this legislation is a good
starting point for helping these farmers, their families, and their
communities.
Obviously, it is too much to hope that everybody affected by the
settlement will be satisfied with every provision in this bill, but it
is important
[[Page S11037]]
that we begin to take steps to ensure farmers the same stability and
predictability that the tobacco companies sought when they negotiated
the national tobacco settlement.
Mr. President, let me make it clear that--and I believe Senator Ford
and all other supporters of this legislation agree--that this is only a
starting point. It may be--after consultation with growers, companies
and other affected parties--that only minor changes in this legislation
need to be made. Or, it may be--that a significant overhaul in our
approach to this issue is needed.
Whatever the future holds, of this tobacco growers may be assured: I
will do everything proper in my power to protect their interests. I
have often been criticized for standing up for the livelihoods of
tobacco farmers--and I suppose I will be criticized many times more in
the future. Let the critics proceed, but I shall never retreat from my
convictions that the hard-working families deserve to be recognized for
the good citizens and splendid families that they are.
So, Mr. President, again I commend my friend from Kentucky, Mr. Ford,
for his tireless effort to protect tobacco farmers, and I am honored to
stand with him once again.
______
By Mr. LOTT (for himself, Mr. Lieberman, Mr. McConnell, Mr. Reid,
Mr. D'Amato, Mrs. Boxer, Mr. Coverdell, Mr. Helms, Mr. Durbin,
Mr. McCain, Mr. Brownback, Mr. Bennett, Mr. Campbell, Mr.
Feingold, Mr. Mack, Mr. Shelby, Mr. Wyden, Mr. Hutchinson, Mrs.
Feinstein, Mr. Hollings, Ms. Mikulski, Mr. Nickles, Mr.
Cleland, Mr. Inouye, Mr. Dorgan, Mr. Bryan, Mr. Abraham, and
Mr. Reed):
S. 1311. A bill to impose certain sanctions on foreign persons who
transfer items contributing to Iran's efforts to acquire, develop, or
produce ballistic missiles; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
the iran missile proliferation sanctions act of 1997
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Iran Missile
Proliferation Sanctions Act of 1997. I am pleased to be joined in this
bipartisan effort by Senator Lieberman, as well as Senators McConnell,
Reid, D'Amato, Boxer, Coverdell, Helms, Durbin, McCain, Brownback,
Bennett, Campbell, Feingold, Mack, Shelby, Wyden, Hutchinson,
Feinstein, Hollings, Mikulski, Nickles, Cleland, Inouye, Dorgan, and
Bryan.
This is very important legislation which addresses a serious threat,
in my opinion, to American security: Iran's relentless efforts to
acquire ballistic missile technology. There is no doubt that Iran is
the major proliferation danger in the world today. Iran is committed to
developing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and the means to
deliver them.
The consequences of Iran's ballistic missile development would be
disastrous. Iran actively supports terrorist groups around the world.
Earlier this year, a German court found Iran's intelligence services
responsible for assassinations on German soil. There is a very real
possibility that Iran was behind the murder of 19 Americans in the
Khobar Towers bombing on June 25, 1996.
News reports now indicate that Iran is developing two missiles with
ranges of 800 or more than 1,200 miles. Such missiles would be able to
reach American forces stationed in the Persian Gulf. They would be able
to reach Israel. They would be able to reach our NATO ally, Turkey.
They would be able to reach all the way into Central Europe, as a
matter of fact.
The terrorist regime in Iran has already demonstrated its willingness
and ability to use bombings and hit squads to support its radical
agenda in the Middle East and in Europe. We cannot sit back and allow
Tehran to acquire ballistic missile capability that could hit even more
targets with the push of a button, possibly even with nuclear warheads.
This administration's track record on dealing with Iran is not
encouraging. We are always anxious to work with the administration in
these important foreign policy issues. In 1995, with great fanfare, the
administration announced it was strongly opposed to the sale of Russian
nuclear reactors to Iran and the issue would be handled in the
commission headed by Vice President Gore and Russian Prime Minister
Chernomyrdin. In the intervening 2 years there has been no progress in
halting that sale, or sales of this type.
In 1995 the administration gave a green light to Iranian extremists
who gained a foothold in Europe by arming the Bosnian Government. The
residue of that green light still affects the situation in Bosnia
today. So, there are problems, obviously, in this area.
When the news reports in the Washington Times over the last month
indicated that there were very serious concerns about Russian support
for Iran's missile technology programs, many of us on Capitol Hill
looked for action. Vice President Gore, we were told, would raise the
issue with the Prime Minister when he was in Russia, but the response
that he received apparently was to call the news report ``stupid'' and
``not worthy of comment.''
I think, after consultation with the administration, that this
legislation is necessary because not enough has been done to address
this Iranian missile development. I believe it is clear that existing
United States law has been broken by Russian entities. Emissaries have
gone to Moscow, information has been shared. Yet, no sanctions action
has been taken by the administration.
This legislation is necessary because it is time to act. Many have
recently expressed concern about Congress imposing ``unilateral''
sanctions. My response is that Congress will step into a vacuum and
take unilateral action when inadequate action is being taken in other
areas.
The legislation is quite simple. It requires the President to report
in 30 days, and every 180 days thereafter, on entities that have
transferred or attempted to transfer goods, technology, technical
assistance or facilities that contribute to Iran's efforts to acquire,
develop or produce ballistic missiles.
The legislation requires three sanctions on any such entities: No
export of American arms, no export of restricted dual-use items, and no
American Government assistance. So it is a targeted sanction, aimed at
the entities involved in these actions.
Congress has established with successive administrations, special
criteria in existing law for each of these three things. Our
legislation simply says if you help Iran acquire ballistic missile
capability, you will not get arms, controlled exports, or taxpayer-
financed aid.
Similar bipartisan legislation is being introduced in the House
today. I refer back to my opening remarks. There are already, I believe
some 26 Senators who are cosponsoring on both sides of the aisle, from
all regions of the country and all philosophical spectrums.
I hope the Senate will take action on this legislation before the end
of the session. Certainly, it will provide, hopefully, some additional
impetus for the administration to aggressively address this issue. A
number of changes have been made in the legislation to meet policy and
legal concerns of the administration, and I hope the administration
will see the merits of imposing these serious and rapid sanctions on
entities which aid Iran's efforts to threaten American forces and
American allies.
We cannot stand mute. We cannot ignore this very serious matter. We
will continue to work with the administration and support any
aggressive efforts that they care to use. But after serious
consideration, and after consultation particularly with Senator
Lieberman, I thought it was important that we go ahead and introduce
this legislation today, and explain why we are doing it.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
S. 1311
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Iran Missile Proliferation
Sanctions Act of 1997''.
SEC. 2. REPORTS ON MISSILE PROLIFERATION TO IRAN.
(a) Reports.--Except as provided in subsection (c), at the
times specified in subsection (b), the President shall submit
to the Committee on International Relations of the House of
Representatives and the Committee
[[Page S11038]]
on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report identifying every
foreign person with respect to whom there is credible
evidence indicating that that person, on or after August 8,
1995--
(1) transferred goods or technology, or provided technical
assistance or facilities, that contributed to Iran's efforts
to acquire, develop, or produce ballistic missiles; or
(2) attempted to transfer goods or technology, or attempted
to provide technical assistance or facilities, that would
have contributed to Iran's efforts to acquire, develop, or
produce ballistic missiles.
(b) Timing of Reports.--The reports under subsection (a)
shall be submitted not later than 30 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, not later than 180 days after such
date of enactment, not later than 360 days after such date of
enactment, and annually thereafter.
(c) Exception for Persons Previously Identified or
Sanctioned or Subject to Waiver.--Any person who--
(1) was identified in a previous report submitted pursuant
to subsection (a);
(2) has engaged in a transfer or transaction that was the
basis for the imposition of sanctions with respect to that
person pursuant to section 73 of the Arms Export Control Act
or section 1604 of the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act
of 1992; or
(3) may have engaged in a transfer or transaction, or made
an attempt, that was the subject of a waiver pursuant to
section 4,
is not required to be identified on account of that same
transfer, transaction, or attempt, in any report thereafter
submitted pursuant to this section.
SEC. 3. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.
(a) Requirement To Impose Sanctions.--
(1) Requirement to impose sanctions.--The sanctions
described in subsection (b) shall be imposed on--
(A) any foreign person identified under subsection (a)(1)
of section 2 in a report submitted pursuant to that section;
and
(B) any foreign person identified under subsection (a)(2)
of section 2 in a report submitted pursuant to that section,
if that person has been identified in that report or a
previous report as having made at least 1 other attempt
described in subsection (a)(2) of that section.
(2) Effective date of sanctions.--The sanctions shall be
effective--
(A) 30 days after the date on which the report triggering
the sanction is submitted, if the report is submitted on or
before the date required by section 2(b);
(B) 30 days after the date required by section 2(b) for
submitting the report, if the report triggering the sanction
is submitted within 30 days after that date; and
(C) immediately after the report triggering the sanction is
submitted, if that report is submitted more than 30 days
after the date required by section 2(b).
(b) Description of Sanctions.--The sanctions referred to in
subsection (a) that are to be imposed on a foreign person
described in that subsection are the following:
(1) Arms export sanction.--For a period of not less than 2
years, the United States Government shall not sell to that
person any item on the United States Munitions List as of
August 8, 1995, and shall terminate sales to that person of
any defense articles, defense services, or design and
construction services under the Arms Export Control Act.
(2) Dual use sanction.--For a period of not less than 2
years, the authorities of section 6 of the Export
Administration Act of 1979 shall be used to prohibit the
export of any goods or technology on the control list
established pursuant to section 5(c)(1) of that Act to that
person.
(3) United states assistance.--For a period of not less
than 2 years, the United States Government shall not provide
any assistance in the form of grants, loans, credits,
guarantees, or otherwise, to that person.
SEC. 4. WAIVER.
The President may waive the imposition of any sanction that
otherwise would be required to be imposed pursuant to section
3 on any foreign person 15 days after the President
determines and reports to the Committee on International
Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the Senate that, on the basis of
information provided by the person, or otherwise obtained by
the President, the President is persuaded that the person did
not, on or after August 8, 1995--
(1) transfer goods or technology, or provide technical
assistance or facilities, that contributed to Iran's efforts
to acquire, develop, or produce ballistic missiles; or
(2) attempt on more than one occasion to transfer goods or
technology, or to provide technical assistance or facilities,
that would have contributed to Iran's efforts to acquire,
develop, or produce ballistic missiles.
SEC. 5. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING ACTIONS BY
GOVERNMENT OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION.
As part of each report submitted pursuant to section 2, the
President shall include the following information with
respect to each person identified in that report:
(1) A statement regarding whether the government of primary
jurisdiction over that person was aware of the activities
that were the basis for the identification of that individual
in the report.
(2) If the government of primary jurisdiction was not aware
of the activities that were the basis for the identification
of that individual in the report, an explanation of the
reasons why the United States Government did not inform that
government of those activities.
(3) If the government of primary jurisdiction was aware of
the activities that were the basis for the identification of
that individual in the report, a description of the efforts,
if any, undertaken by that government to prevent those
activities, and an assessment of the effectiveness of those
efforts, including an explanation of why those efforts
failed.
(4) If the government of primary jurisdiction was aware of
the activities that were the basis for the identification of
that individual in the report and failed to undertake
effective efforts to prevent those activities, a description
of any sanctions that have been imposed on that government by
the United States Government because of such failure.
SEC. 6. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Government of primary jurisdiction.--The term
``government of primary jurisdiction'' means the government
under whose laws a foreign person is organized, or the
government of the place where a foreign person is
headquartered or habitually resides.
(2) Foreign person.--The term ``foreign person'' means a
natural person as well as a corporation, business
association, partnership, society, trust, any other
nongovernmental entity, organization, or group, and any
governmental entity operating as a business enterprise, and
any successor or subsidiary of any such entity that is
organized, headquartered, or habitually resides outside the
United States.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I am pleased to join my friend and
colleague Senator Lott, and the other cosponsors, in offering this bill
which addresses what I believe is one of the most serious and urgent
national security threats facing this country. Ballistic missiles in
the hands of a nation that has been our most implacable foe in the
recent past and that has been the single most intransigent supporter of
terrorism against this Nation and our allies should fill any right
thinking person anywhere with the most profound fear and concern.
Indeed, we here in this body have often expressed our concern. We have
given the administration the tools to address this problem,
specifically in the Arms Export Control Act and in the Iran-Iraq
Sanctions Act. Regrettably, our concern and these tools have not yet
resolved this threat. In fact, it is widely and reliably reported that
persons in Russia continue to provide both technology and assistance to
Iran such that Iran may be now only 8 months from acquiring ballistic
missiles that could be combined with weapons of mass destruction to
threaten United States forces and our allies and friends in the Middle
East. And soon after that, our forces and allies throughout Europe.
This would be a profound change in the balance of power in the
region, and strike a serious, perhaps fatal blow to our ability to
contain Iran until it becomes a responsible member of the community of
nations. It would allow Iran to threaten friendly Arab states, making
it harder for them to cooperate with the United States. It would raise
the risks to U.S. military forces in the region. And it would threaten
the free flow of oil in this critical region, which could create crises
in places far from the Persian Gulf.
We must act to try to prevent this from happening. We must tell
Russia in no uncertain terms that we are serious, and that the time for
slow progress in shutting off Russian assistance is past.
Many of us are aware that the degree of government control over
dangerous technology in the former Soviet Union has eroded
considerably. While trying to remedy this potentially frightful
situation, the Russian Government must contend with other pressing
internal issues. The results are that persons or groups within Russia
have had the latitude to transfer technology to rouge states such as
Iran.
We have the opportunity as well as the obligation to stand up, be
counted, and take reasonable steps to deter this type of potentially
cataclysmic activity. While we cannot expect to prevent all such
technology transfers to rogue states, we do have the ability to check
the flow of it through sanctions aimed at persons engaged in such
activity. We also are able and must take appropriate action against
those governments that condone such activity, whether they are
organizing and abetting such transfer or merely looking the other way
when their citizens engage in these activities.
For many years, the United States and the few other members of the
missile club of nations could be reasonably
[[Page S11039]]
assured that these missiles armed with nuclear weapons would not be
used. That was because the leaders of these nations were generally
reasoned individuals who shared many of the same goals. As this
technology has spread to other countries--and continues to expand at an
alarming rate--some of the leaders share very different views on
methods to solve confrontation. We have to actively guard against these
weapons becoming available to what most of the world considers to be
unstable states governed by leaders whose thinking is outside the
mainstream.
We have been engaged in dialogue across a wide spectrum with our
friends and allies in trying to prevent this from happening. As I
mentioned earlier, the prospect of a nuclear capable, militarily
powerful Iran armed with ballistic missiles, is clearly not in our
national interests. Our efforts at putting controls on the flow of
technology to rogue states have been laudable, but the sieve has been
leaking.
The sanctions we are proposing will further stop the diffusion of
technology and lead toward a more stable Middle East. I fully support
this effort because it will help prevent further technology transfer
into an area that has seen several major wars in the last thirty years
and that remains a region of vital national interest not only to us but
to most of the industrial world.
In closing, I want to take this opportunity to express my thanks to
Senator Lott for his leadership in this matter. This is an important
step toward a safer world.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, the subject of the transfer of sensitive
missile, weapons of mass destruction, and advanced conventional weapons
technology to Iran is far more complicated than most of us would like
to admit. As neighbors in a volatile region, Russia and Iran have a
long history of mutual antipathy alternating with periods of intense
cooperation. The official atheism of the former Soviet Union was
anathema to the Islamic tenets of revolutionary Iran. The former
enjoyed the benefits of a sizable buffer between Russia proper and the
Persian kingdom-turned-fundamentalist regime.
With the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. and the emergence of
independent Islamic governments along its southern frontier, Russia no
longer enjoys the security it once maintained. Certainly, the absence
of the kind of domestic and foreign security apparatus characteristic
of its totalitarian past has exacerbated the problem of stemming
Islamic influence, and Russia has sought to maintain an active military
role in the region to prevent the spread of such influence, as well as
of the kind of fighting that ravaged Tajikistan for years. The state of
its economy, combined with its desire to maintain the best possible
relations with Iran, have led Russia to pursue policies thoroughly
inimical to vital United States interests in the Middle East.
Herein lies the problem. It is in the interests of the United States
for Russia to develop economically, obviously through free market
mechanisms. It is in Russia's interest to have access to Iranian oil,
to the revenue generated by sales to Teheran of whatever the latter
will buy, and to be able to maintain cordial relations with a regime
that possesses, albeit less so since its presidential election, the
wherewithal to destabilize the region. Consequently, any decision to
impose sanctions on Russia for its sale of missile and other advanced
weapons technologies to Iran understandably should come only after an
extraordinarily cautious appraisal of the potential ramifications of
doing so.
I stand before the Senate today to state as emphatically as I can
that such sanctions must be imposed. While news reports of missile
technology sales, in violation of both the 1987 Missile Technology
Control Regime and the 1992 Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act, have
appeared in great numbers over the past several months, the problem
clearly has history going back years that the administration continues
to ignore at our and our allies peril. Were the problem not one of such
duration, the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act, of which I was a
principal sponsor along with then-Senator Al Gore, would not have been
necessary 5 years ago. Were the problem a recent manifestation of
Iranian ambitions and Russian inability or unwillingness to control the
flow of militarily sensitive technologies, I would be willing to
respect the administration's prerogative in the conduct of United
States foreign policy.
Such, however, is not the case. Developments involving Russia and
Iran--and I am not intending to ignore China, simply focusing on a more
immediate and larger scale problem of the moment--are indicative of a
more systemic problem not conducive to quiet diplomacy and seemingly
endless patience. The Teheran Times boasted in November 1995 of
Russia's intransigence in the face of United States efforts at
dissuading it from providing Iran with nuclear technology. Earlier that
year, Russia's Minister for Atomic Energy, Viktor Mikhailov, spoke of
his Government's intention to sell Iran a centrifuge for the enrichment
of used nuclear fuel. More recently, reports of contracts being signed
between Russian companies and research institutes--organizations with
which the Government maintains an integral relationship--for the
provision of missile components, including guidance systems, laser
equipment, wind tunnels for the testing of warheads and missiles, and
militarily sensitive materials like tungsten-coated graphite, all
illuminate a problem of enormous magnitude that, Moscow's protestations
notwithstanding, nevertheless reflect minimal effort on that
government's part to impede the flow of such technology to Iran.
Russia sees its economic interests as lying very much in closer
relations with Iran. Pipelines transporting Caspian Sea oil and natural
gas present Russia with potential revenue in the hundreds of millions
of dollars, should it prevail in dictating future pipeline routes.
Iran's announcement last year of a joint shipping venture with Russia
similarly illuminated the depth of the growing economic relationship
between the two countries. The economic importance of Iran to Russia
and Russia's lack of viable exports other than the very weapon systems
that threaten United States interests in the Middle East have created a
dilemma, but one with which we must come to grips.
Moscow, similarly, must confront the implications of its actions or
inactions with respect to the transfer of militarily sensitive
technology. It clearly places enormous economic importance on its
relationship with Iran, but it needs to be reminded that it fails
within the range of the very missiles it is helping Iran to develop.
Russia may, in the end, find itself selling Teheran the rope with which
to hang itself.
The administration must comply with existing United States laws. It
must take Russia to task, in the form of economic sanctions, for the
continuing problem of missile technology transfer to Iran. Russia must
be made to see that its economic well-being does not lie with
transactions that threaten United States interests. Russia desperately
wants recognition as a major global player despite its inability to
influence events militarily or economically far beyond its borders.
When the United States, Germany, or Japan coughs, much of the
industrialized world catches cold. When Russia coughs, Moscow catches
cold. If Russia wants to see the Group of Seven be permanently enlarged
by one, it must accept that its economic future lies with the
democracies of North America, Europe, and Asia--not with rogue regimes
that seek to threaten the interests of those nations.
The Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act mandates sanctions against
both foreign companies and governments for the transfer of missile,
chemical, biological and nuclear weapon technologies as well as
advanced conventional systems. It further provides for discretionary
sanctions. Russia has thoroughly violated the act, as well as the MTCR.
Not only has it transferred to Iran missile and nuclear technology, it
has sold to Teheran advanced surface-to-air missile systems, three
Kilo-class attack submarines with which Iran fully intends to asserts
its control over the vital Strait of Hormuz, modern T-72 main battle
tanks, and MiG-29 fighter and Su-24 strike aircraft. If the cumulative
effect of these weapon sales does not violate both the MTCR and the
Iran-Iraq Act, then nothing does. And, Mr. President, as a principal
sponsor of the latter legislation, I can personally attest that,
irrespective of administration determinations constructed to suit its
policy preferences,
[[Page S11040]]
these transfers from Russia do violate both the letter and the intent
of the law.
The administration must act on this issue of utmost importance to
United States national security interests. The Middle East lies at the
center of our National Security Strategy and the force structure
exercises that repeatedly postulate the likelihood of future conflict
in that strife-torn region. The administration has not presented to
Congress any reason, compelling or otherwise, for its refusal to abide
by Public Law 102-484 and the MTCR. Congress must demand that it do so,
or impose sanctions accordingly. Its failure to do so is inexcusable.
The ramifications of that failure will be serious indeed, and the costs
will inevitably be paid in American blood.
That is why we are introducing legislation to toughen existing
statutes by making the imposition of sanctions more certain and
requiring that the administration report to Congress information on
weapons sales that will better enable the legislative branch of
Government to determine for itself whether past failures to impose
sanctions have been warranted. Governments must be held accountable
when entities within their borders act dangerously irresponsible.
The administration must comply with the law, or sacrifice its role in
the formulation of U.S. foreign policy in one of the most important
regions of the world.
Mr. WYDEN. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the Iran Missile
Proliferation Act of 1997, introduced by Senators Lieberman and Lott.
This legislation is critically needed because of dangerous recent
developments in the Middle East, namely disturbing reports that
indicate Iran is acquiring terrifying weapons of mass destruction at an
alarming pace.
Iran has become the most serious threat to stability in the Middle
East and is rapidly developing the means to strike Israel. Very
recently, Israeli and American intelligence have discovered that, due
largely to technology obtained from Russia, Iran may soon have the
capability to begin assembling and testing ballistic missiles capable
of reaching Israel and other vital targets in the Middle East.
Russian companies are providing Iran with crucial technologies,
including wind tunnels for the design of missiles, lasers, and special
materials for missile construction. There are even reports of over
9,000 Russian advisers working in Iran on a variety of military
projects, and Iran earlier this year tested a Soviet-designed rocket
engine.
Iran, one of America's foremost self-proclaimed enemies, has been
linked to numerous anti-Israel terrorist attacks ranging from taking
hostages and hijacking airlines to carrying out assassinations and
bombings. These incidents include the taking of more than 30 Western
hostages in Lebanon from 1984 through 1992, the bombings of the United
States Embassy and the French-United States Marine barracks in Beirut
in 1983 and the Buenos Aires terrorist attacks on the Israeli Embassy
in 1992 and on the Argentine Jewish communal building in 1994. An
Iranian ballistic missile capability would have enormous strategic
repercussions for the Persian Gulf and the Middle East. Iran possesses
chemical weapons, and quite possibly could be only a few years away
from acquiring nuclear weapons.
Clearly, the United States must adopt a stronger approach toward
Russia. To its credit, the administration has tried every diplomatic
effort with Russia. Vice President Gore and other senior officials have
addressed this issue at the most senior levels of the Russian
Government, including with President Yeltsin and Prime Minister
Chernomydrin, but these efforts have met with little success. Further
discussions are set for November, however, and I believe Congress must
act now to enact a more forceful policy which will ensure Russian
cooperation.
The Lott-Lieberman legislation requires the President to submit a
report to Congress 30 days after enactment, providing a list of the
entities that have been implicated in the transfer or attempted
transfer of goods, technology, or technical assistance that has
contributed to Iran's efforts to acquire, develop, or produce ballistic
missiles. Highly targeted sanctions will be imposed on these entities
30 days after the submission of the report, unless the President waives
them under limited circumstances.
I urge my colleagues to support this vital measure which takes
concrete steps to halt the spread of ballistic missile technology to
Iran and to preserve peace and stability in the Middle East.
Mr. BENNETT. I am pleased to join with the Distinguished Majority
Leader in sponsoring S. 1311 regarding arms sales to Iran. This is very
critical legislation. If the relevant governments cannot regain control
over their weapons sellers, Iran will have a ballistic missile
capability within months instead of years.
Mr. President, on Tuesday, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright told
me, ``Dealing with proliferation is the highest priority item of this
administration.'' In the national security field, she has the right
sense of priority. And certainly, Iran is the leading problem country.
The legislation we are introducing today calls on the administration
to report on which foreign entities are contributing to Iran's missile
ambitions. For example, the Washington Times has recently reported on a
number of important Russian organizations involved in this trade.
Special metals and associated technology are said to be involved. If
necessary, sanctions against the named entities will be imposed.
I hope sanctions will not be necessary. I have some confidence that
foreign government leaders will fulfill their commitments. But it may
become necessary. We already know Iran has a chemical warfare
capability and we suspect it has nuclear and germ warfare ambitions. We
cannot allow a sponsor of state terrorism like Iran to obtain a
ballistic missile delivery system.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that an article from the
October 20, 1997, issue of the Washington Times be printed in the
Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Russia Sells Iran Missile Metals
(By Bill Gertz)
A secret Russian production center completed a deal with
Iran late last month to supply high-strength steel and
special foil for Iran's long-range missile program, The
Washington-Times has learned.
According to a classified United States intelligence
report, the Russian Scientific and Production Center Inor
concluded an agreement in late September to provide an
Iranian factory with four special metal alloys used in long-
range missiles.
The report contradicts assurances made by Russian officials
only days before the report that Russia had no involvement
with the Iranian missile program.
The report, labeled ``secret,'' says a two-month effort by
Inor to market four alloys to Iran's Instrumentation
Factories Plan, part of the Iranian Defense Industries
Organization, has ``borne fruit'' with the Iranian agreement
to buy the material.
``With an eye to establishing a long-term business
relationship, the Russian firm offered to give the Iranian
firm a discount on the total value of the invoice,'' the
report states.
The deal, worked out between Inor Director L.P. Chromova
and the Iranian factory director identified as A.
Asgharzadeh, amounted to $48,000 for 620 kilograms of alloy,
plus several hundred dollars in shipping and packaging costs.
Efforts to locate and contact Inor were unsuccessful, and a
U.S. official said details about the facility are known only
to the CIA.
A CIA spokesman declined to comment.
The deal includes Inor's offer to provide ``thermal
treatment'' for the alloys ``so that the Iranians could
process the material themselves,'' the report said.
The Iranians have bought 240 kilograms of the high-strength
steel alloy known as ``21HKMT'' for $24,000, the report said.
The steel will be sent in bars that U.S. officials say the
Iranians will shape for missile-casing material.
The remaining materials are alloy foil designated by Inor
as ``49K2F,'' ``CUBE2'' and ``5ON'' that are being sold in
sheets 0.2 millimeter and 0.4 millimeter thick.
The special foil is used to shield guidance equipment in
missiles--material that is needed only for longer-range
missiles.
``This gets into the whole business of the longer-range
ballistic missiles that they are seeking to develop,'' said
one Clinton administration official familiar with the issue.
``There are a number of countries that are very, very
concerned about these Shahab-3 and Shahab-4 missiles.''
During meetings with Vice President Al Gore in Moscow Sept.
19 and 20, senior Russian officials, including Russian
President Borris Yeltsin and Prime Minister Victor
Chernomyrdin, provided the administration with
``commitments'' that Russia is not assisting Iran's missile
program, according to a senior White House official.
[[Page S11041]]
Asked if the administration believes those commitments have
halted the missile trade, the senior officials said: ``The
answer is, we are not satisfied. We're still concerned about
ongoing activities.''
The official declined to comment on the Inor case, but
said, ``to the extent that we see activities going on that we
think are contrary to the assurances we've gotten from the
Russians, we are making an effort to bring that to their
attention and asking them to follow up.''
One official said ``21HKMT'' is a specialty steel that Iran
does not produce. The steel is a key material used by North
Korea and Iran for missiles, but it is not controlled under
the 31-nation Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
The Clinton administration has sought to add the alloy to
the MTCR control list, but those efforts have been blocked by
Russia and France, the official said.
Inor is one of several Russian scientific and production
centers identified by U.S. intelligence agencies as being
involved in Iran's development of a liquid-fuel missile
similar in design to North Korea's Nodong missile.
In 1996, Inor prepared several contracts with Iran's Shahid
Hemmat Industrial Group, which is in charge of Iran's liquid-
fuel missile program. Inor brokered deals to supply the
Iranians with laser equipment, special mirrors used in
missile testing, maraging steel used in missile casings and
composite graphite-tungsten material.
Russia's Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute has been
helping Iran build a wind tunnel.
The Times disclosed last month that several Russian
entities were involved in Iran's program to build two
derivatives of the Nodong missile, the Shahab-3 and Shahab-4,
that will be fielded within three years.
According to an Israeli military intelligence report
provided to the CIA and the Pentagon in January, the Iranians
have worked closely with the Russian Space Agency;
Rosvoorouzhenie, the Russian government arms-export agency;
the Bauman Institute; the missile manufacturer NPO Trud; a
firm called Polyus and other institutes.
The Israeli intelligence report identified Yuri Koptev,
head of the Russian Space Agency, as being connected to the
project. Mr. Koptev is Mr. Yeltsin's representative in talks
with the United States on the issue.
Asked about Mr. Koptev's role in the Iranian program, the
senior White House official said Mr. Koptev was ``irate''
during the meetings in Moscow and felt disclosure of his role
was ``an unfair slam.''
The official said Mr. Koptev has been helpful in seeking to
resolve U.S. concerns.
Mr. Koptev told U.S. officials attending the Moscow meeting
that he did not want U.S. aid to the Russian space program to
``collapse'' because of U.S. opposition to the Russia-Iran
cooperation, which Mr. Koptev described as ``important in my
world, but a secondary issue,'' the official said.
The official said he believes the Shahab-3 is ``within
Iran's basic technical capabilities.'' For the Shahab-4, ``I
think the Iranians are more heavily dependent on external,
and in particular, Russian, assistance'' to field the system.
______
By Mr. ABRAHAM.
S. 1312. A bill to save lives and prevent injuries to children in
motor vehicles through an improved national, State, and local child
protection program; to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation.
the child passenger protection act
Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, today I rise to introduce legislation
designed to increase the awareness and education of parents and public
safety professionals with respect to the proper use and installation of
child safety seats.
This legislation, the Child Passenger Protection Act of 1997, is
nearly identical to legislation introduced in the other Chamber earlier
this year by the gentlewoman from Maryland, Representative Morella. It
would make $7.5 million [i.e., seven point five million] dollars
available to the Secretary of Transportation in each of the next two
fiscal years--FY'98 and '99--for the purpose of assisting State highway
agencies, police departments, and child passenger safety organizations
in setting up and promoting such programs.
To receive funding under this bill, a program must focus on
preventing death and injury to children under the age of 5 years old.
The program must educate the public about all aspects of the proper
installation of child restraints using seat belt hardware and other
supplemental hardware or modification devices. The program must also
educate the public with respect to the appropriate child restraint
design selection and placement as well as harness threading and harness
adjustment. Finally, the program must train and retrain child passenger
safety professionals, police officers, fire and emergency medical
personnel, and other educators concerning all aspects of child
restraint use.
As the parents of three children under the age of 5, all of whom
still ride in child car safety seats, my wife and I can attest to the
fact that these considerations require a great deal of attention. My
wife Jane serves as Honorary Chairperson of the Detroit SAFE KIDS
Coalition and has been deeply involved in the issue of car seat safety
for some time, along with a number of other child protection advocacy
issues. This past Labor Day, I was the sponsor of a Senate resolution
that provided permission to the National SAFE KIDS Coalition to use the
Capitol Building grounds for the kickoff event of the National SAFE
KIDS Buckle Up Campaign. The entire Abraham family participated in this
event. Our family has filmed Public Service Announcements on this issue
for the National SAFE KIDS Campaign and we are planning to sponsor and
to participate in car seat safety check events in the coming months
back in Michigan.
Based on our shared experience, I can assure my colleagues that there
is often tremendous confusion among both parents and public safety
personnel when it comes to the proper selection, installation and use
of child restraint devices in motor vehicles. Results from regional
child restraint clinics demonstrated between 70 and 90 percent of child
restraints are incorrectly installed or otherwise misused, which is
often caused by the complication and wide variety in seat belt and
child restraint designs. And while there are several public-private
partnership programs which exist that focus on the dangers of air bags
and the proper placement of children in cars equipped with air bags,
many of these programs fall short of specifically educating parents and
public safety officials on the proper methods for installing and using
child safety seats.
It is my hope that we can focus the country's attention on this
serious problem and, in the process, prevent needless death and injury
among young children. While this legislation alone will by no means
solve the problem, I believe it is a positive step towards better
educating parents and public safety officials on this important public
safety issue.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
S. 1312
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Child Passenger Protection
Act''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) The annual losses in the United States from motor
vehicle collisions are estimated to exceed 800 deaths and
80,000 injuries to children under the age of 5.
(2) It is estimated that properly used child restraints in
motor vehicles can reduce the chance of serious or fatal
injury in a motor vehicle collision--
(A) by a factor of 69 percent with respect to infants; and
(B) by a factor of 47 percent with respect to children
under the age of 5.
(3) Some of the most common seating position designs that
have emerged in motor vehicles during the last decade make
secure installation of child restraints difficult and, in
some circumstances, impossible.
(4) Results from regional child restraint clinics
demonstrated that 70 to 90 percent of child restraints are
improperly installed or otherwise misused and the improper
installation or other misuse is largely attributable to the
complication and wide variations in seat belt and child
restraint designs.
(5) There is an immediate need to expand the availability
of national, State, and local child restraint education
programs and supporting resources and materials to assist
agencies and associated organizations in carrying out
effective public education concerning child restraints.
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Child restraint education program.--The term ``child
restraint education program'' includes a publication,
audiovisual presentation, demonstration, or computerized
child restraint education program.
(2) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary
of Transportation.
(3) State.--The term ``State'' means any State of the
United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, Guam, American
Samoa, the Northern Mariana Islands, and any other territory
or possession of the United States.
SEC. 4. CHILD PASSENGER EDUCATION.
(a) Awards.--The Secretary may enter into contracts or
cooperative agreements
[[Page S11042]]
with, and may make grants to, State highway agencies and
child passenger safety organizations that are recognized for
their experience to obtain and distribute national, State,
and local child restraint education programs and supporting
educational materials.
(b) Use of Funds.--Funds provided to an agency or
organization under a contract, cooperative agreement, or
grant under subsection (a) shall be used to implement child
restraint programs that--
(1) are designed to prevent deaths and injuries to children
under the age of 5; and
(2) educate the public concerning--
(A) all aspects of the proper installation of child
restraints using standard seatbelt hardware, supplemental
hardware and modification devices (if needed), including
special installation techniques; and
(B) appropriate child restraint design selection and
placement and in harness threading and harness adjustment;
and
(3) train and retrain child passenger safety professionals,
police officers, fire and emergency medical personnel, and
other educators concerning all aspects of child restraint
use.
(c) Distribution of Funds.--An agency or organization that
receives funds made available to the agency or organization
under a contract, cooperative agreement, or grant under
subsection (a) shall, in carrying out subsection (b)--
(1) use not more than 25 percent of those funds to support
nationwide child restraint education programs that are in
operation at the time that the funds are made available;
(2) use not more than 25 percent of those funds to support
State child restraint education programs that are in
operation at the time that the funds are made available; and
(3) use at least 50 percent of those funds to implement
national, State, and local child restraint education programs
that are not in operation at the time that the funds are made
available.
SEC. 5. APPLICATIONS AND REPORTS.
(a) Applications.--To enter into a contract, cooperative
agreement, or grant agreement under section 4(a), the
appropriate official of an agency or organization described
in that section shall submit an application to the Secretary
at such time, in such manner, and accompanied by such
information as the Secretary may reasonably require.
(b) Reports.--
(1) In general.--The appropriate official of each agency or
organization that enters into a contract, cooperative
agreement, or grant agreement under section 4(a) shall
prepare and submit to the Secretary, an annual report for the
period covered by the contract, cooperative agreement, or
grant agreement.
(2) Reports.--A report described in paragraph (1) shall--
(A) contain such information as the Secretary may require;
and
(B) at a minimum, describe the program activities
undertaken with the funds made available under the contract,
cooperative agreement, or grant agreement, including--
(i) any child restraint education program that has been
developed directly or indirectly by the agency or
organization and the target population of that program;
(ii) support materials for such a program that have been
obtained by that agency or organization and the method by
which the agency or organization distributed those materials;
and
(iii) any initiatives undertaken by the agency or
organization to develop public-private partnerships to secure
non-Federal support for the development and distribution of
child restraint education programs and materials.
SEC. 6. REPORT TO CONGRESS.
Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this
Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary shall prepare,
and submit to Congress, a report on the implementation of
this Act that includes a description of the programs
undertaken and materials developed and distributed by the
agencies and organizations that receive funds under section
4(a).
SEC. 7. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
For the purpose of carrying out section 4, there are
authorized to be appropriated to the Department of
Transportation $7,500,000 for each of fiscal years 1998 and
1999, of which not more than $350,000 may be spent in any
fiscal year for administrative costs.
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