[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 144 (Thursday, October 23, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S11011-S11012]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                    THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

  Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. President, since the founding of our Republic, we 
have faced a dilemma as old perhaps as the concept of democracy itself. 
That is how the Nation is governed: With an informed electorate, but at 
the same time we can protect the national security by containing 
information which might be used against ourselves.
  This debate has largely, though not exclusively, been settled by the 
judgment that we are best served by informing the people so they can 
make the proper judgments about choosing the leadership of our country.
  Indeed, this is the philosophy that gave rise to the first amendment 
to the Constitution, but perhaps more exactly also to article I, 
section 9, which reads, ``a regular Statement and Account of the 
Receipts and Expenditures of all public money shall be published from 
time to time.''
  There has, however, in spite of this general judgment of the need to 
govern the Nation based on the best possible information to the 
electorate, and in spite of this rather specific constitutional 
provision, been a notable and exceptional exception in the Nation's 
accounting.
  I speak obviously of the Central Intelligence Agency in its half-
century determination to keep its accounting, its expenditures, private 
from the people of the United States. And, indeed, during both times of 
national conflict and in the broad period of the cold war it was a 
policy with a considerable rationale.
  The United States faced, in the Soviet Union, an adversary which if 
in possession of our expenditures of the intelligence community would 
learn a great deal about our national intentions and our capabilities. 
But now some 7 years after the end of the cold war, there is no longer 
a rationale for not sharing with the American people at least the 
aggregate amount of spending of the American intelligence community.
  I do not speak, obviously, of specific requirements for expenditures 
in individual programs or even broad categories of expenditures but 
whether or not the American people should be informed of the total 
aggregate spending since the United States no longer faces an adversary 
which, if in possession of that amount of expenditures, could make real 
use of it.
  Last Wednesday, George Tenet, the new Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency, perhaps because of this changed situation, took a 
very important step. In response to a Freedom of Information Act 
request filed by the Federation of American Scientists, Director Tenet 
ended 50 years of what

[[Page S11012]]

may have been unconstitutional secrecy and finally disclosed the 
aggregate budget numbers of the U.S. intelligence community.
  I take the floor today, Mr. President, to applaud President Clinton 
and Director Tenet for taking this first step, but note with some 
considerable regret that this judgment was made in response to a 
lawsuit filed against the administration not with the support of this 
Congress and, indeed, in spite of a vote taken in response to an 
amendment that I offered on the floor of this Senate.
  While I applaud Director Tenet, I also speak with regret that while 
the budget numbers were offered this year, they specifically were not 
made as a change in permanent policy, therefore, raising the specter 
that the American people are being provided this information in 1997, 
with the possibility they may never be given this information again.
  That perhaps leads to the most cynical interpretation of all, that 
what is really feared by the intelligence community is not the sharing 
of this aggregate amount of spending with foreign adversaries, but if 
the American people have this number they would be able to gauge this 
year to next, to next, and into the future whether or not the 
intelligence budget of this country is rising or falling, whether it is 
too large or too small.
  What is feared is that the American people will be as engaged in this 
debate as they are about Social Security spending or health care or 
education spending or even defense spending, which routinely is a part 
of the American political debate.
  A 1-year number provides precious little information for public 
debate about the adequacy or the excessive nature of our spending. 
What, of course, is peculiar about this inability to inform the public 
is that defense spending, equally or arguably far more important to 
national security, is so routinely debated. Perhaps that is the reason 
why defense spending in the Nation today, excluding intelligence, is 
now 4 percent lower than defense spending in 1980, why in real dollar 
terms there has been in the last 7 years such a dramatic reduction in 
defense expenditures, while according to the Brown report, intelligence 
spending since 1980 in the United States has risen by 80 percent, an 
increase in spending almost without parallel.
  It is worth noting as well, Mr. President, that in the bipartisan 
Brown Commission report, the commission could find no systematic basis 
upon which the intelligence budget is even created. In the Commission's 
words, ``Most intelligence agencies seemed to lack a resource strategy 
apart from what is reflected in the President's 6-year budget 
projection. Indeed, until the intelligence community reforms its budget 
process, it is poorly positioned to implement these strategies.''
  Mr. President, other countries in the democratic family of nations 
have long recognized the need to include defense and intelligence 
priorities in their national debate over budgetary matters. Indeed, 
Australia, Britain, and Canada long ago lifted this veil of secrecy. I 
think, indeed, even the State of Israel, which today faces potentially 
more serious adversaries at the very heart of their democracy with a 
daily terrorist threat, long ago decided that its democracy was better 
served by sharing this information then continuing with the veil of 
secrecy.
  So, Mr. President, in this notable year when for the first time the 
American people are given access to this information about intelligence 
spending, the burden now passes to this Congress whether or not we will 
allow this to be a single exception, or indeed we will now take the 
challenge and make this a permanent change in how we govern the 
national intelligence community.
  I close, therefore, Mr. President, with the words of Justice Douglas, 
who in 1974 wrote in making a judgment about whether or not the budget 
should be revealed, ``If taxpayers may not ask that rudimentary 
question, their sovereignty becomes an empty symbol and a secret 
bureaucracy is allowed to run our affairs.''
  More than 20 years later, Mr. President, this Senate still faces the 
same judgment. Director Tenet has met his responsibilities. I am proud 
that President Clinton allowed him to proceed. Now the question rests 
with us.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Brownback). The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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