[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 143 (Wednesday, October 22, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10994-S10995]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                         ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS

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         BOSNIA AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: FINISHING THE JOB

 Mr. DODD. Mr. President, on October 16, our colleague, Senator 
Joe Biden gave a very important and insightful assessment of United 
States foreign policy with respect to Bosnia. The occasion for those 
remarks was that Senator Biden was being honored by Fairleigh Dickinson 
University by being chosen as the first individual to hold a newly 
established chair at the university--the Fatemi University Chair in 
International Studies.
  In accepting this honor, Senator Biden focused his remarks on a 
current and some what daunting foreign policy challenge that looms 
before us in the coming months--Bosnia. As is always the case, Joe gave 
his candid and unvarnished assessment of the current situation in 
Bosnia--what's gone right and what's gone wrong. He also sets forth how 
he believes U.S. policy should evolve over the coming months, if the 
United States is to enhance the prospects for fostering peace and 
stability in that war-torn country and in maintaining its leadership in 
shaping the course of world events. His comments were very thoughtful 
and very much on target from my point of view.
  Mr. President, I urge all of my colleagues to take a moment to read 
Senator Biden's remarks. It would be time well spent.
  I ask that the text of Senator Biden's remarks be printed in the 
Record.
  The remarks follow:

         Bosnia and American Foreign Policy: Finishing the Job

                       (By Joseph R. Biden, Jr.)


                            I. Introduction

       It would be a very high honor under any circumstances to be 
     called to the fatemi university chair in international 
     studies here at Farleigh Dickinson University.
       Although I'm not sure I deserve the distinction, I feel 
     honored to be the first to hold that chair.
       This is for me, as I know it is for many of you, an extra-
     special occasion, and an extra-special honor.
       Not only because of the very high standing in the foreign 
     policy community the graduate institute of international 
     studies has earned for Farleigh Dickinson.
       Not just because of the pre-eminent position Dr. Fatemi 
     occupied in the field of international studies,
       But also because I have had the very great privilege of 
     knowing Dr. Fatemi and his family personally, through the 
     friendship of his son Fariborz. So besides an opportunity to 
     discuss foreign policy with you, this is a kind of homecoming 
     for me.
       That's the way Dr. Fatemi and his family made even a 
     stranger feel upon entering their household, and that kind of 
     hospitality was a direct reflection of the kind of man he 
     was.
       I knew beforehand of his record as a diplomat, as a writer 
     and teacher, and as an exemplar of the richness and integrity 
     of an ancient but still vital culture.
       What I discovered when I met him was that the man was even 
     more impressive than his credentials. Despite his many 
     achievements, he always put his newest acquaintance instantly 
     at ease.
       If you were his guest, he became your friend, and when he 
     was your friend, you became, eagerly and irresistibly, his 
     student. That was not just because of his learning and the 
     experience he gained over a long and productive life.
       He became a valued friend and mentor primarily because it 
     was his nature to do so. He was undeniably bright and 
     intellectually challenging. But he was also gentle, 
     unassuming and encouraging.
       He taught by example rather than precept; he radiated 
     wisdom and good will in equal measure.
       It was impossible not to leave his presence wiser than you 
     arrived.
       The breadth of his scholarship was astonishing, and simply 
     being exposed to it was an invigorating experience.
       But it was the clarity of his insights into the maelstrom 
     of the Middle East and the passions of the islamic 
     fundamentalists that were most valuable to me.
       The views I am about to express on Bosnia, are, of course, 
     mine alone. But if I manage to shed any light on that bloody 
     confrontation, much of the credit must go to Nasrollah 
     Fatemi, who opened his hearth, his heart and his mind to me 
     in a way I shall never forget.
       Bosnia, of course, has significance far beyond the borders 
     of the former Yugoslavia.
       It has turned out to be one of the most serious challenges 
     for America's foreign policy in the post-cold-war era. It has 
     produced 5 years of debate in congress. It is the centerpiece 
     of any discussion about American military intervention around 
     the world. In short, it has become a critical test of our 
     foreign policy.
       Rightly or wrongly, whether United States foreign policy in 
     this era is viewed as a success or failure will depend in 
     large part on the success or failure of our policy in Bosnia. 
     So we better get it right.


                 II. From ``Lift and Strike'' to Dayton

       At the outset, let me state the obvious: I have cared 
     deeply about Bosnia for a long time, since the beginning of 
     the war. Some would say I bring ``historical baggage'' to the 
     issue. I care not just because of the strategic 
     implications--as Bosnia goes, so goes NATO--but for 
     humanitarian reasons.
       Appalled by the naked Serbian aggression and genocidal 
     attacks on Bosnian civilians, in September 1992 I called for 
     a ``lift and strike'' policy. That was shorthand for lifting 
     the illegal and immoral arms embargo against the Bosnian 
     Government, which was the victim of aggression, and launching 
     air strikes against the Bosnian Serb aggressors.
       My views were not widely shared at that time. As the war 
     escalated--with massacres, ``ethnic cleansing,'' and rapes--a 
     few other senators, including Bob Dole and Joe Lieberman, 
     joined my call for action. But it took more than two years of 
     failed diplomacy--and a quarter-million killed and two 
     million homeless--before we finally came around to the much-
     derided ``lift and strike'' policy in the fall of 1995.
       Guess what? The policy worked! The Serbian bullies sued for 
     peace, and under the leadership of Ambassador Dick Holbrooke 
     we were able to hammer out the Dayton accords in November 
     1995. I'm leaving out the details--all the peace plans that 
     didn't work--but in a nutshell that's what happened.
       Honest people may disagree about the compromises that were 
     made at Dayton. I think the accords accomplished as much as 
     we could have hoped for, given the obvious reluctance of our 
     Government, and of our European allies, to get more deeply 
     involved militarily.
       And I wish I could say that even the modest results 
     envisioned in Dayton had been achieved. But they have not. 
     It's true that conditions today are far better than the 
     bloody mayhem that existed during the war. The killing has 
     stopped.
       But we are only halfway to the full peace envisioned in the 
     Dayton accords. The question is: ``How do we get the rest of 
     the way? How do we finish the job?


                           III. Bosnia Today

       Having returned 6 weeks ago from my third trip to Bosnia, I 
     am certainly aware of the contradictions, the ambiguities, 
     the ironies, and the uncertainties of Bosnia today. Bosnia 
     and Herzegovina might be labeled the classical land of ``yes, 
     but.''
       Yes, there has been ongoing conflict among the various 
     religious groups in Bosnia--the Orthodox Serbs, the Catholic 
     Croats, and the Muslim South Slavs--for centuries.
       But, for most of the time, these conflicts were kept under 
     control, usually by an outside hegemon: first the Ottoman 
     Turks, then the Austrian Habsburgs, and more recently the 
     Communists under President Tito.
       When violence broke out in the spring of 1992, a 
     cosmopolitan society existed in much of Bosnia. Sarajevo, for 
     example, had one of the highest rates of inter-marriage in 
     all of Europe. What killed the ``live and let live'' 
     character of Sarajevo were unscrupulous, ultra-nationalist 
     politicians, many of whom were searching for a new ``-ism'' 
     to replace communism, an ideology that had been discredited.
       Yes, there were elements of civil war in Bosnia, but there 
     was also blatant aggression from Serbia across an 
     internationally recognized border. In fact, it was through 
     the overwhelming advantage of the weaponry, the salaries, and 
     the support services furnished by Slobodan Milosevic that the 
     Bosnian Serbs perpetrated their systematic slaughter.

[[Page S10995]]

       The ``yes, but'' dichotomy persists in Bosnia today.
       Yes there has been considerable progress in Bosnia since 
     Dayton, but a huge amount remains to be accomplished.
       Yes the 50 percent unemployment rate in the Bosnian Croat 
     Federation is huge, but it has come down from 90 percent in 
     only one year. Incidentally, it still hovers at 90 percent in 
     the Republika Srpska, which has been denied all but a trickle 
     of international aid because it has refused to implement the 
     Dayton accords.
       Yes, Bosnian Serbs regularly try to paralyze many of the 
     institutions of national government created at Dayton, but 
     the Parliament has begun to meet, and even the three-member 
     presidency shows signs of life.
       Yes, the nationalist parties representing the Serbs, 
     Muslims, and Croats are narrow-minded and corrupt, and in 
     many ways resemble the characteristics of the old Yugoslav 
     league of Communists, which they supplanted.
       But even in this cynical Bosnian political arena there is 
     hope. In last month's municipal elections a non-nationalist, 
     multi-ethnic coalition triumphed in Tuzla, one of Bosnia's 
     largest cities.
       A non-nationalist opposition also exists in the Republika 
     Srpska. I met with three of its leaders in Banja Luka. They 
     are confident that they--not Kardzic and his thugs from Pale, 
     not President Plavsic--are the wave of the future.
       Yes, more than two-thirds of the indicted war criminals 
     remain at large--an international disgrace. But, ladies and 
     gentlemen, just last week, under strong pressure from 
     Washington, Croatia and the Bosnian Croats surrendered 10 
     indicted Bosnian Croats to the Hague.
       Virtually every observer of Bosnia believes that Dayton 
     cannot be implemented until indicted war criminals are 
     indicted and transported to the International Tribunal at the 
     Hague to stand trial.
       The other major precondition for progress in Bosnia is the 
     return of refugees and displaced persons that was mandated by 
     the Dayton accords.
       Yes, this will be the most difficult of all the Dayton 
     tasks to accomplish.
       But , contrary to popular belief, even here there has been 
     noteworthy progress. As many as 150,000 refugees have 
     returned to Bosnia from abroad, and another 160,000 persons 
     who were displaced within Bosnia have returned to their 
     homes.
       Most of these have returned to areas where their ethnic 
     group is in the majority, but an ``open cities'' program has 
     induced several towns--even a half-dozen villages in the 
     Republika Srpska--to accept returnees from other groups in 
     return for economic assistance.
       On my last trip, I visited one of these sites in a suburb 
     of Sarajevo occupied by the Bosnian Serbs during the war and 
     returned to the federation by Dayton. The U.S. Agency for 
     International Development and its subcontractor, Catholic 
     Relief Services, are helping returning refugees to rebuild 
     their homes.
       I was moved by the selfless dedication of the young 
     Americans and Europeans working at this important task.
       Finally let me address the issue of security in Bosnia 
     today. In a country that has recently suffered some of the 
     worst atrocities of the 20th century, the citizens need 
     physical security. For the Muslims and Croats, who were 
     forced into an alliance in 1994 by the United States, this 
     means guaranteeing their ability to deter renewed Serbian 
     aggression in the future.
       Toward that end, the ``train and equip'' program, led by 
     retired U.S. military officers, is molding a unified force 
     under joint command. We have supplied three hundred million 
     dollars worth of equipment. I visited the training center in 
     Hadzici (haj-eech-ee), near Sarajevo, where Muslims and 
     Croats are studying and training.
       On the local level, in the Federation, multi-ethnic police 
     forces are being formed. Believe it or not, joint Muslim-
     Croat police units are now patrolling Mostar, scene of some 
     of the worst warfare in 1993 and early 1994. So there is 
     progress here as well.


                             IV. Next Steps

       In citing these examples of progress, I do not want to 
     suggest for a moment that conditions in the Federation, let 
     alone in the Republika Srpska, are rosy.
       They are not. But everyone to whom I spoke in Bosnia agreed 
     on two things: First, significant progress has been made in 
     the Federation; and second, it is absolutely essential for 
     the international military force to remain in Bosnia after 
     June 1998 to guarantee that progress will continue.
       So what should our policy be in Bosnia in the coming 
     months? I believe we should redouble the efforts we are 
     already making.
       Yes, I would like to see a multi-ethnic, multi-religious 
     society re-emerge like the one that existed in Sarajevo 
     before the war. But, I fear that too much blood has been shed 
     and too many atrocities committed for that to happen in the 
     near future.
       More realistic, and politically feasible, is the 
     development of a multi-ethnic state. Most likely that will 
     mean a confederation with a good degree of de-centralization 
     in all but foreign policy and defense.
       Am I sure that we can achieve the goal of a democratic, 
     decentralized Bosnia? No, I am not. Last year I would have 
     rated the odds 1 in 20.
       As a result of the progress made in the last 12 months, I 
     would now estimate the odds on success at about 50-50, if we 
     stay the course.
       But 50-50 looks mighty good compared to the probable 
     outcome if we followed the advice of those now calling for a 
     renegotiation of Dayton and a formal partition of Bosnia. 
     ``Snatching defeat from the jaws of victory'' might be a 
     slight exaggeration, but this policy prescription tends in 
     that direction.
       Those who favor partition seem unaware of the progress 
     already made in Bosnia and blind to the calamities that would 
     result from scrapping Dayton.
       Warfare would almost certainly erupt again, with higher 
     casualties, given the new military balance.
       But renewed fighting would only be part of the tragedy. The 
     vile ethnic cleansers and the war criminals would see their 
     policies vindicated. Europe's remaining anti-democratic 
     rulers like Serbia's Milosevic and Belarus's Lukashenka would 
     be emboldened.
       Moreover, if we pulled the plug on Bosnia just as 
     international efforts are beginning to bear fruit, we could 
     kiss goodbye American leadership in NATO. In fact, the plan 
     to enlarge NATO, I predict, would fail in the Senate.
       And soon thereafter, even the future of NATO itself would 
     be cast in doubt. After all, if Bosnia is the prototypical 
     European crisis of the 21st century--and if NATO is unable to 
     solve Bosnia--then why bother spending billions of dollars on 
     NATO every year?
       So, leaving Bosnia would be a fool's paradise. Just as 
     certainly as night follows day, an American abdication of 
     responsibility and withdrawal from Bosnia would eventually 
     cost us more in blood and treasure than we would ever spend 
     in the current course.
       Let me sum up: the tragedy in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
     although complex, ultimately boils down to old-fashioned 
     oppression. It was preventable, and, with the requisite 
     American and European steadfastness, it is solvable.
       By continuing to lead the effort to put Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina back on its feet and guarantee its citizens a 
     chance to lead productive lives, the United States will be 
     both living up to its ideals and furthering its national 
     self-interest. Thank you.

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