[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 143 (Wednesday, October 22, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10921-S10922]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                  APPROACHING THE CLINTON-JIANG SUMMIT

  Mr. BAUCUS. Mr. President, next week Chinese President Jiang Zemin 
will arrive for his first State visit, the first State visit by a 
Chinese leader in 12 years. As this visit approaches, I rise to discuss 
our China policy and the things we might hope to see from this event.
  Let me begin with the broad goals of our Asia policy. I think they 
are clear. First, a peaceful Pacific. Second, open trade. Third, joint 
work on problems of mutual concern like environmental problems and 
international crime. And fourth, progress toward respect for 
internationally recognized human rights.
  Generally speaking, our Asian policy has helped move us toward these 
goals. We have a permanent military force in the Pacific which, coupled 
with strong alliances with Japan and South Korea, Thailand, the 
Philippines, and Australia, has helped to keep the peace for 20 years. 
While we have a lot of work ahead on Asian trade, our work has produced 
over $100 billion in export growth, an increase of 70 percent. That is 
since 1991. We are beginning to adopt a more systematic approach to the 
region's growing environmental problems, and can cite the 
democratization of the Philippines, Thailand, Taiwan, and South Korea 
as human rights success stories.
  Where does China fit in? China is the largest country in Asia, the 
fastest growing economy, the largest military power, and the Asian 
nation with which our relationship has been most volatile during this 
decade. If we can establish a stable, workable relationship with China, 
all of our goals will come closer to realization. If we cannot, both 
Americans and Chinese, and other Pacific nations, will suffer a great 
deal.
  Next week's summit offers us a chance to make a start. Following it 
must be a work program focusing on a very practical agenda. And as we 
approach the summit, I think we can help ourselves by putting the 
issues we must address in three broad categories. They are: mutual 
interests, areas of dispute, and issues we will face in the future.
  First are the areas where we have mutual interests.
  Regional security is one case. We must work with China to maintain 
peace in Korea. Both countries want to avoid a conflict over Taiwan. We 
need to ensure that Japan does not feel pressured to become a military 
power. On weapons proliferation, if India and Pakistan develop nuclear 
missiles, China will suffer from it a lot more than we would.
  Environmental issues are another matter. We both need to ensure 
sustainable management of fisheries and to address air pollution and 
acid rain problems caused by the boom in Chinese power production. We 
also must work much closer together to do our best to protect 
biodiversity and prevent large-scale climate change. One concrete 
proposal that will help in this area, if the public reports that China 
has agreed to our proposals on nuclear proliferation are accurate, is 
opening up civil nuclear technology sales.
  A number of domestic Chinese issues also fall into this area. Helping 
China establish a broad rule of law will contribute to our human rights 
goals.
  Labor safety is a second case where we could contribute to China's 
own efforts to improve factory safety and improve the lives of many 
ordinary Chinese; and helping Chinese farmers take advantage of cleaner 
pesticides, modern agricultural technologies, and an up-to-date 
infrastructure is a third.
  We also clearly have some disputes with China. We should not make 
them the whole focus of our relationship, but neither should we try to 
duck them.
  At times we will need simply to understand one another's positions 
and agree to put off disagreements into the future.
  Taiwan policy has been handled reasonably well in this manner for the 
past few decades. Perhaps with some adjustments in detail, we should 
continue that policy.
  Likewise, China has recently expressed some unhappiness with our 
stationing of troops in Asia. They need to understand that the issue is 
between us on the one hand and Japan and Korea and our allies on the 
other. It is not on the table for discussion.
  In other areas we should expect to do better. We seem to be doing 
well in nuclear proliferation. It is my hope that the President will 
seal that achievement by certifying China as in compliance in the 
nuclear area, and open up civil nuclear power trade with China. On 
missiles and chemical weapons, we see less thus far. And while I do not 
regard sanctions as a tool appropriate for every issue on the table 
with China--and I do not believe Congress should be passing broad new 
sanction laws--these are areas where we should use targeted sanctions 
if necessary. We did this last spring in the case of the sale of 
chemical weapons precursors involving a Nanjing company. If it happens 
again, we should use tougher penalties.
  Trade is another example. Despite the optimism of United States 
business, since 1980 our exports to China have grown more slowly than 
our exports to any other major market, whether it be Canada, Japan, 
Europe, Mexico, or ASEAN. Meanwhile, we have been tremendously generous 
to China, keeping our market to Chinese goods more open than any other 
in the world.
  This is not acceptable. It is wrong when Chinese shoe companies can 
sell to Montana but Montana wheat farmers cannot sell to China. We 
should expect China to be as fair and open to us as we are to them. And 
we should offer an incentive to do that. Specifically, we should make 
MFN status permanent when China comes up with a good WTO package. But 
we should also be clear that we cannot wait forever.
  Our 5-year bilateral trade agreement negotiated in 1992 is about to 
be completed. And if the pace of the WTO talks does not pick up soon, 
we should use our retaliatory trade law, section 301, to win a broad 
successor to it.

  On human rights, while we should seek common ground and recognize 
where China is doing better, we should also not shrink from bringing up 
the tough issues. The time is past when these questions could be 
considered strictly domestic concerns. We should bring up individual 
cases of political prisoners, ask for talks with the Dalai Lama and Red 
Cross access to Chinese prisons. If the Chinese want us to stop 
sponsoring resolutions at the U.N. Human Rights Commission, they need 
to show some understanding of our concerns and the world's concerns on 
these issues.


                   THE ISSUES: LOOKING TO THE FUTURE

  A third set of issues may be the most important of all, especially as 
we approach a state visit and a summit. These are the issues we will 
face in the years ahead, and where mutual understanding beforehand is 
crucially important.
  The most important of all will be Korean unification. I recently 
visited North Korea. Hunger is widespread and chronic. Economic life in 
Pyongyang is at a standstill, with broken down streetcars in the middle 
of the road, empty streets and darkened buildings. And officials there 
offered no proposals for change other than planting more trees to 
prevent erosion.
  This cannot continue forever. Whether it results from a violent 
collapse, peaceful if belated reform, or even a desperate attack on the 
south, change is sure to come on the Korean Peninsula. There will be no 
belligerent, autarkic regime on the Korean Peninsula.
  And as Koreans sort out their own future, we will have to make some 
very serious security and economic decisions in a very short period of 
time. They will involve American troop movements and a crisis on the 
Chinese border. And we need to ensure beforehand, through intensive 
discussions with China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea, that our 
policies do not bring us into unnecessary disputes or conflicts with 
China or any of Korea's neighbors.
  We can all think of other issues. They include the effects of very 
rapid financial flows on fast-growing regions,

[[Page S10922]]

the potential of newly developed technologies to spur terrorism and 
organized crime. And the vulnerability of the new states on China's 
western border to civil war and religious fanaticism, which we hardly 
think about but which the Chinese Defense Minister told me last winter 
was, together with Korea, the most serious security issue China faces 
today.


                       IF THINGS GO WRONG ANYWAY

  One final point. China policy does not exist in a vacuum. We should 
do our very best to make this relationship work. But we cannot predict 
the course China will take. And so, as we think about China policy, we 
must also think about broader Asian policy.
  If we manage our alliances with Japan, South Korea, Southeast Asia, 
and Australia well; preserve our commitment of troops in the Pacific; 
and protect our own economic and technological strength, we will be 
able to handle whatever lies ahead.


                               CONCLUSION

  But I believe we can do better than that. I have met this year with a 
number of Chinese officials, including the President as well as senior 
military officers and trade officials. And I think the Chinese on the 
whole are pragmatic people who understand the importance of this 
relationship to their own country. And I believe they are interested in 
working with us to set it right.
  So as this summit approaches, we have a great opportunity to set our 
relationship with China on the right course to create a stable, long-
term relationship that contributes to our goals: peace, prosperity, 
environmental protection, and human rights. It is a great chance, and 
we must not miss it. Because the issues dividing us may be many and 
complex. But the basic choice is simple. China will be there for a long 
time. So will we. And both governments can either try their best to get 
along, or all of us can suffer the consequences.
  It's just about that simple, and that important.
  Thank you, Mr. President. I yield the floor and suggest the absence 
of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum 
call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Collins). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to address the 
Senate as in morning business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________