[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 142 (Tuesday, October 21, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10907-S10909]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




             WARD VALLEY LOW-LEVEL WASTE DISPOSAL FACILITY

  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, it is often useful to compare the 
public statements of Government officials with their private 
statements. Such a comparison can say a great deal about an official's 
true motives, not to mention their character. Last week, in response to 
a question I posed for the public record, the Department of the 
Interior provided me with a copy of a memo written by Deputy Secretary 
of the Interior John Garamendi to his boss, Secretary Bruce Babbitt. 
This memorandum was dated February 21, 1996, and it concerns the Ward 
Valley low-level waste disposal issue.
  For those who do not know, Ward Valley is the site of a low-level 
radioactive waste facility licensed by the State of California under 
the Federal Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act. The site sits on 
the Bureau of Land Management land in a remote and sparsely populated 
area of the Mojave Desert. But the Department of the Interior reversed 
an earlier decision to sell the land to California, and has insisted on 
study after study to achieve endless delays.
  Meanwhile, low-level radioactive waste is piling up at hundreds of 
urban locations all across California. It is stored in basements, 
stored in parking lots, stored in trailers, stored in warehouses, and 
temporary shelters. It is on college campuses, it is in residential 
neighborhoods, it is in hospitals--sites that were not designed for 
permanent storage. As long as the waste in these temporary locations in 
populated areas is where it is, it is subject to accidental radioactive 
release from, fire, earthquakes, and floods.
  Governor Wilson is understandably concerned about the health and 
safety of Californians. That is his job. He is frustrated by the delays 
California has faced in trying to get this facility open, and so am I.
  I am further frustrated by the fact that the President's nominee to 
be the Deputy Secretary of the Interior, Mr. John Garamendi, appeared 
before our committee, the Energy and Natural Resources Committee, on 
July 27, 1995, and testified under oath that Ward Valley and the issue 
should and would be quickly resolved. Mind you, this was July, 1995.
  It may interest my colleagues to know that Ward Valley was 
scrutinized by two--not one, but two--environmental impact statements 
under NEPA, and two biological opinions under the Endangered Species 
Act. Although all these environmental reviews have been favorable to 
the Ward Valley facility, the Secretary of the Interior continues to 
opt for further studies rather than just transferring the land to 
California.
  In 1994, having seemingly exhausted the studies available to delay 
the process under NEPA and the Endangered Species Act, the Secretary 
turned to the National Academy of Sciences and asked for yet another 
study. But in May 1995 the National Academy of Sciences study was 
complete, and again it was favorable to the Ward Valley site.
  Finally, it appeared that Secretary Babbitt had little choice but to 
transfer the land, and announced his intention to do so in May 1995. 
Environmentalists bitterly complained. Greenpeace even picketed the 
Secretary. Movie stars and pop singers rallied against the facility. It 
did not matter what the science said. The facts didn't seem to matter. 
It was simply good politics in California to oppose a radioactive waste 
site and I guess the Secretary did not like the unfavorable press he 
was getting at the time.
  Indeed, the politics of Ward Valley seems to loom large in another 
memorandum that we have uncovered, going back to 1993. I have a 
memorandum to the Secretary from October 19, 1993, that speaks to the 
prevailing mindset at Interior, and it says:
  And I quote:

       This memorandum addresses only the politics of Ward Valley. 
     I can imagine no scenario that allows us to go forward with 
     the land transfer and retain credibility with Boxer and the 
     enviros.

  So to keep themselves out of hot water with environmental groups, 
Deputy Secretary Garamendi had to devise a new way to delay Ward Valley 
while simultaneously waging a public relations and political campaign 
against the site.
  As far as John Garamendi was concerned, a new excuse for a new study 
and further delay simply had to be found.
  So in February 1996, the Department of Interior evidently struck 
gold, or thought they had. A former low-level waste facility in Beatty, 
NV, was determined to be ``leaking.''

[[Page S10908]]

  Ignoring the fact the Director of the U.S. Geological Survey told him 
that you could not relate Ward Valley with the Beatty, NV, site, Deputy 
Secretary Garamendi knew a good excuse for another study when he saw 
one and a PR campaign to go with it.
  So environmental and radiological factsheets were prepared by the 
Department for the press and the public, factsheets that were later 
criticized by the chair of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for the 
errors and misinformation they contained.
  Press conferences were held where Deputy Secretary Garamendi 
announced that new tritium tests would be conducted, and another new 
EIS would be performed because of so-called new information about the 
Beatty, NV, site.
  These new studies and the lawsuits that would surely follow might 
take years.
  But what were Interior's true motivations? Did Interior ever intend 
to transfer the site under their watch? Was Interior interested in the 
public health and safety or good PR and political advantage?
  Mr. President, I now have the internal memo that cuts through the 
public statements and press releases to provide clear insight into the 
Department's motivations. Let me read this memorandum for my 
colleagues. It is dated February 21, 1996, memorandum to Bruce Babbitt 
from John Garamendi. Subject: Ward Valley:

       Attached are the Ward Valley [press] clips. We have taken 
     the high ground. Wilson--

  Meaning Governor Pete Wilson--

     is the venal toady of special interests (radiation business).

  It goes further to state:

       I do not think Greenpeace will picket you any longer. I 
     will maintain a heavy PR campaign until the issue is finally 
     won.

  Mr. President, here is the Deputy Secretary of Interior engaged in a 
PR campaign to portray the Governor of California as a venal toady. For 
those in this Chamber who may not know the precise definition of a 
``venal toady,'' it means a deferential, fawning parasite who is open 
to bribery.
  A venal toady. That is Secretary Garamendi's characterization of the 
Governor of California, or the goal of his PR campaign. I am not sure 
which.
  Is this what Deputy Secretary Garamendi calls the high ground? Is it 
taking the high ground to call for study after study and create delay 
after delay while ignoring all the studies that show the site is safe 
so far?
  Is it taking the high ground to keep radioactive waste spread around 
800 locations in California subject to some accidental release, a 
flood, fire or earthquake, where literally millions of people could be 
exposed to radioactivity, or finding a site and put it there, which we 
have given California the authority to do?
  Is it taking the high ground to say you are working to protect public 
health when you are, in fact, endangering the public's health?
  Is it taking the high ground to pretend to be pursuing a careful 
deliberative process following standards of good Government when, in 
fact, you are waging a ruthless PR campaign in which misstatements and 
half-truths are used?
  Remember, I am not the one claiming that misstatements have been 
made. President Clinton's own selection as chair of the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, Dr. Shirley Jackson, has highlighted the 
Interior Department's misleading errors and misstatements in her letter 
to me of July 22, 1997, which I ask unanimous consent be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                                    United States,


                                Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

                                    Washington, DC, July 22, 1997.
     Hon. Bruce Babbitt,
     Secretary, U.S. Department of Interior, Washington, DC.
       Dear Secretary Babbitt: I am writing on behalf of the U.S. 
     Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to share our views 
     related to the Department of Interior's (DOI) actions 
     regarding the proposed Ward Valley low-level radioactive 
     waste (LLW) disposal facility in California. In February 
     1996, DOI announced that it would prepare a second supplement 
     to an environmental impact statement (SEIS) for the transfer 
     of land from the Federal government to the State of 
     California, for the development of the Ward Valley low-level 
     radioactive waste (LLW) disposal facility. We understand that 
     DOI has identified 13 issues that it believes need to be 
     addressed in the SEIS. DOI also stated that it would not make 
     a decision on the land transfer until the SEIS was completed. 
     NRC will actively serve as a ``commenting agency'' on the 
     SEIS in accordance with the Council of Environmental Quality 
     regulations in 40 CFR 1503.2 ``Duty To Comment.'' NRC's 
     interest in the Ward Valley disposal facility is focussed on 
     protection of public health and safety, and many of the 13 
     issues to be addressed in the SEIS are related to our areas 
     of expertise. As a commenting agency, we will review the 
     draft SEIS, and provide comments based on the requirements in 
     federal law and regulations, and our knowledge of policy, 
     technical, and legal issues in LLW management. We would also 
     be available to discuss these issues with DOI, both before 
     and after publication of the draft SEIS.
       On a related matter, it is our understanding that Deputy 
     Secretary John Garamendi of DOI held a press conference on 
     July 22, 1996, addressing the effect of Ward Valley facility 
     availability on the use of radioisotopes in medicine and 
     medical research. It was recently brought to our attention 
     that DOI distributed a document entitled, ``Medical, 
     Research, and Academic Low Level Radioactive Waste (LLRW) 
     Fact Sheet'' at the press conference. This Fact Sheet 
     contains several errors and statements that may mislead the 
     reader. To assist DOI, we have addressed these errors and 
     statements in the enclosure to this letter. Some of the 
     points contained in the Fact Sheet are useful and contribute 
     to the dialogue on this issue; however, NRC is concerned that 
     some of the subjective information of the document is 
     characterized as factual. We are particularly concerned by 
     the statement that the NRC definition of LLW ``. . . is an 
     unfortunate and misleading catch-all definition . . .'' In 
     fact, NRC's definition is taken from Federal law, 
     specifically the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 
     1980, and the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments 
     Act of 1985 (LLRWPAA). Additionally, it is NRC's view that 
     some of the information that was referenced or relied on in 
     the Fact Sheet may not represent a balanced perspective based 
     on facts. For example, a table of the sources and amounts of 
     radioactive waste that is projected to go to the Ward Valley 
     facility is erroneously attributed to NRC, the U.S. 
     Department of Energy (DOE), U.S. Ecology, the Southwestern 
     Compact, and the Ward Valley EIS. Raw data from the sources 
     quoted appear to have been interpreted based on uncertain 
     assumptions about future activities of generators to produce 
     the figures in the table. Additionally, NRC noted that the 
     figures in the table are identical to those in a March 1994 
     Committee to Bridge the Gap report.
       With respect to the relationship between LLW disposal 
     policy and medicine and medical research, we note that the 
     National Academy of Sciences Board on Radiation Effects 
     Research has prepared a Prospectus for a study entitled, 
     ``The Impact of United States Low-Level Radioactive Waste 
     Management Policy on Biomedical Research.'' The study would, 
     among other things, ``Evaluate the effects of higher disposal 
     costs and on-site storage on the current and future 
     activities of biomedical research, including the effects of 
     state noncompliance [with the LLRWPAA of 1985] on 
     institutions conducting biological and biomedical research 
     and on hospitals where radioisotopes are crucial for the 
     diagnosis and treatment of disease.'' Thus, the issue of 
     medical uses of radioisotopes and how they have been affected 
     by the Ward Valley process is far less clear than the Fact 
     Sheet portrays.
       Finally, since there are no formal arrangements that permit 
     NRC to review and comment on the technical accuracy of 
     various DOI documents on LLW and Ward Valley, we may not be 
     aware such documents exist, thus the absence of NRC comments 
     does not imply an NRC judgment with respect to the technical 
     accuracy or completeness of such documents.
       I trust our comments will be helpful in your efforts to 
     address Ward Valley issues.
           Sincerely,
                                              Shirley Ann Jackson,
                                                         Chairman.
       Enclosure.

  NRC Staff Comments on the Department of Interior ``Fact Sheet'' \1\

       1. The Fact Sheet contains a projection of LLW to be sent 
     to the Ward Valley disposal facility over its 30-year life, 
     and attributes the table to the Department of Energy, the 
     U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Southwestern Compact, 
     U.S. Ecology, and the Ward Valley environmental impact 
     statement. In fact, the figures in the table are identical to 
     those in a table from a March 1994 Committee to Bridge the 
     Gap report, are substantially different from California 
     projections, and are based on assumptions that are not 
     identified. The actual assumptions used are contained in the 
     Committee to Bridge the Gap report and minimize the amount 
     and importance of the medical waste stream.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \1\ ``Medical, Research, and Academic Low Level Radioactive 
     Waste (LLRW) Fact Sheet.'' U.S. Department of Interior, 
     Office of the Deputy Secretary. Distributed at a press 
     conference of the Deputy Secretary on July 22, 1996.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       2. The Fact Sheet is incomplete in that it provides only 
     anecdotal evidence of the impact of not having the Ward 
     Valley disposal facility available to medical generators. 
     Although its arguments about short-lived

[[Page S10909]]

     radionuclides appear to be generally true, the Fact Sheet 
     downplays the effects on generators that use longer-lived 
     radionuclides. According to the Fact Sheet, there are an 
     estimated 53 research hospitals in California, out of some 
     500 hospitals overall. The Fact Sheet describes the impact at 
     three of these research organizations and concludes that they 
     can manage their waste, either by disposing of it at an out-
     of-state facility (Barnwell or Environcare), storing it, or, 
     for sealed sources, sending them back to the manufacturer. 
     The Fact Sheet concludes that there is a no health and safety 
     impact from the approach, but does not address broader issues 
     such as the continued availability of existing disposal sites 
     as an option, and the fact that transferring a sealed source 
     to a manufacturer does not eliminate the problem, but simply 
     shifts it from one organization to another.
       3. The Fact Sheet does not address the more complex issues 
     concerning use of radioisotopes in medicine, such as how 
     medical research in general has been affected by issues such 
     as disposal and storage cost increases, and the need to 
     switch from longer-lived radionuclides to short-lived 
     nuclides or non-radioactive materials. The National Academy 
     of Sciences Board on Radiation Effects Research has prepared 
     a Prospectus for a study entitled ``The Impact of United 
     States Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Policy on 
     Biomedical Research.'' The study would, among other things, 
     ``Evaluate the effects on higher disposal costs and on-site 
     storage on the current and future activities on biomedical 
     research, including the effects of state non-compliance on 
     institutions conducting biological and biomedical research 
     and on hospitals where radioisotopes are crucial for the 
     diagnosis and treatment of disease.'' Thus, the issue of 
     medical uses of radioisotopes and how they have been affected 
     by the Ward Valley process is far less clear than the Fact 
     Sheet portrays.
       4. The Fact Sheet characterizes the NRC definition of LLW 
     in 10 CFR Part 61 as ``unfortunate and misleading'' because 
     it includes both long-lived and short-lived radionuclides. It 
     fails to acknowledge that this definition is contained in 
     Federal law (the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 
     1980 and the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments 
     Act of 1985) and that information on the kinds and amounts of 
     radionuclides contained in LLW for land disposal is widely 
     available in NRC regulations and/or NUREGS, and from DOE. In 
     developing Part 61 in the early 1980s. NRC sought public 
     comment on the proposed rule, and provided extensive 
     information on the assumptions, analyses, and proposed 
     content of the regulation for review. In developing the 
     regulations for LLW, including how different classes are 
     defined, NRC received and considered extensive public input. 
     Four regional workshops were held, and 107 persons commented 
     on the draft rulemaking for 10 CFR Part 61, which defines 
     LLW. In short, NRC encouraged public involvement in 
     developing the definition of, and defining the risk 
     associated with LLW.
       The Fact Sheet focuses on the half-life of radionuclides, 
     but fails to discuss risk to the public from the efforts of 
     ionizing radiation and how they are affected by the half-life 
     of radionucludes. Public health and safety is measured in 
     terms of risk, not half-life. Risk is a function of radiation 
     dose, and the determination of risk depends on a variety of 
     factors, including the type of radiation emitted, the 
     concentration of radionuclides in the medium in which they 
     are present, the likelihood that barriers isolating the 
     radionuclides will be effective, and the likelihood of 
     exposure if radioactive materials are not fully contained. 
     The Fact Sheet is misleading when it states that the half-
     life of \123\ used in medicine is 13 hours, and that of \129\ 
     from nuclear power plants is 16 million years and that it 
     remains hazardous for 160-320 million years. Either isotope 
     can be a risk to the public, depending upon the other factors 
     discussed above, and half-life by itself does not indicate 
     risk.
       5. In the definition section, the Fact Sheet defines 
     ``radioactive half-life'' as ``The general rule is that the 
     hazardous life of a radioactive substance is 10-20 times its 
     half-life.'' This definition contains a new term (hazardous) 
     not used by the national or international health physics or 
     radiation protection communities, and not defined in the Fact 
     Sheet.

  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I might add, I did not seek this letter 
from the NRC. It came unsolicited. Perhaps one might give the 
Department the benefit of the doubt and recognize that it is human to 
err. But then you encounter a memorandum such as that of February 21 to 
the Secretary and the Department's intent becomes obvious.
  This is nothing more than a political and public relations game. 
Secretary Garamendi seems to be saying: Let's not worry about the waste 
or danger it may pose. If nothing is done, that's fine. Let somebody 
else take care of it on their watch. But let's just make the Governor 
of California look like a ``parasite open to bribery,'' as the 
definition of ``venal toady'' describes.
  I believe that the Department of Interior has absolutely no intention 
of transferring the Ward Valley land until they are ordered to do so by 
the Congress or the courts.
  If the Senators from California and I cannot work out something with 
respect to land transfer legislation, we will either have to have a 
floor fight of some kind or be content to let the courts decide the 
issue.
  I encourage my colleagues to recognize the significance of the 
administration's attitude toward the Ward Valley issue and refer to the 
memorandum that I have highlighted of February 21, 1996, from John 
Garamendi to Bruce Babbitt where he criticizes, in inappropriate terms, 
the motivation of the Governor of California and suggests to the 
Secretary that he does not think Greenpeace will picket him any longer.
  So again, Mr. President, the terminology, referring to the Governor 
of California as ``the venal toady of special interests,'' deserves 
reflection by my colleagues on the total inappropriateness of such a 
memorandum from the Deputy Secretary, John Garamendi, to the Secretary 
of the Interior, Bruce Babbitt.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.

                          ____________________