[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 142 (Tuesday, October 21, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10907-S10909]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
WARD VALLEY LOW-LEVEL WASTE DISPOSAL FACILITY
Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, it is often useful to compare the
public statements of Government officials with their private
statements. Such a comparison can say a great deal about an official's
true motives, not to mention their character. Last week, in response to
a question I posed for the public record, the Department of the
Interior provided me with a copy of a memo written by Deputy Secretary
of the Interior John Garamendi to his boss, Secretary Bruce Babbitt.
This memorandum was dated February 21, 1996, and it concerns the Ward
Valley low-level waste disposal issue.
For those who do not know, Ward Valley is the site of a low-level
radioactive waste facility licensed by the State of California under
the Federal Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act. The site sits on
the Bureau of Land Management land in a remote and sparsely populated
area of the Mojave Desert. But the Department of the Interior reversed
an earlier decision to sell the land to California, and has insisted on
study after study to achieve endless delays.
Meanwhile, low-level radioactive waste is piling up at hundreds of
urban locations all across California. It is stored in basements,
stored in parking lots, stored in trailers, stored in warehouses, and
temporary shelters. It is on college campuses, it is in residential
neighborhoods, it is in hospitals--sites that were not designed for
permanent storage. As long as the waste in these temporary locations in
populated areas is where it is, it is subject to accidental radioactive
release from, fire, earthquakes, and floods.
Governor Wilson is understandably concerned about the health and
safety of Californians. That is his job. He is frustrated by the delays
California has faced in trying to get this facility open, and so am I.
I am further frustrated by the fact that the President's nominee to
be the Deputy Secretary of the Interior, Mr. John Garamendi, appeared
before our committee, the Energy and Natural Resources Committee, on
July 27, 1995, and testified under oath that Ward Valley and the issue
should and would be quickly resolved. Mind you, this was July, 1995.
It may interest my colleagues to know that Ward Valley was
scrutinized by two--not one, but two--environmental impact statements
under NEPA, and two biological opinions under the Endangered Species
Act. Although all these environmental reviews have been favorable to
the Ward Valley facility, the Secretary of the Interior continues to
opt for further studies rather than just transferring the land to
California.
In 1994, having seemingly exhausted the studies available to delay
the process under NEPA and the Endangered Species Act, the Secretary
turned to the National Academy of Sciences and asked for yet another
study. But in May 1995 the National Academy of Sciences study was
complete, and again it was favorable to the Ward Valley site.
Finally, it appeared that Secretary Babbitt had little choice but to
transfer the land, and announced his intention to do so in May 1995.
Environmentalists bitterly complained. Greenpeace even picketed the
Secretary. Movie stars and pop singers rallied against the facility. It
did not matter what the science said. The facts didn't seem to matter.
It was simply good politics in California to oppose a radioactive waste
site and I guess the Secretary did not like the unfavorable press he
was getting at the time.
Indeed, the politics of Ward Valley seems to loom large in another
memorandum that we have uncovered, going back to 1993. I have a
memorandum to the Secretary from October 19, 1993, that speaks to the
prevailing mindset at Interior, and it says:
And I quote:
This memorandum addresses only the politics of Ward Valley.
I can imagine no scenario that allows us to go forward with
the land transfer and retain credibility with Boxer and the
enviros.
So to keep themselves out of hot water with environmental groups,
Deputy Secretary Garamendi had to devise a new way to delay Ward Valley
while simultaneously waging a public relations and political campaign
against the site.
As far as John Garamendi was concerned, a new excuse for a new study
and further delay simply had to be found.
So in February 1996, the Department of Interior evidently struck
gold, or thought they had. A former low-level waste facility in Beatty,
NV, was determined to be ``leaking.''
[[Page S10908]]
Ignoring the fact the Director of the U.S. Geological Survey told him
that you could not relate Ward Valley with the Beatty, NV, site, Deputy
Secretary Garamendi knew a good excuse for another study when he saw
one and a PR campaign to go with it.
So environmental and radiological factsheets were prepared by the
Department for the press and the public, factsheets that were later
criticized by the chair of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for the
errors and misinformation they contained.
Press conferences were held where Deputy Secretary Garamendi
announced that new tritium tests would be conducted, and another new
EIS would be performed because of so-called new information about the
Beatty, NV, site.
These new studies and the lawsuits that would surely follow might
take years.
But what were Interior's true motivations? Did Interior ever intend
to transfer the site under their watch? Was Interior interested in the
public health and safety or good PR and political advantage?
Mr. President, I now have the internal memo that cuts through the
public statements and press releases to provide clear insight into the
Department's motivations. Let me read this memorandum for my
colleagues. It is dated February 21, 1996, memorandum to Bruce Babbitt
from John Garamendi. Subject: Ward Valley:
Attached are the Ward Valley [press] clips. We have taken
the high ground. Wilson--
Meaning Governor Pete Wilson--
is the venal toady of special interests (radiation business).
It goes further to state:
I do not think Greenpeace will picket you any longer. I
will maintain a heavy PR campaign until the issue is finally
won.
Mr. President, here is the Deputy Secretary of Interior engaged in a
PR campaign to portray the Governor of California as a venal toady. For
those in this Chamber who may not know the precise definition of a
``venal toady,'' it means a deferential, fawning parasite who is open
to bribery.
A venal toady. That is Secretary Garamendi's characterization of the
Governor of California, or the goal of his PR campaign. I am not sure
which.
Is this what Deputy Secretary Garamendi calls the high ground? Is it
taking the high ground to call for study after study and create delay
after delay while ignoring all the studies that show the site is safe
so far?
Is it taking the high ground to keep radioactive waste spread around
800 locations in California subject to some accidental release, a
flood, fire or earthquake, where literally millions of people could be
exposed to radioactivity, or finding a site and put it there, which we
have given California the authority to do?
Is it taking the high ground to say you are working to protect public
health when you are, in fact, endangering the public's health?
Is it taking the high ground to pretend to be pursuing a careful
deliberative process following standards of good Government when, in
fact, you are waging a ruthless PR campaign in which misstatements and
half-truths are used?
Remember, I am not the one claiming that misstatements have been
made. President Clinton's own selection as chair of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Dr. Shirley Jackson, has highlighted the
Interior Department's misleading errors and misstatements in her letter
to me of July 22, 1997, which I ask unanimous consent be printed in the
Record.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
United States,
Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC, July 22, 1997.
Hon. Bruce Babbitt,
Secretary, U.S. Department of Interior, Washington, DC.
Dear Secretary Babbitt: I am writing on behalf of the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to share our views
related to the Department of Interior's (DOI) actions
regarding the proposed Ward Valley low-level radioactive
waste (LLW) disposal facility in California. In February
1996, DOI announced that it would prepare a second supplement
to an environmental impact statement (SEIS) for the transfer
of land from the Federal government to the State of
California, for the development of the Ward Valley low-level
radioactive waste (LLW) disposal facility. We understand that
DOI has identified 13 issues that it believes need to be
addressed in the SEIS. DOI also stated that it would not make
a decision on the land transfer until the SEIS was completed.
NRC will actively serve as a ``commenting agency'' on the
SEIS in accordance with the Council of Environmental Quality
regulations in 40 CFR 1503.2 ``Duty To Comment.'' NRC's
interest in the Ward Valley disposal facility is focussed on
protection of public health and safety, and many of the 13
issues to be addressed in the SEIS are related to our areas
of expertise. As a commenting agency, we will review the
draft SEIS, and provide comments based on the requirements in
federal law and regulations, and our knowledge of policy,
technical, and legal issues in LLW management. We would also
be available to discuss these issues with DOI, both before
and after publication of the draft SEIS.
On a related matter, it is our understanding that Deputy
Secretary John Garamendi of DOI held a press conference on
July 22, 1996, addressing the effect of Ward Valley facility
availability on the use of radioisotopes in medicine and
medical research. It was recently brought to our attention
that DOI distributed a document entitled, ``Medical,
Research, and Academic Low Level Radioactive Waste (LLRW)
Fact Sheet'' at the press conference. This Fact Sheet
contains several errors and statements that may mislead the
reader. To assist DOI, we have addressed these errors and
statements in the enclosure to this letter. Some of the
points contained in the Fact Sheet are useful and contribute
to the dialogue on this issue; however, NRC is concerned that
some of the subjective information of the document is
characterized as factual. We are particularly concerned by
the statement that the NRC definition of LLW ``. . . is an
unfortunate and misleading catch-all definition . . .'' In
fact, NRC's definition is taken from Federal law,
specifically the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of
1980, and the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments
Act of 1985 (LLRWPAA). Additionally, it is NRC's view that
some of the information that was referenced or relied on in
the Fact Sheet may not represent a balanced perspective based
on facts. For example, a table of the sources and amounts of
radioactive waste that is projected to go to the Ward Valley
facility is erroneously attributed to NRC, the U.S.
Department of Energy (DOE), U.S. Ecology, the Southwestern
Compact, and the Ward Valley EIS. Raw data from the sources
quoted appear to have been interpreted based on uncertain
assumptions about future activities of generators to produce
the figures in the table. Additionally, NRC noted that the
figures in the table are identical to those in a March 1994
Committee to Bridge the Gap report.
With respect to the relationship between LLW disposal
policy and medicine and medical research, we note that the
National Academy of Sciences Board on Radiation Effects
Research has prepared a Prospectus for a study entitled,
``The Impact of United States Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Management Policy on Biomedical Research.'' The study would,
among other things, ``Evaluate the effects of higher disposal
costs and on-site storage on the current and future
activities of biomedical research, including the effects of
state noncompliance [with the LLRWPAA of 1985] on
institutions conducting biological and biomedical research
and on hospitals where radioisotopes are crucial for the
diagnosis and treatment of disease.'' Thus, the issue of
medical uses of radioisotopes and how they have been affected
by the Ward Valley process is far less clear than the Fact
Sheet portrays.
Finally, since there are no formal arrangements that permit
NRC to review and comment on the technical accuracy of
various DOI documents on LLW and Ward Valley, we may not be
aware such documents exist, thus the absence of NRC comments
does not imply an NRC judgment with respect to the technical
accuracy or completeness of such documents.
I trust our comments will be helpful in your efforts to
address Ward Valley issues.
Sincerely,
Shirley Ann Jackson,
Chairman.
Enclosure.
NRC Staff Comments on the Department of Interior ``Fact Sheet'' \1\
1. The Fact Sheet contains a projection of LLW to be sent
to the Ward Valley disposal facility over its 30-year life,
and attributes the table to the Department of Energy, the
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Southwestern Compact,
U.S. Ecology, and the Ward Valley environmental impact
statement. In fact, the figures in the table are identical to
those in a table from a March 1994 Committee to Bridge the
Gap report, are substantially different from California
projections, and are based on assumptions that are not
identified. The actual assumptions used are contained in the
Committee to Bridge the Gap report and minimize the amount
and importance of the medical waste stream.
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\1\ ``Medical, Research, and Academic Low Level Radioactive
Waste (LLRW) Fact Sheet.'' U.S. Department of Interior,
Office of the Deputy Secretary. Distributed at a press
conference of the Deputy Secretary on July 22, 1996.
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2. The Fact Sheet is incomplete in that it provides only
anecdotal evidence of the impact of not having the Ward
Valley disposal facility available to medical generators.
Although its arguments about short-lived
[[Page S10909]]
radionuclides appear to be generally true, the Fact Sheet
downplays the effects on generators that use longer-lived
radionuclides. According to the Fact Sheet, there are an
estimated 53 research hospitals in California, out of some
500 hospitals overall. The Fact Sheet describes the impact at
three of these research organizations and concludes that they
can manage their waste, either by disposing of it at an out-
of-state facility (Barnwell or Environcare), storing it, or,
for sealed sources, sending them back to the manufacturer.
The Fact Sheet concludes that there is a no health and safety
impact from the approach, but does not address broader issues
such as the continued availability of existing disposal sites
as an option, and the fact that transferring a sealed source
to a manufacturer does not eliminate the problem, but simply
shifts it from one organization to another.
3. The Fact Sheet does not address the more complex issues
concerning use of radioisotopes in medicine, such as how
medical research in general has been affected by issues such
as disposal and storage cost increases, and the need to
switch from longer-lived radionuclides to short-lived
nuclides or non-radioactive materials. The National Academy
of Sciences Board on Radiation Effects Research has prepared
a Prospectus for a study entitled ``The Impact of United
States Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Policy on
Biomedical Research.'' The study would, among other things,
``Evaluate the effects on higher disposal costs and on-site
storage on the current and future activities on biomedical
research, including the effects of state non-compliance on
institutions conducting biological and biomedical research
and on hospitals where radioisotopes are crucial for the
diagnosis and treatment of disease.'' Thus, the issue of
medical uses of radioisotopes and how they have been affected
by the Ward Valley process is far less clear than the Fact
Sheet portrays.
4. The Fact Sheet characterizes the NRC definition of LLW
in 10 CFR Part 61 as ``unfortunate and misleading'' because
it includes both long-lived and short-lived radionuclides. It
fails to acknowledge that this definition is contained in
Federal law (the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of
1980 and the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments
Act of 1985) and that information on the kinds and amounts of
radionuclides contained in LLW for land disposal is widely
available in NRC regulations and/or NUREGS, and from DOE. In
developing Part 61 in the early 1980s. NRC sought public
comment on the proposed rule, and provided extensive
information on the assumptions, analyses, and proposed
content of the regulation for review. In developing the
regulations for LLW, including how different classes are
defined, NRC received and considered extensive public input.
Four regional workshops were held, and 107 persons commented
on the draft rulemaking for 10 CFR Part 61, which defines
LLW. In short, NRC encouraged public involvement in
developing the definition of, and defining the risk
associated with LLW.
The Fact Sheet focuses on the half-life of radionuclides,
but fails to discuss risk to the public from the efforts of
ionizing radiation and how they are affected by the half-life
of radionucludes. Public health and safety is measured in
terms of risk, not half-life. Risk is a function of radiation
dose, and the determination of risk depends on a variety of
factors, including the type of radiation emitted, the
concentration of radionuclides in the medium in which they
are present, the likelihood that barriers isolating the
radionuclides will be effective, and the likelihood of
exposure if radioactive materials are not fully contained.
The Fact Sheet is misleading when it states that the half-
life of \123\ used in medicine is 13 hours, and that of \129\
from nuclear power plants is 16 million years and that it
remains hazardous for 160-320 million years. Either isotope
can be a risk to the public, depending upon the other factors
discussed above, and half-life by itself does not indicate
risk.
5. In the definition section, the Fact Sheet defines
``radioactive half-life'' as ``The general rule is that the
hazardous life of a radioactive substance is 10-20 times its
half-life.'' This definition contains a new term (hazardous)
not used by the national or international health physics or
radiation protection communities, and not defined in the Fact
Sheet.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I might add, I did not seek this letter
from the NRC. It came unsolicited. Perhaps one might give the
Department the benefit of the doubt and recognize that it is human to
err. But then you encounter a memorandum such as that of February 21 to
the Secretary and the Department's intent becomes obvious.
This is nothing more than a political and public relations game.
Secretary Garamendi seems to be saying: Let's not worry about the waste
or danger it may pose. If nothing is done, that's fine. Let somebody
else take care of it on their watch. But let's just make the Governor
of California look like a ``parasite open to bribery,'' as the
definition of ``venal toady'' describes.
I believe that the Department of Interior has absolutely no intention
of transferring the Ward Valley land until they are ordered to do so by
the Congress or the courts.
If the Senators from California and I cannot work out something with
respect to land transfer legislation, we will either have to have a
floor fight of some kind or be content to let the courts decide the
issue.
I encourage my colleagues to recognize the significance of the
administration's attitude toward the Ward Valley issue and refer to the
memorandum that I have highlighted of February 21, 1996, from John
Garamendi to Bruce Babbitt where he criticizes, in inappropriate terms,
the motivation of the Governor of California and suggests to the
Secretary that he does not think Greenpeace will picket him any longer.
So again, Mr. President, the terminology, referring to the Governor
of California as ``the venal toady of special interests,'' deserves
reflection by my colleagues on the total inappropriateness of such a
memorandum from the Deputy Secretary, John Garamendi, to the Secretary
of the Interior, Bruce Babbitt.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
____________________