[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 142 (Tuesday, October 21, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10869-S10870]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                UNITED STATES-CHINA NUCLEAR COOPERATION

  Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, I rise today to address the disturbing 
prospect that President Clinton will make the necessary certification 
to Congress that would permit so-called nuclear cooperation between the 
United States and China. I really believe we should be honest with each 
other. This is a political decision, driven by the United States-China 
October summit rather than the facts of China's weapons proliferation 
record.
  The prospect of nuclear cooperation with China is perhaps the 
clearest illustration yet of the trust but don't verify approach behind 
the administration's China policy. The administration does not want 
Chinese President Jiang Zemin to return to Beijing emptyhanded. But I 
question the need to make concessions to China in the first place.
  China has a weapons proliferation record that is unrivaled in the 
world. Chinese trade barriers continue to block U.S. goods and 
companies. In the last several years, Beijing has had a human rights 
record that has resulted in the most intense religious persecution in 
several decades, and of course it has also resulted in the silencing of 
all political dissidents in China, according to our State Department 
reports.
  In spite of such behavior, nuclear cooperation with China could 
become a reality. Beijing has made a host of nonproliferation promises 
to acquire United States nuclear technology, and the administration is 
applauding China's efforts. Sadly, China's promises of all new export 
controls and assurance that no nuclear technology will be sent to 
unsafeguarded nuclear facilities will do little to stem China's 
proliferation activity.
  China has made and broken nuclear nonproliferation commitments for 
over a decade, and they have broken them with great regularity. Little 
confidence can be placed in China's new nonproliferation promises until 
Beijing backs up such commitments with action. Disregarding the issue 
of whether or not China can be trusted, each of China's 
nonproliferation commitments is deficient in important areas.
  China's new export controls are untested, and will be administered by 
agencies with close ties to the China National Nuclear Corporation--
that is the organization which has helped Iran prospect for uranium and 
that is the organization which transferred ring magnets used for 
uranium enrichment to an unsafeguarded nuclear facility in Pakistan. So 
we are alleging that we are going to have nonproliferation. Then we are 
going to put it in the hands of the organization which has been a 
massive proliferator of nuclear weapons technology and capacity.
  The ring magnet transfer was in apparent violation of United States 
law, although the Clinton administration did not impose sanctions as a 
violation of China's commitments--so we had a violation of our law--it 
was a violation of China's commitments under the Nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty and our administration refused to impose 
sanctions. I just don't think we can continue to turn our head away 
from the violations and then turn our head toward this country and say, 
well, in spite of all that we'll wink and establish a new level of 
cooperation.
  With regard to China, China has had great cooperation with Iran on 
nuclear issues. The administration is allowing China to use nuclear 
blackmail to obtain United States nuclear technology as it relates to 
Iran. China will consider forswearing new nuclear cooperation, it says, 
with Iran, such as the sale of a nuclear reactor and a plant for 
uranium conversion, if the administration will allow United States-
China nuclear cooperation to proceed. They are threatening to 
proliferate more nuclear weapons and proliferate more nuclear 
technology if we don't give them additional nuclear information and 
additional nuclear technology with which they could violate agreements 
like they have regularly. China's pledge to join the Zangger committee 
says more about what China is unwilling to do rather than signaling a 
new commitment to nonproliferation. China has joined the Zangger 
committee and not the Nuclear Suppliers Group because Zangger members 
can continue to export nuclear technology to countries which keep some 
nuclear facilities

[[Page S10870]]

from international inspection. If they were to pledge to join the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group that would be a different thing. But the 
Zangger committee has the loophole necessary to proliferate nuclear 
technology with the potential of nuclear weaponry to places that don't 
have international inspection. China is the only nuclear weapons power 
in the world that has not joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group and they 
remain unwilling to do so.
  The national security arguments for United States-China nuclear 
cooperation are far from compelling, and the economic rationale is 
exaggerated. As the Washington Post notes this morning, United States 
big business is lobbying hard for nuclear cooperation with China in 
hopes that this market will boost exports.
  I want United States businesses to benefit from possible export 
markets, but China is seeking nuclear cooperation with the United 
States to increase the number of bidders for and to lower the price of 
Chinese power projects. Once China obtains nuclear technology, they 
will reverse engineer our products and they will start building those 
products themselves and be our competitors in other export markets.
  As Dan Horner of the Nuclear Control Institute notes in the Post 
article this morning, China is only seeking enough technology to 
develop a domestic production capability.
  The United States should not enter into nuclear cooperation with 
China until real and observable progress is made in China's 
nonproliferation record. Before we send our nuclear technology to 
China, Beijing should cut off all nuclear cooperation with terrorist 
states, such as Iran. Before we send our nuclear technology to China, 
Beijing should maintain at least for 1 year an exemplary 
nonproliferation record for all weapons-of-mass-destruction technology, 
including technologies other than nuclear--chemical technologies and 
biological technologies.
  The threat of weapons of mass destruction has become a broader issue 
than that of nuclear-proliferation technology alone. Chemical weapons, 
biological weapons and the missile systems to deliver those weapons are 
all part of the weapons-of-mass-destruction threat. China's 
improvements in nuclear nonproliferation are questionable at best, but 
even the administration can't defend China's broader weapons-of-mass-
destruction nonproliferation record.
  Even though the administration argues that China has honored its May 
1996 pledge not to transfer nuclear material to unsafeguarded nuclear 
facilities, doubts persist about China's recent nuclear-proliferation 
activity. A June 1997 CIA report released this year states that:

       During the last half of 1996--

  After its assurances of May 1996--

       During the last half of 1996, China was the most 
     significant supplier of [weapons of mass-destruction]-related 
     goods and technology to foreign countries. The Chinese 
     provided a tremendous variety of assistance to both Iran's 
     and Pakistan's ballistic-missile programs. China was also the 
     primary source of nuclear-related equipment and technology to 
     Pakistan, and a key supplier to Iran during this reporting 
     period.

  Clearly, the Chinese record does not develop a sense of confidence in 
those who observe her objectively, and it certainly does not justify a 
bill of good health that nuclear cooperation would signify.
  Therefore, I hope the President does not accord to China a standing 
it does not deserve in a way that would jeopardize our capacity to 
restrain the proliferation of nuclear technology.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. BOND addressed the Chair.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Missouri.

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