[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 140 (Thursday, October 9, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10782-S10786]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




              THE STRATEGIC RATIONALE FOR NATO ENLARGEMENT

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. Prsident, this week the Committee on Foreign Relations 
began a comprehensive series of six hearings on NATO enlargement. I 
commend Chairman Helms for holding these hearings at this busy time. He 
and I have met at great length to construct the agenda as preparation 
for the committee's acting expeditiously next year to consider the 
enlargement amendment to the Washington Treaty.
  At the committee's first hearing on October 7, Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright outlined the adminsitration's strategic rationale 
for enlargement. Mr. President, I ask permission for the text of 
Secretary Albright's statement be printed in the Record. Following my 
remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. BIDEN. The second hearing today will feature testimony of 
distinguished experts who are for and against enlargement. Later in the 
month the committee will hear examinations of cost and burden-sharing, 
of the qualifications for membership of the three candidate countries--
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, and of the new relationship 
between NATO and Russia. The final hearing will be reserved for public 
testimony from individuals and groups with special interest in the NATO 
enlargement issue.
  Through these hearings, the Committee on Foreign Relations hopes to 
inform not only the entire Senate on this critically important issue, 
but also the American public.
  Mr. President, as my colleagues know, I have spoken many times in 
some detail on this floor about the issue of NATO enlargement. As the 
Committee on Foreign Relations launches its series of hearings, I would 
like briefly to recapitulate why I believe NATO enlargement is in the 
best interest of the United States.
  Europe remains a vital area of interest for the United States for 
political, strategic, economic, and cultural reasons. A sizable 
percentage of the world's democracies are in Europe, and the continent 
remains a major global economic player and partner of the United 
States. The European Union, with a combined population a third larger 
than ours, has a combined gross domestic product that exceeds ours.
  While the United States has a larger and less balanced trading 
relationship with Asia than with Europe, we invest far more in Europe. 
Several new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe have highly 
educated work forces, already boast rapidly expanding economies, and 
already attract considerable American investment. Moreover, most 
Americans trace their ethnic and cultural roots to Europe, and millions 
retain personal ties to it.
  Other than North America, no other part of the world can match 
Europe's combination of political, economic, military, and cultural 
power. By any geopolitical standard, it would be a catastrophe for U.S. 
interests if instability would alter the current situation in Europe.
  Of course no one believes that the Russian Army is poised to pour 
through the Fulda Gap in Germany--NATO's horror scenario for 45 years. 
Rather, the threats to stability in Europe have changed, but they are, 
if anything, even more real than those of the cold war: ethnic and 
religious hatred as horrifyingly shown in the hundreds of thousands 
killed, raped, made homeless, or otherwise brutalized in Bosnia, and 
the well-organized forces of

[[Page S10783]]

international crime, whose tentacles extend from Moscow and Palermo to 
New York and Los Angeles.
  Unfortunately, the history of the 20th century has demonstrated that 
out of enlightened self-interest the United States must play a leading 
role in organizing the security of Europe. In two world wars and lately 
in Bosnia without American leadership the countries of Europe have been 
unable to resolve their differences peacefully.
  Translated into 1997 terms it means that we must lead the Europeans 
to create a new security architecture to guarantee stability to the 
areas most vulnerable to disruption, namely Central and Eastern Europe, 
where newly independent states are striving to create and soldify 
political democracy and free markets. It is a difficult process, which 
if not put into a larger framework could spin out of control.
  It is in this context that the enlargement of NATO must be 
seen. During the cold war, NATO provided the security umbrella under 
which former enemies like France and Germany were able to cooperate and 
build highly successful free societies.

  It was the framework in which former pariahs like Germany, Italy, and 
Spain could be reintegrated into democratic Europe. And it was NATO 
that kept the feud between Greece and Turkey from escalating to 
warfare.
  The enlargement of NATO can now serve to move the zone of stability 
eastward to Central Europe and thereby both prevent ethnic conflicts 
from escalating and forestall a scramble for new bilateral and 
multilateral pacts along the lines of the 1930's from occurring.
  In fact, it is already happening. In anticipation of NATO membership, 
several Central and East European countries have recently settled long-
standing disputes.
  If NATO were not to enlarge, however, the countries between Germany 
and Russia would inevitably seek other means to protect themselves. The 
question for today is not, as is often assumed, enlarge NATO or remain 
the same. The status quo is simply not an option.
  Finally, there is the moral argument for enlargement. For 40 years 
the United States loudly proclaimed its solidarity with the captive 
nations who were under the heel of communist oppressors. Now that most 
of them have cast off their shackles, it is our responsibility to live 
up to our pledges to readmit them into the West through NATO and the 
European Union when they are fully qualified.
  NATO enlargement, of course, like any venture, is not cost-free. 
Earlier this year the Pentagon issued a study that estimated the cost 
to the United States to be around $200 million per year for 10 years. 
Other estimates by the Congressional Budget Office and by the Rand 
Corp. have varied considerably, according to risk assumptions. At the 
July NATO Summit in Madrid, the North Atlantic Council directed the 
Alliance to come up with a definitive cost estimate for the NATO 
ministerial meeting in December.
  Whatever the final, authoritative cost estimate turns out to be, we 
must be certain that our current allies, and our future allies, pay 
their fair share of the enlargement costs.
  Similarly, before we in the Senate vote on whether or not to admit 
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to NATO, we must settle what we 
plan to do in Bosnia after the expiration of the mandate for SFOR in 
June 1998. That in itself is an immensely complicated topic, for which 
there is inadequate time to discuss today. After my latest trip to 
Bosnia at the end of August, I am more convinced than ever that we are 
making progress and that we must not abandon the international effort 
to reach a lasting, peaceful, and just solution for that troubled land. 
But whatever post-SFOR plan we hammer out, it must be done on the basis 
of sharing the risks and costs with our European allies and with non-
NATO contributors to SFOR.
  NATO enlargement need not adversely affect our relations with Russia. 
In fact, we must redouble our peaceful engagement with Russia in the 
hope that its nascent democracy and free market system will mature 
sufficiently so that some day it may fully join the Western world. The 
NATO-Russia Founding Act of May 1997 is a significant step in the right 
direction.
  Enlargement plans have been accompanied by a redefinition of NATO's 
mission and force posture. The alliance's primary mission remains the 
same: treating an attack on one member as an attack on all, and 
responding through the use of armed force if necessary.
  NATO's new strategic concept emphasizes rapid and flexible 
deployment. The three new members, plus other countries like Slovenia 
and Romania in the near future, will enhance NATO's ability to project 
power, if necessary, into crisis areas like the Middle East.
  In addition, in the current post-cold war situation, missions like 
peacekeeping, sometimes in cooperation with non-NATO powers, have 
become possible. The SFOR joint effort in Bosnia with Russia and 
several other non-NATO countries, which I mentioned earlier, is an 
excellent example.
  NATO enlargement corresponds to America's security requirements in 
the 21st century. As long as the costs of enlargement are equitably 
shared among current and future NATO members, and as long as we have 
agreed upon a fair and coherent plan for Bosina after SFOR, I believe 
that my Senate colleagues will vote to ratify NATO enlargement when it 
comes before us next spring.


                               Exhibit 1

Statement by Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright before the Senate 
              Foreign Relations Committee, October 7, 1997

       Chairman Helms, Senator Biden, members of the committee: It 
     is with a sense of appreciation and anticipation that I come 
     before you to urge support for the admission of the Czech 
     Republic, Hungary and Poland to NATO.
       Each of us today is playing our part in the long unfolding 
     story of America's modern partnership with Europe. That story 
     began not in Madrid, when the President and his fellow NATO 
     leaders invited these three new democracies to join our 
     Alliance, nor eight years ago when the Berlin Wall fell, but 
     half a century ago when your predecessors and mine dedicated 
     our nation to the goal of a secure, united Europe.
       It was then that we broke with the American aversion to 
     European entanglements, an aversion which served us well in 
     our early days, but poorly when we became a global power. It 
     was then that we sealed a peacetime alliance open not only to 
     the nations which had shared our victory in World War II, but 
     to our former adversaries. It was then that this committee 
     unanimously recommended that the Senate approve the original 
     NATO treaty.
       The history books will long record that day as among the 
     Senate's finest. On that day, the leaders of this body rose 
     above partisanship and they rose to the challenge of a 
     pivotal moment in the history of the world.
       Mr. Chairman, I believe you are continuing that tradition 
     today. I thank you for your decision to hold these hearings 
     early, for the bipartisan manner in which you and Senator 
     Biden are conducting them, and for the serious and 
     substantive way in which you have framed our discussion.
       I am honored to be part of what you have rightly called the 
     beginning of the process of advice and consent. And I am 
     hopeful that with your support, and after the full national 
     debate to which these hearings will contribute, the Senate 
     will embrace the addition of new members to NATO. It would be 
     fitting if this renewal of our commitment to security in 
     Europe could come early next year, as Congress celebrates the 
     50th anniversary of its approval of the Marshall Plan.
       As I said, and as you can see, I am very conscious of 
     history today. I hope that you and your colleagues will look 
     back as I have on the deliberations of 1949, for they address 
     so many of the questions I know you have now: How much will a 
     new alliance cost and what are its benefits? Will it bind us 
     to go to war? Will it entangle us in far away quarrels?
       We should take a moment to remember what was said then 
     about the alliance we are striving to renew and expand today.
       Senator Vandenberg, Chairman Helms' extraordinary 
     predecessor, predicted that NATO would become ``the greatest 
     war deterrent in history.'' He was right. American forces 
     have never had to fire a shot to defend a NATO ally.
       This Committee, in its report to the Senate on the NATO 
     treaty, predicted that it would ``free the minds of men in 
     many nations from a haunting sense of insecurity, and enable 
     them to work and plan with that confidence in the future 
     which is essential to economic recovery and progress.'' Your 
     predecessors were right. NATO gave our allies time to rebuild 
     their economies. It helped reconcile their ancient 
     animosities. And it made possible an unprecedented era of 
     unity in Western Europe.
       President Truman said that the NATO pact ``will be a 
     positive, not a negative, influence

[[Page S10784]]

     for peace, and its influence will be felt not only in the 
     area it specifically covers but throughout the world.'' And 
     he was right, too. NATO gave hope to democratic forces in 
     West Germany that their country would be welcome and secure 
     in our community if they kept making the right choices. 
     Ultimately, it helped bring the former fascist countries into 
     a prosperous and democratic Europe. And it helped free the 
     entire planet from the icy grip of the Cold War.
       Thanks in no small part to NATO, we live in a different 
     world. Our Soviet adversary has vanished. Freedom's flag has 
     been unfurled from the Baltics to Bulgaria. The threat of 
     nuclear war has sharply diminished. As I speak to you today, 
     our immediate survival is not at risk.
       Indeed, you may ask if the principle of collective defense 
     at NATO's heart is relevant to the challenges of a wider and 
     freer Europe. You may ask why, in this time of relative 
     peace, are we so focused on security?
       The answer is, we want the peace to last. We want freedom 
     to endure. And we believe there are still potential threats 
     to our security emanating from European soil.
       You have asked me, Mr. Chairman, what these threats are. I 
     want to answer as plainly as I can.
       First, there are the dangers of Europe's past. It is easy 
     to forget this, but for centuries virtually every European 
     nation treated virtually every other as a military threat. 
     That pattern was broken only when NATO was born and only in 
     the half of Europe NATO covered. With NATO, Europe's armies 
     prepared to fight beside their neighbors, not against them; 
     each member's security came to depend on cooperation with 
     others, not competition.
       That is one reason why NATO remains essential, even though 
     the Cold War is over. It is also one reason why we need a 
     larger NATO, so that the other half of Europe is finally 
     embedded in the same cooperative structure of military 
     planning and preparation.
       A second set of dangers lies in Europe's present. Because 
     of conflict in the Balkans and the former Soviet Union, 
     Europe has already buried more victims of war since the 
     Berlin Wall fell than in all the years of the Cold War. It is 
     sobering to recall that this violence has its roots in the 
     same problems of shattered states and hatred among ethnic 
     groups that tyrants exploited to start this century's great 
     wars.
       Finally, Mr. Chairman, and most important, we must consider 
     the dangers of Europe's future. By this I mean direct threats 
     against the soil of NATO members that a collective defense 
     pact is designed to meet. Some are visible on Europe's 
     horizon, such as the threat posed by rogue states with 
     dangerous weapons that might have Europe within their range 
     and in their sights. Others may not seem apparent today, in 
     part because the existence of NATO has helped to deter them. 
     But they are not unthinkable.
       Within this category lie questions about the future of 
     Russia. We have an interest in seeing Russian democracy 
     endure. We are doing all we can with our Russian partners to 
     see that it does. And we have many reasons to be optimistic. 
     At the same time, one should not dismiss the possibility that 
     Russia could return to the patterns of its past. By engaging 
     Russia and enlarging NATO, we give Russia every incentive to 
     deepen its commitment to democracy and peaceful relations 
     with neighbors, while closing the avenue to more destructive 
     alternatives.
       We do not know what other dangers may arise 10, 20, or even 
     50 years from now. We do know enough from history and human 
     experience to believe that a grave threat, if allowed to 
     arise, would arise. We know that whatever the future may 
     hold, it will be in our interest to have a vigorous and 
     larger alliance with those European democracies that share 
     our values and our determination to defend them.
       We recognize NATO expansion involves a solemn expansion of 
     American responsibilities in Europe. It does not bind us to 
     respond to every violent incident by going to war. But it 
     does oblige us to consider an armed attack against one ally 
     an attack against all and to respond with such action as we 
     deem necessary, including the use of force, to restore the 
     security of the North Atlantic area.
       As Americans, we take our commitments seriously and we do 
     not extend them lightly. Mr. Chairman, you and I do not agree 
     on everything, but we certainly agree that any major 
     extension of American commitments must serve America's 
     strategic interests.
       Let me explain why welcoming the Czech Republic, Hungary 
     and Poland into NATO meets that test.
       First, a larger NATO will make us safer by expanding the 
     area in Europe where wars simply do not happen. This is the 
     productive paradox at NATO's heart: By imposing a price on 
     aggression, it deters aggression. By making clear that we 
     will fight, if necessary, to defend our allies, it makes it 
     less likely our troops will ever be called upon to do so.
       Now, you may say that no part of Europe faces any immediate 
     threat of armed attack today. That is true. And I would say 
     that the purpose of NATO enlargement is to keep it that way. 
     Senator Vandenberg said it in 1949: ``[NATO] is not built to 
     stop a war after it starts, although its potentialities in 
     this regard are infinite. It is built to stop wars before 
     they start.''
       It is also fair to ask if it is in our vital interest to 
     prevent conflict in central Europe. There are those who imply 
     it is not. I'm sure you have even heard a few people trot out 
     what I call the ``consonant cluster clause,'' the myth that 
     in times of crisis Americans will make no sacrifice to defend 
     a distant city with an unpronounceable name, that we will 
     protect the freedom of Strasbourg but not Szczecin, 
     Barcelona, but not Brno.
       Let us not deceive ourselves. The United States is a 
     European power. We have an interest not only in the lands 
     west of the Oder river, but in the fate of the 200 million 
     people who live in the nations between the Baltic and Black 
     Seas. We waged the Cold War in part because these nations 
     were held captive. We fought World War II in part because 
     these nations had been invaded.
       Now that these nations are free, we want them to succeed 
     and we want them to be safe, whether they are large or small. 
     For if there were a major threat to the security of their 
     region, if we were to wake up one morning to the sight of 
     cities being shelled and borders being overrun, I am certain 
     that we would choose to act, enlargement or no enlargement. 
     Expanding NATO now is simply the surest way to prevent that 
     kind of threat from arising, and thus the need to make that 
     kind of choice.
       Mr. Chairman, the second reason why enlargement passes the 
     test of national interest is that it will make NATO stronger 
     and more cohesive. The Poles, Hungarians and Czechs are 
     passionately committed to NATO and its principles of shared 
     responsibility. Experience has taught them to believe in a 
     strong American leadership role in Europe. Their forces have 
     risked their lives alongside ours from the Gulf War to 
     Bosnia. Just last month, Czech soldiers joined our British 
     allies in securing a police station from heavily armed 
     Bosnian Serb extremists.
       Mr. Chairman, I know you have expressed concern that 
     enlargement could dilute NATO by adding too many members and 
     by involving the alliance in too many missions. Let me assure 
     you that we invited only the strongest candidates to join the 
     Alliance. And nothing about enlargement will change NATO's 
     core mission, which is and will remain the collective defense 
     of NATO soil.
       At the same time, it is important to remember that NATO has 
     always served a political function as well. It binds our 
     allies to us just as it binds us to our allies. So when you 
     consider the candidacy of the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
     Poland, Mr. Chairman, I ask you to consider this:
       When peace is threatened somewhere in the world and we 
     decide it is in our interest to act, here are three nations 
     we have been able to count on to be with us. In the fight 
     against terror and nuclear proliferation, here are three 
     nations we have been able to count on. In our effort to 
     reform the UN, here are three nations we have been able to 
     count on. When we speak out for human rights around the 
     world, here are three nations we will always be able to count 
     on.
       Here are three nations that know what it means to lose 
     their freedom and who will do what it takes to defend it. 
     Here are three democracies that are ready to do their 
     dependable part in the common enterprise of our alliance of 
     democracies.
       Mr. Chairman, the third reason why a larger NATO serves our 
     interests is that the very promise of it gives the nations of 
     central and eastern Europe an incentive to solve their own 
     problems. To align themselves with NATO, aspiring countries 
     have strengthened their democratic institutions. They have 
     made sure that soldiers serve civilians, not the other way 
     around. They have signed 10 major accords that taken together 
     resolve virtually every old ethnic and border dispute in the 
     region, exactly the kind of disputes that might have led to 
     future Bosnias. In fact, the three states we have invited to 
     join NATO have resolved every outstanding dispute of this 
     type.
       I have been a student of central European history and I 
     have lived some of it myself. When I see Romanians and 
     Hungarians building a genuine friendship after centuries of 
     enmity, when I see Poles, Ukrainians and Lithuanians forming 
     joint military units after years of suspicion, when I see 
     Czechs and Germans overcoming decades of mistrust, when I see 
     central Europeans confident enough to improve their political 
     and economic ties with Russia, I know something remarkable is 
     happening.
       NATO is doing for Europe's east precisely what it did--
     precisely what this Committee predicted it would do--for 
     Europe's west after World War II. It is helping to vanquish 
     old hatreds, to promote integration and to create a secure 
     environment for economic prosperity. This is another reminder 
     that the contingencies we do not want our troops to face, 
     such as ethnic conflict, border skirmishes, and social unrest 
     are far more easily avoided with NATO enlargement than 
     without it.
       In short, a larger NATO will prevent conflict, strengthen 
     NATO, and protect the gains of stability and freedom in 
     central and eastern Europe. That is the strategic rationale. 
     But I would be disingenuous if I did not tell you that I see 
     a moral imperative as well. For this is a policy that should 
     appeal to our hearts as well as to our heads, to our sense of 
     what is right as well as to our sense of what is smart.
       NATO defines a community of interest among the free nations 
     of North America and Europe that both preceded and outlasted 
     the Cold War. America has long stood for the proposition that 
     this Atlantic community should not be artificially divided 
     and that its nations should be free to shape their destiny. 
     We have long argued that the nations of

[[Page S10785]]

     central and eastern Europe belong to the same democratic 
     family as our allies in western Europe.
       We often call them ``former communist countries,'' and that 
     is true in the same sense that America is a ``former British 
     colony.'' Yes, the Czechs, Poles, and Hungarians were on the 
     other side of the Iron Curtain during the Cold War. But we 
     were surely on the same side in the ways that truly count.
       As Americans, we should be heartened today that so many of 
     Europe's new democracies wish to join the institutions 
     Americans did so much to build. They are our friends and we 
     should be proud to welcome them home.
       We should also think about what would happen if we were to 
     turn them away. That would mean freezing NATO at its Cold War 
     membership and preserving the old Iron Curtain as its eastern 
     frontier. It would mean locking out a whole group of 
     otherwise qualified democracies simply because they were 
     once, against their will, members of the Warsaw Pact.
       Why would America choose to be allied with Europe's old 
     democracies forever, but its new democracies never? There is 
     no acceptable, objective answer to that question. Instead, it 
     would probably be said that we blocked the aspirations of our 
     would-be allies because Russia objected. And that, in turn, 
     could cause confidence to crumble in central Europe, leading 
     to a search for security by other means, including costly 
     arms buildups and competition among neighbors.
       We have chosen a better way. We have chosen to look at the 
     landscape of the new Europe and to ask a simple question: 
     Which of these nations that are so clearly important to our 
     security are ready and able to contribute to our security? 
     The answer to that question is before you today, awaiting 
     your affirmation.
       I said at the outset, Mr. Chairman, that there are weighty 
     voices on both sides of this debate. There are legitimate 
     concerns with which we have grappled along the way, and that 
     I expect you to consider fully as well. Let me address a few.
       First, we all want to make sure that the costs of expansion 
     are distributed fairly. Last February, at the behest of 
     Congress and before the Alliance had decided which nations to 
     invite to membership, the Administration made a preliminary 
     estimate of America's share. Now that we have settled on 
     three candidates, we are working with our allies to produce a 
     common estimate by the December meeting of the North Atlantic 
     Council. At this point, the numbers we agree upon as 16 
     allies are needed prior to any further calculations made in 
     Washington.
       I know you are holding separate hearings in which my 
     Pentagon colleagues will go into this question in detail. But 
     I will say this: I am convinced that the cost of expansion is 
     real but affordable. I am certain our prospective allies are 
     willing and able to pay their share, because in the long run 
     it will be cheaper for them to upgrade their forces within 
     the alliance than outside it. As Secretary of State, I will 
     insist that our old allies share this burden fairly. That is 
     what NATO is all about.
       I know there are serious people who estimate that a larger 
     NATO will cost far more than we have anticipated. The key 
     fact about our estimate is that it is premised on the 
     current, favorable security environment in Europe. Obviously, 
     if a grave threat were to arise, the cost of enlargement 
     would rise. But then so would the cost of our entire defense 
     budget.
       In any case, there are budgetary constraints in all 16 NATO 
     democracies that will prevent costs from ballooning. That is 
     why the main focus of our discussion, Mr. Chairman, and in 
     our consultations with our allies, needs to be on defining 
     the level of military capability we want our old and new 
     allies to have in this favorable environment, and then making 
     sure that they commit to that level. We must spend no more 
     than we must, but no less than we need to keep NATO strong.
       Another common concern about NATO enlargement is that it 
     might damage our cooperation with a democratic Russia. 
     Russian opposition to NATO enlargement is real. But we should 
     see it for what it is: a product of old misperceptions about 
     NATO and old ways of thinking about its former satellites in 
     central Europe. Instead of changing our policies to 
     accommodate Russia's outdated fears, we need to encourage 
     Russia's more modern aspirations.
       This means that we should remain Russia's most steadfast 
     champion whenever it seeks to define its greatness by joining 
     international institutions, opening its markets and 
     participating constructively in world affairs. It means we 
     should welcome Russia's decision to build a close partnership 
     with NATO, as we did in the NATO-Russia Founding Act.
       But when some Russian leaders suggest that a larger NATO is 
     a threat, we owe it candor to say that is false--and to base 
     our policies on what we know to be true. When they imply that 
     central Europe is special, that its nations still are not 
     free to choose their security arrangements, we owe it to 
     candor to say that times have changed, and that no nation can 
     assert its greatness at the expense of its neighbors. We do 
     no favor to Russian democrats and modernizers to suggest 
     otherwise.
       I believe our approach is sound and producing results. Over 
     the past year, against the backdrop of NATO enlargement, 
     reformers have made remarkable gains in the Russian 
     government. We have agreed to pursue deeper arms reductions. 
     Our troops have built a solid working relationship on the 
     ground in Bosnia. Russia was our full partner at the Summit 
     of the Eight in Denver and it has joined the Paris Club of 
     major international lenders.
       What is more, last week in New York we signed documents 
     that should pave the way for the Russian Duma to ratify the 
     START II treaty. While this prospect is still by no means 
     certain, it would become far less so if we gave the Duma any 
     reason to think it could hold up NATO enlargement by holding 
     up START II.
       As you know Mr. Chairman, last week, NATO and Russia held 
     the first ministerial meeting of their Permanent Joint 
     Council. This council gives us an invaluable mechanism for 
     building trust between NATO and Russia through dialogue and 
     transparency.
       I know that some are concerned NATO's new relationship with 
     Russia will actually go too far. You have asked me for an 
     affirmation, Mr. Chairman, that the North Atlantic Council 
     remains NATO's supreme decision making body. Let me say it 
     clearly: It does and it will. The NATO-Russia Founding Act 
     gives Russia no opportunity to dilute, delay or block NATO 
     decisions. NATO's allies will always meet to agree on every 
     item on their agenda before meeting with Russia. And the 
     relationship between NATO and Russia will grow in importance 
     only to the extent Russia uses it constructively.
       The Founding Act also does not limit NATO's ultimate 
     authority to deploy troops or nuclear weapons in order to 
     meet its commitments to new and old members. All it does is 
     to restate unilaterally existing NATO policy: that in the 
     current and foreseeable security environment, we have no 
     plan, no need, and no intention to station nuclear weapons in 
     the new member countries, nor do we contemplate permanently 
     stationing substantial combat forces. The only binding limits 
     on conventional forces in Europe will be set as we adapt the 
     CFE treaty, with central European countries and all the other 
     signatories at the table, and we will proceed on the 
     principle of reciprocity.
       Another important concern is that enlargement may create a 
     new dividing line in Europe between a larger NATO and the 
     countries that will not join in the first round. We have 
     taken a range of steps to ensure this does not happen.
       President Clinton has pledged that the first new members 
     will not be the last. NATO leaders will consider the next 
     steps in the process of enlargement before the end of the 
     decade. We have strengthened NATO's Partnership for Peace 
     program. We have created a new Euro-Atlantic Partnership 
     Council, through which NATO and its democratic partners 
     throughout Europe will shape the missions we undertake 
     together. We have made it clear that the distinction between 
     the nations NATO invited to join in Madrid and those it did 
     not is based purely on objective factors--unlike the 
     arbitrary line that would divide Europe if NATO stood still.
       Among the countries that still aspire to membership, there 
     is enthusiastic support for the process NATO has begun. Had 
     you seen the crowds that cheered the President in Romania in 
     July, had you been with me when I spoke to the leaders of 
     Lithuania and Slovenia, you would have sensed how eager these 
     nations are to redouble their efforts.
       They understand a simple fact: With enlargement, no new 
     democracy is permanently excluded; without enlargement, every 
     new democracy would be permanently excluded. The most 
     important thing the Senate can do to reassure them now is to 
     get the ball rolling by ratifying the admission of the first 
     three candidates.
       Mr. Chairman, a final concern I wish to address has to do 
     with Bosnia.
       Some have suggested that our debate on NATO enlargement 
     simply cannot be separated from our actions and decisions in 
     that troubled country. I agree with them. Both enlargement 
     and our mission in Bosnia are aimed at building a stable 
     undivided Europe. Both involve NATO and its new partners to 
     the east.
       It was our experience in Bosnia that proved the fundamental 
     premise of our enlargement strategy: there are still threats 
     to peace and security in Europe that only NATO can meet. It 
     was in Bosnia that our prospective allies proved they are 
     ready to take responsibility for the security of others. It 
     was in Bosnia that we proved NATO and Russian troops can work 
     together.
       We cannot know today if our mission in Bosnia will achieve 
     all its goals, for that ultimately depends on the choices the 
     Bosnian people will make. But we can say that whatever may 
     happen, NATO's part in achieving the military goals of our 
     mission has been a resounding success. Whatever may happen, 
     our interest in a larger, stronger NATO will endure long 
     after the last foreign soldier has left Bosnia.
       We can also say that NATO will remain the most powerful 
     instrument we have for building effective military coalitions 
     such as SFOR. At the same time, Bosnia does not by itself 
     define the future of a larger NATO. NATO's fundamental 
     purpose is collective defense against aggression. Its most 
     important aim, if I can paraphrase Arthur Vandenberg, is to 
     prevent wars before they start so it does not have to keep 
     the peace after they stop.
       These are some of the principal concerns I wanted to 
     address today; I know you have many more questions and I look 
     forward to answering them all.

[[Page S10786]]

       This discussion is just beginning. I am glad that it will 
     also involve other committees of the Senate, the NATO 
     Observers' Group and the House of Representatives. Most 
     important, I am glad it will involve the people of the United 
     States. For the commitment a larger NATO entails will only be 
     meaningful if the American people understand and accept it.
       When these three new democracies join NATO in 1999, as I 
     trust they will, it will be a victory for us all, Mr. 
     Chairman. And on that day, we will be standing on the 
     shoulders of many.
       We will be thankful to all those who prosecuted the Cold 
     War, to all those on both sides of the Iron Curtain who 
     believed that the goal of containment was to bring about the 
     day when the enlargement of our democratic community would be 
     possible.
       We will be grateful to all those who championed the idea of 
     a larger NATO--not just President Clinton, or President 
     Havel, or President Walesa, but members of Congress from both 
     parties who voted for resolutions urging the admission of 
     these three nations. We will owe a debt to the Republican 
     members who made NATO enlargement part of their Contract with 
     America.
       Today, all of our allies and future allies are watching you 
     for one simple reason. The American Constitution is unique in 
     the power it grants to the legislative branch over foreign 
     policy, especially over treaties. In this matter, Mr. 
     Chairman, members of the Committee, you and the American 
     people you represent are truly in the driver's seat.
       That is as it should be. In fact, I enjoy going to Europe 
     and telling our allies: ``This is what we want to do, but 
     ultimately, it will be up to our Senate and our people to 
     decide.'' I say that with pride because it tells them 
     something about America's faith in the democratic process.
       But I have to tell you that I say it with confidence as 
     well. I believe we will stand together, Mr. Chairman, when 
     the time comes for the Senate to decide, because I know that 
     the policy we ask you to embrace is a policy that the 
     Administration and Congress shaped together, and because I am 
     certain that it advances the fundamental interests of the 
     United States.
       Thank you very much.

                          ____________________