[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 140 (Thursday, October 9, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10782-S10786]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
THE STRATEGIC RATIONALE FOR NATO ENLARGEMENT
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. Prsident, this week the Committee on Foreign Relations
began a comprehensive series of six hearings on NATO enlargement. I
commend Chairman Helms for holding these hearings at this busy time. He
and I have met at great length to construct the agenda as preparation
for the committee's acting expeditiously next year to consider the
enlargement amendment to the Washington Treaty.
At the committee's first hearing on October 7, Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright outlined the adminsitration's strategic rationale
for enlargement. Mr. President, I ask permission for the text of
Secretary Albright's statement be printed in the Record. Following my
remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. BIDEN. The second hearing today will feature testimony of
distinguished experts who are for and against enlargement. Later in the
month the committee will hear examinations of cost and burden-sharing,
of the qualifications for membership of the three candidate countries--
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, and of the new relationship
between NATO and Russia. The final hearing will be reserved for public
testimony from individuals and groups with special interest in the NATO
enlargement issue.
Through these hearings, the Committee on Foreign Relations hopes to
inform not only the entire Senate on this critically important issue,
but also the American public.
Mr. President, as my colleagues know, I have spoken many times in
some detail on this floor about the issue of NATO enlargement. As the
Committee on Foreign Relations launches its series of hearings, I would
like briefly to recapitulate why I believe NATO enlargement is in the
best interest of the United States.
Europe remains a vital area of interest for the United States for
political, strategic, economic, and cultural reasons. A sizable
percentage of the world's democracies are in Europe, and the continent
remains a major global economic player and partner of the United
States. The European Union, with a combined population a third larger
than ours, has a combined gross domestic product that exceeds ours.
While the United States has a larger and less balanced trading
relationship with Asia than with Europe, we invest far more in Europe.
Several new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe have highly
educated work forces, already boast rapidly expanding economies, and
already attract considerable American investment. Moreover, most
Americans trace their ethnic and cultural roots to Europe, and millions
retain personal ties to it.
Other than North America, no other part of the world can match
Europe's combination of political, economic, military, and cultural
power. By any geopolitical standard, it would be a catastrophe for U.S.
interests if instability would alter the current situation in Europe.
Of course no one believes that the Russian Army is poised to pour
through the Fulda Gap in Germany--NATO's horror scenario for 45 years.
Rather, the threats to stability in Europe have changed, but they are,
if anything, even more real than those of the cold war: ethnic and
religious hatred as horrifyingly shown in the hundreds of thousands
killed, raped, made homeless, or otherwise brutalized in Bosnia, and
the well-organized forces of
[[Page S10783]]
international crime, whose tentacles extend from Moscow and Palermo to
New York and Los Angeles.
Unfortunately, the history of the 20th century has demonstrated that
out of enlightened self-interest the United States must play a leading
role in organizing the security of Europe. In two world wars and lately
in Bosnia without American leadership the countries of Europe have been
unable to resolve their differences peacefully.
Translated into 1997 terms it means that we must lead the Europeans
to create a new security architecture to guarantee stability to the
areas most vulnerable to disruption, namely Central and Eastern Europe,
where newly independent states are striving to create and soldify
political democracy and free markets. It is a difficult process, which
if not put into a larger framework could spin out of control.
It is in this context that the enlargement of NATO must be
seen. During the cold war, NATO provided the security umbrella under
which former enemies like France and Germany were able to cooperate and
build highly successful free societies.
It was the framework in which former pariahs like Germany, Italy, and
Spain could be reintegrated into democratic Europe. And it was NATO
that kept the feud between Greece and Turkey from escalating to
warfare.
The enlargement of NATO can now serve to move the zone of stability
eastward to Central Europe and thereby both prevent ethnic conflicts
from escalating and forestall a scramble for new bilateral and
multilateral pacts along the lines of the 1930's from occurring.
In fact, it is already happening. In anticipation of NATO membership,
several Central and East European countries have recently settled long-
standing disputes.
If NATO were not to enlarge, however, the countries between Germany
and Russia would inevitably seek other means to protect themselves. The
question for today is not, as is often assumed, enlarge NATO or remain
the same. The status quo is simply not an option.
Finally, there is the moral argument for enlargement. For 40 years
the United States loudly proclaimed its solidarity with the captive
nations who were under the heel of communist oppressors. Now that most
of them have cast off their shackles, it is our responsibility to live
up to our pledges to readmit them into the West through NATO and the
European Union when they are fully qualified.
NATO enlargement, of course, like any venture, is not cost-free.
Earlier this year the Pentagon issued a study that estimated the cost
to the United States to be around $200 million per year for 10 years.
Other estimates by the Congressional Budget Office and by the Rand
Corp. have varied considerably, according to risk assumptions. At the
July NATO Summit in Madrid, the North Atlantic Council directed the
Alliance to come up with a definitive cost estimate for the NATO
ministerial meeting in December.
Whatever the final, authoritative cost estimate turns out to be, we
must be certain that our current allies, and our future allies, pay
their fair share of the enlargement costs.
Similarly, before we in the Senate vote on whether or not to admit
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to NATO, we must settle what we
plan to do in Bosnia after the expiration of the mandate for SFOR in
June 1998. That in itself is an immensely complicated topic, for which
there is inadequate time to discuss today. After my latest trip to
Bosnia at the end of August, I am more convinced than ever that we are
making progress and that we must not abandon the international effort
to reach a lasting, peaceful, and just solution for that troubled land.
But whatever post-SFOR plan we hammer out, it must be done on the basis
of sharing the risks and costs with our European allies and with non-
NATO contributors to SFOR.
NATO enlargement need not adversely affect our relations with Russia.
In fact, we must redouble our peaceful engagement with Russia in the
hope that its nascent democracy and free market system will mature
sufficiently so that some day it may fully join the Western world. The
NATO-Russia Founding Act of May 1997 is a significant step in the right
direction.
Enlargement plans have been accompanied by a redefinition of NATO's
mission and force posture. The alliance's primary mission remains the
same: treating an attack on one member as an attack on all, and
responding through the use of armed force if necessary.
NATO's new strategic concept emphasizes rapid and flexible
deployment. The three new members, plus other countries like Slovenia
and Romania in the near future, will enhance NATO's ability to project
power, if necessary, into crisis areas like the Middle East.
In addition, in the current post-cold war situation, missions like
peacekeeping, sometimes in cooperation with non-NATO powers, have
become possible. The SFOR joint effort in Bosnia with Russia and
several other non-NATO countries, which I mentioned earlier, is an
excellent example.
NATO enlargement corresponds to America's security requirements in
the 21st century. As long as the costs of enlargement are equitably
shared among current and future NATO members, and as long as we have
agreed upon a fair and coherent plan for Bosina after SFOR, I believe
that my Senate colleagues will vote to ratify NATO enlargement when it
comes before us next spring.
Exhibit 1
Statement by Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, October 7, 1997
Chairman Helms, Senator Biden, members of the committee: It
is with a sense of appreciation and anticipation that I come
before you to urge support for the admission of the Czech
Republic, Hungary and Poland to NATO.
Each of us today is playing our part in the long unfolding
story of America's modern partnership with Europe. That story
began not in Madrid, when the President and his fellow NATO
leaders invited these three new democracies to join our
Alliance, nor eight years ago when the Berlin Wall fell, but
half a century ago when your predecessors and mine dedicated
our nation to the goal of a secure, united Europe.
It was then that we broke with the American aversion to
European entanglements, an aversion which served us well in
our early days, but poorly when we became a global power. It
was then that we sealed a peacetime alliance open not only to
the nations which had shared our victory in World War II, but
to our former adversaries. It was then that this committee
unanimously recommended that the Senate approve the original
NATO treaty.
The history books will long record that day as among the
Senate's finest. On that day, the leaders of this body rose
above partisanship and they rose to the challenge of a
pivotal moment in the history of the world.
Mr. Chairman, I believe you are continuing that tradition
today. I thank you for your decision to hold these hearings
early, for the bipartisan manner in which you and Senator
Biden are conducting them, and for the serious and
substantive way in which you have framed our discussion.
I am honored to be part of what you have rightly called the
beginning of the process of advice and consent. And I am
hopeful that with your support, and after the full national
debate to which these hearings will contribute, the Senate
will embrace the addition of new members to NATO. It would be
fitting if this renewal of our commitment to security in
Europe could come early next year, as Congress celebrates the
50th anniversary of its approval of the Marshall Plan.
As I said, and as you can see, I am very conscious of
history today. I hope that you and your colleagues will look
back as I have on the deliberations of 1949, for they address
so many of the questions I know you have now: How much will a
new alliance cost and what are its benefits? Will it bind us
to go to war? Will it entangle us in far away quarrels?
We should take a moment to remember what was said then
about the alliance we are striving to renew and expand today.
Senator Vandenberg, Chairman Helms' extraordinary
predecessor, predicted that NATO would become ``the greatest
war deterrent in history.'' He was right. American forces
have never had to fire a shot to defend a NATO ally.
This Committee, in its report to the Senate on the NATO
treaty, predicted that it would ``free the minds of men in
many nations from a haunting sense of insecurity, and enable
them to work and plan with that confidence in the future
which is essential to economic recovery and progress.'' Your
predecessors were right. NATO gave our allies time to rebuild
their economies. It helped reconcile their ancient
animosities. And it made possible an unprecedented era of
unity in Western Europe.
President Truman said that the NATO pact ``will be a
positive, not a negative, influence
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for peace, and its influence will be felt not only in the
area it specifically covers but throughout the world.'' And
he was right, too. NATO gave hope to democratic forces in
West Germany that their country would be welcome and secure
in our community if they kept making the right choices.
Ultimately, it helped bring the former fascist countries into
a prosperous and democratic Europe. And it helped free the
entire planet from the icy grip of the Cold War.
Thanks in no small part to NATO, we live in a different
world. Our Soviet adversary has vanished. Freedom's flag has
been unfurled from the Baltics to Bulgaria. The threat of
nuclear war has sharply diminished. As I speak to you today,
our immediate survival is not at risk.
Indeed, you may ask if the principle of collective defense
at NATO's heart is relevant to the challenges of a wider and
freer Europe. You may ask why, in this time of relative
peace, are we so focused on security?
The answer is, we want the peace to last. We want freedom
to endure. And we believe there are still potential threats
to our security emanating from European soil.
You have asked me, Mr. Chairman, what these threats are. I
want to answer as plainly as I can.
First, there are the dangers of Europe's past. It is easy
to forget this, but for centuries virtually every European
nation treated virtually every other as a military threat.
That pattern was broken only when NATO was born and only in
the half of Europe NATO covered. With NATO, Europe's armies
prepared to fight beside their neighbors, not against them;
each member's security came to depend on cooperation with
others, not competition.
That is one reason why NATO remains essential, even though
the Cold War is over. It is also one reason why we need a
larger NATO, so that the other half of Europe is finally
embedded in the same cooperative structure of military
planning and preparation.
A second set of dangers lies in Europe's present. Because
of conflict in the Balkans and the former Soviet Union,
Europe has already buried more victims of war since the
Berlin Wall fell than in all the years of the Cold War. It is
sobering to recall that this violence has its roots in the
same problems of shattered states and hatred among ethnic
groups that tyrants exploited to start this century's great
wars.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, and most important, we must consider
the dangers of Europe's future. By this I mean direct threats
against the soil of NATO members that a collective defense
pact is designed to meet. Some are visible on Europe's
horizon, such as the threat posed by rogue states with
dangerous weapons that might have Europe within their range
and in their sights. Others may not seem apparent today, in
part because the existence of NATO has helped to deter them.
But they are not unthinkable.
Within this category lie questions about the future of
Russia. We have an interest in seeing Russian democracy
endure. We are doing all we can with our Russian partners to
see that it does. And we have many reasons to be optimistic.
At the same time, one should not dismiss the possibility that
Russia could return to the patterns of its past. By engaging
Russia and enlarging NATO, we give Russia every incentive to
deepen its commitment to democracy and peaceful relations
with neighbors, while closing the avenue to more destructive
alternatives.
We do not know what other dangers may arise 10, 20, or even
50 years from now. We do know enough from history and human
experience to believe that a grave threat, if allowed to
arise, would arise. We know that whatever the future may
hold, it will be in our interest to have a vigorous and
larger alliance with those European democracies that share
our values and our determination to defend them.
We recognize NATO expansion involves a solemn expansion of
American responsibilities in Europe. It does not bind us to
respond to every violent incident by going to war. But it
does oblige us to consider an armed attack against one ally
an attack against all and to respond with such action as we
deem necessary, including the use of force, to restore the
security of the North Atlantic area.
As Americans, we take our commitments seriously and we do
not extend them lightly. Mr. Chairman, you and I do not agree
on everything, but we certainly agree that any major
extension of American commitments must serve America's
strategic interests.
Let me explain why welcoming the Czech Republic, Hungary
and Poland into NATO meets that test.
First, a larger NATO will make us safer by expanding the
area in Europe where wars simply do not happen. This is the
productive paradox at NATO's heart: By imposing a price on
aggression, it deters aggression. By making clear that we
will fight, if necessary, to defend our allies, it makes it
less likely our troops will ever be called upon to do so.
Now, you may say that no part of Europe faces any immediate
threat of armed attack today. That is true. And I would say
that the purpose of NATO enlargement is to keep it that way.
Senator Vandenberg said it in 1949: ``[NATO] is not built to
stop a war after it starts, although its potentialities in
this regard are infinite. It is built to stop wars before
they start.''
It is also fair to ask if it is in our vital interest to
prevent conflict in central Europe. There are those who imply
it is not. I'm sure you have even heard a few people trot out
what I call the ``consonant cluster clause,'' the myth that
in times of crisis Americans will make no sacrifice to defend
a distant city with an unpronounceable name, that we will
protect the freedom of Strasbourg but not Szczecin,
Barcelona, but not Brno.
Let us not deceive ourselves. The United States is a
European power. We have an interest not only in the lands
west of the Oder river, but in the fate of the 200 million
people who live in the nations between the Baltic and Black
Seas. We waged the Cold War in part because these nations
were held captive. We fought World War II in part because
these nations had been invaded.
Now that these nations are free, we want them to succeed
and we want them to be safe, whether they are large or small.
For if there were a major threat to the security of their
region, if we were to wake up one morning to the sight of
cities being shelled and borders being overrun, I am certain
that we would choose to act, enlargement or no enlargement.
Expanding NATO now is simply the surest way to prevent that
kind of threat from arising, and thus the need to make that
kind of choice.
Mr. Chairman, the second reason why enlargement passes the
test of national interest is that it will make NATO stronger
and more cohesive. The Poles, Hungarians and Czechs are
passionately committed to NATO and its principles of shared
responsibility. Experience has taught them to believe in a
strong American leadership role in Europe. Their forces have
risked their lives alongside ours from the Gulf War to
Bosnia. Just last month, Czech soldiers joined our British
allies in securing a police station from heavily armed
Bosnian Serb extremists.
Mr. Chairman, I know you have expressed concern that
enlargement could dilute NATO by adding too many members and
by involving the alliance in too many missions. Let me assure
you that we invited only the strongest candidates to join the
Alliance. And nothing about enlargement will change NATO's
core mission, which is and will remain the collective defense
of NATO soil.
At the same time, it is important to remember that NATO has
always served a political function as well. It binds our
allies to us just as it binds us to our allies. So when you
consider the candidacy of the Czech Republic, Hungary and
Poland, Mr. Chairman, I ask you to consider this:
When peace is threatened somewhere in the world and we
decide it is in our interest to act, here are three nations
we have been able to count on to be with us. In the fight
against terror and nuclear proliferation, here are three
nations we have been able to count on. In our effort to
reform the UN, here are three nations we have been able to
count on. When we speak out for human rights around the
world, here are three nations we will always be able to count
on.
Here are three nations that know what it means to lose
their freedom and who will do what it takes to defend it.
Here are three democracies that are ready to do their
dependable part in the common enterprise of our alliance of
democracies.
Mr. Chairman, the third reason why a larger NATO serves our
interests is that the very promise of it gives the nations of
central and eastern Europe an incentive to solve their own
problems. To align themselves with NATO, aspiring countries
have strengthened their democratic institutions. They have
made sure that soldiers serve civilians, not the other way
around. They have signed 10 major accords that taken together
resolve virtually every old ethnic and border dispute in the
region, exactly the kind of disputes that might have led to
future Bosnias. In fact, the three states we have invited to
join NATO have resolved every outstanding dispute of this
type.
I have been a student of central European history and I
have lived some of it myself. When I see Romanians and
Hungarians building a genuine friendship after centuries of
enmity, when I see Poles, Ukrainians and Lithuanians forming
joint military units after years of suspicion, when I see
Czechs and Germans overcoming decades of mistrust, when I see
central Europeans confident enough to improve their political
and economic ties with Russia, I know something remarkable is
happening.
NATO is doing for Europe's east precisely what it did--
precisely what this Committee predicted it would do--for
Europe's west after World War II. It is helping to vanquish
old hatreds, to promote integration and to create a secure
environment for economic prosperity. This is another reminder
that the contingencies we do not want our troops to face,
such as ethnic conflict, border skirmishes, and social unrest
are far more easily avoided with NATO enlargement than
without it.
In short, a larger NATO will prevent conflict, strengthen
NATO, and protect the gains of stability and freedom in
central and eastern Europe. That is the strategic rationale.
But I would be disingenuous if I did not tell you that I see
a moral imperative as well. For this is a policy that should
appeal to our hearts as well as to our heads, to our sense of
what is right as well as to our sense of what is smart.
NATO defines a community of interest among the free nations
of North America and Europe that both preceded and outlasted
the Cold War. America has long stood for the proposition that
this Atlantic community should not be artificially divided
and that its nations should be free to shape their destiny.
We have long argued that the nations of
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central and eastern Europe belong to the same democratic
family as our allies in western Europe.
We often call them ``former communist countries,'' and that
is true in the same sense that America is a ``former British
colony.'' Yes, the Czechs, Poles, and Hungarians were on the
other side of the Iron Curtain during the Cold War. But we
were surely on the same side in the ways that truly count.
As Americans, we should be heartened today that so many of
Europe's new democracies wish to join the institutions
Americans did so much to build. They are our friends and we
should be proud to welcome them home.
We should also think about what would happen if we were to
turn them away. That would mean freezing NATO at its Cold War
membership and preserving the old Iron Curtain as its eastern
frontier. It would mean locking out a whole group of
otherwise qualified democracies simply because they were
once, against their will, members of the Warsaw Pact.
Why would America choose to be allied with Europe's old
democracies forever, but its new democracies never? There is
no acceptable, objective answer to that question. Instead, it
would probably be said that we blocked the aspirations of our
would-be allies because Russia objected. And that, in turn,
could cause confidence to crumble in central Europe, leading
to a search for security by other means, including costly
arms buildups and competition among neighbors.
We have chosen a better way. We have chosen to look at the
landscape of the new Europe and to ask a simple question:
Which of these nations that are so clearly important to our
security are ready and able to contribute to our security?
The answer to that question is before you today, awaiting
your affirmation.
I said at the outset, Mr. Chairman, that there are weighty
voices on both sides of this debate. There are legitimate
concerns with which we have grappled along the way, and that
I expect you to consider fully as well. Let me address a few.
First, we all want to make sure that the costs of expansion
are distributed fairly. Last February, at the behest of
Congress and before the Alliance had decided which nations to
invite to membership, the Administration made a preliminary
estimate of America's share. Now that we have settled on
three candidates, we are working with our allies to produce a
common estimate by the December meeting of the North Atlantic
Council. At this point, the numbers we agree upon as 16
allies are needed prior to any further calculations made in
Washington.
I know you are holding separate hearings in which my
Pentagon colleagues will go into this question in detail. But
I will say this: I am convinced that the cost of expansion is
real but affordable. I am certain our prospective allies are
willing and able to pay their share, because in the long run
it will be cheaper for them to upgrade their forces within
the alliance than outside it. As Secretary of State, I will
insist that our old allies share this burden fairly. That is
what NATO is all about.
I know there are serious people who estimate that a larger
NATO will cost far more than we have anticipated. The key
fact about our estimate is that it is premised on the
current, favorable security environment in Europe. Obviously,
if a grave threat were to arise, the cost of enlargement
would rise. But then so would the cost of our entire defense
budget.
In any case, there are budgetary constraints in all 16 NATO
democracies that will prevent costs from ballooning. That is
why the main focus of our discussion, Mr. Chairman, and in
our consultations with our allies, needs to be on defining
the level of military capability we want our old and new
allies to have in this favorable environment, and then making
sure that they commit to that level. We must spend no more
than we must, but no less than we need to keep NATO strong.
Another common concern about NATO enlargement is that it
might damage our cooperation with a democratic Russia.
Russian opposition to NATO enlargement is real. But we should
see it for what it is: a product of old misperceptions about
NATO and old ways of thinking about its former satellites in
central Europe. Instead of changing our policies to
accommodate Russia's outdated fears, we need to encourage
Russia's more modern aspirations.
This means that we should remain Russia's most steadfast
champion whenever it seeks to define its greatness by joining
international institutions, opening its markets and
participating constructively in world affairs. It means we
should welcome Russia's decision to build a close partnership
with NATO, as we did in the NATO-Russia Founding Act.
But when some Russian leaders suggest that a larger NATO is
a threat, we owe it candor to say that is false--and to base
our policies on what we know to be true. When they imply that
central Europe is special, that its nations still are not
free to choose their security arrangements, we owe it to
candor to say that times have changed, and that no nation can
assert its greatness at the expense of its neighbors. We do
no favor to Russian democrats and modernizers to suggest
otherwise.
I believe our approach is sound and producing results. Over
the past year, against the backdrop of NATO enlargement,
reformers have made remarkable gains in the Russian
government. We have agreed to pursue deeper arms reductions.
Our troops have built a solid working relationship on the
ground in Bosnia. Russia was our full partner at the Summit
of the Eight in Denver and it has joined the Paris Club of
major international lenders.
What is more, last week in New York we signed documents
that should pave the way for the Russian Duma to ratify the
START II treaty. While this prospect is still by no means
certain, it would become far less so if we gave the Duma any
reason to think it could hold up NATO enlargement by holding
up START II.
As you know Mr. Chairman, last week, NATO and Russia held
the first ministerial meeting of their Permanent Joint
Council. This council gives us an invaluable mechanism for
building trust between NATO and Russia through dialogue and
transparency.
I know that some are concerned NATO's new relationship with
Russia will actually go too far. You have asked me for an
affirmation, Mr. Chairman, that the North Atlantic Council
remains NATO's supreme decision making body. Let me say it
clearly: It does and it will. The NATO-Russia Founding Act
gives Russia no opportunity to dilute, delay or block NATO
decisions. NATO's allies will always meet to agree on every
item on their agenda before meeting with Russia. And the
relationship between NATO and Russia will grow in importance
only to the extent Russia uses it constructively.
The Founding Act also does not limit NATO's ultimate
authority to deploy troops or nuclear weapons in order to
meet its commitments to new and old members. All it does is
to restate unilaterally existing NATO policy: that in the
current and foreseeable security environment, we have no
plan, no need, and no intention to station nuclear weapons in
the new member countries, nor do we contemplate permanently
stationing substantial combat forces. The only binding limits
on conventional forces in Europe will be set as we adapt the
CFE treaty, with central European countries and all the other
signatories at the table, and we will proceed on the
principle of reciprocity.
Another important concern is that enlargement may create a
new dividing line in Europe between a larger NATO and the
countries that will not join in the first round. We have
taken a range of steps to ensure this does not happen.
President Clinton has pledged that the first new members
will not be the last. NATO leaders will consider the next
steps in the process of enlargement before the end of the
decade. We have strengthened NATO's Partnership for Peace
program. We have created a new Euro-Atlantic Partnership
Council, through which NATO and its democratic partners
throughout Europe will shape the missions we undertake
together. We have made it clear that the distinction between
the nations NATO invited to join in Madrid and those it did
not is based purely on objective factors--unlike the
arbitrary line that would divide Europe if NATO stood still.
Among the countries that still aspire to membership, there
is enthusiastic support for the process NATO has begun. Had
you seen the crowds that cheered the President in Romania in
July, had you been with me when I spoke to the leaders of
Lithuania and Slovenia, you would have sensed how eager these
nations are to redouble their efforts.
They understand a simple fact: With enlargement, no new
democracy is permanently excluded; without enlargement, every
new democracy would be permanently excluded. The most
important thing the Senate can do to reassure them now is to
get the ball rolling by ratifying the admission of the first
three candidates.
Mr. Chairman, a final concern I wish to address has to do
with Bosnia.
Some have suggested that our debate on NATO enlargement
simply cannot be separated from our actions and decisions in
that troubled country. I agree with them. Both enlargement
and our mission in Bosnia are aimed at building a stable
undivided Europe. Both involve NATO and its new partners to
the east.
It was our experience in Bosnia that proved the fundamental
premise of our enlargement strategy: there are still threats
to peace and security in Europe that only NATO can meet. It
was in Bosnia that our prospective allies proved they are
ready to take responsibility for the security of others. It
was in Bosnia that we proved NATO and Russian troops can work
together.
We cannot know today if our mission in Bosnia will achieve
all its goals, for that ultimately depends on the choices the
Bosnian people will make. But we can say that whatever may
happen, NATO's part in achieving the military goals of our
mission has been a resounding success. Whatever may happen,
our interest in a larger, stronger NATO will endure long
after the last foreign soldier has left Bosnia.
We can also say that NATO will remain the most powerful
instrument we have for building effective military coalitions
such as SFOR. At the same time, Bosnia does not by itself
define the future of a larger NATO. NATO's fundamental
purpose is collective defense against aggression. Its most
important aim, if I can paraphrase Arthur Vandenberg, is to
prevent wars before they start so it does not have to keep
the peace after they stop.
These are some of the principal concerns I wanted to
address today; I know you have many more questions and I look
forward to answering them all.
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This discussion is just beginning. I am glad that it will
also involve other committees of the Senate, the NATO
Observers' Group and the House of Representatives. Most
important, I am glad it will involve the people of the United
States. For the commitment a larger NATO entails will only be
meaningful if the American people understand and accept it.
When these three new democracies join NATO in 1999, as I
trust they will, it will be a victory for us all, Mr.
Chairman. And on that day, we will be standing on the
shoulders of many.
We will be thankful to all those who prosecuted the Cold
War, to all those on both sides of the Iron Curtain who
believed that the goal of containment was to bring about the
day when the enlargement of our democratic community would be
possible.
We will be grateful to all those who championed the idea of
a larger NATO--not just President Clinton, or President
Havel, or President Walesa, but members of Congress from both
parties who voted for resolutions urging the admission of
these three nations. We will owe a debt to the Republican
members who made NATO enlargement part of their Contract with
America.
Today, all of our allies and future allies are watching you
for one simple reason. The American Constitution is unique in
the power it grants to the legislative branch over foreign
policy, especially over treaties. In this matter, Mr.
Chairman, members of the Committee, you and the American
people you represent are truly in the driver's seat.
That is as it should be. In fact, I enjoy going to Europe
and telling our allies: ``This is what we want to do, but
ultimately, it will be up to our Senate and our people to
decide.'' I say that with pride because it tells them
something about America's faith in the democratic process.
But I have to tell you that I say it with confidence as
well. I believe we will stand together, Mr. Chairman, when
the time comes for the Senate to decide, because I know that
the policy we ask you to embrace is a policy that the
Administration and Congress shaped together, and because I am
certain that it advances the fundamental interests of the
United States.
Thank you very much.
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