[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 137 (Monday, October 6, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10409-S10420]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                 BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM ACT OF 1997

  The Senate continued with consideration of the bill.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I am a cosponsor and strong supporter of 
the McCain-Feingold bill, and I want to explain this afternoon in some 
detail why I support a key section in the bill that is the subject of 
much debate. It is section 201, the provision that is intended to stop 
what we call issue ad abuse. By issue ad abuse I mean the mislabeling 
of candidate ads as issue ads in order to evade contribution limits and 
the disclosure requirements that now exist in Federal campaign law.
  I want to emphasize this point because it has been overlooked, it 
seems to me, by so many of us during this debate. Current law restricts 
contributions and the Buckley case has upheld that restriction as being 
consistent with the first amendment. Section 201 is not only 
constitutional within Buckley but it is also critically important to 
campaign finance reform. I want to spend some time explaining why.
  Now, Buckley--which I think has been cited by just about everybody 
who has spoken in this debate--is the touchstone for drafting 
constitutionally permissible Federal campaign finance laws. So I want 
to start with Buckley. In Buckley, the Supreme Court upheld a strict 
set of limits on campaign contributions to Federal candidates, despite 
impassioned argument, including by the ACLU, that such limits 
impermissibly restricted first amendment rights of free speech and free 
association.
  This is what the Court said in Buckley, and I will be quoting at some 
length because it is critical in understanding the permissible limits 
of campaign finance law and limits:

       It is unnecessary to look beyond the Act's primary 
     purpose--to limit the actuality and appearance of corruption 
     resulting from large individual financial contributions--in 
     order to find a constitutionally sufficient justification for 
     the $1,000 contribution limitation. Under a system of private 
     financing of elections, a candidate lacking immense personal 
     or family wealth must depend on financial contributions from 
     others to provide the resources necessary to conduct a 
     successful campaign. The increasing importance of the 
     communications media and sophisticated mass mailing and 
     polling operations to effective campaigning make the raising 
     of large sums of money an ever more essential ingredient of 
     an effective candidacy. To the extent that large 
     contributions are given to secure political quid pro quo's 
     from current and potential office holders, the integrity of 
     our system of representative democracy is undermined. . . .
       Of almost equal concern is the danger of actual quid pro 
     quo arrangements and the impact of the appearance of 
     corruption stemming from public awareness of the 
     opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large 
     individual financial contributions. . . .

  And the Court went on:

       Congress could legitimately conclude that the avoidance of 
     the appearance of improper influence ``is also critical. . . 
     if confidence in the system of representative government is 
     not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.'' . . .

[[Page S10410]]

      Congress was surely entitled to conclude that disclosure was 
     only a partial measure, and that contribution ceilings were a 
     necessary legislative concomitant to deal with the reality or 
     appearance of corruption inherent in a system permitting 
     unlimited financial contributions, even when the identities 
     of the contributors and the amounts of their contributions 
     are fully disclosed.

  In other words, the Supreme Court explicitly held in Buckley that 
eliminating actual and apparent corruption of our electoral system--
corruption which is ``inherent in a system permitting unlimited 
financial contributions''--was a compelling enough interest to justify 
Congress in imposing campaign contribution limits, although such limits 
collide with unfettered first amendment rights of free expression and 
free association.
  The Supreme Court adopted a balancing test, looking at what was the 
restriction on the first amendment compared to the public interest in 
avoiding the appearance of corruption in elections where there are 
unlimited financial contributions.
  Now, what did the Supreme Court do in the area of contributions? They 
upheld a $1,000 contribution limit on contributions that an individual 
may make to a Federal candidate. Despite the argument that that limit 
collided with pure free speech rights--an argument made by the ACLU in 
the Buckley case and not adopted by the Supreme Court in Buckley--quite 
the opposite. They approved the contribution limit. The Supreme Court 
not only said that the $1,000 limit on contributions to candidates was 
constitutional, but it also upheld an overall ceiling of $25,000 on the 
amount of money that a single individual could give to all Federal 
candidates in a single year.
  Now, how does the Court explain that? If the $1,000 limit is 
constitutional, how, then, would it be constitutional to limit the 
number of $1,000 contributions in effect to 25 candidates? Why 
shouldn't people be allowed to give $1,000 to 50 candidates if they 
want?
  The language of the Court is again very instructive as to the 
balancing test that they adopted relative to weighing limits on 
contributions and any impingement on first amendment rights. Here is 
what the Supreme Court said:

       The overall $25,000 ceiling does impose an ultimate 
     restriction on the number of candidates and committees with 
     which an individual may associate himself by means of 
     financial support. But this quite modest restraint upon 
     protected political activity serves to prevent evasion of the 
     $1,000 contribution limitation by a person who might 
     otherwise contribute massive amounts of money to a particular 
     candidate through the use of unearmarked contributions to 
     political committees likely to contribute to that candidate 
     or huge contributions to the candidate's political party.

  The Supreme Court went on to say:

       The limited additional restriction on associational freedom 
     imposed by the overall ceiling is thus no more than a 
     corollary of the basic individual contribution limitation 
     that we have found to be constitutionally valid.

  So the Buckley Court not only upheld limits on contributions of 
$1,000 per candidate per election, they also upheld an overall limit of 
$25,000 in a test which weighed the restrictions on associational 
freedoms and first amendment freedoms against the need for clean 
elections, against the need to avoid the appearance of corruption, 
which in the Supreme Court's words, arises from unlimited financial 
contributions to candidates.
  The Supreme Court said Congress may try to avoid the appearance of 
corruption that results from unlimited contribution to candidates by 
putting limits on the contributions to any one candidate and on the 
total number of contributions to all candidates combined. Why? In order 
to prevent ``evasion of the contribution limit'' by a person who might 
``contribute massive amounts of money to a particular candidate through 
the use of unearmarked contributions to political committees likely to 
contribute to that candidate or huge contributions to the candidate's 
political party.''
  That is Buckley. Now, we haven't heard a lot about that part of 
Buckley in this debate yet, but that's Buckley. We have heard, and 
properly so, about that part of Buckley which put limits on 
expenditures and acts inconsistent with the first amendment. But what 
we have not heard enough of is those parts of Buckley which rule 
constitutional the limits on contributions to candidates. It is that 
part of Buckley that upholds the constitutionality of limits on 
contributions, which is at the core of McCain-Feingold. Because it is 
in order to avoid the evasion of existing law and its limits on 
contributions that the McCain-Feingold bill is designed as it is. That 
is why we believe that it is perfectly consistent with Buckley.
  The Buckley opinion also upheld disclosure requirements. By 
sustaining these disclosure requirements, the Supreme Court effectively 
approved the prohibition of anonymous or secret contributions to any 
candidate or political committee. It also effectively approved the 
prohibition of direct campaign spending by anonymous or secret persons. 
Again, the Supreme Court adopted a balancing test even when it came to 
disclosure.
  I know that the Presiding Officer has a particular interest in the 
need for disclosure--an interest that I think most Members of this body 
share. Many of us also want to put limits on soft money contributions. 
On that, there is a difference inside this body. But in terms of 
disclosure, I know that the Presiding Officer has had a very sincere 
and a very longstanding interest, one I think most of us would share.
  Here is what the Court said relative to the first amendment's 
application to disclosure requirements:

       Compelled disclosure has the potential for substantially 
     infringing on the exercise of first amendment rights. But we 
     have acknowledged that there are governmental interests 
     sufficiently important to outweigh the possibility of 
     infringement, particularly when the free functioning of our 
     national institutions is involved. The governmental interests 
     sought to be vindicated by the disclosure requirements are of 
     this magnitude.

  So, again, it is a weighing test. The Supreme Court said explicitly 
that compelled disclosure--which I think probably all of us in this 
body support in one fashion or another--has the potential for 
substantially infringing on the exercise of first amendment rights. But 
then the Court went on to weigh the value of disclosure against the 
infringement and said that we have a legitimate public interest in 
coming down on the side of disclosure. The Court listed three 
compelling interests in requiring disclosure.
  Later Supreme Court decisions built upon the base provided in 
Buckley. One key case was Austin versus Michigan State Chamber of 
Commerce in 1990. The Supreme Court in Austin upheld a Michigan State 
law which prohibited corporations from making independent expenditures, 
except through a political action committee which is subject to 
contribution limits and disclosure requirements. Despite the 
corporation's argument that its first amendment rights were being 
violated, the Supreme Court specifically held that Michigan could bar 
the corporation from placing an ad endorsing a specific candidate.
  In other words, a corporation was told by the Supreme Court that 
Michigan has a right to prevent you from putting on an ad that endorses 
a candidate. It quoted extensively from the Massachusetts Citizens For 
Life case, a 1986 case.
  Here is what the Supreme Court said in the Michigan case, again 
quoting an earlier case significantly but having additional language of 
its own:

       ``The resources in the treasury of a business corporation . 
     . . are not an indication of popular support for the 
     corporation's political ideas. They reflect instead the 
     economically motivated decisions of investors and customers. 
     The availability of these resources may make a corporation a 
     formidable political presence, even though the power of the 
     corporation may be no reflection of the power of its ideas.'' 
     We therefore have recognized--

  Here again, we get into a weighing test

     that ``the compelling governmental interest in preventing 
     corruption support[s] the restriction of the influence of 
     political war chests funneled through the corporate form.''. 
     . . Regardless of whether this danger of ``financial quid pro 
     quo'' corruption may be sufficient to justify a restriction 
     on independent expenditures, Michigan's regulation aims at a 
     different type of corruption in the political arena: the 
     corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of 
     wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate 
     form and that have little or no correlation to the public's 
     support for the corporation's political ideas.

  So we have contribution limits approved by the Supreme Court. We have

[[Page S10411]]

disclosure requirements approved by the Supreme Court. We have a ban on 
corporate independent expenditures except through a PAC approved by the 
Supreme Court.
  Each of these campaign finance restrictions has been upheld by the 
Court in the face of arguments that these restrictions were 
inconsistent with the first amendment. In each of those cases, the 
Supreme Court acknowledged that there was some impingement on pure 
first amendment rights but weighed that against the public interest in 
clean campaigns.


                       Twenty Years After Buckley

  Now, the campaign contribution limits that are in existing law--the 
$1,000 an election and $25,000 overall--are strict limits. No corporate 
or union campaign spending, except through political action committees. 
Presidential campaigns are supposed to be funded with public funds.
  Those laws, as I said, are on the books today. But candidates and 
parties in the 20 years since Buckley have found many ways around these 
tough laws. Contribution limits have been rendered all but meaningless 
by the soft money loophole. We have all heard the story of Roger 
Tamraz's $300,000 contribution to the Democrats, and the tobacco 
industry's donating millions of dollars to Republicans. Disclosure 
requirements and the ban on corporate independent expenditures have 
also been rendered toothless, not only by the soft money loophole, but 
also by the use of so-called ``issue ads.''
  In my opinion, the most vicious combination in the 1996 election 
season, outside of our control and the control of the campaign finance 
laws, was the use of huge contributions from individuals or entities, 
corporations included, funding candidate attack ads mislabeled as issue 
ads. This vicious combination encapsulates for me more than any other 
single image the collapse of our campaign finance system and the rock-
bottom need for reform. Documenting issue ad abuse and the role that 
these so-called issue ads now play in American elections is vital to 
support legislative reforms that touch upon first amendment concerns. 
That record is being built right here on the Senate floor. That record 
is being built in campaign finance hearings before the Senate 
Governmental Affairs Committee, of which I am a member. It is a record 
that is filled with examples of so-called issue ads that are 
indistinguishable from candidate ads, as well as testimony that we have 
elicited from experienced candidates, officeholders, and others about 
the growing use of so-called issue ads as a tactic in Federal campaigns 
to evade the legal limits on contributions and disclosure requirements.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent at this point that following 
my remarks there be printed in the Record the transcripts of six so 
called ``issue ads'' that aired on television during the course of the 
1996 campaign.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, this list, compiled by Public Citizen, 
illustrates in the words of the group, ``. . . the use of the `issue 
ad' loophole to engage in flat-out electioneering.''
  I want to just use one of these ads as an example. This is a 1996 ad, 
paid for by the League of Conservation Voters. It refers to a House 
Member, Greg Ganske, a Republican Congressman from Iowa. The transcript 
of the ad reads as follows:

       It's our land; our water. America's environment must be 
     protected. But in just 18 months, Congressman Ganske has 
     voted 12 out of 12 times to weaken environmental protections. 
     Congressman Ganske even voted to let corporations continue 
     releasing cancer-causing pollutants into our air. Congressman 
     Ganske voted for the big corporations who lobbied these bills 
     and gave him thousands of dollars in contributions.

  The next line is:

       Call Congressman Ganske. Tell him to protect America's 
     environment. For our families. For our future.

  This ad is treated by its sponsors as an issue ad which can be paid 
for out of unlimited, undisclosed funds. But if one word is changed--
just one word--instead of saying ``call'' Congressman Ganske, the ad 
says ``defeat'' Congressman Ganske--which the ad says in every single 
other way but doesn't use the word ``defeat.'' If they had explicitly 
use the word ``defeat,'' then that ad would have to be paid for out of 
funds which are restricted by law, because the word ``defeat'' is one 
of those magic seven words.
  In the real world is there any difference between those two ads? In 
the real political world, would any viewer of that ad get any message 
other than to defeat Congressman Ganske? Would any reasonable person 
reach any other conclusion as to the purpose and intent of that ad? Is 
that ad not unmistakably aimed at the defeat of a candidate in the 
middle of an election when that ad runs? Is that ad not equivalent to 
an ad that is calling for the defeat of a candidate?
  I think most of us in this Chamber who have been living in the real 
political world, as well as most of our constituents, wouldn't even 
notice the difference--whether the word ``defeat'' or ``call'' were in 
that ad. That is how similar they are.
  Then the question is: Just as we are permitted by the Supreme Court 
to protect our contribution limit of $1,000 by having an overall limit 
of $25,000, will we be allowed to protect our law requiring that ads 
calling for the defeat or the election of a candidate come from 
contributions which are limited by law? Can we not protect that law 
also in the way we have done in McCain-Feingold, by adding another word 
to the seven magic words --for instance, the eighth word--the name of 
the candidate?
  Seven words are listed in a footnote in Buckley--the so-called 
``seven magic words.'' If you use the words ``vote for'' or ``defeat'' 
or ``elect'' or ``support'' or ``vote against'' or ``reject,'' that is 
unequivocally considered an ad calling for the election or defeat of a 
candidate. And the Supreme Court says that our restriction on 
contributions is constitutional if one of those ads is used. It doesn't 
say one of those words has to be used. It uses that as an example in a 
footnote.
  So we are coming along now in the real world 20 years later and 
saying, ``Here is an ad that didn't use one of those magic seven 
words.'' But is that ad functionally any different? Is that ad in the 
real world any different from an ad which contains the word ``defeat,'' 
or does that ad unmistakably call for the defeat of that Congressman 
just as much if it had used the ``vote against''?
  That is a question which the Federal Election Commission has ruled 
on. They have adopted a test from a case called Furgatch that comes out 
of the ninth circuit. In the Furgatch case, the ninth circuit approved 
the test which is now the regulation of the Federal Election Commission 
which says that, if an ad unmistakably calls for the defeat or election 
of a candidate, that ad is within the meaning of our law that restricts 
contributions to $1,000 where the advocacy of a candidate's defeat or 
election is express.
  We had 30 days after the Federal Election Commission adopted that 
regulation based on the Furgatch case, as approved by the ninth 
circuit--to reject the Federal Election Commission regulation that was 
adopted a few years ago.
  The courts are divided. We have the ninth circuit saying that the 
test in the Furgatch case is constitutional. We have the first circuit 
ruling the other way. We have the Supreme Court deciding not to accept 
certiorari in either of the appeals. In fact, just today they did not 
accept an appeal of the first circuit decision.
  So we have the ninth circuit a number of years ago approving the 
unmistakable test in Furgatch which is in the Federal Election 
Commission regulation, and we have the ninth circuit going the other 
way, and one other circuit I believe going the other way.
  So we have a division in our circuits as to whether or not the 
unmistakable test that the Federal Election Commission has adopted by 
regulation--and that we have not rejected when we had an opportunity--
as to whether or not that Furgatch test is in fact constitutional. But 
surely when you have one circuit ruling that it is constitutional, and 
when you have the Supreme Court declining to rule on an appeal from 
either circuit approving it or disapproving it, what we have now is the 
situation where we have divided circuits. We have the Supreme Court 
that hasn't ruled on the subject.

  I would have like to have seen the Supreme Court adopt certiorari 
today, but they didn't. They left us with law

[[Page S10412]]

in a state of limbo where you have one circuit saying the Federal 
Election Commission is right--it properly adopts the unmistakable test, 
and you have another court of appeals saying no--they can't do it 
consistent with the Supreme Court decision in Buckley.
  That is where we sit. That is where we are going to sit until one of 
two things happen. Either the Supreme Court decides to rule on an 
appeal from one of these circuits, or we adopt a test ourselves and 
then presumably have that test ruled upon by the Supreme Court.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, will the Senator from Michigan yield for 
a question?
  Mr. LEVIN. I would be happy to.
  Mr. SESSIONS. With regard to that, I was, I could say, a victim. That 
is the way I saw it with that very type of ad late in the campaign 
asking people to call Jeff Sessions and say you are opposed to A, B, C, 
or D--to things he had done while in office.
  I think we can take two approaches to it. It fundamentally troubles 
me that the League of Conservation Voters do not feel free to run an ad 
and say vote against this guy just like the people who ran ads against 
me. Why shouldn't we just let them do it? They should have to put their 
name on it and say who is funding it.
  Mr. LEVIN. Is the Senator proposing we repeal the current law?
  Mr. SESSIONS. I think we have to consider the problem of trying to 
contain free speech in America. I really am troubled by it. I was a 
victim of it. I got angry at the time. Now I wonder why I should feel 
obliged to tell those trial lawyers and plaintiff lawyers who opposed 
some of my filed suits that they can't run an ad and say my ideas are 
wrong and I shouldn't be elected.
  As a matter of fact, I am troubled by that.
  Mr. LEVIN. Of course the Senator knows they can run ads saying you 
ought to be defeated. They can run all of those ads they want. But 
under the law that we have passed, they must use contributions which 
comply with the limits which we have adopted. So they are free to run 
those kind of ads. But they must comply with law when they run those 
ads.
  The question is whether they should have unlimited, undisclosed funds 
to run ads which effectively say to defeat or elect somebody but do not 
comply with the limit. That is what we are facing.
  So, unless the Senator is suggesting that we repeal the existing law, 
which puts restrictions on contributions for ads which advocate the 
election or defeat of a candidate--that is the existing law--unless the 
Senator is proposing that, then it seems to me we should make that law 
effective and not put form over substance. And when you have two ads 
which are functionally the same and equivalent, treat one as though it 
is different from the other.
  That is the issue which we are now facing on the floor, as to whether 
we want to enforce existing law to eliminate what we call a loophole, 
which clearly is the avoidance of a magic word in an ad which 
functionally is the same and which any reasonable person would say 
unmistakably is calling for the defeat of Congressman Ganske, as an ad 
which uses the word ``defeat'' itself.
  But, again, unless the Senator is calling for the repeal of existing 
law, it seems to me we are then in the situation where we are either 
going to make those limits work, those contribution limits work, which 
have been approved by the Supreme Court in Buckley, or else we are 
going to continue the current system where those limits are evaded and 
where you have all this soft money which comes into these campaigns, 
which I don't think was the intent of our law when we adopted the 
reform that we did after Watergate.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Will the Senator yield for a question?
  Mr. LEVIN. Sure.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Is the Senator talking about the Furgatch case?
  Mr. LEVIN. I have made a number of references to Furgatch.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I am sorry; I was not on the floor, and the Senator 
was making the point that he thought the Furgatch case did what? 
Indicated that the restrictions on express advocacy in the McCain-
Feingold bill would be constitutional?
  Mr. LEVIN. I think the language of the Furgatch case is such that it 
is much more than the magic words which determine whether or not an 
advertisement effectively supports the election or defeat of a 
candidate. Just to read some of the language from Furgatch, what 
Furgatch does, of course, is look at that famous --as my good friend 
from Kentucky knows--footnote in the Buckley case, footnote 52, which 
uses seven magic words. The question is, are those the only words which 
determine whether or not an ad advocates expressly the election or 
defeat of a candidate?
  Here is the Furgatch test. Here is what the Furgatch case says:

       We begin with the proposition that ``express advocacy'' is 
     not limited to communications using certain key phrases. The 
     short list of words included in the Supreme Court's opinion 
     in Buckley does not exhaust the capacity of the English 
     language to expressly advocate the election or defeat of a 
     candidate. A test requiring the magic words ``elect,'' 
     ``support'' or their nearly perfect synonyms for a finding of 
     express advocacy would preserve the first amendment right of 
     unfettered expression only at the expense of eviscerating the 
     Federal Election Campaign Act. Independent campaign spenders 
     working on behalf of candidates could remain just beyond the 
     reach of the act by avoiding certain key words while 
     conveying a message that is unmistakably directed to the 
     election or defeat of a named candidate.

  So they then provided an alternative test. We are now talking about 
the ninth circuit in Furgatch, which says that the term ``express 
advocacy'' means a communication that advocates the election or defeat 
of a candidate by expressing unmistakable and unambiguous support for 
or opposition to one or more clearly identified candidates when taken 
as a whole and with limited reference to external events such as 
proximity to an election.
  Now, that test was basically adopted by the Federal Election 
Commission in its current regulation. So we have a current regulation 
which basically adopts the unmistakable test. Under the law, as I 
understand it, Congress had about 30 days within which to review that 
regulation. We did not overturn that regulation of the Federal Election 
Commission. It has to date, in a case which the Supreme Court refused 
to review, been left in limbo in the case.
  The Supreme Court, by the way, it has been said in the Chamber here, 
struck down Furgatch, or more accurately----
  Mr. McCONNELL. I didn't hear anyone say that.
  Mr. LEVIN. I was just getting the exact wording.
  I think today it was said in the Chamber that the Federal Election 
Commission test has been stricken by the Supreme Court's decision 
today, and that is simply not accurate.
  What the Supreme Court decided today was not to review a case, not to 
review a case from a court of appeals in which the Court said that the 
Federal Election Commission regulation was not constitutional. But we 
have another court of appeals in the Furgatch case adopting language 
which is the basis of the Federal Election Commission regulation, and 
the Supreme Court didn't review the ninth circuit's decision. So we 
have two decisions unreviewed by the Supreme Court, the ninth circuit 
decision with Furgatch language and a first circuit decision with the 
FEC language which is based on Furgatch----
  Mr. McCONNELL. Will my colleague yield for a question?
  Mr. LEVIN. In which a key question was raised, in fact was thrown out 
as unconstitutional.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Is my colleague from Michigan familiar with the 
Federal Election Commission versus Christian Action Network, which was 
decided April 7 of this year? The language in that decision on page 7, 
I directly quote for my friend from Michigan:

       Seven years later and less than a month following the 
     Court's decision in MCFL, the ninth circuit in FEC v. 
     Furgatch could not have been clearer that it, too, shared 
     this understanding of the Court's decision in Buckley. 
     Although the Court declined to strictly limit express 
     advocacy to the magic words of Buckley's footnote 52 because 
     that footnote list ``does not exhaust the capacity of the 
     English language to expressly advocate election or defeat of 
     a candidate,'' the entire premise of the Court's analysis was 
     that words of advocacy such as those recited in footnote 52 
     were provided to support Commission jurisdiction over a given 
     corporate expenditure.


[[Page S10413]]


  I think what the Supreme Court was saying, or what the fourth circuit 
was saying is that there might be another way beyond the precise words 
of the footnote to expressly advocate the election or defeat, but that 
that was basically it. There might be another way to say the same thing 
beyond words actually chosen in footnote 52. But you are not permitted 
to wander further. Is that not the----
  Mr. LEVIN. I think there is a split in the circuits, and the fourth 
circuit basically is close to where the first circuit is, and that is, 
as I understand it, also subject to appeal to the Supreme Court.
  The ninth circuit has adopted the Furgatch test, which was then 
adopted by the Federal Election Commission. So we have a situation 
where we have circuits split. We have the ninth circuit adopting the 
Furgatch test, saying if something unmistakably calls for election or 
defeat of a candidate, that amounts to the express advocacy which is 
prohibited--not prohibited but which is subject to limits and 
regulations of existing law. You have the fourth circuit and the first 
circuit that have reached a different conclusion on that. So you have a 
split in the circuits, and today the Supreme Court as of this moment 
decided to leave that split where it is, to leave that issue in limbo.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I am not sure how in limbo my friend from Michigan 
would find denial of cert in a first circuit case which pretty clearly 
laid out that language, much of which is in the underlying bill the 
Senator from Michigan supports, is unconstitutional. Does the Senator 
from Michigan find that vague?
  Mr. LEVIN. Find what? Find it vague?
  Mr. McCONNELL. Vague.
  Mr. LEVIN. No; I find it very clear in the fourth and first circuits. 
But I also find in the ninth circuit, a very clear opinion which reads, 
in part, as follows:

       We begin with the proposition that ``express advocacy'' is 
     not strictly limited to communications using certain key 
     phrases. The short list of words included in the Supreme 
     Court's opinion in Buckley does not exhaust the capacity of 
     the English language to expressly advocate the election or 
     defeat of a candidate. A test requiring the magic words 
     ``elect,'' ``support,'' et cetera or their nearly perfect 
     synonyms for a finding of express advocacy, would preserve 
     the first amendment right of unfettered expression only at 
     the expense of eviscerating the Federal Election Campaign 
     Act.

  I find those words to be very clear as well, to answer my friend from 
Kentucky, but the Supreme Court did not accept cert in that case 
either. So we have the Supreme Court not accepting appeals from 
circuits which have reached different conclusions. The answer to the 
question of my friend is I find the words of the fourth circuit clear, 
I find the words of the first circuit clear, and I find the words of 
the ninth circuit clear. Very clear.
  What could be clearer than a finding of the circuit court in the 
ninth circuit that says, ``The short list of words included in the 
Supreme Court's opinion in Buckley does not exhaust the capacity of the 
English language to expressly advocate the election or defeat of a 
candidate''?
  It is a very clear statement.
  The Supreme Court is going to have additional opportunities to 
address this issue, because there are additional cases which will be 
coming to the Supreme Court. Hopefully, they will see fit to resolve 
the dispute between the circuits on this issue.
  Just to briefly continue with the Furgatch court, the Furgatch court 
went on to say the following:

       First amendment doctrine has long recognized that words 
     take part of their meaning and effect from the environment in 
     which they are spoken. . . . However, context cannot supply a 
     meaning that is incompatible with or simply unrelated to the 
     clear import of the words. With these principles in mind, we 
     propose a standard for ``express advocacy'' that will 
     preserve the efficacy of the Act without treading upon the 
     freedom of political expression.

  And here is the conclusion of the Furgatch court, again, left where 
it was by a Supreme Court about 10 years ago. So this is the law in the 
ninth circuit. The Furgatch court said:

       We conclude that speech need not include any of the words 
     listed in Buckley to be express advocacy under the Act, but 
     it must, when read as a whole, and with limited reference to 
     external events, be susceptible of no other reasonable 
     interpretation but as an exhortation to vote for or against a 
     specific candidate. . . . [S]peech is ``express'' for present 
     purposes if its message is unmistakable and unambiguous, 
     suggestive of only one plausible meaning.

  That test, which I think most of us would agree is a real-world test, 
that test was adopted by the Federal Election Commission by a vote of 4 
to 2. It was adopted after extensive public debate. It was presented to 
the Congress in 1995 under a mandatory 30-day period of review. It 
encountered no opposition here, and it encountered no opposition that I 
know of in the House of Representatives. But, this issue has not been 
ruled on by the Supreme Court. And the Supreme Court, again, as we all 
know, announced today that it declined to review a case out of the 
first circuit which went the other way from Furgatch, leaving a split 
in the circuits between those who do and those who don't approve of 
using the Furgatch test to distinguish between candidate and issue ads.


                              60-Day Rule

  One final comment, and that relates to the so-called 60-day rule that 
is in section 201 of the McCain-Feingold bill, because this is a third 
way of distinguishing candidate ads from issue ads. The key provision 
reads as follows:

       The term ``express advocacy'' means a communication that 
     advocates the election or defeat of a candidate by . . . 
     referring to one or more clearly identified candidates in a 
     paid advertisement that is broadcast within 60 calendar days 
     preceding the date of an election of the candidate and that 
     appears in the State in which the election is occurring. . . 
     .

  We have seven magic words in a footnote which, if used at any time 
during an election, will result in an ad being required to be paid for 
from regulated, limited funds. If any of those magic words, so-called, 
are used, the Supreme Court has said, that is evidence, indeed 
compelling evidence, that the ad is an express advocacy ad for election 
or defeat of a candidate.
  Now, what we do is add an eighth word, in addition to words like 
``defeat'' and ``elect'' and ``vote against'' and ``vote for.'' For 60 
days prior to an election we add a eighth word, the name of the 
candidate.
  It is pretty logical in an election. That is what a candidate ad is 
usually all about. When a candidate is named--in this ad, we have 
Congressman Ganske, Congressman Ganske, Congressman Ganske, Congressman 
Ganske. The Supreme Court has said, if you use any of the words in the 
footnote, that does it, that is express advocacy anytime during an 
election. And if it is express advocacy for the election or defeat of a 
candidate, you have to use the limited, regulated contributions. It has 
to be paid for according to the law which Congress has adopted, because 
we wanted contributions which go to advocate the defeat or the election 
of a candidate for Federal office to be governed by contribution 
limits.
  In order to avoid the appearance of corruption--in the Supreme 
Court's words that exists when you have unlimited funds going into 
these elections--adding a eighth word to ``vote for, vote against, 
defeat, elect,'' when that eighth word is the candidate's name in the 
60 days before an election, is fully consistent with what the Court 
decided in Buckley. It is inside the spirit of it, and it implements 
the purpose of our law which is on the books, and it is intended to 
comply with what the Supreme Court said in Buckley is the legitimate 
purpose, public purpose of the Federal elections law.
  They said we can restrict and limit contributions. They have said why 
it is good public policy to do so. They have said all of that. They 
affirmed our limit on contributions, despite the ACLU's opposition to a 
limit on contributions.
  The ACLU's name has been invoked here a number of times. The ACLU was 
wrong in Buckley. The ACLU, in Buckley, argued that the first amendment 
did not permit restrictions on contributions. The Supreme Court did not 
follow the ACLU in Buckley. They adopted a weighing test, and they have 
since in a number of other cases.
  So, what we are doing is saying, ``Here is another bright-line test. 
Add to those seven words in that footnote, a eighth word, for 60 days 
on licensed media, and reflect the real world.'' Because we really have 
two choices, it seems to me. One is to repeal the law which puts limits 
on contributions. And many in this body, I think, favor the repeal of 
the law that puts limits

[[Page S10414]]

on contributions. The other thing that we can do is to implement the 
law, to fully implement its purpose by closing a massive loophole which 
has now been created, a loophole which allows for those contributions 
to be made in nonregulated funds to attack or support the election of 
candidates to the same degree in any real world sense as does an ad 
which uses one of the magic words in that footnote.
  The 60-day rule is a good-faith effort in McCain-Feingold to comply 
with the Buckley decision. It is an honest effort to comply with the 
words in the first amendment in the spirit of the first amendment. I 
don't think any of us differ in terms of our love of this Constitution. 
I think everybody in this body would pass that test with flying colors 
as to whether we love our Constitution. I think all of us would also 
say we want clean and fair elections; we want to avoid the appearance 
of corruption.
  Where we differ is in the process, as to whether or not we want to 
restrict contributions or whether or not we want them unlimited. For 
those of us who feel that unlimited contributions contribute to the 
appearance of corruption--and the Supreme Court has said that there is 
a legitimate public purpose in restricting unlimited contributions--for 
those of us who feel that unlimited contributions lead to the kind of 
spending and attack ads that we saw in the 1996 election, we want to 
fill that loophole, we want to close that loophole which has been now 
opened so wide that it basically has destroyed the effectiveness of the 
limit.
  So the effort in McCain-Feingold is consistent with the first 
amendment. We hope that this body will have an opportunity to adopt, or 
at least to vote on, McCain-Feingold. What we have done, in summary, is 
to adopt some bright-line rules which we feel carry out the Buckley 
decision and close the issue ad loophole without infringing on the 
first amendment.
  It is not an easy task, but these rules that we have added we believe 
do it. The 60-day rule provides criteria that are clear and 
uncomplicated but narrowly tailored to the essentials of 
electioneering.
  Mr. President, we are facing a historic moment, and that moment is 
whether or not we are going to restore limits to a system which was 
intended to have $1,000 per candidate per election. That is supposed to 
be the law of the land. It has been evaded. It has been evaded with the 
soft-money loophole, and we are going to, within the next 24 hours, 
cast the first vote determining whether or not we want to restore 
limits, effective limits, on campaign contributions as the Supreme 
Court in Buckley said that we can do.
  I hope that we rise to this occasion. I think the American public has 
had its fill of the unlimited variety. The status quo has no limits. 
Every day the status quo is losing more and more of the public's 
confidence, and it will, hopefully, be our lot to restore some of that 
public confidence by effectively restoring the limits that were 
intended to be in this law all along but which have been evaded by the 
soft-money loophole and the issue ads, as they are now called.
  We've talked about some specific issue ads that have raised concerns. 
A broader analysis of issue ads is provided by a recently released 
study from the Annenberg Public Policy Center, an executive summary of 
which I've already included in the Record. This study takes a 
concentrated look at so-called issue ads aired during the most recent 
election cycle. It estimates that, in addition to the $400 million 
spent by candidates and political committees to broadcast candidate 
ads, between $135 and $150 million was spent by parties and outside 
groups to broadcast issue ads never reported to the FEC as independent 
expenditures. The study notes that the total spent on these issue ads 
is approximately one-third of the total spent on broadcast ads by all 
candidates for Federal office in 1995 and 1996.
  The study catalogs over 100 specific so-called issue ads, a list 
which it states is incomplete. It then analyzes these ads, finding 
among other things that almost 90 percent mention a candidate by name, 
half the ads favor Democrats while the other half favors Republicans, 
and, compared to other types of political advertising, issue ads as a 
group were the highest in pure attack.
  The study makes the following comments about the role of issue ads in 
the 1996 elections:

       This report catalogs one of the most intriguing and thorny 
     new practices to come onto the political scene in many 
     years--the heavy use of so-called `issue advocacy' 
     advertising by political parties, labor unions, trade 
     associations and business, ideological and single-issue 
     groups during the last campaign. . . .  This is 
     unprecedented, and represents an important change in the 
     culture of campaigns. . . .  To the naked eye, these issue 
     advocacy ads are often indistinguishable from ads run by 
     candidates. But in a number of key respects, they are 
     different. Unlike candidates, issue advocacy groups face no 
     contribution limits or disclosure requirements. Nor can they 
     be held accountable by the voters on election day. . . .  [A] 
     sharp imbalance has evolved over the past two decades in the 
     laws governing campaigns. One part of the electoral system--
     the part that pertains to candidates--remains regulated, 
     while another part--one that pertains to advocacy groups and 
     political parties--is barely regulated or not regulated at 
     all. If you were a wealthy donor interested in affecting the 
     outcome of a campaign, but not interested in leaving any 
     fingerprints, it is pretty clear where you would put your 
     money.

  I have quoted from the Annenberg study, because it is a study 
performed by a nonpartisan group with long experience in tracking 
broadcast ads during election campaigns. The conclusions drawn by this 
expert, nonpartisan group, based upon a broad-ranging study of specific 
issue ads in the last election cycle, confirms what every Senator knows 
from personal experience. Issue ads have become a powerful, frequently 
used tool in Federal elections--an election tool that has nevertheless 
been able to evade compliance with campaign finance contribution limits 
and disclosure requirements.
  The bottom line is that the actual experience of Congress during the 
20 years since Buckley is that issue ad abuse has spiraled out of 
control and is now undermining not only the campaign finance system set 
up to deter corruption and educate the electorate, but also public 
confidence in the integrity of that system. The abuse has reached 
crisis proportions. The system is broken, and it is time to fix it.


                mc cain-feingold provisions on issue ads

  So what to do? How are we to stop issue ad abuse, plug the issue ad 
loophole that is swallowing the rules on candidate ads, and do so in a 
way consistent with our respect for the first amendment?
  The McCain-Feingold bill offers two answers. First, it seeks to 
curtail the soft money loophole that currently provides the bulk of 
funding for so-called issue ads.
  The second solution that the McCain-Feingold bill offers to the 
problem of issue ad abuse is section 201 which takes on the knotty 
problem of fairly distinguishing between true candidate ads that ought 
to comply with campaign finance laws and true issue ads that are not 
campaign activity and legitimately should escape campaign finance 
restrictions.
  As we've discussed, section 201 tackles this problem by first 
codifying the basic test set out in Buckley for distinguishing between 
candidate and issue ads. It states that independent expenditures 
covered by the Federal Election Campaign Act are communications which 
expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified 
candidate.
  This general principle, first set out 20 years ago in Buckley, 
provides the constitutional basis for laws that subject political 
speech about candidates to such tough legal requirements as 
contribution limits and disclosure requirements. Congress has not 
previously codified this principle in the primary Federal campaign law. 
McCain-Feingold would do so for the first time.
  But codifying the general principle is not, of course, enough to stop 
issue ad abuse. The Supreme Court has already held that Congress can 
impose contribution limits and disclosure requirements on ads that 
expressly advocate the election or defeat of one or more clearly 
identified candidates. The problem is how to identify those ads--the 
ads that contain the express advocacy that the Supreme Court said must 
be present to justify campaign finance requirements.
  Section 201 offers three alternative ways for determining whether an 
ad contains express advocacy. The first alternative would codify the 
so-called magic words test first articulated in

[[Page S10415]]

the Buckley decision. The magic words test, which we've all heard 
about, says that if certain enumerated words are present in an ad, the 
ad is express advocacy and must comply with Federal campaign laws. This 
part of section 201, which simply codifies Supreme Court case law, has 
not engendered controversy.
  Section 201 then offers two other ways to determine if an ad contains 
express advocacy. Some critics argue that the McCain-Feingold bill 
violates the Constitution right there, because the Supreme Court has 
allegedly held that only one test of express advocacy is permissible--
the magic words test--and nothing more is constitutionally permitted.
  Those critics go too far. Buckley never says that the magic words 
test is the only permissible way to determine whether an ad expressly 
advocates the election or defeat of a candidate. In fact, Buckley 
barely discusses the magic words test. That magic words test, which 
some claim controls the fate of candidate and issue ads, is set out in 
one sentence in one footnote, footnote 52, which provides minimal 
guidance.

  Here is footnote 52 and the magic words test in its entirety:

       Footnote 52. This construction would restrict the 
     application of [Section] 608(e)(1) to communications 
     containing express words of advocacy of election or defeat, 
     such as ``vote for,'' ``elect,'' ``support,'' ``cast your 
     ballot for,'' ``Smith for Congress,'' ``vote against,'' 
     ``defeat,'' ``reject.''

  That's it. That's the whole footnote. That's the whole discussion of 
the magic words test in all of Buckley. Critics who claim that the 
Supreme Court has held that this test is the only test that can be used 
to determine whether an ad contains express advocacy sufficient to 
justify campaign finance restrictions are going beyond the bounds of 
Buckley--the Supreme Court has simply not made that determination.
  Many of us don't think the Supreme Court would go that far in 
elevating form over substance. Instead, we support the ninth circuit 
Furgatch test which I've quoted earlier and which is one of the three 
tests that section 201 of the McCain-Feingold bill seeks to codify. 
Section 201 words the Furgatch test as follows:

       The term ``express advocacy'' means a communications that 
     advocates the election or defeat of a candidate by . . . 
     expressing unmistakable and unambiguous support for or 
     opposition to one or more clearly identified candidates when 
     taken as a whole with limited reference to external events, 
     such as proximity to an election.

If Federal campaign laws are to stop issue ad abuse, we have to be able 
to go after ads that unmistakably and unambiguously advocate the 
election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate--including ads 
that convey such information without once mentioning a magic word.
  Finally, section 201 of the McCain-Feingold bill proposes using the 
so-called 60-day rule. Broken down to its essentials, this test 
requires three elements for an ad to qualify as express advocacy: a 
paid broadcast on television or radio, a reference to a clearly 
identified candidate, and a broadcast aired within 60 days of the 
candidate's election.
  This 60-day rule is a more limited version of a proposal first made 
by Thomas Mann and Norman Ornstein. It is more limited in two ways. 
Where the Mann-Ornstein proposal would have applied to all forms of 
communications, including newspaper ads, mailings, billboards and more, 
the section 201 proposal is limited to ads broadcast on licensed 
airwaves. Where the Mann-Ornstein proposal suggested a 90-day 
timeframe, the section 201 is limited to 60 days.
  The limitation to broadcast ads is a narrowly tailored solution to 
the problem of issue ad abuse.
  The Senate Governmental Affairs Committee on which I sit has received 
evidence of serious issue ad abuse outside the broadcast arena. For 
example, the committee subpoenaed documents related to a 1996 million-
dollar mailing and telephone effort by a group called Americans for Tax 
Reform. This group claimed to be engaged solely in issue advocacy, but 
a host of undisputed facts suggests otherwise, including the fact that 
the Republican National Committee [RNC] donated $4.5 million to the 
group in October 1996--the largest donation a political party has ever 
made to a private organization; the group used the money from the RNC 
to pay for the mailings and telephone calls; the mailings and calls 
were orchestrated by a known partisan corporation with campaign 
expertise; the mailings and calls targeted specific congressional 
districts; and the mailings and calls were timed to occur in the last 
few weeks before the 1996 elections. These facts raise the same 
concerns that exist with respect to broadcast issue ads--that people 
are gaming the system and mislabeling activities as issue advocacy 
simply to circumvent campaign laws meant to ensure clean election and 
an informed electorate.
  Despite this evidence of issue ad abuse outside the broadcast field, 
the sponsors of the McCain-Feingold bill adopted the suggestion to 
limit the 60-day test to ads aired on television or radio. They agreed 
that this limitation would address the worst abuses involving so-called 
issue advocacy, while leaving untouched many other outlets for first 
amendment expression. They also agreed that Supreme Court precedent 
under the Red Lion series of cases, provide constitutional foundation 
for a campaign finance law that addresses paid advertisements broadcast 
on publicly licensed airwaves, but not other forms of political 
advertising.
  Second, the sponsors of the McCain-Feingold bill limited the 
provision to a 60-day rather than 90-day period, again in an effort to 
narrowly tailor the test to address the worst issue ad abuse--those ads 
that are broadcast immediately before an election.
  Third, the McCain-Feingold test is limited to ads that mention a 
clearly identified candidate. That means that anyone who wants to 
present an issue ad during the 60-day period can easily avoid the 
extending laws' contribution limits and disclosure requirements simply 
by excluding mention of a specific candidate. Issue ads could direct 
viewers to ``Call Congress,'' ``Call Your Member of Congress,'' ``Call 
the White House,'' or ``Call Washington''--none of which mentions a 
specific candidate.
  Alternatively, an issued ad whose sponsor felt that mentioning a 
specific candidate was crucial to an effective communication would be 
free to mention that candidate--the ad would just have to comply with 
the same contribution limits and disclosure requirements that now apply 
to candidate advocacy. Those legal requirements have already passed 
conditional muster in the courts, and the $400 million spent on 
candidate ads in the last election cycle is incontrovertible proof that 
they do not stop speech.
  Critics argue that, nothwitstanding our efforts to craft a narrowly 
tailored solution to issue ad abuse, the 60-day rule is overly broad. 
They contend that the rule would unavoidably restrict the broadcast of 
true issue advocacy during the 60-day time period.
  My response to this argument is that it ignores the past 20 years of 
experience we have had with the ingenuity of those who want to use the 
public airwaves to communicate their message.

  Any rule that Congress develops to stop issue ad abuse will best pass 
constitutional muster by providing bright line guidance in this area. 
To date, the Supreme Court has explicitly approved one bright-line rule 
to distinguish candidate and issue ads--the magic words test--though we 
believe the Court will approve other carefully crafted tests. Since 
Buckley, we have seen that the magic words test has suffered wholesale 
evasion due to the ingenuity of ad sponsors in designing ads that send 
clear messages about candidates without once using a magic word.
  The McCain-Feingold 60-day rule doesn't want to repeat that mistake. 
Its goal is not to fight first amendment ingenuity, but to harness it. 
It does so by providing such simple, bright line guidance that it 
becomes easy for any person who wants to discuss issues to avoid 
triggering it. All they have to do is avoid mention of a candidate or 
avoid the 60-day period. That's not very difficult to do. At the same 
time, the rule intentionally makes it very difficult for anyone who 
wants to support or oppose a candidate to evade the campaign finance 
law, since it is pretty hard to advocate the election or defeat of a 
candidate without mentioning the person at issue immediately before the 
election.
  The Supreme Court has already held that it is constitutionally 
acceptable

[[Page S10416]]

for seven magic words like ``elect'' or ``defeat'' in an advertisement 
to trigger contribution limits and disclosure requirements. The 60-day 
rule proposes adding an eighth magic word in ads broadcast during the 
last 60 days before an election--a candidate's name.
  The Supreme Court has already said that clean elections is so 
compelling a state interest that it justifies contribution limits and 
disclosure requirements. That is the law today. But the law is being 
evaded. Constantly. With hundreds of millions of dollars of TV ads. 
Evading the magic words test is not a hypothetical or theoretical 
problem. It is an actual problem documented in the Annenberg study and 
in the personal campaign experiences that many of us have had.
  If we want to stop issue ad abuse--to stop allowing candidate ads to 
masquerade as issue ads in order to evade the law--we need to design 
bright line rules intended to work with rather than against ingenuity, 
and the endless possibilities of effective broadcast communication. We 
need bright line rules that close the issue ad loophole without 
infringing on the first amendment. It's not an easy task, but we think 
McCain-Feingold does it. We think it does so in a constitutionally 
permissible manner, because it provides criteria that are clear and 
uncomplicated yet so narrowly tailored to the essentials 
of electioneering, that those who wish to engage in issue advocacy can 
do so with minimal effort, while those who wish to engage in candidate 
advocacy will be hard pressed to evade Federal contribution limits and 
disclosure requirements.

  Some will argue that Congress has no right to close the issue ad 
loophole. But those of us who believe stopping issue ad abuse is 
critical to restoring effective campaign finance laws believe we have 
crafted a minimally intrusive means to achieve the compelling public 
interest of detering actual and perceived corruption which the Supreme 
Court has said is ``inherent in a system permitting unlimited financial 
contributions.''
  One of the most important provisions in the McCain-Feingold bill is 
the ban on soft money contributions to the political parties. But if 
Congress shuts down soft money to the political parties without also 
effectively stopping issue ad abuse, our campaign system might actually 
end up worse off than now. How? Because the hundreds of millions of 
dollars of unregulated, unlimited and undisclosed money that now flows 
to parties could be redirected to broadcasting issue ads that are 
candidate ads in everything but name.
  I have heard opponents of the bill claim that McCain-Feingold's 
express advocacy provisions would shut down the use of educational 
voting guides that simply report candidates' voting records. In fact, 
the bill creates an explicit safe harbor for exactly that type of 
communication. Section 201(b) explicitly includes a subsection 
entitled, ``Voting Record and Voting Guide Exception.'' It states that, 
so long as none of the 7 magic words in the Buckley footnote are used 
in the material, educational voting guides will not be deemed express 
advocacy subject to campaign contribution limits and disclosure 
requirements.
  I and other authors of section 201 in the McCain-Feingold bill are 
well aware of the difficulty of putting into statute an effective yet 
easily understood means of distinguishing candidate ads from issue ads. 
We've worked hard to create constitutionally acceptable language. We 
think the tests proposed in the McCain-Feingold bill are a significant 
improvement over the status quo. It is a status quo that every day is 
losing more of the public's confidence due to ongoing, wholesale 
evasion of the contribution limits and disclosure requirements that are 
supposed to be safeguarding our electoral process.
  Stopping issue ad abuse requires more than magic words. I urge my 
colleagues to give the McCain-Feingold approach an opportunity to do 
better.
  I thank the Chair and thank my colleagues for this long period of 
time that I have taken.

                               Exhibit 1

               Phony ``Issue Ads'' From the 1996 Campaign

       Here are a few television advertisements, each aired during 
     the 1996 campaign, that illustrate the use of the ``issue 
     ad'' loophole to engage in flat-out electioneering: \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \1\ Transcripts originally published in ``Issue Advocacy 
     Advertising During the 1996 Campaign: A Catalog.'' The 
     Annenberg Policy Center, September 16, 1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Republican National Committee: ``Clinton: I will not raise 
     taxes on the middle class. Announcer: We heard this a lot. 
     Clinton: We gotta give middle class tax relief. Announcer: 
     Six months later, he gave us the largest tax increase in 
     history. Higher income taxes, income taxes on social security 
     benefits, more payroll taxes. Under Clinton, the typical 
     American family now pays over $1,500 more in federal taxes. A 
     big price to pay for his broken promise. Tell President 
     Clinton: You can't afford higher taxes for more wasteful 
     spending.''
       Democratic National Committee: ``Announcer: Protect 
     families. For millions of working families, President Clinton 
     cut taxes. The Dole/Gingrich budget tried to raise taxes on 
     eight million. The Dole/Gingrich budget would've slashed 
     Medicare $270 billion, cut college scholarships. The 
     President defended our values, protected Medicare. And now a 
     tax cut of $1,500 a year for the first two years of college, 
     most community colleges free. Help adults go back to school. 
     The President's plan protects our values.''
       Citizens Flag Alliance: ``Announcer: Some things are wrong. 
     They've always been wrong. And no matter how many politicians 
     say they're right, they're still hateful and wrong. Stand up 
     for the right values. Call Representative Richard Durbin 
     today. Ask him why he voted against the Flag Protection 
     Amendment. Against the values we hold dear. The 
     Constitutional Amendment to safeguard our flags, because 
     America's values are worth protecting.''
       Citizen Action: ``Announcer: They've worked hard all their 
     lives. They're our neighbors, our friends, our parents. They 
     earned Social Security and Medicare. But Congressman Creamens 
     voted five times to cut their Medicare. Even their nursing 
     home care. To pay for a $16,892 tax break he voted to give to 
     the wealthy. Congressman Creamens, it's not your money to 
     give away. Don't cut their Medicare. They earned it.''
       The League of Conservation Voters: ``Announcer: It's our 
     land; our water. America's environment must be protected. But 
     in just 18 months, Congressman Ganske has voted 12 out of 12 
     times to weaken environmental protections. Congressman Ganske 
     even voted to let corporations continue releasing cancer-
     causing pollutants into our air. Congressman Ganske voted for 
     the big corporation who lobbied these bills and give him 
     thousands of dollars in contributions. Call Congressman 
     Ganske. Tell him to protect America's environment. For our 
     families. For our future.''
       Citizens for the Republic Education Fund: ``Announcer: 
     Senate candidate Winston Bryant's budget as Attorney General 
     increased 71%. Bryant has taken taxpayer funded junkets to 
     the Virgin Islands. And spent about $100,000 on new 
     furniture. Unfortunately as the state's top law enforcement 
     official, he's never opposed the parole of any convicted 
     criminal, even rapists and murderers. And almost 4,000 
     Arkansas prisoners have been sent back to prison for crimes 
     committed while they were on parole. Winston Bryant: 
     government waste, political junkets, soft on crime. Call 
     Winston Bryant and tell him to give the money back.''

  Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, the debate over campaign finance reform is 
what I like to call the ``News of the Day''. The media has been on a 
feeding frenzy looking for angles to show that this issue had divided 
members of Congress. That it had divided the members of the same party. 
There there is a cry of outrage across America as people stand by ready 
to storm the Capitol in protest.
  But despite the massive media hype, the public really doesn't care 
about the campaign finance reform issue. In the most recent ABC News/
Washington Post poll--where people were asked about the most important 
problems facing the country--campaign finance reform did not even 
appear as one of the top 10 items on the list. In fact, it didn't 
appear at all. The same stands true for the latest CBS News poll, the 
latest CNN/Gallup Poll, and even last month's L-A Times poll. After 
extensive research of all the major polls, campaign finance has not 
showed up as a concern among American at all.
  What is important to the American people are issues like crime, the 
economy, health care, education, social security, and the moral decline 
of the country. What people really care about is whether their children 
will get safely back and forth from school--and whether they'll get a 
good education in the public schools. They care about keeping their 
jobs and trying to make ends meet while they watch a good portion of 
their hard earned money going to Washington to support a wasteful and 
inefficient Federal Government bureaucracy. They care about their 
future--whether they can save enough money to retire some day--and 
acquire affordable health care. These are real concerns of Americans 
today.

[[Page S10417]]

  Now let's just support for a minute that people actually did care 
about campaign finance reform. That they sat around the dinner table at 
night and said ``How was your day at the office, oh, and by the way, we 
really need more campaign finance laws.
  What Americans really need to know are the details about the campaign 
finance laws that are currently on the books. And then they need to 
know about the appalling campaign finance practices that were part of 
President Clinton's reelection effort--and how the campaign finance 
issues is being used to divert attention away from these scandals.
  And they need to know what Congress wants to do to reform the 
campaign finance laws and level the paying field so neither political 
party has an unfair advantage over another.
  They need to know what we've going to do to make all political 
contributions voluntary--so that no person--union or nonunion worker--
is forced to pony up their money for political purposes without their 
expressed permission.
  And, they need to know what we're going to do to give them complete 
and immediate access to campaign contribution records about who gave 
how much to whom.
  This prompt and full disclosure of so-called soft money campaign 
donations will make the name of the donors public, aid allow the voters 
to decide if the candidate is looking after their best interest. Under 
the McCain-Feingold plan, there would be an across-the-board ban on 
soft money for any Federal election activity.
  Let me first recognize my colleagues who have worked on this issue at 
great length and in good faith. I have nothing but the deepest respect 
for both Senators McCain and Feingold in their tenacity and diligence 
to bring this issue to the attention of the public. I agree with some 
of their points of disagree with others--and I will continue to do so 
during the course of this debate.
  As for the ban on soft money, I have several major reservations on 
how this measure would ultimately impact the current campaign finance 
system.
  Not improving it, but creating such a hardship on the country's State 
and local political parties that it would force them to concentrate on 
raising money in order to exist.
  Under the McCain-Feingold proposal to ban soft money, State and local 
party committees would be prohibited from spending soft money for any 
Federal election activity.
  Right now, State and local political parties receive so-called soft 
money from the national political parties. Here in Washington, both the 
Republican National Committee and the Democratic National Committee 
receive money from donors.
  Some of that money is then distributed to the respective political 
parties in counties and localities all over the country. There are 
thousands of State, county, and local party offices that receive this 
financial aid. Then--under certain conditions--the money is used for 
activities such as purchasing buttons, bumper stickers, posters, and 
yard signs on behalf of a candidate. The money is also used for voter 
registration activities on behalf of the party's Presidential and Vice 
Presidential nominees. The money is also used for multicandidate 
brochures and even sample ballots.
  Let's say it's election day. You go down to your local polling site--
whether it's a school, a church or the American Legion hall. Sometimes 
there's a person there who will hand you what's called a sample 
ballot--listing all the candidates running for office who are in your 
party. Like most voters, you are more likely to choose the candidates 
of your party.
  But under the McCain-Feingold proposal, it will be against the law to 
use soft money to pay for a sample ballot with the name of any 
candidate who's running for Congress on the same sample ballot with 
State and local candidates of the same party.
  Under McCain-Feingold, it will be against the law to use soft money 
to pay for buttons, posters, yard signs, or brochures that include the 
name or picture of a candidate for Federal office on the same item that 
has the name or picture of State and local candidates.
  Under McCain-Feingold, it will be against the law to use soft money 
to conduct a local voter registration drive 120-days before a Federal 
election.
  Because of these new laws in the McCain-Feingold plan, State and 
local party officials will have to use hard money instead of soft money 
for these activities.
  Let's look at the reality of this situation. Because of these new 
restrictions, local party officials--say like the Republican Party 
chairman in Caldwell, ID--will be forced to seek out hard money 
donations from local businesses and individuals to fund these political 
activities.
  In a town of just 2,000 people, this party official--who is a 
volunteer--now has to spend more of his or her time fundraising, not to 
mention the fact that those with more money stand a better chance of 
winning an election. Party affiliation will become insignificant. In 
other words, raising hard money will become a bigger concern for these 
State and local officials than ever before. And, whomever raises the 
most money can then fund more political activities.
  Mr. President, what kind of campaign finance reform is this? We have 
just added more laws to a system that's already heavily regulated, 
increased the burden on thousands of State and local party officials 
forcing them to go out and raise money, and created more confusion for 
the voters. If the point of the McCain-Feingold plan is to reform the 
campaign finance system, the last thing you want to do is ban soft 
money.
  Instead, full and immediate public disclosure of campaign donations 
would be a much more logical approach. With the help of the latest 
technology, we could post this information on the Internet within 24 
hours. Let's open up the records for everyone to see.
  Anyone interested in researching the integrity of a campaign, or in 
finding out the identity of the donors, or in looking for signs of 
undue influence or corruption would only have to have access to a 
computer. They could track a campaign--dollar for dollar--to see first 
hand where the money is coming from.
  But Mr. President, what bothers me the most about the McCain-Feingold 
proposal is not what's in the bill, but what has been left out. it is, 
what the majority leader called the other day, ``the great scandal in 
American politics * * * and worst campaign abuse of all.'' That is the 
forced collection and expenditure of union dues for political purposes.
  Mr. President, this is nothing short of extortion.
  Let me make myself clear, I fully support the right of unions and 
union workers to participate in the political process. they should be 
encouraged to become involved and active in the electoral process. it's 
not only their right but their civic responsibility.
  Back in my home State of Idaho, I meet with union workers in union 
halls, on the streets, and in their homes. And I hear their complaints, 
their anger and their outrage over how their dues are being spent and 
mishandled by national union officers.
  They say to me ``Senator Craig (Larry), every month I am forced to 
pay dues that are used for political purposes I don't agree with. But 
what can I do? If I speak out, they'll call me a troublemaker * * *''
  During the 1996 elections alone, union bosses tacked on an extra 
surcharge on dues to their members in order to raise $35 million to 
defeat Republican candidates around the country. It's likely they used 
much more of the worker's money than they reported, but I'm sure we'll 
never find out the truth.
  But under the Paycheck Protection Act, offered by Senators Lott and 
Nickles, union workers will have new and expanded rights and the final 
say on how their money is being spent. The legislation not only 
protects the rights of union workers, but also makes it clear that 
corporations adhere to the same measure.
  Unions and corporations would have to get the permission in writing 
from each employee prior to using any portion of dues or fees to 
support political activities. And, workers will have the right to 
revoke their authorization at any time.
  Finally, employees would be guaranteed the protection that if their 
money was used for purposes against their will, it would be a violation 
of federal

[[Page S10418]]

campaign law. Mr. President, this is commonsense legislation and it's 
the right thing to do.
  Mr. FORD. Mr. President, once again, I rise to discuss an issue that 
in the recent past has generated lots of talk and not much action--
campaign finance reform. But thanks to the hard work of my colleagues--
on both sides of the aisle--we may finally be on the brink of actually 
doing something to address the many problems we have with our system 
for financing election campaigns.
  Thanks to the tireless efforts of our colleagues, Senators McCain and 
Feingold, we now know that the question is not whether a bill will come 
to the floor, but whether we will pass the bill that they have brought 
us. Keeping that in mind, I want to speak a bit today on why I will 
support the measure currently before us.
  As an original cosponsor of McCain-Feingold, I agree that what is 
necessary is a comprehensive overhaul of the way we conduct our 
campaign business. If we have learned anything from our experiences in 
the last few elections, it is that money has become too important in 
our campaigns. Mr. President, in the last election Federal candidates 
and their allies spent over $2 billion--$2 billion--in support of their 
campaigns. The McCain-Feingold bill currently before us, I believe, is 
the sort of sweeping reform that we must pass if we are to restore 
public trust and return a measure of sanity to the way we finance 
elections.
  Now each of us has his or her own perspective on what's wrong with 
the system. For me, Mr. President, it's the explosive cost of 
campaigning. When I announced in March that I would not seek 
reelection, I said: Democracy as we know it will be lost if we continue 
to allow Government to become one bought by the highest bidder, for the 
highest bidder. Candidates will simply become bit players and pawns in 
a campaign managed and manipulated by paid consultants and hired guns. 
The problem becomes clearer when you look at specifics. In my case, 
when I first was elected to the Senate, I spent less than $450,000--
actually, $437,482--on my campaign. Back them, I thought that was a lot 
of money. If only I'd known. Mr. President, if I hadn't decided to 
retire, for next year's election I would have had to raise $4.5 
million. Now, I know all about inflation but that's not inflation--
that's madness. What's worse, I understand that if we continue on this 
path, by the year 2025 it will cost $145 million to run for a single 
Senate seat. Can any of us imagine what our country will look like when 
the only people who can afford public service are people who have--or 
can raise--tens of millions of dollars for their campaigns? I can't 
imagine such a future, Mr. President--and the time is now to make sure 
things never get that bad. McCain-Feingold won't cure everything that 
ails the current system, but I support it because it represents a real, 
meaningful first step toward restoring a sense of balance in our 
campaigns by ensuring that people and ideas--not money--are what 
matters. Specifically, I support McCain-Feingold because it deals with 
a series of disturbing issues that have grown in importance in recent 
years.
  I also agree that a primary problem with the current system is the 
flood of soft money. But when I speak of soft money, Mr. President, I 
want to make it clear that we are talking about more than just the 
fundraising of the national parties. True--in 1996, the parties raised 
over a quarter billion dollars in soft money, which they then used in 
various ways to support their candidates at every level of the ballot. 
That's a lot of money, but it's only a small part of the total so-
called soft money picture. That's because soft money, is any money that 
is not regulated by the Federal Election Campaign Act. That includes 
national party money, of course, but it also includes the millions of 
dollars raised and spent by corporations, unions, interest groups, and 
tax-exempt organizations. Our recent experience shows that these 
organizations are established, operated, and financed by parties and 
candidates themselves--and their finances are totally unregulated. 
Therefore, McCain-Feingold is meaningful reform because it recognizes 
that the problem is not just soft money, it is unregulated money.

  The McCain-Feingold bill currently before us is also valuable because 
it recognizes that closing the party soft money loophole is not enough. 
The bill also addresses the problem of so-called issue advoacy 
advertising. These so-called issue ads have developed as a new--and 
sometimes devious--way that unregulated money is used to affect 
elections. Lawyers might call it issue advocacy, but I'm not a lawyer 
so I call it what it really is, handoff funding. Handoff funding is 
where a candidate hands off spending, usually on hardhitting negative 
ads, to a supposedly neutral third party whose finances are completely 
unregulated and not disclosed. Now I know there are those who call 
these ads free speech. But this isn't free speech, it's paid speech. Of 
course we need to respect the Constitution, but we can't let people 
hide behind the Constitution for their own personal or partisan gain. 
McCain-Feingold draws this paid speech into the light where not the 
lawyers but the jury--the American people--can decide which issues and 
which candidates they will support.
  Mr. President, I want to respond just a moment to the claim of many 
of my Republican colleagues that McCain-Feingold's issue advocacy 
reform somehow limits free speech. That simply is not true. When this 
bill passes, not one ad that ran in the last election--not one, not 
even the worst attack ad--will be illegal. What McCain-Feingold would 
do is say to those candidates and groups who have been using handoff 
funding to puff themselves up or tear down their opponents--all the 
while claiming that they were simply, quote, advocating issues--is that 
within 60 days of the election they must take credit for their work, 
dirty or otherwise. The only people whose speech will be prevented by 
this law are people who are afraid to step into the light and be seen 
for who they are. That, Mr. President, is what I call reform--and I 
think the American people would agree.
  Another critical issue addressed in McCain-Feingold--and this is one 
area, I think, where we all are in nearly unanimous agreement--is the 
question of disclosure. Currently there is too much campaign activity--
contributions and spending--that is not disclosed to the public on a 
regular, timely basis. We must commit ourselves, as does McCain-
Feingold, to providing the American people with timely and full 
disclosure to information about political spending, and the means by 
which they can access that information. Like many colleagues, I believe 
that the Internet and electronic filing is the way to make this happen; 
but I hope we will make it clear that all campaign finances--including 
third-party issue advocacy--are to be disclosed before we get too 
worried about how such disclosure would take place.

  Mr. President, all these reforms will be meaningless unless we are 
willing to do right by the Federal Election Commission. If the FEC 
really is the toothless tiger that many people say it is, we must take 
at least some of the blame for removing its teeth. Any bill that makes 
changes to the campaign finance laws without restoring the FEC's 
funding and improving its ability to publicize, investigate, and punish 
violations cannot truly claim the title of reform.
  In conclusion, Mr. President, I know that we will not have an easy 
road to passage of campaign finance reform legislation. In this body 
there are a number of colleagues who are opposed to reform and aren't 
afraid to speak their minds about the quote, danger, of reform. Mr. 
President, I can't blame them. If I had the advantage of millions of 
dollars from wealthy folks and millions more from corporations and 
special interests, I would think reform was dangerous, too, and I would 
have to think twice before supporting a bill that took away that 
advantage. Their opposition--whether in the public interest or their 
self-interest--means that the debate on this issue will get more than a 
few of us into a real lather. I'll take that challenge, Mr. president. 
Just because campaign finance reform will be difficult, and might 
require each party to give up things it cares about or simply has 
gotten used to, is no reason not to pass McCain-Feingold, and soon.
  All we need to do is to rollup our sleeves and remember the wisdom of 
that great Kentuckian Henry Clay, who called compromise ``mutual 
sacrifice.'' Our way is clear, if not easy,

[[Page S10419]]

but I have confidence that we will do what is right to restore public 
confidence in the way we fund our campaigns. I look forward to the 
continuing debate, and to demonstrate to the American people that we 
are serious about cleaning up the system by voting for comprehensive 
campaign finance reform.
  Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, I rise today to speak on the issue of 
campaign finance reform; an issue which has been before the Senate in 
recent days.
  Like many members of this Chamber, I count myself on the side of 
those favoring reform. The question is: what type of reform will have 
the most positive impact on our electoral system.
  As this debate has evolved, I have spent considerable time 
identifying priorities. I have divided these priorities into two 
separate categories. The first category is comprised of those standards 
or tests that any reform legislation must meet in order to receive my 
support. The second category constitutes a set of objectives which I 
believe should, as opposed to must, be included in any reform 
legislation.
  Let me begin by listing the standards or tests that I believe must be 
met by any reform legislation.
  First, we must act in a manner that is consistent with the first 
amendment of the Constitution of the United States. Mr. President I 
will not support a campaign finance reform bill that establishes any 
kind of prior restraint on political speech or empowers any federal 
bureaucracy to constrain first amendment rights. That is why earlier 
this year I opposed the constitutional amendment presented to the 
Senate which would have allowed Congress and its agents, including the 
Federal Election Commission, to place constraints on first amendment 
rights.
  Mr. President, The first amendment to the Constitution and its 
guarantees of political speech are fundamental. We must not allow any 
Federal legislation to circumvent them, or attempt to circumvent them.
  My second priority with respect to campaign finance legislation is 
that it must not impede or intrude on the prerogatives of the States 
and local units of government with respect to how they conduct 
political campaigns. To that end, Mr. President, I will scrutinize any 
legislative proposal very carefully to determine not only whether it 
explicitly encroaches on State and/or local election law, but also 
whether it sets in motion a process which ultimately could require such 
intrusion in the future.
  Any campaign finance reform legislation must also, in my judgement, 
maintain a proper balance between the first amendment rights of the 
actual candidates and the political parties they represent and the 
rights of those who are not directly in the arena. Mr. President, I 
have watched with interest in recent years as special interest groups 
and others who exist to promote particular issue positions and 
ideologies have become increasingly active in the electoral process. 
Through so-called advocacy advertising and independent expenditures 
these groups have become dominant in many Federal elections. And, as 
they have grown in dominance, they have diminished the roles of the 
candidates and political parties.
  Of course, our first amendment permits this. It is perfectly 
appropriate for anyone, either individually or in collaboration with 
others, to advocate their views on issues and campaigns. Moreover, the 
Supreme Court has ruled that if this is done independently of Federal 
candidates and the political parties, such individuals or groups may 
spend vast amounts of resources--well beyond donation limits permitted 
under Federal law--in furtherance of their causes and candidates.
  What this has led to, of course, is an environment in which political 
campaigns are now increasingly a function of the efforts of special 
interests groups, rather than of the candidates and political parties. 
Accordingly, we must be very careful, as we enact any campaign 
financing reforms, to make certain that we do not totally tilt the 
balance away from the candidates and parties. Otherwise, Mr. President 
we will end up with a system in which the candidates themselves are 
more bystanders than participants and in which the various interest 
groups on all sides of all the issues are doing all of the talking. In 
my judgement, this would completely undermine the concept of 
representative democracy and I will not support legislation that 
enhances the prospects of such an environment.
  In addition to these requirements, any campaign reform legislation we 
pass must be balanced. It can not be one-sided in favor of any 
particular political party or cause. Frankly, Mr. President, one of our 
parties likes the bill before us too much for my taste. I don't blame 
them, but it clearly focuses more on constraining sources which fund 
Republicans than Democrats.
  To their credit, I think the sponsors of the legislation have 
endeavored to move in a more balanced direction. That's why the 
legislation before us has been modified from its original version. But 
in my judgment it isn't there yet.
  Finally Mr. President, to have my support, any new campaign finance 
legislation must address what I find in my State to be the most 
disturbing aspect of the way American Federal elections are funded: 
namely, the increasing extent to which the campaigns of candidates for 
the House and Senate are financially supported by people who are not 
even constituents of the candidates themselves.
  When I travel around my State and conduct town meetings, and the 
issue of campaign finance reform is raised, I ask people what disturbs 
them the most. Almost every time I hear the same answer--that 
individuals, political action committees, and special interest groups 
who don't even live in Michigan are bank-rolling the campaigns of 
Michigan's Members of Congress.
  Mr. President, I have not conducted a thorough study of this issue 
but I do know that a large percentage of the money flowing into almost 
every campaign comes from individuals who are not the constituents of 
our elected officials. In fact, in many instances, Members of the House 
and Senate actually receive a majority of their campaign funds from 
people they don't even represent.
  In my view this, more than anything else, is what has undermined 
public confidence in our system. Sure, people are upset because of 
large personal or corporate or labor contributions to the national 
parties. But I think what galls them even more is the fact that their 
own representatives in Washington are being financed by people from 
other States or even other countries. Thus, to have my support, a 
campaign finance reform bill must seek to address this glaring problem.
  Obviously, the first amendment places certain constraints on how this 
can be accomplished. In fact, some argue that requiring a certain 
percentage of funds to come from the candidate's State would not meet a 
constitutional test. I think that's actually a close call and that such 
a reform would be constitutional. By the same token, though, I believe 
we can achieve the same general objective, and not raise a 
constitutional challenge, by simply adjusting the donor limits, based 
on whether or not the donors are contributing to someone who represents 
them.
  Whether this is accomplished by increasing the personal contribution 
limit for constituents, decreasing the limits for non-constituents, or 
a combination of both is a question we can look into. But I think such 
a change would move us in the right direction. It would mean that more 
time would be spent raising money from constituents, and it would mean 
that the people we represent would produce a far greater percentage of 
the resources involved in our campaigns. These results would greatly 
increase our constituents' confidence that we are here to serve them.
  These, then, are the five tests or standards by which I will measure 
any election reform effort. For my vote, any piece of legislation must 
meet all of these tests. Also, I would note Mr. President, that I have 
separately introduced a campaign reform bill which I believe 
accomplishes these objectives. At the same time, there are several 
other issues which I think should be addressed in a campaign finance 
reform bill. While not indispensable to the legislation from the 
standpoint of my support, I consider them to be very important matters 
that must be focused on either at this time or in some future context.

[[Page S10420]]

  First, I believe we must put an end to any explicit or implicit 
involvement of foreign money in political campaigns. As the Thompson 
hearings have gone forward, and the investigations of the financing of 
the 1996 campaign reported, I have been increasingly disturbed at the 
prospect that a foreign government would endeavor to influence American 
foreign policy through campaign donations. We need real teeth in our 
federal statutes to prevent this from ever happening.
  In addition, a campaign finance reform bill should include fuller 
disclosure than that which is presently required. I believe campaigns 
which reach a certain level of activity ought to be reporting, on-line, 
their contributions in a much more timely fashion. I also believe that 
independent committees should be required to make the same type of 
total disclosure. The increasing role that advocacy advertising and 
independent expenditures are playing in our campaigns demand that the 
funding sources for such activities be disclosed and made available as 
part of the campaign debate.
  Third, I believe there should be more democracy with respect to the 
activities of political action committees. Whether it's labor PAC's, 
trade association PAC's, issue advocacy PAC's or corporate PAC's, the 
leaders of our political action committees too often act in a fashion 
inconsistent with the wishes of the very people whose money they are 
spending. I think this is wrong. I think our campaign finance reform 
bill should create a mechanism by which donors to PAC's are able to 
easily indicate at least the political parties, if not the specific 
candidates, they want their fund to benefit. Such a reform in my view 
would much more effectively justify the existence of political 
committees in the future.
  Finally, with respect to my list of things that should be included in 
a campaign finance reform bill is the subject of fundraising in 
government buildings. Evidently, the question of what can and can not 
be done within Federal buildings and on Federal property is in need of 
clarification. I suggest that we eliminate any uncertainty that might 
currently exist and expressly prohibit such practices once again.
  Mr. President, this then constitutes the context in which I believe 
campaign finance reform must be addressed. As we move forward with 
amendments and develop a bill, I will be monitoring our progress to 
determine whether the priorities I've established here today are 
satisfactorily addressed. Legislation which does so will receive my 
backing. Legislation which fails to accomplish these objectives will 
not.
  In closing, Mr. President, I would also make several additional 
points. Contrary to the innuendoes contained in much of the media 
coverage of campaign financing I believe the Members of this body 
conduct their official business in a fully honorable and respectable 
fashion. While the way we finance elections sometimes gives rise to the 
appearance of impropriety, the truth is that the Members of the Senate 
are motivated by and act on the basis of long established personal 
philosophies and not campaign donations.
  I would say without question that the proponents of the legislation 
before us are fine examples of people whose integrity is unquestioned. 
If tomorrow Senator McCain found himself with Senator Feingold's 
contributors and vice-versa, I do not believe either would cast one 
vote or take one action differently than is their current pattern, and 
I feel that way about the other Members of this body as well.
  Mr. President, I think it is important that we say these things and 
that we not allow the innuendos and criticisms to go totally 
uncontested.
  At the same time, though, as we struggle to find consensus 
legislation, I think all of us have an obligation to take personal 
action--regardless of what the election financing laws might be at a 
particular point in time--to reassure our constituents that we are 
acting in an appropriate fashion.
  Frankly, Mr. President, I'm tired of hearing political figures on the 
one hand condemn the way we finance elections and then on the other 
hand engage in all of the conduct they purportedly abhor, based on the 
rationale that they will not unilaterally disarm themselves.
  Instead of exclusively focusing our energies on passing legislation 
in an effort to, in theory, save us from ourselves, I think each of us 
should undertake those actions we determine to be most appropriate to 
address the perception problems which exist regarding campaigns. I 
think we should set these examples regardless of what the campaign 
finance laws might permit.
  If we think it's wrong to receive a disproportionate amount of our 
campaign contributions from out of our States, then we should stop 
taking a disproportionate amount of contributions from out of our 
States. Similarly, if we think independent committees operating on our 
behalf or in support of our efforts are acting in an inappropriate 
fashion, we should say so clearly, publicly and definitively.
  Instead of simply debating campaign finance reform while conducting 
business as usual, I think every Member of this Chamber who feels 
strongly about these issues should take some action, independent of 
anything that might happen legislatively, to make the system better. I 
intend to do so, Mr. President, regardless of what the outcome might be 
of these campaign finance reform efforts. If that means I am 
disadvantaged in my campaign should I decide to seek re-election, so be 
it. In fact, Mr. President, during my campaign in 1994 I unilaterally 
acted to limit the flow of PAC and out-of-state dollars to my 
candidacy.
  Instead of simply waiting around for Congress to act, I will move 
ahead on my own. I hope other Members will do the same and that we 
might lead by example.
  Mr. LOTT addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.

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