[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 134 (Wednesday, October 1, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10268-S10269]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                       THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN

  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I come before the Senate this afternoon 
to talk briefly about the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty submitted to 
the Senate by President Clinton last week. This treaty represents 
another useful and important step toward reducing the spread of nuclear 
weapons. I stand ready to do all that I can to ensure that the Senate 
considers the CTBT in a timely manner and votes to allow the United 
States to join 145 other signatories of this treaty to put an end to 
nuclear testing.
  It was on July 16, 1945, at a site called Trinity in the desert near 
Alamogordo, NM, that the United States conducted the first test of an 
atomic bomb. In a fraction of a second, the detonation not only 
released over the isolated test site an amount of energy equivalent to 
what we consume in the entire United States in 30 seconds--it also 
changed the world. The nuclear age had loudly begun. For decades to 
come, humanity would be forced to grapple with the consequences borne 
out of what occurred at Trinity.
  Much has happened since that first test in the New Mexico desert.
  The United States was quickly joined in the nuclear club by Russia 
and several others. We saw the onset of the cold war and an arms race 
between the United States and the Soviet Union. As each country strove 
to keep pace with the other, the United States and Russia engaged in a 
buildup of thousands of nuclear weapons with a destructive power 
unprecedented in human history.
  The United States would go on to conduct more than 1,000 additional 
nuclear tests; and the Russians more than 700. Several other countries 
would carry out a total of roughly 300 tests of nuclear weapons.
  The Russians would test the largest weapon ever designed by mankind--
a monstrous device that, in a split second, produced enough energy to 
power the entire United States for a whole day. At the height of the 
cold war, the United States and the Russians had deployed between them 
roughly 60,000 nuclear weapons.
  Taken together, these frightening developments would make a four 
decade old comment by the preeminent scientist of the 20th century, 
Albert Einstein, even more poignant. Einstein played a large role in 
the conceptual development of the atom bomb. Moreover, in 1939, in a 
letter he sent to President Roosevelt, Einstein urged the President to 
begin a nuclear weapons program immediately. Later in life, after 
observing the early stages of the arms buildup and the development of 
ever more destructive weapons, Einstein commented, ``I made one great 
mistake in my life, when I signed the letter to President Roosevelt 
recommending that atom bombs be made.''
  Fortunately, the outlook has improved markedly since the darkest days 
of the cold war. The United States and Russia have cooperated 
repeatedly during the past several years to reduce the nuclear threat. 
Each country has ratified the START I Treaty.
  Following President Clinton's lead, the Senate ratified the START II 
Treaty, and we hope the Russians will follow suit by year's end. If 
START II is implemented, each side will reduce its strategic arsenal 
down to about 3,500 deployed weapons. In addition, once START II enters 
into force, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin pledged to immediately begin 
negotiations on START III. Under the terms of the Helsinki agreement, 
START III would establish ceilings of as low as 2,000 strategic 
weapons.
  While much has been done to reduce the threat posed by nuclear 
weapons, much remains to be done. And, President Clinton's submission 
of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty represents a useful step in the 
right direction.
  The CTBT prohibits any test involving a nuclear explosion, regardless 
of the test's purpose, size, or location. On behalf of the United 
States, the President was the first to sign this treaty last September. 
He would subsequently be joined by representatives from more than 140 
other nations.
  We will soon hear from the usual critics of arms control, voicing 
objections to the treaty that are as predictable as they are likely. 
They will say the CTBT is unverifiable. They will say that it will lead 
to the inevitable erosion of our nuclear weapons capability. And, they 
will be wrong on both counts. Although we will have plenty of time to 
thoroughly address their objections in the days ahead, I will briefly 
address each of those criticisms.
  As to the verifiability of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, this is 
a

[[Page S10269]]

familiar refrain uttered by those who oppose arms control agreements in 
any form. The treaty's verification regime includes a comprehensive 
international monitoring system composed of hundreds of seismological, 
radionuclide, hydroacoustic, and infrasound sensors spread out all over 
the globe. This network is backed up by the ability of Members to 
conduct onsite inspections of questionable activities. This combination 
should be more than sufficient to deter would-be cheaters and, if 
deterrence fails, catch those who try to violate the treaty's 
restrictions.
  As to the concern that CTBT will erode our nuclear capability, I have 
4.5 billion reasons why that will not be the case this year and tens of 
billions more reasons in subsequent years. Last week, the 
administration reached an important agreement with our weapons 
development labs. These labs are staffed by the world's foremost 
nuclear weapons experts. The labs stated that if they are provided with 
$4.5 billion this year and similar amounts in each subsequent year, 
they will be able to conduct a program that will ensure with a high 
level of confidence the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons 
in our stockpile. In short, the cessation of nuclear testing need not 
erode our nuclear capability.
  The CTBT is an important step down the path toward a safer world. In 
simple terms, the United States, the country with one of the largest 
and certainly the most sophisticated nuclear weapons arsenals in the 
world, has the most to gain from freezing the competition in place. 
Countries already possessing nuclear weapons will have a difficult time 
making qualitative and quantitative improvements to their existing 
arsenals. And as for countries without nuclear weapons, the CTBT will 
place an additional hurdle in their path if they seek to develop and 
deploy such weapons.
  I do not believe we can rest with the submission, and, hopefully, 
ratification of this treaty.
  Many more challenges face us if we are to reduce to acceptable levels 
the threat posed by nuclear weapons. For example, despite the fact that 
the cold war ended years ago, the United States and Russia still 
maintain at least 3,000 strategic nuclear warheads poised and ready to 
launch at a moment's notice. As noted by former Senator Sam Nunn, one 
of the most distinguished and insightful defense experts to ever serve 
in this Chamber, while this practice may have been necessary in the 
cold war, ``today it represents a dangerous anachronism.'' Moreover, 
tens of tons of nuclear materials and thousands of nuclear weapons 
remain outside international controls.
  Tens of thousands of highly trained employees of the Russian nuclear 
complex, each armed with the ability to design and build nuclear 
weapons, go unpaid for months at a time. Future security measures must 
be designed to speak to these concerns as well.
  While I will be doing all I can to ensure smooth ratification of the 
CTBT in the Senate, I will also be attempting to help design measures 
that speak to these other security problems. Outside experts such as 
former Senator Nunn, General Lee Butler, the last Commander in Chief of 
the now-disbanded Strategic Air Command, and Dr. Bruce Blair, a 
thoughtful arms control expert at the Brookings Institution, have all 
raised these same concerns and begun to design solutions. It is an 
important opportunity for the Senate, the Pentagon, and the country to 
begin to consider them.
  At Helsinki, the administration acknowledged its awareness of these 
problems and indicated a commitment to resolve them. Unfortunately, the 
administration appears to have put the detailed discussion of many of 
these measures on hold until START II enters force and the START III 
negotiations begin. I hope the administration would begin exploring 
these steps today. The only real linkage between START and these other 
measures is that they both can enhance our security. There is no reason 
why United States action in one arena should be held in abeyance until 
the Russians act in another.
  In summary, Mr. President, I look forward to working with the 
administration and the other supporters of the CTBT in this body to 
ensure that the merits of this treaty are fully aired. If that happens, 
I am confident the CTBT will be ratified, and another step will be 
taken toward turning back the clock that unfortunately began ticking 52 
years ago at a place called Trinity.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wyoming.
  Mr. THOMAS. Are we in morning business?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.

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