[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 134 (Wednesday, October 1, 1997)]
[House]
[Pages H8269-H8271]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
MANPRINT FOR THE U.S. ARMY
(Mr. SKELTON asked and was given permission to address the House for
1 minute.)
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, today, it is my pleasure to share with my
colleagues a good news story, one about our Nation's military and, in
particular, our Army. It involves a materiel acquisition program first
developed in the 1980's for Army soldiers. It is called MANPRINT, which
stands for manpower and personnel integration.
The MANPRINT program objective is to improve the performance of Army
weapons and equipment through a man-machine total systems approach.
That is, MANPRINT focuses on the interrelationship of the soldier and
his or her weapon or equipment and the human requirements for
maximizing system performance. In a nutshell, it does not make any
difference if there is a tank that is capable of firing 10 rounds per
minute if its crew can only operate it at three rounds per minute.
Regardless of its technical capabilities, the tank is a three-round-
per-minute tank due to the human factors that limit its output. This is
the kind of problem MANPRINT addresses.
MANPRINT is an umbrella term that refers to seven disciplines that
are critical to optimizing the man-machine, total-system approach. They
are manpower, personnel, training, human factors engineering, system
safety, health hazards, and soldier survivability. The central idea is
to integrate considerations of these domains continuously into the
acquisition process.
Thanks to MANPRINT the Army now has a vastly increased confidence
that its new systems will perform as expected in the hands of its
soldiers-and, at the same time, save lives and dollars. As I will
explain later, MANPRINT has, in fact, already saved hundreds of
soldiers' lives and billions of dollars. It has returned thousands of
percent on a trickle of investment dollars. It is, or should be, a
governmental downsizer's dream come true. Moreover, in this day of
increased reliance on technology, we are only beginning to explore the
ramifications the Army's concept could have for our entire society.
There is an element of urgency associated with this Army program,
however, and the very real danger that we could repeat mistakes of the
past--the type where U.S. inventors or progressive thinkers create
great ideas which we fail to appreciate and implement. Instead, other
countries capitalize on them. You will recall the Dr. W. Edward
Deming's ideas on quality were ignored in this country in the 1950's
and then successfully adopted by the Japanese. We may be on the verge
of committing such a mistake with the Army's MANPRINT program. The Army
resources devoted to MANPRINT have been continually slashed during the
drawdown. At the same time, the United Kingdom has picked up on the
U.S. Army's idea and is already in the process of implementing it
throughout all services in the royal force. Moreover, as the Japanese
recognized, Deming's quality ideas applied to all technology, not just
defense. Not surprisingly, the British are starting MANPRINT programs
in the Departments of Trade and Industry as well.
In order to reduce the likelihood of our making the same error with
MANPRINT as we did with Deming's quality management, I want to make
sure my colleagues are familiar with this highly successful soldier-
oriented concept for the design, development, manufacturing, and
fielding of the Army's newest weapon's systems.
army acquisition programs led to adoption of manprint
I am sure that many of you recall the manpower and readiness problems
that plagued the Army force modernization program in the early 1980's.
It seemed that whenever a new system was put into the hands of the
soldier, actual field performance often failed to match the standards
predicted during its development. The Stinger anti-aircraft missile,
for example, was designed to hit incoming aircraft better than 6
percent of the time. But if it had been placed in service as originally
designed, it would actually have achieved hits only 30 percent of the
time when operated by soldiers in combat units. The Stinger's problems
were eventually corrected. But the problems of soldier utilization were
so great in the Division Air Defense Gun, known as the DIVAD or
Sergeant York, that the program had to be canceled. In the case of the
Dragon anti-tank missile, that soldier's nightmare is still in the
Army's inventory.
In addition to unacceptable performance from new systems, the Army
experienced problems in crew performance. When the Army replaced an
existing system with a newer, more technologically complex system, the
newer system often generated requirements for soldiers of a higher
level of skill and for more soldiers per system. The Army personnel
system simply could not provide enough soldiers of the caliber required
to operate and maintain such sophisticated systems.
The Army's first study on what to do about the disappointing
performance and unaffordable manpower costs of new weapons systems and
equipment was conducted by retired Generals Walter T. Kerwin and George
S. Blanchard in 1980. In examining the Army's concerns about the
mobilization, readiness and sustainability of new systems, the report
concluded that it was primarily a lack of consideration of the human in
the system that was causing the problem. Human performance assessments
either were not done or were too late to influence weapons design.
Supporting the Kerwin and Blanchard findings, the General Accounting
Office [GAO] published reports in 1981 and 1985 attributing 50 percent
of equipment failures to human error. GAO, too, stressed the need for
integrating into the acquisition process human disciplines, such as, in
particular, manpower, personnel and training needs.
The recommendations for a new soldier-oriented approach to systems
acquisition were taken very seriously in the mid-1980's. With the full
support of the entire Army leadership, military and civilian, Gen.
Maxwell Thurman, as the Vice Chief of Staff, directed that an entirely
new approach to systems acquisition be adopted by the Army, one which
required that systems fit the soldiers rather than that the soldier--
through selection or training--fit the systems.
This new concept also affected industry because, as we all know,
defense contractors actually design and develop Army systems. In the
mid-eighties, the concept required a radical change in the way
contractors did business. To successfully compete in the new Army
acquisition process, industry had to focus on the human element and
design systems that fit soldier's needs and capabilities. In the
MANPRINT process, human parameters are specified in the same manner as
any other component of the system. System performance is measured with
the humans quantitative performance included as an inherent part of the
total system performance. No longer could performance in the laboratory
be extrapolated as satisfying the requirements of performance in the
field.
The MANPRINT philosophy and examples of the array of concepts
inherent in MANPRINT are documented in a book, ``MANPRINT: An Approach
to Systems Integration'' (Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1990), edited by Dr.
Harold R. Booher, who was the first senior Army civilian official
appointed to direct the Army's MANPRINT program.
comanche and manprint
Nowhere has the new soldier-oriented partnership between Government
and industry been more visible than on the Army's Light Helicopter
Experimental [LHX] program. Better known to us today as the Comanche,
the LHX in 1986 was the Army's true experimental program, testing where
it was possible to introduce cutting-edge technology into its inventory
without running headlong into the problems of unsatisfactory
performance and runaway personnel costs. Even opponents of Comanche
cannot ignore the great advances achieved in this program beyond the
standard of normal acquisition practices.
Perhaps the first indication that MANPRINT was not only viable but
could revolutionize the military's procurement process was the
successful development of the Comanche's T-800 engine. The MANPRINT
approach fostered hundreds of design improvements affecting both
maintenance and reliability. In one
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striking example, the tool kit for the organization mechanic was
reduced from 134 tools to only 6. The trunk-sized caster tool kit used
on other helicopters was reduced to a canvass pouch half the size of a
rolled-up newspaper. Furthermore, this reduction cost Government and
industry nothing and will save taxpayer dollars.
For the Comanche itself, MANPRINT resulted in more than 500 design
improvements in system performance and logistics. The cockpit was
designed outward, from the pilot seat, using simulations and modeling,
lessons learned from previous aircraft programs, and user inputs. In
addition, when fielded, the Comanche would allow the aircrew to select
what information is needed during missions. The result is an
anticipated system with a much improved pilot-crew workload. A typical
performance benefit is illustrated in the reduced number of steps it
takes for the pilot to acquire a target. The OH-58D Kiowa Warrior
required 34; the Comanche, 5.
Incorporation of MANPRINT considerations during Comanche development
also introduced entirely new concepts to the acquisition process. The
source selection competition included MANPRINT in all evaluation areas.
It became impossible for a company to win the contract without a plan
to integrate MANPRINT in the design, development, and manufacture of
Comanche. In addition, seasoned maintenance personnel and other
soldiers with field experience in operational units were assigned to
the contractor's plant as representatives of the users in the operating
commands. These soldiers were invaluable in fitting the machine to the
operator. For example, they completed a rotor design change in 30 days
that would otherwise have taken 12 months to achieve contractor-
Government approval.
MANPRINT was also responsible for technological advances. To provide
for easy maintenance to aircraft components, Comanche was built around
a box-like, load-bearing keel. In most helicopters, the load is carried
by the external skin. In Comanche, the load-bearing keel made it
possible to locate easy-access panels almost anywhere on the aircraft.
Consequently, maintenance personnel can easily reach all of the
internal components. In this case, a maintenance requirement drove the
technological design, which in turn resulted in an aerodynamic
improvement.
In another instance MANPRINT and transport considerations suggested
the need for an improved rotor blade removal capability. The contractor
design team already had a rotor blade design which met Government
specifications and was concerned about the added expense. Nevertheless,
because of soldier concerns, MANPRINT prevailed. A new blade was
designed at a cost of approximately $60,000. Life cycle cost
calculations have indicated that the new blade will remain easier to
manufacture and should save approximately $150 million in personnel,
maintenance, and transport costs from the original design.
From the outset soldier safety has been a major design objective.
Safety experts studied more than two decades of helicopters accident
reports to determine how the designers could make Comanche a safer
aircraft. As a result of their efforts, the Comanche's safety-related
design features are projected--when compared to other helicopters such
as the OH-58 Kiowa and AH-1F Cobra--to save 91 soldiers lives and avoid
at least 116 disabling injuries.
A 1995 report by the Analytic Sciences Corp.--Minninger, et al.--
documents the performance improvements and savings on Comanche
attributable to MANPRINT. The report found Comanche cost avoidance in
manpower, personnel, training, and safety to be a whopping $3.29
billion. This return resulted from a design investment of approximately
4 percent of the Comanche R&D budget. Calculated as a return on design
investment, MANPRINT in the Comanche program yielded over an 8,000-
percent return. Moreover, if the costs of the remaining MANPRINT
disciplines--health hazards and soldiers survivability--are included in
the calculation, the return on investment for the entire program
remains well over 4000 percent.
manprint applied to other army systems
MANPRINT is not only limited to new or major acquisition systems. It
works with systems already in the inventory as well. In 1994, McDonnell
Douglas conducted a study covering 4 years of MANPRINT design
improvements on Longbow Apache. More than 80 MANPRINT problems, issues,
and concerns were identified and resolved. Each of them yielded an
improvement either for the operator or the maintainer of the aircraft.
Once again, improved human performance proved cost effective. From a
$2.7 million investment, a return in manpower and safety costs reached
$268 million, approximately a 2,000-percent return on investment.
The Fox vehicle modification is an illustrative example of MANPRINT's
contribution to smaller, less visible acquisition programs. The Army
uses the Fox--a mobile sensing module built into an eight-wheeled
armored vehicle--as a nuclear, biological, and chemical reconnaissance
system for identifying contaminated areas. In a recent system
improvement project, the Army wanted to reduce the crew from four
soldiers to three. But operational evaluators labeled the vehicle, when
operated by three soldiers, ``unsuitable and ineffective.'' The program
appeared doomed because it was out of money and time. But MANPRINT
experts, using two different types of integration models, redesigned
the Fox and it was subsequently shown to be fully effective in its
projected missions. The MANPRINT effort cost $60,000 and was completed
in a short time; additional operational testing was avoided and the
Army saved $2 to $4 million from projected program costs while removing
on crew member requirement from each vehicle.
manprint viability today
A recent Army Audit Agency [AAA] report evaluated how the Army, after
its radical downsizing, is ``incorporating MANPRINT into weapon systems
development.'' The good news is that nine Army weapons systems were
evaluated and all but one were considered to have incorporated MANPRINT
adequately. Based on the AAA's audit assessment, the Army can expect
positive MANPRINT results in such current programs as Land Warrior,
Javelin, and Extended Range Multiple Launch Rocket System. The Command
and Control Vehicle program and several nondevelopmental programs
examined by AAA, including the Embedded Global Positioning System/
Inertial Navigation System, also include good MANPRINT initiatives.
Because of MANPRINT, the Army can have increased confidence in many of
the systems it will be fielding in the not-too-distant future.
The Army cannot rest on its laurels, however. Several developments
cloud the future of MANPRINT.
First, the AAA report noted that not all systems under development
have incorporated MANPRINT. The now-canceled Armored Gun System is an
example in the recent past of a program in which MANPRINT
considerations were purposely rejected. It is not a coincidence that
the Army canceled the program.
Second, the new DOD acquisition system may make it easier to omit
MANPRINT from programs. The new system rightly attempts to give program
managers more latitude by removing regulations that previously proved
too restrictive. But this new-found freedom in itself may make it more
difficult in the future to ensure an appropriate incorporation of
MANPRINT. It would be very unfortunate if an unintended consequence of
streamlining the acquisition process proved to be a reduced emphasis on
MANPRINT.
That need not be the case, as the AAA report points out. The new
acquisition system, if approached correctly, affords the opportunity
for greater integration of people-oriented concerns into the
acquisition process. If the ``unbound'' program managers appreciate the
value of optimizing the man-machine interface, they are free under the
new system to tailor their programs to incorporate people-oriented
considerations. Consequently, a major effort is needed to adapt
MANPRINT to the new acquisition process.
A third concern is the erosion of the MANPRINT program in recent
years as the Army has experienced the drawdown. The Army made a
commitment to understand and incorporate the features that optimize
man-machine performance in the mid-1980's but until recently has been
in danger of returning to old ways. MANPRINT personnel have been
reduced 55 percent while the active Army has come down approximately 37
percent. The AAA audit report concluded that the Army's training
process, which started out so well in 1986, is now inadequate. Career
paths no longer identify MANPRINT as important. Nor does MANPRINT
always play as prominent a role in source selection as in some
programs, such as Comanche. Finally, the technology resources devoted
to the research and development needed to advance the state of the art
for quantitative tradeoffs of manpower, personnel skills, and training
have shrunk significantly.
Fortunately, thanks to the AAA audit report, Army leadership has been
reminded that MANPRINT is a golden nugget and seems determined that it
must be revitalized. A panel of senior officers has been working for
several months to ensure that the wounds inflicted on the program by
the drawdown are not fatal and that MANPRINT recovers its health.
In closing I want to congratulate the Army for developing MANPRINT
and for continuing to support the program in a time of very scarce
resources.
I also want to suggest that the Army's approach to systems
integration is relevant to the other military departments, to the
entire Department of Defense, and probably to the remainder of the
Government. Acquisition reform seeks to advance technology while
holding down procurement costs. Downsizing seeks to ensure essential
Government functions are accomplished with a minimum of
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staff. MANPRINT can be an essential ingredient in both initiatives.
With respect to the military, it ensures that the weapons and equipment
supporting a reduced force structure will perform as expected on the
battlefield.
But the possible applications for MANPRINT go far beyond the military
in our constantly evolving technological-based society. Our regulatory
agencies like the Federal Aviation Agency, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, the Food and Drug Administration should push this concept
to the forefront with the systems and equipment they regulate. Also it
would seem our medical and educational systems could benefit from a
technological development and management process which focuses on the
end user. One may wonder what a difference it would make it these
systems were made to operate primarily for the doctor and the patient
or the teacher and the learner rather than fitting these individuals to
the system as an afterthought. We have not been in such an enviable
position to take advantage of a technological cultural change since
Deming's total quality management. Let's not miss our opportunity this
time around.
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