[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 134 (Wednesday, October 1, 1997)]
[House]
[Pages H8269-H8271]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                       MANPRINT FOR THE U.S. ARMY

  (Mr. SKELTON asked and was given permission to address the House for 
1 minute.)
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, today, it is my pleasure to share with my 
colleagues a good news story, one about our Nation's military and, in 
particular, our Army. It involves a materiel acquisition program first 
developed in the 1980's for Army soldiers. It is called MANPRINT, which 
stands for manpower and personnel integration.
  The MANPRINT program objective is to improve the performance of Army 
weapons and equipment through a man-machine total systems approach. 
That is, MANPRINT focuses on the interrelationship of the soldier and 
his or her weapon or equipment and the human requirements for 
maximizing system performance. In a nutshell, it does not make any 
difference if there is a tank that is capable of firing 10 rounds per 
minute if its crew can only operate it at three rounds per minute. 
Regardless of its technical capabilities, the tank is a three-round-
per-minute tank due to the human factors that limit its output. This is 
the kind of problem MANPRINT addresses.
  MANPRINT is an umbrella term that refers to seven disciplines that 
are critical to optimizing the man-machine, total-system approach. They 
are manpower, personnel, training, human factors engineering, system 
safety, health hazards, and soldier survivability. The central idea is 
to integrate considerations of these domains continuously into the 
acquisition process.
  Thanks to MANPRINT the Army now has a vastly increased confidence 
that its new systems will perform as expected in the hands of its 
soldiers-and, at the same time, save lives and dollars. As I will 
explain later, MANPRINT has, in fact, already saved hundreds of 
soldiers' lives and billions of dollars. It has returned thousands of 
percent on a trickle of investment dollars. It is, or should be, a 
governmental downsizer's dream come true. Moreover, in this day of 
increased reliance on technology, we are only beginning to explore the 
ramifications the Army's concept could have for our entire society.
  There is an element of urgency associated with this Army program, 
however, and the very real danger that we could repeat mistakes of the 
past--the type where U.S. inventors or progressive thinkers create 
great ideas which we fail to appreciate and implement. Instead, other 
countries capitalize on them. You will recall the Dr. W. Edward 
Deming's ideas on quality were ignored in this country in the 1950's 
and then successfully adopted by the Japanese. We may be on the verge 
of committing such a mistake with the Army's MANPRINT program. The Army 
resources devoted to MANPRINT have been continually slashed during the 
drawdown. At the same time, the United Kingdom has picked up on the 
U.S. Army's idea and is already in the process of implementing it 
throughout all services in the royal force. Moreover, as the Japanese 
recognized, Deming's quality ideas applied to all technology, not just 
defense. Not surprisingly, the British are starting MANPRINT programs 
in the Departments of Trade and Industry as well.
  In order to reduce the likelihood of our making the same error with 
MANPRINT as we did with Deming's quality management, I want to make 
sure my colleagues are familiar with this highly successful soldier-
oriented concept for the design, development, manufacturing, and 
fielding of the Army's newest weapon's systems.


         army acquisition programs led to adoption of manprint

  I am sure that many of you recall the manpower and readiness problems 
that plagued the Army force modernization program in the early 1980's. 
It seemed that whenever a new system was put into the hands of the 
soldier, actual field performance often failed to match the standards 
predicted during its development. The Stinger anti-aircraft missile, 
for example, was designed to hit incoming aircraft better than 6 
percent of the time. But if it had been placed in service as originally 
designed, it would actually have achieved hits only 30 percent of the 
time when operated by soldiers in combat units. The Stinger's problems 
were eventually corrected. But the problems of soldier utilization were 
so great in the Division Air Defense Gun, known as the DIVAD or 
Sergeant York, that the program had to be canceled. In the case of the 
Dragon anti-tank missile, that soldier's nightmare is still in the 
Army's inventory.
  In addition to unacceptable performance from new systems, the Army 
experienced problems in crew performance. When the Army replaced an 
existing system with a newer, more technologically complex system, the 
newer system often generated requirements for soldiers of a higher 
level of skill and for more soldiers per system. The Army personnel 
system simply could not provide enough soldiers of the caliber required 
to operate and maintain such sophisticated systems.
  The Army's first study on what to do about the disappointing 
performance and unaffordable manpower costs of new weapons systems and 
equipment was conducted by retired Generals Walter T. Kerwin and George 
S. Blanchard in 1980. In examining the Army's concerns about the 
mobilization, readiness and sustainability of new systems, the report 
concluded that it was primarily a lack of consideration of the human in 
the system that was causing the problem. Human performance assessments 
either were not done or were too late to influence weapons design. 
Supporting the Kerwin and Blanchard findings, the General Accounting 
Office [GAO] published reports in 1981 and 1985 attributing 50 percent 
of equipment failures to human error. GAO, too, stressed the need for 
integrating into the acquisition process human disciplines, such as, in 
particular, manpower, personnel and training needs.
  The recommendations for a new soldier-oriented approach to systems 
acquisition were taken very seriously in the mid-1980's. With the full 
support of the entire Army leadership, military and civilian, Gen. 
Maxwell Thurman, as the Vice Chief of Staff, directed that an entirely 
new approach to systems acquisition be adopted by the Army, one which 
required that systems fit the soldiers rather than that the soldier--
through selection or training--fit the systems.
  This new concept also affected industry because, as we all know, 
defense contractors actually design and develop Army systems. In the 
mid-eighties, the concept required a radical change in the way 
contractors did business. To successfully compete in the new Army 
acquisition process, industry had to focus on the human element and 
design systems that fit soldier's needs and capabilities. In the 
MANPRINT process, human parameters are specified in the same manner as 
any other component of the system. System performance is measured with 
the humans quantitative performance included as an inherent part of the 
total system performance. No longer could performance in the laboratory 
be extrapolated as satisfying the requirements of performance in the 
field.
  The MANPRINT philosophy and examples of the array of concepts 
inherent in MANPRINT are documented in a book, ``MANPRINT: An Approach 
to Systems Integration'' (Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1990), edited by Dr. 
Harold R. Booher, who was the first senior Army civilian official 
appointed to direct the Army's MANPRINT program.


                         comanche and manprint

  Nowhere has the new soldier-oriented partnership between Government 
and industry been more visible than on the Army's Light Helicopter 
Experimental [LHX] program. Better known to us today as the Comanche, 
the LHX in 1986 was the Army's true experimental program, testing where 
it was possible to introduce cutting-edge technology into its inventory 
without running headlong into the problems of unsatisfactory 
performance and runaway personnel costs. Even opponents of Comanche 
cannot ignore the great advances achieved in this program beyond the 
standard of normal acquisition practices.
  Perhaps the first indication that MANPRINT was not only viable but 
could revolutionize the military's procurement process was the 
successful development of the Comanche's T-800 engine. The MANPRINT 
approach fostered hundreds of design improvements affecting both 
maintenance and reliability. In one

[[Page H8270]]

striking example, the tool kit for the organization mechanic was 
reduced from 134 tools to only 6. The trunk-sized caster tool kit used 
on other helicopters was reduced to a canvass pouch half the size of a 
rolled-up newspaper. Furthermore, this reduction cost Government and 
industry nothing and will save taxpayer dollars.
  For the Comanche itself, MANPRINT resulted in more than 500 design 
improvements in system performance and logistics. The cockpit was 
designed outward, from the pilot seat, using simulations and modeling, 
lessons learned from previous aircraft programs, and user inputs. In 
addition, when fielded, the Comanche would allow the aircrew to select 
what information is needed during missions. The result is an 
anticipated system with a much improved pilot-crew workload. A typical 
performance benefit is illustrated in the reduced number of steps it 
takes for the pilot to acquire a target. The OH-58D Kiowa Warrior 
required 34; the Comanche, 5.
  Incorporation of MANPRINT considerations during Comanche development 
also introduced entirely new concepts to the acquisition process. The 
source selection competition included MANPRINT in all evaluation areas. 
It became impossible for a company to win the contract without a plan 
to integrate MANPRINT in the design, development, and manufacture of 
Comanche. In addition, seasoned maintenance personnel and other 
soldiers with field experience in operational units were assigned to 
the contractor's plant as representatives of the users in the operating 
commands. These soldiers were invaluable in fitting the machine to the 
operator. For example, they completed a rotor design change in 30 days 
that would otherwise have taken 12 months to achieve contractor-
Government approval.
  MANPRINT was also responsible for technological advances. To provide 
for easy maintenance to aircraft components, Comanche was built around 
a box-like, load-bearing keel. In most helicopters, the load is carried 
by the external skin. In Comanche, the load-bearing keel made it 
possible to locate easy-access panels almost anywhere on the aircraft. 
Consequently, maintenance personnel can easily reach all of the 
internal components. In this case, a maintenance requirement drove the 
technological design, which in turn resulted in an aerodynamic 
improvement.
  In another instance MANPRINT and transport considerations suggested 
the need for an improved rotor blade removal capability. The contractor 
design team already had a rotor blade design which met Government 
specifications and was concerned about the added expense. Nevertheless, 
because of soldier concerns, MANPRINT prevailed. A new blade was 
designed at a cost of approximately $60,000. Life cycle cost 
calculations have indicated that the new blade will remain easier to 
manufacture and should save approximately $150 million in personnel, 
maintenance, and transport costs from the original design.
  From the outset soldier safety has been a major design objective. 
Safety experts studied more than two decades of helicopters accident 
reports to determine how the designers could make Comanche a safer 
aircraft. As a result of their efforts, the Comanche's safety-related 
design features are projected--when compared to other helicopters such 
as the OH-58 Kiowa and AH-1F Cobra--to save 91 soldiers lives and avoid 
at least 116 disabling injuries.
  A 1995 report by the Analytic Sciences Corp.--Minninger, et al.--
documents the performance improvements and savings on Comanche 
attributable to MANPRINT. The report found Comanche cost avoidance in 
manpower, personnel, training, and safety to be a whopping $3.29 
billion. This return resulted from a design investment of approximately 
4 percent of the Comanche R&D budget. Calculated as a return on design 
investment, MANPRINT in the Comanche program yielded over an 8,000-
percent return. Moreover, if the costs of the remaining MANPRINT 
disciplines--health hazards and soldiers survivability--are included in 
the calculation, the return on investment for the entire program 
remains well over 4000 percent.


                 manprint applied to other army systems

  MANPRINT is not only limited to new or major acquisition systems. It 
works with systems already in the inventory as well. In 1994, McDonnell 
Douglas conducted a study covering 4 years of MANPRINT design 
improvements on Longbow Apache. More than 80 MANPRINT problems, issues, 
and concerns were identified and resolved. Each of them yielded an 
improvement either for the operator or the maintainer of the aircraft. 
Once again, improved human performance proved cost effective. From a 
$2.7 million investment, a return in manpower and safety costs reached 
$268 million, approximately a 2,000-percent return on investment.
  The Fox vehicle modification is an illustrative example of MANPRINT's 
contribution to smaller, less visible acquisition programs. The Army 
uses the Fox--a mobile sensing module built into an eight-wheeled 
armored vehicle--as a nuclear, biological, and chemical reconnaissance 
system for identifying contaminated areas. In a recent system 
improvement project, the Army wanted to reduce the crew from four 
soldiers to three. But operational evaluators labeled the vehicle, when 
operated by three soldiers, ``unsuitable and ineffective.'' The program 
appeared doomed because it was out of money and time. But MANPRINT 
experts, using two different types of integration models, redesigned 
the Fox and it was subsequently shown to be fully effective in its 
projected missions. The MANPRINT effort cost $60,000 and was completed 
in a short time; additional operational testing was avoided and the 
Army saved $2 to $4 million from projected program costs while removing 
on crew member requirement from each vehicle.


                        manprint viability today

  A recent Army Audit Agency [AAA] report evaluated how the Army, after 
its radical downsizing, is ``incorporating MANPRINT into weapon systems 
development.'' The good news is that nine Army weapons systems were 
evaluated and all but one were considered to have incorporated MANPRINT 
adequately. Based on the AAA's audit assessment, the Army can expect 
positive MANPRINT results in such current programs as Land Warrior, 
Javelin, and Extended Range Multiple Launch Rocket System. The Command 
and Control Vehicle program and several nondevelopmental programs 
examined by AAA, including the Embedded Global Positioning System/
Inertial Navigation System, also include good MANPRINT initiatives. 
Because of MANPRINT, the Army can have increased confidence in many of 
the systems it will be fielding in the not-too-distant future.
  The Army cannot rest on its laurels, however. Several developments 
cloud the future of MANPRINT.
  First, the AAA report noted that not all systems under development 
have incorporated MANPRINT. The now-canceled Armored Gun System is an 
example in the recent past of a program in which MANPRINT 
considerations were purposely rejected. It is not a coincidence that 
the Army canceled the program.
  Second, the new DOD acquisition system may make it easier to omit 
MANPRINT from programs. The new system rightly attempts to give program 
managers more latitude by removing regulations that previously proved 
too restrictive. But this new-found freedom in itself may make it more 
difficult in the future to ensure an appropriate incorporation of 
MANPRINT. It would be very unfortunate if an unintended consequence of 
streamlining the acquisition process proved to be a reduced emphasis on 
MANPRINT.
  That need not be the case, as the AAA report points out. The new 
acquisition system, if approached correctly, affords the opportunity 
for greater integration of people-oriented concerns into the 
acquisition process. If the ``unbound'' program managers appreciate the 
value of optimizing the man-machine interface, they are free under the 
new system to tailor their programs to incorporate people-oriented 
considerations. Consequently, a major effort is needed to adapt 
MANPRINT to the new acquisition process.
  A third concern is the erosion of the MANPRINT program in recent 
years as the Army has experienced the drawdown. The Army made a 
commitment to understand and incorporate the features that optimize 
man-machine performance in the mid-1980's but until recently has been 
in danger of returning to old ways. MANPRINT personnel have been 
reduced 55 percent while the active Army has come down approximately 37 
percent. The AAA audit report concluded that the Army's training 
process, which started out so well in 1986, is now inadequate. Career 
paths no longer identify MANPRINT as important. Nor does MANPRINT 
always play as prominent a role in source selection as in some 
programs, such as Comanche. Finally, the technology resources devoted 
to the research and development needed to advance the state of the art 
for quantitative tradeoffs of manpower, personnel skills, and training 
have shrunk significantly.
  Fortunately, thanks to the AAA audit report, Army leadership has been 
reminded that MANPRINT is a golden nugget and seems determined that it 
must be revitalized. A panel of senior officers has been working for 
several months to ensure that the wounds inflicted on the program by 
the drawdown are not fatal and that MANPRINT recovers its health.
  In closing I want to congratulate the Army for developing MANPRINT 
and for continuing to support the program in a time of very scarce 
resources.
  I also want to suggest that the Army's approach to systems 
integration is relevant to the other military departments, to the 
entire Department of Defense, and probably to the remainder of the 
Government. Acquisition reform seeks to advance technology while 
holding down procurement costs. Downsizing seeks to ensure essential 
Government functions are accomplished with a minimum of

[[Page H8271]]

staff. MANPRINT can be an essential ingredient in both initiatives. 
With respect to the military, it ensures that the weapons and equipment 
supporting a reduced force structure will perform as expected on the 
battlefield.
  But the possible applications for MANPRINT go far beyond the military 
in our constantly evolving technological-based society. Our regulatory 
agencies like the Federal Aviation Agency, the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, the Food and Drug Administration should push this concept 
to the forefront with the systems and equipment they regulate. Also it 
would seem our medical and educational systems could benefit from a 
technological development and management process which focuses on the 
end user. One may wonder what a difference it would make it these 
systems were made to operate primarily for the doctor and the patient 
or the teacher and the learner rather than fitting these individuals to 
the system as an afterthought. We have not been in such an enviable 
position to take advantage of a technological cultural change since 
Deming's total quality management. Let's not miss our opportunity this 
time around.

                          ____________________