[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 131 (Friday, September 26, 1997)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E1879-E1881]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




     INVESTIGATE ABUSES SURROUNDING THE CITIZENSHIP U.S.A. PROGRAM

                                 ______
                                 

                          HON. MARK E. SOUDER

                               of indiana

                    in the house of representatives

                       Friday, September 26, 1997

  Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Speaker, I am submitting additional evidence 
supporting the need for my amendment approved by the House on September 
24, 1997 which provides $2,000,000 for the inspector general's office 
at the Justice Department to complete a thorough and objective 
investigation of the abuses surrounding the Citizenship U.S.A. Program 
accelerating the naturalization process prior to the 1996 elections. 
This evidence includes an executive summary of the KPMG Peat Marwick 
LLP Report, a statistical listing of the naturalizations where complete 
background checks were not done provided by the Justice Department, and 
an editorial in the Washington Post entitled ``Burned Again.''
  Naturalization is a critical symbol of the American democratic 
experiment and the continuing contribution immigrants made. The time 
has come to eliminate this blemish on the immigration system and those, 
the overwhelming majority of whom, legally pursue their citizenship. 
These abuses of the Clinton/Gore administration should not be tolerated 
which cheapen the integrity of citizenship and the naturalization 
process.

    Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, 
        Naturalization Quality Procedures Implementation Review


                      FINAL REPORT--April 17, 1997

       Executive Summary: The Department of Justice, Justice 
     Management Division, engaged KPMG Peat Marwick LLP to review 
     the Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS) 
     implementation of the November 29, 1996 Naturalization 
     Quality Procedures (NQP). The Naturalization Quality 
     Procedures address seven key enhancements to the 
     naturalization process. These enhancements include (1) 
     standardization of work process, (2) fingerprint check 
     integrity, (3) enhanced supervisory review, (4) instructions 
     regarding temporary file (T-file) use, (5) implementation of 
     a standardized quality assurance program, (6) guidance 
     regarding revocation procedures, and (7) requirements for 
     increased monitoring of outside English and Civics test 
     sites. The instructions contained within the November 29, 
     1996 memorandum were effective upon receipt, and affected 
     interview scheduling and oath ceremonies.
       DoJ contracted with KPMG to conduct a review of NQP 
     implementation to evaluate the effective implementation of 
     these procedures. This document contains our review of the 
     NQP directed internal controls implemented by INS to 
     determine if INS field offices and service centers were 
     complying with Memorandum provisions. We conducted our review 
     between February 19 and March 26, 1997. The sites reviewed by 
     KPMG represent approximately 85% of the INS naturalization 
     processing capacity and provide a cross-section of INS 
     offices. Our review indicates that, of the seven areas 
     addressed by the Memorandum, the INS continues to have the 
     most significant control problems with the fingerprint 
     process and the identification of statutorily-barred 
     applicants.
       A key control implemented by the Naturalization Quality 
     Procedures was the establishment of a data match between INS 
     naturalization tracking systems and the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation (FBI) billing system to identify aliens with a 
     disqualifying criminal history. This data match allowed INS 
     to direct that no cases could be scheduled for interview or 
     oath ceremony until receipt of a definitive response from the 
     FBI regarding criminal history had occurred. Although this 
     data match utilizes the same methodology used to determine 
     the number of cases identified for the felony case review, 
     there is one important exception. Unlike the methodology 
     utilized during the felony case review, the production system 
     requires a match of not only the A-number, but also the first 
     and last names of the applicant. This additional

[[Page E1880]]

     requirement should increase the accuracy of the matching 
     results. However, it should be understood that, although this 
     is an improvement over the previous methodology, the 
     introduction of any data manipulation into the matching 
     methodology also introduces potential errors into the 
     results.
       The root cause of this potential error is the continued 
     lack of quality control in the completion of FD-258 
     fingerprint cards. Although the automated matching process 
     does provide some control, a correct identification from the 
     FBI is not assured. Currently, INS is experiencing a growing 
     backlog of cases that are classified ``not found'' as a 
     result of the failure of the FBI and INS matching effort. 
     Additionally, in a sample conducted by INS of 200 cases 
     identified as NON-IDENT by the FBI, 25 applicants admitted to 
     previous arrested during their interviews.
       In addition to the potential error in the matching 
     methodology between INS and FBI systems, local and state 
     agencies are not required to report criminal arrest data to 
     the FBI. Although the problem with state and local agency 
     reporting is beyond the control of the INS, the integrity of 
     FD-258 data is clearly within the INS purview, and should be 
     corrected immediately. Based on our review, the use of 
     Designated Fingerprint Services (DFS) has done little to 
     increase the accuracy of this data.
       To ensure that no cases are scheduled for interview or oath 
     ceremony until a definitive criminal history response from 
     the FBI is received, a unique system-generated control number 
     is required to be entered on the N-400 processing worksheet. 
     However, in our review, we often were unable to verify that 
     this mandatory check had taken place. Since this is the 
     validation step of this critical control, we feel this 
     constitutes a material weakness in the criminal history 
     validation process.
       Upon further examination of the fingerprint process, we 
     discovered pending case files with fingerprints that had been 
     rejected by the FBI and are currently on indefinite hold 
     pending a policy decision from INS Headquarters. The 
     categories of fingerprint rejections currently being held 
     pending a policy decision include: Applicants whose 
     fingerprints had been rejected twice by the FBI as 
     unclassifiable; applicants who had not responded to a request 
     to be reprinted; and, applicants whose rejection notice was 
     undeliverable due to an incorrect address given by the 
     applicant.
       The number of rejections we witnessed further supports our 
     conclusion that the DFS initiative is not significantly 
     improving the overall quality and integrity of the FD-258 
     process.
       In addition to the findings regarding the criminal history 
     validation process, our remaining findings focused on two 
     major areas: dissemination of the new procedures and staff 
     training. With regard to dissemination of the NQP, we 
     discovered three different versions of the memorandum had 
     been distributed throughout the INS. One is the 
     Commissioner's signed copy, a second is an unsigned cc:mail 
     version of the Commissioner's memos with different 
     attachments, and the third is an early version drafted for 
     the Deputy Commissioner's signature. The cc:mail version 
     being used did not require FBI verification, completion of a 
     processing worksheet with initials and dates, nor enhanced 
     supervisory review for IDENT, T-file, or complex cases. If a 
     sense of urgency regarding the NQP was communicated from INS 
     Headquarters, it became diminished as it worked its way down 
     the chain of command. In addition, generally staff at the 
     first-line supervisor level and below were not informed of 
     the reasons behind the implementation of the changes.
       In reviewing the training records related to the NQP 
     memorandum, we discovered that INS Headquarters decentralized 
     training down to the individual office level. There were no 
     standards set, no curriculum established, and no policies 
     established regarding the recording of attendance for 
     accountability purposes. This was a major contributing factor 
     in the INS' inability to implement fully the NQP.
       As a result of our site reviews, it is now clear that the 
     NQP has increased internal control and helped reduce the risk 
     of incorrectly naturalizing an applicant. But it is also 
     clear that criminal history validation, a key control of the 
     NQP, remains ineffective. In addition, the NQP standards 
     outlined in the memorandum were unevenly applied across the 
     INS as a result of the lack of standardized training and an 
     inability to effectively communicate the NQP requirements.
       Due to the inherent weaknesses in the FBI and INS matching, 
     and the continued lack of control within the overall 
     fingerprint process, we cannot provide assurance that INS is 
     not continuing to incorrectly naturalize aliens with 
     disqualifying conditions.

                  Distribution of Naturalized Persons

                            [Sept. 1995-96]

Non-Idents: Persons identified as having no FBI criminal history 
  records.......................................................766,959
                                                             __________
                                                             
Idents: \1\ Persons identified as having FBI records which include 
  INS administrative actions, misdemeanor and felony arrests and 
  convictions....................................................81,492
                                                             __________
                                                             
Reject/unclassifiable: \2\ Persons identified as not having had 
  definitive criminal history checks conducted because their 
  fingerprint cards were rejected by the FBI because of poor quality 
  prints........................................................124,740
                                                             __________
                                                             
Not matched: \2\ Persons for whom it cannot be determined whether or 
  not FBI records checks were ever conducted.....................55,750
                                                             __________
                                                             
Elder/minor (not submitted): Elders and minors for whom INS policy 
  does not require FBI records checks............................19,685
                                                             __________
                                                             
Pending: Persons whose records checks were still being processed by 
  the FBI at the time this data was produced......................1,241
                                                             __________
                                                             
      Total naturalized persons...............................1,049,867

(1) Includes 9,145 candidate IDENTS resulting from full FBI CJIS name 
check, without full 10-print identification, as well as some expunged 
records.
(2) No record found from full FBI CJIS name check. No criminal history 
record based on name/date of birth check.


                          Breakdown of idents

         [Persons identified by FBI as having criminal records]

Administrative Violations: Individuals arrested only for INS 
  administrative violations..................................... 31,000
Misdemeanor: Individuals arrested for at least one misdemeanor, but 
  no felonies................................................... 25,000
Felony: Persons arrested for at least one felony................ 16,400
Candidate Idents: Possible matches based on name checks; some 
  expunged records............................................... 9,100
                                                             __________
                                                             
      Total idents.............................................. 81,500


               Table 3.--Case files reviewed by INS/KPMG

Proper decision: Cases in which the NRT adjudicators found that the 
  statutorily defined residency and good moral character criteria 
  were met (64.5%)...............................................10,030
Presumptively ineligible: Cases in which the NRT adjudicators found 
  that the statutorily defined residency and good moral character 
  criteria were presumptively not met (2%)..........................296
Needs further action: Cases in which the NRT adjudicators found that 
  they could not validate that the statutorily defined residency and 
  good moral character criteria were met based on the information 
  contained in the case files the NRT has in Lincoln (33.5%)..\1\ 5,210
                                                             __________
                                                             
      Total cases reviewed.......................................15,536

\1\ Plus 4,650 involve failure to reveal felony arrest.

                [From the Washington Post, Mar. 5, 1997]

                              Burned Again

       On subject after subject, this turns out to be a White 
     House that you believe at your peril. Six months ago, 
     Republicans were accusing it of trying to make political use 
     of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The charge was 
     that the White House had put the arm on the INS to speed up 
     and cut corners in the naturalization process, the theory 
     being that new citizens would more likely vote Democratic 
     than Republican, and therefore the more of them, the merrier.
       The administration responded that there was no way it would 
     do a thing like that, manipulate the citizenship process for 
     political gain, and folks believed it. We ourselves wrote 
     sympathetically that, while ``some congressional Republicans 
     suspect a Democratic plan to load up the voter rolls . . . 
     the administration replies that there are good and innocent 
     reasons for [the] increase.''
       So now, guess what? It turns out the White House was in 
     fact leaning on the INS to hasten the process, in part in 
     hopes of creating new Democratic voters. There are documents 
     that amply show as much. The attempt was described in a 
     lengthy account in this newspaper by reporter William 
     Branigin the other day. It was centered in the office of Vice 
     President Gore, where they do reinventing government 
     projects. But it wasn't just another reinvention. ``The 
     president is sick of this and wants action,'' Elaine Kamarck, 
     a domestic policy adviser to Mr. Gore wrote in an e-mail last 
     March, the ``this'' being that the INS wasn't moving people 
     along at the proper speed.
       The Republican charge is that, in speeding up the process, 
     the INS made citizens of some applicants with criminal 
     records who should have been barred. The Democratic defense--
     the current version--is that some of this may indeed have 
     occurred, but not because of political interference. Rather, 
     it was the result of simple bungling. You are told now that 
     you shouldn't take the political meddling in this process--
     essentially a law enforcement process--seriously not because 
     it didn't happen but because it was ineffectual. Now there's 
     a comfort.
       The INS has long been an agency in disrepair. It had and 
     still has a huge naturalization backlog, partly the result of 
     increased applications after the grant of amnesty to certain 
     illegal aliens in the immigration act of 1986, partly now the 
     result as well of last year's welfare bill, which cuts off 
     benefits to immigrants who fail to naturalize. The agency was 
     already trying to cut the backlog, as well it should, and if 
     ever there were a candidate for reinvention, it's the INS. So 
     you

[[Page E1881]]

     had a legitimate project until the folks with the hot hands 
     in the White House decided it should be a political project 
     as well, at which point it was compromised.
       Some of the worst ideas ginned up in the White House never 
     got anywhere, in part apparently because of stout INS 
     resistance. Nor is it yet clear how many people with 
     disqualifying records were made citizens, nor how much of 
     that was due to political pressure and how much to just plain 
     everyday incompetence. But in a way it doesn't matter. What 
     matters is that once again the political people couldn't keep 
     their distance from a process that should have been respected 
     and left alone on decency-in-government grounds, and then 
     they were untruthful about it. Who believes them and goes 
     bail for them next time?