[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 130 (Thursday, September 25, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9940-S9956]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




   DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 1998--CONFERENCE REPORT

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the clerk will 
report H.R. 2266, the conference report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The committee on conference on the disagreeing votes of the 
     two Houses on the amendments of the Senate to the H.R. 2266 
     having met, after full and free conference, have agreed to 
     recommend and do recommend to their respective Houses this 
     report, signed by majority of the conferees.

  The Senate proceeded to consider the conference report.
  (The conference report is printed in the House proceedings of the 
Record of September 23, 1997.)
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska.


                         privilege of the floor

  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the 
following Members of the staff of the Defense Appropriations 
Subcommittee be granted the privilege of the floor during consideration 
of the conference report to accompany H.R. 2266: Sid Ashworth, Susan 
Hogan, Jay Kimmitt, Gary Reese, Mary Marshall, John Young, Mazie 
Mattson, Michelle Randolph, Charlie Houy, Emelie East, and Mike Morris, 
a legislative fellow detailed to the committee from the Department of 
Defense.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, the conference report on H.R. 2269, the 
Department of Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1998, closely 
follows the bill passed by the Senate on July 15.
  The bill provides $247.5 billion in new budget authority for the 
Department, an amount within the levels set in the budget agreement 
with the White House.
  As in July, the conference report reflects a bipartisan effort, and I 
am grateful to my friend and colleague from Hawaii, Senator Inouye, for 
his partnership in bringing this bill back to the Senate, and bringing 
it back as a very good bill.
  The House passed the conference report by a vote of 356 to 65, today.
  The full text of the conference report, and the accompanying 
statement of the managers was printed in yesterday's Congressional 
Record.
  The print of House Report 105-265 has been available to all Members 
today.
  The tables and descriptive text of the statement of the managers 
details the funding levels for all the programs considered by the 
conferees--I will not take the Senate's time to summarize those 
adjustments.
  I do want to highlight the toughest policy issue we faced--continued 
funding for operations in and around Bosnia.
  The House of Representatives in its original bill passed a provision 
which was a total prohibition on spending for any operations in Bosnia 
after June 30, 1998.
  Personally, I believe we should withdraw our forces from Bosnia.
  Secretary Cohen and General Ralston met with us, and urged us not to 
take that unilateral step, at this time.
  Prior to this conference, several of us traveled to the United 
Kingdom, for the periodic United States-United Kingdom 
interparliamentary meetings.
  In those talks some of us came to appreciate better the total 
dependence by our European allies on the United States forces in 
Bosnia.
  The compromise we reached retains the position of the House that we 
bring our forces out of Bosnia by June 30, but the President can waive 
that requirement if he certifies to the Congress the forces must stay 
in the interest of our national security.
  The President must also inform the Congress on seven points: First, 
the reasons for the deployment; second, the number of personnel to be 
deployed; third, the duration of the mission; fourth, the mission and 
objectives; fifth, the exit strategy for U.S. forces; sixth, the costs 
for operations past June 30; and seventh, the impact on morale and 
retention.
  This certification to Congress will constitute the first time this 
President has informed the Congress about Bosnia before deploying or 
extending our forces there.
  I want to recognize the leadership of my good friend from Kansas, 
Senator Pat Roberts, who contributed to our discussions in the United 
Kingdom following the visit he made to the continent. And it was his 
ideas that he passed on to me that really led to the compromise that we 
have reached in this conference.
  The Congress and the American people, Senator Roberts told me, 
deserve to know why our forces are in Bosnia and how long they must 
stay. The provision in this bill requires such a statement.
  The President is also expected to submit a supplemental 
appropriations request for additional amounts needed to maintain our 
forces in Bosnia if he decides to keep them there without damaging the 
readiness or the quality of life of our Armed Forces.
  Virtually every program funded in this bill when we originally passed 
it the House and the Senate were funded differently. And ultimately we 
had to find a compromise level between those two bills. We actually had 
to eliminate some $4.5 billion of items that were funded in one bill or 
the other.
  Let me point out just some instances.
  In the case of the Dual Use Applications Program, we sustained the 
full $125 million that was provided by the Senate. That is $25 million 
more than the House had provided.
  On ACTD's, we reached an even split with the House, which provides 
$81 million--nearly a 50 percent increase compared to the level 
appropriated for fiscal year 1997.
  For overseas humanitarian, disaster, and civic aid, we again split 
the difference with the House providing $47 million.
  One program where we sustained the full administration request is in 
the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, known as the ``Nunn-Lugar'' 
initiative.
  Secretary Cohen made the strong plea for the full $382 million sought 
by the President, and we have convinced the conference to accommodate 
that request.
  I again want to thank all conferees on both sides, and especially the 
House Chairman, Congressman Bill Young, and the ranking member, 
Congressman Jack Murtha.
  I feel very proud about the work that was done by the conference 
working as a team.
  I urge all Members of the Senate to vote in favor of approving the 
conference report before the Senate.
  I reserve the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Hawaii.
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I rise this moment to express my complete 
support for the conference report on the defense appropriations bill 
for fiscal year 1998.
  As Chairman Stevens noted, this bill is within the budget allocation 
provided by the committee for defense funding.
  The amounts provided represents an increase of $5.4 billion, 2 
percent above the amounts available during the current fiscal year.
  Mr. President, it is my view that this increase is very modest, and 
is fully justified under the circumstances.
  The increase is necessary to allow us to continue to modernize our 
forces, to protect readiness, and to fully fund a 2.8-percent cost-of-
living increase for our men and women in uniform. And it allows us to 
protect the priorities of the Members of the Senate.
  This conference agreement is a compromise which I believe all Members 
should support.
  The bill was passed by the House with two controversial matters to 
which the administration strongly objected to--the B-2, and Bosnia. 
This conference report has dealt with those matters to the satisfaction 
of the administration.
  On the B-2 bomber, the conferees have provided the President with 
$331 million to begin the purchase of additional B-2 bombers. However, 
it is up to the President to determine whether to buy more aircraft, or 
to upgrade the existing fleet of B-2 bombers. Mr. President, I for one 
hope the President chooses to buy more B-2's. But here the choice is 
his.

  On Bosnia, the conferees agreed that consistent with the current 
plans of

[[Page S9941]]

the administration all United States troops be removed from Bosnia by 
June 30th of next year. However, if the President certifies that it is 
in our national interest to maintain our presence in and around Bosnia, 
he can waive the restriction by consulting with and informing the 
Congress of his decision. And should the President decide to keep the 
forces in Bosnia, as Chairman Stevens noted, he shall submit a 
supplemental, if additional funds are required to pay for this 
deployment.
  Mr. President, this is an agreement which can be supported by both 
the Congress and the President.
  We should be grateful to Chairman Stevens and the House conferees for 
negotiating this very workable compromise.
  I would like to also mention the hard work of the staff under the 
staff director, Mr. Steve Cortese, and on the minority side, Mr. 
Charlie Houy.
  Mr. President, I think it should be noted that the staff worked long 
hours--in one instance throughout the whole night--to ensure that this 
conference report was completed before the end of this fiscal year. I 
believe that the Senate owes them its gratitude for their efforts.
  Mr. President, this is a good conference report. I urge all my 
colleagues to support its adoption.
  Once again, may I express to my colleagues my great pleasure in being 
able to serve them, together with Chairman Stevens. We are fortunate to 
have Chairman Stevens at the helm.
  Thank you, Mr. President. I reserve the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Chairman of the 
Appropriations Committee, and ranking member. Everyone involved in our 
military and our national security owes Senator Stevens and Senator 
Inouye a depth of gratitude for their outstanding leadership.
  Mr. President, I rise in strong support of the provisions contained 
in the defense appropriations bill--so kindly referred to by the 
chairman as the Roberts amendment--that will force the Clinton 
administration to clearly and articulately justify our policy in the 
use of military forces in Bosnia. Additionally, Mr. President, these 
provisions will also force Congress to debate the Bosnian dilemma and 
our policy in that shattered region.
  These provisions are about being honest with the American public.
  Specifically, these provisions require the President to certify to 
Congress by May 15 of next year that the continued presence of U.S. 
forces in Bosnia is in our national security interests, and why.
  He must state the reasons for deployment, and the expected duration 
of deployment.
  He must provide numbers of troops deployed, estimate the dollar costs 
involved, and give the effect of such deployment on overall 
effectiveness of our U.S. forces.
  Most importantly, the President must provide a clear statement of our 
mission, and our objective.
  And he must provide an exit strategy for bringing our troops home.
  If these specifics are not provided to the satisfaction of the 
Congress, funding for military deployment in Bosnia will end next May.
  Let me repeat: We are requiring the administration--and, yes; the 
Congress--to clearly articulate our Bosnia policy, justify use of 
military forces, and tell us when and under what circumstances our 
troops can come home.
  That is not asking too much.
  In my view, events of recent weeks make this an urgent matter. It has 
become increasingly clear to me that in the wake of the Dayton accords, 
and after drifting for months, and with elections on the near horizon 
and the crippling winter only weeks away, the United States went from 
peacekeeping to peace enforcement with what I consider to be dubious 
tactics.
  Troop protection, refugee relocation, democracy building, economic 
restoration, and, oh, by the way, if we run across a war criminal let's 
arrest him. Those goals have been replaced.
  So today we see increased troop strengths--perhaps up to 16,000--we 
have picked a U.S. candidate in the election process, we have embarked 
upon an aggressive disarmament and location, and capture and 
prosecution of war criminals.
  Is this mission creep, or is it long overdue action, Mr. President? 
And will these goals accomplish realistic progress?
  Item: The world was treated to the spectacle of American troops, the 
symbol of freedom's defenders, taking over a Bosnia television station 
in an effort to muzzle its news. The troops were stoned by angry 
citizens. We gave the TV station back.
  Item: In the country where benevolent leaders are scarce, we have 
chosen up sides, supporting the cause of one candidate over another. It 
is a cynical approach, it seems to this Senator, to foreign policy that 
says to the world, ``Sure, he--or she--is a dictator, but he's our 
dictator.'' At least for the time being.
  Item: Elections were conducted but to cast ballots--listen up--to 
cast ballots many citizens had to be bussed back to their homes, which 
they cannot now, or may never, occupy to vote for officials who will 
never serve unless SFOR stands at the ready.
  In the Civil War in the United States, Quantrill's Raiders sacked 
Lawrence, then fled to Missouri. Should his ruffians have been bussed 
back to Lawrence to vote for city council? That makes about as much 
sense.
  Item. A United States diplomat overruled a Norwegian judge, whose 
decision disqualified candidates with ties to indicted war crime 
suspect Radovan Karadzic. Members of the group overseeing the elections 
threatened to resign. Posters of Elmer Fudd--I am not making this up. 
That's right, the cartoon character Elmer Fudd sprouted up as a protest 
to ``free'' elections by one faction.
  NATO forces, which include U.S. troops, have been cast into the role 
of cops on the beat chasing war crimes suspects. Just arrest Mr. 
Karadzic, we are told, try him for war crimes, and our problems will be 
solved.
  Mr. President, as the New York Times pointed out recently, much as we 
do not like it, ``Mr. Karadzic reflects widely held views in Serbian 
society.'' Those views are real.
  Do these events reflect a sound, defensible Bosnian policy that is in 
our national interest? Or do they sound an ominous alarm as America is 
dragged down into a Byzantine nightmare straight out of a Kafka novel?
  I visited Bosnia, like many of my colleagues. I talked with the 
troops in August, met with the officers, met with intelligence 
officials. They are outstanding individuals. They deserve our support, 
our respect, our gratitude. They are doing an outstanding job, Mr. 
President, even though they have not been given a coherent mission.
  Just this past week, Gen. Hugh Shelton, our outstanding nominee for 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was asked at his confirmation 
hearing by Senator McCain of Arizona whether there is a strategy to 
remove United States troops from Bosnia, and the general was stumped. 
Let me repeat that. The general admitted he was aware of no exit 
strategy by the administration. That awareness is repeated in Tazar, 
Mr. President, which is our staging base in southern Hungary, 7 days in 
for our troops and 7 days out. We have no clear idea of how to extract 
them.
  If the provisions of this bill do nothing else, they should force a 
major reexamination of our Bosnian involvement from top to bottom.
  Now, our former Secretary of Defense, Casper Weinberger, articulated 
six conditions for military intervention, Mr. President. I repeat them 
here today just to show how much our Bosnian policy is lacking. He said 
troops should be committed only when the following things happen: No. 
1. Vital national interests are threatened. I do not think that is the 
case in Bosnia. The United States clearly intends to win. We did win. 
We stopped the fighting. But the political settlement is contrary to 
the means by which we stopped the fighting. We separated the ethnic 
groups. Now we are trying to put them back together again. The 
intervention has precisely defined political and military objectives. 
As the former Secretary of Defense said, there is reasonable assurance 
that intervention will be supported by the American people and the 
Congress. The commitment of American forces and their objectives can be

[[Page S9942]]

reassessed and adjusted, if necessary. And, finally, Secretary 
Weinberger said this: The commitment of forces to combat is undertaken 
as a last resort.
  As Chairman Stevens will tell you, our involvement in Bosnia has come 
at a large price. There are approximately 10,000 troops. I personally 
think it is closer to 16,000. That is nearly one-third of the 35,000 
NATO troops involved. From 1996 to 1998, costs are estimated to be $7.8 
billion--almost $8 billion. That figure, too, may escalate.
  In justifying our policy in Bosnia, the administration must include a 
plan to fund the costs. Do they intend to take these rising costs out 
of the current defense budget, money we need for modernization and 
procurement and quality of life for the armed services to protect our 
vital national security interests? Or is the administration prepared to 
come clean and ask for the money up front?
  Finally, I offer these thoughts. All of us in this body, and I know 
President Clinton, Secretary of State Albright, Secretary of Defense 
Cohen, all of us, desperately want lasting peace in Bosnia--all of our 
allies as well. We want the killing to stop. We have stopped the 
killing. We want stability in that part of the world, permanent peace 
and permanent stability. But wishing it does not make it so.
  Richard Grenier, writing for the Washington Times put it this way:

       Generally speaking, Serbs didn't love Croats, Croats didn't 
     love Serbs, nor do either of them love Muslims. Reciprocally, 
     Muslims love neither the Croats or Serbs. What happened to 
     the lessons we are supposed to have learned in Beirut and 
     Somalia? What happened to our swearing off mission creep?
       But here we go again in Bosnia. Once again, our goal was at 
     first laudably humanitarian: to stop the killing. But it 
     expanded as we thought how wonderful it would be if we could 
     build a beautiful, tolerant, multiethnic Bosnia on the model 
     of American multiculturalism.

  I respond. The Bosnian situation is complex. It is shrouded by 
centuries--centuries--of conflict that only a few understand. What we 
have seen in recent months is a lull in the fighting, not the end. It 
is a fragile ``peace,'' held together only by a continued presence of 
military force. How long can that continue? Are we prepared to pay the 
price?
  This week, National Security Adviser Sandy Berger said the United 
States must remain engaged in Bosnia beyond June of this year but that 
continued American troop presence has not yet been decided. It is time 
to decide.
  Now, compare that statement with the advice of former Secretary of 
State, Dr. Henry Kissinger, who wrote just this week:

       America has no national interest for which to risk lives to 
     produce a multiethnic state in Bosnia.

  Mr. President, no more drift. No more drift. It is time for candor, 
for honesty and clear purpose. Let the debate begin.
  I urge acceptance of these provisions. We owe them as a debt of 
honesty to the American people. We owe them to our military men and 
women with their lives on the line.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time yielded to the Senator from Kansas 
has expired.
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the 
Senator from Rhode Island.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island has 5 minutes of 
his own already.
  Mr. INOUYE. Yes.
  Mr. REED. I thank the Chair.
  I rise to express my support for the defense appropriations 
conference agreement, and I commend my colleagues, particularly Senator 
Stevens and Senator Inouye, for their great work on this measure.
  I am particularly pleased that an important provision in the 
conference report is language which will allow Newport News and 
Electric Boat, this country's only two manufacturers of submarines, to 
team together to design and build the next generation of attack 
submarines. Without this language, these shipyards and our submarine 
program could be endangered. With this language, however, we will 
continue to build the Navy's most valuable weapon, a silent and very 
effective submarine. Work will commence on the new attack submarines, 
which will boast great stealth and great strength with advanced war-
fighting capabilities, yet will be smaller, more flexible and more cost 
effective.
  This teaming agreement will preserve America's vital submarine 
industry base, which encompasses over 3,000 high-technology companies 
in 44 States. This conference report brings us one step closer to 
ensuring that the United States continues to maintain the finest 
submarine force in the world.
  Since the first day I arrived in Congress, there has been a strong 
debate over the future of the U.S. naval submarine program. There are 
those who believe that the era of the submarine ended with the end of 
the cold war. But a majority of my colleagues and I believe that our 
submarine fleet needs to be maintained and modernized and that it will 
serve us as well in the future as it has in the past.
  In a time when the mission of our armed services is constantly 
changing and a threat could emerge anywhere in the world, we need such 
flexibility. I think it is fitting to note the comments of our 
respected Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. John 
Shalikashvili, on the eve of his retirement. General Shalikashvili 
said, ``Submarines are an integral part of U.S. global influence and 
presence. Their stealth and endurance provide the unified commander 
enormous capabilities across the full spectrum of conflict.''
  I believe that the provisions in this defense appropriations 
agreement indicate that the submarine has proven itself. This 
legislation allocates scarce defense dollars to build up the submarine 
industrial base, to procure new torpedoes, to procure new submarine 
periscopes, and to assure excellent training programs for our submarine 
crews. This agreement will provide funding for the completion of the 
Seawolf program and for the first new attack submarine.
  This report shows support for the submarine procurement program as 
well as a logical and cost-effective way to harness the expertise and 
skill of our Nation's submarine builders.
  I would like particularly to again thank Chairman Stevens and Senator 
Inouye for their continued support, Senator Warner for his efforts on 
the committee, and all of those who have played a critical role in 
ensuring that our submarine fleet will continue to be the finest in the 
world, that our sailors will go forth with the best ships in the world 
and that with their service and these ships we will continue to protect 
America and defend our principles.
  I thank the Senator for the time. I yield back the remainder of my 
time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I think under the previous order I am to be 
recognized for 15 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana has 15 minutes under 
the previous order and is recognized.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I rise to address this question of the 
defense appropriations bill with some degree of disappointment.
  First of all, I am disappointed that an appropriations bill is going 
to be passed out of this Congress ahead of the authorization. That is 
not the way it is supposed to work. It renders much of the work done by 
the authorization committee this year of no effect in some of the 
critical areas. I do not blame the Appropriations Committee, however. 
There are 4 days remaining before the end of the fiscal year. The clock 
is ticking. Senate Armed Services and the House didn't get the job done 
in time, and the Appropriations Committee was patient in giving us that 
time. I regret that we were not able to get our authorization act 
together. So I am not here to condemn the Appropriations Committee.
  I do, however, want to express my disappointment, sincere 
disappointment, that as chairman of the Air and Land Subcommittee the 
actions that we have taken in the Senate Armed Services Committee to 
address the question of TACAIR and where we are going in the future 
were forfeited in the negotiations with the House; that the Senate 
deferred to the House position particularly on the issue of F-22 
funding, and I want to discuss that because there are consequences, I 
believe, to that decision.
  First, a little bit of history.
  Our committee withheld approximately $500 million in development and

[[Page S9943]]

advanced procurement funds, and I want to state the reasons why we did 
so. It was not done on a whim. It was not done on a number picked out 
of the air. It was done as a result of a process of our methodical 
oversight of the F-22 program that dates back at least to the 103d 
Congress.

  Here are the facts. The F-22 program as we speak today is 
approximately $2.2 billion over budget for development alone. There is 
speculation that F-22 production could also run several billion dollars 
over program estimates. In fact, in just the last 2 years, the Air 
Force has cut the number of aircraft to be bought in the next 6 years 
from 128 to only 70, and yet there has been no decrease in program 
costs to the taxpayer or money freed up for Department of Defense 
expenditures in other areas. Yet we have not been told by the Air Force 
or the contractors how the F-22 program got to be in this situation.
  Those of us on the Armed Services Committee felt it was time to 
definitively put this program on notice, and that is what we attempted 
to do.
  Now, Mr. President, I say that as a supporter of the F-22. I think it 
is fair to say our committee is a strong supporter of the F-22. I have 
visited production facilities and engine facilities for the F-22. It is 
a leap ahead in technology. It lays the basis for our crucial joint 
strike fighter program. It will give us air dominance in the future. 
Had I thought that the actions we had taken in any way jeopardized 
further development of the F-22, I would not have considered them.
  But to those who have argued that we must fully support the F-22 air 
dominance fighter because it is the No. 1 procurement priority of the 
Department of the Air Force without any questions, without any 
reservations, without any reports, without any event-based 
decisionmaking, I think those people are missing the point. They are 
missing the point of the consequences of doing so and the consequences 
to other systems.
  Let me also say that I, in addition to supporting F-22, I support the 
importance of air dominance as a joint warfighting capability. But, we 
have to remember that the F-22 is just one piece of the Department of 
Defense TACAIR recapitalization strategy. We are acting like it is the 
whole thing.
  As a matter of fact, the Navy's F/A-18EF is the Navy's No. 1 
priority, and the Marine Corps has placed its priority on the joint 
strike fighter yet to be developed. So we are looking to balance our 
approach in joint warfighting capability across the full spectrum of 
military operations. If the F-22 program is not brought under control, 
it will severely jeopardize a prudent balance in TACAIR 
recapitalization.
  So the issue before us is not support for the relative priority of 
the F-22 program. The issue before us is, does that support imply that 
we should blindly throw billions of dollars at the program without some 
accountability? The issue is the viability of the F-22 program, and it 
is exactly because of the high priority of the F-22 that we need to 
send a powerful message to the Air Force and to the contractors that 
the Senate is watching, that we are watching the restructuring, and we 
are watching for schedule slippage, and we are watching for cost 
overruns. It is time to hold F-22 to a realistic level of 
accountability. It is time to end the promises of performance and cost 
control and instead focus on results. We do so because we want to 
protect the F-22. We want it to be a viable program, and we do not want 
it to go the way of other programs that have not been held accountable.
  So, therefore, I regret deeply that the Senate yielded to the House, 
that we were not able to get the authorization approved, that we 
yielded to the House in the appropriations process and we are simply 
giving the Air Force and giving the contractor exactly what they asked 
for without any explanations, without any details, and without any 
accountability features built in.
  Let me explain a little bit about why the Armed Services Committee's 
actions on the F-22 are good policy.
  In the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1995, the 
Senate requested the Department of Defense and the General Accounting 
Office assess and provide us a report on the degree of concurrency--
that is the testing-while-you-are-buying process that goes on sometimes 
in these programs; you are buying the planes at the same time you are 
testing them; many of us would argue that you need to test first and 
make sure that what you are buying is what you think you are buying--
and we asked them for this report on risk, also. In April 1995, we 
received those reports and the Department of Defense report concluded, 
just a little over 2 years ago, ``there is no reason, based upon risk/
concurrency considerations to introduce a program stretch at this 
time.'' So we thought, fine, everything is on track.
  At the same time the GAO conclude that the F-22 program involved 
considerable risk and that there may be adverse consequences from 
concurrent development and production. Furthermore, they felt the need 
for the F-22 program ``is not urgent,'' it quoted, based on the threat 
and viability of the F-15 program.
  Then we went into 1996. We held hearings. In those hearings surfaced 
additional concerns about the level of concurrent production and 
development, projected F-22 weight and specific fuel consumption. We 
came back in the National Defense Authorization Act for 1996 to, once 
again, require the Department of Defense to respond to 21 specific 
questions. And they did respond and indicated, again, that the level of 
concurrency in the program was acceptable using departmental risk 
criteria.
  In short, less than 2 years ago, the Senate was being told the 
program was on track, no problems. Now in 1997, we held hearings and 
surfaced still yet other concerns about the F-22's transition from this 
engineering, manufacturing and development phase to production, based 
on what one witness calls an ``event driven program that ensures that 
key production criteria are met as a prerequisite for production 
decisions.'' That gave us some assurance. Correspondingly, the Senate 
then included in the 1997 National Defense Authorization bill a 
requirement that the Department of Defense undertake a cost analysis 
and report on their events-based decisionmaking criteria.
  We took them at their word. We said fine, give us a report. Within 
the last year, the Air Force commissioned a Joint Evaluation Team which 
concluded that the F-22 development program was $2.2 billion over cost, 
and that much more time would be needed for testing. This was the first 
time that we had been notified that the F-22 was in trouble, despite 
numerous years of hearings and reports back from the Air Force. So, 
based on this information the committee held--I chaired--two additional 
hearings in 1997, on tactical aviation. And we learned then that the 
Air Force canceled four preproduction vehicles that it previously 
indicated were a key to the program going forward. And then it took 
that money, $700 million, and put it back into development. This 
action, to infuse hundreds of millions of dollars into development, was 
taken by the Air Force again without specifying how the program had 
been changed, identifying cost-control measures, and describing the 
level of risk that remains. They have not told us how the program got 
in this shape. They have only told us that they have found the funds to 
fix it. They found the funds to fix it by canceling four preproduction 
aircraft, thereby jeopardizing a necessary step testing for most 
development programs, which they say now is not necessary, and taking 
that money and pumping it into engineering and manufacturing 
development.
  They also promised that event-based decisionmaking would keep the F-
22 program on track. We asked them to report on this aspect of the 
program. The Air Force said it would give us a report on it. They did. 
That report, 6 months late: 18 words. Here is the Air Force report. 
Specific exit criteria:

       First EMD aircraft first flight complete.
       Complete engine initial flight release.
       Air vehicle interim production readiness review complete.

  What does that tell us? This is the report that it took them 6 months 
to put together to respond to what we asked for, what we thought was 
legitimate?
  Furthermore, each of these three events were supposed to have been 
completed before the fiscal year even started. What kind of confidence 
does that provide, for a program with nearly $20 billion in development 
and well

[[Page S9944]]

over $40 billion in procurement? We are talking about $60 billion here. 
Consequently, the Senate Armed Services Committee came to the 
conclusion that, if tactical air modernization is going to be viable in 
the future from both a technical perspective and the perspective of 
affordability, that we had to take some action now in the F-22 program 
to achieve and ensure performance and cost-control goals. Therefore, I 
recommended to the Senate, and the Senate agreed, that we not permit 
the infusion of an additional $420 million into F-22 research and 
development until we understand how this program came to be in this 
present condition.
  Some people are going to argue that these actions are too severe. But 
I think it is just the opposite. We believe the actions that we have 
taken help to ensure the program's success. Remember, this is just the 
development phase and it is more than $2 billion over budget. It was 
not that long ago that then Secretary of Defense Cheney canceled the 
Navy A-12 program because it was $1 billion over cost. Now we have a 
plane more than $2 billion over cost.
  I have deep concern over whether we can maintain continuing support 
politically for the F-22 program here in Congress, and with the 
American people, if we cannot adequately address these cost overruns 
and explain to the American people that we are taking prudent steps to 
make sure that this does not continue. The steps that we have taken are 
not designed to put the program in jeopardy. They are designed to save 
the program. They are designed to demonstrate that we recognize there 
are problems and we must hold the contractors accountable.
  We are told the Air Force and the contractors have this agreement. 
They don't have an agreement. All they have said is that they have 
agreed to agree; they have agreed to agree that there will not be any 
more cost overruns, that they will deliver on time. And I pray and 
hope--and maybe have some confidence--that they can do that. But the 
agreement has not been negotiated. It is not in print. It does not have 
signatures on the bottom line. And until it does, I think it is 
reasonable to withhold some funds so we know that those agreements are 
going to be guaranteed and performed.
  What is in jeopardy if the F-22 does not get on track? I suggest four 
very important things. We may end up treating the F-22 like we did the 
B-2, producing far fewer than we need but only what we can afford, and 
then we have an inadequate tactical air program for the future. Also, 
we could lose support for the next aircraft carrier, the CVN-77. In 
fact, I believe it's the advanced procurement for the smart-buy 
initiative that was to save taxpayers $600 million on this carrier that 
was taken by the appropriators to fund the F-22. We may not get that 
carrier. Third, we may lose the Joint Strike Fighter. We cannot 
consider throwing more money at three TACAIR programs, given the low 
levels of procurement for land and sea systems. F-22 cost growth cannot 
be permitted to eat the lion's share of the funding pie. The Navy is 
absolutely counting on the Joint Strike Fighter to complement the F/A-
18E/F. The Marine Corps has put their entire TACAIR future solely in 
the hands of the Joint Strike Fighter. If the Joint Strike Fighter does 
not come through on time, then we are going to have to radically 
rethink whether or not there will even be Marine Corps TACAIR in the 
future.

  We all know that from a political standpoint there will not be a 
Joint Strike Fighter if we cannot control the F-22 cost. This places 
the Navy and the Marine Corps in deep jeopardy.
  Finally, continued F-22 cost growth could rob funds from other key 
Air Force modernization initiatives, whether they be TACAIR, strategic 
airlift, or the communications and intelligence programs which the 
entire joint force will have to rely on for information superiority in 
the 21st century.
  In short, we need to be confident and ensure ourselves that the F-22 
program is under control. We don't know how else to get their 
attention. I found that the best way is to say: No performance, no 
money.
  No, Mr. President, we did that some time back. We were confronted 
with a very similar cost and performance problem with the development 
of the C-17--a marvelous airplane, but they could not get their act 
together. So we told the manufacturer you either come in at cost or you 
are not going to building more planes. As a result, there was a huge 
banner erected in the production plant, which said, ``Build 40 at cost, 
or no more.'' Guess what, they built 40 at cost and now we have a 
multiyear procurement of 120 C-17's. This is a success story because 
Congress held the line, and I am disappointed that we have lost that 
opportunity with this action.
  We should all ask ourselves whether the F-22 program would benefit 
from a similar policy from this body.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Abraham). The time of the Senator has 
expired.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, the pending conference report 
accompanying H.R. 2266, the Department of Defense appropriations bill, 
provides $247.7 billion in new budget authority and $164.7 billion in 
new outlays for Department of Defense programs for fiscal year 1998.
  When outlays from prior-year budget authority and other completed 
actions are taken into account, the final bill totals $247.7 billion in 
budget authority and $244.4 billion in outlays for fiscal year 1998
  This legislation provides for military pay, procurement, research and 
development, operations and maintenance, and various other important 
activities of the Department of Defense and the U.S. military services 
throughout the world. This bill provides for the readiness, current, 
and future weapons systems, and all the other necessities of our 
national defenses--except for military construction and Department of 
Energy atomic energy defense activities--that enable our Armed Forces 
to protect U.S. national interests at home and abroad. It is certainly 
one of the most important pieces of legislation that Congress passes 
each year.
  The spending in this conference report falls within the revised 
section 302(b) allocation for the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee. 
I commend the distinguished chairman, the Senator from Alaska, for 
bringing this bill to the floor within the subcommittee's revised 
allocation.
  The bill provides important increases over the President's request 
for 1998. It is fully consistent with the bipartisan budget agreement 
that the President and Congress concluded earlier this year. I urge the 
adoption of the conference report.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a table displaying the 
Budget Committee scoring of the conference report be placed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                H.R. 2266, DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS, 1998--SPENDING COMPARISONS--CONFERENCE REPORT                
                                   [Fiscal year 1998, in millions of dollars]                                   
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                   Defense     Nondefense     Crime      Mandatory      Total   
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conference Report:                                                                                              
    Budget authority...........................      247,485           27  ...........          197      247,709
    Outlays....................................      244,167           31          197  ...........      244,395
Senate 302(b) allocation:                                                                                       
    Budget authority...........................      247,485           27          197  ...........      247,709
    Outlays....................................      244,232           31  ...........          197      244,460
President's request:                                                                                            
    Budget authority...........................      243,700           27  ...........          197      243,924
    Outlays....................................      243,874           31  ...........          197      244,102
House-passed bill:                                                                                              
    Budget authority...........................      248,111           27  ...........          197      248,335
    Outlays....................................      244,527           31  ...........          197      244,755
Senate-passed bill:                                                                                             
    Budget authority...........................      246,988  ...........  ...........          197      247,185

[[Page S9945]]

                                                                                                                
    Outlays....................................      244,185            7  ...........          197      244,389
Conference Report compared to:                                                                                  
    Senate 302(b) allocation:                                                                                   
        Budget authority.......................  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........
        Outlays................................          -65  ...........  ...........  ...........          -65
President's request:                                                                                            
        Budget authority.......................        3,785  ...........  ...........  ...........        3,785
        Outlays................................          293  ...........  ...........  ...........          293
House-passed bill:                                                                                              
        Budget authority.......................         -626  ...........  ...........  ...........         -626
        Outlays................................         -360  ...........  ...........  ...........         -360
Senate-passed bill:                                                                                             
        Budget authority.......................          497           27  ...........  ...........          524
        Outlays................................          -18           24  ...........  ...........           6 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Details may not add to total due to rounding. Totals adjusted for consistency with current scorekeeping   
  conventions.                                                                                                  

  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I rise to speak in strong support of the 
Defense appropriations conference report, which the Senate is now 
considering.
  The distinguished chairman and the distinguished ranking member, 
Senators Stevens and Inouye, working with our House counterparts, have 
done a remarkable job in fashioning a truly balanced bill that will 
meet our Nation's security needs for the 21st century. I would like to 
salute Senators Stevens and Inouye for their leadership and skill in 
balancing the competing needs of our Nation's military.
  I also would like to thank the chairman and ranking member for 
working with me to address some Defense issues that are of a very high 
priority to North Dakota. Let me just highlight some of these matters.


                              B-52 BOMBERS

  First, this Defense spending bill provides an additional $57.3 
million above the administration's budget request to fully fund our 
Nation's fleet of B-52 bombers. My colleagues will recall that we 
deployed 66 B-52's during Operation Desert Storm, and that these planes 
dropped 40 percent of the ordnance dropped by allied forces during the 
Persian Gulf war. Yet the administration has consistently recommended 
sending 23 of these valuable planes to the boneyard. I am pleased that 
the bill now before us specifically rejects that suggestion.
  As those who fly B-52's out of Minot Air Force Base know, the B-52 is 
a highly capable bomber, one that can continue to contribute to our 
national defense through at least 2030. Nearly every part of the B-52 
has been replaced or modernized, and we have spent over $4 billion in 
recent years to upgrade and update these planes. The B-52's that 
entered service in the 1960's still have only about one-third of the 
flight hours of the average 747 now in commercial service.
  If we were left with 71 B-52's, only about 44 of the aircraft would 
be combat-coded, making it impossible for us to repeat the B-52's gulf 
war performance in any future regional conflict, much less hold some in 
reserve for a second regional conflict or a nuclear role.
  Lastly, to retire strategic bombers would reduce Russia's incentives 
to ratify the START II Treaty. This major arms control agreement will 
help us achieve greater strategic stability. But we should not throw 
away bargaining chips before the Duma acts to approve START II.


                           AIR BATTLE CAPTAIN

  In another area of interest to my State, this bill provides $450,000 
for the Air Battle Captain Program at the University of North Dakota's 
Center for Aerospace Sciences. Most importantly, report language 
accompanying the bill also directs that the program continue to accept 
new students. The Air Battle Captain Program trains helicopter pilots 
for the Army efficiently and cost effectively, and most of its 
graduates have gone on to become Army aviators. When the graduates 
reach Fort Rucker, they arrive as commissioned second lieutenants and 
are able to forego the primary flight training, thus enabling the Army 
to assign them to combat units 8 months ahead of their contemporaries.


                              FLOOD RELIEF

  As my colleagues will recall, this spring the Red River Valley 
suffered its worst flooding in recorded history. When the water finally 
won, a 500-year flood emptied Grand Forks, ND, a city of 50,000 people, 
and sent 4,000 residents to the Grand Forks Air Force Base for shelter. 
Many of the base personnel who fought the flood for weeks, and who 
hosted evacuees when the flood water breached the dikes, were 
themselves flood victims. Over 700 military personnel were forced to 
evacuate during this disaster. And 406 service members have suffered 
losses to personal property, including 95 families whose homes were 
extensively damaged.
  This Defense appropriations bill ensures that these personnel will 
not be victims of unintended discrimination as well as flooding.
  If these service members had lived on base, they would be eligible to 
file a claim with the Department of Defense for losses incident to 
service. The Air Force pays such claims pursuant to section 3721 of 
title 31 of the United States Code. But as the law now stands, military 
personnel living off base are not eligible to file such claims, even 
though they are stationed at Grand Forks Air Force Base as a result of 
their military service.
  Section 8120 of the bill would simply permit the Air Force to 
reimburse these service members for their losses despite the fact that 
they lived off base. The bill makes available up to $4.5 million of the 
funds already available to the Department of Defense for paying claims.
  Let me assure my colleagues that section 8120 supplements private 
insurance and benefits provided by the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency. Air Force practices and FEMA regulations prohibit duplication. 
Service members with private insurance will have to file claims against 
that insurance before the Air Force will pay claims under this 
provision.


                        LEADERSHIP AND HARD WORK

  Mr. President, none of these aspects of the bill would have been 
approved by the Senate or would have survived conference with the House 
were it not for the support and leadership provided by the 
distinguished chairman of the subcommittee, Senator Stevens, and the 
distinguished ranking member, Senator Inouye. I would like to 
acknowledge their willingness to help in these areas and to thank them 
for their assistance.
  Let me also take this opportunity to put in a good word for the hard-
working staff of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee. My thanks and 
congratulations go in particular to Senator Stevens's able lieutenant, 
staff director Steve Cortese, and to Charlie Huoy, who handles these 
issues for Senator Inouye. And I am also grateful for the skilled 
efforts of Susan Hogan, John Young, Mazie Mattson, and Emelie East.
  I urge my colleagues to support this conference report. Thank you, 
Mr. President. I yield the floor.


                             bosnia policy

  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the President's National Security Advisor, 
Mr. Sandy Berger, two days ago made an important statement on U.S. 
policy toward Bosnia, in particular the question of keeping United 
States' ground forces in the region beyond June of 1998, in order to 
keep the peace in an area where political reconciliation has lagged 
behind the actual military separation of the opposing forces. It is not 
surprising that political, economic and social reconciliation would 
proceed at a pace commensurate with the levels of extensive brutality 
and violence which characterized the Bosnia conflict prior

[[Page S9946]]

to the introduction of U.S.-led NATO forces two years ago. In what 
might be characterized as a trial balloon, Mr. Berger stated, according 
to the New York Times of yesterday, September 24, 1997, that the 
``international community'' will be required to ``stay engaged in 
Bosnia in some fashion for a good while to come.''
  The question is for how long should the United States remain while 
expending billions of defense dollars and risking the erosion of U.S. 
readiness by tying our forces down in Bosnia? The problem, as I see it, 
is that our European partners have said that they will not remain on 
the ground in Bosnia unless the United States does, and when we leave, 
they will. I find this to be a very unreasonable position, in that 
Bosnia is not paramount in the vital interests of the U.S., and at some 
point our European allies should consider taking the responsibility for 
acting as the military security force in that European country. This is 
not to say that the U.S. could not provide continued logistical, 
intelligence, and other supporting roles while the Europeans take their 
turn at bat in Bosnia.
  I call the attention of my colleagues to the provision in the 
Department of Defense conference report, Section 8132 which requires 
the President to certify, by May 15, 1998, his intentions regarding 
keeping our forces in Bosnia on the ground beyond June 30, 1998. The 
certification must include the reasons for the deployment, the size and 
duration of the deployment, the missions of our military forces, the 
exit strategy for our forces, the costs of the deployment, and the 
impact of it on the morale, retention, and effectiveness of U.S. 
forces. This is a very good, very complete provision, and it will 
trigger a debate, as it should, in this body, regarding the future 
policy of the United States in Bosnia.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the Defense 
Appropriations conference report. First, I'd like to recognize Senator 
Stevens and Senator Inouye for the fine work they did in working 
through the conference issues with their House counterparts. I think 
that after this vote, it will be clear that the vast majority of this 
body supports the balance this report strikes between the changing 
needs of our Armed Forces and the constraints imposed by necessary 
spending reductions.
  I felt that the conferees made the right decision by endorsing the 
submarine teaming agreement. That endorsement ends the costly battle 
between our two submarine builders, saves the taxpayers money, and 
preserves competition in the research and development phase of 
submarine building. While some oppose this plan, no one argues the 
point that this agreement will save the Navy hundreds of millions of 
dollars over the building plan contained in last year's bill. 
Furthermore, this plan maintains competition for new ideas on how to 
improve the new attack submarine. In sum, we have two fine shipyards 
working together overall to decrease the cost to taxpayers even while 
they compete on sub-systems to ensure continued technological 
advancement.
  On a related matter, I'm heartened to see that this report provides 
funding to complete the Seawolf submarine program. This building 
program has clearly undergone radical changes as a result of the end of 
the cold war. At one point, this nation expected to build 30 Seawolf-
class submarines and now that number has been reduced to just 3 in 
favor of the less-costly new attack submarine. So this Nation has 
already throttled back in terms of its submarine plans; now it's time 
to move forward with our new plan.
  This conference report also increases the number of Blackhawk 
helicopters to 28, 10 more than the President requested. And it asks 
for two navy CH-60 helicopters as well as advance procurement money for 
that Navy version of the Blackhawk. These additional aircraft reveal 
once again that the Blackhawk is this Nation's most capable helicopter. 
Derivatives of this helicopter are at work for nearly every branch of 
the U.S. Armed Forces as well as 15 foreign countries. As capable and 
versatile as these helicopters are, however, National Guard adjutant 
generals throughout the country remind us year after year that they do 
not have enough. In fact, a conservative reading of the numbers reveals 
that the National Guard has a shortfall of over 400 Blackhawks. 
Meanwhile, the production line for these aircraft will shut down in a 
couple of years. The plan for coping with that shortfall is to rely on 
Vietnam-era UH-1 helicopters as we move into the next century. Frankly, 
as the National Guard stands at the front line of defense against 
devastating natural disasters, they deserve better. I hope the 
President's next budget request reflects their requirements.
  On a brighter note, this committee made the tough decisions between 
modernizing military equipment and cutting costs. I was glad to see 
that the committee agreed with the Defense Department's requests for 
the C-17 cargo aircraft, the F-22 program, and the emerging Comanche 
helicopter program. These prudent decisions in support of cost-
effective programs will provide vital support for our military forces 
well into the 21st century.
  Finally, Mr. President, let me congratulate the conferees on 
completing this bill, the largest of the 13 appropriations bills, 
before the end of the fiscal year. There was a lot of hard work in 
negotiations that allowed this bill to move forward and I'm sure that 
this body and the Nation appreciates their efforts.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I have 8 minutes, roughly. I yield 4 
minutes to the Senator from Texas.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas is recognized for up to 
4 minutes.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I thank the chairman, Senator Stevens, 
and Senator Inouye, for producing a defense appropriations bill that 
will fund the defense needs of our country. It will create a quality of 
life improvement for those who are serving in our military, and it will 
give us, to the extent that we can, the equipment that we need for our 
young men and women to do this job.
  I want to point out particularly one part of this bill that I think 
is a major step for this Senate and for our country. That is the part 
that provides for a cutoff of funds for the Bosnia deployment after 
June 30, 1998, unless the President comes to Congress 45 days before 
that time and shows us exactly why he would want to extend the forces, 
how much it would cost, what it is going to do--what the mission is, 
and what the exit strategy is. This is what we have been asking the 
President for, for 2 years.
  When we started this deployment over the objections of many of us in 
this Congress, it was for 1 year, from November 1995 to November 1996. 
Then the continuation came with very little consultation from Congress, 
certainly no previous consultation, and we started in January 1997 
until now; it was set for June 1998. But even today the New York Times 
editorialized, ``Still No Exit Strategy on Bosnia.''
  Congress is saying to the President, we want to see an exit strategy. 
Many of us are concerned that we are drifting into a potential 
commitment that we do not understand, that the American people do not 
understand. They do not see a need for it because they don't see the 
strategy. It seems, if you are looking at Bosnia, that the military 
mission is to keep the parties apart. But the political mission is to 
bring them together, perhaps bring them together prematurely.
  I have been to the Balkans six times. I was there in August. I walked 
on the streets of Brcko. I talked to the Serbs. I talked to the Muslim 
residents. I asked them if they were helping each other move into the 
neighborhoods to bring the refugees back. They acted like the others 
weren't there. They are not helping each other. They are not ready for 
this move. If we are going to try to continue to force this 
resettlement, is it an inherently peaceful move? Or are we disrupting 
the peace that we would like to put into Bosnia today?
  Mr. President, I think what this bill does is say, once and for all, 
we are going to have consultation. We are not going to allow a mission 
creep, such as we have seen in Somalia. We are not going to allow a 
mission creep, such as we have seen in Vietnam. We are not going to 
allow our young men and women, who are serving in Bosnia, to give their 
lives before we have a policy in this country about what our mission is 
there. We are going to do it, I hope, in the light of day, taking into 
consideration what the U.S. security interest

[[Page S9947]]

is, what it is going to cost us, what our relationship is to our 
allies.
  These are the questions we must address before we put our young men 
and women into a mission that has no end.
  So, Mr. President, I commend the leaders of the armed services and 
Defense Appropriations Subcommittee. I am on that subcommittee. Under 
the leadership of Chairman Stevens and cochairman, Senator Inouye, with 
Senator Pat Roberts, with Senator Russ Feingold, we are trying to 
fashion a policy that the American people will agree is the right 
policy for our country.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the New York Times 
editorial be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                    Still No Exit Strategy on Bosnia

       Having already stretched America's troop commitment in 
     Bosnia from 12 to 30 months, the Clinton Administration has 
     begun an effort to prepare public opinion for the possibility 
     of an even longer stay. That is the way to read Samuel 
     Berger's speech at Georgetown University on Tuesday, when he 
     linked the duration of American involvement to a notably 
     ambitious set of policy goals. Mr. Berger, the President's 
     national security adviser, is too hasty. Instead of managing 
     the public relations of a longer stay, he should be using the 
     time to try to produce a workable exit strategy by the June 
     deadline.
       Everyone wants to unified, democratic and prospering 
     Bosnia. But Congressional Republicans are right to warn that 
     American soldiers cannot remain deployed until that goal is 
     fully achieved. What was regrettably absent from Mr. Berger's 
     speech was any sense of driving toward departure. It is clear 
     from the speech that Mr. Berger and Secretary of State 
     Madeleine Albright plan to spend the time between now and 
     June urging President Clinton once again to push back the 
     withdrawal deadline.
       Lack of an exit strategy has been a consistently troubling 
     omission ever since Mr. Clinton first sent American troops 
     into Bosnia at the end of 1995. On Tuesday, Administration 
     officials spoke about the need to begin planning by February 
     for the next phase of military involvement. By our calender 
     it is still September, and such a focus on the hypothetical 
     future is premature. The Administration has nine months to 
     clarify the specific military talks that need to be 
     accomplished before Bosnia is secure enough to allow a full 
     American withdrawal. Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison speaks for 
     many Republicans and, no doubt, a number of Democrats when 
     she warns the White House that without such an exit strategy, 
     Congress will fight any extension requests.
       Common sense argues against igniting a renewed war in 
     Bosnia by precipitously withdrawing NATO troops. We readily 
     concede that withdrawal deadlines cannot be set in cement 
     without regard to protecting the progress that has already 
     been made. Future events could even warrant an extended 
     presence. But the Administration is tilting the wrong way, 
     and the current mindset of Mr. Clinton's foreign-policy team 
     suggests that it will not discover a way out in the absence 
     of a Congressional revolt.
       When Mr. Clinton first proposed sending American troops to 
     Bosnia, skeptics argued that guaranteeing full respect for 
     the Dayton peace agreements could take decades. The 
     Administration countered that all it meant to do was give the 
     Bosnians a year to build the peace outlined at Dayton. As 
     that one-year deadline approached, the White House gave the 
     original mission a new name and extended if for 18 months. 
     Now, as the Administration seems to be preparing for yet 
     another extension, Congress may have to force it to show that 
     fundamental American interests require a continued military 
     presence in Bosnia.
       The two strongest arguments for staying are the persistence 
     of deadly hatreds that could spark renewed hostilities once 
     outside troops withdraw and the statements by various 
     European governments that once American troops depart, their 
     troops will be withdrawn as well. But the irresponsibility of 
     Bosnian fractional leaders and European allies should not 
     push Washington into an expanded definition of America's own 
     vital interests.
       The United States has all along had a limited interest in 
     Bosnia, consisting mainly of preventing the slaughter of 
     civilians and preserving the unity and effectiveness of the 
     NATO alliance. Beyond that there are some desirable goals, 
     like bringing war crimes suspects to trial and allowing 
     refugees to return to their homes. These warrant strong 
     diplomatic exertions, supplemented, at least through June, by 
     carefully planned military actions. There is a lot NATO 
     troops can still do in this regard before their currently 
     scheduled withdrawal date.
       Building a united and peaceful Bosnia is ultimately up to 
     the people of Bosnia. Policing Europe in the absence of acute 
     threats like shooting wars is primarily the responsibility of 
     European nations themselves. If the Bosnians will not work 
     together and the Europeans will not shoulder greater security 
     responsibilities on their own, the breach cannot be filled 
     indefinitely with American troops.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I would like to join the Senator from 
Texas [Mrs. Hutchison] in highlighting the provisions in Department of 
Defense appropriations bill, as agreed to in conference, concerning the 
deployment of United States troops in Bosnia.
  The conferees agreed to include--in legislative language--a provision 
that stipulates that no funds may be made available for the deployment 
of United States ground forces in Bosnia after June 30, 1998--a date 
the President himself has specified--unless the President submits to 
the Congress a certification that the continued presence of our troops 
is necessary to protect our national security interests. In this 
certification, the President will have to justify for the Congress and 
the American people the reasons for such determination and specify 
details concerning the deployment. These include: the number of 
military personnel to be deployed, the expected duration of the 
deployment, the mission and objectives of the deployment, and the exit 
strategy for the U.S. forces who have been deployed.
  But most importantly, Mr. President, President Clinton will have to 
detail the costs associated with any deployment after June 30, 1998. 
This is perhaps the most troubling aspect of our involvement in Bosnia. 
After originally being told that the mission would cost the American 
people some $2 billion, recent estimates indicate that we will soon 
have spent well over $7 billion to deploy U.S. troops. Mr. President, 
that is more than a threefold increase. With the language included in 
the bill before us today, the administration will now have to be much 
more clear about the potential costs of continuing deployment in the 
region. I think this is vitally important so that we, the Members of 
the U.S. Congress, and the American people we represent will have a 
better idea of the financial implications of a mission that I feel has 
already gone on much too long with too little to show for it.
  Because of my concerns about this mission, concerns which I have 
detailed on the Senate floor many times before, I have joined with the 
Senator from Texas [Mrs. Hutchison] in developing a Senate Bosnia 
Working Group. She and I both feel that it is time to think about what 
policy alternatives we may have with respect to U.S. involvement in the 
Balkans.
  The compromise language arrived at by the conferees, while perhaps 
not as strong as I would have liked, hopefully represents a first step 
toward the development of a policy that we can all be more comfortable 
with.
  So Mr. President, I thank all the conferees for their efforts in this 
area.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I yield the Senator from Virginia 4 
minutes, but I might say, Mr. President, to the Senator from Arizona, 
we thought he might proceed first. If he doesn't use all his time, 
there will be more time for us.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I thank Senator Stevens and Senator 
Inouye.
  I have the usual objections. One of them is particularly egregious: 
$250,000 to transfer commercial cruise ship shipbuilding technology to 
U.S. Navy shipyards and to establish a monopoly for a single cruise 
line in the Hawaiian Islands, for which there is a competitor already 
who wants to compete there. The people who tour the Hawaiian Islands 
and who live there are going to pay for that. I find it regrettable.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, the effects of over 10 years of cuts in 
defense spending are being acutely felt by the men and women who serve 
in uniform. Enough has been said on this floor about issues like pilot 
retention, maintenance backlogs and modernization problems all caused 
by the confluence of declining resources and high operational temmpos 
that I will not dwell on them here today. Suffice to say, I applaud the 
decision by Congress to add $3.6 billion to the amount allocated for 
national defense reflected in the legislation before us today. The 
defense appropriations bill rightfully addresses some of these problems 
with funds added during congressional budget negotiations earlier this 
year.
  The examples of waste, as usual, are many. I'm not sure whether I 
should be nervous about an imminent threat to our national security 
from another

[[Page S9948]]

solar system or galaxy. What or who is out there that warrants over 
$3.5 million in unrequested funds being added to the defense budget for 
the Sacramento Peak Observatory and the Southern Observatory for 
Astronomical Research? I am cognizant of the very real risk that Earth 
may someday be threatened by a comet or asteroid, but this is a problem 
already receiving ample attention from the scientific community using 
other federal and private dollars. I question whether we should be 
using defense dollars to fund these observatories.
  I have to confess to also being concerned about the increasing amount 
of defense dollars being earmarked for medical research programs 
despite the fact that the National Institutes for Health exists 
precisely to perform such research. Each area of research, whether 
diabetes, prostate cancer or HIV, carries with it an entirely 
sympathetic constituency for whom my heart goes out. That does not, 
however, justify the cynical use of defense dollars to conduct such 
research. To oppose this spending sets one up at as heartless. After 
all, who could oppose medical research. That, however, is precisely why 
Members of Congress like to use the defense budget: opponents of these 
earmarks risk antagonizing people suffering from serious illness or who 
have relatives with these afflictions. The point has to be made, 
however, that medical research not related to military service belongs 
with NIH--not DoD.
  Mr. President, the tortuous process through which Members of Congress 
contort themselves to conjure up national security rationalizations for 
parochial projects is absurd. It degrades this institution and further 
undermines public confidence in their elected officials. The $8 million 
in this bill for the Pacific Disaster Center is a case in point, as is 
the $9 million for the Monterey Institute for Counter-Proliferation 
Analysis. The latter is illustrative of the growing trend toward 
establishing endless numbers of research institutes irrespective of the 
existence of other centers and government agencies already performing 
such work.
  It is in this light that I find particularly disturbing the inclusion 
in this bill of $3 million for the establishment of a ``21st Century 
National Security Study Group.'' Neither House nor Senate bill included 
this item, but suddenly it finds itself in the Conference Report. Not 
only is this group wholly unnecessary--after all, how many more such 
studies do we really need, especially given the number produced without 
federal dollars--but it was never even brought before either chamber of 
Congress prior to now.
  This is ridiculous. What possible practical utility can this study 
group have? Is Congress so enamored of insinuating itself into the 
process of formulating our National Security and Military Strategies 
that it needs to mandate that some smart people get together and do 
what they're already doing in Department of Defense doctrinal and 
warfighting centers and research institutes all over America? Perhaps 
our counterparts in the House where I understand this program 
originated have lost sight of why they are here.
  I do not know why the defense appropriations conference report 
includes $5 million to expand the North Star Borough Landfill; $20 
million not requested by the Defense Department for an integrated 
family of test equipment; $50 million--$50 million--for an Industrial 
Modernization program to assist in the commercial reutilization of 
government industrial complexes no longer used by the government. Local 
government and chambers of commerce have been performing this task just 
fine throughout the base closure process. Similarly, why do the 
communities surrounding Fort Ord and San Diego get a combined $15 
million in defense conversion money earmarked in this bill? Was it 
necessary to double the amount requested for the Young Marines program? 
Should Congress really be in the business of legislating monopolies for 
individual cruise ship lines, as is done in this bill?
  This body has important business to which it must attend. I believe I 
have made my point. I won't even dwell on the $100,000 in the bill to 
preserve a Revolutionary War-era gunboat located at the bottom of Lake 
Champlain. There isn't time. Mr. President, the hemorrhaging of defense 
dollars for nondefense and highly questionable purposes is inexcusable 
during a period when we are struggling with vital questions of long-
term military readiness. I hope to live to see the day Members of 
Congress see the light and cease this destructive practice of filling 
appropriations bills with garbage. It just has to stop.
  I ask unanimous consent that a list of objectionable provisions in 
the bill be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the list was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

 Objectionable Provisions in H.R. 2266, Conference Agreement on Fiscal 
                 Year 1998 Defense Appropriations Bill


                             bill language

       $35 million earmarked for the Kaho'olawe Island Conveyance, 
     Remediation, and Environmental Restoration Fund.
       Section 8009 mandates that funding be available for 
     graduate medical education programs at Hawaii-based Army 
     medical facilities.
       Section 8030 prohibits the use of funds appropriated in the 
     bill to reduce or disestablish the 53rd Weather 
     Reconnaissance Squadron of the Air Force Reserve, based at 
     Keesler Air Force Base, Mississippi.
       Section 8056 sets aside $8 million (unauthorized) for 
     mitigation of environmental impacts on Indian lands.
       Section 8078 requires the Army to utilize the former George 
     Air Force Base.
       Section 8097 directs a $13 million grant to the Intrepid 
     Sea-Air-Space Foundation to refurbish the U.S.S. Intrepid.
       Section 8099 compels the Air Force to send its officers 
     through Air Force Institute of Technology irrespective of 
     cost relative to civilian institutions.
       Section 8109 earmarks $250,000 to transfer commercial 
     cruise ship shipbuilding technology to U.S. Navy shipyards 
     and establishes a monopoly for a single cruise line in the 
     Hawaiian islands.
       Section 8130 earmarks $3 million for establishment of a 
     ``21st Century National Security Study Group'' [NOT IN EITHER 
     BILL]
       Section 8131 establishes another panel to review the 
     requirement for B-2 bombers, with an appropriation of 
     unlimited funds as requested by the panel members.


                            report language

       $5 million is earmarked for the expansion of the North Star 
     Borough Landfill.
       The Department of the Air Force is ``urged'' to work 
     closely with the William Lehman Aviation Center at Florida 
     Memorial College.
       $50 million is earmarked for projects and programs to 
     convert former government facilities and complexes to 
     commercial use.
       $72 million is earmarked for the Youth Challenge, 
     Innovative Reading Training, and Starbase Youth Programs.
       $100,000 is earmarked for the preservation of a 
     Revolutionary War gunboat discovered on the bottom of lake 
     Champlain.
       The Department of the Army is directed to re-award the 
     Joint Tactical Terminal contract.
       The Army is ``urged'' to allocate $750,000 to connect four 
     historically-black colleges to the Army High Performance 
     Computing Center in Minneapolis and provides an additional 
     $500,000 for work stations at the colleges.
       A Diagnostic Imaging Technology Center of Excellence is 
     required to be established at Walter Reed Army Hospital and 
     $4 million is earmarked for one particular program, all 
     without benefit of competitive processes.
       $3 million is earmarked for the Terfenol-D program, under 
     the proviso that the work be performed in partnership with 
     the National Center for Excellence in Metal Working 
     Technology.

                     Conference report budget tables                    
                  [Procurement in millions of dollars]                  
                             Army                                       
                                                                        
C-XX Medium-Range Aircraft...................................      23.0 
UH-60 Blackhawk Mods.........................................       3.0 
EFOG-M.......................................................      13.3 
MELIOS.......................................................       5.0 
All Terrain Cranes...........................................       8.0 
                                                                        
                      Navy/Marine Corps                                 
                                                                        
CH-60 Helicopters............................................      30.4 
KC-130J Aircraft.............................................     120.0 
AN/AAQ-22....................................................       2.0 
Ground Proximity Warning System..............................       4.0 
                                                                        
                          Air Force                                     
                                                                        
B-2A Increase................................................     156.9 
WC-130J Aircraft.............................................     118.0 
WC-130J Spares...............................................      14.8 
GATM.........................................................      17.5 
F-16 OBOGS...................................................       1.1 
U-2 Sensor Glass.............................................      24.0 
U-2 SYERS....................................................       5.0 
MEECN........................................................       8.5 
                                                                        
                         Defense-Wide                                   
                                                                        
JSLIST Industrial Production.................................      10.0 
M17-LDS Water Sprayers.......................................       2.0 
7 HMVV Medical Shelters......................................       3.0 
                                                                        
                 Reserves and National Guard                            
                                                                        
Including the following Aircraft:                                       
    T-39 Replacement Aircraft................................      10.0 
    C-130J...................................................     226.0 
    KC-135 Re-Engining.......................................      52.0 
    F-16 Avionics Intermediate Shop..........................      32.0 
                                                              ----------

[[Page S9949]]

                                                                        
        Total................................................     320.0 
                                                              ==========
                                                                        
          RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST AND EVALUATION                    
                                                                        
                             Army                                       
                                                                        
Environmental Quality Technology:                                       
    Gallo Center.............................................       4.0 
    Commercialization of Technologies to Lower Defense Cost             
     Initiative..............................................       5.0 
    Bioremediation Education, Science, & Technology Center...       4.0 
    Plasma Energy Pyrolysis System...........................       6.0 
    Radford Environmental Development & Management Program...       5.0 
    Environmental Projects at the WETO Facility..............       7.0 
    Small Business Development Program.......................       5.4 
    Agriculturally based remediation in Pacific Island                  
     Ecosystems..............................................       4.0 
    Computer based land management...........................       4.0 
Military Engineering Technology: Molten carbonate fuel cells            
 technology..................................................       6.0 
Medical Advanced Technology:                                            
    Army-managed peer-reviewed breast cancer research........     135.0 
    Emergency telemedicine...................................       2.5 
    Volume Angiocat (VAC)....................................       4.0 
    Periscopic minimally-invasive surgery....................       3.0 
    Proton beam..............................................       4.0 
Munitions Standardization, Effectiveness & Safety:                      
    Blast Chamber--Anniston Army Depot.......................       2.0 
    Explosive waste incinerator..............................       1.1 
                                                                        
                             Navy                                       
                                                                        
Industrial Preparedness......................................      55.0 
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Technology:                               
    Autonomous underwater vehicle/sensor development.........      10.0 
    Ocean partnerships.......................................      12.0 
Medical Development:                                                    
    Bone marrow..............................................      34.0 
    National Biodynamics Lab.................................       2.6 
    Biocide materials research...............................       5.5 
    Freeze dried blood.......................................       1.5 
    Dental research..........................................       2.0 
    Mobile medical monitor...................................       2.0 
    Rural health.............................................       3.0 
    Natural gas cooling/desiccant demonstration..............       2.5 
Manpower, Personnel and Training Advanced Technology                    
 Development:                                                           
    Virtual reality environment/training research............       3.69
    Center for Integrated Manufacturing Studies..............       2.0 
Environmental Quality and Logistics Advanced Techn.:                    
    250KW proton exchange membrane fuel cell.................       1.7 
    Visualization of technical information...................       2.0 
    Smart Base...............................................       6.3 
Undersea Warfare Advanced Technology: COTS airgun as an                 
 acoustic source.............................................       3.0 
                                                                        
                          Air Force                                     
                                                                        
HAARP........................................................       5.0 
ALR-69 PLAID.................................................       5.0 
Missile Technology Demonstration flight testing..............       4.8 
Scorpius.....................................................       5.0 
Hypersonic wind tunnel design study..........................       2.0 
                                                                        
                         Defense-Wide                                   
                                                                        
Agile Port Demonstration.....................................       5.0 
University Research Initiatives:                                        
    DEPSCOR..................................................      10.0 
    Southern Observatory for Astronomical Research...........       3.0 
Tactical Technology:                                                    
    Simulation based design (Gulf Coast Region Maritime                 
     Center).................................................       3.0 
    Center of Excellence for Research in Ocean Sciences......       7.0 
Materials and Electronics Technology: Cryogenic electronics..       6.0 
Defense Special Weapons Agency:                                         
    Bioenvironmental research................................       5.0 
    Nuclear weapons effects core competencies................      12.0 
Counterproliferation Support: HAARP..........................       3.0 
Advanced Electronics Technologies:                                      
    Lithographic & Alternative Semiconductor Processing                 
     (LAST)..................................................      18.0 
    Laser plasma x-ray source technology.....................       5.0 
Defense Imagery and Mapping Program; USIGS Improv............       5.0 
                                                                        
             Other Department of Defense Programs                       
                                                                        
Defense Health Program:                                                 
    Hepatitis A Vaccine......................................      17.0 
    Military Health Information Services.....................       7.0 
    Pacific Island Health Care Program.......................       5.0 
    Brown Tree Snakes........................................       1.0 
    Cancer Control Program...................................       8.9 
    Army Research Institute..................................       5.4 
    Military Nursing Research................................       5.0 
    Disaster Management Training.............................       5.0 
    Holloman Air Force Base..................................       5.0 
    Restoration of Army O&M (VAC)............................       8.0 
                                                                        
        Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities                   
                                                                        
Source Nation Support: Riverine Interdiction Initiative......       9.0 
Law Enforcement Agency Support:                                         
    Southwest Border Information System......................       4.0 
    Southwest Border Fence...................................       4.0 
    HIDTA Crack House Demolition.............................       2.3 
    C-26 Aircraft Photo Reconnaissance Upgrade...............       4.5 
    Regional Police Information System.......................       3.0 
                                                              ==========
        Total questionable adds to the Defense appropriation            
         conference report...................................   1,495.4 
                                                                        

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I would like to continue on this very 
important issue. The 19th century Danish philosopher Kierkegaard wrote 
that ``purity of heart is to will one thing.'' In Bosnia, the 
international community has willed many things, and the result has been 
a highly tenuous peace among the warring ethnic factions unlikely to 
long survive the departure of NATO military forces. As we all know, 
what was originally a 1-year mission has involved in a multiyear 
engagement of indeterminate duration. It is time to assess where we are 
and where we are going, with an eye toward ending deployment of U.S. 
forces to that war-torn region.
  When this body debated back in December 1995 the issue of whether to 
support the deployment of U.S. forces as part of the Implementation 
Force following the signing of the Dayton peace accords, I stated that, 
``I know that by supporting the deployment, but not the decision [to 
send the troops], I must accept the blame if something happens.'' 
Events of the past several weeks have shown disturbing signs of a trend 
that may entail actions being taken that will result in the death of 
American servicemen. Mr. President, I am a realist. I recognize that 
the military exists to support national policy and that wearing the 
uniform involves a very real risk of being killed in action. Our 
failure to ``will one thing,'' however, is leading us down a perilous 
path on which such deaths will have been unnecessary.
  Congress, the press, scholars, and others have all considered the 
perennial question of mission creep. We can stop debating it, and 
accept that it has happened. Comparisons have been made with the ill-
fated mission in Somalia to capture the late warlord and tribal leader 
Mohammed Farah Aideed. Such comparisons are often inappropriate for a 
number of reasons, but in this case it is valid. The multinational 
force, including the 9,400-strong contingent of U.S. troops, has seen 
its mission grow from that which is very specifically set forth in the 
annex accompanying the Dayton accords to one of extraordinarily 
confusing incongruity. The recent capture by British special forces of 
a Bosnian Serb indicted by the International War Crimes Tribunal in The 
Hague and the killing of another certainly sent a signal to Radovan 
Karadzic, Ratko Mladic, and the others on the long list of war 
criminals that at long last that provision of Dayton would be enforced.
  As with Farah Aideed in Somalia, however, the signal has raised the 
stakes greatly in terms of the cost we could pay to bring them to 
justice. Lest anyone think I exaggerate, remember the tragedy of 
watching an entire company of elite American soldiers killed or wounded 
while Farah Aideed continued to elude capture. The situation in Bosnia 
could be incomparably worse.
  The United States has overtly positioned itself in the middle of a 
power struggle between two Bosnian Serb leaders, President Biljana 
Plavsic and Radovan Karadzic. It is not what I would consider a great 
set of options. In the world of Serbian politics, though, everything is 
relative. The Clinton Administration has thrown its weight behind 
President Plavsic, the properly elected leader despite her abysmal 
record during the years following the splintering of the former

[[Page S9950]]

Yugoslavia into ethnically derived divisions. Not a hard choice when 
the alternative is Karadzic, whose name should rightfully be placed 
alongside those of other 20th Century butchers. The point I am trying 
to raise, however, is that once we sided with one faction within the 
Bosnian-Serb community, we placed our military personnel in the kind of 
position that faced those in Lebanon in 1983 and Somalia 10 years 
later.
  The phenomenon of mission creep was accepted by most when it entailed 
benign nation-building measures. Indeed, the absence of a viable 
alternative to NATO in terms of competence, discipline, willingness to 
think innovatively, and absence of the kind of civilian political 
oversight that characterized the disastrous and tragic decision making 
apparatus under former U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and 
his deputy Yasushi Akashi made it only logical that the military 
component of the operation to end the war and rebuild the country 
should fall on NATO's shoulders. Logical, but not necessarily right. 
That extension of the military's original mission of simply keeping the 
warring factions apart ensured that the deployment would last longer 
than originally intended.
  When the President announced that he would keep our forces in Bosnia 
beyond the original withdrawal date, he was met with widespread 
skepticism. How many of us actually believed that the June 1998 target 
date would be met? We knew that the deployment would continue 
indefinitely; that the costs would never be properly budgeted; that the 
diplomatic framework upon which we are operating would never stand on 
its own. But we also knew that a decision by Congress to terminate 
funding for troops in the field, for men and women sent in harms way at 
the behest of their Commander-in-Chief, stands as perhaps the most 
morally and politically difficult we can ever be called upon to make.
  The absence of an exit strategy has made it easier for the 
Administration to justify keeping troops there to execute an expanding 
list of missions with no logical completion date other than the fairly 
arbitrary one of June 1998. The appearance of conflict back in the late 
May-early June timeframe between the Secretaries of State and Defense 
and the more recent contradictory messages conveyed by the National 
Security Advisor and the Secretary of Defense regarding the June 1998 
withdrawal date illuminates all too well the total lack on the part of 
the Administration of a clear concept of what we are doing in Bosnia 
and, consequently, how long we should be there.
  Mr. President, I supported the decision to deploy troops to end the 
war because President Clinton, in his capacity as Chief Executive and 
with his constitutional prerogative of conducting this Nation's foreign 
policy, had committed us to stop the fighting. And let no one doubt 
that the bitterness involved, the scale of atrocities inflicted, did 
not warrant some kind of forceful action.
  It is certainly likely that a peacekeeping force will be needed 
beyond June 1998. The parties to the conflict in Bosnia have shown 
little sign that they are prepared to accept in full the terms of the 
Dayton Accord, and key provisions like the return of refugees to their 
pre-war homes will require the presence of such a force. There is a 
legitimate question, though, whether that contingent needs to include 
U.S. ground forces. We should not continue to accept the protestations 
of our allies, such as those that were voiced prior to our deployment 
of ground forces, that the United States is not sharing the risk. This 
country has seen too many of its fallen soldiers laid to rest in 
European cemetaries for us to accept that kind of rhetoric. A 
peacekeeping force without United States ground forces can and should 
assume responsibility for Bosnia after June 1998.
  This does not imply an abandonment of our allies and friends in the 
effort at preventing a return of the fighting that forced the civilized 
world to once again reflect upon the fragility of global or regional 
peace. On the contrary, the conflagration that enveloped the former 
Yugoslavia earlier this decade was all the more shocking for its 
occurrence in Europe, where war was considered least likely to occur 
following the end of the East-West confrontation of the cold war era. 
The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was a sad reminder that the so-called 
enlightened continent remains vulnerable to the kind of hatred and 
violence that culminated not long ago in the Holocaust.
  What is important, to this country, is that we not become the 
permanent caretaker of the region. Our troops must be out by the end of 
June 1998. We should maintain a rapid reaction force in Hungary, and 
our heavier forces in Germany should remain available if needed. The 
rapid reaction force should include air and ground components capable 
of responding in a timely manner to a resurgence in fighting with 
sufficient strength to quell any such fighting at minimal risk to our 
personnel. But make no mistake: The peacekeeping force that remains 
inside Bosnia and Herzegovina must be European in content. The 
governments of Europe must accept responsibility for maintaining peace 
in their own backyard. Two world wars demonstrated that the United 
States cannot disengage from Europe, and our own economic well-being 
demands that we not do so. But the American public should not be 
expected to see its military personnel kept in harm's way in perpetuity 
in a situation where the parties refuse to take the necessary steps for 
lasting peace.
  During the cold war, we prided ourselves on our role as leader of the 
free world. Those of us who know the horror of war first hand, however, 
know the price such leadership entails. It is not a price that should 
be paid in Bosnia. We should not send the wrong message to our 
personnel in the field by cutting off their funding; but we should send 
a message to the President that the United States has done all it can 
for that sad country and withdraw our soldiers from Bosnia.
  Mr. President, I appreciate the indulgence of my colleagues. I yield 
the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia is recognized.
  Mr. STEVENS. I yield the Senator 4 minutes.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I wish to associate myself with the 
distinguished Senator from Arizona and his remarks and, indeed, those 
of the distinguished Senator from Texas [Mrs. Hutchison]. I have worked 
with them on this very issue.
  Mr. President, I commend the Appropriations Committee for the 
language which is contained in their bill, but I would like to urge 
that this whole analysis be taken a step further.
  During the course of the confirmation hearings on General Shelton, I 
said that it is time for the United States to exercise the leadership 
to reconvene the principles, the very principles that laid down the 
Dayton accords, assess what has been done, what has to be done and, 
most significantly, the realistic chances of the balance being done.
  Mr. President, I have in my hand, and I ask unanimous consent to have 
printed in the Record an op-ed piece by the distinguished former 
National Security Adviser, Dr. Kissinger, with whom I worked when he 
was in that position, and likewise excerpts from the statement by the 
current National Security Adviser, showing very clearly different 
viewpoints by distinguished Americans who understand this subject.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

               [From the Washington Post, Sept. 22, 1997]

                Limits to What the U.S. Can Do in Bosnia

                          (By Henry Kissinger)

       Every American foreign policy setback, from Indochina to 
     Somalia, has resulted from the failure to define objectives, 
     to choose means appropriate to these objectives and to create 
     a public opinion prepared to pay the necessary price over the 
     requisite period of time.
       We are now on the verge of sliding into a similar dilemma 
     in Bosnia: Our goals are unrealistic, the means available do 
     not fit the objectives and the public is unlikely to block 
     the probable consequences of our actions. Policy drifts 
     because three issues await resolution: What are our 
     objectives in Bosnia? How long should our troops stay? What 
     risks should we run for the capture of war criminals?
       In 1991, when Yugoslavia broke up, the United States joined 
     the other NATO countries in recognizing its various 
     administrative subdivisions as independent states. With

[[Page S9951]]

     respect to Croatia and Slovenia, inhabited by a dominant 
     ethnic group, this decision made sense. But in Bosnia, 
     populated by Croats, Serbs and Muslims whose reciprocal 
     hatreds had broken up the much larger Yugoslavia, the attempt 
     to bring about a multiethnic state evoked a murderous civil 
     war.
       The same flaw that attended the birth of the Bosnian state 
     lies at the heart of the dilemmas of the Dayton accords 
     mediated by the United States that brought about the current 
     Bosnian cease fire. Its military provisions separate the 
     parties substantially along the lines of the ethnic enclaves 
     that emerged as hostilities ceased. But the political 
     provisions do the opposite. They seek to unite these enclaves 
     under the banner of a multiethnic state that caused the 
     explosion in the first place.
       The American tendency is to treat Bosnian tensions as a 
     political problem to be overcome by constitutional provisions 
     that reconcile the parties and establish procedures for 
     settling conflicts. But for the Bosnians, the overwhelming 
     reality is their historical memory, which has sustained their 
     ineradicable hatreds and unquenchable aspirations for 
     centuries.
       Throughout their histories, the Serbs and Croats have 
     considered themselves defenders of their religions, first 
     against a Muslim tide, then against each other. The Serbs' 
     identity derives from a series of bloody battles in defense 
     of the Serbian faith and population against Islam. Once Islam 
     was stopped, the Serbs fought to vindicate their independence 
     from Catholic Austria, spear-headed by the Croats.
       The Croats perception is precisely the reverse--as 
     upholders of Catholicism against Serbian Orthodoxy and Islam. 
     And the Muslims know that they are regarded by the two other 
     ethnic groups as a historical instrument of the hated Turks 
     and therefore--since ethnically they are at one with the 
     Serbs and Croats--as turncoats.
       The deep-seated hatred of each party for all the others 
     exists because their conflict is more akin to the Thirty 
     Years War over religion than it is to political conflict. And 
     this should serve to caution the United States not to get in 
     between these parties by trying to impose political solutions 
     drawn from our own, largely secular, experience.
       Once passions were unleashed by the civil war, each group 
     committed unspeakable cruelties in the process of expelling 
     the other groups from the regions that they controlled--the 
     ethnic cleansing. The Serbs started the process, but as the 
     war continued, the other parties also engaged in murderous 
     acts--the Croats in Krajina, the Muslims around Sarajevo. 
     Among the existing leaders, few, if any, innocents are to be 
     found.
       The NATO allies would have done well to stop the killings 
     six years ago, in its incipient phase. They could have taken 
     the position that they would not tolerate such outrages 
     within reach of NATO forces and on the continent where the 
     political concept of human dignity originated and is now 
     institutionalized. As a result of their failure to do so, 
     each of the ethnic regions of Bosnia has become largely 
     homogeneous; the results of ethnic, cleansing are now the 
     dominant fact of life in Bosnia.
       The political provisions of the Dayton agreement seek to 
     reverse this state of affairs. They provide for free movement 
     among the ethnic enclaves, for free repatriation of refugees 
     and for elections leading to national reconciliation. This 
     vision has turned out to be a mirage.
       No free movement among the various ethnic enclaves takes 
     place, and no mail or telephone services exist. Each ethnic 
     group issues its own currency, license plates and passports. 
     Serbs with Cyrillic license plates are at particular risk in 
     other areas, but so are the Muslims and Croats if they leave 
     their enclaves. Not surprisingly, refugees tend to return 
     home only with armed escorts and are frequently obliged to 
     flee as soon as the escorts leave.
       Nor will elections solve the problem. In Bosnia, elections 
     are not about alternation in office but about dominance 
     determining life, death and religion. They must either ratify 
     the new ethnic composition, or, since refugees vote on the 
     rolls of the towns from which they have been expelled, 
     produce the bizarre situation that absentee voters are in 
     a position to ``win'' and, in effect, gain the right to 
     rule the group that expelled them. In the Krajina region, 
     for example, now occupied by Croatia, the voting rolls of 
     many towns show a majority of Serbs, all of whom have been 
     expelled. Are NATO forces expected to enforce this 
     outcome?
       Refusing to recognize these realities has twisted American 
     policies into contortions that will guarantee an ultimate 
     breakdown. Exerting considerable economic and political 
     pressure, we engineered the shotgun wedding between Croats 
     and Muslims that goes under the label of the Bosnian 
     Federation. In this technically multiethnic structure, within 
     which no cease-fire line is necessary according to the 
     official mythology, NATO patrols only the line between the 
     so-called Federation and the Serb part of Bosnia.
       Reality mocks this mythology. The dividing line between 
     Croats and Muslims is as rigid as the one between them and 
     the Serbs. No Croat officials enter Muslim territory, no 
     Muslim official serves in the Croat part of the Federation. 
     Few Croats are to be found in Sarajevo, the purported capital 
     of the Federation that was ethnically cleansed when the 
     Muslims took it over after the Dayton accords were signed. 
     Nor is there free movement of Croat and Muslim groups within 
     the Federation.
       It is a conceit that this state of affairs is the fault of 
     a few evil bigots who, once removed either to war crimes 
     trials or to exile, will permit the natural preference of the 
     ethnic groups for some sort of unity to assert itself. This 
     misconception has tempted senior American officials to 
     pretend that Croat attitudes are the aberrations of its 
     president, Franjo Tudjman, and has led the American NATO 
     commander to abandon the neutral position of mediator and 
     involve himself in the internal struggles of the Serb part of 
     Bosnia.
       Neither judgment is correct. In Croatia, the opposition is 
     even less flexible than the president. And while Serb 
     strongman Radovan Karadzic well deserves to be placed before 
     a war crimes tribunal, his adversary, Biljana Plavsic, will 
     not survive politically unless she too advocates nationalist 
     Serb policies without, of course, the war-crime element.
       A multiethnic state in Bosnia is unlikely to emerge except 
     after another round of fighting, and then only if one of the 
     parties achieves an overwhelming victory. Should NATO 
     military power be used to promote such an outcome? Should 
     American casualties be incurred to force the various ethnic 
     groups into a multiethnic state that the majority of them do 
     not want? Why should we violate our own principle of self-
     determination in pursuit of such goals?
       American pressure to implement the political provisions of 
     the Dayton accords may well lead to precisely such an 
     outcome. The cease-fire now holds because of NATO's military 
     preponderance and because the Muslims, the only ethnic group 
     seeking a multiethnic state, are arming for the purpose of 
     imposing what we are urging. Since they are now already the 
     better equipped, they will probably achieve initial successes 
     and thereupon implement another round of ethnic cleansing. At 
     that point, the Croats would almost certainly enter the fray 
     to keep the Muslims from achieving a dominant position. And 
     Russia, the historical protector of the Serbs, is unlikely to 
     remain passive--at least politically.
       Some favor such risks to punish the evil men who are 
     assumed to have undermined the traditional coexistence 
     between the ethnic groups. But there has never been a Bosnian 
     state on the present territory of Bosnia. Whenever the 
     various ethnic groups have lived together in apparent 
     harmony, it was due to the pressure of some outside force 
     that overwhelmed their passions--the Turks, the Austrians or 
     Tito's dictatorship. The Croats slaughtered the Serbs under 
     Hitler, the Serbs slaughtered the Croats in the early years 
     of Tito; both Croats and Serbs cling to a collective memory 
     of Muslim atrocities under Turkish rule.
       Another often-cited argument holds that to abandon the 
     political part of the Dayton Agreement is to reward 
     aggression on the model of Hitler's dismemberment of 
     Czechoslovakia. The analogy is mistaken. Hitler violated a 
     recognized sovereign state; Bosnia's civil war was triggered 
     by the West's misconceived attempt to experiment with a 
     multiethnic state among populations divided by religion and 
     whose very reason for existence has been to prevent 
     domination by the other ethnic groups.
       America has no national interest for which to risk lives to 
     produce a multiethnic state in Bosnia. The creation of a 
     multiethnic state should be left to negotiations among the 
     parties--welcomed by America if it happens but not pursued at 
     the risk of American lives. America does have a political 
     concern to preserve the cease-fire for a reasonable period. 
     We have already extended the deadline for withdrawal which 
     the president promised to Congress. A case can be made to 
     extend it once again with gradually reduced forces for a 
     limited period--but after next June with personnel who have 
     specifically volunteered for this duty, backed up by air 
     power and naval forces stationed nearby. Manning cease-fire 
     lines in Bosnia cannot be a permanent American undertaking.
       As for the war criminals, there is no doubt that they 
     deserve to be judged before a tribunal constituted for that 
     purpose at The Hague. In the current state of affairs, an 
     American military move would be construed as an effort to 
     break Serb resistance to a multiethnic state and therefore 
     would be opposed bitterly by the Serb population. But if 
     America confined its role in Bosnia to maintaining the cease-
     fire lines and left the political evolution to the parties, a 
     situation might present itself in which the arrest of war 
     criminals could be dealt with on its merits.
       America must avoid drifting into a crisis with implications 
     it may not be able to master. The administration deserves 
     much credit for having brought about the end of hostilities. 
     Ending communal hatred is a longer-term challenge. We can 
     facilitate this but we cannot justify military action.

 Excerpts From Remarks on Bosnia at Georgetown University, Washington, 
                                   DC

              (By Sandy Berger, National Security Adviser)

       Some argue that we set our sights too high in Dayton, that 
     only an ethnic partition will produce the stability we want 
     and extricate us from Bosnia. I believe the partitionists are 
     wrong. Because accepting partition means ratifying the worst 
     ethnic cleansing in Europe in more than a half century. We 
     should not give up on justice and reward aggression.

[[Page S9952]]

       Partition also would be wrong because it would send the 
     message to ethnic fanatics everywhere that the international 
     community will allow redrawing of borders by force, by 
     creating the kinds of ethnically pure states that often 
     harbor a dangerous sense of grievance, entities that would be 
     inherently unstable, ultimately not viable, and inclined to 
     expansionist aggression, partition would lead not to peace, 
     but to war.
       In short, to advocate partition is to accept defeat.

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I think it is imperative we take the steps 
outlined in this amendment and add additional steps so that this 
country does not drift into a new policy along the very lines that the 
Senator from Arizona has so eloquently stated.
  I was privileged, on behalf of the Armed Services Committee, to write 
the committee's report on Somalia, with the distinguished Senator from 
Michigan [Mr. Levin]. I well understood how we got into it, what the 
problems were. And, once again, we are in the business of nation 
building as we interpose ourself amongst the several political factions 
fighting in that country.
  I voted consistently against putting ground troops in. Therefore, I 
can stand here with a clear conscience today and say, once they are in, 
we have to assess what is that exit strategy. We are going to have $7.3 
billion of American taxpayers' money expended if we go through June 
1998. There is no way of assessing the price tag of the risks of our 
men and women of the Armed Forces of our Nation have taken during that 
period of time. Therefore, this policy has to be rethought, and I think 
no less a reconvening of the Dayton principles is a measure we need to 
do to get to the right result in this situation.
  Mr. President, I thank the distinguished manager for my few minutes 
here.
  Mr. STEVENS. If there is any time, I reserve it. Does the Senator 
from Hawaii have any final statements?
  Mr. INOUYE addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Hawaii.
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I regret very much that there are some who 
are disappointed with section 8109 of the appropriations bill that 
authorized the creation of the cruise ship industry.
  So, if I may, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed 
in the Record letters indicating support, first, from the Department of 
Defense, a letter from the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, John 
Douglass; the Governor of Hawaii, the Honorable Benjamin Cayetano; the 
National Security Caucus Foundation; and representatives of our 
maritime industry, for example, Seafarers International Union, the 
Transportation Institute, the American Shipbuilding Association, the 
American Maritime Officers, the American Classic Voyages Co.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

         The Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research Development 
           and Acquisition,
                                    Washington, DC, July 30, 1997.
     Hon. Ted Stevens,
     Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on 
         Appropriations, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing in strong support of the 
     United States-flag Cruise Ship pilot project included in the 
     Senate's Fiscal Year 1998 Department of Defense 
     Appropriations Bill, S1005, as passed on July 15, 1997. The 
     construction of large, ocean-going cruise ships in United 
     States' shipyards under this project is vital to 
     transitioning U.S. shipyards back into the construction of 
     cruise ships and to sustain this country's shipbuilding 
     industrial base.
       Military preparedness depends on the maintenance of a 
     robust industrial base for U.S. Navy shipbuilding. With the 
     decline in the number of new construction Navy ships, we have 
     been actively encouraging the producers of our large warships 
     and support ships to explore commercial opportunities. The 
     sophistication involved in cruise ship design and 
     construction makes this commercial project ideal for 
     sustaining critical shipbuilding skills.
       The MARITECH program authorized by Congress in Fiscal Year 
     1994 has served as an innovative research and development 
     initiative to improve the international competitiveness of 
     our U.S. shipyards, particularly in the construction of 
     large, oceangoing vessels of all types. The technology 
     transfer that accompanies any large ship construction program 
     is essential to the continued viability of the shipyard 
     industrial base in the U.S. The Cruise Ship pilot project 
     contained in Section 8097 of S1005 would provide the means 
     for just such technology transfers. I support the use of 
     $250,000 in Fiscal Year 1998 for the Cruise Ship pilot 
     project.
       However, I have some concern with the language that 
     prohibits the future use of federal funds under this section. 
     There may be a future need to utilize federal research and 
     development funds for shared ship design applications and 
     this requirement should be left to the determination of the 
     Secretary of Defense. Specifically, the Navy is interested in 
     exploring the potential use of the hull design used for these 
     cruise ships as the hull for future Joint Command and Control 
     ships. Accordingly, the Navy needs the flexibility to spend 
     research and development funds on a common hull design for 
     this mission.
       Your support for this important project is appreciated. A 
     similar letter has been sent to the other Chairmen of the 
     Congressional Defense Committees.
           Sincerely.
     John W. Douglass.
                                                                    ____



                                           Executive Chambers,

                                    Honolulu, HI, August 29, 1997.
     Hon. Daniel K. Inouye,
     U.S. Senate, Hart Senate Office Building, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Inouye: I recently received a briefing on your 
     U.S.-flag Cruise Ship Pilot Project (S. 1005, Sec. 8097) 
     contained in the FY 1998 Department of Defense Appropriations 
     Bill.
       Hawaii's domestic cruise ship operation remains a vital 
     component of our state's visitor industry. I am excited about 
     the prospect of revitalizing that business with new passenger 
     cruise ships dedicated solely to interisland cruises.
       I support your leadership in initiating an innovative 
     program aimed at facilitating a dedicated cruise ship within 
     18 months and the construction of two new cruise ships, the 
     first to be built in U.S. shipyards in over 40 years.
       Please know that you can count on the full support of the 
     State of Hawaii in your efforts.
       With warmest personal regards,
           Aloha,
     Benjamin J. Cayetano.
                                                                    ____

                                                 National Security


                                            Caucus Foundation,

                                Washington, DC, September 8, 1997.
     Hon. C.W. (Bill) Young,
     Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Rayburn House 
         Office Building, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: This is a follow-up to the letter you 
     received from Assistant Secretary of the Navy John Douglass 
     regarding the United States-flag Cruise Ship Pilot Project. 
     We are in complete agreement with Secretary Douglass, the 
     U.S. Navy, the Department of Defense, and many prominent 
     national security experts regarding the importance of this 
     initiative.
       During the August recess Secretary Douglass and Deputy 
     Assistant Secretary Hammes participated in a Congressional 
     Delegation (CODEL) to Asia which was sponsored by the NSC 
     Foundation. This project was a focal point of their meetings 
     with your fellow members of the Appropriations Committee and 
     the Senate Intelligence Committee.
       They also joined your colleague Duke Cunningham in meetings 
     with the President, Defense Minister and Chairman of the 
     Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Philippines. They all emphasized 
     the importance of American shipbuilding to the national 
     security interests of both of our nations.
       Furthermore, many of your colleagues participated in a 
     recent National Security Caucus dinner with Navy Secretary 
     John Dalton and Marine Corps Commandant Charles Krulak who 
     both said this program is vital to sustain our nation's 
     shipbuilding industrial base.
       The bottom line is that the senior leadership of the 
     national security community is supporting this initiative 
     because it is an ideal project to sustain critical 
     shipbuilding skills. Furthermore, as the Assistant Secretary 
     indicated, the Navy is very interested in exploring the 
     potential use of hull designs used for these cruise ships as 
     the hull for future Joint Command and Control Ships.
       Finally, several flag officers have already testified 
     before your Subcommittee regarding the need for builders of 
     large warships and support ships to explore commercial 
     opportunities. The United States-Flag Cruise Ship Project is 
     a perfect example of an appropriate commercial initiative, 
     and we hope you will join your Senate colleagues in 
     supporting this endeavor.
       We are enclosing an analysis which describes this project 
     in further detail. If your staff has any questions about this 
     please have them contact Gregg Hilton, the Executive Director 
     of the NSC Foundation, at 479-4580. Many thanks.
         Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, USN (Ret.), Former Chairman, 
           Joint Chiefs of Staff; Rear Admiral Robert H. Spiro, 
           Jr., USNR (Ret.), Former Under Secretary of the Army, 
           Carter Administration.
                                                                    ____

                                                 National Security


                                            Caucus Foundation,

                                Washington, DC, September 4, 1997.

               The United States-Flag Cruise Ship Project

       The United-States-flag Cruise Ship Project was included in 
     the Fiscal Year 1998 Department of Defense Appropriations 
     Bill (S. 1005) when it was passed by the Senate on July 15. 
     Many prominent national security experts

[[Page S9953]]

     believe that the construction of large, oceangoing cruise 
     ships in United States' shipyards under that project is vital 
     to transitioning U.S. shipyards. This will allow them to move 
     from strictly military to commercial vessel construction and 
     the initiative is important for the preservation and 
     modernization of the American shipyard industrial base.
       Military preparedness depends on the maintenance of a 
     robust industrial base for U.S. navy shipbuilding and repair. 
     In this country, we have six shipyards capable of building 
     large warships and support ships critical to our national 
     defense.
       The U.S. Navy believes it is essential for these shipyards 
     to remain active, with a skilled and trained work force. The 
     declining number of active U.S. Navy ships and new 
     construction and repair opportunities requires America to 
     look to commercial ship building as the best means by which 
     to maintain that shipbuilding capability. The burgeoning 
     worldwide demand for cruise ships, coupled with their 
     sophisticated construction demands, make cruise ships an 
     ideal commercial project for American shipyards to maintain 
     their heightened state of readiness.
       The MARITECH program was authorized by Congress in 1994 and 
     according to senior Defense Department officials it has 
     served as an innovative research and development initiative 
     to improve the international competitiveness of U.S. 
     shipyards, particularly in the construction of large, 
     oceangoing vessels of all types. The technology transfer that 
     accompanies any large ship construction program is essential 
     to the modernization of the shipyard industrial base in the 
     United States. The cruise ship pilot project contained in 
     Section 8097 of S. 1005, as amended, would provide the means 
     for just such technology transfers, without requiring 
     obligation of scarce federal shipbuilding funds for either 
     shipyard tooling or the construction of the vessels 
     themselves.
       This provision, as passed by the Senate will jump start 
     cruise ship construction in the U.S., develop the American 
     flag cruise industry and help reduce U.S. shipyard dependence 
     on Department of Defense construction--all without the use of 
     federal funds. It would result in the construction in the 
     U.S. of two state of the art large ocean-going commercial 
     cruise ships. These ships cost hundreds of millions of 
     dollars each and will be built with private capital. The 
     pilot project will create thousands of jobs in U.S. shipyards 
     during construction and on board the vessels after 
     completion.
       The provision would be supervised under the Department of 
     Defense's MARITECH program. Under MARITECH auspices two 
     cruise ship design projects have been completed, the pilot 
     project would result in actual construction.
       An existing operator of U.S.-flag cruise ships in Hawaii 
     and on the inland waterways is ready and willing to build new 
     cruise ships. However, U.S. shipyards have not built a large 
     ocean-going cruise ship in over 40 years and the first 
     operator to do so faces a cost disadvantage.
       The pilot project would assist U.S. yards by facilitating 
     series construction of the two new cruise ships and the 
     operator would be required to sign a binding contract for 
     delivery of the first vessel by 2005, the second by 2008.
       The pilot project would also help Hawaii operations by 
     permitting the temporary reflagging of an existing foreign-
     flag cruise ship for operation under the U.S.-flag with U.S. 
     crews while the new ships are constructed in order to develop 
     market demand and would give preference in the trade for the 
     life expectancy of the vessels built under this program in 
     order to allow an adequate return on the significant 
     investment required to enter and develop this market.
       U.S. shipyards build the best naval vessels in the world, 
     but without the infusion of commercial shipbuilding 
     technology, as will be made possible under the proposed pilot 
     project, our shipyards will find it increasingly difficult to 
     make the transition to building large commercial vessels that 
     is vital to the future of our shipyard industrial base.
                                                                    ____

                                                    July 17, 1997.
       Dear Congressman: We are writing to request your support 
     for the U.S.-flag Cruise Ship Pilot Project contained in 
     Section 8097 of S. 1005 of the FY '98 DOD Appropriations bill 
     as passed by the Senate under the leadership of Chairman 
     Stevens and Senator Inouye. This provision is critically 
     important to our U.S. flag cruise ship industry and for our 
     U.S. shipbuilding base.
       Section 8097 would direct the MARITECH program to supervise 
     a pilot project to enhance the shipbuilding industrial base 
     and to develop the U.S.-flag cruise industry. The MARITECH 
     program (authorized by the FY '94 defense authorization bill) 
     has served as an innovative research and development 
     initiative that has produced substantive results in improving 
     the international competitiveness of the shipbuilding 
     industry in the United States.
       The U.S.-flag Cruise Ship Pilot Project would result in the 
     construction of two new cruise ships in U.S. yards and allow 
     the temporary reflagging of one foreign cruise ship. The 
     project would be privately funded and constructed (without 
     the use of federal funds) and provide preference in the trade 
     in order to allow for an adequate return on the significant 
     capital investment required to develop this new shipbuilding 
     capability and a broader market for U.S. cruise ships. The 
     U.S.-flag Cruise Ship Pilot Project means thousands of 
     shipyard jobs over several years and more than two thousand 
     permanent jobs on board the vessels when completed--
     approximately seven hundred within the first year alone. We 
     urge your support of this important provision.
           Very truly yours,
         American Classic Voyages Co., Philip Calian, President; 
           American Shipbuilding Association, Cynthia Brown, 
           President; Transportation Institute, James Henry, 
           President; American Maritime Officers, Michael K. 
           McKay, President; Seafarers International Union, 
           Michael Sacco, President; American Maritime Officers 
           Service, Gordon Spencer, Legis. Director.

  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I believe the Record should note that up 
until the latter part of 1967, America controlled the seas. Most of the 
cruise vessels were American owned, American built. Today, the 
situation is slightly changed. Last year, over 6.2 million passengers 
worldwide--and 75 percent were Americans. The Caribbean and the Bahamas 
regions, which is the largest North American market, does not have a 
single American cruise vessel.
  Cruises are the fastest growing segment of the tourism industry. They 
bring in over $7.5 billion in revenues. And 113 vessels currently 
operate in the North American market--1 American. Of the 30 companies 
operating in the North American market, 3 companies--foreign companies, 
Mr. President--command over 70 percent of the market. These foreign 
ships are obviously built in foreign shipyards. They employ very cheap 
foreign labor and operate outside our regulations. They pay no U.S. 
taxes and are not available for U.S. emergencies.
  Shipbuilding subsidies in foreign countries in recent years ranged 
from 9 percent to 33 percent of the cost of the vessel's construction. 
At a 9-percent construction subsidy, an operator today could build a 
new $500 million, 130,000-ton cruise vessel in a foreign yard and 
reduce its cost of capital by an astounding $45 million. The United 
States, since the early 1980's, has not subsidized the commercial 
construction of ships.
  These foreign companies also take advantage of the lower cost of 
foreign labor. In fact, the Wall Street Journal recently ran an article 
reporting these foreign cruise companies pay workers on board their 
ships a paltry $1.50 per day--that's right, $1.50 per day before tips--
for 16 to 18 hours of work. We here in the United States have 
undertaken an aggressive campaign to stop the use of sweatshop labor, 
and we should hold these foreign-flag ships operating in the American 
market to those same high standards.
  But perhaps the main reason these vessels fly a foreign flag is to 
avoid U.S. tax laws. Although most of these foreign-flag cruise 
operations are located in the United States--and most of their 
passengers are Americans--they are protected by reciprocal 
international tax treaties. These reciprocal agreements allow the 
foreign-flag cruise ship companies to avoid the tax laws of the United 
States. For example, one large foreign-flag cruise operator recently 
reported earnings of approximately $1.8 billion in revenues for its 
cruise operations. While most of these revenues came from American 
passengers, this cruise line, under existing U.S. law, considers this 
foreign source income which is exempt from U.S. tax law. Because of 
this loophole, this one company did not pay any income tax on its 
cruise ship operations. Based on the companies' net income from cruise 
operations, this can be equated to a $158 million corporate income tax 
loss to the Federal Treasury.
  An existing operator of U.S.-flag cruise ships in Hawaii and on the 
inland waterways, however, is ready and willing to build new U.S. 
cruise ships and employ American workers. But since U.S. shipyards have 
not built a large oceangoing cruise ship in over 40 years, the first 
operator to do so faces a significant cost disadvantage. That is why 
the U.S.-flag cruise ship pilot project is so important.
  The pilot project will facilitate a series construction for two new 
cruise ships by requiring the operator to sign a binding shipyard 
contract with delivery of the first new vessel no later than 2005; the 
second by 2008. In order to replace a retired ship and develop market 
demand that operator will temporarily document an existing foreign-flag 
cruise ship for operation under U.S.-

[[Page S9954]]

flag with U.S. crews while the new ships are constructed.
  This project is a milestone for our U.S.-flag cruise ship industry. 
After decades of dormancy in the oceangoing U.S. cruise ship arena, we 
now have a U.S. company that is willing to make a very substantial 
investment to try to rebuild our once proud U.S.-flag passenger fleet. 
Because this existing operator will make a very large investment in the 
development of new U.S.-flag cruise ships, which otherwise would not 
exist absent this significant investment, section 8109 includes a 
preference to ensure that other operators do not take advantage of this 
company incurring such ``first mover'' development costs and unfairly 
compete against the existing operator. I would note that Congress has 
provided similar incentives and preferences in other areas. The patent 
system is perhaps the most prominent example of such a restriction that 
protects, and thus encourages, investment in the development of new 
products and services that otherwise would not exist--even in highly 
competitive markets, such as the computer industry.
  The patent-like preference contained in section 8109 is for a very 
narrow segment of the highly competitive Hawaiian tourism market--
domestic inter-island cruises. These cruises account for less than 1 
percent of overall Hawaiian tourism and an even smaller percentage of 
the North American cruise market. Moreover, Hawaii vacationers will 
have many competitively priced vacation alternatives to these new 
cruise ships. In addition, foreign-flag cruise ships, with their 
significant cost advantages in terms of low capital costs, low foreign 
labor costs, and freedom from U.S. income tax, will still be free to 
call in Hawaii, just as they always have. In fact, in 1995 alone 12 
competing foreign-flag cruise ships operated in the Hawaiian market. 
Nothing in this provision will change that.
  I recognize that there is a vibrant small U.S. passenger vessel 
fleet. I want to assure you that they are not affected by this 
provision. These U.S. operators will be able to enter and compete 
freely in the Hawaii cruise trade, including inter-island cruises. 
Mindful of this segment of the fleet, we were careful to draft section 
8109 to exclude vessels measuring less than 10,000 gross tons and 
having berth or stateroom accommodation of fewer than 275 passengers, 
these thresholds accommodate not only the entire U.S. small passenger 
fleet, but also any new vessels planned. Nothing in section 8109 will 
bar this vessel from entering the inter-island cruise market in Hawaii 
or in anyway inhibits its operation, once the plans are finished and 
construction of the vessel is completed.
  Mr. President, this pilot project will help reverse the dreadful 
decline of the U.S.-flag cruise industry. It will jump start cruise 
ship construction in the United States, develop the U.S.-flag cruise 
industry, and help reduce U.S. shipyard dependence on DOD 
construction--all without Federal funds.
  The cruise industry is projecting that $7.5 billion will be invested 
in the construction of new vessels over the next 5 years--and not one 
cent of this investment will be spent in U.S. shipyards. This pilot 
project, however, will result in the construction in the United States 
of two state-of-the-art large oceangoing commercial cruise ships, 
representing a private capital investment in U.S. shipbuilding of 
approximately $1 billion.
  The pilot project will create thousands of American jobs in U.S. 
shipyards during construction and onboard the vessels upon completion 
and approximately 750 shipboard jobs on board the temporary vessel 
within 18 months. It will create some 2,500 shipyard and subcontractor 
jobs throughout the construction project. And upon completion of the 
new ships, over 2,000 permanent onboard and shoreside support jobs will 
be created.
  The pilot project will be supervised under DOD's MARITECH Program 
which Congress authorized in 1993 and has funded annually to facilitate 
advanced commercial shipbuilding in U.S. yards and the transition from 
depending on military construction to the competitive commercial 
market. Under MARITECH auspices two cruise ship design projects have 
been completed, led by the Ingalls and NASSCO shipyards. The pilot 
project would result in the actual construction of new cruise vessels 
in U.S. shipyards for the first time in 40 years.
  In addition to the commercial benefits of the pilot project, it is 
also of significant value to the Department of Defense. It will reduce 
the U.S. shipyards dependence on Defense funds needed to maintain an 
adequate industrial base. In fact, a recent letter from the Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy for Research Development and Acquisition, John 
Douglass called

       * * * the construction of large, oceangoing cruise ships 
     vital to transitioning U.S. shipyards back into the 
     construction of cruise ships and to sustain this country's 
     shipbuilding industrial base.

  The Navy is also interested in exploring the potential use of the 
hull design for these cruise ships as the hull design for future Joint 
Command and Control ships.
  Mr. President, the Governor from my State of Hawaii has also 
expressed his support for the provision and the bipartisan National 
Security Caucus Foundation called the project ``a perfect example of an 
appropriate commercial initiative.'' Support for the pilot project can 
also be found within the maritime industry--the American Shipbuilding 
Association, Seafarers International Union, American Maritime Officers, 
American Classic Voyages Company, Transportation Institute, and 
American Maritime Officers Service.
  This project will provide the incentive for U.S. expansion in the 
cruise market, so that once again we can take pride in new U.S.-built 
oceangoing, U.S.-flag cruise ships. It will help to employ thousands of 
American workers, put the best shipbuilding technology in the world 
into commercial use, and help the Nation sustain a viable shipbuilding 
industrial base--all at no cost to the American taxpayers. It deserves 
our support.
  The program that we have set forth, supported by DOD and supported by 
the whole industry, will once again reestablish our cruise industry.
  So, Mr. President, I hope that my colleagues will adopt this 
amendment.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a paper, prepared by 
several members of my staff, to alert lawyers on the question of 
monopoly be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

Section 8097 of the DOD Appropriations Bill Creates No ``Monopoly'' or 
               ``Unprecedented Restriction on Commerce''

       Section 8097 of S. 1005, the FY '98 DoD appropriations bill 
     as passed by the Senate, contains a provision critically 
     important to the U.S.-flag cruise ship industry and the U.S. 
     shipbuilding base. It directs the MARITECH program to 
     supervise a pilot project to develop and construct two new 
     cruise ships in U.S. yards, and to allow, until they are 
     built, temporary reflagging to the U.S.-flag of a foreign 
     vessel. The result would be the first new cruise ships built 
     in U.S. yards in over 40 years.
       To allow for an adequate return on the significant capital 
     investment required for this innovative initiative, the new 
     ships would receive a preference in the trade. An objection 
     has been raised that this would create a ``monopoly'' and a 
     ``legislative restriction on commerce [that] is 
     unprecedented.'' The objection is unfounded.


                  section 8097 creates no ``monopoly''

       The cruise ship business is quite competitive. Operators 
     compete with each other for the patronage of vacationers who 
     wish to spend their holidays aboard ship. Operators also 
     compete with other providers of vacation and leisure 
     activities. Passengers considering a cruise in the Hawaiian 
     Islands thus can, and do, consider competing cruise trips in 
     the Caribbean, the South Pacific, Alaska, and even the 
     Mediterranean. They also can, and do, consider alternative 
     vacations in the Hawaiian Islands, or other resort and 
     vacation destinations.
       There is thus absolutely no basis for the suggestion that a 
     cruise ship operator would enjoy any sort of ``monopoly'' 
     even as the only U.S.-flag company operating in the Hawaiian 
     Islands. Antitrust case law recognizes this fact. In American 
     Ass'n of Cruise Passengers v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 
     911 F.2d 786, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1990), an antitrust action 
     involving alleged discrimination against certain travel 
     agents, the court defined vacation cruises as including, but 
     not limited to, ``any travel by a person as a passenger on a 
     cruise ship for vacation purposes.'' The court also noted 
     that the cruise business differs from carriage of cargo 
     because the actual ports of destination are often of only 
     secondary importance to cruise passengers:
       ``The purpose of taking a cruise, after all, is to enjoy a 
     relaxing holiday aboard ship, generally while still visiting 
     an unfamiliar place ashore. The cruise ship assumes 
     responsibility for that transportation, and can substantially 
     discharge its responsibility

[[Page S9955]]

     even if circumstances require it to skip, or substitute, a 
     port of call. Getting there, in other words, is half the 
     fun.''--911 F.2d at 790.
       Thus, analysis of competition on the basis of ``port-to-
     port'' or ``city-pair'' markets, which might be appropriate 
     in analyzing competition for in the carriage of cargo, or for 
     the carriage of passengers on other modes of transportation 
     such as airlines, is not meaningful in assessing cruise ship 
     competition. Someone shipping a container, or flying on an 
     airplane for business, usually has very specific origin and 
     destination points in mind for the transportation 
     involved. The same is not true, however, for cruise 
     passengers, or even vacation travelers in general, for 
     when one leisure destination often substitutes perfectly 
     well for another.
       One court has in fact specifically described the 
     competitive situation facing cruise operators and others in 
     Hawaii:
       ``The pattern of competition within the tourist industry is 
     varied and intense. Hawaii competes for tourists from the 
     mainland United States and foreign countries. In offering a 
     relaxed tropical vacation spot, Hawaii competes with South 
     Pacific and other offshore destinations. It thus operates in 
     a national and international market.''--Waikiki Small 
     Business Ass'n v. Anderson, Civ. No. 83-0806 (D. Hawaii May 
     14, 1984).
       Consumers of Hawaii cruises can, and do, face a host of 
     substitute choices: (1) cruises to other U.S. and overseas 
     locations; (2) other types of Hawaiian vacations, with 
     shoreside accommodations and other forms of travel between 
     the islands. Well over 95% of all visitors to Hawaii are not 
     cruise passengers at al. Cruises on small seacraft and yachts 
     are available as well as inter-island voyages on larger 
     cruise ships. Over 22,000 passengers a day fly between the 
     islands, and the Honolulu--Kahului, Maui city pair is the 3rd 
     busiest in the United States. Aviation Daily, June 5, 1997, 
     at 403; and (3) other ``relaxed, tropical vacation spots'' 
     around the world.
       In sum, there is no basis to the allegation that 
     restricting the number of cruise ship operators between or 
     among the Hawaiian Islands through the preference created by 
     Section 8097 would create any ``monopoly,'' as that term may 
     properly be understood. See Coastal Fuels of Puerto Rico, 
     Inc. v. Caribbean Petroleum Corp. 79 F. 3d 182, 197-98 (1st 
     Cir. 1996) (seller with 90% share of sales of bunker fuel to 
     ocean going vessels in Puerto Rico has no monopoly power 
     because it competes with sellers throughout the Caribbean and 
     the Southeastern United States).


  Congress Often ``Restricts Commerce'' In Order To Achieve Important 
                               Objectives

       There is also no basis to the suggestion that Section 8097 
     creates some sort of ``unprecedented restriction on 
     commerce.'' There are numerous precedents for the kind of 
     preference created in Section 8097, particularly given its 
     purpose of protecting the substantial investment that will be 
     necessary to develop and construct the first new U.S.-flag 
     cruise ships in almost 40 years.
       The patent system, established by Congress pursuant to 
     Constitutional direction, provides perhaps the most prominent 
     example of a ``restriction'' of competition to protect, and 
     thus encourage, investment in the development of new products 
     and services that otherwise would not exist. The grant of a 
     patent allows its holder to ``restrict'' competition by those 
     who would seek to sell competing projects that infringe on 
     its claims. Significantly, however, despite this restriction, 
     holders of patents generally compete in highly competitive 
     markets; the grant of the patent does not create itself any 
     ``monopoly.'' See Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, 
     Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (``When the 
     patented product is merely one of many products that actively 
     compete on the market, few problems arise between the 
     property rights of a patent owner and the antitrust laws. . . 
     . [Even] when the patented product is so successful that 
     creates its own economic market . . . the two bodies of law 
     are actually complementary, as both are aimed at encouraging 
     innovation, industry, and competition.'').
       Federal procurement law also recognizes a number of 
     circumstances in which competition may be restricted to serve 
     important objectives. Procurements may be conducted without 
     competitive procedures, for example, where necessary ``keep 
     vital facilities or suppliers in business or make them 
     available in the event of a national emergency,'' 48 C.F.R. 
     Sec. 6.302-3(b)(1)(i), to ``train a selected supplier in the 
     furnishing of critical supplies or services,'' id. at 
     (b)(1)(ii), or to ``create or maintain the required domestic 
     capability for production of critical supplies.'' Id. at 
     (b)(1)(v). See generally 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2304(c). Such 
     procurements necessarily give the supplier a leg up on its 
     competitions in the development and sale of the product being 
     supplied, but they do not in any sense grant the seller a 
     ``monopoly.''
       Finally, Congress has often specifically restricted 
     competition by statute to serve specific policy objectives. 
     See 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2304(c)(5). Examples include small 
     business set-asides, 15 U.S.C. 637, and preferences for local 
     suppliers in disaster relief situations, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 5150. 
     Last year's Defense Authorization bill included a statutory 
     direction to enter sole source contracts with certain 
     designated health care providers. Pub. L. 104-201 
     Sec. 722(b)(2), 110 Stat. 2593. The suggestion that the 
     provisions of Section 8097 are ``unprecedented'' is without 
     any basis, and would be so even if Section 8097 did, in fact, 
     create a ``monopoly,'' which it does not.


                               conclusion

       While the operator of newly-built U.S.-flag cruise vessels 
     in the Hawaii trade will receive some protection of its 
     investment through the preference created by Section 8097, no 
     monopoly will be created, and the operator will still face 
     vigorous competition in the markets in which it operates.


                      new attack submarine program

  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, the conferees have included a general 
provision, sec. 8129, within this conference report containing language 
to permit the Navy to enter into a contract for the procurement of four 
submarines under the New Attack Submarine Program. I would like to 
point out that this section does not provide new budget authority, but 
rather is an earmark of the amounts appropriated under the heading 
``Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy'' for the New Attack Submarine 
Program. The intent of the conferees was not to create new budget 
authority over and above amounts set forth elsewhere in the bill, but 
rather to clarify the terms and conditions under which the New Attack 
Submarine contract may be entered into between the Navy and the 
contractor team.


                                  c-17

  Mr. President, the conferees on the Defense spending bill understand 
that the manufacturer of the C-17 is building two additional aircraft 
in fiscal year 1998 for potential commercial sale. However, the Air 
Force has an agreement with the contractor which may permit DOD to 
accept early delivery of these aircraft within the Defense Department's 
C-17 multiyear contract. This agreement, combined with positive cost 
and schedule performance under the C-17 contract, may permit DOD to 
purchase up to 11 aircraft within the fiscal year 1998 appropriation. 
Thus, I believe the Senate's objective of delivering additional C-17 
aircraft in fiscal year 1998 may actually be achieved without the 
appropriation of additional funds at this time.


   holloman air force base/gerald champion memorial hospital shared 
                                facility

  Mr. President, during the final session of the conference on Defense 
appropriations an error was made on the amount appropriated for the 
Holloman Air Force Base/Gerald Champion Memorial Hospital Shared 
Facility. It was the intent of the conferees to appropriate $7 million 
for the shared facility, but the filed report reflects only $5 million. 
This project was strongly supported by the Secretary of the Air Force 
and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force during hearings conducted by 
the subcommittee. Senator Domenici worked very hard on this issue and I 
believe that it is a great idea.
  Mr. President, I have contacted the Department of Defense about this 
matter and they have assured me that they will fully fund the shared 
facility project at its intended level of $7 million. I will continue 
to work with Senator Domenici to ensure full funding for this important 
project. I commend Senator Domenici for his efforts in this regard and 
look forward to seeing his vision of better quality service for our 
troops at a lower cost become a reality.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I thank the chairman for his support and 
for his efforts to correct this mistake. I am very pleased that the 
chairman has received the commitment from the Department of Defense to 
fully fund the shared facility. I believe that in the end we will look 
back on this program and say that it was one of the very best things 
that we did.


                      patriot modification program

  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, in review of the printed copy of the 
``Statement of the Managers'' that accompanies H.R. 105-265, the fiscal 
year 1998 Department of Defense conference report, we have found a 
typographical error in the Patriot modification line of the ``Missile 
Procurement, Army'' account. The President's budget request included 
$20,825,000 for the continued modification of the Patriot missile 
system. It was the decision of the conference committee to provide a 
total $28,825,000, an increase of $8 million above the budget request 
for this program in fiscal year 1998. The additional funds provided by 
the conferees are for the procurement of additional GEM +/- upgrades 
for the Patriot system. I would note that the tables on page 90 of 
House Report 105-265, do not reflect the intent of the conferees.
  It would be my hope that the Army would execute this program to 
reflect the intent of the conferees and further,

[[Page S9956]]

that the Army use its reprogramming authority to provide the 
recommended funding level of the conference committee. I intend to work 
with my ranking member, Senator Inouye and Representatives Young and 
Murtha to insure this program is not inappropriately reduced because of 
a administrative error.


                            printing errors

  Mr. President, I would like to bring to the attention of Members 
three typographical errors that appear in the statement of the managers 
to accompany H.R. 2266. On page 76, under ``Operation and Maintenance, 
Air Force'', the REMIS program should read as an increase of $8.9 
million and not a decrease. On page 119, ``Research, Development, Test 
and Evaluation, Navy'', under the heading ``Undersea Warfare Weaponry 
Technology'', the 6.25-inch torpedo project should read as an increase 
of $3 million and not zero. On page 125, ``Research, Development, Test 
and Evaluation, Air Force'', under the heading ``Space and Missile 
Rocket Propulsion'', the total amount should read $18,147 and not 
$18,847. All of these programs were listed correctly in the official 
conference papers. The typographical errors appear in the project level 
adjustment tables and do not affect the funding levels in the bill.
  Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on our conference report.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There is a 
sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, in order to notify the leader--it is time 
for him to make a statement concerning the proceedings--I suggest the 
absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to proceed under my 
leader time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________