[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 129 (Wednesday, September 24, 1997)]
[House]
[Pages H7821-H7828]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                          TRIP TO SOUTH AFRICA

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of 
January 7, 1997, the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Weldon] is 
recognized for 60 minutes as the designee of the majority leader.
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I, too, want to thank the 
staff for bearing with me as I attempt to address two key issues that I 
think are extremely important to this country. I hope not to take the 
entire hour.
  Mr. Speaker, my first issue has to do with a trip that I took this 
past weekend to South Africa. It was a very difficult weekend. I left 
Washington on Thursday and flew 22 hours to Durban, South Africa, and 
returned Monday to be able to be here for votes on Tuesday.
  The reason I went to Africa, Mr. Speaker, and to Durban, was because 
the African Association of Physiological Sciences and the South African 
Physiological Society invited me to deliver the keynote speech at the 
conference representing those health care professionals throughout the 
African nations as they assembled for their annual conference, and in 
the case of the other organization, their biannual conference.
  The purpose of the session was to convey what is happening in the 
technology area relative to this country and how it could assist Africa 
with the terrible problems they have with their medical care delivery. 
I was asked to give the keynote speech because of a major initiative 
that we are involved in in the Philadelphia area, including the States 
of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland, to create the 
first smart region in America, and in fact, in the world.
  Over the past 2 years we have worked on a project that is known as 
HUBS, which stands for hospitals, universities and businesses and 
schools, to link all of these institutions through an aggressive, 
large, fiberoptic network into one major supercomputing center, as well 
as 14 satellite sub-HUB centers throughout the four-State region, and 
in doing so to be able to provide the storage and capability of high-
speed transportation of data so that our health care institutions, our 
schools, our colleges, can, in fact, provide better use of the Internet 
and information for our citizens.
  In fact, one example in the health care area of what the benefit of 
this kind of an instrument will be is best evidenced by the example of 
what the University of Pennsylvania has been able to do just within the 
last 2 years in terms of our HUBS project. The University of 
Pennsylvania has been, in fact, the primary processor for the imaging 
data collected from an MRI unit by the Children's hospital in 
Philadelphia so that when a child would undergo brain surgery, the 
imaging data from the MRI unit would be processed by the computers at 
Penn, which are very sophisticated, high-speed computers. In spite of 
their speed, it would normally take the Penn computers 5 hours to 
process the imaging data so that the surgeon could have a look at that 
child's brain prior to surgery.
  Partly because of the effort that we started and the fact that Penn's 
lab is now connected to the fat pipe supercomputing center in Illinois, 
Chicago, and in San Diego, we can now process that same data for a 
child's brain surgery procedure in 3 seconds. So we have taken, because 
of the speed and the capability, the processing of data that in the 
past has taken 5 hours and given those surgeons the real-time 
capability of looking at that child's brain image in 3 seconds.
  We want to give that same speed and capability of using data in the 
health care field to every medical institution in our region, but we 
want to do more than that, Mr. Speaker. In fact, we have two 
initiatives underway in the region, one of which is to market the 
health care services of the four-State region worldwide, and to market 
the Delaware Valley four-State health care network as the world's 
health care resource center. We want to establish not just this fast 
supercomputing capability within the four States, but we have already 
agreed with the Shanghai Government to establish a direct satellite 
linkage to Shanghai as they are in the process of now developing smart 
capability there. And also we want to establish that same capability 
for the African continent, and specifically to the African health care 
system.
  Now, I am going to Africa, and I would ask unanimous consent, Mr. 
Speaker, to enter into the Record the letters of invitation that I 
received from the African medical leadership.

                                               African Association


                                    of Physiological Sciences,

                                     Lexington, KY, July 12, 1997.
     Hon. Dr. Curt Weldon,
     U.S. Congress,
     Washington, DC.
       The African Association of Physiological Sciences (AAPS) 
     was founded in 1989 in Helsinki, Finland, by the African 
     delegates to the XXX Congress of the International Union of 
     Physiological Sciences (IUPS), the most important and 
     prestigious international organization of this all important 
     field in the medical science profession.
       AAPS is a non-governmental, non-profit making organization 
     that aims to unite the entire African scientific communities, 
     especially those involved in active research into and/or 
     teaching of human or animal physiology in Africa. The 
     Association primary objective is to advance physiological 
     sciences, bring it to cutting edge that has been left behind 
     in global human scientific discoveries in the last 5 
     centuries. It is our earnest hope that through this, we will 
     bring medical sciences practice in the African continent to 
     the way it should be practiced in the 20th century and the 
     21st century!
       AAPS held his first scientific congress in Nairobi, Kenya 
     in 1992 with the participation of 800 scientists from 40 
     countries, nearly all from Africa.
       Due to our active pursue of excellence, and our inclusive 
     policy of welcoming all scientists of the world, especially 
     those from the African continent, AAPS was admitted as a 
     regional member by IUPS in 1993 and presently has over 2000 
     members from every country in Africa. We are very proud to 
     say that this makes it the largest and probably most 
     significant scientific association in Africa.
       The second congress will be held in Durban, South Africa, 
     September 21-24, 1997. It will be the honor of not only our 
     large congress, but by extrapolation the entire scientific 
     community of Africa if you, as the technological, educational 
     and international relations champion in the United States 
     Congress, could bestow us the honor of accepting our 
     invitation to deliver the keynote address at this congress.

[[Page H7822]]

       I have been informed by Professor K.J.R. Abaidoo, Director-
     General AFRET and Adviser to the Government of Lesotho on 
     Health, that upon hearing the possibility of having you as 
     the keynote speaker, the Vice President of the Republic of 
     South Africa, the Honorable Thabo Mbeki, has agreed to serve 
     as your host while you are in the country. They are also 
     trying to arrange a meeting between you and your entourage to 
     meet with His Excellency Nelson Mandela.
       For your information, subsequent AAPS congresses will be 
     held as follows:
       2000--Nigeria.
       2004--Sudan.
       2008--South Africa.
       2012--Tanzania.
       The idea of setting up an African Regional Training Center 
     for the Basic Medical Sciences (AFRET) was conceived at the 
     AAPS meeting in Nairobi, as an attempt to address the major 
     concerns for the African medical education system.
       AFRET is a regional resource sharing facility established 
     to support the basic medical science teaching needs of 
     African medical schools. It's major objective is the training 
     of suitably qualified Africans in the disciplines of anatomy, 
     biochemistry, biostatistics, epidemiology, microbiology, 
     pharmacology, and physiology.
       It is a regional support program designed to strengthen the 
     basic medical sciences and the quality of medical training, 
     to meet current and projected basic medical science teaching 
     needs of African medical schools.
       The AFRET congress in Durban, September 19-21, 1997, will 
     focus on how to effectively begin the activities of the 
     center.
       The Center will embark on the following activities:
       1. Network teaching of basic medical science across the 
     region to support the immediate teaching needs of all African 
     medical schools.
       2. Graduate academic programs (MSc/Ph.D) to be carried out 
     in designated centers of excellence in the region.
       3. Specially designed programs for short-term fellows and 
     scholars.
       4. Workshops and seminars.
       5. Evaluation, research and development activities as they 
     relate to basic medical sciences.
       6. Consultation and technical support to African medical 
     school.
       7. Publication of learning resources and materials.
       8. Maintenance of a resource library.
       9. Promotion of staff development and in-service training.
       Dear Honorable Curt Weldon, as medical practitioners, 
     educators and scientists for Africa, our journey is a very 
     long, and indeed very arduous one. Even so, the longest 
     journey will always begin with a first step. We see AAPS and 
     the AFRET initiative as steps aimed at propelling the 
     continent forward in Health care delivery.
       We hope that you, with your worldwide reputation as one of 
     the most farsighted leaders of the most industrialized and 
     humane nation of the world that you will allow your 
     reputation and gesture to assist us in this exciting trip for 
     Africa into the new millennium. This will also be consistent 
     with your efforts to make available healthcare system from 
     your region to the large number of citizens of the global 
     village. We want to have a share in your vision, as we see it 
     as the only way to forge ahead.
           Sincerely,

                                        Kayode Adeniyi, Ph.D.,

                                          Professor of Physiology,
                                       University of Jos, Nigeria,
     Secretary General, AAPS.
                                  ____

                           Ladybrand, South Africa, July 16, 1997.
     Hon. Dr. Curt Weldon,
     U.S. Congress,
     Washington, DC.
       Your Excellency, It would be an understatement to assert 
     that your reputation as a champion of the Sciences, 
     Technology, Education and International Relations have 
     permeated every corner of the globe. Those of us, who have 
     keenly followed your tremendous career and endeavours feel a 
     certain definable closeness with you even though we are 
     thousands of kilometers away from your immediate 
     constituency. It is in these regards that we feel this 
     extraordinary honour to be associated with you in this 
     African endeavour, whose ultimate objective is to strengthen 
     Medical Education and Health Care delivery in the African 
     Region.
       We would be greatly honoured if your Excellency would 
     consider becoming the Patron of AFRET. Your association with 
     this worthy continental cause would unquestionably be an 
     invaluable boost in our efforts to stimulate African Heads of 
     State to these enormous responsibilities that they are 
     undoubtedly capable of.
       His Excellency, Mr. Thabo Mbeki, Vice-President of the 
     Republic of South Africa has been alerted of your 
     participation in the AFRET and AAPS Congresses in Durban 
     (September 19-25) and requested that he host your presence in 
     the country. Arrangements are being made to ensure that you 
     will also have the opportunity to meet the President, Mr. 
     Nelson Mandela. Your vibrant voice in the cause of African 
     health development will certainly echo throughout the 
     continent and muster the kind of financial support needed to 
     realise the noble aspirations of AFRET.
       May I ask your Excellency to communicate with me in this 
     regard at your convenience but timely enough for specific 
     arrangements to be concluded.
           Yours sincerely,

                                         Prof. K.J.R. Abaidoo,

                        Adviser on Health (Government of Lesotho),
     Director-General, AFRET.
                                  ____



                               Memorandum

     To: Douglas D. Ritter, Chief of Staff, Congressman Curt 
         Weldon.
     From: Leonard M. Rosenfeld, Ph.D., Assistant Dean, College of 
         Graduate Studies.
     Date: 5 September 1997.
     Re: Visit to African Regional Training Center, African 
         Association for Physiological Science, Durban, South 
         Africa.
       The delegation of representatives of regional academic 
     health centers which will accompany Congressman Weldon on his 
     trip to South Africa includes:
       Leonard M. Rosenfeld, Ph.D., Assistant Dean, College of 
     Graduate Studies, Thomas Jefferson University.
       Donald Silberberg, M.D., Associate Dean for International 
     Affairs, Medical School, University of Pennsylvania.
       Gerald J. Kelliher, Ph.D., Vice Provost for Education, 
     Allegheny University for the Health Sciences.
       Our backgrounds cover the range of basic medical science. I 
     am a physiologist; Silberberg a neurobiologist; Kelliher a 
     pharmacologist.

  Not only was I to give the keynote speech about technology linkages 
to the American health care system, namely the HUBS project that we are 
working on, as well as all of the medical breakthroughs that we are 
involved in, telemedicine, distance learning, virtual surgery and so 
forth, but also, Mr. Speaker, I was there at the request of the two 
leaders of the African physiological societies to become the patron of 
what is called AFRET.

                              {time}  2230

  AFRET is a newly emerging technology linkage between the major health 
care teaching institutions in each of the major African nations. So in 
going to Africa on Saturday, prior to giving the keynote speech at the 
conference of the medical professionals of Africa, I sat down and in 
fact helped work out what is going to be a formal process that 
hopefully will get funded which will provide the first technology 
linkage between every one of the 92 teaching hospitals in every nation 
in Africa.
  In addition, we will move to establish a linkage through the 
satellite systems, so we in fact can provide the same kind of 
capability being used in our medical centers to help the medical 
centers in Africa reach out to all of the people who in many cases are 
suffering under very severe limitations relative to their health care 
system.
  In forming this initiative called AFRET, I took along with me, Mr. 
Speaker, on the trip three major regional leaders who are involved as 
cutting edge leaders in health care initiatives worldwide: the 
assistant dean of the College of Graduate Studies at Thomas Jefferson 
University, Dr. Leonard Rosenfeld; the associate dean for international 
affairs at the Medical School of the University of Pennsylvania, Dr. 
Donald Silberberg; and the vice provost for education at Allegheny 
University for the Health Sciences, Dr. Gerald Kelleher.
  These three doctors, traveling with me to Africa, represent over 75 
of the Nation's finest medical institutions, and involving themselves 
in the meetings that I chaired, they made solid commitments from their 
institutions to involve themselves in the development of this new AFRET 
system. In fact, all three of them have been named to the 21-member 
advisory council that would oversee the development of the AFRET 
system.
  In fact, Mr. Speaker, in working with the African medical leadership 
in deciding who would be the 21 members of the council, we have tapped 
some of the finest health care leaders, not just in the U.S., and six 
of the council members will be from the States, not just three from the 
Philadelphia institutions, but also representatives of the University 
of Michigan, Oklahoma State University, and Duke University's health 
care systems, but also respected medical leaders from Finland, from 
Germany, from Sudan, Nigeria, Ghana, and from a number of other 
institutions throughout the African continent.
  These 21 council members represent all of the regions of Africa, and 
are helping us to put into place both the bylaws and the working 
documents relative to this AFRET system.
  We estimate the cost of bringing AFRET into reality is approximately

[[Page H7823]]

$600,000 over the first 3 years. That is a very modest amount of money 
when we talk about the benefits it will provide the people of Africa 
who are suffering so much in terms of a lack of proper medical care.
  It will allow us to train their doctors, to help train their nurses, 
to do ``train the trainer'' sessions, to provide technical resources 
for every one of the 92 institutions that are involved in medical and 
health care education in each of the African nations. It will also 
allow us to send post-docs over to Africa to do their training, to 
provide capabilities through distance learning and telemedicine that 
the African health care community would not have access to.
  In fact, the Chair of this council is the dean of the medical school 
in Zimbabwe. His name is Dr. Mufanda. He in fact is going to be leading 
this effort, which is largely under the control of the African health 
care system leaders.
  Mr. Speaker, I am excited about this opportunity because it provides 
several opportunities for us. Obviously, it is helping Africa to 
empower its own health care system to meet the needs of its citizens, 
which are largely going unmet, into the 21st century, and to help 
accomplish that we are establishing a network of parliamentarians and 
ministerial leaders from each of the African nations to work with us to 
provide the solid support for this AFRET network. We are also 
networking with all of the professional medical societies in Africa to 
get their support.
  In addition, we are identifying as we speak the major American 
contractors, the pharmaceutical companies who are today doing business 
in Africa so they can help us establish this system and this network.
  The benefit to America is also significant. Not only will we be doing 
significant amounts of work to assist the African people to improve the 
quality of their health care and their health care education, but Mr. 
Speaker, we will also be opening new doors and new opportunities for 
the American health care system. Many of our institutions have been 
suffering dramatically because of the cutbacks in State and Federal 
funding. Many of them are having to close their doors. In speaking to 
many of these leaders, I have told them they have to find ways to grow 
their markets. The way to grow the market for the American health care 
system is to provide health care consultation and services not just to 
people in America, but to people around the world. This outreach effort 
to Africa is an example of how we can do that in a cooperative way.
  Mr. Speaker, I am excited about what occurred this past weekend. The 
prospects I think are outstanding. We also met with the government 
leadership of Pretoria, in fact proposing to them that Pretoria and 
Johannesburg, which are already looking at high-speed high-capable 
telecommunications, that they become the network location where we can 
have a downlink capability that would ultimately reach all 92 medical 
institutions throughout Africa, and eventually become the high-
capability technology center for the continent of Africa and for South 
Africa itself.
  Mr. Speaker, I would ask our colleagues to become briefed on this 
initiative, to lend their support to this very worthwhile effort, so we 
can benefit both the people of the African continent and the individual 
nations in Africa, but also benefit our health care systems that are 
looking to establish new linkages around the world.
  Mr. Speaker, the second issue that I want to talk about this evening 
is one that I have addressed many times on the floor of this body, and 
one which I think is certainly troubling to me as an elected official 
and as someone who works on issues involving the former Soviet States. 
This issue has to deal with two major news stories that have dominated 
the national media for the past several weeks, and which have raised 
very troubling concerns among both Members of Congress and the 
administration and peace-loving people around the world.
  First of all, Mr. Speaker, significantly spread throughout the news 
of this country in our cities and even over in foreign countries, 
especially in Israel, has been the information that has linked Iran's 
missile technology development program with Russia. In fact, there have 
been reports that have been widely reported that the Russians have been 
actively working directly with Iran to help them develop a modification 
of their SS4 missile.
  Why this is so significant, Mr. Speaker, is the fact that if in fact 
Iran develops this capability, which we have every reason to believe 
they are doing right now, within the next 2 to 3 years Iran would then 
have the capability of a medium-range missile, a medium-range 
sophisticated missile unlike the Scuds that Iraq used in Desert Storm, 
that would be capable of hitting any part of Israel, any part of the 
Middle East; in fact, any part of a 1,200 mile radius around Iran. This 
would be a missile that would be capable of carrying a chemical, a 
biological, a conventional weapon, or a nuclear weapon.
  In addition to those nations, many of whom are our allies and 
friends, it would also be capable of being pinpointed onto American 
troops who are today involved in various operations in those nations 
within the range of the Iranian missiles.
  What is so troubling, Mr. Speaker, is the fact that Iran has not 
developed this capability on their own. In fact, the evidence is that 
Iran has developed this capability with the strong, direct cooperation 
of Russia.
  In addition to providing the direct cooperation of Russia, we have 
evidence, in fact, Mr. Speaker, that we are now trying to investigate 
thoroughly, in fact, I was at a closed CIA briefing today on this, that 
would in fact perhaps confirm what has been alleged in the American 
media, that Israeli intelligence is actually seeing documents that 
prove that actual agreements have been signed between the Russian space 
agency and the Iranian agency building the medium-range missiles.

  Why is that so significant and important to us? It is important to us 
because we are the country pouring significant amounts of dollars into 
the Mir Space Station program which is overseen by the Russian space 
agency, meaning American tax dollars are going into the Mir space 
program, overseen by the agency that is also involved in contractual 
relationships with Iranian firms building medium-range missiles.
  The problem with that is, Mr. Speaker, in effect, American taxpayers 
may in fact be subsidizing illegal treaty violation actions involving 
Russia with Iran. That is totally unacceptable.
  In fact, Mr. Speaker, at last week's hearing in the Committee on 
Science I raised the issue publicly that in 1993 the administration 
witness before our committee, in discussing our involvement in the Mir 
program, said on the record that what would guide our involvement in 
the Mir program would be Russia's adherence to the Missile Technology 
Control Regime, better known as the MTCR.
  So here we have the administration testifying in 1993 that we will 
cooperate with Russia in this joint project, but only if Russia 
complies with the Missile Technology Control Regime. In fact, Mr. 
Speaker, the facts are that since 1993 Russia has violated the MTCR 
seven times. Seven specific times transfers of technology that are 
covered by that treaty have left Russia, and those violations have not 
in fact been called by this administration. No sanctions have been 
imposed, no actions have been taken, as are required by that treaty. My 
point is, Mr. Speaker, what good is a treaty if we are not going to 
enforce it?
  So here we have Iranian-Russian cooperation on the SS4 program. That 
has received a lot of attention. In fact, the people in Israel, and 
Binyamin Netanyahu himself has spoken on this issue repeatedly, are 
extremely concerned because of what this new dilemma presents to the 
people of Israel and the people around Iran who in fact could be hit by 
these missiles.
  The second news story, Mr. Speaker, that has received a lot of 
attention, in fact, that was the subject of a ``60 Minutes'' story 2 
weeks ago, was the issue of a conversation that I had with General 
Lebed in Moscow in May of this year.
  Mr. Speaker, I met with General Lebed twice this year. The first time 
was in January in Washington for 2 hours. The second time was in Moscow 
in the office of his campaign organization, again for 2 hours, at the 
end of May.
  On that trip, Mr. Speaker, I had six of our colleagues. We were 
meeting

[[Page H7824]]

with General Lebed without the media, without any reporters in, a very 
low-key, informal way to get his assessment on the ability of Russia to 
control its nuclear stockpile, and to also give us his insights as to 
whether or not there was in fact any problem with the control of 
Russia's strategic materials, and what the status of Russia's military 
in fact is at this point in time.
  As we all know, General Lebed is one of the most respected generals 
who has served in the Soviet military. He was a command officer, 
actually, in helping to solve the Chechen uprising, and who in fact was 
Boris Yeltsin's point person on defense for a period of time.
  In meeting with General Lebed, he went through a number of issues 
with us, giving us his feelings about the level of control of Russia 
over their nuclear arms, their nuclear devices, as well as the status 
of the conventional and strategic military forces.
  All of what General Lebed discussed with us I wrote up into our trip 
report, which became public record about a month after the trip ended, 
and which was picked up by the producer of ``60 Minutes.'' In August I 
was called by the producer of ``60 Minutes'' and asked if I would 
repeat what General Lebed told me in that interview that we had in May.
  The subject of the ``60 Minutes'' piece then became the fact that 
General Lebed said that one of his responsibilities as Boris Yeltsin's 
chief defense policy analyst and adviser was to account for 132 
suitcase-sized nuclear devices, nuclear bombs, that were built by the 
Soviet Union to be used in the case of an attack on that country, or to 
be used to bomb cities or to cause terrorism in areas where the Soviet 
Union felt they had to take action because they were being threatened, 
or because something was perhaps leading to an armed conflict.
  General Lebed said his responsibility was to account for these 
devices, and in fact, of the 132, he could only account for 48. Mr. 
Speaker, that is a very troubling statement. That is not the only 
troubling statement that General Lebed gave to us, but it certainly is 
a troubling one. In fact, he was saying that the Soviet Union built 132 
suitcase-sized nuclear bombs, each with a capability of one kiloton, 
and yet could only account for 48. He had no idea where the others are, 
as he said to us when we asked him that question.
  What is the capability of one of these suitcase devices? By the way, 
we have very complete descriptions of them which appeared in the 
Russian media in an article in 1995 describing these nuclear suitcases 
in great detail. A tactical nuclear weapon with a yield of 1 kiloton, 
which is equivalent to 2.2 million pounds of TNT, could kill as 
effectively as seven artillery battalions. One suitcase-sized bomb 
automatically being able to discharge itself through the mechanism that 
is in the bomb itself, activated by two individuals who knew how to 
operate the device, could in fact provide the same effectiveness as 
seven artillery battalions.

                              {time}  2245

  It could destroy a major portion of one of our cities in this 
country. It could kill tens if not hundreds of thousands of people 
wherever in fact it was activated.
  Now, do we know that Russia in fact or the Soviet Union in fact built 
these devices? Absolutely, without question. Do we know and do we have 
the assurance that the current leadership of Russia knows where they 
are? We do not. We do not have the assurance to know that Russia in 
fact has a full accounting for these nuclear devices.
  General Lebed has said to me and he has said publicly in ``60 
Minutes'' that he thinks that Russia does not have control of these 
devices. Now, as we expected, the immediate response from the Russian 
Government and from President Yeltsin and from Chernomyrdin and the 
other leaders in Russia and the military command operation was, ``That 
is not true. General Lebed does not know what he is talking about. He 
never had the ability to know where these nuclear devices would be 
located. He never would in fact have been able to find out whether or 
not Russia had these under control. Therefore, he is not an authority 
to be able to speak on these devices.''
  Mr. Speaker, after going through a significant amount of briefings by 
our intelligence communities, after having talked to a number of people 
who are aware of this issue, I say that I am not convinced. In fact, 
Mr. Speaker, I can assure our colleagues tonight that we are not 
confident that Russia has control of these nuclear devices, nor are we 
sure that Russia has control of its strategic arsenal. And I will get 
into some of these items in a moment.
  In fact, Mr. Speaker, since the article and the ``60 Minutes'' piece 
and other articles ran on the subject of the nuclear suitcases, another 
prominent Russian, Alexei Yablokov, who is one of the most outspoken 
Russian leaders in Moscow today, who himself was on Boris Yeltsin's 
staff, who was a key environmental advisor to Boris Yeltsin, who has 
been very critical of the Ministry of Atomic Energy, wrote an article 
in one of the leading Russian journals just last week where he in fact 
said that he thinks General Lebed was correct, that in fact Russia 
produced these devices.
  Mr. Yablokov, who I know personally, who I had testified before my 
committee 2 years ago here in Washington on the issue of Russian 
nuclear waste and how we could assist Russia in that problem, Mr. 
Yablokov has said also that these devices were also under the control 
of what used to be the KGB, the Russian security forces.
  So we have General Lebed and now Mr. Yablokov and others saying 
publicly that Russia built these devices and, in fact, they as Russians 
do not believe that the command and control situation in Russia is such 
that Russia's leadership know where they are and have full control of 
all the ones that were built.
  Now that is extremely troubling, Mr. Speaker. Because if that is the 
case, that means the black market has been or could be right now and 
have been looking for the ability to buy one of these devices, pay the 
right price, and use it for a terrorist act.
  Now these are the two major stories that have been dominating our 
news relative to our concerns with Russia over the past several weeks. 
Now, all of a sudden, Mr. Speaker, the administration has said they are 
shocked. The President says he is shocked that Russia would be 
cooperating with Iran on developing the SS-4 medium-range missile.
  The administration has said it is concerned that Russia may, in fact, 
have suitcase size nuclear devices that they may not know where they 
are; even they said that they believe that Russia knows where they are. 
They cannot verify that, but they believe it.
  My point today, Mr. Speaker, is, why is the administration shocked? 
Why are they shocked, when for the past 4 or 5 years we have repeatedly 
on this floor, in the House Committee on National Security and in every 
possible opportunity cited example after example of where this 
administration has ignored violations of arms control agreements, 
ignored them, where we know the Russians and the Chinese and other 
countries have in fact violated the missile technology control regime, 
have violated other arms control agreements, and we have not followed 
up action to go deal with that.
  Why, then, is this administration shocked? In fact, my feeling is, 
Mr. Speaker, that the administration is the reason why we have the 
growing problem today of the lack of security as to where Russia's 
nuclear devices and strategic arms are. The administration's lack of 
strong and solid and consistent enforcement of arms control agreements, 
which they maintain are the basis of our bilateral relationship, is the 
very reason why Russia today is transferring technology, seeing nuclear 
devices being sold or attempted to be sold, missile material being 
stolen, attempts to buy long-range rockets, and in fact seeing Russia 
in a state today that could in fact pose a threat for peace-loving 
people everywhere.
  I want to get into some of the specific examples that would lead me 
to believe that this administration should not have to wonder why and 
should not act surprised that Russia has been working with Iran, that 
in fact loose nuclear suitcases in fact could be out there. Let us talk 
about arms control violations.
  Mr. Speaker, December 1995, front page story in the Washington Post. 
The front page story in the Washington Post in December 1995, the 
headlines screamed, ``Jordanian and Israeli intelligence intercepts 
accelerometers and gyroscopes going from Russia to Iraq.''

[[Page H7825]]

  I was in Moscow in January 1996. I met with Ambassador Pickering, who 
was our ambassador at that time, at his office at the embassy; and I 
said, ``Mr. Ambassador, what was the reaction of Russia when you asked 
them about the Washington Post story about the accelerometers and 
gyroscopes that the Israeli and Jordanian intelligence people found 
going from Russia to Iraq?'' Ambassador Pickering said, ``Congressman, 
I have not asked them yet.'' I said, ``Mr. Ambassador, why haven't you 
asked them? Accelerometers and gyroscopes are very sophisticated, very 
expensive devices that are small that provide the guidance systems for 
long-range missiles. So that if Iran or Iraq could in fact develop a 
medium- to long-range missile, having Russian guidance systems would 
allow those missiles to be very accurate. So I would think it would be 
logical that we would ask Russia why were these devices going from your 
country to Iraq when that is a violation of the missile technology 
control regime? You are not allowed to transfer those types of devices. 
They are covered by the treaty.'' Ambassador Pickering said, ``That has 
got to come from Washington.''
  So I came back to Washington, Mr. Speaker. On January 30, I wrote 
this letter to the President.
  I include the letter for the Record, Mr. Speaker.
                                    Congress of the United States,


                                     House of Representatives,

                                 Washington, DC, January 30, 1996.
     President William Clinton,
     The White House, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. President: I am writing to express my concern 
     about the recent attempted shipment of Russia missile 
     components to Iraq. While this shipment, which included 
     gyroscopes and accelerometers designed for use in long-range 
     missiles, was intercepted in Jordan, it raises serious 
     questions about the Russian government's willingness or 
     ability to halt proliferation.
       Reports of this shipment, in contravention of the Missile 
     Technology Control Reime (MTCR), surfaced publicly in 
     December, several months after Russia was admitted as a full 
     member of the MTCR regime. Whether the Russian government 
     sanctioned the shipment or not, the events which transpired 
     underscore the fact that Russia is at best unable or at worst 
     unwilling to fulfill its MTCR obligations.
       Recently, I travelled to Russia and met with members of the 
     Duma, defense advisors to President Yeltsin and officials of 
     Rosvooruzheniye, the main Russian state arms export company. 
     Russian government officials with whom I raised the issue 
     denied all knowledge of this highly reported incident. 
     Rosvooruzheniye officials were aware of the attempted 
     transfer, but denied any involvement. I also met with 
     Ambassador Pickering, who indicated that the United States 
     neither sought nor received any information or explanation 
     from the Russian government about the attempted transfer.
       This recent incident is not the first time that Russia has 
     transferred missile technology to non-MTCR states. In 1993, 
     Russia sold an associated production technology for cryogenic 
     rocket engines to India. Recently, Russia transferred missile 
     components to Brazil. To this very day, Russian continues to 
     aggressively market a variant of its SS-25 missile under the 
     guise of a ``space launch vehicle.''
       If nonproliferation agreements are to have any meaning, 
     they must be aggressively enforced through careful monitoring 
     and the application of sanctions for violations. I believe 
     that the Russian shipment of missile components deserves a 
     forceful response from the United States, and I am deeply 
     troubled by the U.S. government's apparent inaction in this 
     regard. I would appreciate answers to the following questions 
     in that regard:
       1. Has the United States demanded from the Russian 
     government a detailed explanation of the attempted shipment 
     of gyroscopes and accelerometers to Iraq? If so, when did 
     this occur and through what channels? If not, why not?
       2. Has the Russian government responded, and what was the 
     substance of the response? Does the Administration find it 
     credible?
       3. Do you believe that this shipment occurred with or 
     without the knowledge of the Russian government, and what 
     does your answer imply about Russia's willingness or ability 
     to advance the U.S. nonproliferation agenda?
       4. Why have sanctions not been imposed on Russia as a 
     result of this attempted transfer of MTCR-prohibited missile 
     components? What does the failure to impose sanctions, as 
     required by U.S. law, say about the Administration's 
     commitment to ensure the viability of the MTCR regime? Why 
     wouldn't this set a dangerous precedent for other that might 
     seek to circumvent or violate MTCR guidelines?
       5. Russia's ascension to the MTCR regime as a full member 
     imposes certain obligations on it that this incident 
     demonstrates Russia is unwilling or unable to fulfill. What 
     does the Administration intend to do to ensure full Russian 
     compliance with its MTCR obligations in the future? Without 
     acting firmly now in response to the attempted component 
     transfer to Iraq, why should Russia believe that similar 
     transfers will carry severe consequences in the future?
       6. Please provide the dates and topic considered by the 
     Missile Trade Analysis Group since the Russian shipment was 
     reported.
       7. Please list and describe all instances which raised U.S. 
     concerns regarding compliance with the MTCR, all instances 
     since 1987 in which the U.S. government considered imposing 
     sanctions on a ``foreign government or entity,'' whether 
     sanctions were in fact imposed and against whom; how long 
     those sanctions remained in effect, and the reason why there 
     were lifted.
       Thank you for responding to these serious issues.
           Sincerely,
                                                      Curt Weldon,
                                               Member of Congress.

  The letter asked President Clinton ``What is the story, Mr. 
President? What are we going to do about the accelerometers and 
gyroscopes going to Iraq.''
  Well, the President finally answered me on April 3.
  Mr. Speaker, I include the President's letter for the Record, his 
answer to me.

                                              The White House,

                                    Washington, DC, April 3, 1996.
     Hon. Curt Weldon,
     House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
       Dear Representative Weldon: Thank you for your letter 
     regarding the recent interdiction of Russian missile guidance 
     components destined for Iraq.
       Gaining Russian restraint on missile sales is a major 
     objective of this Administration. As you know, in September 
     1993 we concluded a Memorandum of Understanding with Russia 
     on the control of missile equipment and technology. We also 
     successfully worked with Russia to meet the requirements for 
     Russian membership in the 28-nation Missile Technology 
     Control Regime.
       I agree with you that for our nonproliferation agreements 
     to have meaning, they must be fully enforced. For this 
     reason, we have made clear to the Russian Government our deep 
     concern about the shipment of missile guidance components 
     interdicted in Jordan on its way to Iraq. We fully expect 
     Russian authorities to investigate this case and provide us 
     the details of their investigation as well as take steps to 
     preclude similar incidents in the future.
       As this case points out, Russia needs to continue to 
     strengthen its new export control system. That is why, with 
     the support of Congress, we are providing export control 
     assistance to the Russian Government. I believe that our 
     continued engagement with Russia on export control issues is 
     the key to long-term improvement on their part.
       I appreciate hearing your views on this important issue.
           Sincerely,
                                                     Bill Clinton.

  Mr. Speaker, the President's response was, basically, Congressman, 
thank you for your interest. We are as concerned as you are about these 
accelerometers and gyroscopes. But Russia has not yet had time to fully 
investigate this situation. We will not take any action until we are 
sure that we know what happened here. But we guarantee you we will 
follow through.
  That was in April, Mr. Speaker. Here we are, a year and a half later, 
and we have not taken any action under the requirements of the MTCR. We 
did not impose any sanctions. And, in fact, there has been little talk 
about the accelerometers and gyroscopes up until the news media started 
focusing on the Iran SS-4 cooperation.
  Last Thursday, in the Committee on Science, I held up in the 
committee a Russian accelerometer and a Russian gyroscope. In fact, we 
have, Mr. Speaker, 180 of these devices. These were not transferred 
once. We know of at least three times that someone in Russia 
transferred the most sophisticated guidance systems available today 
that were taken from an SS-18 missile, which were the missiles in the 
Russian submarines that were aimed at American cities, clipped those 
devices in perfectly good condition, and shipped them to Iraq.
  We intercepted one shipment with the help of the Jordanians and 
Israelis. The other devices were found in the Tigris River Basin where 
Iraq threw them because they knew we know they had them. We know of at 
least three times this technology transfer occurred, and we suspect 
there were more.
  All of a sudden, the administration is concerned that Russia may be 
cooperating with Iran on the SS-4 technology? Where was there concern 2 
years ago, Mr. Speaker, when I raised the issue in Moscow and with the 
President on the accelerometer and the gyroscope transfer?
  Let us go beyond that, Mr. Speaker. Let us, for the record, put into 
the

[[Page H7826]]

Record seven specific violations of the missile technology control 
regime. Let us talk about the shipment of North Korea Scud launchers 
from Russia to Syria. That was in August 1993. What was the action on 
the MTCR as a violation? None, no action taken.
  What about the sale to China of mobile multiple warhead high accuracy 
solid and liquid missile technology to modernize its strategic rocket 
forces? That was also in 1993. It is a violation of the MTCR. What was 
the response? Nothing, nada, no sanctions.
  What about the Russian rocket builder who says it is still lending 
India space launch integration technology, that is in 1994, despite the 
MTCR and Russia's July 1993 pledge not to give India missile production 
assistance? No response, Mr. Speaker. No sanctions.
  What about the Washington Post reporting in June of 1995 that Russia 
was helping Brazil build a large rocket? Violation of the MTCR. You 
cannot do that. No response. No sanction.
  How about the shipping of the guidance sets to Iraq, as I just 
explained, which Jordan and Israel intercepted in November 1995 
reported in the Washington Post in December 1995. No sanction, Mr. 
Speaker.
  And now we have the sale of a 1,250-mile-range missile production 
technology to Iran in 1996 and 1997. Again no response accept a lot of 
hyperbole and the comment that the vice president just concluded 
serious meetings with Chernomyrdin, but no sanctions.
  What about the sale to Armenia of 8 Scud-B missile launchers with 22 
to 32 missiles through late 1996.
  Mr. Speaker, I enter these violations into the Record.

                                         RECKLESS RUSSIAN ROCKET EXPORTS
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                       White House action taken to enforce U.S.
       Russian missile misdeed           Administration assessment         missile technology sanctions law
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Air ships North Korean Scud launchers  Tel erector launcher units     None.
 to Syria (8/93).                       may have been mistaken by
                                        Russians to be trucks.
Sells China mobile, multiple-war-      Russia made these transfers    None.
 head, high-accuracy solid and liquid   as an MICR adherent and so
 missile technology to modernize its    is legally exempt from US
 aging strategic rocket forces (1993).  sanctions. Acting against
                                        Bejing would jeopardize U.S.-
                                        China relations.
Russian rocket builder says it's       Shown evidence of Russia's     None.
 still lending India space launch       continued missile assistance
 integration tech (6/94) despite MTCR   to India and warned it could
 & Russia's 7/93 pledge not to give     jeopardize $100s of millions
 India missile production assistance.   in U.S.-Russian space
                                        cooperation, White House
                                        tells House Space Committee
                                        Chairman (9/94) CIA will
                                        look into the matter.
Washington Post reports Russia has     Waived U.S. missile sanctions  None.
 been helping Brazil build a large      against Brazil and Russia
 rocket (6/8/95).                       (citing US national security
                                        interest), admitted both
                                        into the MICR because of
                                        their creation of a
                                        ``sound'' systems of
                                        nonproliferation export
                                        controls.
Ships intercontinental-range           Shipment of gyroscopes was an  None.
 ballistic missile guidance sets to     ``aberrational'' action.
 Iraq. Jordan interdicts shipment (11/  Russia efforts to find who
 95).                                   was responsible are
                                        inconclusive.
Sells Iran 1,250-mile range missile    Administration official is     None.
 production technology (96-97).         quoted in Los Angeles Times
                                        explaining that the transfer
                                        may have been `beyond the
                                        control of the government'
                                        (2/12/97).
Sells Armenia 8 Scud-B missile         Administration officials       None.
 launchers with 24-32 missiles          claim that there may have
 (through late 1996).                   been no ``transfer'' since
                                        the Scud systems were in
                                        Armenia under Soviet control
                                        prior to the sale. Russian
                                        officials claim that they
                                        were only able to confirm
                                        these sales recently.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

  Mr. Speaker, the point is simple: The administration should not show 
its shock. The administration should not say they do not understand 
what is going on. The reason why technology is leaving Russia is 
because this administration has not enforced our arms control 
agreements. We have put our head in the sand. How can we have a 
bilateral relationship based on arms control agreements if we are not 
going to enforce them?
  It is not a case of embarrassing Boris Yeltsin. As I have said on 
this floor perhaps 50 times, I want Yeltsin to succeed. I spent as much 
time in dealing with Russia as any Member of this institution. I chair 
the new Dumas-Congress Study Group, which I formed with the Speaker of 
our Congress, the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. Gingrich] and the 
gentleman from Missouri [Mr. Gephardt] coordinating with us, with the 
deputy speaker of the Russian parliament, Mr. Shokin. I chair that.
  I formed the FSU American Energy Caucus six years ago to work on 
helping Russia develop its energy resources, and I still stay involved 
with that, bringing billions of dollars into Russia for their economy. 
I work on the environmental issues with Russia through programs called 
GLOBE and ACOPS on ocean protection. I have fought for and put funding 
into the defense bill to help Russia clean up its nuclear waste, to 
help Russia with its environmental problems relative to both nuclear 
and non-nuclear sources of pollutants.
  I was in Russia twice this year proposing with Charles Taylor a new 
initiative to create a housing incentive program modeled after our 
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae to help middle-income Russians own their own 
homes. I support the cooperative threat reduction program. I support 
the cooperative space station program through Mir. Every possible 
opportunity, Mr. Speaker, I have been there.
  But Mr. Speaker, we cannot in fact cooperate with Russia and want 
them to succeed and then expect to put our heads in the sand when they 
have violations occurring in front of us and think that Russia will 
respect us. Russian people and Russian leaders respect strength and 
they respect consistency. And we have given them neither.
  When the violations occur, we turn our backs. We say we do not have 
enough information or we say that Russia has excused itself and said 
they are sorry, it will not happen again. Imagine the signal we send to 
rogues and Mafia types in Russia today who see seven straight times 
where they are caught transferring technology and America does nothing.
  What kind of signal is that sending, Mr. Speaker? It is sending a 
signal to Russia that we are just not going to call them on these 
violations. We have done the wrong thing. This administration should 
not be surprised at the technology cooperation with Iran.

                              {time}  2300

  They should not be surprised that Russia cannot guarantee us control 
of their nuclear assets.
  There is a second reason why the administration, I think, has failed 
in this area, Mr. Speaker. That is the fact that this administration 
and this President has used the bully pulpit to create the impression 
in America that Russia is no longer a threat.
  I am not one of those who wants to re-create the Cold War. I do not 
think Russia is the evil empire. In fact I hope Boris Yeltsin and I 
work to see Boris Yeltsin succeed. But let me repeat the quote that 
President Clinton has used 140 times across this country over the past 
4 years. In fact, Mr. Speaker, he used it three times standing in this 
room at the podium behind me. He looked the American people in the eye 
through the camera in front of me, the same camera I am looking at. Mr. 
Speaker, this is what he said: ``America can sleep well tonight, 
because for the first time in 50 years, there are no long-range Russian 
ICBMs pointed at America's children.''
  One hundred forty times the President has used that same phrase in 
his speeches. For those who want to see, in past months I have placed 
all 140 times in the Congressional Record. He said it three times in 
State of the Union speeches. He said it on college campuses, 
international groups and national groups. He said it in Washington 
State, in California, in Texas, in Pennsylvania, in Florida, in Ohio 
and in Maine, in Illinois and in Indiana. And he said it even after 
last year on the defense bill, we asked the President to certify that 
to us. The Defense Department wrote back to us and said, we cannot 
certify that because Russia will not allow us to have access to their 
targeting practices, just as we will not allow them to have access to 
ours.
  Furthermore, Mr. Speaker, even if we could verify that statement, you 
can retarget an offensive ICBM in under 30 seconds. But here we have a 
President going around the country, 140 times saying, ``Sleep well 
tonight, America, there are no longer missiles pointed at you. You're 
safe.''
  So many of our colleagues who believe what the Commander in Chief

[[Page H7827]]

says, he should know, he is the Commander in Chief, and the American 
people then become complacent and think Russia is not a problem. We 
have solved that problem. The Cold War is over.
  Mr. Speaker, as I said a few moments ago, I do not believe Russia is 
an evil empire, but I could make the case very easily that Russia is 
more destabilized today than it has been at any time in the last 50 
years. In fact, there is more of a chance of an accidental launch today 
from a Russian ICBM than at any time during the Cold War. Let me back 
that up with some examples.
  January 1995. The Norwegians are going to launch a weather rocket to 
sample the upper atmosphere for weather conditions. As is normally 
done, Norway notified Russia, ``Be prepared between a certain period of 
time, we're going to launch a weather rocket. Don't think anything of 
it. It is just to sample the weather.''
  The day came. Norway launched the rocket. Because Russia is so 
paranoid about the status of their conventional military, their radar 
picked up that rocket launch, their system went into play, their 
nuclear response capability was activated, and Russia came within 10 
minutes of activating an all-out response to a weather rocket from 
Norway. Boris Yeltsin has publicly said on the record that the black 
box that he controls with what are called the chegets that control the 
activation of a response or an attack were activated, which meant that 
for a period of minutes, Boris Yeltsin, General Kalashnikov, the 
commander of the general staff, and the defense minister, Pavel 
Grachev, the three of them had the ability to launch a response because 
they were mistaken initially and thought that that Norwegian rocket 
going up for weather sampling was an attack by the U.S. or some other 
Nation. Within 10 minutes of an all-out nuclear response.
  The President though says, ``Don't worry. There's no more missiles 
pointed at America's kids.'' The fact is, Mr. Speaker, the situation in 
Russia today is unstable. The situation in Russia today is, in fact, 
troubling. We do not need to paint Russia into a corner, but we do not 
need to mislead the American people or the Russian people as well.
  Major problems with the troops, Mr. Speaker. Let me cite from a book 
that is going to come out tomorrow that I am going to mention in a 
moment about the status of the Russian military.

       Forty-three percent of the draftees are found to be 
     suffering from some form of mental illness. At a desolate far 
     eastern military base at Komsomolsk-na-Amure, not far from 
     where another Russian military leader died from hunger, two 
     soldiers recently blew themselves up while trying to extract 
     precious metals from the warhead of an air defense missile 
     they had stolen from the ammunition dump. Others take the 
     easy way out. Currently half the noncombat deaths in the 
     military are due to suicide.

  These comments are taken from a book coming out tomorrow called One 
Point Safe that documents in detail every issue I have raised on this 
floor for the past 4 and 5 years about the problems of lack of control, 
and the lack of adequate monitoring of Russia's strategic and nuclear 
materials and arsenal.
  Mr. Speaker, it is not the right thing to tell the American people 
that there is no reason to worry. That is just as wrong as a 
conservative Republican standing up on the floor and recreating the 
evil empire. They are both extremes. The problem, Mr. Speaker, is one 
of those two people happens to be the President of the United States, 
who now expresses shock that we would find that Russia is cooperating 
with Iran on the SS-4 missile program; expresses concern that Russia 
may have nuclear suitcases that they cannot account for.
  What else am I concerned about, Mr. Speaker, besides the violations 
of the missile control regimes and the bully pulpit creating a wrong 
impression in this country? I am concerned about deliberate distortions 
of intelligence data. Three years ago I had a senior American 
intelligence officer come into my office, ask to meet with me, I had 
never met the man before. He said: Congressman Weldon, I want to talk 
to you. I have been a career intelligence officer in the service of 
this country for, I think, 18 years. He showed me the highest award 
that you can get in the Intelligence Community that he had received 
from our government. He said, I have to tell you a story. I am coming 
to you because you work issues involving Russia, and because you are 
concerned about the proliferation of missiles, and because you work the 
issue of missile defense technology.
  He said, my job at the intelligence agency for the Department of 
Energy has been to run a program called Russian fission. The Russian 
fission program, which was highly classified, was designed to monitor 
the ability for Russia to control fissile material in their nuclear 
stockpile. This individual, whose name is Jay Stewart, and I can say it 
publicly because this book now documents this story, this individual 
ran the Russian fission program.
  This individual was asked to go over and brief the head of NATO, 
Manfred Worner, on the troubling conclusions he was coming to 3 and 4 
years ago about the lack of control of Russia's nuclear stockpile. 
Manfred Worner cabled back in a secret cable to the State Department 
saying this briefing should be given to every country in NATO.

  What did the administration do? The administration, through the 
Department of Energy, deliberately took apart the Russian fission 
program. They took Jay Stewart's job away. They eliminated the Russian 
fission program. In fact, Mr. Speaker, there was a briefing that was 
held on the status of the ability of Russia to control its nuclear 
stockpile 3 years ago. All of the documentation, all the film footage 
of that briefing was shredded.
  This book, Mr. Speaker, documents the entire story. This book will be 
out tomorrow. I am not the author. I am not involved in any part of the 
marketing of it, except I have over the past 2 years helped these two 
writers identify the proper people to talk to to see whether or not 
they could verify the facts that were given to me.
  I had our committee do a preliminary investigation of Jay Stewart's 
allegations, and they came back and said, well, DOE has circled the 
wagons, and under Hazel O'Leary's leadership they have all got their 
same story down, that Jay Stewart really was not removed for that 
reason, and it is really not true.
  In our investigation, we found at least two other individuals who 
verified everything Jay Stewart said. Neither of them work for the 
Department of Energy. They were at labs, our energy labs in other parts 
of the country. One of those individuals, Jessica Stern, is in this 
book. She corroborates also what Jay Stewart said.
  So now we have a third dimension, Mr. Speaker. We have a deliberate 
effort on the part of certain people in this administration to distort 
intelligence data that would allow this country to understand more 
about what was happening in Russia in regard to controlling their 
nuclear materials. And what was the administration's response? It was 
to destroy the data, rip up the records, shred the documents, shred the 
film footage and deny there is a problem.
  Nothing could be worse for the security of this country, Mr. Speaker. 
In my opinion, our investigation coupled with what is in this book 
requires a congressional investigation that is not politicized; that, 
in fact, gets to the heart of what this administration now rails about, 
their concern and surprise and their shock at the fact that Russia 
would be cooperating with Iran on developing the SS-4. Forget the 
accelerometers and gyroscopes going to Iraq, forget the instability of 
nuclear devices as outlined by General Lebed. Forget about the problems 
associated with the Norwegian rocket launch. Forget about the morale 
problems in the military. Forget about all the other violations of the 
MTCR, but all of a sudden we are shocked.
  I am not shocked, Mr. Speaker. And I am not here to stand here and 
blame the leadership of the Russian Government. I am here to say the 
reason why these things are occurring is because this administration 
has a policy that does not make sense. This administration does not 
have the backbone to enforce arms control agreements that it maintains 
are the basis of our bilateral relationship. This administration does 
not want us to put into play systems to defend our people and our 
troops even when we have technology being transferred that threatens 
our troops. And now all of a sudden they are shocked.

[[Page H7828]]

  Here we are still cooperating and putting money into the Mir program 
when the agency in Russia running the Mir program has signed contracts 
with the same Iranian agency developing components of their medium-
range missile.
  Something is wrong, Mr. Speaker, and something is terribly wrong in 
terms of our lack of enforcement and our lack of dealing honestly with 
this problem that faces this Nation and people around the world who are 
concerned about nuclear material, who are concerned about technology 
that could be used against our troops, our allies and our people, and 
we just cannot brush it aside and say that all of a sudden we are 
concerned and we are going to do something about it.
  With the most recent revelation about the Iranian cooperation, the 
President called back to work the retired U.S. Ambassador to India, 
Ambassador Wisner. Ambassador Wisner's assignment was to go to Moscow 
and to meet with the individual who runs the Russian space agency, 
Koptev.
  Ambassador Wisner asked to brief me last week before he went to 
Moscow. He came in and we chatted for an hour. He said, Congressman, I 
assure you I am going to go over to Russia, meet with Koptev and tell 
him this is not acceptable.
  Mr. Speaker, I am glad the Ambassador is doing that, and I am happy 
the administration is responding, but I think it is a little bit too 
late. I think that the policy of not enforcing agreements and not being 
consistent has now caused a feeling in Russia, especially with the 
problems of the Mafia being involved in a lot of the operations there, 
as General Lebed said. Former senior Russian commanders, General Lebed 
told us that the most capable generals and admirals in the Soviet Navy 
had been forced out of the military, and when they were forced out, 
they were not given housing to live in. Many of them have not even been 
paid their pensions. These are Russia's most capable military leaders. 
And General Lebed, who himself was one of those leaders, when asked 
what are they doing today, they are involved in rogue operations. They 
are selling the very equipment that they were responsible for 
maintaining and controlling as military leaders.
  Do we know that to be true? Absolutely. In fact, we know, and it is 
in the record, and it is in this book that we now have evidence that a 
$1 billion sale of Russian military equipment took place that the 
Kremlin did not even know about. $1 billion of Russian military 
hardware, not nuclear, military hardware was being sold by a Russian 
official without the Kremlin even aware that the sale was taking place. 
And all of a sudden we are surprised?
  Mr. Speaker, I rise tonight because of my concern at this 
administration not listening to what we have said for the past 5 years. 
We are not about backing Russia into a corner. We are about helping 
Russia stabilize itself. But the policy of this administration has not 
worked. Now the President, as he has recently done in Helsinki, wants 
to reinforce the ABM treaty, a treaty based on mutually assured 
destruction, a treaty that was designed for the 1960s and 1970s when 
you had two superpowers, each with long-range missiles, the Soviet 
Union and America, that no longer is relevant today because mutually 
assured deterrence does not work when you have China and North Korea 
and India and Pakistan and Iran and Iraq developing long-range missile 
capabilities. They are not signatories to the ABM treaty, but this 
administration, instead of reflecting a new attitude toward Russia, 
considering what is happening in China and North Korea and Iraq and 
Iran, wants to reinforce the ABM treaty.

                              {time}  2315

  The administration, Mr. Speaker, continues to go down the wrong path 
and I pledge, Mr. Speaker, that as long as I am in this body I am going 
to call it the way I see it. I am going to be vocal on these concerns 
that I have expressed, and I am going to continue to pursue this 
administration, I am going to work with it in helping to build a strong 
Russia, as I have been, I am going to support it when it asks for money 
to help in the case, but not unless we get more cooperation in sending 
a signal to Russia that they got to be more open with us.
  One other issue, Mr. Speaker. We found out that Russia for the past 
18 years has been working on a project in the Ural Mountains. This 
project is in a mountain called Yamantau. The project has basically 
been mining, an operation that has built a facility down inside of this 
mountain the size of the city of Washington, D.C. Our experts estimated 
it could withstand a direct nuclear hit. We do not know what it is for. 
We have asked the Russians; they have not given any response except in 
1991 the general who runs the project, General Zyuganov, said it was a 
project for ore mining. In 1992 he said it was a facility to store food 
and shelter. In 1993 and 1994 the intelligence officer for that region 
said it was a state secret and they had no responsibility to tell us 
what it was.
  If we are going to rely on trust and if we are going to follow this 
administration's stated policy of building trust based on agreements, 
then we need to know what happens in Yamantau Mountain. When the 
Russian military cannot be paid their pensions, when they cannot be 
given housing, how can Russia continue to spend billions of dollars on 
a mountain in the middle of the Urals with a city of 65,000 people that 
is closed, working on this project day in and day out. We know it is 
there, our aerial surveillance has seen shots of what is going on, and 
yet Russia will not talk about it.
  I raised this issue in May with the Minister of Atomic Energy, 
Mikhaylov, the Minister of Natural Resources, Orlov, and the Deputy 
Minister of Defense Kakoshin and the No. 2 general in the command, 
Staff General Manilow, and I told each of them, ``If you want me to 
continue to work Russian American issues, I need to know something 
about Yamantau Mountain.''
  Each of them said, ``We know of this project, but we cannot talk 
about it. You have to go to President Yeltsin.'' I asked them to assist 
me. I wrote a 3-page letter in Russian to President Yeltsin in July, 
and I have yet to receive a response. President Clinton supposedly 
raised the Yamantau Mountain issue with Yeltsin a year ago at an 
international summit, and to this day we have no new information on 
Yamantau Mountain.
  Mr. Speaker, our relationship with Russia is a very simple one. Yes, 
we need to help stabilize them, yes, we need to work together with them 
aggressively, but most important, we need Russia to understand that we 
are here to work with them to make sure they have control of the 
strategic weapons, their nuclear technology and that when they allow or 
deliberately violate arms control agreements, they have to pay the 
price.
  And so I say, Mr. Speaker, as we discuss these issues it is critical 
for this Nation to understand what has been going on, and I also want 
to encourage each of our colleagues to read this book, the most recent 
Steven Spielberg movie, ``Peacemaker,'' the fictional movie is 
partially based on this book which is factual. This book in detail 
highlights all of the issues I have been raising on the floor of this 
institution for the last 4 years, and it names names, it names 
locations. I do not know how they got their data because much of what 
is in here was classified. But it is here in black and white. They are 
respected journalists. In fact Leslie Cockburn, who was a co-author 
with her husband Andrew, was a producer for ABC TV up until she 
resigned that position this year. They are capable, intelligent, 
articulate people who have finally documented all of the evidence that 
highlights the facts relative to this administration's position in 
terms of Russia and our relationship militarily and strategically.
  Mr. Speaker, I thank the staff again for bearing with me in this 
special order.

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