[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 128 (Tuesday, September 23, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9806-S9808]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




REMOVAL OF INJUNCTION OF SECRECY--TREATY DOCUMENTS NOS. 105-28, 105-29, 
                               AND 105-30

  Mr. ENZI. As in executive session, I ask unanimous consent that the 
injunction of secrecy be removed from the following treaties 
transmitted to the Senate on September 23, 1997, by the President of 
the United States:
  Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (Treaty Document No. 105-28);
  Protocol Amending Tax Convention With Canada (Treaty Document No. 
105-29);
  Extradition Treaty With India (Treaty Document No. 105-30).
  I further ask that the treaties be considered as having been read the 
first time; that they be referred, with accompanying papers, to the 
Committee on Foreign Relations and ordered to be printed; and that the 
President's messages be printed in the Record.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The President's messages are as follows:

To the Senate of the United States:
  I transmit herewith, for the advice and consent of the Senate to 
ratification, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (the ``Treaty'' 
or ``CTBT''), opened for signature and signed by the United States at 
New York on September 24, 1996. The Treaty includes two Annexes, a 
Protocol, and two Annexes to the Protocol, all of which form integral 
parts of the Treaty. I transmit also, for the information of the 
Senate, the report of the Department of State on the Treaty, including 
an Article-by-Article analysis of the Treaty.
  Also included in the Department of State's report is a document 
relevant to but not part of the Treaty: The Treaty on the Establishment 
of a Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban 
Treaty Organization, adopted by the Signatory States to the Treaty on 
November 19, 1996. The Text provides the basis for the work of the 
Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty 
Organization is preparing detailed procedures for implementing the 
Treaty and making arrangements for the first session of the Conference 
of the States Parties to the Treaty. In particular, by the terms of the 
Treaty, the Preparatory Commission will be responsible for ensuring 
that the verification regime established by the Treaty will be 
effectively in operation at such time as the Treaty enters into force. 
My Administration has completed and will submit separately to the 
Senate an analysis of the verifiability of the Treaty, consistent with 
section 37 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as amended. Such 
legislation as may be necessary to implement the Treaty also will be 
submitted separately to the Senate for appropriate action.
  The conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty is a 
signal event in the history of arms control. The subject of the Treaty 
is one that has been under consideration by the international community 
for nearly 40 years, and the significance of the conclusion of 
negotiations and the signature to date of more than 140 states cannot 
be overestimated. The Treaty creates an absolute prohibition against 
the conduct of nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear 
explosion anywhere. Specifically, each State Party undertakes not to 
carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear 
explosion; to prohibit and prevent any nuclear explosions at any place 
under its jurisdiction or control; and to refrain from causing, 
encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any 
nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.
  The Treaty establishes a far reaching verification regime, based on 
the provision of seismic, hydroacoustic, radionuclide, and infrasound 
data by a global network (the ``International Monitoring System'') 
consisting of the facilities listed in Annex 1 to the Protocol. Data 
provided by the International Monitoring System will be stored, 
analyzed, and disseminated, in accordance with Treaty-mandated 
operational manuals, by an International Data Center that will be part 
of the Technical Secretariat of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban 
Treaty Organization. The verification regime includes rules for the 
conduct of on-site inspections, provisions for consultation and 
clarification, and voluntary confidence-building measures designed to 
contribute to the timely resolution of any compliance concerns arising 
from possible misinterpretation of monitoring data related to chemical 
explosions that a State Party intends to or has carried out. Equally 
important to the U.S. ability to verify the Treaty, the text 
specifically provides for the rights of States Parties to use 
information obtained by national technical means in a manner consistent 
with generally

[[Page S9807]]

recognized principles of international law for purposes of verification 
generally, and in particular, as the basis for an on-site inspection 
request. The verification regime provides each State Party the right to 
protect sensitive installations, activities, or locations not related 
to the Treaty. Determinations of compliance with the Treaty rest with 
each individual State Party to the Treaty.

  Negotiations for a nuclear test-ban treaty date back to the 
Eisenhower Administration. During the period 1978-1980, negotiations 
among the United States, the United Kingdom, and the USSR (the 
Depositary Governments of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (NPT)) made progress, but ended without agreement. 
Thereafter, as the nonnuclear weapon states called for test-ban 
negotiations, the United States urged the Conference on Disarmament 
(the ``CD'') to devote its attention to the difficult aspects of 
monitoring compliance with such a ban and developing elements of an 
international monitoring regime. After the United States, joined by 
other key states, declared its support for comprehensive test-ban 
negotiations with a view toward prompt conclusion of a treaty, 
negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban were initiated in the CD, in 
January 1994. Increased impetus for the conclusion of a comprehensive 
nuclear test-ban treaty by the end of 1996 resulted from the adoption, 
by the Parties to the NPT in conjunction with the indefinite and 
unconditional extension of that Treaty, of ``Principles and Objectives 
for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament'' that listed the 
conclusion of a CTBT as the highest measure of its program of action.
  On August 11, 1995, when I announced U.S. support for a ``zero 
yield'' CTBT, I stated that:

  ``. . . as part of our national security strategy, the United States 
    must and will retain strategic nuclear forces sufficient to deter 
    any future hostile foreign leadership with access to strategic 
    nuclear forces from acting against our vital interests and to 
    convince it that seeking a nuclear advantage would be futile. In 
    this regard, I consider the maintenance of a safe and reliable 
    nuclear stockpile to be a supreme national interest of the United 
    States.
  ``I am assured by the Secretary of Energy and the Directors of our 
    nuclear weapons labs that we can meet the challenge of maintaining 
    our nuclear deterrent under a CTBT through a Science Based 
    Stockpile Stewardship program without nuclear testing. I directed 
    the implementation of such a program almost 2 years ago, and it is 
    being developed with the support of the Secretary of Defense and 
    the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This program will now be 
    tied to a new certification procedure. In order for this program to 
    succeed, both the Administration and the Congress must provide 
    sustained bipartisan support for the stockpile stewardship program 
    over the next decade and beyond. I am committed to working with the 
    Congress to ensure this support.
  ``While I am optimistic that the stockpile stewardship program will 
    be successful, as President I cannot dismiss the possibility, 
    however unlikely, that the program will fall short of its 
    objectives. Therefore, in addition to the new annual certification 
    procedure for our nuclear weapons stockpile, I am also establishing 
    concrete, specific safeguards that define the conditions under 
    which the United States can enter into a CTBT. . .''

  The safeguards that were established are as follows:

  --The conduct of a Science Based Stockpile Stewardship program to 
    ensure a high level of confidence in the safety and reliability of 
    nuclear weapons in the active stockpile, including the conduct of a 
    broad range of effective and continuing experimental programs.
  --The maintenance of modern nuclear laboratory facilities and 
    programs in theoretical and exploratory nuclear technology that 
    will attract, retain, and ensure the continued application of our 
    human scientific resources to those programs on which continued 
    progress in nuclear technology depends.
  --The maintenance of the basic capability to resume nuclear test 
    activities prohibited by the CTBT should the United States cease to 
    be bound to adhere to this Treaty.
  --The continuation of a comprehensive research and development 
    program to improve our treaty monitoring capabilities and 
    operations.
  --The continuing development of a broad range of intelligence 
    gathering and analytical capabilities and operations to ensure 
    accurate and comprehensive information on worldwide nuclear 
    arsenals, nuclear weapons development programs, and related nuclear 
    programs.
  --The understanding that if the President of the United States is 
    informed by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy 
    (DOE)--advised by the Nuclear Weapons Council, the Directors of 
    DOE's nuclear weapons laboratories, and the Commander of the U.S. 
    Strategic Command--that a high level of confidence in the safety or 
    reliability of a nuclear weapon type that the two Secretaries 
    consider to be critical to our nuclear deterrent could no longer be 
    certified, the President, in consultation with the Congress, would 
    be prepared to withdraw from the CTBT under the standard ``supreme 
    national interests'' clause in order to conduct whatever testing 
    might be required.

  With regard to the last safeguard:

  --The U.S. regards continued high confidence in the safety and 
    reliability of its nuclear weapons stockpile as a matter affecting 
    the supreme interests of the country and will regard any events 
    calling that confidence into question as ``extraordinary events 
    related to the subject matter of the treaty.'' It will exercise its 
    rights under the ``supreme national interests'' clause if it judges 
    that the safety or reliability of its nuclear weapons stockpile 
    cannot be assured with the necessary high degree of confidence 
    without nuclear testing.
  --To implement that commitment, the Secretaries of Defense and 
    Energy--advised by the Nuclear Weapons Council or ``NWC'' 
    (comprising representatives of DOD, JCS, and DOE), the Directors of 
    DOE's nuclear weapons laboratories and the Commander of the U.S. 
    Strategic Command--will report to the President annually, whether 
    they can certify that the Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile and 
    all critical elements thereof are, to a high degree of confidence, 
    safe and reliable, and, if they cannot do so, whether, in their 
    opinion and that of the NWC, testing is necessary to assure, with a 
    high degree of confidence, the adequacy of corrective measures to 
    assure the safety and reliability of the stockpile, or elements 
    thereof. The Secretaries will state the reasons for their 
    conclusions, and the views of the NWC, reporting any minority 
    views.
  --After receiving the Secretaries' certification and accompanying 
    report, including NWC and minority views, the President will 
    provide them to the appropriate committees of the Congress, 
    together with a report on the actions he has taken in light of 
    them.
  --If the President is advised, by the above procedure, that a high 
    level of confidence in the safety or reliability of a nuclear 
    weapon type critical to the Nation's nuclear deterrent could no 
    longer be certified without nuclear testing, or that nuclear 
    testing is necessary to assure the adequacy of corrective measures, 
    the President will be prepared to exercise our ``supreme national 
    interests'' rights under the Treaty, in order to conduct such 
    testing.
  --The procedure for such annual certification by the Secretaries, and 
    for advice to them by the NWC, U.S. Strategic Command, and the DOE 
    nuclear weapons laboratories will be embodied in domestic law.

  As negotiations on a text drew to a close it became apparent that one 
member of the CD, India, would not join in a consensus decision to 
forward the text to the United Nations for its adoption. After 
consultations among countries supporting the text, Australia requested 
the President of the

[[Page S9808]]

U.N. General Assembly to convene a resumed session of the 50th General 
Assembly to consider and take action on the text. The General Assembly 
was so convened, and by a vote of 158 to 3 the Treaty was adopted. On 
September 24, 1996, the Treaty was opened for signature and I had the 
privilege, on behalf of the United States, of being the first to sign 
the Treaty.

  The Treaty assigns responsibility for overseeing its implementation 
to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization (the 
``Organization''), to be established in Vienna. The Organization, of 
which each State Party will be a member, will have three organs: the 
Conference of the States Parties, a 51-member Executive Council, and 
the Technical Secretariat. The Technical Secretariat will supervise the 
operation of and provide technical support for the International 
Monitoring System, operate the International Data Center, and prepare 
for and support the conduct of on-site inspections. The Treaty also 
requires each State Party to establish a National Authority that will 
serve as the focal point within the State Party for liaison with the 
Organization and with other States Parties.
  The Treaty will enter into force 180 days after the deposit of 
instruments of ratification by all of the 44 states listed in Annex 2 
to the Treaty, but in no case earlier than 2 years after its being 
opened for signature. If, 3 years from the opening of the Treaty for 
signature, the Treaty has not entered into force, the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations, in his capacity as Depositary of the Treaty, 
will convene a conference of the states that have deposited their 
instruments of ratification if a majority of those states so requests. 
At this conference the participants will consider what measures 
consistent with international law might be undertaken to accelerate the 
ratification process in order to facilitate the early entry into force 
of the Treaty. Their decision on such measures must be taken by 
consensus.
  Reservations to the Treaty Articles and the Annexes to the Treaty are 
not permitted. Reservations may be taken to the Protocol and its 
Annexes so long as they are not incompatible with the object and 
purpose of the Treaty. Amendment of the Treaty requires the positive 
vote of a majority of the States Parties to the Treaty, voting in a 
duly convened Amendment Conference at which no State Party casts a 
negative vote. Such amendments would enter into force 30 days after 
ratification by all States Parties that cast a positive vote at the 
Amendment Conference.
  The Treaty is of unlimited duration, but contains a ``supreme 
interests'' clause entitling any State Party that determines that its 
supreme interests have been jeopardized by extraordinary events related 
to the subject matter of the Treaty to withdraw from the Treaty upon 6-
months' notice.
  Unless a majority of the Parties decides otherwise, a Review 
Conference will be held 10 years following the Treaty's entry into 
force and may be held at 10-year intervals thereafter if the Conference 
of the States Parties so decides by a majority vote (or more frequently 
if the Conference of the States Parties so decides by a two-thirds 
vote).
  The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty is of singular significance 
to the continuing efforts to stem nuclear proliferation and strengthen 
regional and global stability. Its conclusion marks the achievement of 
the highest priority item on the international arms control and 
nonproliferation agenda. Its effective implementation will provide a 
foundation on which further efforts to control and limit nuclear 
weapons can be soundly based. By responding to the call for a CTBT by 
the end of 1996, the Signatory States, and most importantly the nuclear 
weapon states, have demonstrated the bona fides of their commitment to 
meaningful arms control measures.
  The monitoring challenges presented by the wide scope of the CTBT 
exceed those imposed by any previous nuclear test-related treaty. Our 
current capability to monitor nuclear explosions will undergo 
significant improvement over the next several years to meet these 
challenges. Even with these enhancements, though, several conceivable 
CTBT evasion scenarios have been identified. Nonetheless, our National 
Intelligence Means (NIM), together with the Treaty's verification 
regime and our diplomatic efforts, provide the United States with the 
means to make the CTBT effectively verifiable. By this, I mean that the 
United States:

  --will have a wide range of resources (NIM, the totality of 
    information available in public and private channels, and the 
    mechanisms established by the Treaty) for addressing compliance 
    concerns and imposing sanctions in cases of noncompliance; and
  --will thereby have the means to: (a) assess whether the Treaty is 
    deterring the conduct of nuclear explosions (in terms of yields and 
    number of tests) that could damage U.S. security interests and 
    constraining the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and (b) take 
    prompt and effective counteraction.

  My judgment that the CTBT is effectively verifiable also reflects the 
belief that U.S. nuclear deterrence would not be undermined by possible 
nuclear testing that the United States might fail to detect under the 
Treaty, bearing in mind that the United States will derive substantial 
confidence from other factors--the CTBT's ``supreme national 
interests'' clause, the annual certification procedure for the U.S. 
nuclear stockpile, and the U.S. Safeguards program.
  I believe that the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty is in the 
best interests of the United States. Its provisions will significantly 
further our nuclear nonproliferation and arms control objectives and 
strengthen international security. Therefore, I urge the Senate to give 
early and favorable consideration to the Treaty and its advice and 
consent to ratification as soon as possible.
                                                  William J. Clinton.  
  The White House, September 22, 1997.
                                  ____

To the Senate of the United States:
  I transmit herewith for Senate advice and consent to ratification the 
Protocol Amending the Convention Between the United States of America 
and Canada with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital Signed at 
Washington on September 26, 1980 as Amended by the Protocols Signed on 
June 14, 1983, March 28, 1984 and March 17, 1995, signed at Ottawa on 
July 29, 1997. This Protocol modified the taxation of social security 
benefits and the taxation of gains from the sale of shares of foreign 
real-property holding companies.
  I recommend that the Senate give early and favorable consideration to 
this Protocol and give its advice and consent to ratification.
                                                  William J. Clinton.  
  The White House, September 23, 1997.
                                  ____

To the Senate of the United States:
  With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to 
ratification, I transmit herewith the Extradition Treaty Between the 
Government of the United States of America and the Government of the 
Republic of India, signed at Washington on June 25, 1997.
  In addition, I transmit, for the information of the Senate, a related 
exchange of letters signed the same date and the report of the 
Department of State with respect to the Treaty. As the report states, 
the Treaty will not require implementing legislation.
  The provisions in this Treaty follow generally the form and content 
of extradition treaties recently concluded by the United States.
  Upon entry into force, this Treaty would enhance cooperation between 
the law enforcement authorities of both countries, and thereby make a 
significant contribution to international law enforcement efforts. With 
respect to the United States and India, the Treaty would supersede the 
Treaty for the Mutual Extradition of Criminals between the United 
States of America and Great Britain, signed at London December 22, 
1931, which was made applicable to India on March 9, 1942, and is 
currently applied by the United States and India.
  I recommend that the Senate give early and favorable consideration to 
the Treaty and give its advice and consent to ratification.
                                                  William J. Clinton.  
  The White House, September 23, 1997.

                          ____________________