[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 124 (Wednesday, September 17, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9437-S9440]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




               THE CHINA SUMMIT: WHAT KIND OF ENGAGEMENT?

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, at the end of October President Clinton 
will sit down with Chinese President Jiang Zemin to try to put the 
United States-China relationship on a sounder footing. After 8 years of 
tension in the relationship, it should go without saying that there is 
plenty of work to be done by both Presidents.
  With over a billion people and a burgeoning economy undergoing a 
dramatic transformation from doctrinaire communism to market-driven 
capitalism, China undeniably is an emerging great power. How we deal 
with China will be one of the great foreign policy challenges of the 
next century.
  The forthcoming meeting with President Jiang Zemin is one of a series 
of important opportunities to advance our relations that will occur 
over the next several months.
  Today I want to outline some of the objectives that I think the 
United States should pursue during Jiang's visit, particularly in 
regard to one of the central issues in our relationship.

[[Page S9438]]

  The issues on the agenda are familiar. We have deep concerns about 
China's human rights record, its trade practices, and most important, 
from the perspective of international security, its lackluster record 
of adherence to nonproliferation agreements.
  It is unrealistic to assume that we will resolve all our differences 
next month, next year, or even over the next several years.
  I am convinced, however, that it is possible to build a mutually 
beneficial relationship with China. A rising China need not threaten 
United States interests. In fact, China cannot achieve the economic 
growth, international respect, and regional stability it seeks without 
a workable relationship with the United States and close, constructive, 
integration with global economic, political, and security regimes.


                The Containment-versus-Engagement Debate

  Just as China is engaged in a great internal debate about its future 
direction, the United States is undertaking a great debate about the 
future direction of its policy toward China. The choice is often 
framed, simplistically, as one between two mutually exclusive paths: 
containment or engagement.
  But the relationship between these two great nations is far more 
complicated than that. It demands a more sophisticated strategy.
  Containment--the central organizing principle of the West during the 
cold war--is not a realistic policy option for China. Economically, 
China is already a powerhouse, the third largest market in the world 
and our fastest growing export market. Unlike the former Soviet Union, 
China has a vibrant economy, enjoys normal relations with all of its 
neighbors, and is attracting vast amounts of foreign investment.
  If we try to smother China by denying it access to our markets, the 
effect on China would be less severe than commonly expected. Exports to 
the United States represent only about 2 to 3 percent of China's gross 
domestic product, and the injury would be borne not only by China, but 
also by our many allies in the region. This is because 70 to 80 percent 
of the value of China's exports to the United States represent products 
originally imported by China from the United States and other countries 
and then processed for export.
  Militarily, a containment strategy for China would be a terrible act 
of folly worthy of a Barbara Tuchman history volume. For the last 25 
years our alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand, and 
the Philippines have helped to foster peace and stability in the 
Pacific--all without vilifying China. While it is essential that we 
adapt our regional alliances to post-cold war realities, we should not 
cast China as an adversary.
  Our allies support the integration of China into the region's 
economic and political structure, including the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations regional forum. None would support a policy of 
containment premised, as it would have to be, on the notion of an 
expansionist China bent on regional hegemony.
  If containment fails to advance our interests, what about engagement? 
Engagement, a term frequently used to describe the Clinton 
administration's policy, is, by itself, virtually without substance. 
``Engagement'' could run the gamut from normal diplomatic relations, to 
a zealous mercantilist approach that runs the risk of placing profits 
over principle. Or to paraphrase George Will in another context from 
years ago, he said, ``Some of my friends love capitalism more than they 
hate communism.''
  Engagement is not a policy. It is a means to an end. It is the 
content of the engagement that matters.
  We should not be passive in our relationship with China. We can 
influence what kind of great power China becomes.
  Encouraging China's transition from a poor, isolated Communist state 
to a more prosperous, open, and democratic partner, however, will take 
more than a bland policy of engagement. It requires patience and 
purpose in the pursuit of clearly articulated U.S. interests.


                             U.S. Interests

  American interests in China are clear. We seek a free, prosperous, 
and secure China, at peace with its neighbors. We want China to respect 
international norms--particularly, nonproliferation, human rights, 
trade, and the environment.


                    The Summit's Measure of Success

  Next month, Chinese President Jiang Zemin will visit Washington, the 
first such visit since the Tiananmen Square massacre. I am prepared to 
support this diplomatic step, provided that it yields meaningful 
progress on issues of concern to us.
  Early reports about China's priorities at this summit call into 
question whether such progress can be achieved. According to press 
reports, China is obsessed with ensuring that President Jiang receives 
the red carpet treatment, similar to the celebrated visit of Deng Xiao-
Ping in 1979.
  Let me state it plainly: this visit must be about more than ceremony.
  In the area of international security, we should not hesitate to 
criticize China for conduct which calls into question Beijing's 
commitment to nonproliferation and invites U.S. sanctions.
  However, we should also be prepared to lay out plainly the benefits 
that might accrue to China if it takes decisive steps to join with the 
United States to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction.


                       Nonproliferation Concerns

  As my colleagues know, I have for several years been critical, along 
with Senator Helms, of China's behavior in the area of 
nonproliferation. Their consistent flouting of international norms 
warrant skepticism that China is willing to engage us honestly on our 
proliferation concerns.
  Nonetheless, I agree with this objective: we must strive to transform 
nonproliferation from an issue that has become emblematic of the 
difficulties in Sino-United States relations to an example of 
cooperation and trust.
  Toward that end, China deserves some credit for development of its 
official policy on nonproliferation. For example, since 1992, Beijing 
has promised to abide by the Missile Technology Control Regime, acceded 
to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT], signed and ratified the 
Chemical Weapons Convention, developed regulations governing exports 
limited by the Chemical Weapons Convention, and issued its first public 
defense white paper, which focused on arms control and disarmament.
  On May 11, 1996, following what the Chinese maintain was an 
unauthorized sale of ring magnets used in uranium enrichment to 
Pakistan in violation of China's Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] 
commitments and United States law, China pledged not to provide 
assistance to any nuclear facilities not under International Atomic 
Energy Agency safeguards.
  Last year, China began a moratorium on nuclear testing and signed the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Finally, just last month China 
promulgated a list of controlled nuclear technologies which are 
prohibited from export.
  Perhaps even more significantly, in recent months we have observed 
for the first time a Chinese willingness to forego exports of nuclear 
technology to Iran in response to United States concerns.
  Hopefully, this is the dawning on the part of the Chinese of not only 
a recognition of the commitments they made, but what their self-
interest is. It is not in their self-interest, in my humble opinion--
although I never tell another man or woman their politics or lecture 
another country about what is their interest--but on the surface it 
clearly is not in their interest to continue to engage in the 
activities they have engaged in during the decades of the 1980's and 
the 1990's. So I am not making any prophecy about what this portends, I 
am just stating a fact, that there has been a change--not sufficient 
change, but a change. Again, hopefully, it is a recognition of their 
self-interest in addition to their international obligations.
  The China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation reportedly has canceled 
an agreement to sell Iran a facility to convert uranium ore into 
uranium hexaflouride gas, which could be enriched to weapons-grade 
material. I hope that is correct. China has also suspended an agreement 
to sell nuclear reactors to Iran. Again, if true, if they keep on that 
path, that is a very positive change.
  I hope that these developments are evidence that Chinese leaders now 
fully

[[Page S9439]]

accept that China's own national security would be threatened by the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver 
them. I also hope that China understands that great powers go beyond 
their minimum treaty obligations in the interest of peace and security. 
If they wish to be a great power, they will be required to do the same.
  China wants to be accepted as a great power. I welcome that desire 
and understand it. A great power bears an obligation not to sell dual-
use equipment to a country that is known to have a program to develop 
long-range missiles. A great power bears an obligation not to sell 
chemical weapons precursors or technology to firms or institutes that 
are fronts for military programs. A great power agrees to work with 
other countries to ensure that the burdens of nonproliferation are 
shared equitably. China must step up to that obligation.


                           China's Next Steps

  There are several steps China could take to shoulder their share of 
the nonproliferation burden and to increase the world's confidence in 
their stance on nuclear nonproliferation. Specifically, in my humble 
opinion, China should do the following: Expand its pledge not to assist 
unsafeguarded facilities to include unsafeguarded programs; clarify its 
recent commitment not to assist Iran's nuclear program and put it in 
writing; make its nuclear export control list available to Chinese and 
foreign firms and expand controls to include dual-use nuclear 
technology; establish a comprehensive export controls enforcement 
mechanism, and demonstrate its effectiveness through the arrest and 
prosecution of violators within China; stop all contact between Chinese 
nuclear engineers and those Pakistani experts with ties to Pakistan's 
nuclear weapons program; and last, I believe China should agree to join 
multilateral bodies committed to nuclear nonproliferation, including 
the Zanger Committee.
  If China took these steps, we would be well on our way to 
transforming nuclear nonproliferation from a sore point in Sino-United 
States relations to a genuine success story.


              Activating the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement

  United States concerns about Chinese proliferation are not restricted 
to nuclear technology. China's export of chemicals and equipment 
destined for Iran's chemical weapons factories and its sale of cruise 
and ballistic missile technology to Iran, Pakistan, and other countries 
remain of serious concern to the United States and must be addressed.
  But progress in the area of nuclear nonproliferation could serve as 
an example for these other areas of our bilateral relationships. 
Moreover, there are benefits that could flow to both the United States 
and China once we became convinced by China's actions of the sincerity 
of its commitment to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction.
  For example, if recent progress in the area of nuclear 
nonproliferation continues, the President could choose to implement the 
1985 Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with China. That early 
agreement permits the export of United States nuclear energy technology 
to China. We have suspended it because of our doubts about China's 
intentions. If China continued on the path that they have begun of 
late, the President, or the next President, could in fact reengage that 
agreement.
  The Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreement was suspended in 1986 in 
response to Congressional concerns about Chinese assistance to 
Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. I was one of those expressing 
concern at that time. I think we made the right decision.

  For the past decade, China's nonproliferation track record has 
effectively, in my view, precluded resumption of nuclear cooperation 
with the United States. I have been one of the people on this floor 
calling for the rare secret sessions that we occasionally have here to 
discuss China's activities over the last decade in this area.
  During the intervening years, China has pursued a ``Noah's Ark'' 
approach to nuclear energy, purchasing two Russian reactors, two French 
reactors, and two Canadian reactors. Now they are close to reaching a 
decision on a standard configuration for their nuclear industry, and 
they would like to purchase two American reactors. The Chinese rightly 
believe that United States reactors are the safest, most efficient, and 
reliable on the planet--which they are.
  For the United States, reactivation of the nuclear cooperation 
agreement could mean billions of dollars' worth of exports to help 
balance our trade with China, additional high-paying jobs for 
Americans, and a beneficial change in the relationship. There would 
also be an environmental benefit: reducing China's consumption of high-
sulfur coal, which fouls the air over China's cities and contributes to 
global warming.
  So, there could be a great benefit. But China must first, must first 
demonstrate to us that their recent adumbrations with regard to nuclear 
nonproliferation, are real, and that is why I was presumptuous enough 
to suggest the things that I think China could and should do, and 
should be discussed in the impending visit.
  The world system has never been adept at accommodating the 
aspirations of rising powers.
  As a student of history, and although it has been 100 years since I 
was in undergraduate school, my love and my avocation still, as a 
student of history--I know, and you know and all our colleagues know, 
that the world has never been adept at accommodating the aspirations of 
rising powers. To deny that China is a rising power is to deny reality. 
China's rise is not likely to be an exception in the way in which the 
world responds.
  Increasingly, China not only wants a seat at the table, it expects 
its interests to be taken seriously and balks at being held accountable 
to rules it had no role in shaping when the great powers shaped them, 
before they had a seat at the table.
  China is an ancient country with a rich history and a proud list of 
cultural and technological accomplishments which will forever 
distinguish it from our western, Judeo-Christian traditions. In light 
of this, one can understand why they might feel that it could be 
unreasonable for us to try to mold them in our image. But we do China 
no favors by failing to communicate our concerns, or by jettisoning our 
principles or our strategic interests in pursuit of an ill-defined 
policy of engagement. To suggest that international norms that all the 
world are willing to accept, or should be willing to accept, are an 
imposition of our system on China, is in fact, I think, an incorrect 
way of looking at it.
  We are not trying to make China in our own image. But there are 
certain basic international norms to which they must conform.
  We are not being unreasonable when we expect China to accept 
international norms of behavior in the area of nonproliferation, human 
rights, and trade. We are not being unreasonable when we expect China 
to adhere to the terms of its international agreements--period.
  Since the introduction of Deng Xiaoping's reforms 20 years ago, China 
has opened to the world, seeking even greater integration into global 
trade and security regimes. And during that process, as an observer, it 
seems to me, like all change, like all transitions, they have begun to 
learn. They have begun to learn where their interests lie. My hope is 
their learning curve continues.
  Some China watchers discount this trend as mere tactics. I believe 
that these China watchers are mistaken. Only in a Chinese historical 
context of dynasties and centuries could the consistent policy of two 
decades be dismissed as tactics. China's opening is the single greatest 
force for economic modernization and political reform that the Middle 
Kingdom has ever known. We should reinforce this strategic opening.
  How ironic and tragic it would be if we attempted to contain China 
just at the moment in history when China becomes convinced that it no 
longer needed a great wall to protect it from the barbarian hordes and 
foreign influences.
  Rather than throwing up the ramparts, we should be seeking to expand 
the areas of cooperation. China must do its part by adhering to 
international norms of behavior and following through on its 
commitments, and we must do our part standing ready to

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welcome China as it strives to become a truly great power. Our 
interests with China are too vital--the consequences of failing to 
build a constructive relationship with China too profound--to do 
otherwise.
  Mr. President, how much time do I have left in my request?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 8 minutes 4 seconds.

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