[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 120 (Thursday, September 11, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9199-S9210]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. ABRAHAM (for himself, Mr. Feingold, Mr. Hutchinson, Mr. 
        Coverdell, Mr. DeWine, Mr. Ashcroft, Mr. Brownback, Mr. Mack, 
        and Mr. Helms):
  S. 1164. A bill to state a policy of the United States that engages 
the People's Republic of China in areas of mutual interest, promotes 
human rights, religious freedom, and democracy in China, and enhances 
the national security interests of the United States with respect to 
China, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.


                        CHINA POLICY ACT OF 1997

  Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the China 
Policy Act of 1997. Cosponsors of this legislation include Senators 
Feingold, Hutchinson, Coverdell, DeWine, Ashcroft, Brownback, Mack, and 
Helms.
  Now is the time, Mr. President, to take a closer look at our 
relations with the People's Republic of China. Preparations are 
underway for the October 28 state visit of Chinese President Jiang 
Zemin. The President will be feted, toasted, and praised. Meanwhile, 
Wei Jingsheng rots in a Beijing prison, serving out a 14-year sentence 
for the crime of peacefully advocating democracy and other political 
reforms.
  This contrast, in my view, points up the current crisis in United 
States-China relations. For too long now, this administration has put 
process over substance, holding repeated meetings and discussions with 
Chinese leaders, but failing to set and hold to a concrete agenda 
addressing critical issues of human rights and religious freedom, as 
well as nuclear and other weapons proliferation.
  There is much of substance to work out with Chinese leaders, Mr. 
President. To begin with, China's record of human rights abuses and 
repression of religious faith is long and disturbing. Women pregnant 
with their second or third child have been coerced into abortions. 
Peaceful advocates of democracy and political reforms have been 
sentenced to long terms in prisons where they have been beaten, 
tortured, and denied needed medical care. Religious meeting places have 
been forcibly closed. Tibetan monks refusing to condemn their religious 
leader, the Dalai Lama, have been forced from their monasteries; some 
of their leaders have disappeared.
  President Clinton knows full well about these abuses. His own State 
Department just released a report on human rights in China which states 
that in 1996 ``The Government continued to commit widespread and well-
documented human rights abuses, in violation of internationally 
accepted norms, stemming from the authorities' intolerance of dissent, 
fear of unrest, and the absence or inadequacy of laws protecting basic 
freedoms.'' America cannot allow these abuses of fundamental human 
rights to continue unopposed.
  Our own national security also demands that we take a firmer, more 
substantive stance in our dealings with China. Although China signed 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and agreed to abide by the terms 
of the missile technology control regime in 1992, violations of both 
agreements continue. Especially worrisome are Chinese sales of weapons 
technology to Pakistan, Iran, and other countries in the Middle East.
  Chinese weapons exports also have more directly threatened Americans 
here on United States soil. Companies associated with the People's 
Liberation Army [PLA] have been caught attempting to sell smuggled 
assault weapons to street gangs in Los Angeles.
  Mr. President, I am not advocating any rash response to these 
provocations. China is an important nation with the potential to take 
part in mutually beneficial commerce and diplomatic cooperation, or 
destabilize a number of important strategic areas. In my view our 
disagreements with China call for development of incentives and 
disincentives designed to steer that country toward internal 
liberalization and constructive participation in the international 
community.
  Up until now, debates over American policy toward China have focused 
almost exclusively on the annual extension of that country's most-
favored-nation trading status [MFN]. Both sides in this debate have 
highlighted legitimate issues calling for reasoned argument. But, now 
that Congress has renewed MFN, it is imperative that we address broader 
United States-China relations, lest China policy be relegated to the 
back pages for another year.
  I firmly believe, Mr. President, that Congress and the President can 
put United States-Chinese relations on a course toward substantive 
progress by taking concrete action now. That is why I am introducing 
the China Policy Act of 1997. This legislation is designed to 
discourage the Chinese regime from oppressive internal policies and 
destabilizing actions contrary to United States national security, 
while advancing American values of freedom and human rights among the 
Chinese people. It represents a consensus view reached among proponents 
on both sides of the MFN question. It combines provisions of China-
related bills and amendments authored by myself and Senators Feingold, 
Ashcroft, DeWine, Coverdell, and Brownback. I would like to extend 
special thanks to Senator Feingold for strengthening the human rights 
focus of the bill.
  This legislation includes a number of sanctions aimed at Chinese 
leaders intended to express our dismay at recent human rights abuses. 
First, the bill would deny American visas to high ranking Chinese 
Government officials involved in political and religious persecution. 
The bill also would require United States representatives at 
multilateral development banks to vote ``no'' on all loans to China, 
except those related to famine, national disaster relief, and 
environmental protection. This last provision also puts into practice 
the important principle that United States taxpayers should not be 
forced to subsidize the Chinese Government.
  In addition, Mr. President, the bill would institute targeted 
sanctions against PLA companies found to have engaged in weapons 
proliferation, illegal importation of weapons to the United States or 
military or political espionage in the United States. The U.S. 
Government also would publish a list of other PLA-controlled companies. 
This would allow American companies and consumers to decide whether 
they wish to purchase products manufactured in whole or in part by the 
Communist Chinese army. The bill also takes direct aim at China's use 
of slave labor by instituting stricter enforcement of the ban against 
sale of Chinese products produced in prison labor camps.
  These sanctions, specifically aimed at government officials and the 
Chinese Governmental apparatus, will show our determination to stand up 
and defend human rights and religious freedom.
  This legislation also would tighten United States export licensing 
requirements for supercomputers sold to China. This will impede Chinese 
weapons development and proliferation.
  In addition to its sanctions, the bill includes provisions to 
encourage internal reforms and cultural exchanges between our two 
countries. It would increase funding for international broadcasting to 
China, including Radio Free Asia and the Voice of America. I also

[[Page S9200]]

would increase funding for National Endowment for Democracy and U.S. 
Information Agency student, cultural, and legislative exchange 
programs.
  These concrete actions would make clear to the Chinese leadership 
that there is a price to be paid for human rights abuses and for 
irresponsible weapons proliferation. They also would encourage greater 
openness in that country, without penalizing the Chinese people for the 
actions of their Government. They would provide the basis for 
substantive negotiations and a productive relationship with China.
  It is my hope that my colleagues will adopt these measures, and that 
the President will seize the opportunity to set our policy on a new, 
more productive course.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a summary and the full 
text of the China Policy Act of 1997 be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the bill and summary were ordered to be 
printed in the Record, as follows:

                                S. 1164

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``China 
     Policy Act of 1997''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents of this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Declaration of policy.

                           TITLE I--SANCTIONS

Sec. 101. Denial of entry into United States of certain officials of 
              the People's Republic of China.
Sec. 102. Limitations on multilateral assistance for the People's 
              Republic of China.
Sec. 103. Sanctions regarding China North Industries Group, China Poly 
              Group, and certain other entities affiliated with the 
              People's Liberation Army.
Sec. 104. Consultations with allies regarding sanctions against the 
              People's Republic of China.
Sec. 105. Termination of certain authorities.

   TITLE II--HUMAN RIGHTS, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, AND DEMOCRACY IN CHINA

Sec. 201. Findings on human rights abuses in the People's Republic of 
              China.
Sec. 202. Findings on religious freedom in the People's Republic of 
              China.
Sec. 203. Findings on Tibet.
Sec. 204. Findings on coercive family planning practices in the 
              People's Republic of China.
Sec. 205. Combating slave labor and ``reeducation'' centers.
Sec. 206. International broadcasting to China.
Sec. 207. National Endowment for Democracy.
Sec. 208. United States Information Agency student, cultural, and 
              legislative exchange programs.
Sec. 209. Annual reports on family planning activities in the People's 
              Republic of China by recipients of United States funds.
Sec. 210. Sense of Congress regarding multilateral efforts to address 
              China's human rights record.
Sec. 211. Sense of Congress regarding compliance by the People's 
              Republic of China with the Joint Declaration on Hong 
              Kong.

                  TITLE III--NATIONAL SECURITY MATTERS

Sec. 301. Findings on the proliferation of ballistic missiles by the 
              People's Republic of China.
Sec. 302. Findings on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
              by the People's Republic of China.
Sec. 303. Findings on the proliferation of destabilizing advanced 
              conventional weapons by the People's Republic of China.
Sec. 304. Findings on the evasion of United States export control laws 
              by the People's Republic of China.
Sec. 305. Findings on the inconsistent application of United States 
              export control laws to the People's Republic of China and 
              Hong Kong.
Sec. 306. Exports of supercomputers to the People's Republic of China.
Sec. 307. Dual-use exports to Hong Kong.
Sec. 308. Enforcement of Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act with 
              respect to the People's Republic of China.
Sec. 309. Transfers of sensitive equipment and technology by the 
              People's Republic of China.
Sec. 310. Annual reports on activities of the People's Liberation Army.
Sec. 311. Annual reports on intelligence activities of the People's 
              Republic of China.
Sec. 312. Study of theater ballistic missile defense system for Taiwan.
Sec. 313. Sense of Congress regarding United States force levels in 
              Asia.
Sec. 314. Sense of Congress regarding establishment of commission on 
              security and cooperation in Asia.

                            TITLE IV--TRADE

Sec. 401. Sense of Congress regarding the accession of Taiwan to the 
              World Trade Organization.

         TITLE V--HUMAN RIGHTS AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM WORLDWIDE

Sec. 501. Training for immigration officers regarding religions 
              persecution.
Sec. 502. Promotion of religious freedom and human rights worldwide.

                        TITLE VI--OTHER MATTERS

Sec. 601. Termination of United States assistance for East-West Center.

     SEC. 2. DECLARATION OF POLICY.

       The policy of the United States with respect to the 
     People's Republic of China is as follows:
       (1) To encourage freedom and democracy in the People's 
     Republic of China and to deter the Government of the People's 
     Republic of China from engaging in activities that are 
     contrary to the national security interests of the United 
     States.
       (2) To encourage the Government of the People's Republic of 
     China to make progress towards improving overall human rights 
     conditions in China and Tibet, including the taking of 
     concrete steps to assure freedom of speech, freedom of 
     religion, and freedom of association in compliance with 
     international standards on human rights.
       (3) To encourage the Government of the People's Republic of 
     China to channel its emerging power and influence along paths 
     that are conducive to peace, stability, and development in 
     the Asian Pacific region.
       (4) To preserve and protect the national security interests 
     of the United States and its allies by--
       (A) deterring the proliferation of weapons and sensitive 
     equipment and technology by the Government of the People's 
     Republic of China; and
       (B) sanctioning companies affiliated with the People's 
     Liberation Army that engage in the proliferation of weapons 
     of mass destruction, the importation of illegal weapons or 
     firearms into the United States, or espionage in the United 
     States.
       (5) To support a strong United States presence in and 
     commitment to the leadership of the Asian Pacific region.
       (6) To support integration of the People's Republic of 
     China into the community of nations.
       (7) To limit the use of United States taxpayer funds for 
     the subsidization of the Government of the People's Republic 
     of China through such mechanisms as assistance through 
     multilateral development banks and other United States 
     Government programs.
                           TITLE I--SANCTIONS

     SEC. 101. DENIAL OF ENTRY INTO UNITED STATES OF CERTAIN 
                   OFFICIALS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

       (a) Denial of Entry.--Except as provided in subsection (b), 
     the Secretary of State may not issue any visa to, and the 
     Attorney General may not admit to the United States, any of 
     the following officials of the Government of the People's 
     Republic of China:
       (1) High-ranking officials of the People's Liberation Army, 
     as determined by the Secretary.
       (2) High-ranking officials of the Public Security Bureau, 
     as so determined.
       (3) High-ranking officials of the Religious Affairs Bureau, 
     as so determined.
       (4) Other high-ranking officials determined by the 
     Secretary to be involved in the implementation or enforcement 
     of laws and directives of the People's Republic of China 
     which restrict religious freedom.
       (5) High-ranking officials determined by the Secretary to 
     be involved in the implementation or enforcement of laws and 
     directives of the People's Republic of China on family 
     planning.
       (6) Officials determined by the Secretary to have been 
     materially involved in ordering or carrying out the massacre 
     of students in Tiananmen Square in 1989.
       (b) Waiver.--
       (1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2), the President 
     may waive the applicability of subsection (a) with respect to 
     any official otherwise covered by that subsection if the 
     President determines that the waiver with respect to the 
     official is in the interests of the United States.
       (2) Notice.--
       (A) Requirement.--The President may not exercise the 
     authority provided in paragraph (1) with respect to an 
     official unless the President submits to Congress a written 
     notification of the exercise of the authority before the 
     entry of the official into the United States.
       (B) Contents.--Each notice shall include a justification of 
     the exercise of the authority, including--
       (i) a statement why the exercise of the authority is in the 
     interests of the United States; and
       (ii) a statement why such interests supersede the need for 
     the United States to deny entry to the official concerned in 
     response to the practices of the Government of the People's 
     Republic of China which limit the free exercise of religion 
     and other human rights.

     SEC. 102. LIMITATIONS ON MULTILATERAL ASSISTANCE FOR THE 
                   PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

       (a) International Bank for Reconstruction and 
     Development.--
       (1) Opposition to assistance.--
       (A) Opposition.--Except as provided in subparagraph (B), 
     the Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United 
     States Executive Director of the International Bank for 
     Reconstruction and Development to vote against any loan or 
     other utilization of the

[[Page S9201]]

     funds of the Bank to or for the People's Republic of China.
       (B) Exception.--Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to any 
     loan or other utilization of funds for purposes of--
       (i) meeting basic human needs; or
       (ii) environmental improvements or safeguards.
       (2) Opposition to modification of single country loan 
     limit.--The Secretary shall instruct the United States 
     Executive Director of the International Bank for 
     Reconstruction and Development to vote against any 
     modification of the limitation on the share of the total 
     funds of the Bank that may be loaned to a single country.
       (b) Asian Development Bank.--
       (1) Opposition to assistance.--Except as provided in 
     paragraph (2), the Secretary shall instruct the United States 
     Director of the Asian Development Bank to vote against any 
     loan or other utilization of the funds of the Bank to or for 
     the People's Republic of China.
       (2) Exception.--Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any loan 
     or other utilization of funds for purposes of--
       (A) meeting basic human needs; or
       (B) environmental improvements or safeguards.
       (c) International Monetary Fund.--
       (1) Opposition to assistance.--Except as provided in 
     paragraph (2), the Secretary shall instruct the United States 
     Executive Director of the International Monetary Fund to vote 
     against any loan or other utilization of the funds of the 
     Fund to or for the People's Republic of China.
       (2) Exception.--Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any loan 
     or other utilization of funds for purposes of--
       (A) meeting basic human needs; or
       (B) environmental improvements or safeguards.
       (d) Basic Human Needs Defined.--In this section, the term 
     ``basic human needs'' refers to human needs arising from 
     natural disasters or famine.

     SEC. 103. SANCTIONS REGARDING CHINA NORTH INDUSTRIES GROUP, 
                   CHINA POLY GROUP, AND CERTAIN OTHER ENTITIES 
                   AFFILIATED WITH THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY.

       (a) Finding; Purpose.--
       (1) Finding.--Congress finds that, in May 1996, United 
     States authorities caught representatives of the People's 
     Liberation Army enterprise, China Poly Group, and the 
     civilian defense industrial company, China North Industries 
     Group, attempting to smuggle 2,000 AK-47s into Oakland, 
     California, and offering to sell to Federal undercover agents 
     300,000 machine guns with silencers, 66-millimeter mortars, 
     hand grenades, and ``Red Parakeet'' surface-to-air missiles, 
     which, as stated in the criminal complaint against one of 
     those representatives, ``. . . could take out a 747'' 
     aircraft.
       (2) Purpose.--The purpose of this section is to impose 
     targeted sanctions against entities affiliated with the 
     People's Liberation Army that engage in the proliferation of 
     weapons of mass destruction, the importation of illegal 
     weapons or firearms into the United States, or espionage in 
     the United States.
       (b) Sanctions Against Certain PLA Affiliates.--
       (1) Sanctions.--Except as provided in paragraph (2) and 
     subject to paragraph (3), the President shall--
       (A) prohibit the importation into the United States of all 
     products that are produced, grown, or manufactured by a 
     covered entity, the parent company of a covered entity, or 
     any affiliate, subsidiary, or successor entity of a covered 
     entity;
       (B) direct the Secretary of State and the Attorney General 
     to deny or impose restrictions on the entry into the United 
     States of any foreign national serving as an officer, 
     director, or employee of a covered entity or other entity 
     described in subparagraph (A);
       (C) prohibit the issuance to a covered entity or other 
     entity described in subparagraph (A) of licenses in 
     connection with the export of any item on the United States 
     Munitions List;
       (D) prohibit the export to a covered entity or other entity 
     described in subparagraph (A) of any goods or technology on 
     which export controls are in effect under section 5 or 6 of 
     the Export Administration Act of 1979;
       (E) direct the Export-Import Bank of the United States not 
     to give approval to the issuance of any guarantee, insurance, 
     extension of credit, or participation in the extension of 
     credit with respect to a covered entity or other entity 
     described in subparagraph (A);
       (F) prohibit United States nationals from directly or 
     indirectly issuing any guarantee for any loan or other 
     investment to, issuing any extension of credit to, or making 
     any investment in a covered entity or other entity described 
     in subparagraph (A); and
       (G) prohibit the departments and agencies of the United 
     States and United States nationals from entering into any 
     contract with a covered entity or other entity described in 
     subparagraph (A) for the procurement or other provision of 
     goods or services from such entity.
       (2) Exceptions.--
       (A) In general.--The President shall not impose sanctions 
     under this subsection--
       (i) in the case of the procurement of defense articles or 
     defense services--

       (I) under contracts or subcontracts that are in effect on 
     October 1, 1997 (including the exercise of options for 
     production quantities to satisfy United States operational 
     military requirements);
       (II) if the President determines that the person or entity 
     to whom the sanctions would otherwise be applied is a sole 
     source supplier of essential defense articles or services and 
     no alternative supplier can be identified; or
       (III) if the President determines that such articles or 
     services are essential to the national security; or

       (ii) in the case of--

       (I) products or services provided under contracts or 
     binding agreements (as such terms are defined by the 
     President in regulations) or joint ventures entered into 
     before October 1, 1997;
       (II) spare parts;
       (III) component parts that are not finished products but 
     are essential to United States products or production;
       (IV) routine servicing and maintenance of products; or
       (V) information and technology products and services.

       (B) Immigration restrictions.--The President shall not 
     apply the restrictions described in paragraph (1)(B) to a 
     person described in that paragraph if the President, after 
     consultation with the Attorney General, determines that the 
     presence of the person in the United States is necessary for 
     a Federal or State judicial proceeding against a covered 
     entity or other entity described in paragraph (1)(A).
       (3) Termination.--The sanctions under this subsection shall 
     terminate as follows:
       (A) In the case of an entity referred to in paragraph (1) 
     or (2) of subsection (c), on the date that is one year after 
     the date of enactment of this Act.
       (B) In the case of an entity that becomes a covered entity 
     under paragraph (3) or (4) of subsection (c) by reason of its 
     identification in a report under subsection (d), on the date 
     that is one year after the date on which the entity is 
     identified in such report.
       (c) Covered Entities.--For purposes of subsection (b), a 
     covered entity is any of the following:
       (1) China North Industries Group.
       (2) China Poly Group, also known as Polytechnologies 
     Incorporated or BAOLI.
       (3) Any affiliate of the People's Liberation Army 
     identified in a report of the Director of Central 
     Intelligence under subsection (d)(1).
       (4) Any affiliate of the People's Liberation Army 
     identified in a report of the Director of the Federal Bureau 
     of Investigation under subsection (d)(2).
       (d) Reports on Activities of PLA Affiliates.--
       (1) Transfers of sensitive items and technologies.--Not 
     later than 30 days after the date of enactment of this Act 
     and annually thereafter through 2002, the Director of Central 
     Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate members Congress 
     a report that identifies each entity owned wholly or in part 
     by the People's Liberation Army which, during the 2-year 
     period ending on the date of the report, transferred to any 
     other entity a controlled item for use in the following:
       (A) Any item listed in category I or category II of the 
     MTCR Annex.
       (B) Activities to develop, produce, stockpile, or deliver 
     chemical or biological weapons.
       (C) Nuclear activities in countries that do not maintain 
     full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards or 
     equivalent full-scope safeguards.
       (2) Illegal activities in the united states.--Not later 
     than 30 days after the date of enactment of this Act and 
     annually thereafter through 2002, the Director of the Federal 
     Bureau of Investigation shall submit to the appropriate 
     members Congress a report that identifies each entity owned 
     wholly or in part by the People's Liberation Army which, 
     during the 2-year period ending on the date of the report, 
     attempted to--
       (A) illegally import weapons or firearms into the United 
     States; or
       (B) engage in military intelligence collection or espionage 
     in the United States under the cover of commercial business 
     activity.
       (3) Form.--Each report under this subsection shall be 
     submitted in classified form.
       (e) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Affiliate.--The term ``affiliate'' does not include any 
     United States national engaged in a business arrangement with 
     a covered entity or other entity described in subsection 
     (b)(1)(A).
       (2) Appropriate members of congress.--The term 
     ``appropriate members of congress'' means the following:
       (A) The Majority leader and Minority leader of the Senate.
       (B) The chairmen and ranking members of the Committee on 
     Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the 
     Senate.
       (C) The Speaker and Minority leader of the House of 
     Representatives.
       (D) The chairmen and ranking members of the Committee on 
     International Relations and the Committee on National 
     Security of the House of Representatives.
       (3) Component part.--The term ``component part'' means any 
     article that is not usable for its intended function without 
     being embedded or integrated into any other product and, if 
     used in the production of a finished product, would be 
     substantially transformed in that process.
       (4) Controlled item.--The term ``controlled item'' means 
     the following:
       (A) Any item listed in the MTCR Annex.
       (B) Any item listed for control by the Australia Group.
       (C) Any item relevant to the nuclear fuel cycle of nuclear 
     explosive applications that

[[Page S9202]]

     are listed for control by the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
       (5) Finished product.--The term ``finished product'' means 
     any article that is usable for its intended function without 
     being embedded in or integrated into any other product, but 
     does not include an article produced by a person or entity 
     other than a covered entity or other entity described in 
     subsection (b)(1)(A) that contains parts or components of 
     such an entity if the parts or components have been 
     substantially transformed during production of the finished 
     product.
       (6) Investment.--The term ``investment'' includes any 
     contribution or commitment of funds, commodities, services, 
     patents, processes, or techniques, in the form of--
       (A) a loan or loans;
       (B) the purchase of a share of ownership;
       (C) participation in royalties, earnings, or profits; and
       (D) the furnishing of commodities or services pursuant to a 
     lease or other contract,

     but does not include routine maintenance of property.
       (7) MTCR annex.--The term ``MTCR Annex'' has the meaning 
     given that term in section 74(4) of the Arms Export Control 
     Act (22 U.S.C. 2797c(4)).
       (8) United states national.--
       (A) In general.--The term ``United States national'' 
     means--
       (i) any United States citizen; and
       (ii) any corporation, partnership, or other organization 
     created under the laws of the United States, any State, the 
     District of Columbia, or any territory or possession of the 
     United States.
       (B) Exception.--The term ``United States national'' does 
     not include a subsidiary or affiliate of corporation, 
     partnership, or organization that is a United States national 
     if the subsidiary or affiliate is located outside the United 
     States.

     SEC. 104. CONSULTATIONS WITH ALLIES REGARDING SANCTIONS 
                   AGAINST THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

       (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     the President should begin consultations with the major 
     allies and other trading partners of the United States in 
     order to encourage such allies and trading partners to adopt 
     sanctions against the People's Republic of China that are 
     similar to the sanctions imposed on the People's Republic of 
     China by section 102.
       (b) Report.--Not later than 45 days after the completion of 
     the first Group of Seven summit meeting after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress 
     a report on the results, if any, of consultations referred to 
     in subsection (a).

     SEC. 105. TERMINATION OF CERTAIN AUTHORITIES.

       (a) Termination Date.--Sections 101 and 102 shall cease to 
     apply at the end of the five-year period beginning on the 
     date of enactment of this Act.
       (b) Sense of Congress on Review.--It is the sense of 
     Congress that Congress should review the desirability of 
     terminating the sanctions in this title before the date on 
     which the sanctions would otherwise terminate under this 
     title upon the occurrence of any of the following events:
       (1) The admission of the People's Republic of China into 
     the World Trade Organization on commercially viable terms.
       (2) A determination by the President that the Government of 
     the People's Republic of China is implementing fully all 
     applicable international agreements relating to the 
     proliferation of arms.
       (3) A determination by the President that the Government of 
     the People's Republic of China is actively and effectively 
     combatting all forms of religious persecution in China.
       (4) A determination by the President that the Government of 
     the People's Republic of China is reevaluating in a 
     meaningful manner its actions regarding the massacre of 
     students in Tiananmen Square in 1989.
       (5) The publication by the Government of the People's 
     Republic of China of a report on the national security 
     strategy of that government which includes a comprehensive 
     description and discussion of the elements of that strategy 
     similar to the description and discussion of the national 
     security strategy of the United States in the annual report 
     required by section 108 of the National Security Act of 1947 
     (50 U.S.C. 404a).
       (6) A determination by the President that the Government of 
     the People's Republic of China has taken meaningful actions 
     toward improving overall human rights conditions in China and 
     Tibet, including the release of political prisoners, 
     improving prison conditions, providing prisoners with 
     adequate medical care, and full compliance with any 
     international human rights accords to which that government 
     is a signatory.
   TITLE II--HUMAN RIGHTS, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, AND DEMOCRACY IN CHINA

     SEC. 201. FINDINGS ON HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN THE PEOPLE'S 
                   REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

       Congress makes the following findings regarding human 
     rights abuses in the People's Republic of China:
       (1) Congress concurs in the following conclusions of the 
     Department of State regarding human rights in the People's 
     Republic of China in 1996:
       (A) The People's Republic of China is ``an authoritarian 
     state'' in which ``citizens lack the freedom to peacefully 
     express opposition to the party-led political system and the 
     right to change their national leaders or form of 
     government''.
       (B) The Government of the People's Republic of China has 
     ``continued to commit widespread and well documented human 
     rights abuses, in violation of internationally accepted 
     norms, stemming from the authorities' intolerance of dissent, 
     fear of unrest, and the absence or inadequacy of laws 
     protecting basic freedoms''.
       (C) ``Abuses include torture and mistreatment of prisoners, 
     forced confessions, and arbitrary and incommunicado 
     detention''.
       (D) ``Prison conditions remained harsh [and] [t]he 
     Government continued severe restrictions on freedom of 
     speech, the press, assembly, association, religion, privacy, 
     and worker rights''.
       (E) ``Although the Government denies that it holds 
     political prisoners, the number of persons detained or 
     serving sentences for `counterrevolutionary crimes' or 
     `crimes against the state' and for peaceful political or 
     religious activities are believed to number in the 
     thousands''.
       (F) ``Non-approved religious groups, including Protestant 
     and Catholic groups . . . experienced intensified 
     repression''.
       (G) ``Serious human rights abuses persist in minority 
     areas, including Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia [, and] 
     [c]ontrols on religion and other fundamental freedoms in 
     these areas have also intensified''.
       (H) ``Overall in 1996, the authorities stepped up efforts 
     to cut off expressions of protest or criticism. All public 
     dissent against the party and government was effectively 
     silenced by intimidation, exile, the imposition of prison 
     terms, administrative detention, or house arrest. No 
     dissidents were known to be active at year's end.''.
       (2) People's Republic of China authorities continue to hold 
     Wei Jingsheng in prison for his prodemocracy beliefs, and he 
     is suffering in prison from a lack of medical attention and 
     beatings by fellow prisoners.
       (3) On October 30, 1996, a People's Republic of China court 
     sentenced Wang Dan to 11 years in prison primarily for 
     articles published outside the People's Republic of China, 
     and People's Republic of China authorities are not providing 
     him with adequate medical care.
       (4) In addition to Wei Jingsheng and Wang Dan, hundreds, if 
     not thousands, of other political, religious, and labor 
     dissidents are imprisoned in China for peacefully expressing 
     their beliefs and exercising their internationally recognized 
     rights of free association and expression.
       (5) Labor activist Liu Nianchun, severely ill in a labor 
     camp, has not only been denied medical treatment but has been 
     tortured with electric batons and has had his 3 year 
     reeducation-through-labor sentence in prison arbitrarily 
     extended by 216 days.
       (6) Li Hai was charged with prying into and gathering state 
     secrets and subsequently sentenced to a 9-year term in prison 
     on December 18, 1996, for going door-to-door to collect the 
     names, ages, family situations, alleged crimes, lengths of 
     prison sentences, locations of imprisonment, and treatment 
     while imprisoned of people sentenced to prison for their 
     activities during the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests.
       (7) Gao Yu, serving a 6-year term in prison on charges of 
     ``leaking state secrets'' despite the fact that the 
     information in question was already common knowledge, has 
     been denied medical parole and adequate medical care despite 
     life threatening illness and was vilified by People's 
     Republic of China authorities after she was awarded the 
     UNESCO Guillemo Cano World Press Freedom Prize.
       (8) People's Republic of China companies still export 
     prison labor products to the United States. Since 1991, the 
     United States Customs Service has issued 27 detention orders 
     banning the importation of goods suspected to be products of 
     prison labor in China, including hand tools, artificial 
     flowers, Christmas tree lights, and diesel engines.
       (9) The People's Republic of China has not fully complied 
     with the 1992 Memorandum of Understanding on Prison Labor, 
     and People's Republic of China authorities often wait several 
     years before granting requests by United States Customs 
     Service officials to inspect prison facilities in China. In 
     1996, such authorities granted just one of eight outstanding 
     requests by such officials to inspect prison facilities in 
     China.
       (10) Under current law, People's Republic of China 
     authorities may administratively sentence China citizens to 3 
     years of labor reform without trial.
       (11) The People's Republic of China restricts the access of 
     its citizens to the Internet and blocks web sites operated by 
     foreign news organizations and human rights organizations.
       (12) The Government of the People's Republic of China 
     prohibits independent labor unions, and workers who attempt 
     to form unions without state approval are given severe prison 
     sentences as shown in the treatment of Zhang Jingsheng, a 
     labor leader in Hunan province who was arrested following the 
     1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre and sentenced to 13 years in 
     prison for organizing workers.

     SEC. 202. FINDINGS ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE PEOPLE'S 
                   REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

       Congress makes the following findings regarding religious 
     freedom in the People's Republic of China:
       (1) The Government of the People's Republic of China 
     restricts the ability of religious adherents, including 
     Christians, Buddhists, Muslims, and others, to practice 
     outside of state-approved religious organizations, and

[[Page S9203]]

     detains worshipers and clergy who participate in religious 
     services conducted outside state-approved religious 
     organizations, as well as those who refuse to register with 
     the authorities as required.
       (2) Bishop Zeng Jingmu, 76 years old, detained for the 
     third time in 7 months and in poor health from pneumonia, is 
     serving a reeducation through labor term for organizing 
     religious assemblies and masses not sanctioned by the 
     official Chinese Catholic Church.
       (3) On January 31, 1994, Premier Li Peng signed decrees 
     number 144 and 145 which restrict worship, religious 
     education, distribution of Bibles and others religious 
     literature, and contact with foreign coreligionists.
       (4) The Government of the People's Republic of China has 
     created official religious organizations that control all 
     religious worship, activity, and association in China and 
     Tibet and supplant the independent authority of the Roman 
     Catholic Church, independent Protestant churches, and 
     independent Buddhist, Taoist, and Islamic associations.
       (5) In July 1995, Ye Xiaowen, a rigid communist hostile to 
     religion, was appointed to head the Bureau of Religious 
     Affairs, a government agency of the People's Republic of 
     China that is controlled by the United Front Work Department 
     of the Chinese Communist Party. The Bureau of Religious 
     Affairs has administrative control over all religious worship 
     and activity in China and Tibet through a system of granting 
     or denying rights through an official registration system. 
     Those who fail to or are not allowed to register are subject 
     to punitive measures.
       (6) Unofficial Christian and Catholic communities were 
     targeted by the Government of the People's Republic of China 
     during 1996. A renewed campaign aimed at forcing all churches 
     to register or face dissolution resulted in beating and 
     harassment of congregants, closure of churches, and numerous 
     arrests, fines, and sentences. In Shanghai, for example, more 
     than 300 house churches or meeting points were closed down by 
     the security authorities in April alone.

     SEC. 203. FINDINGS ON TIBET.

       Congress makes the following findings regarding Tibet:
       (1) The Department of State China Country Report on Human 
     Rights Practices for 1996 states: ``Chinese government 
     authorities continued to commit widespread human rights 
     abuses in Tibet, including instances of death in detention, 
     torture, arbitrary arrest, detention without public trial, 
     long detention of Tibetan nationalists for peacefully 
     expressing their religious and political views, and 
     intensified controls on religion and on freedom of speech and 
     the press, particularly for ethnic Tibetans.''.
       (2) The report also cites three instances in which Tibetan 
     Buddhist monks died in prison in the People's Republic of 
     China in 1996.
       (3) Many victims of the brutality committed by the People's 
     Armed Police and the Public Security Bureau of the People's 
     Republic of China have been young Tibetan Buddhist nuns and 
     monks.
       (4) Between June 1994 and May 1995, three Tibetan nuns--15-
     year-old Sherab Ngawang, 24-year-old Gyaltsen Kelsang, and 
     20-year-old Phuntsok Yangkyi--died as a result of torture in 
     prison in Tibet.
       (5) On March 11, 1997, the Senate adopted a resolution 
     calling for the release by the Government of the People's 
     Republic of China of Tibetan ethnomusicologist and Fulbright 
     Scholar Ngawang Choephel, who was sentenced to 18 years in 
     prison in the People's Republic of China in December 1996, 
     and of other Tibetans who are prisoners in the People's 
     Republic of China for reasons of conscience.
       (6) In May 1995, authorities of the Government of the 
     People's Republic of China detained Gedhun Choekyi Nyima, 
     then 6 years old, and his parents, just days after the boy 
     was recognized by the Dalai Lama as the 11th Panchen Lama, 
     and authorities of that government continue to hold him and 
     his family.
       (7) In May 1997, the Government of the People's Republic of 
     China announced the sentencing of Chadrel Rinpoche, the head 
     of the search committee for the 11th Panchen Lama, to 6 years 
     in prison.
       (8) In April 1996, authorities of the Government of the 
     People's Republic of China banned the display of photographs 
     of the Dalai Lama, even in private homes, and the decision 
     led to demonstrations in Ganden monastery during which 90 
     monks were arrested and 1 monk was shot to death by security 
     forces of that government.

     SEC. 204. FINDINGS ON COERCIVE FAMILY PLANNING PRACTICES IN 
                   THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

       Congress makes the following findings regarding family 
     planning practices in the People's Republic of China:
       (1) For more than 15 years there have been frequent and 
     credible reports of forced abortion and forced sterilization 
     in connection with the coercive population control practices 
     of the People's Republic of China.
       (2) Forced abortion was rightly denounced as a crime 
     against humanity by the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal.
       (3) Although it is the stated position of the politburo of 
     the Chinese Communist Party that forced abortion and forced 
     sterilization have no role in the population control program 
     of the Government of the People's Republic of China, the 
     policy of that government seems to encourage both forced 
     abortion and forced sterilization through a combination of 
     strictly enforced birth quotas and impunity for local 
     population control officials who engage in coercion. 
     Officials acknowledge that there have been instances of 
     forced abortions and sterilization, yet there is no evidence 
     that the perpetrators of such acts have been punished.
       (4) The People's Republic of China population control 
     officials, in cooperation with employers and works unit 
     officials, monitor women's menstrual cycles and subject women 
     who conceive without government authorization to extreme 
     psychological pressure, to harsh economic sanctions 
     (including unpayable fines and loss of employment), and to 
     physical force.
       (5) Official sanctions for giving birth to unauthorized 
     children include fines in amounts several times larger than 
     the per capita annual incomes of residents of the People's 
     Republic of China. In Fujian, for example, the average fine 
     is estimated to be twice a family's gross annual income. 
     Families who cannot pay the fine have had their homes and 
     personal property confiscated and destroyed.
       (6) Especially harsh punishments have been inflicted on 
     those whose resistance to such policies is motivated by 
     religion. For example, according to a 1995 Amnesty 
     International report, the Catholic inhabitants of two 
     villages in Hebei Province were subjected to population 
     control under the slogan ``better to have more graves than 
     one more child''. Enforcement measures included torture, 
     sexual abuse, and the detention of resisters' relatives as 
     hostages.
       (7) Forced abortions in the People's Republic of China 
     often take place in the very late stages of pregnancy, or 
     even during the process of birth itself.

     SEC. 205. COMBATING SLAVE LABOR AND ``REEDUCATION'' CENTERS.

       (a) Authorizations for Appropriations for Additional 
     Monitoring of Exportation of Slave Labor Products.--There are 
     authorized to be appropriated $2,000,000 for fiscal year 1998 
     and $2,000,000 for fiscal year 1999 for monitoring by the 
     United States Customs Service and the Department of State of 
     the export by the People's Republic of China to the United 
     States of products which may be made with slave labor in 
     violation of section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 
     1307) or section 1761 of title 18, United States Code.
       (b) Reports on Exportation of Products Made With Slave 
     Labor.--
       (1) Reports.--
       (A) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
     enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the 
     Commissioner of Customs and the Secretary of State shall each 
     submit to the Members of Congress referred to in subparagraph 
     (B) a report on the manufacturing and exportation of products 
     made with slave labor in the People's Republic of China 
     during the one-year period ending on the date of the report. 
     Each report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may 
     include a classified annex.
       (B) Members of congress.--Reports under subparagraph (A) 
     shall be submitted to the following Members of Congress:
       (i) The Majority leader and Minority leader of the Senate.
       (ii) The chairman and ranking member of the Committee on 
     Foreign Relations of the Senate.
       (iii) The Speaker and Minority leader of the House of 
     Representatives.
       (iv) The chairman and ranking member of the Committee on 
     International Relations of the House of Representatives.
       (2) Contents of reports.--Each report under paragraph (1) 
     shall include information concerning the following:
       (A) The extent of the use of slave labor in manufacturing 
     products for exportation by the People's Republic of China, 
     as well as the volume of exports of such slave labor products 
     by that country.
       (B) The progress of the United States Government--
       (i) in identifying products made with slave labor in the 
     People's Republic of China that are destined for the United 
     States market in violation of section 307 of the Tariff Act 
     of 1930 or section 1761 of title 18, United States Code; and
       (ii) in stemming the importation of such products.
       (c) Renegotiation of Memorandum of Understanding on Prison 
     Labor With the People's Republic of China.--It is the sense 
     of Congress that, since the People's Republic of China has 
     substantially frustrated the purposes of the 1992 Memorandum 
     of Understanding with the United States on Prison Labor, the 
     President should immediately commence negotiations to replace 
     the memorandum of understanding with one providing for 
     effective monitoring of forced labor in the People's Republic 
     of China, without restrictions on which prison labor camps 
     international monitors may visit.

     SEC. 206. INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING TO CHINA.

       (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--In addition to such 
     sums as are otherwise authorized to be appropriated for 
     ``International Broadcasting Activities'' for fiscal year 
     1998, there is authorized to be appropriated for 
     ``International Broadcasting Activities'' for that fiscal 
     year $5,000,000, which shall be available only for 
     broadcasting by Radio Free Asia and the Voice of America to 
     the People's Republic of China.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     United States international broadcasting through Radio Free 
     Asia and Voice of America should be increased to provide 
     continuous 24-hour broadcasting in Chinese and Tibetan 
     dialects which include Mandarin Chinese, Tibetan, and at 
     least one other dialect.

[[Page S9204]]

     SEC. 207. NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY.

       In addition to such sums as are otherwise authorized to be 
     appropriated for fiscal year 1998 for grants to the National 
     Endowment for Democracy, there is authorized to be 
     appropriated for that fiscal year $2,000,000 for grants to 
     the Endowment which shall be available only for purposes of 
     programs relating to the People's Republic of China.

     SEC. 208. UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY STUDENT, CULTURAL, 
                   AND LEGISLATIVE EXCHANGE PROGRAMS.

       In addition to such sums as are otherwise authorized to be 
     appropriated to the United States Information Agency for 
     fiscal year 1998, there is authorized to be appropriated for 
     the Agency for that fiscal year $2,000,000, which shall be 
     available only for the purposes of student, cultural, and 
     legislative exchange activities in or with the People's 
     Republic of China.

     SEC. 209. ANNUAL REPORTS ON FAMILY PLANNING ACTIVITIES IN THE 
                   PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA BY RECIPIENTS OF 
                   UNITED STATES FUNDS.

       (a) Annual Reports.--
       (1) Requirement.--Not later than January 15 each year, the 
     Secretary of State shall submit to Congress a report that 
     describes the family planning activities in the People's 
     Republic of China during the preceding year of each covered 
     family planning organization that carried out such activities 
     in the People's Republic of China during that year.
       (2) Additional information.--Each report under paragraph 
     (1) shall include the filing submitted to the Secretary for 
     purposes of such report by each covered family planning 
     organization whose activities are covered by such report.
       (b) Covered Family Planning Organization Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``covered family planning organization'' 
     means any for-profit or non-profit entity that receives 
     United States funds to conduct family planning activities 
     abroad.

     SEC. 210. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING MULTILATERAL EFFORTS TO 
                   ADDRESS CHINA'S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD.

       (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) On April 15, 1997, members of the United Nations Human 
     Rights Commission voted 27-17 to block a resolution, 
     sponsored by Denmark, critical of the human rights record of 
     the Government of the People's Republic of China.
       (2) The United States Government failed to vigorously lobby 
     other nations to support the resolution in a timely and 
     effective manner, and France, Canada, Germany, Italy, Spain, 
     Australia, and Japan did not cosponsor the resolution.
       (3) In response to support for the resolution by Denmark 
     and the Netherlands, the Government of the People's Republic 
     of China has adopted punitive measures against Denmark and 
     Netherlands businesses--including the denial of contracts to 
     Netherlands companies and undue delays in authorizing 
     expansion plans by the Denmark shipping line Maersk--thereby 
     linking human rights and trade.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the United States Government should greatly increase 
     efforts in the United Nations Human Rights Commission and 
     other international fora to draw attention to and condemn the 
     gross violations of international standards on human rights 
     by the Government of the People's Republic of China;
       (2) the President should vigorously lobby other countries 
     for passage of future Commission resolutions on the human 
     rights record of the Government of the People's Republic of 
     China; and
       (3) such lobbying should begin not later than 6 months 
     before the commencement of the next annual meeting of the 
     Commission.

     SEC. 211. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING COMPLIANCE BY THE 
                   PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA WITH THE JOINT 
                   DECLARATION ON HONG KONG.

       (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The People's Republic of China resumed sovereignty over 
     Hong Kong on July 1, 1997.
       (2) In the Joint Declaration, a legally binding document in 
     all its parts and the highest form of commitment between 
     sovereign states, the People's Republic of China pledged that 
     after its resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong ``[t]he 
     current social and economic systems in Hong Kong will remain 
     unchanged, and so will the life-style. Rights and freedoms, 
     including those of the person, of speech, of the press, of 
     association, of travel, of movement, of correspondence, of 
     strike, of choice of occupation, of academic research and 
     religious belief will be ensured by law in the Hong Kong 
     Special Administrative Region''.
       (3) The People's Republic of China further pledged in the 
     Joint Declaration that the policies of the ``. . . Joint 
     Declaration will be stipulated in a Basic Law of the Hong 
     Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic 
     of China, by the National People's Congress of the People's 
     Republic of China, and they will remain unchanged for 50 
     years''.
       (4) The Basic Law prescribes the systems to be practiced in 
     the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region after the 
     resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong by the People's 
     Republic of China.
       (5) According to Article 2 of the Basic Law: ``The National 
     People's Congress authorizes the Hong Kong Special 
     Administrative Region to exercise a high degree of autonomy 
     and enjoy executive, legislative and independent judicial 
     power, including that of final adjudication''.
       (6) According to Article 5 of the Basic Law: ``The 
     socialist system and policies (of the People's Republic of 
     China) shall not be practiced in the Hong Kong Special 
     Administrative Region, and the previous capitalist system and 
     way of life shall remain unchanged for 50 years''.
       (7) According to Article 27 of the Basic Law: ``Hong Kong 
     residents shall have freedom of speech, of the press and 
     publication; freedom of association, of assembly, of 
     procession and of demonstration; and the right and freedom to 
     form and join trade unions, and to strike''.
       (8) According to Article 32 of the Basic Law: ``Hong Kong 
     residents shall have freedom of religious belief and freedom 
     to preach and to conduct and participate in religious 
     activities in public''.
       (9) According to Article 34 of the Basic Law: ``Hong Kong 
     residents shall have freedom to engage in academic research, 
     literary and artistic creation, and other cultural 
     activities''.
       (10) According to Article 39 of the Basic Law: ``The 
     provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and 
     Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, 
     Social and Cultural Rights, and international labour 
     conventions as applied to Hong Kong shall remain in force and 
     shall be implemented through the laws of the Hong Kong 
     Special Administrative Region''.
       (11) President Jiang Zemin of the People's Republic of 
     China, in his statement of July 1, 1997, at the ceremony in 
     Hong Kong marking the establishment of the Hong Kong Special 
     Administrative Region, said that ``. . . Hong Kong will enjoy 
     a high degree of autonomy as provided for by the Basic Law, 
     which includes the executive, legislative and independent 
     judicial power, including that of final adjudication''.
       (12) President Jiang further said that the Hong Kong 
     Special Administrative Region has the ``ultimate aim of 
     electing the Chief Executive and the Legislative Council by 
     universal suffrage''.
       (13) President Jiang further said that ``[n]o central 
     department or locality (of the People's Republic of China) 
     may or will be allowed to interfere in the affairs which, 
     under the Basic Law, should be administered by the Hong Kong 
     Special Administrative Region on its own''.
       (14) President Jiang further said that ``the provisions of 
     the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 
     International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
     Rights, and international covenants as applied to Hong Kong 
     shall remain in force to be implemented through the laws of 
     Hong Kong's regional legislation''.
       (15) President Jiang further said that adherence to these 
     principles ``serves Hong Kong, serves the (People's Republic 
     of China) and serves the entire nation as well. Therefore 
     there is no reason whatsoever to change them. Here I want to 
     reaffirm that `one country, two systems, Hong Kong 
     administering Hong Kong' and `a high degree of autonomy' will 
     remain unchanged for 50 years''.
       (16) President Jiang, in another statement of July 1, 1997, 
     at a rally in Beijing marking the establishment of the Hong 
     Kong Special Administrative Region, said that the People's 
     Republic of China ``will unswervingly carry out the 
     principles of `one country, two systems', `Hong Kong people 
     administering Hong Kong' and `high degree of autonomy', and 
     make sure that the previous socio-economic system and way of 
     life of Hong Kong remain unchanged and that laws previously 
     in force will remain basically unchanged. We will firmly 
     support the Hong Kong SAR in its exercise of the functions 
     and powers bestowed on it by the Basic Law and the Hong Kong 
     SAR Government in its administration in accordance with 
     law.''.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the statements of President Jiang Zemin of the People's 
     Republic of China constitute a welcome reaffirmation of the 
     obligations of the People's Republic of China under the Joint 
     Declaration to ensure that Hong Kong remains autonomous, the 
     human rights of the people of Hong Kong remain protected, and 
     the government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
     is elected democratically; and
       (2) the fulfillment by the People's Republic of China of 
     the obligations under the terms of the Joint Declaration and 
     the Basic Law constitutes a crucial test of Beijing's ability 
     to play a responsible global role.
       (c) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Basic Law.--The term ``Basic Law'' means the Basic Law 
     of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the 
     People's Republic of China, as adopted on April 4, 1990, by 
     the Seventh National People's Congress of the People's 
     Republic of China.
       (2) Joint declaration.--The term ``Joint Declaration'' 
     means the Joint Declaration of the Government of the United 
     Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
     Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question 
     of Hong Kong, done at Beijing on December 19, 1984.
                  TITLE III--NATIONAL SECURITY MATTERS

     SEC. 301. FINDINGS ON THE PROLIFERATION OF BALLISTIC MISSILES 
                   BY THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

       Congress makes the following findings regarding the 
     proliferation of ballistic missiles by the People's Republic 
     of China:

[[Page S9205]]

       (1) In December 1992, the Government of the People's 
     Republic of China violated the Arms Export Control Act and 
     the Export Administration Act of 1979 with the transfer by 
     the Ministry of Aerospace Industry of approximately 24 M-11 
     missiles to Sargodha Air Force Base in Pakistan.
       (2) From September 1994 to June 1996, the Government of the 
     People's Republic of China again violated the Arms Export 
     Control Act and the Export Administration Act of 1979 with 
     the transfer by the Ministry of Aerospace Industry of as many 
     as 30 M-11 ballistic missiles to Sargodha Air Force Base.
       (3) In June 1995, the Government of the People's Republic 
     of China violated the Arms Export Control Act and the Export 
     Administration Act of 1979 with the transfer by the Chinese 
     Aerospace Corporation to Iran of possibly hundreds of missile 
     guidance systems and computerized machine tools for the 
     production of ballistic missiles.
       (4) In August 1996, the Government of the People's Republic 
     of China violated the Arms Export Control Act and the Export 
     Administration Act of 1979 with the transfer to Pakistan of 
     factory plans and equipment capable of constructing a 
     ballistic missile factory.
       (5) In August 1996, the Government of the People's Republic 
     of China violated the Arms Export Control Act, the Export 
     Administration Act of 1979, and the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-
     Proliferation Act of 1992 with the transfer by the China 
     Precision Engineering Institute to Iran's Defense Industries 
     of gyroscopes, accelerometers, and test equipment for the 
     construction and test of ballistic missile guidance systems.
       (6) It has been reported that the Central Intelligence 
     Agency discovered a shipment by the People's Republic of 
     China to the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center, a 
     Syria Government agency that oversees missile development, of 
     guidance equipment for M-11 ballistic missiles. This alleged 
     shipment would be a violation of the Missile Technology 
     Control Regime. This alleged shipment would have taken place 
     after the limited sanctions imposed by the United States on 
     the People's Republic of China for shipments of M-11 missiles 
     and components to Pakistan had been lifted following the 
     assurances of the Government of the People's Republic of 
     China that it would comply with the Missile Technology 
     Control Regime.
       (7) After each of these violations, the President either 
     failed to take appropriate actions to deter future violations 
     of such Acts and the Regime, took the least onerous action 
     against the Government of the People's Republic of China that 
     was possible under such Acts and the Regime, or rescinded 
     previous actions thereby diluting or eliminating the 
     deterrent effect of sanctions under such Acts and the Regime 
     with respect to the Government of the People's Republic of 
     China.
       (8) This inaction forces Congress to take affirmative 
     action in the bilateral relations between the United States 
     and the People's Republic of China in order to respond 
     sufficiently to these violations of United States law.

     SEC. 302. FINDINGS ON THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS 
                   DESTRUCTION BY THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

       Congress makes the following findings regarding the 
     proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by the People's 
     Republic of China:
       (1) In January 1996, the Government of the People's 
     Republic of China violated the Arms Export Control Act, the 
     Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994, and the Export-
     Import Bank Act of 1945 with the transfer by the China 
     Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation to the Abdul Qadeer Khan 
     Research Laboratory in Kahuta, Pakistan, of as many as 5,000 
     ring-magnets for the extraction of enriched uranium for the 
     potential use in nuclear weapons.
       (2) In September 1996, the Government of the People's 
     Republic of China violated the Arms Export Control Act, the 
     Export Administration Act of 1979, and the Nuclear 
     Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 with the transfer by the 
     China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation to a nuclear 
     reactor facility in Khushab, Pakistan, of an industrial 
     furnace and special diagnostic equipment capable of 
     converting plutonium and uranium to weapons grade material.
       (3) In March 1996, the Government of the People's Republic 
     of China violated the Arms Export Control Act, the Export 
     Administration Act of 1979, the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-
     Proliferation Act of 1992, and Executive Order 12938 with the 
     transfer by the Jiangsu Corporation to Iran organizations 
     affiliated with the Iranian Defense Industries Organization 
     and the Revolutionary Guards of virtually complete chemical 
     weapons production facilities.
       (4) After each of these violations, the President either 
     failed to take any action to deter future violations of such 
     Acts or took such trifling action as to have no meaning or 
     effect on the future proliferation of weapons of mass 
     destruction by the People's Republic of China.
       (5) This inaction forces Congress to take affirmative 
     action in the bilateral relations between the People's 
     Republic of China and the United States in order to respond 
     sufficiently to these violations of United States law.

     SEC. 303. FINDINGS ON THE PROLIFERATION OF DESTABILIZING 
                   ADVANCED CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS BY THE PEOPLE'S 
                   REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

       Congress makes the following findings regarding the 
     proliferation of destabilizing advanced conventional weapons 
     by the People's Republic of China:
       (1) In January 1996, the Government of the People's 
     Republic of China violated the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-
     Proliferation Act of 1992 with the transfer by the Chinese 
     Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation to the Iran 
     military of 60 C-802 advanced anti-ship missiles and 20 
     Houdong fast-attack patrol craft, 15 of which were equipped 
     with C-802 missiles.
       (2) In test firings of this missile from land-based 
     batteries and from naval vessels, and test firings of a 
     similar missile from fighter aircraft, the Iran Government 
     claimed direct hits on the intended targets. This operational 
     ability restores an anti-surface warfare capability lost by 
     the Iran military during the Iran-Iraq War.
       (3) The Commander of the United States Fifth Fleet 
     commented that these missiles represented a new dimension to 
     the threat faced by the United States Navy, stating ``[i]t 
     used to be we just had to worry about land-based cruise 
     missiles. Now [the Iranians] have the potential to have that 
     throughout the [Persian] Gulf mounted on ships.''.
       (4) It was reported in numerous press sources that the 
     Department of Defense found these transfers destabilizing, 
     and pressed for the imposition of sanctions under the Iran-
     Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 but that the 
     Department of State did not wish to impose such sanctions for 
     fear of damaging bilateral relations between the People's 
     Republic of China and the United States.
       (5) The Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 does 
     not differentiate between transfers of destabilizing weapons 
     that will and will not damage bilateral relations. Any 
     determination of whether to impose sanctions on the People's 
     Republic of China for this transfer should have been made 
     strictly on the basis whether this transfer was or was not 
     destabilizing.
       (6) In light of these reports, it is likely that sanctions 
     would have been imposed if the Clinton Administration had 
     been more concerned with the stability of the region and the 
     security of United States troops than with the maintenance of 
     cordial relations between the People's Republic of China and 
     the United States.
       (7) This inaction forces Congress to take affirmative 
     action in the bilateral relations between the People's 
     Republic of China and the United States in order to respond 
     sufficiently to this violation of United States law.

     SEC. 304. FINDINGS ON THE EVASION OF UNITED STATES EXPORT 
                   CONTROL LAWS BY THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

       Congress makes the following findings regarding the evasion 
     of United States export control laws by the People's Republic 
     of China:
       (1) On November 14, 1994, the President issued Executive 
     Order 12938, relating to the emergency regarding weapons of 
     mass destruction, declaring that the proliferation of weapons 
     of mass destruction and the means of delivering them 
     constitute ``an unusual and extraordinary threat to the 
     national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United 
     States'' and that he had therefore decided to ``declare a 
     national emergency to deal with that threat''.
       (2) The President reaffirmed Executive Order 12938 on 
     November 15, 1995, and again on November 11, 1996.
       (3) The Director of Central Intelligence stated in the 
     report entitled ``The Acquisition of Technology Relating to 
     Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional 
     Munitions'' that, from July to December 1996, ``China was the 
     most significant supplier of W[eapons of] M[ass] 
     D[estruction]-related goods and technology to foreign 
     countries.''.
       (4) United States supercomputers are the computer of choice 
     for the nuclear weapons agencies of the People's Republic of 
     China as highlighted by the comments of the Chinese Academy 
     of Sciences, an agency known to work on nuclear weapons 
     development, that its United States-built supercomputer 
     provides the Academy with ``computational power previously 
     unknown'' and is available to ``all the major scientific and 
     technological institutes across China''.
       (5) The People's Republic of China has consistently 
     provided technical and scientific assistance for the 
     development of nuclear weapons to both Iran and Pakistan, and 
     it is illogical to believe that such assistance would not 
     also include computational assistance if needed.
       (6) According to the Under Secretary of Commerce for Export 
     Administration, 47 United States high-performance 
     supercomputers were exported to the People's Republic of 
     China between January 1996 and March 1997. Press reports 
     indicate United States intelligence sources consider the 
     actual number of such supercomputers exported to the People's 
     Republic of China during that period to have been in the 
     hundreds.
       (7) Current United States export regulations require an 
     export license for shipments of supercomputers to the 
     People's Republic of China only if the end-use will be 
     militarily related. However, the determination of that end-
     use is left to the exporter, thereby providing an incentive 
     for inadequate investigations of the end-use of 
     supercomputers exported to the People's Republic of China.

[[Page S9206]]

       (8) The Department of Commerce has initiated investigations 
     of United States supercomputer manufacturers who, as last as 
     June 1996, allegedly sold supercomputers to the Chinese 
     Academy of Sciences, which also administers research in 
     nuclear weapons and missiles, in violation of existing United 
     States export control regulations relating to supercomputers.
       (9) On 14 July 1997, the ``China Daily'', the newspaper of 
     the Government of the People's Republic of China, stated that 
     ``China will open up its defense sector to foreign 
     investors'' by ``strengthening international military-related 
     electronic technology exchanges'' and that ``China's defense-
     related electronics should no longer be hidden from foreign 
     investors''.
       (10) It was exactly this concern of diversion to military 
     end-use and to third nation proliferators that prompted the 
     President, on June 16, 1997, to tighten export controls for 
     supercomputers so as to address the concern of ``[t]he 
     potential diversion to military use of technology acquired'' 
     through experience developed in operating supercomputers and 
     customizing software and the concern that ``the People's 
     Republic of China may transfer advanced-weapons related 
     technology to other countries, as in the case of ballistic 
     missile transfers''.
       (11) Throughout this period, the President has consistently 
     acted in a manner so as to loosen controls on the export of 
     supercomputers from the United States and thereby make it 
     easier for the Government of the People's Republic of China 
     to divert United States supercomputers to military end-uses 
     and to assist in the proliferation of weapons of mass 
     destruction.
       (12) This inaction forces Congress to take affirmative 
     action in the bilateral relations between the People's 
     Republic of China and the United States in order to respond 
     sufficiently to these violations of United States law.

     SEC. 305. FINDINGS ON THE INCONSISTENT APPLICATION OF UNITED 
                   STATES EXPORT CONTROL LAWS TO THE PEOPLE'S 
                   REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND HONG KONG.

       Congress makes the following findings regarding the 
     inconsistent application of United States export control laws 
     to the People's Republic of China and Hong Kong:
       (1) While Hong Kong was sovereign territory of the United 
     Kingdom, United States control of United States exports to 
     Hong Kong of items listed on the United States Munitions List 
     and the Commerce Control List was considerably more lax than 
     United States control of exports of such items to the 
     People's Republic of China.
       (2) On June 19, 1997, at a time when Hong Kong was still 
     territory of the United Kingdom, the Department of Commerce 
     discovered that a supercomputer exported to a Hong Kong based 
     company without the need of an export license because it was 
     being exported to Hong Kong was reexported to a defense 
     research institute in Changsha, People's Republic of China.
       (3) A Federal grand jury is currently investigating the 
     1995 diversion by the Government of the People's Republic of 
     China to military aviation production of aircraft machining 
     equipment that was originally exported from the United States 
     for civilian end-use.
       (4) The People's Republic of China is the only country 
     which does not allow United States officials to investigate 
     the final end-use of exported technology and recently refused 
     United States requests to examine the location of the 
     supercomputer diverted from Hong Kong.
       (5) The continuation of this inconsistent export control 
     regime without specific assurances and verification measures 
     to prevent unauthorized reexport from Hong Kong, or diversion 
     to military end-use, provides the Government of the People's 
     Republic of China with the means to circumvent United States 
     export controls and gain access to critical technology 
     necessary both for defense modernization and the 
     proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass 
     destruction.
       (6) This inaction forces Congress to take affirmative 
     action in the bilateral relations between the People's 
     Republic of China and the United States in order to respond 
     sufficiently to these violations of United States law.

     SEC. 306. EXPORTS OF SUPERCOMPUTERS TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC 
                   OF CHINA.

       (a) Prior Approval of Exports and Reexports.--The President 
     shall require that no covered computer may be exported or 
     reexported to the People's Republic of China without the 
     prior written approval of each of the designated officials.
       (b) Export or Reexport Without Unanimous Approval.--If any 
     one of the designated officials does not approve of the 
     export or reexport of a covered computer to the People's 
     Republic of China, the computer may be exported or reexported 
     to the People's Republic of China only pursuant to a license 
     issued by the Secretary of Commerce under the export 
     administration regulations of the Department of Commerce, and 
     without regard to the licensing exceptions otherwise 
     authorized under section 740.7 of title 15, Code of Federal 
     Regulations, as in effect on June 10, 1997.
       (c) Deadline for Response to Application.--Each designated 
     official shall approve or disapprove in writing of the export 
     or reexport of a covered computer to the People's Republic of 
     China not later than 10 days after receipt by the United 
     States of the application for the export or reexport of the 
     computer.
       (d) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Covered computers.--The term ``covered computers'' 
     means the digital computers listed as ``eligible computers'' 
     in section 740.7(d)(2) of title 15, Code of Federal 
     Regulations, as in effect on June 10, 1997.
       (2) Designated officials.--The term ``designated 
     officials'' means the following:
       (1) The Secretary of Commerce.
       (2) The Secretary of Defense.
       (3) The Secretary of Energy.
       (4) The Secretary of State.
       (5) The Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament 
     Agency.

     SEC. 307. DUAL-USE EXPORTS TO HONG KONG.

       (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     law, the provisions of this section shall apply with respect 
     to exports of covered items to Hong Kong.
       (b) Pre-License Verifications.--The Secretary of State and 
     the Secretary of Commerce shall not approve an export license 
     application for the export of a covered item to Hong Kong if 
     United States officials are denied an opportunity to conduct 
     a pre-license verification with respect to the end-use of 
     such covered item and the recipient of such item.
       (c) Post-Shipment Verification.--If United States officials 
     are denied the ability to a conduct post-shipment 
     verification of the location, recipient, and end use of a 
     covered item that has been exported to Hong Kong from the 
     United States pursuant to an export license granted by the 
     Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce, thereafter 
     any application to export a covered item to Hong Kong shall 
     be treated in the same manner as a request to export such 
     item to the People's Republic of China.
       (d) Diversion of Covered Items.--If the President, or any 
     other official of the United States, obtains credible 
     evidence that a covered item exported from the United States 
     to Hong Kong on or after July 1, 1997, has been diverted--
       (1) to the People's Republic of China;
       (2) to an end use not authorized under the export control 
     laws or regulations of the United States, or
       (3) to a recipient, other than the recipient specified in 
     the export license application,

     any application to export a covered item to Hong Kong that is 
     pending or filed after the date on which such evidence is 
     obtained shall be treated in the same manner as a request to 
     export such item to the People's Republic of China.
       (e) Covered Item Defined.--In this section, the term 
     ``covered item'' means the following:
       (1) Any item on the United States Munitions List.
       (2) Any item on the Commerce Control List of the Department 
     of Commerce.

     SEC. 308. ENFORCEMENT OF IRAN-IRAQ ARMS NON-PROLIFERATION ACT 
                   WITH RESPECT TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

       (a) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the 
     United States that--
       (1) the delivery of 60 C-802 cruise missiles by the China 
     National Precision Machinery Import Export Corporation to 
     Iran poses a new, direct threat to deployed United States 
     forces in the Middle East and materially contributed to the 
     efforts of Iran to acquire destabilizing numbers and types of 
     advanced conventional weapons; and
       (2) the delivery is a violation of the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-
     Proliferation Act of 1992 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note).
       (b) Implementation of Sanctions.--
       (1) Requirement.--The President shall impose on the 
     People's Republic of China the mandatory sanctions set forth 
     in paragraphs (3), (4), and (5) of section 1605(b) of the 
     Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992.
       (2) Nonavailability of waiver.--For purposes of this 
     section, the President shall not have the authority contained 
     in section 1606 of the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act 
     of 1992 to waive the sanctions required under paragraph (1).

     SEC. 309. TRANSFERS OF SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY BY 
                   THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

       (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) Credible allegations exist that the People's Republic 
     of China has transferred equipment and technology as follows:
       (A) Gyroscopes, accelerometers, and test equipment for 
     missiles to Iran.
       (B) Chemical weapons equipment and technology to Iran.
       (C) Missile guidance systems and computerized machine tools 
     to Iran.
       (D) Industrial furnace equipment and high technology 
     diagnostic equipment to a nuclear facility in Pakistan.
       (E) Blueprints and equipment to manufacture M-11 missiles 
     to Pakistan.
       (F) M-11 missiles and components to Pakistan.
       (2) The Department of State has failed to determine whether 
     most such transfers violate provisions of relevant United 
     States laws and Executive orders relating to the 
     proliferation of sensitive equipment and technology, 
     including the Arms Export Control Act, the Nuclear 
     Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994, the Export 
     Administration Act of 1979, and the Export-Import Bank Act of 
     1945, and Executive Order 12938.
       (3) Where the Department of State has made such 
     determinations, it has imposed the least onerous form of 
     sanction, which significantly weakens the intended deterrent

[[Page S9207]]

     effect of the sanctions provided for in such laws.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the transfers of equipment and technology by the 
     People's Republic of China described in subsection (a)(1) 
     pose a threat to the national security interests of the 
     United States;
       (2) the failure of the Clinton Administration to initiate a 
     formal process to determine whether to impose sanctions for 
     such transfers under the provisions of law referred to in 
     subsection (a)(2) contributes to the threat posed to the 
     national security interests of the United States by the 
     proliferation of such equipment and technology; and
       (3) the President should immediately initiate the 
     procedures necessary to determine whether sanctions should be 
     imposed under such provisions of law for such transfers.
       (c) Report.--
       (1) Requirement.--Not later than 60 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress 
     a report setting forth--
       (A) the date, if any, of the commencement and of the 
     conclusion of each formal process conducted by the Department 
     of State to determine whether to impose sanctions under the 
     provisions of law referred to in subsection (a)(2) for each 
     transfer described in subsection (a)(1);
       (B) the facts providing the basis for each determination 
     not to impose sanctions under such provisions of law on the 
     Government of the People's Republic of China, or entities 
     within or having a relationship with that government, for 
     each transfer, and the legal analysis supporting such 
     determination; and
       (C) a schedule for initiating a formal process described in 
     paragraph (1) for each transfer not yet addressed by such 
     formal process and an explanation for the failure to commence 
     such formal process with respect to such transfer before the 
     date of the report.
       (2) Form.--The report shall be submitted in unclassified 
     form, but may include a classified annex.

     SEC. 310. ANNUAL REPORTS ON ACTIVITIES OF THE PEOPLE'S 
                   LIBERATION ARMY.

       (a) Entities Owned by PLA.--Not later than January 31 each 
     year, the Secretary of State shall publish in the Federal 
     Register a list of each corporation or other business entity 
     that was owned in whole or in part by the People's Liberation 
     Army of the People's Republic of China as of December 31 of 
     the preceding year.
       (b) Report on PRC Military Modernization.--
       (1) Requirement.--
       (A) In general.--Not later than March 31 each year, the 
     Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of 
     State, shall submit to Congress a report on the military 
     modernization activities of the People's Liberation Army.
       (B) Submittal.--The Secretary of Defense shall submit each 
     report to the following:
       (i) The Majority leader and Minority leader of the Senate.
       (ii) The chairmen and ranking members of the Committee on 
     Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the 
     Senate.
       (iii) The Speaker and Minority leader of the House of 
     Representatives.
       (iv) The chairmen and ranking members of the Committee on 
     International Relations and the Committee on National 
     Security of the House of Representatives.
       (C) Form.--The report shall be submitted in unclassified 
     form, but may include a classified annex.
       (2) Contents of report.--
       (A) Contents.--Each report under paragraph (1) shall 
     include the following:
       (i) A description of developments within the People's 
     Liberation Army, including the implications of the 
     developments for United States policy toward the People's 
     Republic of China.
       (ii) A description of the scope and pace of modernization 
     by the People's Liberation Army.
       (iii) To the maximum extent practicable, an analysis of the 
     intent of such modernization programs.
       (B) Relationship to annual human rights report.--The report 
     shall complement and not replace applicable sections of the 
     annual report on human rights in China by the Department of 
     State.
       (c) Protection of Sources and Methods.--In publishing a 
     list under subsection (a) and preparing a report under 
     subsection (b), the Secretary of Defense shall take 
     appropriate actions to ensure the protection of sources and 
     methods of gathering intelligence.

     SEC. 311. ANNUAL REPORTS ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE 
                   PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

       (a) Reports.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than March 31 each year, the 
     Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation, jointly and in consultation 
     with the heads of other appropriate Federal agencies 
     (including the Departments of Defense, Justice, Treasury, and 
     State), shall submit to the Members of Congress referred to 
     in paragraph (2) a report on the intelligence activities of 
     the People's Republic of China directed against or affecting 
     the interests of the United States.
       (2) Submittal.--Each report under paragraph (1) shall be 
     submitted to the following:
       (A) The Majority leader and Minority leader of the Senate.
       (B) The chairman and ranking member of the Select Committee 
     on Intelligence of the Senate.
       (C) The Speaker and Minority leader of the House of 
     Representatives.
       (D) The chairman and ranking member of the Permanent Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
       (3) Form.--Each report shall be submitted in unclassified 
     form, but may include a classified annex.
       (b) Contents of Reports.--Each report under subsection (a) 
     shall include information concerning the following:
       (1) Political and military espionage.
       (2) Intelligence activities designed to gain political 
     influence, including activities undertaken or coordinated by 
     the United Front Work Department of the Chinese Communist 
     Party.
       (3) Efforts to gain direct or indirect influence through 
     commercial or noncommercial intermediaries subject to control 
     by the People's Republic of China, including enterprises 
     controlled by the People's Liberation Army.
       (4) Disinformation and press manipulation by the People's 
     Republic of China with respect to the United States, 
     including activities undertaken or coordinated by the United 
     Front Work Department of the Chinese Communist Party.

     SEC. 312. STUDY OF THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM 
                   FOR TAIWAN.

       (a) Study.--The Secretary of Defense shall carry out, with 
     appropriate representatives of the Government of Taiwan, a 
     study of the architecture requirements for the establishment 
     and operation of a theater ballistic missile defense system 
     for Taiwan, including the Penghu Islands, Kinmen, and Matsu. 
     The study shall include the following:
       (1) An assessment of missile threats to Taiwan.
       (2) Identification of the requirements of Taiwan for 
     deployment of an effective theater ballistic missile defense 
     system.
       (3) Identification of existing theater ballistic missile 
     defense systems or existing technology for such systems, that 
     the United States could sell to Taiwan to assist in meeting 
     the requirements identified under paragraph (2).
       (4) Systems or technologies the United States is developing 
     that could address the missile threats to Taiwan's security.
       (5) Identification of potential joint cooperative efforts 
     by the United States and Taiwan to develop theater ballistic 
     missile defense systems.
       (b) Submittal to Congress.--
       (1) Submittal.--Not later than July 1, 1998, the Secretary 
     of Defense shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services 
     and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and the 
     Committee on National Security and the Committee on 
     Appropriations of the House of Representatives a report on 
     the study conducted under subsection (a).
       (2) Form.--The report shall be submitted in unclassified 
     form, but may include a classified annex.

     SEC. 313. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING UNITED STATES FORCE 
                   LEVELS IN ASIA.

       It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the current force levels in the Pacific Command Theater 
     of Operations are necessary to the fulfillment of the 
     military mission of that command and are vital to continued 
     peace and stability in the region covered by that command;
       (2) any reductions in such force levels should only be done 
     in close consultation with Congress and with a clear 
     understanding of their impact upon the capacity of the United 
     States to fulfill its current treaty obligations with other 
     states in the region as well as to the continued ability of 
     the United States to deter potential aggression in the 
     region; and
       (3) the annual report on the national security strategy of 
     the United States required by section 108 of the National 
     Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404a) should include specific 
     information on the adequacy of the capabilities of the United 
     States Armed Forces to support the implementation of the 
     national security strategy of the United States as it relates 
     to the People's Republic of China.

     SEC. 314. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING ESTABLISHMENT OF 
                   COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN ASIA.

       It is the sense of Congress that the President and the 
     Secretary of State should initiate negotiations with the 
     Government of the People's Republic of China and the 
     governments of other countries in Asia to establish a 
     commission on matters relating to security and cooperation in 
     Asia that would be modeled after the Commission on Security 
     and Cooperation in Europe.
                            TITLE IV--TRADE

     SEC. 401. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE ACCESSION OF TAIWAN 
                   TO THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION.

       It is the sense of Congress that Taiwan should be admitted 
     to the World Trade Organization as a separate customs 
     territory when Taiwan meets the established criteria of the 
     Organization for membership on that basis.
         TITLE V--HUMAN RIGHTS AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM WORLDWIDE

     SEC. 501. TRAINING FOR IMMIGRATION OFFICERS REGARDING 
                   RELIGIONS PERSECUTION.

       Section 235 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 
     U.S.C. 1225) is amended by adding at the end the following:

[[Page S9208]]

       ``(e) Training on Religious Persecution.--The Attorney 
     General shall establish and operate a program to provide to 
     immigration officers performing functions under subsection 
     (b), or section 207 or 208, training on religious 
     persecution, including training on--
       ``(1) the fundamental components of the right to freedom of 
     religion;
       ``(2) the variation in beliefs of religious groups; and
       ``(3) the governmental and nongovernmental methods used in 
     violation of the right to freedom of religion.''.

     SEC. 502. PROMOTION OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
                   WORLDWIDE.

       (a) Reports on Religious Persecution.--
       (1) Reports.--Not later than March 30, 1998, and annually 
     thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit to the 
     Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the 
     Committee on International Relations of the House of 
     Representatives a report on religious persecution worldwide.
       (2) Contents.--Each report shall include a list of the 
     government officials of any country worldwide who have been 
     materially involved in the commission of acts of persecution 
     that are motivated by a person's religion.
       (b) Prisoner Information Registry.--
       (1) Establishment.--The Secretary of State shall establish 
     and maintain a registry to be known as the Prisoner 
     Information Registry.
       (2) Contents.--The registry shall be a repository of 
     information on matters relating to the penal systems of the 
     various countries and of individuals in such systems, 
     including--
       (A) the charges brought against the individuals in such 
     systems;
       (B) the judicial or administrative processes to which such 
     individuals were subject;
       (C) the length of imprisonment of such individuals in such 
     systems;
       (D) the use (if any) of forced labor in such systems;
       (E) the incidences (if any) of torture in such systems;
       (F) the physical and health conditions in such systems; and
       (G) such other matters as the Secretary considers 
     appropriate.
       (3) Allocation of resources.--The Secretary may make funds 
     available to non-governmental organizations currently engaged 
     in monitoring penal systems worldwide or individuals in such 
     systems in order to assist in the establishment and 
     maintenance of the registry.
                        TITLE VI--OTHER MATTERS

     SEC. 601. TERMINATION OF UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE FOR EAST-
                   WEST CENTER.

       (a) Repeal of Authorization of Assistance.--The Center for 
     Cultural and Technical Interchange Between East and West Act 
     of 1960 (chapter VII of Public Law 86-472; 22 U.S.C. 2054 et 
     seq.) is repealed.
       (b) Prohibition on Use of Funds for Center.--
     Notwithstanding any other law, no funds appropriated or 
     otherwise made available to the Director of the United States 
     Information Agency for any fiscal year after fiscal year 1997 
     may be used for any purposes (including grants and payments 
     and expenses of operation) relating to the Center for 
     Cultural and Technical Interchange Between East and West.
                                                                    ____


                Summary of the China Policy Act of 1997


                           title i: sanctions

        Deny visas to Chinese Government officials 
     involved in political and religious persecution. This measure 
     would deny visas to high ranking officials who are employed 
     by the Public Security Bureau (the state police), the 
     Religious Affairs Bureau, China's family planning apparatus, 
     the People's Liberation Army (PLA), and those found to be 
     materially involved in the ordering or carrying out of the 
     massacre of Chinese students in Tiananmen Square. The 
     President is granted waiver authority that can be exercised, 
     in writing, each time a proscribed individual is to enter 
     this country that explains why awarding such visas overrides 
     United States concerns about China's human rights practices 
     past and present.
        Require U.S. Representatives at multilateral banks 
     to vote ``no'' on loans to China. Exception for loans related 
     to environmental improvements and safeguards, famine, and 
     natural disaster relief. China received approximately $3 
     billion in World Bank loans in the most recent fiscal year. 
     While receiving this foreign aid, the Chinese military budget 
     increased by 12.7 percent. Between 1985 and 1995 the United 
     States supported 111 of 183 loans approved by the World Bank 
     Group and 15 of 92 loans that the Asian Development Bank 
     approved. The bill also requires the Secretary of Treasury to 
     oppose and instruct the U.S. executive director of the World 
     Bank to oppose any change in the World Bank's rules that 
     limit the total share of the bank's lending that can be made 
     in any one country.
        Require the President to begin consultations with 
     major United States allies and trading partners to encourage 
     them to adopt similar measures contained in this bill and to 
     work with our allies to vote against loans for China at 
     multilateral development banks. Within 60 days of a G-7 
     meeting, the President shall submit a report to Congress on 
     the progress of this effort.
        Targeted sanctions against People's Liberation 
     Army (PLA) companies involved in the illegal sale of AK-47 
     rifles in the United States. China North Industries Group 
     (NORINCO) and the PLA-owned company China Poly Group (POLY) 
     will be prohibited from (1) exporting to, and maintaining a 
     physical presence in, the United States; (2) receiving loans 
     from the Export-Import Bank; and (3) receiving contracts for 
     goods or services from the U.S. Government for a period of 
     one year. The attempted illegal sale of AK-47 machine guns to 
     street gangs in California warrant these targeted sanctions 
     against these firms.
        The bill establishes a mechanism to apply 
     sanctions on additional PLA companies based on certain 
     specific actions, including weapons proliferation, illegal 
     arms sales in U.S., and military and political espionage in 
     the United States. The Director of Central Intelligence and 
     the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in 
     separate annual reports, shall identify entities owned in 
     part or wholly by the People's Liberation Army who have 
     engaged in proliferation of nuclear or chemical weapons, the 
     illegal importation of weapons to the United States, or 
     unlawful military intelligence collection or espionage in the 
     United States. Such entities will be prohibited from 
     exporting to, or maintaining a physical presence in the 
     United States, receiving loans from the Export-Import Bank, 
     and receiving contracts from the United States Government for 
     a period of 1 year.
        Sanctions remain in effect for 5 years. The bill 
     includes a Sense of Congress that the sanctions in the China 
     Policy Act shall be reviewed by Congress within the 5 year 
     period upon the occurrence of one or more of the following 
     events: (1) People's Republic of China's entry into the WTO 
     on commercially viable terms; (2) President's certification 
     of PRC's full implementation of international proliferation 
     standards and agreements; (3) President's certification that 
     PRC is actively and effectively combating all forms of 
     religious persecution; (4) PRC re-evaluation of Tiananmen 
     Square massacre; (5) Publication by the PRC of a National 
     Security White Paper describing its intentions 
     internationally; or (6) President's certification that the 
     PRC has taken concrete steps towards improving overall human 
     rights conditions in China and Tibet, including the release 
     of political prisoners; improving prison conditions and 
     providing prisoners with adequate medical care; and full 
     compliance with the international human rights accords to 
     which the PRC is a signatory.


        title ii: human rights, religious freedom, and democracy

        Congressional findings detailing the Chinese 
     Government's jailing of political dissidents, persecution of 
     religious groups, human rights violations in Tibet and 
     coercive family planning practices.
        Combats slave labor and ``reeducation'' centers. 
     The bill calls for stricter enforcement of the ban against 
     the sale of products produced in slave labor camps; 
     appropriations to United States Customs to increase 
     monitoring; require reporting and advocacy requirements; and 
     a Sense of Congress urging renegotiation of prison labor 
     memorandum of understanding with China.
        Authorize an additional $5 million for 
     international broadcasting to China, including Radio Free 
     Asia and the Voice of America to expand broadcast hours in 
     multiple Chinese dialects, Tibetan, and other languages 
     spoken in China.
        Authorize additional $2 million in funding for 
     National Endowment for Democracy programs in China.
        Authorize additional $2 million of funding for 
     existing United States Information Agency student, cultural, 
     and legislative exchange programs between the U.S. and China.
        Terminate the East-West Center. This center funds 
     cooperative programs of study, research and training between 
     the U.S. and Asian Pacific nations. However, the resources of 
     the State Department, which maintains a network of embassies 
     and consulates in Asian Pacific countries, should be more 
     than sufficient to promote good relations with these 
     countries. Eliminating this $10 million program offsets 
     the spending increases proposed in the bill.
       Require United States contractors who receive international 
     family planning funds from the United States to report on 
     their organization's activities in China.
       Sense of Congress concerning multilateral efforts to 
     address China's human rights record.
       Sense of Congress that China should abide by the 1984 Sino-
     British Joint Declaration on Hong Kong.


                  Title III: National Security Matters

       Congressional findings on PRC's proliferation of ballistic 
     missiles, weapons of mass destruction, destabilizing advanced 
     conventional weapons, and evasion of U.S. export controls.
       Tighten United States export licensing requirements on 
     super computers sold to China. Current regulation only 
     requires an export license for mid-range supercomputers to 
     countries such as China with only a certification, by the 
     exporting firm, that the end-use is not military-related. 
     This provision requires an export license for any mid-range 
     supercomputers (currently 2000-7000 MTOP range, but amendable 
     by the Secretary of Commerce) sold to China which the 
     Departments of Defense, State, Energy, and Commerce, and the 
     Arms Control and Disarmament Agency do not unanimously agree 
     to export without a license. This provision is a modified 
     version of the Spence-Dellums amendment to the House Fiscal 
     Year 98 DoD Authorization bill.

[[Page S9209]]

       Protects against dual-use export diversion from Hong Kong. 
     The recent diversion of a Sun Microsystems supercomputer from 
     a Hong Kong importer to a military end-user in the People's 
     Republic of China highlights the potential problems with 
     having dual-use technology exports to Hong Kong being treated 
     more liberally than such exports to the PRC. This provision 
     would deny licenses for export of items on the U.S. Munitions 
     List and the Commerce Control List to Hong Kong if United 
     States officials are denied access to conduct pre-license 
     checks verifying the end-user. It will also require that if 
     United States officials are denied access for post-shipment 
     verification checks, or if an actual diversion of dual-use 
     items takes place from Hong Kong to the PRC, then Hong Kong 
     will thereafter be placed in the same export control category 
     as the People's Republic of China.
       A finding that China violated the Iran-Iraq 
     Nonproliferation Act with the export of C-802 missiles to 
     Iran, and a requirement on the implementation of this Act's 
     sanctions. The Commander of the United States Navy's Fifth 
     Fleet in the Persian Gulf has called the Iranian acquisition 
     of C-802 cruise missiles a direct threat to the 15,000 US 
     servicemen stationed in the area. Iran acquired these 
     missiles from China, in direct contravention of the Iran-Iraq 
     Nonproliferation Act (McCain-Gore Act). However, the 
     Administration did not implement the sanctions called for in 
     the Act.
       Limiting transfers of sensitive equipment and technology by 
     the People's Republic of China. Require within 60 days a 
     report detailing State Department's sanctions determination 
     process for each allegation against China in the area of 
     proliferation, and a schedule for initiating sanctions 
     determination process where the process has not been 
     initiated.
       Sunshine requirement on PLA companies. On an annual basis, 
     the United States Government shall publish a list of all 
     companies owned in part or wholly by the People's Liberation 
     Army (PLA) of the People's Republic of China who export to, 
     or have an office in, the United States. In addition, require 
     a report on PLA military modernization.
       Require enhanced monitoring of Chinese intelligence 
     activities in the United States, including a report on such 
     activities and a report on political and military espionage.
       Require a bilateral United States-Taiwan study of 
     establishing theater missile defense in the Pacific Rim.
       Sense of the Congress that the current level of United 
     States forces in Asia are vital to continued peace and 
     stability in the region and should only be reduced with a 
     clear understanding of their impact on United States treaty 
     obligations and the continued ability of the United States to 
     deter potential aggression in the region.
       Sense of Congress that the President shall initiate 
     negotiations with the PRC and other Asian countries to 
     establish a ``Helsinki Commission'' for Asia.


                            Title IV: Trade

       Sense of Congress that Taiwan should enter the World Trade 
     Organization (WTO) as soon as it meets the established 
     criteria.


         Title V: Human rights and Religious Freedom Worldwide

       The legislation mandates additional and extensive training 
     for United States asylum officers world-wide in recognizing 
     religious persecution.
       Enhanced reporting of human rights violations and religious 
     persecution around the world. Increased publicizing of 
     political and religious persecution world-wide through annual 
     reports by the State Department, publication of list of 
     individuals involved in religious persecution, and 
     establishment of a Prisoner Information Registry.

  Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, I rise today in strong support of the 
China Policy Act of 1997. As an original cosponsor of the act, I 
believe this legislation provides the starting point for a much needed 
restructuring of United States-China relations. For too long, our 
approach to China has been one of passivity and appeasement. The 
Clinton administration seems willing to tolerate virtually any 
misbehavior--gross violations of human rights, arms deals with 
terrorist states, a headlong push to develop military capabilities that 
exceed any conceivable threat, even efforts to smuggle guns into the 
United States. This is no way to build a stable, peaceful, and 
constructive relationship.
  Our legislation offers a dramatically different approach. Under this 
bill, when China violates standards of decency or endangers vital 
American interests, there will be a response that is swift, 
predictable, and appropriate. This legislation is an important first 
step toward a policy that rewards and encourages constructive behavior, 
and discourages questionable activity. It points the way to a new and 
better era in United States-China relations.
  The 20th century has been the American century, and if the new 
century is to bear the same imprint, we must fashion a stable and 
constructive relationship with the People's Republic of China, which is 
pushing hard for global superpower status.
  One specific provision I have included in this bill protects the 
United States from Chinese diversion of sensitive technology from Hong 
Kong. Hong Kong has abided by international export control regimes and 
has benefited from preferential access to sensitive U.S. technology--
technology that can be used for military purposes.
  My provision simply does the following: if China diverts controlled 
technology from Hong Kong, or if United States officials are denied the 
opportunity to conduct post-shipment checks on location and end use of 
controlled items, then the United States shall apply the stricter 
export controls to Hong Kong presently applied to the rest of China. In 
addition, if United States officials are denied an opportunity to 
conduct a prelicense check on the end use and end user of a controlled 
item, then the export license for that item shall be denied.
  A May, 1997 GAO report on the export of controlled items to Hong Kong 
stated that effective monitoring is critical to prevent weapons and 
technology proliferation. The report identified pre-license checks and 
post-shipment verification as possible means to ensure the continued 
effectiveness of Hong Kong's export control system.
  Now that Hong Kong has reverted to Chinese control, China undoubtedly 
will attempt to use the port to divert technology and proliferate 
weapons. Prosecutions for illegal shipments of arms-related commodities 
in Hong Kong have grown dramatically in recent years, from 65 cases in 
1994 to 250 last year. One Hong Kong firm, Cheong Yee, was sanctioned 
by the United States last May for helping Iran obtain chemical weapons.
  The technology flow to Hong Kong is a significant national security 
risk if China compromises the integrity of Hong Kong's export control 
system. Chinese front companies in Hong Kong already have been 
identified with efforts to acquire controlled technologies for illicit 
export to countries of proliferation concern, according to United 
States and Hong Kong officials. China has refused to sign many of the 
export control regimes by which Hong Kong historically has abided. The 
old restrictions are kept in place only from a sense of moral 
obligation, states Brian Lo, Hong Kong's chief trade-licensing officer.
  Mr. President, moral obligation is flimsy stuff when you are dealing 
with the Communist leaders of Beijing. These are the leaders who attack 
their own young people in Tiananmen Square, persecute Christians, and 
proliferate weapons to terrorist states which target U.S. citizens 
around the world.
  In the face of this growing proliferation risk, the Clinton 
administration has been relaxing America's export control regulations. 
Just this week, a bipartisan report issued by the House National 
Security Committee stated that the changes made to U.S. export controls 
contributed to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and 
their means of delivery as well as the development of advanced 
conventional weapons.
  The number of export licenses reviewed each year for national 
security reasons has fallen from 150,000 in the mid-1980's to less than 
8,000 today. The world may have become a safer place, but the 
international arena is still threatening.
  Clearly, it is time for the United States to take aggressive steps 
which protect United States national security interests and limit the 
ability of potential enemies to develop weapons of mass destruction. I 
am proud to be a cosponsor of the China Policy Act and believe that the 
provisions contained therein make a significant contribution to the 
United States-China debate. I urge the Senate's prompt consideration 
and passage of this bill.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I join the Senator from Michigan [Mr. 
Abraham] in introducing the China Policy Act of 1997. This is a bill 
that I am proud to cosponsor and one that will send a much-needed 
message to the leaders of the People's Republic of China. I commend the 
Senator from Michigan for his efforts.
  The China Policy Act is an omnibus bill that covers a broad range of 
issues. This legislation will impose targeted sanctions against Chinese 
entities--

[[Page S9210]]

such as the military and public security apparatus--that are directly 
engaged in weapons proliferation and human rights abuses. In addition, 
this bill calls for tighter enforcement of various laws related to 
China, such as the ban on Chinese prison-labor goods and controls on 
the export of high-speed computers to China. The legislation also 
contains funding increases for student, cultural, and legislative 
exchanges between the United States and China.
  The China Policy Act is designed to move Congress and the American 
public beyond the sometimes polarizing debate over China's most-
favored-nation trade status, offering realistic alternatives to 
revoking MFN that merit broad bipartisan support.
  As many of my colleagues know, I have been a strong opponent of 
granting MFN privileges to China and, in fact, have been an original 
cosponsor of the resolutions of disapproval for the past 3 years. I 
strongly believe that, in light of Beijing's egregious human rights 
record, China does not deserve to have such trade privileges with the 
United States. Ever since the administration delinked MFN and human 
rights in 1994, I have watched with alarm as the Chinese Government has 
heightened its political and religious persecution throughout the 
country.
  But despite my strong views on the issue, I realize that the Congress 
has been unable to reach a consensus on whether MFN is the best tool to 
pressure China to make improvements in human rights. I know that many 
of my colleagues share my concerns over China's human rights record, 
but nevertheless feel that MFN is too blunt an instrument, especially 
for a nation as large and diverse as China.
  But once you step away from the debate over the effectiveness of MFN, 
there is widespread agreement among Members of both the Senate and the 
House that the administration's current policy of constructive 
engagement toward China remains unsatisfactory.
  I believe the administration is promoting engagement for engagement's 
sake, not as a way to halt the many offensive behaviors of the Chinese 
regime. I prefer to call the administration policy not ``constructive'' 
engagement but rather unconditional engagement.
  No matter how uncooperative China is, the United States appears ready 
to continue business as usual with the Chinese regime. This is 
especially true with respect to human rights. Recent events paint a 
very bleak picture. In October of last year, a Chinese court sentenced 
Wang Dan--a leader of the Tiananmen Square protests--to 11 years in 
prison for peacefully expressing his prodemocracy beliefs. Seventy-six-
year-old Bishop Zeng Jingmu has been sentenced to reeducation through 
labor for organizing religious ceremonies outside China's official 
Catholic Church. In Tibet, Chinese authorities have banned the display 
of the Dalai Lama's photograph and the State Department Human Rights 
Report cites three instances of Buddhist monks dying in Chinese prisons 
in 1996. Sadly, this represents on a tiny fraction of the human rights 
abuses that are taking place in China today. It would be impossible to 
name all of the people who are being kept behind bars for the 
expression of their political and religious beliefs.
  Yet, even as the Chinese leadership continues to brutalize political 
dissidents and the people of Tibet, the administration is preparing to 
welcome China's President, Jiang Zemin, to the White House next month. 
What kind of message does this send?
  The China Policy Act of 1997 represents the efforts of both pro- and 
anti-MFN Senators to find new ways to deal with the problems the United 
States currently faces in China.
  And there is no shortage of problems.
  I have already mentioned my primary concern, which is China's 
deplorable human rights record, but in addition, the Government of 
China continues to sell dangerous chemical and nuclear weapons 
technologies to terrorist and rogue regimes. China has used military 
intimidation to disrupt free elections in Taiwan and has harassed its 
neighbors in the South China Sea. Furthermore, we have all seen reports 
of Beijing's unfair trade practices and rampant copyright violations. 
This is what I refer to as a ``kaleidoscope'' of problems the United 
States has with China.
  The China Policy Act of 1997 contains targeted sanctions aimed at the 
organizations most directly associated with China's poor behavior. For 
example, the bill contains provisions imposing comprehensive sanctions 
against enterprises run by the People's Liberation Army that have 
engaged in weapons smuggling or proliferation. The United States simply 
should refrain from doing business with companies that create security 
risks to our country.
  This bill will also require the administration to deny United States 
visas to high-level Chinese officials directly connected with human 
rights violations and religious persecution. This provision expresses 
United States outrage at China's human rights abuses while still giving 
the President adequate waiver authority to conduct foreign policy.
  I am particularly pleased this bill contains strong language on human 
rights, an area that has been a special focus of mine. The bill 
includes a provision stating that the administration needs to greatly 
increase multilateral efforts to condemn China's human rights record. 
As you know, Mr. President, this past April, the U.N. Human Rights 
Commission failed to pass a resolution criticizing China's human rights 
policies. Unfortunately, the United States only began lobbying for the 
resolution at the last moment and, as a result of this delay, many of 
our allies--including France, Germany, and Canada--would not cosponsor 
the motion. To make our China policy more effective, the United States 
must do a better job of coordinating with our allies in multilateral 
fora.

  In addition to addressing a wide spectrum of issues in Sino-United 
States relations, the China Policy Act also gives the Senate--and the 
American people we represent--an important opportunity to have an 
extensive debate about China policy. Such a debate is long overdue, and 
has continued to be delayed because of the controversy surrounding MFN.
  It is my view that the inability of Congress to reach a consensus on 
MFN has led the Chinese authorities to believe that they can continue 
to commit gross human rights violations without facing any 
consequences. Unfortunately, it may be that, until now, the Beijing 
leadership has been right. In China's eyes, Congress has become what 
Chairman Mao Zedong would have called a paper tiger, something that 
might act ferocious, but is, in fact, harmless.
  However, once Congress steps out of the restrictive confines of the 
MFN debate, I think China will be surprised at the level of 
dissatisfaction in Congress toward Beijing's actions.
  The Chinese Government will obviously condemn this legislation 
because it demands that Chinese leaders live up to the international 
and bilateral agreements on weapons-proliferation, human rights, and 
trade to which China is a party. The Beijing government categorically 
rejects any outside scrutiny of its policies and equates good relations 
with a complete lack of criticism. But truly close relations between 
two countries can only be built when both sides fulfill their 
obligations and act in good faith toward one another.
  The China Policy Act of 1997 is intended to send a strong message 
that Chinese Government's actions on many fronts remains unacceptable. 
Unfortunately, Chinese leaders have not heard this message loudly or 
strongly enough in the past. They have not heard it from the U.N. Human 
Rights Commission. They have not heard it from our trade negotiators. 
And, until now, they have not heard it from the U.S. Congress.
  It is my view that the time has come for us to send this message 
clearly.
  I yield the floor.
                                 ______