Congressional Record, Volume 143 Issue 120 (Thursday, September 11, 1997)

[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 120 (Thursday, September 11, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9198-S9218]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

By Mr. ALLARD:
S. 1162. A bill to amend the Controlled Substances Act and the
Controlled Substances Import and Export Act with respect to penalties
for powder cocaine and crack offenses; to the Committee on the
Judiciary.

the powder-crack cocaine penalty equalization act of 1997

Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, today I rise to address one of the most
longstanding and racially sensitive disputes in the criminal justice
system. I am introducing legislation to equalize the criminal penalties
for offenses involving crack and powder cocaine.
Under current law, a seller of 5 grams of crack cocaine receives the
same mandatory 5-year prison term as a seller of 500 grams of powder
cocaine.
That disparity between penalties has been scrutinized by the U.S.
Sentencing Commission, Congress, and the Clinton administration for the
last several years. Although many solutions have called for narrowing
the gap in penalties, these recommendations don't go far enough.
Instead of equalizing the penalties, they only narrow the disparity in
sentencing for powder versus crack cocaine by altering the ratio from 5
to 1 instead of the current 100 to 1.
Additional recommendations have called for lessening the penalty for
crack dealers, bringing it closer to the lax penalties applied to
powder offenders.
My legislation rejects the hollow solution of lowering the penalty
for crack to make it equal to powder cocaine penalties. The fact is
that 90 percent of those convicted of dealing crack are African-
Americans, while the majority of powder cocaine offenders are white.
Raising the powder cocaine penalties to that of crack will help
alleviate the perception of unfairness and racial bias in sentencing.
But reducing the penalties for crack cocaine would only increase
violent crime and harm those which the law is seeking to help.
Statistics remind us that cocaine addiction continues to plague our
society. According to the Partnership for a Drug Free America, 1 out of
every 10 babies born in the United States is born addicted to drugs,
and most are addicted to crack cocaine. Crime exploded between 1985 and
1990, the years crack was introduced. In fact, violent crime went up 37
percent in 1990 and aggravated assaults increased 43 percent. Partly
because of crack cocaine, more teens in this country now die of gunshot
wounds than all natural causes combined. Lowering sentences on crack
cocaine would be devastating to the progress we have made in fighting
the drug war.
During the 1980's, Congress legislated steep consequences for crack
cocaine.
The crack epidemic spread across our Nation--and it warranted several
drastic legal reforms. We saw the destruction wrought on entire
communities by this cheap and highly addictive form of cocaine and
realized that tough penalties were needed to restrict its availability.
These tougher sentences were needed, but the problem we are seeing
today is that powder cocaine sentences were set before the crack
epidemic began and do not reflect the influence powder has had on crime
and drug trafficking.
This bill provides a twofold solution: It corrects the inequality in
penalties which has contributed to the perceived race bias in
sentencing; while at the same time stiffening the penalty for powder
cocaine offenses, which are currently far too lenient.
In light of the numerous proposals introduced to correct this
problem, I encourage my colleagues to contemplate the alternatives and
consider how justice is served in this matter. Maintaining the current
ratio is allowing a wrongful disparity in penalties to continue.
Congress must act now to correct this injustice.
______

By Mr. BRYAN:
S. 1163. A bill to amend the Truth in Lending Act to prohibit the
distribution of any negotiable check or other instrument with any
solicitation to a consumer by a creditor to open an account under any
consumer credit plan or to engage in any other credit transaction which
is subject to that Act, and for other purposes; to the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.

the unsolicited loan consumer protection act

Mr. BRYAN. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce legislation that
will protect consumers from a new, egregious banking practice that
gives new meaning to the old expression, ``The check's in the mail.''
This practice involves financial institutions sending unsolicited
checks to consumers, some of whom have no prior relationship with the
financial institution at all. These checks in fact obligate the
recipient to a loan with interest rates as high as 25 percent.
I invite my colleagues' attention to a format that is frequently
used. This check is sent in a window envelope in which the recipient
sees his or her name, opens it up and believes that indeed a check has
been sent to him or to her.
What may at first appear to be pennies from Heaven is in reality a
loan backed by exorbitant interest rates and punitive loan terms, but
these details are only found in the fine print often on the back of the
check.
While only a few banks are engaged in this practice, it is
nevertheless a growing practice and needs to be stopped before it gets
completely out of hand. For example, one bank has booked $1 billion of
these unsolicited loans in a period of 18 months.
At a time when personal bankruptcies are at an all-time high --many
attribute that to easy credit-card debt--the practice in which
consumers are enticed into taking a loan that they really have not
sought should concern all Americans.
I fear for the long-term consequence of these loans should the
economy take a sudden downturn and these loans are left in default.
The bottom line, Mr. President, is loans should only be issued when
an application has been made and approved, with the consumer fully
understanding the terms of the loan. In the case of these loans, all
the pertinent information consumers need to know about

[[Page S9199]]

fees, charges, interest rates is in microscopic print and most
frequently on the back of the check itself.
Mr. President, banks are trying the patience of the American consumer
with their ever increasing use of fees and questionable market
practices.
My State of Nevada has gone through a series of bank mergers that
have left customers frustrated and confused. Service has been
downgraded, accounts lost and fees increased. According to one report,
the number of types of fees charged by banks increased from 96 to 250
while the banking industry itself continues to earn record profits--
surpassing $50 billion.
These unsolicited checks are setting rates right up against the usury
ceilings with some carrying rates as high as 25 percent. Adding insult
to injury, these checks are targeted to people who can least afford to
pay these exorbitant rates but are easily tempted by the lure of easy
money.
Mr. President, I want to commend Congressmen Hinchey and Gonzalez in
the House for raising this issue. I look forward to the Banking
Committee holding hearings on this important legislation. The
distinguished chairman of the subcommittee has indicated that it is his
intention to hold hearings on this issue. I look forward to processing
this legislation as quickly as possible.
______

By Mr. ABRAHAM (for himself, Mr. Feingold, Mr. Hutchinson, Mr.
Coverdell, Mr. DeWine, Mr. Ashcroft, Mr. Brownback, Mr. Mack,
and Mr. Helms):
S. 1164. A bill to state a policy of the United States that engages
the People's Republic of China in areas of mutual interest, promotes
human rights, religious freedom, and democracy in China, and enhances
the national security interests of the United States with respect to
China, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

CHINA POLICY ACT OF 1997

Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the China
Policy Act of 1997. Cosponsors of this legislation include Senators
Feingold, Hutchinson, Coverdell, DeWine, Ashcroft, Brownback, Mack, and
Helms.
Now is the time, Mr. President, to take a closer look at our
relations with the People's Republic of China. Preparations are
underway for the October 28 state visit of Chinese President Jiang
Zemin. The President will be feted, toasted, and praised. Meanwhile,
Wei Jingsheng rots in a Beijing prison, serving out a 14-year sentence
for the crime of peacefully advocating democracy and other political
reforms.
This contrast, in my view, points up the current crisis in United
States-China relations. For too long now, this administration has put
process over substance, holding repeated meetings and discussions with
Chinese leaders, but failing to set and hold to a concrete agenda
addressing critical issues of human rights and religious freedom, as
well as nuclear and other weapons proliferation.
There is much of substance to work out with Chinese leaders, Mr.
President. To begin with, China's record of human rights abuses and
repression of religious faith is long and disturbing. Women pregnant
with their second or third child have been coerced into abortions.
Peaceful advocates of democracy and political reforms have been
sentenced to long terms in prisons where they have been beaten,
tortured, and denied needed medical care. Religious meeting places have
been forcibly closed. Tibetan monks refusing to condemn their religious
leader, the Dalai Lama, have been forced from their monasteries; some
of their leaders have disappeared.
President Clinton knows full well about these abuses. His own State
Department just released a report on human rights in China which states
that in 1996 ``The Government continued to commit widespread and well-
documented human rights abuses, in violation of internationally
accepted norms, stemming from the authorities' intolerance of dissent,
fear of unrest, and the absence or inadequacy of laws protecting basic
freedoms.'' America cannot allow these abuses of fundamental human
rights to continue unopposed.
Our own national security also demands that we take a firmer, more
substantive stance in our dealings with China. Although China signed
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and agreed to abide by the terms
of the missile technology control regime in 1992, violations of both
agreements continue. Especially worrisome are Chinese sales of weapons
technology to Pakistan, Iran, and other countries in the Middle East.
Chinese weapons exports also have more directly threatened Americans
here on United States soil. Companies associated with the People's
Liberation Army [PLA] have been caught attempting to sell smuggled
assault weapons to street gangs in Los Angeles.
Mr. President, I am not advocating any rash response to these
provocations. China is an important nation with the potential to take
part in mutually beneficial commerce and diplomatic cooperation, or
destabilize a number of important strategic areas. In my view our
disagreements with China call for development of incentives and
disincentives designed to steer that country toward internal
liberalization and constructive participation in the international
community.
Up until now, debates over American policy toward China have focused
almost exclusively on the annual extension of that country's most-
favored-nation trading status [MFN]. Both sides in this debate have
highlighted legitimate issues calling for reasoned argument. But, now
that Congress has renewed MFN, it is imperative that we address broader
United States-China relations, lest China policy be relegated to the
back pages for another year.
I firmly believe, Mr. President, that Congress and the President can
put United States-Chinese relations on a course toward substantive
progress by taking concrete action now. That is why I am introducing
the China Policy Act of 1997. This legislation is designed to
discourage the Chinese regime from oppressive internal policies and
destabilizing actions contrary to United States national security,
while advancing American values of freedom and human rights among the
Chinese people. It represents a consensus view reached among proponents
on both sides of the MFN question. It combines provisions of China-
related bills and amendments authored by myself and Senators Feingold,
Ashcroft, DeWine, Coverdell, and Brownback. I would like to extend
special thanks to Senator Feingold for strengthening the human rights
focus of the bill.
This legislation includes a number of sanctions aimed at Chinese
leaders intended to express our dismay at recent human rights abuses.
First, the bill would deny American visas to high ranking Chinese
Government officials involved in political and religious persecution.
The bill also would require United States representatives at
multilateral development banks to vote ``no'' on all loans to China,
except those related to famine, national disaster relief, and
environmental protection. This last provision also puts into practice
the important principle that United States taxpayers should not be
forced to subsidize the Chinese Government.
In addition, Mr. President, the bill would institute targeted
sanctions against PLA companies found to have engaged in weapons
proliferation, illegal importation of weapons to the United States or
military or political espionage in the United States. The U.S.
Government also would publish a list of other PLA-controlled companies.
This would allow American companies and consumers to decide whether
they wish to purchase products manufactured in whole or in part by the
Communist Chinese army. The bill also takes direct aim at China's use
of slave labor by instituting stricter enforcement of the ban against
sale of Chinese products produced in prison labor camps.
These sanctions, specifically aimed at government officials and the
Chinese Governmental apparatus, will show our determination to stand up
and defend human rights and religious freedom.
This legislation also would tighten United States export licensing
requirements for supercomputers sold to China. This will impede Chinese
weapons development and proliferation.
In addition to its sanctions, the bill includes provisions to
encourage internal reforms and cultural exchanges between our two
countries. It would increase funding for international broadcasting to
China, including Radio Free Asia and the Voice of America. I also

[[Page S9200]]

would increase funding for National Endowment for Democracy and U.S.
Information Agency student, cultural, and legislative exchange
programs.
These concrete actions would make clear to the Chinese leadership
that there is a price to be paid for human rights abuses and for
irresponsible weapons proliferation. They also would encourage greater
openness in that country, without penalizing the Chinese people for the
actions of their Government. They would provide the basis for
substantive negotiations and a productive relationship with China.
It is my hope that my colleagues will adopt these measures, and that
the President will seize the opportunity to set our policy on a new,
more productive course.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a summary and the full
text of the China Policy Act of 1997 be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the bill and summary were ordered to be
printed in the Record, as follows:

S. 1164

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``China
Policy Act of 1997''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents of this Act
is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Declaration of policy.

TITLE I--SANCTIONS

Sec. 101. Denial of entry into United States of certain officials of
the People's Republic of China.
Sec. 102. Limitations on multilateral assistance for the People's
Republic of China.
Sec. 103. Sanctions regarding China North Industries Group, China Poly
Group, and certain other entities affiliated with the
People's Liberation Army.
Sec. 104. Consultations with allies regarding sanctions against the
People's Republic of China.
Sec. 105. Termination of certain authorities.

TITLE II--HUMAN RIGHTS, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, AND DEMOCRACY IN CHINA

Sec. 201. Findings on human rights abuses in the People's Republic of
China.
Sec. 202. Findings on religious freedom in the People's Republic of
China.
Sec. 203. Findings on Tibet.
Sec. 204. Findings on coercive family planning practices in the
People's Republic of China.
Sec. 205. Combating slave labor and ``reeducation'' centers.
Sec. 206. International broadcasting to China.
Sec. 207. National Endowment for Democracy.
Sec. 208. United States Information Agency student, cultural, and
legislative exchange programs.
Sec. 209. Annual reports on family planning activities in the People's
Republic of China by recipients of United States funds.
Sec. 210. Sense of Congress regarding multilateral efforts to address
China's human rights record.
Sec. 211. Sense of Congress regarding compliance by the People's
Republic of China with the Joint Declaration on Hong
Kong.

TITLE III--NATIONAL SECURITY MATTERS

Sec. 301. Findings on the proliferation of ballistic missiles by the
People's Republic of China.
Sec. 302. Findings on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
by the People's Republic of China.
Sec. 303. Findings on the proliferation of destabilizing advanced
conventional weapons by the People's Republic of China.
Sec. 304. Findings on the evasion of United States export control laws
by the People's Republic of China.
Sec. 305. Findings on the inconsistent application of United States
export control laws to the People's Republic of China and
Hong Kong.
Sec. 306. Exports of supercomputers to the People's Republic of China.
Sec. 307. Dual-use exports to Hong Kong.
Sec. 308. Enforcement of Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act with
respect to the People's Republic of China.
Sec. 309. Transfers of sensitive equipment and technology by the
People's Republic of China.
Sec. 310. Annual reports on activities of the People's Liberation Army.
Sec. 311. Annual reports on intelligence activities of the People's
Republic of China.
Sec. 312. Study of theater ballistic missile defense system for Taiwan.
Sec. 313. Sense of Congress regarding United States force levels in
Asia.
Sec. 314. Sense of Congress regarding establishment of commission on
security and cooperation in Asia.

TITLE IV--TRADE

Sec. 401. Sense of Congress regarding the accession of Taiwan to the
World Trade Organization.

TITLE V--HUMAN RIGHTS AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM WORLDWIDE

Sec. 501. Training for immigration officers regarding religions
persecution.
Sec. 502. Promotion of religious freedom and human rights worldwide.

TITLE VI--OTHER MATTERS

Sec. 601. Termination of United States assistance for East-West Center.

SEC. 2. DECLARATION OF POLICY.

The policy of the United States with respect to the
People's Republic of China is as follows:
(1) To encourage freedom and democracy in the People's
Republic of China and to deter the Government of the People's
Republic of China from engaging in activities that are
contrary to the national security interests of the United
States.
(2) To encourage the Government of the People's Republic of
China to make progress towards improving overall human rights
conditions in China and Tibet, including the taking of
concrete steps to assure freedom of speech, freedom of
religion, and freedom of association in compliance with
international standards on human rights.
(3) To encourage the Government of the People's Republic of
China to channel its emerging power and influence along paths
that are conducive to peace, stability, and development in
the Asian Pacific region.
(4) To preserve and protect the national security interests
of the United States and its allies by--
(A) deterring the proliferation of weapons and sensitive
equipment and technology by the Government of the People's
Republic of China; and
(B) sanctioning companies affiliated with the People's
Liberation Army that engage in the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction, the importation of illegal weapons or
firearms into the United States, or espionage in the United
States.
(5) To support a strong United States presence in and
commitment to the leadership of the Asian Pacific region.
(6) To support integration of the People's Republic of
China into the community of nations.
(7) To limit the use of United States taxpayer funds for
the subsidization of the Government of the People's Republic
of China through such mechanisms as assistance through
multilateral development banks and other United States
Government programs.
TITLE I--SANCTIONS

SEC. 101. DENIAL OF ENTRY INTO UNITED STATES OF CERTAIN
OFFICIALS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

(a) Denial of Entry.--Except as provided in subsection (b),
the Secretary of State may not issue any visa to, and the
Attorney General may not admit to the United States, any of
the following officials of the Government of the People's
Republic of China:
(1) High-ranking officials of the People's Liberation Army,
as determined by the Secretary.
(2) High-ranking officials of the Public Security Bureau,
as so determined.
(3) High-ranking officials of the Religious Affairs Bureau,
as so determined.
(4) Other high-ranking officials determined by the
Secretary to be involved in the implementation or enforcement
of laws and directives of the People's Republic of China
which restrict religious freedom.
(5) High-ranking officials determined by the Secretary to
be involved in the implementation or enforcement of laws and
directives of the People's Republic of China on family
planning.
(6) Officials determined by the Secretary to have been
materially involved in ordering or carrying out the massacre
of students in Tiananmen Square in 1989.
(b) Waiver.--
(1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2), the President
may waive the applicability of subsection (a) with respect to
any official otherwise covered by that subsection if the
President determines that the waiver with respect to the
official is in the interests of the United States.
(2) Notice.--
(A) Requirement.--The President may not exercise the
authority provided in paragraph (1) with respect to an
official unless the President submits to Congress a written
notification of the exercise of the authority before the
entry of the official into the United States.
(B) Contents.--Each notice shall include a justification of
the exercise of the authority, including--
(i) a statement why the exercise of the authority is in the
interests of the United States; and
(ii) a statement why such interests supersede the need for
the United States to deny entry to the official concerned in
response to the practices of the Government of the People's
Republic of China which limit the free exercise of religion
and other human rights.

SEC. 102. LIMITATIONS ON MULTILATERAL ASSISTANCE FOR THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

(a) International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development.--
(1) Opposition to assistance.--
(A) Opposition.--Except as provided in subparagraph (B),
the Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United
States Executive Director of the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development to vote against any loan or
other utilization of the

[[Page S9201]]

funds of the Bank to or for the People's Republic of China.
(B) Exception.--Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to any
loan or other utilization of funds for purposes of--
(i) meeting basic human needs; or
(ii) environmental improvements or safeguards.
(2) Opposition to modification of single country loan
limit.--The Secretary shall instruct the United States
Executive Director of the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development to vote against any
modification of the limitation on the share of the total
funds of the Bank that may be loaned to a single country.
(b) Asian Development Bank.--
(1) Opposition to assistance.--Except as provided in
paragraph (2), the Secretary shall instruct the United States
Director of the Asian Development Bank to vote against any
loan or other utilization of the funds of the Bank to or for
the People's Republic of China.
(2) Exception.--Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any loan
or other utilization of funds for purposes of--
(A) meeting basic human needs; or
(B) environmental improvements or safeguards.
(c) International Monetary Fund.--
(1) Opposition to assistance.--Except as provided in
paragraph (2), the Secretary shall instruct the United States
Executive Director of the International Monetary Fund to vote
against any loan or other utilization of the funds of the
Fund to or for the People's Republic of China.
(2) Exception.--Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any loan
or other utilization of funds for purposes of--
(A) meeting basic human needs; or
(B) environmental improvements or safeguards.
(d) Basic Human Needs Defined.--In this section, the term
``basic human needs'' refers to human needs arising from
natural disasters or famine.

SEC. 103. SANCTIONS REGARDING CHINA NORTH INDUSTRIES GROUP,
CHINA POLY GROUP, AND CERTAIN OTHER ENTITIES
AFFILIATED WITH THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY.

(a) Finding; Purpose.--
(1) Finding.--Congress finds that, in May 1996, United
States authorities caught representatives of the People's
Liberation Army enterprise, China Poly Group, and the
civilian defense industrial company, China North Industries
Group, attempting to smuggle 2,000 AK-47s into Oakland,
California, and offering to sell to Federal undercover agents
300,000 machine guns with silencers, 66-millimeter mortars,
hand grenades, and ``Red Parakeet'' surface-to-air missiles,
which, as stated in the criminal complaint against one of
those representatives, ``. . . could take out a 747''
aircraft.
(2) Purpose.--The purpose of this section is to impose
targeted sanctions against entities affiliated with the
People's Liberation Army that engage in the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, the importation of illegal
weapons or firearms into the United States, or espionage in
the United States.
(b) Sanctions Against Certain PLA Affiliates.--
(1) Sanctions.--Except as provided in paragraph (2) and
subject to paragraph (3), the President shall--
(A) prohibit the importation into the United States of all
products that are produced, grown, or manufactured by a
covered entity, the parent company of a covered entity, or
any affiliate, subsidiary, or successor entity of a covered
entity;
(B) direct the Secretary of State and the Attorney General
to deny or impose restrictions on the entry into the United
States of any foreign national serving as an officer,
director, or employee of a covered entity or other entity
described in subparagraph (A);
(C) prohibit the issuance to a covered entity or other
entity described in subparagraph (A) of licenses in
connection with the export of any item on the United States
Munitions List;
(D) prohibit the export to a covered entity or other entity
described in subparagraph (A) of any goods or technology on
which export controls are in effect under section 5 or 6 of
the Export Administration Act of 1979;
(E) direct the Export-Import Bank of the United States not
to give approval to the issuance of any guarantee, insurance,
extension of credit, or participation in the extension of
credit with respect to a covered entity or other entity
described in subparagraph (A);
(F) prohibit United States nationals from directly or
indirectly issuing any guarantee for any loan or other
investment to, issuing any extension of credit to, or making
any investment in a covered entity or other entity described
in subparagraph (A); and
(G) prohibit the departments and agencies of the United
States and United States nationals from entering into any
contract with a covered entity or other entity described in
subparagraph (A) for the procurement or other provision of
goods or services from such entity.
(2) Exceptions.--
(A) In general.--The President shall not impose sanctions
under this subsection--
(i) in the case of the procurement of defense articles or
defense services--

(I) under contracts or subcontracts that are in effect on
October 1, 1997 (including the exercise of options for
production quantities to satisfy United States operational
military requirements);
(II) if the President determines that the person or entity
to whom the sanctions would otherwise be applied is a sole
source supplier of essential defense articles or services and
no alternative supplier can be identified; or
(III) if the President determines that such articles or
services are essential to the national security; or

(ii) in the case of--

(I) products or services provided under contracts or
binding agreements (as such terms are defined by the
President in regulations) or joint ventures entered into
before October 1, 1997;
(II) spare parts;
(III) component parts that are not finished products but
are essential to United States products or production;
(IV) routine servicing and maintenance of products; or
(V) information and technology products and services.

(B) Immigration restrictions.--The President shall not
apply the restrictions described in paragraph (1)(B) to a
person described in that paragraph if the President, after
consultation with the Attorney General, determines that the
presence of the person in the United States is necessary for
a Federal or State judicial proceeding against a covered
entity or other entity described in paragraph (1)(A).
(3) Termination.--The sanctions under this subsection shall
terminate as follows:
(A) In the case of an entity referred to in paragraph (1)
or (2) of subsection (c), on the date that is one year after
the date of enactment of this Act.
(B) In the case of an entity that becomes a covered entity
under paragraph (3) or (4) of subsection (c) by reason of its
identification in a report under subsection (d), on the date
that is one year after the date on which the entity is
identified in such report.
(c) Covered Entities.--For purposes of subsection (b), a
covered entity is any of the following:
(1) China North Industries Group.
(2) China Poly Group, also known as Polytechnologies
Incorporated or BAOLI.
(3) Any affiliate of the People's Liberation Army
identified in a report of the Director of Central
Intelligence under subsection (d)(1).
(4) Any affiliate of the People's Liberation Army
identified in a report of the Director of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation under subsection (d)(2).
(d) Reports on Activities of PLA Affiliates.--
(1) Transfers of sensitive items and technologies.--Not
later than 30 days after the date of enactment of this Act
and annually thereafter through 2002, the Director of Central
Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate members Congress
a report that identifies each entity owned wholly or in part
by the People's Liberation Army which, during the 2-year
period ending on the date of the report, transferred to any
other entity a controlled item for use in the following:
(A) Any item listed in category I or category II of the
MTCR Annex.
(B) Activities to develop, produce, stockpile, or deliver
chemical or biological weapons.
(C) Nuclear activities in countries that do not maintain
full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards or
equivalent full-scope safeguards.
(2) Illegal activities in the united states.--Not later
than 30 days after the date of enactment of this Act and
annually thereafter through 2002, the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation shall submit to the appropriate
members Congress a report that identifies each entity owned
wholly or in part by the People's Liberation Army which,
during the 2-year period ending on the date of the report,
attempted to--
(A) illegally import weapons or firearms into the United
States; or
(B) engage in military intelligence collection or espionage
in the United States under the cover of commercial business
activity.
(3) Form.--Each report under this subsection shall be
submitted in classified form.
(e) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Affiliate.--The term ``affiliate'' does not include any
United States national engaged in a business arrangement with
a covered entity or other entity described in subsection
(b)(1)(A).
(2) Appropriate members of congress.--The term
``appropriate members of congress'' means the following:
(A) The Majority leader and Minority leader of the Senate.
(B) The chairmen and ranking members of the Committee on
Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the
Senate.
(C) The Speaker and Minority leader of the House of
Representatives.
(D) The chairmen and ranking members of the Committee on
International Relations and the Committee on National
Security of the House of Representatives.
(3) Component part.--The term ``component part'' means any
article that is not usable for its intended function without
being embedded or integrated into any other product and, if
used in the production of a finished product, would be
substantially transformed in that process.
(4) Controlled item.--The term ``controlled item'' means
the following:
(A) Any item listed in the MTCR Annex.
(B) Any item listed for control by the Australia Group.
(C) Any item relevant to the nuclear fuel cycle of nuclear
explosive applications that

[[Page S9202]]

are listed for control by the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
(5) Finished product.--The term ``finished product'' means
any article that is usable for its intended function without
being embedded in or integrated into any other product, but
does not include an article produced by a person or entity
other than a covered entity or other entity described in
subsection (b)(1)(A) that contains parts or components of
such an entity if the parts or components have been
substantially transformed during production of the finished
product.
(6) Investment.--The term ``investment'' includes any
contribution or commitment of funds, commodities, services,
patents, processes, or techniques, in the form of--
(A) a loan or loans;
(B) the purchase of a share of ownership;
(C) participation in royalties, earnings, or profits; and
(D) the furnishing of commodities or services pursuant to a
lease or other contract,

but does not include routine maintenance of property.
(7) MTCR annex.--The term ``MTCR Annex'' has the meaning
given that term in section 74(4) of the Arms Export Control
Act (22 U.S.C. 2797c(4)).
(8) United states national.--
(A) In general.--The term ``United States national''
means--
(i) any United States citizen; and
(ii) any corporation, partnership, or other organization
created under the laws of the United States, any State, the
District of Columbia, or any territory or possession of the
United States.
(B) Exception.--The term ``United States national'' does
not include a subsidiary or affiliate of corporation,
partnership, or organization that is a United States national
if the subsidiary or affiliate is located outside the United
States.

SEC. 104. CONSULTATIONS WITH ALLIES REGARDING SANCTIONS
AGAINST THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
the President should begin consultations with the major
allies and other trading partners of the United States in
order to encourage such allies and trading partners to adopt
sanctions against the People's Republic of China that are
similar to the sanctions imposed on the People's Republic of
China by section 102.
(b) Report.--Not later than 45 days after the completion of
the first Group of Seven summit meeting after the date of
enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress
a report on the results, if any, of consultations referred to
in subsection (a).

SEC. 105. TERMINATION OF CERTAIN AUTHORITIES.

(a) Termination Date.--Sections 101 and 102 shall cease to
apply at the end of the five-year period beginning on the
date of enactment of this Act.
(b) Sense of Congress on Review.--It is the sense of
Congress that Congress should review the desirability of
terminating the sanctions in this title before the date on
which the sanctions would otherwise terminate under this
title upon the occurrence of any of the following events:
(1) The admission of the People's Republic of China into
the World Trade Organization on commercially viable terms.
(2) A determination by the President that the Government of
the People's Republic of China is implementing fully all
applicable international agreements relating to the
proliferation of arms.
(3) A determination by the President that the Government of
the People's Republic of China is actively and effectively
combatting all forms of religious persecution in China.
(4) A determination by the President that the Government of
the People's Republic of China is reevaluating in a
meaningful manner its actions regarding the massacre of
students in Tiananmen Square in 1989.
(5) The publication by the Government of the People's
Republic of China of a report on the national security
strategy of that government which includes a comprehensive
description and discussion of the elements of that strategy
similar to the description and discussion of the national
security strategy of the United States in the annual report
required by section 108 of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 404a).
(6) A determination by the President that the Government of
the People's Republic of China has taken meaningful actions
toward improving overall human rights conditions in China and
Tibet, including the release of political prisoners,
improving prison conditions, providing prisoners with
adequate medical care, and full compliance with any
international human rights accords to which that government
is a signatory.
TITLE II--HUMAN RIGHTS, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, AND DEMOCRACY IN CHINA

SEC. 201. FINDINGS ON HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

Congress makes the following findings regarding human
rights abuses in the People's Republic of China:
(1) Congress concurs in the following conclusions of the
Department of State regarding human rights in the People's
Republic of China in 1996:
(A) The People's Republic of China is ``an authoritarian
state'' in which ``citizens lack the freedom to peacefully
express opposition to the party-led political system and the
right to change their national leaders or form of
government''.
(B) The Government of the People's Republic of China has
``continued to commit widespread and well documented human
rights abuses, in violation of internationally accepted
norms, stemming from the authorities' intolerance of dissent,
fear of unrest, and the absence or inadequacy of laws
protecting basic freedoms''.
(C) ``Abuses include torture and mistreatment of prisoners,
forced confessions, and arbitrary and incommunicado
detention''.
(D) ``Prison conditions remained harsh [and] [t]he
Government continued severe restrictions on freedom of
speech, the press, assembly, association, religion, privacy,
and worker rights''.
(E) ``Although the Government denies that it holds
political prisoners, the number of persons detained or
serving sentences for `counterrevolutionary crimes' or
`crimes against the state' and for peaceful political or
religious activities are believed to number in the
thousands''.
(F) ``Non-approved religious groups, including Protestant
and Catholic groups . . . experienced intensified
repression''.
(G) ``Serious human rights abuses persist in minority
areas, including Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia [, and]
[c]ontrols on religion and other fundamental freedoms in
these areas have also intensified''.
(H) ``Overall in 1996, the authorities stepped up efforts
to cut off expressions of protest or criticism. All public
dissent against the party and government was effectively
silenced by intimidation, exile, the imposition of prison
terms, administrative detention, or house arrest. No
dissidents were known to be active at year's end.''.
(2) People's Republic of China authorities continue to hold
Wei Jingsheng in prison for his prodemocracy beliefs, and he
is suffering in prison from a lack of medical attention and
beatings by fellow prisoners.
(3) On October 30, 1996, a People's Republic of China court
sentenced Wang Dan to 11 years in prison primarily for
articles published outside the People's Republic of China,
and People's Republic of China authorities are not providing
him with adequate medical care.
(4) In addition to Wei Jingsheng and Wang Dan, hundreds, if
not thousands, of other political, religious, and labor
dissidents are imprisoned in China for peacefully expressing
their beliefs and exercising their internationally recognized
rights of free association and expression.
(5) Labor activist Liu Nianchun, severely ill in a labor
camp, has not only been denied medical treatment but has been
tortured with electric batons and has had his 3 year
reeducation-through-labor sentence in prison arbitrarily
extended by 216 days.
(6) Li Hai was charged with prying into and gathering state
secrets and subsequently sentenced to a 9-year term in prison
on December 18, 1996, for going door-to-door to collect the
names, ages, family situations, alleged crimes, lengths of
prison sentences, locations of imprisonment, and treatment
while imprisoned of people sentenced to prison for their
activities during the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests.
(7) Gao Yu, serving a 6-year term in prison on charges of
``leaking state secrets'' despite the fact that the
information in question was already common knowledge, has
been denied medical parole and adequate medical care despite
life threatening illness and was vilified by People's
Republic of China authorities after she was awarded the
UNESCO Guillemo Cano World Press Freedom Prize.
(8) People's Republic of China companies still export
prison labor products to the United States. Since 1991, the
United States Customs Service has issued 27 detention orders
banning the importation of goods suspected to be products of
prison labor in China, including hand tools, artificial
flowers, Christmas tree lights, and diesel engines.
(9) The People's Republic of China has not fully complied
with the 1992 Memorandum of Understanding on Prison Labor,
and People's Republic of China authorities often wait several
years before granting requests by United States Customs
Service officials to inspect prison facilities in China. In
1996, such authorities granted just one of eight outstanding
requests by such officials to inspect prison facilities in
China.
(10) Under current law, People's Republic of China
authorities may administratively sentence China citizens to 3
years of labor reform without trial.
(11) The People's Republic of China restricts the access of
its citizens to the Internet and blocks web sites operated by
foreign news organizations and human rights organizations.
(12) The Government of the People's Republic of China
prohibits independent labor unions, and workers who attempt
to form unions without state approval are given severe prison
sentences as shown in the treatment of Zhang Jingsheng, a
labor leader in Hunan province who was arrested following the
1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre and sentenced to 13 years in
prison for organizing workers.

SEC. 202. FINDINGS ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

Congress makes the following findings regarding religious
freedom in the People's Republic of China:
(1) The Government of the People's Republic of China
restricts the ability of religious adherents, including
Christians, Buddhists, Muslims, and others, to practice
outside of state-approved religious organizations, and

[[Page S9203]]

detains worshipers and clergy who participate in religious
services conducted outside state-approved religious
organizations, as well as those who refuse to register with
the authorities as required.
(2) Bishop Zeng Jingmu, 76 years old, detained for the
third time in 7 months and in poor health from pneumonia, is
serving a reeducation through labor term for organizing
religious assemblies and masses not sanctioned by the
official Chinese Catholic Church.
(3) On January 31, 1994, Premier Li Peng signed decrees
number 144 and 145 which restrict worship, religious
education, distribution of Bibles and others religious
literature, and contact with foreign coreligionists.
(4) The Government of the People's Republic of China has
created official religious organizations that control all
religious worship, activity, and association in China and
Tibet and supplant the independent authority of the Roman
Catholic Church, independent Protestant churches, and
independent Buddhist, Taoist, and Islamic associations.
(5) In July 1995, Ye Xiaowen, a rigid communist hostile to
religion, was appointed to head the Bureau of Religious
Affairs, a government agency of the People's Republic of
China that is controlled by the United Front Work Department
of the Chinese Communist Party. The Bureau of Religious
Affairs has administrative control over all religious worship
and activity in China and Tibet through a system of granting
or denying rights through an official registration system.
Those who fail to or are not allowed to register are subject
to punitive measures.
(6) Unofficial Christian and Catholic communities were
targeted by the Government of the People's Republic of China
during 1996. A renewed campaign aimed at forcing all churches
to register or face dissolution resulted in beating and
harassment of congregants, closure of churches, and numerous
arrests, fines, and sentences. In Shanghai, for example, more
than 300 house churches or meeting points were closed down by
the security authorities in April alone.

SEC. 203. FINDINGS ON TIBET.

Congress makes the following findings regarding Tibet:
(1) The Department of State China Country Report on Human
Rights Practices for 1996 states: ``Chinese government
authorities continued to commit widespread human rights
abuses in Tibet, including instances of death in detention,
torture, arbitrary arrest, detention without public trial,
long detention of Tibetan nationalists for peacefully
expressing their religious and political views, and
intensified controls on religion and on freedom of speech and
the press, particularly for ethnic Tibetans.''.
(2) The report also cites three instances in which Tibetan
Buddhist monks died in prison in the People's Republic of
China in 1996.
(3) Many victims of the brutality committed by the People's
Armed Police and the Public Security Bureau of the People's
Republic of China have been young Tibetan Buddhist nuns and
monks.
(4) Between June 1994 and May 1995, three Tibetan nuns--15-
year-old Sherab Ngawang, 24-year-old Gyaltsen Kelsang, and
20-year-old Phuntsok Yangkyi--died as a result of torture in
prison in Tibet.
(5) On March 11, 1997, the Senate adopted a resolution
calling for the release by the Government of the People's
Republic of China of Tibetan ethnomusicologist and Fulbright
Scholar Ngawang Choephel, who was sentenced to 18 years in
prison in the People's Republic of China in December 1996,
and of other Tibetans who are prisoners in the People's
Republic of China for reasons of conscience.
(6) In May 1995, authorities of the Government of the
People's Republic of China detained Gedhun Choekyi Nyima,
then 6 years old, and his parents, just days after the boy
was recognized by the Dalai Lama as the 11th Panchen Lama,
and authorities of that government continue to hold him and
his family.
(7) In May 1997, the Government of the People's Republic of
China announced the sentencing of Chadrel Rinpoche, the head
of the search committee for the 11th Panchen Lama, to 6 years
in prison.
(8) In April 1996, authorities of the Government of the
People's Republic of China banned the display of photographs
of the Dalai Lama, even in private homes, and the decision
led to demonstrations in Ganden monastery during which 90
monks were arrested and 1 monk was shot to death by security
forces of that government.

SEC. 204. FINDINGS ON COERCIVE FAMILY PLANNING PRACTICES IN
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

Congress makes the following findings regarding family
planning practices in the People's Republic of China:
(1) For more than 15 years there have been frequent and
credible reports of forced abortion and forced sterilization
in connection with the coercive population control practices
of the People's Republic of China.
(2) Forced abortion was rightly denounced as a crime
against humanity by the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal.
(3) Although it is the stated position of the politburo of
the Chinese Communist Party that forced abortion and forced
sterilization have no role in the population control program
of the Government of the People's Republic of China, the
policy of that government seems to encourage both forced
abortion and forced sterilization through a combination of
strictly enforced birth quotas and impunity for local
population control officials who engage in coercion.
Officials acknowledge that there have been instances of
forced abortions and sterilization, yet there is no evidence
that the perpetrators of such acts have been punished.
(4) The People's Republic of China population control
officials, in cooperation with employers and works unit
officials, monitor women's menstrual cycles and subject women
who conceive without government authorization to extreme
psychological pressure, to harsh economic sanctions
(including unpayable fines and loss of employment), and to
physical force.
(5) Official sanctions for giving birth to unauthorized
children include fines in amounts several times larger than
the per capita annual incomes of residents of the People's
Republic of China. In Fujian, for example, the average fine
is estimated to be twice a family's gross annual income.
Families who cannot pay the fine have had their homes and
personal property confiscated and destroyed.
(6) Especially harsh punishments have been inflicted on
those whose resistance to such policies is motivated by
religion. For example, according to a 1995 Amnesty
International report, the Catholic inhabitants of two
villages in Hebei Province were subjected to population
control under the slogan ``better to have more graves than
one more child''. Enforcement measures included torture,
sexual abuse, and the detention of resisters' relatives as
hostages.
(7) Forced abortions in the People's Republic of China
often take place in the very late stages of pregnancy, or
even during the process of birth itself.

SEC. 205. COMBATING SLAVE LABOR AND ``REEDUCATION'' CENTERS.

(a) Authorizations for Appropriations for Additional
Monitoring of Exportation of Slave Labor Products.--There are
authorized to be appropriated $2,000,000 for fiscal year 1998
and $2,000,000 for fiscal year 1999 for monitoring by the
United States Customs Service and the Department of State of
the export by the People's Republic of China to the United
States of products which may be made with slave labor in
violation of section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C.
1307) or section 1761 of title 18, United States Code.
(b) Reports on Exportation of Products Made With Slave
Labor.--
(1) Reports.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the
Commissioner of Customs and the Secretary of State shall each
submit to the Members of Congress referred to in subparagraph
(B) a report on the manufacturing and exportation of products
made with slave labor in the People's Republic of China
during the one-year period ending on the date of the report.
Each report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may
include a classified annex.
(B) Members of congress.--Reports under subparagraph (A)
shall be submitted to the following Members of Congress:
(i) The Majority leader and Minority leader of the Senate.
(ii) The chairman and ranking member of the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate.
(iii) The Speaker and Minority leader of the House of
Representatives.
(iv) The chairman and ranking member of the Committee on
International Relations of the House of Representatives.
(2) Contents of reports.--Each report under paragraph (1)
shall include information concerning the following:
(A) The extent of the use of slave labor in manufacturing
products for exportation by the People's Republic of China,
as well as the volume of exports of such slave labor products
by that country.
(B) The progress of the United States Government--
(i) in identifying products made with slave labor in the
People's Republic of China that are destined for the United
States market in violation of section 307 of the Tariff Act
of 1930 or section 1761 of title 18, United States Code; and
(ii) in stemming the importation of such products.
(c) Renegotiation of Memorandum of Understanding on Prison
Labor With the People's Republic of China.--It is the sense
of Congress that, since the People's Republic of China has
substantially frustrated the purposes of the 1992 Memorandum
of Understanding with the United States on Prison Labor, the
President should immediately commence negotiations to replace
the memorandum of understanding with one providing for
effective monitoring of forced labor in the People's Republic
of China, without restrictions on which prison labor camps
international monitors may visit.

SEC. 206. INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING TO CHINA.

(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--In addition to such
sums as are otherwise authorized to be appropriated for
``International Broadcasting Activities'' for fiscal year
1998, there is authorized to be appropriated for
``International Broadcasting Activities'' for that fiscal
year $5,000,000, which shall be available only for
broadcasting by Radio Free Asia and the Voice of America to
the People's Republic of China.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
United States international broadcasting through Radio Free
Asia and Voice of America should be increased to provide
continuous 24-hour broadcasting in Chinese and Tibetan
dialects which include Mandarin Chinese, Tibetan, and at
least one other dialect.

[[Page S9204]]

SEC. 207. NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY.

In addition to such sums as are otherwise authorized to be
appropriated for fiscal year 1998 for grants to the National
Endowment for Democracy, there is authorized to be
appropriated for that fiscal year $2,000,000 for grants to
the Endowment which shall be available only for purposes of
programs relating to the People's Republic of China.

SEC. 208. UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY STUDENT, CULTURAL,
AND LEGISLATIVE EXCHANGE PROGRAMS.

In addition to such sums as are otherwise authorized to be
appropriated to the United States Information Agency for
fiscal year 1998, there is authorized to be appropriated for
the Agency for that fiscal year $2,000,000, which shall be
available only for the purposes of student, cultural, and
legislative exchange activities in or with the People's
Republic of China.

SEC. 209. ANNUAL REPORTS ON FAMILY PLANNING ACTIVITIES IN THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA BY RECIPIENTS OF
UNITED STATES FUNDS.

(a) Annual Reports.--
(1) Requirement.--Not later than January 15 each year, the
Secretary of State shall submit to Congress a report that
describes the family planning activities in the People's
Republic of China during the preceding year of each covered
family planning organization that carried out such activities
in the People's Republic of China during that year.
(2) Additional information.--Each report under paragraph
(1) shall include the filing submitted to the Secretary for
purposes of such report by each covered family planning
organization whose activities are covered by such report.
(b) Covered Family Planning Organization Defined.--In this
section, the term ``covered family planning organization''
means any for-profit or non-profit entity that receives
United States funds to conduct family planning activities
abroad.

SEC. 210. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING MULTILATERAL EFFORTS TO
ADDRESS CHINA'S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD.

(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) On April 15, 1997, members of the United Nations Human
Rights Commission voted 27-17 to block a resolution,
sponsored by Denmark, critical of the human rights record of
the Government of the People's Republic of China.
(2) The United States Government failed to vigorously lobby
other nations to support the resolution in a timely and
effective manner, and France, Canada, Germany, Italy, Spain,
Australia, and Japan did not cosponsor the resolution.
(3) In response to support for the resolution by Denmark
and the Netherlands, the Government of the People's Republic
of China has adopted punitive measures against Denmark and
Netherlands businesses--including the denial of contracts to
Netherlands companies and undue delays in authorizing
expansion plans by the Denmark shipping line Maersk--thereby
linking human rights and trade.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the United States Government should greatly increase
efforts in the United Nations Human Rights Commission and
other international fora to draw attention to and condemn the
gross violations of international standards on human rights
by the Government of the People's Republic of China;
(2) the President should vigorously lobby other countries
for passage of future Commission resolutions on the human
rights record of the Government of the People's Republic of
China; and
(3) such lobbying should begin not later than 6 months
before the commencement of the next annual meeting of the
Commission.

SEC. 211. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING COMPLIANCE BY THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA WITH THE JOINT
DECLARATION ON HONG KONG.

(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The People's Republic of China resumed sovereignty over
Hong Kong on July 1, 1997.
(2) In the Joint Declaration, a legally binding document in
all its parts and the highest form of commitment between
sovereign states, the People's Republic of China pledged that
after its resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong ``[t]he
current social and economic systems in Hong Kong will remain
unchanged, and so will the life-style. Rights and freedoms,
including those of the person, of speech, of the press, of
association, of travel, of movement, of correspondence, of
strike, of choice of occupation, of academic research and
religious belief will be ensured by law in the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region''.
(3) The People's Republic of China further pledged in the
Joint Declaration that the policies of the ``. . . Joint
Declaration will be stipulated in a Basic Law of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic
of China, by the National People's Congress of the People's
Republic of China, and they will remain unchanged for 50
years''.
(4) The Basic Law prescribes the systems to be practiced in
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region after the
resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong by the People's
Republic of China.
(5) According to Article 2 of the Basic Law: ``The National
People's Congress authorizes the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region to exercise a high degree of autonomy
and enjoy executive, legislative and independent judicial
power, including that of final adjudication''.
(6) According to Article 5 of the Basic Law: ``The
socialist system and policies (of the People's Republic of
China) shall not be practiced in the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, and the previous capitalist system and
way of life shall remain unchanged for 50 years''.
(7) According to Article 27 of the Basic Law: ``Hong Kong
residents shall have freedom of speech, of the press and
publication; freedom of association, of assembly, of
procession and of demonstration; and the right and freedom to
form and join trade unions, and to strike''.
(8) According to Article 32 of the Basic Law: ``Hong Kong
residents shall have freedom of religious belief and freedom
to preach and to conduct and participate in religious
activities in public''.
(9) According to Article 34 of the Basic Law: ``Hong Kong
residents shall have freedom to engage in academic research,
literary and artistic creation, and other cultural
activities''.
(10) According to Article 39 of the Basic Law: ``The
provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, and international labour
conventions as applied to Hong Kong shall remain in force and
shall be implemented through the laws of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region''.
(11) President Jiang Zemin of the People's Republic of
China, in his statement of July 1, 1997, at the ceremony in
Hong Kong marking the establishment of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, said that ``. . . Hong Kong will enjoy
a high degree of autonomy as provided for by the Basic Law,
which includes the executive, legislative and independent
judicial power, including that of final adjudication''.
(12) President Jiang further said that the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region has the ``ultimate aim of
electing the Chief Executive and the Legislative Council by
universal suffrage''.
(13) President Jiang further said that ``[n]o central
department or locality (of the People's Republic of China)
may or will be allowed to interfere in the affairs which,
under the Basic Law, should be administered by the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region on its own''.
(14) President Jiang further said that ``the provisions of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, and international covenants as applied to Hong Kong
shall remain in force to be implemented through the laws of
Hong Kong's regional legislation''.
(15) President Jiang further said that adherence to these
principles ``serves Hong Kong, serves the (People's Republic
of China) and serves the entire nation as well. Therefore
there is no reason whatsoever to change them. Here I want to
reaffirm that `one country, two systems, Hong Kong
administering Hong Kong' and `a high degree of autonomy' will
remain unchanged for 50 years''.
(16) President Jiang, in another statement of July 1, 1997,
at a rally in Beijing marking the establishment of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region, said that the People's
Republic of China ``will unswervingly carry out the
principles of `one country, two systems', `Hong Kong people
administering Hong Kong' and `high degree of autonomy', and
make sure that the previous socio-economic system and way of
life of Hong Kong remain unchanged and that laws previously
in force will remain basically unchanged. We will firmly
support the Hong Kong SAR in its exercise of the functions
and powers bestowed on it by the Basic Law and the Hong Kong
SAR Government in its administration in accordance with
law.''.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the statements of President Jiang Zemin of the People's
Republic of China constitute a welcome reaffirmation of the
obligations of the People's Republic of China under the Joint
Declaration to ensure that Hong Kong remains autonomous, the
human rights of the people of Hong Kong remain protected, and
the government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
is elected democratically; and
(2) the fulfillment by the People's Republic of China of
the obligations under the terms of the Joint Declaration and
the Basic Law constitutes a crucial test of Beijing's ability
to play a responsible global role.
(c) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Basic Law.--The term ``Basic Law'' means the Basic Law
of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the
People's Republic of China, as adopted on April 4, 1990, by
the Seventh National People's Congress of the People's
Republic of China.
(2) Joint declaration.--The term ``Joint Declaration''
means the Joint Declaration of the Government of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the
Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question
of Hong Kong, done at Beijing on December 19, 1984.
TITLE III--NATIONAL SECURITY MATTERS

SEC. 301. FINDINGS ON THE PROLIFERATION OF BALLISTIC MISSILES
BY THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

Congress makes the following findings regarding the
proliferation of ballistic missiles by the People's Republic
of China:

[[Page S9205]]

(1) In December 1992, the Government of the People's
Republic of China violated the Arms Export Control Act and
the Export Administration Act of 1979 with the transfer by
the Ministry of Aerospace Industry of approximately 24 M-11
missiles to Sargodha Air Force Base in Pakistan.
(2) From September 1994 to June 1996, the Government of the
People's Republic of China again violated the Arms Export
Control Act and the Export Administration Act of 1979 with
the transfer by the Ministry of Aerospace Industry of as many
as 30 M-11 ballistic missiles to Sargodha Air Force Base.
(3) In June 1995, the Government of the People's Republic
of China violated the Arms Export Control Act and the Export
Administration Act of 1979 with the transfer by the Chinese
Aerospace Corporation to Iran of possibly hundreds of missile
guidance systems and computerized machine tools for the
production of ballistic missiles.
(4) In August 1996, the Government of the People's Republic
of China violated the Arms Export Control Act and the Export
Administration Act of 1979 with the transfer to Pakistan of
factory plans and equipment capable of constructing a
ballistic missile factory.
(5) In August 1996, the Government of the People's Republic
of China violated the Arms Export Control Act, the Export
Administration Act of 1979, and the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-
Proliferation Act of 1992 with the transfer by the China
Precision Engineering Institute to Iran's Defense Industries
of gyroscopes, accelerometers, and test equipment for the
construction and test of ballistic missile guidance systems.
(6) It has been reported that the Central Intelligence
Agency discovered a shipment by the People's Republic of
China to the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center, a
Syria Government agency that oversees missile development, of
guidance equipment for M-11 ballistic missiles. This alleged
shipment would be a violation of the Missile Technology
Control Regime. This alleged shipment would have taken place
after the limited sanctions imposed by the United States on
the People's Republic of China for shipments of M-11 missiles
and components to Pakistan had been lifted following the
assurances of the Government of the People's Republic of
China that it would comply with the Missile Technology
Control Regime.
(7) After each of these violations, the President either
failed to take appropriate actions to deter future violations
of such Acts and the Regime, took the least onerous action
against the Government of the People's Republic of China that
was possible under such Acts and the Regime, or rescinded
previous actions thereby diluting or eliminating the
deterrent effect of sanctions under such Acts and the Regime
with respect to the Government of the People's Republic of
China.
(8) This inaction forces Congress to take affirmative
action in the bilateral relations between the United States
and the People's Republic of China in order to respond
sufficiently to these violations of United States law.

SEC. 302. FINDINGS ON THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION BY THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

Congress makes the following findings regarding the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by the People's
Republic of China:
(1) In January 1996, the Government of the People's
Republic of China violated the Arms Export Control Act, the
Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994, and the Export-
Import Bank Act of 1945 with the transfer by the China
Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation to the Abdul Qadeer Khan
Research Laboratory in Kahuta, Pakistan, of as many as 5,000
ring-magnets for the extraction of enriched uranium for the
potential use in nuclear weapons.
(2) In September 1996, the Government of the People's
Republic of China violated the Arms Export Control Act, the
Export Administration Act of 1979, and the Nuclear
Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 with the transfer by the
China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation to a nuclear
reactor facility in Khushab, Pakistan, of an industrial
furnace and special diagnostic equipment capable of
converting plutonium and uranium to weapons grade material.
(3) In March 1996, the Government of the People's Republic
of China violated the Arms Export Control Act, the Export
Administration Act of 1979, the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-
Proliferation Act of 1992, and Executive Order 12938 with the
transfer by the Jiangsu Corporation to Iran organizations
affiliated with the Iranian Defense Industries Organization
and the Revolutionary Guards of virtually complete chemical
weapons production facilities.
(4) After each of these violations, the President either
failed to take any action to deter future violations of such
Acts or took such trifling action as to have no meaning or
effect on the future proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction by the People's Republic of China.
(5) This inaction forces Congress to take affirmative
action in the bilateral relations between the People's
Republic of China and the United States in order to respond
sufficiently to these violations of United States law.

SEC. 303. FINDINGS ON THE PROLIFERATION OF DESTABILIZING
ADVANCED CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS BY THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

Congress makes the following findings regarding the
proliferation of destabilizing advanced conventional weapons
by the People's Republic of China:
(1) In January 1996, the Government of the People's
Republic of China violated the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-
Proliferation Act of 1992 with the transfer by the Chinese
Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation to the Iran
military of 60 C-802 advanced anti-ship missiles and 20
Houdong fast-attack patrol craft, 15 of which were equipped
with C-802 missiles.
(2) In test firings of this missile from land-based
batteries and from naval vessels, and test firings of a
similar missile from fighter aircraft, the Iran Government
claimed direct hits on the intended targets. This operational
ability restores an anti-surface warfare capability lost by
the Iran military during the Iran-Iraq War.
(3) The Commander of the United States Fifth Fleet
commented that these missiles represented a new dimension to
the threat faced by the United States Navy, stating ``[i]t
used to be we just had to worry about land-based cruise
missiles. Now [the Iranians] have the potential to have that
throughout the [Persian] Gulf mounted on ships.''.
(4) It was reported in numerous press sources that the
Department of Defense found these transfers destabilizing,
and pressed for the imposition of sanctions under the Iran-
Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 but that the
Department of State did not wish to impose such sanctions for
fear of damaging bilateral relations between the People's
Republic of China and the United States.
(5) The Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 does
not differentiate between transfers of destabilizing weapons
that will and will not damage bilateral relations. Any
determination of whether to impose sanctions on the People's
Republic of China for this transfer should have been made
strictly on the basis whether this transfer was or was not
destabilizing.
(6) In light of these reports, it is likely that sanctions
would have been imposed if the Clinton Administration had
been more concerned with the stability of the region and the
security of United States troops than with the maintenance of
cordial relations between the People's Republic of China and
the United States.
(7) This inaction forces Congress to take affirmative
action in the bilateral relations between the People's
Republic of China and the United States in order to respond
sufficiently to this violation of United States law.

SEC. 304. FINDINGS ON THE EVASION OF UNITED STATES EXPORT
CONTROL LAWS BY THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

Congress makes the following findings regarding the evasion
of United States export control laws by the People's Republic
of China:
(1) On November 14, 1994, the President issued Executive
Order 12938, relating to the emergency regarding weapons of
mass destruction, declaring that the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction and the means of delivering them
constitute ``an unusual and extraordinary threat to the
national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United
States'' and that he had therefore decided to ``declare a
national emergency to deal with that threat''.
(2) The President reaffirmed Executive Order 12938 on
November 15, 1995, and again on November 11, 1996.
(3) The Director of Central Intelligence stated in the
report entitled ``The Acquisition of Technology Relating to
Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional
Munitions'' that, from July to December 1996, ``China was the
most significant supplier of W[eapons of] M[ass]
D[estruction]-related goods and technology to foreign
countries.''.
(4) United States supercomputers are the computer of choice
for the nuclear weapons agencies of the People's Republic of
China as highlighted by the comments of the Chinese Academy
of Sciences, an agency known to work on nuclear weapons
development, that its United States-built supercomputer
provides the Academy with ``computational power previously
unknown'' and is available to ``all the major scientific and
technological institutes across China''.
(5) The People's Republic of China has consistently
provided technical and scientific assistance for the
development of nuclear weapons to both Iran and Pakistan, and
it is illogical to believe that such assistance would not
also include computational assistance if needed.
(6) According to the Under Secretary of Commerce for Export
Administration, 47 United States high-performance
supercomputers were exported to the People's Republic of
China between January 1996 and March 1997. Press reports
indicate United States intelligence sources consider the
actual number of such supercomputers exported to the People's
Republic of China during that period to have been in the
hundreds.
(7) Current United States export regulations require an
export license for shipments of supercomputers to the
People's Republic of China only if the end-use will be
militarily related. However, the determination of that end-
use is left to the exporter, thereby providing an incentive
for inadequate investigations of the end-use of
supercomputers exported to the People's Republic of China.

[[Page S9206]]

(8) The Department of Commerce has initiated investigations
of United States supercomputer manufacturers who, as last as
June 1996, allegedly sold supercomputers to the Chinese
Academy of Sciences, which also administers research in
nuclear weapons and missiles, in violation of existing United
States export control regulations relating to supercomputers.
(9) On 14 July 1997, the ``China Daily'', the newspaper of
the Government of the People's Republic of China, stated that
``China will open up its defense sector to foreign
investors'' by ``strengthening international military-related
electronic technology exchanges'' and that ``China's defense-
related electronics should no longer be hidden from foreign
investors''.
(10) It was exactly this concern of diversion to military
end-use and to third nation proliferators that prompted the
President, on June 16, 1997, to tighten export controls for
supercomputers so as to address the concern of ``[t]he
potential diversion to military use of technology acquired''
through experience developed in operating supercomputers and
customizing software and the concern that ``the People's
Republic of China may transfer advanced-weapons related
technology to other countries, as in the case of ballistic
missile transfers''.
(11) Throughout this period, the President has consistently
acted in a manner so as to loosen controls on the export of
supercomputers from the United States and thereby make it
easier for the Government of the People's Republic of China
to divert United States supercomputers to military end-uses
and to assist in the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction.
(12) This inaction forces Congress to take affirmative
action in the bilateral relations between the People's
Republic of China and the United States in order to respond
sufficiently to these violations of United States law.

SEC. 305. FINDINGS ON THE INCONSISTENT APPLICATION OF UNITED
STATES EXPORT CONTROL LAWS TO THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND HONG KONG.

Congress makes the following findings regarding the
inconsistent application of United States export control laws
to the People's Republic of China and Hong Kong:
(1) While Hong Kong was sovereign territory of the United
Kingdom, United States control of United States exports to
Hong Kong of items listed on the United States Munitions List
and the Commerce Control List was considerably more lax than
United States control of exports of such items to the
People's Republic of China.
(2) On June 19, 1997, at a time when Hong Kong was still
territory of the United Kingdom, the Department of Commerce
discovered that a supercomputer exported to a Hong Kong based
company without the need of an export license because it was
being exported to Hong Kong was reexported to a defense
research institute in Changsha, People's Republic of China.
(3) A Federal grand jury is currently investigating the
1995 diversion by the Government of the People's Republic of
China to military aviation production of aircraft machining
equipment that was originally exported from the United States
for civilian end-use.
(4) The People's Republic of China is the only country
which does not allow United States officials to investigate
the final end-use of exported technology and recently refused
United States requests to examine the location of the
supercomputer diverted from Hong Kong.
(5) The continuation of this inconsistent export control
regime without specific assurances and verification measures
to prevent unauthorized reexport from Hong Kong, or diversion
to military end-use, provides the Government of the People's
Republic of China with the means to circumvent United States
export controls and gain access to critical technology
necessary both for defense modernization and the
proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass
destruction.
(6) This inaction forces Congress to take affirmative
action in the bilateral relations between the People's
Republic of China and the United States in order to respond
sufficiently to these violations of United States law.

SEC. 306. EXPORTS OF SUPERCOMPUTERS TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
OF CHINA.

(a) Prior Approval of Exports and Reexports.--The President
shall require that no covered computer may be exported or
reexported to the People's Republic of China without the
prior written approval of each of the designated officials.
(b) Export or Reexport Without Unanimous Approval.--If any
one of the designated officials does not approve of the
export or reexport of a covered computer to the People's
Republic of China, the computer may be exported or reexported
to the People's Republic of China only pursuant to a license
issued by the Secretary of Commerce under the export
administration regulations of the Department of Commerce, and
without regard to the licensing exceptions otherwise
authorized under section 740.7 of title 15, Code of Federal
Regulations, as in effect on June 10, 1997.
(c) Deadline for Response to Application.--Each designated
official shall approve or disapprove in writing of the export
or reexport of a covered computer to the People's Republic of
China not later than 10 days after receipt by the United
States of the application for the export or reexport of the
computer.
(d) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Covered computers.--The term ``covered computers''
means the digital computers listed as ``eligible computers''
in section 740.7(d)(2) of title 15, Code of Federal
Regulations, as in effect on June 10, 1997.
(2) Designated officials.--The term ``designated
officials'' means the following:
(1) The Secretary of Commerce.
(2) The Secretary of Defense.
(3) The Secretary of Energy.
(4) The Secretary of State.
(5) The Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency.

SEC. 307. DUAL-USE EXPORTS TO HONG KONG.

(a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, the provisions of this section shall apply with respect
to exports of covered items to Hong Kong.
(b) Pre-License Verifications.--The Secretary of State and
the Secretary of Commerce shall not approve an export license
application for the export of a covered item to Hong Kong if
United States officials are denied an opportunity to conduct
a pre-license verification with respect to the end-use of
such covered item and the recipient of such item.
(c) Post-Shipment Verification.--If United States officials
are denied the ability to a conduct post-shipment
verification of the location, recipient, and end use of a
covered item that has been exported to Hong Kong from the
United States pursuant to an export license granted by the
Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce, thereafter
any application to export a covered item to Hong Kong shall
be treated in the same manner as a request to export such
item to the People's Republic of China.
(d) Diversion of Covered Items.--If the President, or any
other official of the United States, obtains credible
evidence that a covered item exported from the United States
to Hong Kong on or after July 1, 1997, has been diverted--
(1) to the People's Republic of China;
(2) to an end use not authorized under the export control
laws or regulations of the United States, or
(3) to a recipient, other than the recipient specified in
the export license application,

any application to export a covered item to Hong Kong that is
pending or filed after the date on which such evidence is
obtained shall be treated in the same manner as a request to
export such item to the People's Republic of China.
(e) Covered Item Defined.--In this section, the term
``covered item'' means the following:
(1) Any item on the United States Munitions List.
(2) Any item on the Commerce Control List of the Department
of Commerce.

SEC. 308. ENFORCEMENT OF IRAN-IRAQ ARMS NON-PROLIFERATION ACT
WITH RESPECT TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

(a) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the
United States that--
(1) the delivery of 60 C-802 cruise missiles by the China
National Precision Machinery Import Export Corporation to
Iran poses a new, direct threat to deployed United States
forces in the Middle East and materially contributed to the
efforts of Iran to acquire destabilizing numbers and types of
advanced conventional weapons; and
(2) the delivery is a violation of the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-
Proliferation Act of 1992 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note).
(b) Implementation of Sanctions.--
(1) Requirement.--The President shall impose on the
People's Republic of China the mandatory sanctions set forth
in paragraphs (3), (4), and (5) of section 1605(b) of the
Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992.
(2) Nonavailability of waiver.--For purposes of this
section, the President shall not have the authority contained
in section 1606 of the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act
of 1992 to waive the sanctions required under paragraph (1).

SEC. 309. TRANSFERS OF SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY BY
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Credible allegations exist that the People's Republic
of China has transferred equipment and technology as follows:
(A) Gyroscopes, accelerometers, and test equipment for
missiles to Iran.
(B) Chemical weapons equipment and technology to Iran.
(C) Missile guidance systems and computerized machine tools
to Iran.
(D) Industrial furnace equipment and high technology
diagnostic equipment to a nuclear facility in Pakistan.
(E) Blueprints and equipment to manufacture M-11 missiles
to Pakistan.
(F) M-11 missiles and components to Pakistan.
(2) The Department of State has failed to determine whether
most such transfers violate provisions of relevant United
States laws and Executive orders relating to the
proliferation of sensitive equipment and technology,
including the Arms Export Control Act, the Nuclear
Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994, the Export
Administration Act of 1979, and the Export-Import Bank Act of
1945, and Executive Order 12938.
(3) Where the Department of State has made such
determinations, it has imposed the least onerous form of
sanction, which significantly weakens the intended deterrent

[[Page S9207]]

effect of the sanctions provided for in such laws.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the transfers of equipment and technology by the
People's Republic of China described in subsection (a)(1)
pose a threat to the national security interests of the
United States;
(2) the failure of the Clinton Administration to initiate a
formal process to determine whether to impose sanctions for
such transfers under the provisions of law referred to in
subsection (a)(2) contributes to the threat posed to the
national security interests of the United States by the
proliferation of such equipment and technology; and
(3) the President should immediately initiate the
procedures necessary to determine whether sanctions should be
imposed under such provisions of law for such transfers.
(c) Report.--
(1) Requirement.--Not later than 60 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress
a report setting forth--
(A) the date, if any, of the commencement and of the
conclusion of each formal process conducted by the Department
of State to determine whether to impose sanctions under the
provisions of law referred to in subsection (a)(2) for each
transfer described in subsection (a)(1);
(B) the facts providing the basis for each determination
not to impose sanctions under such provisions of law on the
Government of the People's Republic of China, or entities
within or having a relationship with that government, for
each transfer, and the legal analysis supporting such
determination; and
(C) a schedule for initiating a formal process described in
paragraph (1) for each transfer not yet addressed by such
formal process and an explanation for the failure to commence
such formal process with respect to such transfer before the
date of the report.
(2) Form.--The report shall be submitted in unclassified
form, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 310. ANNUAL REPORTS ON ACTIVITIES OF THE PEOPLE'S
LIBERATION ARMY.

(a) Entities Owned by PLA.--Not later than January 31 each
year, the Secretary of State shall publish in the Federal
Register a list of each corporation or other business entity
that was owned in whole or in part by the People's Liberation
Army of the People's Republic of China as of December 31 of
the preceding year.
(b) Report on PRC Military Modernization.--
(1) Requirement.--
(A) In general.--Not later than March 31 each year, the
Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of
State, shall submit to Congress a report on the military
modernization activities of the People's Liberation Army.
(B) Submittal.--The Secretary of Defense shall submit each
report to the following:
(i) The Majority leader and Minority leader of the Senate.
(ii) The chairmen and ranking members of the Committee on
Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the
Senate.
(iii) The Speaker and Minority leader of the House of
Representatives.
(iv) The chairmen and ranking members of the Committee on
International Relations and the Committee on National
Security of the House of Representatives.
(C) Form.--The report shall be submitted in unclassified
form, but may include a classified annex.
(2) Contents of report.--
(A) Contents.--Each report under paragraph (1) shall
include the following:
(i) A description of developments within the People's
Liberation Army, including the implications of the
developments for United States policy toward the People's
Republic of China.
(ii) A description of the scope and pace of modernization
by the People's Liberation Army.
(iii) To the maximum extent practicable, an analysis of the
intent of such modernization programs.
(B) Relationship to annual human rights report.--The report
shall complement and not replace applicable sections of the
annual report on human rights in China by the Department of
State.
(c) Protection of Sources and Methods.--In publishing a
list under subsection (a) and preparing a report under
subsection (b), the Secretary of Defense shall take
appropriate actions to ensure the protection of sources and
methods of gathering intelligence.

SEC. 311. ANNUAL REPORTS ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

(a) Reports.--
(1) In general.--Not later than March 31 each year, the
Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, jointly and in consultation
with the heads of other appropriate Federal agencies
(including the Departments of Defense, Justice, Treasury, and
State), shall submit to the Members of Congress referred to
in paragraph (2) a report on the intelligence activities of
the People's Republic of China directed against or affecting
the interests of the United States.
(2) Submittal.--Each report under paragraph (1) shall be
submitted to the following:
(A) The Majority leader and Minority leader of the Senate.
(B) The chairman and ranking member of the Select Committee
on Intelligence of the Senate.
(C) The Speaker and Minority leader of the House of
Representatives.
(D) The chairman and ranking member of the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(3) Form.--Each report shall be submitted in unclassified
form, but may include a classified annex.
(b) Contents of Reports.--Each report under subsection (a)
shall include information concerning the following:
(1) Political and military espionage.
(2) Intelligence activities designed to gain political
influence, including activities undertaken or coordinated by
the United Front Work Department of the Chinese Communist
Party.
(3) Efforts to gain direct or indirect influence through
commercial or noncommercial intermediaries subject to control
by the People's Republic of China, including enterprises
controlled by the People's Liberation Army.
(4) Disinformation and press manipulation by the People's
Republic of China with respect to the United States,
including activities undertaken or coordinated by the United
Front Work Department of the Chinese Communist Party.

SEC. 312. STUDY OF THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM
FOR TAIWAN.

(a) Study.--The Secretary of Defense shall carry out, with
appropriate representatives of the Government of Taiwan, a
study of the architecture requirements for the establishment
and operation of a theater ballistic missile defense system
for Taiwan, including the Penghu Islands, Kinmen, and Matsu.
The study shall include the following:
(1) An assessment of missile threats to Taiwan.
(2) Identification of the requirements of Taiwan for
deployment of an effective theater ballistic missile defense
system.
(3) Identification of existing theater ballistic missile
defense systems or existing technology for such systems, that
the United States could sell to Taiwan to assist in meeting
the requirements identified under paragraph (2).
(4) Systems or technologies the United States is developing
that could address the missile threats to Taiwan's security.
(5) Identification of potential joint cooperative efforts
by the United States and Taiwan to develop theater ballistic
missile defense systems.
(b) Submittal to Congress.--
(1) Submittal.--Not later than July 1, 1998, the Secretary
of Defense shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services
and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and the
Committee on National Security and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives a report on
the study conducted under subsection (a).
(2) Form.--The report shall be submitted in unclassified
form, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 313. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING UNITED STATES FORCE
LEVELS IN ASIA.

It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the current force levels in the Pacific Command Theater
of Operations are necessary to the fulfillment of the
military mission of that command and are vital to continued
peace and stability in the region covered by that command;
(2) any reductions in such force levels should only be done
in close consultation with Congress and with a clear
understanding of their impact upon the capacity of the United
States to fulfill its current treaty obligations with other
states in the region as well as to the continued ability of
the United States to deter potential aggression in the
region; and
(3) the annual report on the national security strategy of
the United States required by section 108 of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404a) should include specific
information on the adequacy of the capabilities of the United
States Armed Forces to support the implementation of the
national security strategy of the United States as it relates
to the People's Republic of China.

SEC. 314. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING ESTABLISHMENT OF
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN ASIA.

It is the sense of Congress that the President and the
Secretary of State should initiate negotiations with the
Government of the People's Republic of China and the
governments of other countries in Asia to establish a
commission on matters relating to security and cooperation in
Asia that would be modeled after the Commission on Security
and Cooperation in Europe.
TITLE IV--TRADE

SEC. 401. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE ACCESSION OF TAIWAN
TO THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION.

It is the sense of Congress that Taiwan should be admitted
to the World Trade Organization as a separate customs
territory when Taiwan meets the established criteria of the
Organization for membership on that basis.
TITLE V--HUMAN RIGHTS AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM WORLDWIDE

SEC. 501. TRAINING FOR IMMIGRATION OFFICERS REGARDING
RELIGIONS PERSECUTION.

Section 235 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8
U.S.C. 1225) is amended by adding at the end the following:

[[Page S9208]]

``(e) Training on Religious Persecution.--The Attorney
General shall establish and operate a program to provide to
immigration officers performing functions under subsection
(b), or section 207 or 208, training on religious
persecution, including training on--
``(1) the fundamental components of the right to freedom of
religion;
``(2) the variation in beliefs of religious groups; and
``(3) the governmental and nongovernmental methods used in
violation of the right to freedom of religion.''.

SEC. 502. PROMOTION OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND HUMAN RIGHTS
WORLDWIDE.

(a) Reports on Religious Persecution.--
(1) Reports.--Not later than March 30, 1998, and annually
thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit to the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the
Committee on International Relations of the House of
Representatives a report on religious persecution worldwide.
(2) Contents.--Each report shall include a list of the
government officials of any country worldwide who have been
materially involved in the commission of acts of persecution
that are motivated by a person's religion.
(b) Prisoner Information Registry.--
(1) Establishment.--The Secretary of State shall establish
and maintain a registry to be known as the Prisoner
Information Registry.
(2) Contents.--The registry shall be a repository of
information on matters relating to the penal systems of the
various countries and of individuals in such systems,
including--
(A) the charges brought against the individuals in such
systems;
(B) the judicial or administrative processes to which such
individuals were subject;
(C) the length of imprisonment of such individuals in such
systems;
(D) the use (if any) of forced labor in such systems;
(E) the incidences (if any) of torture in such systems;
(F) the physical and health conditions in such systems; and
(G) such other matters as the Secretary considers
appropriate.
(3) Allocation of resources.--The Secretary may make funds
available to non-governmental organizations currently engaged
in monitoring penal systems worldwide or individuals in such
systems in order to assist in the establishment and
maintenance of the registry.
TITLE VI--OTHER MATTERS

SEC. 601. TERMINATION OF UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE FOR EAST-
WEST CENTER.

(a) Repeal of Authorization of Assistance.--The Center for
Cultural and Technical Interchange Between East and West Act
of 1960 (chapter VII of Public Law 86-472; 22 U.S.C. 2054 et
seq.) is repealed.
(b) Prohibition on Use of Funds for Center.--
Notwithstanding any other law, no funds appropriated or
otherwise made available to the Director of the United States
Information Agency for any fiscal year after fiscal year 1997
may be used for any purposes (including grants and payments
and expenses of operation) relating to the Center for
Cultural and Technical Interchange Between East and West.
____

Summary of the China Policy Act of 1997

title i: sanctions

Deny visas to Chinese Government officials
involved in political and religious persecution. This measure
would deny visas to high ranking officials who are employed
by the Public Security Bureau (the state police), the
Religious Affairs Bureau, China's family planning apparatus,
the People's Liberation Army (PLA), and those found to be
materially involved in the ordering or carrying out of the
massacre of Chinese students in Tiananmen Square. The
President is granted waiver authority that can be exercised,
in writing, each time a proscribed individual is to enter
this country that explains why awarding such visas overrides
United States concerns about China's human rights practices
past and present.
Require U.S. Representatives at multilateral banks
to vote ``no'' on loans to China. Exception for loans related
to environmental improvements and safeguards, famine, and
natural disaster relief. China received approximately $3
billion in World Bank loans in the most recent fiscal year.
While receiving this foreign aid, the Chinese military budget
increased by 12.7 percent. Between 1985 and 1995 the United
States supported 111 of 183 loans approved by the World Bank
Group and 15 of 92 loans that the Asian Development Bank
approved. The bill also requires the Secretary of Treasury to
oppose and instruct the U.S. executive director of the World
Bank to oppose any change in the World Bank's rules that
limit the total share of the bank's lending that can be made
in any one country.
Require the President to begin consultations with
major United States allies and trading partners to encourage
them to adopt similar measures contained in this bill and to
work with our allies to vote against loans for China at
multilateral development banks. Within 60 days of a G-7
meeting, the President shall submit a report to Congress on
the progress of this effort.
Targeted sanctions against People's Liberation
Army (PLA) companies involved in the illegal sale of AK-47
rifles in the United States. China North Industries Group
(NORINCO) and the PLA-owned company China Poly Group (POLY)
will be prohibited from (1) exporting to, and maintaining a
physical presence in, the United States; (2) receiving loans
from the Export-Import Bank; and (3) receiving contracts for
goods or services from the U.S. Government for a period of
one year. The attempted illegal sale of AK-47 machine guns to
street gangs in California warrant these targeted sanctions
against these firms.
The bill establishes a mechanism to apply
sanctions on additional PLA companies based on certain
specific actions, including weapons proliferation, illegal
arms sales in U.S., and military and political espionage in
the United States. The Director of Central Intelligence and
the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in
separate annual reports, shall identify entities owned in
part or wholly by the People's Liberation Army who have
engaged in proliferation of nuclear or chemical weapons, the
illegal importation of weapons to the United States, or
unlawful military intelligence collection or espionage in the
United States. Such entities will be prohibited from
exporting to, or maintaining a physical presence in the
United States, receiving loans from the Export-Import Bank,
and receiving contracts from the United States Government for
a period of 1 year.
Sanctions remain in effect for 5 years. The bill
includes a Sense of Congress that the sanctions in the China
Policy Act shall be reviewed by Congress within the 5 year
period upon the occurrence of one or more of the following
events: (1) People's Republic of China's entry into the WTO
on commercially viable terms; (2) President's certification
of PRC's full implementation of international proliferation
standards and agreements; (3) President's certification that
PRC is actively and effectively combating all forms of
religious persecution; (4) PRC re-evaluation of Tiananmen
Square massacre; (5) Publication by the PRC of a National
Security White Paper describing its intentions
internationally; or (6) President's certification that the
PRC has taken concrete steps towards improving overall human
rights conditions in China and Tibet, including the release
of political prisoners; improving prison conditions and
providing prisoners with adequate medical care; and full
compliance with the international human rights accords to
which the PRC is a signatory.

title ii: human rights, religious freedom, and democracy

Congressional findings detailing the Chinese
Government's jailing of political dissidents, persecution of
religious groups, human rights violations in Tibet and
coercive family planning practices.
Combats slave labor and ``reeducation'' centers.
The bill calls for stricter enforcement of the ban against
the sale of products produced in slave labor camps;
appropriations to United States Customs to increase
monitoring; require reporting and advocacy requirements; and
a Sense of Congress urging renegotiation of prison labor
memorandum of understanding with China.
Authorize an additional $5 million for
international broadcasting to China, including Radio Free
Asia and the Voice of America to expand broadcast hours in
multiple Chinese dialects, Tibetan, and other languages
spoken in China.
Authorize additional $2 million in funding for
National Endowment for Democracy programs in China.
Authorize additional $2 million of funding for
existing United States Information Agency student, cultural,
and legislative exchange programs between the U.S. and China.
Terminate the East-West Center. This center funds
cooperative programs of study, research and training between
the U.S. and Asian Pacific nations. However, the resources of
the State Department, which maintains a network of embassies
and consulates in Asian Pacific countries, should be more
than sufficient to promote good relations with these
countries. Eliminating this $10 million program offsets
the spending increases proposed in the bill.
Require United States contractors who receive international
family planning funds from the United States to report on
their organization's activities in China.
Sense of Congress concerning multilateral efforts to
address China's human rights record.
Sense of Congress that China should abide by the 1984 Sino-
British Joint Declaration on Hong Kong.

Title III: National Security Matters

Congressional findings on PRC's proliferation of ballistic
missiles, weapons of mass destruction, destabilizing advanced
conventional weapons, and evasion of U.S. export controls.
Tighten United States export licensing requirements on
super computers sold to China. Current regulation only
requires an export license for mid-range supercomputers to
countries such as China with only a certification, by the
exporting firm, that the end-use is not military-related.
This provision requires an export license for any mid-range
supercomputers (currently 2000-7000 MTOP range, but amendable
by the Secretary of Commerce) sold to China which the
Departments of Defense, State, Energy, and Commerce, and the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency do not unanimously agree
to export without a license. This provision is a modified
version of the Spence-Dellums amendment to the House Fiscal
Year 98 DoD Authorization bill.

[[Page S9209]]

Protects against dual-use export diversion from Hong Kong.
The recent diversion of a Sun Microsystems supercomputer from
a Hong Kong importer to a military end-user in the People's
Republic of China highlights the potential problems with
having dual-use technology exports to Hong Kong being treated
more liberally than such exports to the PRC. This provision
would deny licenses for export of items on the U.S. Munitions
List and the Commerce Control List to Hong Kong if United
States officials are denied access to conduct pre-license
checks verifying the end-user. It will also require that if
United States officials are denied access for post-shipment
verification checks, or if an actual diversion of dual-use
items takes place from Hong Kong to the PRC, then Hong Kong
will thereafter be placed in the same export control category
as the People's Republic of China.
A finding that China violated the Iran-Iraq
Nonproliferation Act with the export of C-802 missiles to
Iran, and a requirement on the implementation of this Act's
sanctions. The Commander of the United States Navy's Fifth
Fleet in the Persian Gulf has called the Iranian acquisition
of C-802 cruise missiles a direct threat to the 15,000 US
servicemen stationed in the area. Iran acquired these
missiles from China, in direct contravention of the Iran-Iraq
Nonproliferation Act (McCain-Gore Act). However, the
Administration did not implement the sanctions called for in
the Act.
Limiting transfers of sensitive equipment and technology by
the People's Republic of China. Require within 60 days a
report detailing State Department's sanctions determination
process for each allegation against China in the area of
proliferation, and a schedule for initiating sanctions
determination process where the process has not been
initiated.
Sunshine requirement on PLA companies. On an annual basis,
the United States Government shall publish a list of all
companies owned in part or wholly by the People's Liberation
Army (PLA) of the People's Republic of China who export to,
or have an office in, the United States. In addition, require
a report on PLA military modernization.
Require enhanced monitoring of Chinese intelligence
activities in the United States, including a report on such
activities and a report on political and military espionage.
Require a bilateral United States-Taiwan study of
establishing theater missile defense in the Pacific Rim.
Sense of the Congress that the current level of United
States forces in Asia are vital to continued peace and
stability in the region and should only be reduced with a
clear understanding of their impact on United States treaty
obligations and the continued ability of the United States to
deter potential aggression in the region.
Sense of Congress that the President shall initiate
negotiations with the PRC and other Asian countries to
establish a ``Helsinki Commission'' for Asia.

Title IV: Trade

Sense of Congress that Taiwan should enter the World Trade
Organization (WTO) as soon as it meets the established
criteria.

Title V: Human rights and Religious Freedom Worldwide

The legislation mandates additional and extensive training
for United States asylum officers world-wide in recognizing
religious persecution.
Enhanced reporting of human rights violations and religious
persecution around the world. Increased publicizing of
political and religious persecution world-wide through annual
reports by the State Department, publication of list of
individuals involved in religious persecution, and
establishment of a Prisoner Information Registry.

Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, I rise today in strong support of the
China Policy Act of 1997. As an original cosponsor of the act, I
believe this legislation provides the starting point for a much needed
restructuring of United States-China relations. For too long, our
approach to China has been one of passivity and appeasement. The
Clinton administration seems willing to tolerate virtually any
misbehavior--gross violations of human rights, arms deals with
terrorist states, a headlong push to develop military capabilities that
exceed any conceivable threat, even efforts to smuggle guns into the
United States. This is no way to build a stable, peaceful, and
constructive relationship.
Our legislation offers a dramatically different approach. Under this
bill, when China violates standards of decency or endangers vital
American interests, there will be a response that is swift,
predictable, and appropriate. This legislation is an important first
step toward a policy that rewards and encourages constructive behavior,
and discourages questionable activity. It points the way to a new and
better era in United States-China relations.
The 20th century has been the American century, and if the new
century is to bear the same imprint, we must fashion a stable and
constructive relationship with the People's Republic of China, which is
pushing hard for global superpower status.
One specific provision I have included in this bill protects the
United States from Chinese diversion of sensitive technology from Hong
Kong. Hong Kong has abided by international export control regimes and
has benefited from preferential access to sensitive U.S. technology--
technology that can be used for military purposes.
My provision simply does the following: if China diverts controlled
technology from Hong Kong, or if United States officials are denied the
opportunity to conduct post-shipment checks on location and end use of
controlled items, then the United States shall apply the stricter
export controls to Hong Kong presently applied to the rest of China. In
addition, if United States officials are denied an opportunity to
conduct a prelicense check on the end use and end user of a controlled
item, then the export license for that item shall be denied.
A May, 1997 GAO report on the export of controlled items to Hong Kong
stated that effective monitoring is critical to prevent weapons and
technology proliferation. The report identified pre-license checks and
post-shipment verification as possible means to ensure the continued
effectiveness of Hong Kong's export control system.
Now that Hong Kong has reverted to Chinese control, China undoubtedly
will attempt to use the port to divert technology and proliferate
weapons. Prosecutions for illegal shipments of arms-related commodities
in Hong Kong have grown dramatically in recent years, from 65 cases in
1994 to 250 last year. One Hong Kong firm, Cheong Yee, was sanctioned
by the United States last May for helping Iran obtain chemical weapons.
The technology flow to Hong Kong is a significant national security
risk if China compromises the integrity of Hong Kong's export control
system. Chinese front companies in Hong Kong already have been
identified with efforts to acquire controlled technologies for illicit
export to countries of proliferation concern, according to United
States and Hong Kong officials. China has refused to sign many of the
export control regimes by which Hong Kong historically has abided. The
old restrictions are kept in place only from a sense of moral
obligation, states Brian Lo, Hong Kong's chief trade-licensing officer.
Mr. President, moral obligation is flimsy stuff when you are dealing
with the Communist leaders of Beijing. These are the leaders who attack
their own young people in Tiananmen Square, persecute Christians, and
proliferate weapons to terrorist states which target U.S. citizens
around the world.
In the face of this growing proliferation risk, the Clinton
administration has been relaxing America's export control regulations.
Just this week, a bipartisan report issued by the House National
Security Committee stated that the changes made to U.S. export controls
contributed to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
their means of delivery as well as the development of advanced
conventional weapons.
The number of export licenses reviewed each year for national
security reasons has fallen from 150,000 in the mid-1980's to less than
8,000 today. The world may have become a safer place, but the
international arena is still threatening.
Clearly, it is time for the United States to take aggressive steps
which protect United States national security interests and limit the
ability of potential enemies to develop weapons of mass destruction. I
am proud to be a cosponsor of the China Policy Act and believe that the
provisions contained therein make a significant contribution to the
United States-China debate. I urge the Senate's prompt consideration
and passage of this bill.
Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I join the Senator from Michigan [Mr.
Abraham] in introducing the China Policy Act of 1997. This is a bill
that I am proud to cosponsor and one that will send a much-needed
message to the leaders of the People's Republic of China. I commend the
Senator from Michigan for his efforts.
The China Policy Act is an omnibus bill that covers a broad range of
issues. This legislation will impose targeted sanctions against Chinese
entities--

[[Page S9210]]

such as the military and public security apparatus--that are directly
engaged in weapons proliferation and human rights abuses. In addition,
this bill calls for tighter enforcement of various laws related to
China, such as the ban on Chinese prison-labor goods and controls on
the export of high-speed computers to China. The legislation also
contains funding increases for student, cultural, and legislative
exchanges between the United States and China.
The China Policy Act is designed to move Congress and the American
public beyond the sometimes polarizing debate over China's most-
favored-nation trade status, offering realistic alternatives to
revoking MFN that merit broad bipartisan support.
As many of my colleagues know, I have been a strong opponent of
granting MFN privileges to China and, in fact, have been an original
cosponsor of the resolutions of disapproval for the past 3 years. I
strongly believe that, in light of Beijing's egregious human rights
record, China does not deserve to have such trade privileges with the
United States. Ever since the administration delinked MFN and human
rights in 1994, I have watched with alarm as the Chinese Government has
heightened its political and religious persecution throughout the
country.
But despite my strong views on the issue, I realize that the Congress
has been unable to reach a consensus on whether MFN is the best tool to
pressure China to make improvements in human rights. I know that many
of my colleagues share my concerns over China's human rights record,
but nevertheless feel that MFN is too blunt an instrument, especially
for a nation as large and diverse as China.
But once you step away from the debate over the effectiveness of MFN,
there is widespread agreement among Members of both the Senate and the
House that the administration's current policy of constructive
engagement toward China remains unsatisfactory.
I believe the administration is promoting engagement for engagement's
sake, not as a way to halt the many offensive behaviors of the Chinese
regime. I prefer to call the administration policy not ``constructive''
engagement but rather unconditional engagement.
No matter how uncooperative China is, the United States appears ready
to continue business as usual with the Chinese regime. This is
especially true with respect to human rights. Recent events paint a
very bleak picture. In October of last year, a Chinese court sentenced
Wang Dan--a leader of the Tiananmen Square protests--to 11 years in
prison for peacefully expressing his prodemocracy beliefs. Seventy-six-
year-old Bishop Zeng Jingmu has been sentenced to reeducation through
labor for organizing religious ceremonies outside China's official
Catholic Church. In Tibet, Chinese authorities have banned the display
of the Dalai Lama's photograph and the State Department Human Rights
Report cites three instances of Buddhist monks dying in Chinese prisons
in 1996. Sadly, this represents on a tiny fraction of the human rights
abuses that are taking place in China today. It would be impossible to
name all of the people who are being kept behind bars for the
expression of their political and religious beliefs.
Yet, even as the Chinese leadership continues to brutalize political
dissidents and the people of Tibet, the administration is preparing to
welcome China's President, Jiang Zemin, to the White House next month.
What kind of message does this send?
The China Policy Act of 1997 represents the efforts of both pro- and
anti-MFN Senators to find new ways to deal with the problems the United
States currently faces in China.
And there is no shortage of problems.
I have already mentioned my primary concern, which is China's
deplorable human rights record, but in addition, the Government of
China continues to sell dangerous chemical and nuclear weapons
technologies to terrorist and rogue regimes. China has used military
intimidation to disrupt free elections in Taiwan and has harassed its
neighbors in the South China Sea. Furthermore, we have all seen reports
of Beijing's unfair trade practices and rampant copyright violations.
This is what I refer to as a ``kaleidoscope'' of problems the United
States has with China.
The China Policy Act of 1997 contains targeted sanctions aimed at the
organizations most directly associated with China's poor behavior. For
example, the bill contains provisions imposing comprehensive sanctions
against enterprises run by the People's Liberation Army that have
engaged in weapons smuggling or proliferation. The United States simply
should refrain from doing business with companies that create security
risks to our country.
This bill will also require the administration to deny United States
visas to high-level Chinese officials directly connected with human
rights violations and religious persecution. This provision expresses
United States outrage at China's human rights abuses while still giving
the President adequate waiver authority to conduct foreign policy.
I am particularly pleased this bill contains strong language on human
rights, an area that has been a special focus of mine. The bill
includes a provision stating that the administration needs to greatly
increase multilateral efforts to condemn China's human rights record.
As you know, Mr. President, this past April, the U.N. Human Rights
Commission failed to pass a resolution criticizing China's human rights
policies. Unfortunately, the United States only began lobbying for the
resolution at the last moment and, as a result of this delay, many of
our allies--including France, Germany, and Canada--would not cosponsor
the motion. To make our China policy more effective, the United States
must do a better job of coordinating with our allies in multilateral
fora.

In addition to addressing a wide spectrum of issues in Sino-United
States relations, the China Policy Act also gives the Senate--and the
American people we represent--an important opportunity to have an
extensive debate about China policy. Such a debate is long overdue, and
has continued to be delayed because of the controversy surrounding MFN.
It is my view that the inability of Congress to reach a consensus on
MFN has led the Chinese authorities to believe that they can continue
to commit gross human rights violations without facing any
consequences. Unfortunately, it may be that, until now, the Beijing
leadership has been right. In China's eyes, Congress has become what
Chairman Mao Zedong would have called a paper tiger, something that
might act ferocious, but is, in fact, harmless.
However, once Congress steps out of the restrictive confines of the
MFN debate, I think China will be surprised at the level of
dissatisfaction in Congress toward Beijing's actions.
The Chinese Government will obviously condemn this legislation
because it demands that Chinese leaders live up to the international
and bilateral agreements on weapons-proliferation, human rights, and
trade to which China is a party. The Beijing government categorically
rejects any outside scrutiny of its policies and equates good relations
with a complete lack of criticism. But truly close relations between
two countries can only be built when both sides fulfill their
obligations and act in good faith toward one another.
The China Policy Act of 1997 is intended to send a strong message
that Chinese Government's actions on many fronts remains unacceptable.
Unfortunately, Chinese leaders have not heard this message loudly or
strongly enough in the past. They have not heard it from the U.N. Human
Rights Commission. They have not heard it from our trade negotiators.
And, until now, they have not heard it from the U.S. Congress.
It is my view that the time has come for us to send this message
clearly.
I yield the floor.
______

By Mr. GRASSLEY:
S. 1165. A bill to apply rules regarding the conduct of meetings and
recordkeeping under the Federal Advisory Committee Act to the Social
Security Advisory Board and for other purposes; to the Committee on
Finance.

THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD SUNSHINE ACT

Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, today I rise to introduce the Social
Security Advisory Board Sunshine Act. This legislation will apply the
public meeting and disclosure requirements of

[[Page S9211]]

the Federal Advisory Committee Act to the Social Security advisory
board.
The Social Security Advisory Board was created in 1994 when the
Social Security Administration became an independent agency. Its
purpose is to serve as an advisor to the Commissioner of the Social
Security Administration, the President and the Congress. The 1994 law
requires the Board to make recommendations on some of the most critical
issues facing the Social Security Administration and the country,
including: How to ensure economic security for Government retirement
and disability programs; how to ensure the solvency of Social Security
programs; how to improve the quality of service and the policies and
regulations that influence that service; and how to increase the
public's understanding of Social Security.
With such a significant mandate, the question we should be asking is
not why have open meetings, but why not have open meetings? This Board
has been entrusted with the responsibility of making policy
recommendations regarding the largest domestic Government program in
this country. Virtually every American is affected by Social Security.
Every American has a stake in Social Security. They have the right to
know what recommendations are being made and why. The Federal Advisory
Committee Act, which became public law in 1972 is intended to promote
good Government values, such as openness, accountability, and balance
of viewpoints. At the heart of the matter is a desire to keep the
channels open between Government and the interested public.
Yesterday, during the confirmation hearing for Ken Apfel for the
position of Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, I asked
him if bringing the Advisory Board under the Sunshine laws was a good
idea. He said, ``I think sunshine is almost always a good idea.''
My legislation would require the Advisory Board to provide notice of
all meetings, make available for public inspection all Advisory Board
documents, provide opportunities for nonmembers to participate in Board
meetings, keep minutes of those meetings, and make transcripts of
Advisory Board meetings available. In addition, the Social Security
Administration will be required to disclose the disbursement of money
to, and the disposal of money by, the advisory Board.
My legislation would also provide for compensation of the board
members. Board members are paid per diem travel expenses, but they
receive no compensation for the time they take off work to attend the
meetings, which are held once a month. Because they have been given
charge of such an important task, and because of the homework that must
be done in order for them to be prepared and participate in meetings,
compensation commensurate with that of similar boards and committees is
only fair.
I want to commend the Board on the work it has done so far,
particularly to highlight the need to expand the Social Security
Administration's policy analysis capabilities. Those capabilities will
be very important as we jump start discussions about Social Security
reform.
The Advisory Board will be undergoing some changes in membership in
the near future. I intend to work at getting this legislation enacted
as soon as possible so the change in membership will occur with a
change in the philosophy that Government is best done in the open and
not behind closed doors.
______

By Mr. CAMPBELL:
S. 1166. A bill to prevent Federal agencies from pursuing policies of
unjustifiable nonacquiescence in, and relitigation of, precedents
established in the Federal judicial circuits; to the Committee on the
Judiciary.

The Federal Agency Compliance Act

Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. President, because the concept of nonacquiescence
is so often mired and hidden in the bureaucratic processes of our
Government agencies, few realize the magnitude of its true
implications. I am extremely concerned that so many Federal agencies
currently fail to comply with established case law when dealing with
American's rights and legal claims. Instead, the very agencies whose
function it is to serve the people of this country have been ignoring
the law through the policy of nonacquiescence. Specifically,
nonacquiescence occurs when an agency refuses to comply with judicial
precedent and instead, relies on agency policy to determine the outcome
of a claim. For example, if a beneficiary has a social security claim,
the agency can rule against the claimant even if the judicial precedent
in that circuit is entirely in favor of the beneficiary. Agency wins--
claimant loses--end of story. The only recourse that beneficiary has is
to relitigate that same issue in court. The beneficiary can't bypass
the agency and go directly to court, because he or she must first
exhaust all administrative remedies. This is an extremely expensive
burden on any person with a claim against an agency. In fact, it is a
financial burden on the entire judicial system and on the American
taxpayer who eventually pays the cost of relitigation.
Stare decisis--``let the decision stand''--is the fundamental
doctrine of law upon which our entire judicial system is based. It is a
concept of fairness and equity that has withstood the test of time. We
require the American people and courts to adhere to judicial precedent.
This policy of nonacquiescence completely undermines that principle. It
allows the agency to completely ignore judicial precedent and instead
rely solely on agency interpretation. The most glaring examples of
nonacquiescence have surfaced in a select few agencies, such as the
Social Security Administration, the National Labor Relations Board, and
the Internal Revenue Service. This year alone, the Social Security
Administration itself indicates that tens of thousands of claims
involving nonacquiescence may be litigated. In a recent judicial
opinion, the appellate judge stated that ``if a [social security]
claimant has the determination and financial and physical strength and
lives long enough to make it through the administrative process he can
turn to the courts * * *'' and ultimately prevail. Similarly, the NLRB
and the IRS have invoked this policy and were the subject of inquiry
during a recent House hearing which investigated the alarming rise of
agency nonacquiescence.
The true residual dangers of the nonacquiescence policy, however, lie
in its more far-reaching implications. Theoretically, any agency can
invoke this policy to avoid the law. When the Bureau of Land Management
recently proposed reform regulations for grazing permits, ranchers
challenged the new provisions. After exhausting all administrative
remedies, the ranchers took their case to court. Following lengthy and
costly litigation, the appellate court ruled in favor of the ranchers.
However, under the nonacquiescence policy, the BLM could refuse to
abide by this ruling each and every time this issue arises. Now grazing
permits may not seem like a big deal to people here in Washington, but
like many Western States, more than 30 percent of all the land in my
home State of Colorado is Government-owned and under the control of a
Federal agency. In western Colorado, almost 60 percent of the land
falls into this arrangement. A rancher waiting for a grazing permit may
be unable to get a loan or conduct necessary planning, which could
force that rancher out of the livestock industry altogether. At the
very least, each time a claim is relitigated, it involves tens of
thousands of dollars and years of financial uncertainty for the
claimant. Such a refusal to adhere to judicial precedent sends a clear
message to the American people--a message of unfairness and inequality
which in turn breeds mistrust against the Government. If the people
must adhere to judicial precedent, we should require no less of
Government agencies.
This problem has been around for decades, but Congress first
addressed this issue when it was considering the Social Security Act of
1984. The conference report for that legislation highlighted the
magnitude of concern over this policy when it stated:

By refusing to apply circuit court interpretations and by
not promptly seeking review by the Supreme Court, the
Secretary forces beneficiaries to re-litigate the same issue
over and over again in the circuit, at a substantial expense
to both beneficiaries and the federal government. This is
clearly an undesirable consequence.

At that time, Congress allowed the agencies to address this problem
internally rather than by statute. Now in

[[Page S9212]]

1997, 13 years later, nonacquiescence is alive and well and it would be
a gross understatement to say that this problem continues to be an
undesirable consequence. In fact, Congress' failure to act 13 years ago
has allowed the nonacquiescence policy to grow into a bureaucratic
nightmare. This is nothing less than bureaucracy run amuck. It is now
our duty to address this situation before any more time and money is
wasted.
Because I believe it is important to hold Federal agencies
accountable, today I am introducing legislation which would require a
Federal agency to comply with Federal court precedents within the
circuit where a claim is filed. However, this bill also allows an
agency to deviate from such precedent under certain circumstances, thus
giving the agency additional avenues when there is a conflict between
judicial precedent and agency regulations. In contrast to the present
policy of nonacquiescence, in which the general public has no
additional avenue except to relitigate an issue at personal expense, my
bill upholds the fundamental concept of stare decisis and will in turn
provide stability, economy and equality for all Americans.
The House version of this legislation was introduced earlier in this
Congress by Congressman Gekas and Congressman Frank and has been
reported favorably out of the Subcommittee on Commercial and
Administrative Law. This bill is supported by the Judicial Conference
of the United States, Americans for Tax Reform, the Association of
Administrative Law Judges, and the American Bar Association.
I urge my colleagues to support this important legislation.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent, that the text of the bill be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:

S. 1166

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ``Federal Agency Compliance
Act''.

SEC. 2. PROHIBITING INTRACIRCUIT AGENCY NONACQUIESCENCE IN
APPELLATE PRECEDENT.

(a) In General.--Chapter 7 of title 5, United States Code,
is amended by adding at the end the following:

``Sec. 707. Adherence to court of appeals precedent

``(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), an agency (as
defined in section 701(b)(1) of this title) shall, in
administering a statute, rule, regulation, program, or policy
within a judicial circuit, adhere to the existing precedent
respecting the interpretation and application of such
statute, rule, regulation, program, or policy, as established
by the decisions of the United States court of appeals for
that circuit.
``(b) An agency is not precluded under subsection (a) from
taking a position, either in administration or litigation,
that is at variance with precedent established by a United
States court of appeals if--
``(1) it is not certain whether the administration of the
statute, rule, regulation, program, or policy will be subject
to review by the court of appeals that established that
precedent or a court of appeals for another circuit;
``(2) the Government did not seek further review of the
case in which that precedent was first established, in that
court of appeals or the United States Supreme Court,
because--
``(A) neither the United States nor any agency or officer
thereof was a party to the case; or
``(B) the decision establishing that precedent was
otherwise substantially favorable to the Government; or
``(3) it is reasonable to question the continued validity
of that precedent in light of a subsequent decision of that
court of appeals or the United States Supreme Court, a
subsequent change in any pertinent statute or regulation, or
any other subsequent change in the public policy or
circumstances on which that precedent was based.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the
beginning of chapter 7 of title 5, United States Code, is
amended by adding at the end of following new item:

``707. Adherence to court of appeals precedent.''.

SEC. 3. PREVENTING UNNECESSARY AGENCY RELITIGATION IN
MULTIPLE CIRCUITS.

(a) In General.--Chapter 7 of title 5, United States Code,
as amended by section 2(a), is amended by adding at the end
the following:

``Sec. 708. Supervision of litigation; limiting unnecessary
relitigation of legal issues

``(a) In supervising the conduct of litigation, the
officers of any agency of the United States authorized to
conduct litigation, including the Department of Justice
acting under sections 516 and 519 of title 28 shall ensure
that the initiation, defense, and continuation of proceedings
in the courts of the United States within, or subject to
the jurisdiction of, a particular judicial circuit avoids
unnecessarily repetitive litigation on questions of law
already consistently resolved against the position of the
United States, or an agency or officer thereof, in
precedents established by the United States courts of
appeals for 3 or more other judicial circuits.
``(b) Decisions on whether to initiate, defend, or continue
litigation for purposes of subsection (a) shall take into
account, among other relevant factors, the following:
``(1) The effect of intervening changes in pertinent law or
the public policy or circumstances on which the established
precedents were based.
``(2) Subsequent decisions of the United States Supreme
Court or the courts of appeals that previously decided the
relevant question of law.
``(3) The extent to which that question of law was fully
and adequately litigated in the cases in which the precedents
were established.
``(4) The need to conserve judicial and other parties'
resources.
``(c) The Attorney General shall report annually to the
Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and the House of
Representatives on the efforts of the Department of Justice
and other agencies to comply with subsection (a).
``(d) A decision on whether to initiate, defend, or
continue litigation is not subject to review in a court, by
mandamus or otherwise, on the grounds that the decision
violates subsection(a).''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the
beginning of chapter 7 of title 5, United States Code, as
amended by section 2(b) is amended by adding at the end of
the following new item:

``708, Supervision of litigation; limiting unnecessary relitigation of
legal issues.''.
______

By Mr. INOUYE (for himself and Mr. Akaka):
S. 1167. A bill to amend the Tariff Act of 1930 to clarify the method
for calculating cost of production for purposes of determining
antidumping margins; to the Committee on Finance.

THE TARIFF ACT OF 1930 ANTIDUMPING CLARIFICATION AMENDMENT ACT OF 1997

Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I rise to introduce legislation that would
make very minor changes to the antidumping provisions of the Tariff Act
of 1930. This bill will clarify Commerce Department authority to
allocate costs in antidumping cases consistent with sound accounting
principles and commercial reality. Although the antidumping law
generally affords the Commerce Department wide latitude in determining
proper cost allocations in antidumping cases, developing case law in
this area severely limits the ability of the Department to calculate
accurate dumping margins. Specifically, these cases interpret the
current antidumping statute to prevent the Department from relying on
cost allocations based on revenues, even though revenue-based
allocations are widely accepted in the accounting profession and often
are most appropriate in particular fact situations.
This bill would not require a particular kind of cost allocation in
any given case. Rather, the proposal would clarify the Department of
Commerce's authority to use any appropriate cost allocation
methodology, including a revenue-based methodology, consistent with
generally accepted accounting principles and the particular facts of
the case at hand.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:

S. 1167

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. CLARIFICATION OF RULES FOR CALCULATING COST OF
PRODUCTION AND CONSTRUCTED VALUE.

Section 773(f)(1)(A) of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C.
1677b(f)(1)(A)) is amended--
(1) by striking ``Costs'' and inserting ``(i) Calculation
of costs.--Costs'';
(2) by striking ``The Administering authority'' and
inserting ``(ii) Allocation of costs.--
``(I) General rule.--The administering authority'';
(3) by indenting the text so as to align clauses (i) and
(ii) (as added by paragraphs (1) and (2)) with clause (i) of
subparagraph (C) of such section 773(f)(1)); and
(4) by adding at the end the following:
``(II) Methods for allocating cost of production.--In
determining the proper allocation of costs, the administering
authority may use value-based methodology, weight-based cost
methodology, or any other methodology that is consistent with
generally accepted accounting principles of the exporter

[[Page S9213]]

country (or producing country, where appropriate) and that
reasonably reflects the costs associated with the production
and sale of each product.''.
(b) Application to Canada and Mexico.--Pursuant to article
1902 of the North American Free Trade Agreement and section
408 of the North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation
Act, the amendments made by this section shall apply with
respect to goods from Canada and Mexico.
(c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section
shall apply with respect to--
(1) investigations initiated--
(A) on the basis of petitions filed under section 732(b) or
783(b) of the Tariff Act of 1930 after January 1, 1995; or
(B) by the administering authority under section 732(a) of
such Act after such date;
(2) reviews initiated under section 751 of such Act--
(A) by the administering authority or the Commission on
their own initiative after such date; or
(B) pursuant to a request filed after such date;
(3) petitions filed under section 780 of such Act after
such date; and
(4) inquiries initiated under section 781 of such Act--
(A) by the administering authority on its initiative after
such date; or
(B) pursuant to a request filed after such date.
______

By Mr. REED:
S. 1169. A bill to establish professional development partnerships to
improve the quality of America's teachers and the academic achievement
of students in the classroom, and for other purposes; to the Committee
on Labor and Human Resources.

the teacher excellence in america challenge act of 1997

Mr. REED. Mr. President, we all recognize the need for qualified,
well-trained and dedicated teachers to improve the education of
students throughout the United States. Unfortunately, many students who
are just returning from their summer vacations are entering classrooms
where teachers have not been so prepared, who are not as qualified as
they should be, and this, of course, impacts tremendously on the
productivity and the excellence of American education.
Today I am introducing legislation which I believe will change
fundamentally the way teachers are trained and, thus, improve the
quality of teaching in America's classrooms. This is absolutely
critical, since over the next decade, 2 million new teachers will need
to be hired. This is the result of a combination of retirements of
existing teachers, together with the increase in student population
which is taking place throughout the United States.
Last year's report by the National Commission on Teaching and
America's Future entitled, ``What Matters Most: Teaching for America's
Future'', shed light on the disheartening state of the teaching
profession in the United States: more than 12 percent of all newly
hired teachers have no training whatsoever in educational technique and
pedagogy; more than 14 percent enter the teaching profession without
meeting State standards; 23 percent of all secondary teachers do not
have even a minor in the main teaching field which they have been hired
to perform, including more than 30 percent of mathematics teachers;
and, in schools with the highest minority enrollments, students have
less than a 50-percent chance of getting a science or mathematics
teacher who holds a license and degree in the field which they are
teaching.
These findings were echoed also in ``Quality Counts: A Report Card on
the Condition of Public Education in the 50 States,'' which was
published this past January by Education Week. This report notes that
on average, 4 out of 10 secondary teachers do not have a degree in the
subjects they teach; there are too many unlicensed teachers in
America's classrooms; and too few of our prospective teachers receive
the high-quality education they need to be effective teachers.
Overall, this report rated the States, and the average was C. No
State received an A, and there were only eight B's: California,
Colorado, Georgia, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, and
Vermont. Three States received D's for their teaching: Arizona, Hawaii,
and Idaho. And the rest, including my State of Rhode Island, received a
gentleman's C, which in today's competitive world is unsatisfactory for
the future of our country and the success of our children.
It must be noted that teacher quality varies tremendously; that in
different classrooms in the same schools, you will see outstanding
teachers in one and less qualified teachers in another. Many students
are taught by a qualified teacher who understands their subject and how
to teach students to excel. But not all students are so fortunate.
These students are being deprived essentially of the quality education
they need because their teacher is not well prepared and not qualified.
``What teachers know and do is the most important reflection on what
students learn'' is the first premise of the National Commission on
Teaching and America's Future.
Given the statistics I just recited about the current state of
teaching in America, it is no wonder American students are failing to
make the grade in a very competitive world. Indeed, a study which
compared high- and low-achieving elementary schools with similar
student characteristics found that more than 90 percent of the
variation in achievement in math and reading was directly attributable
to differences in the qualifications of the teachers in those schools.
It is also no wonder that American students don't fare well in
international comparisons. The results of the eighth-grade
Third International Mathematics and Science Study found that these
students barely scored above the world average in science and below the
world average in mathematics. And today, being mediocre is insufficient
in order to face the challenges of a very complex world.

Even though much has been done to address teacher quality, the truth
is that the current system of teacher preparation does not give
teachers a fair chance at success. Prospective teachers, those in
training in our Nation's teacher colleges, are not likely to be
provided with the panoply of experiences which they need, such as
actual classroom time, structured practice opportunities, a talented
and experienced teacher as a mentor, and the skills to work with
diverse student populations.
These are the tools they need to be adequately prepared and, sadly,
many do not receive this help while they are in teacher preparation.
Indeed, as the 1996 report by the National Commission on Teaching and
America's Future notes, traditional teacher education programs are
failing because they are too short, too fragmented and they use
textbooks rather than active hands-on teaching methods. They also
neglect to develop some of the ideas and concepts that are critical to
success, such as working in teams and using technology.
Sadly, I believe there is a real disconnect between the teacher
colleges that prepare teachers and the elementary and secondary schools
that hire them to teach the children of America. Consequently,
beginning teachers are thrown into classrooms without the skills to
succeed. As Linda Darling-Hammond, the Executive Director of the
National Commission on Teaching and America's Future, writes, the
message given to these teachers in the beginning of the school year is
``Figure it out yourself. We'll see you in June. . .if you make it that
long!''
Due to this sink-or-swim method of teacher preparation, some teachers
do not make it to June or survive past the first few years of teaching.
As a USA Today article from earlier this year points out, 17 percent of
new teachers leave the classroom after 1 year, and a 1987 study by
Grissmer and Kirby estimated that 30 to 50 percent of new teachers
leave the profession within 3 to 5 years.
Add to this defection from the ranks of the profession the increased
student enrollment due to the continuing Baby Boom Echo which will
reach a record 52.2 million in 1997 and, indeed, increase each year
through 2006, and impending retirements of many of our teachers. This
situation creates a tremendous challenge and a need to prepare over 2
million new teachers to face the next century.
The time is ripe to face this challenge. We must do so now before
public support for education wanes. By enacting needed reforms and
changes in how we prepare and continue the development of teachers, we
can guarantee the success of both students and teachers.
We must directly connect our teacher preparation and development
system to

[[Page S9214]]

our elementary and secondary schools. Our future teachers need and
deserve the kind of hands-on training and ``real world'' experience
they will get from more exposure and practice in today's classrooms, as
well as the mentoring and assistance they will receive from our best
and most experienced veteran teachers. My bill accomplishes this by
fostering partnerships between the teacher colleges at our Nation's
institutions of higher education and elementary and secondary schools.
These partners should work in concert to prepare teachers adequately
and keep their skills updated by working jointly to develop enhanced
curricula and mentoring activities, as well as to research and
implement sound teaching and learning practices.
As Jerrald Shrive wrote in ``Lessons from Restructuring Experiences:
Stories of Change in Professional Development Schools'':

. . . educational partnerships and collaborations [between
schools and universities] can be one significant piece of the
actions necessary to move all of education to more productive
levels.

These premises underlie the legislation I introduce today. The
Teacher Excellence in America Challenge Act or the TEACH Act, aims to
improve the continuum of professional development from preservice
preparation to the induction of new teachers to the improvement of
veteran teachers, all of this designed to increase the achievement of
our students.
My legislation establishes a competitive 5-year grant program to
provide grants to professional development partnerships consisting of
institutions of higher education, public elementary and secondary
schools, local educational agencies, and others, such as the State
educational agency, teacher organizations, or nonprofit organizations.
These partnerships must be based upon a mutual commitment to improve
teaching and learning.
These partnerships would use grant funding to support, as well as
create, professional development schools, a reform that has been
employed across this country and other industrialized nations and has
shown success in increasing student achievement, better preparing
prospective and beginning teachers, and providing critical ongoing
opportunities for the professional development of veteran teachers.
Professional development schools involve shared responsibility and
cooperation between the institutions of higher education that prepare
teachers and the public elementary and secondary schools that employ
teachers, a system similar to teaching hospitals.
An example of a professional development school can be found at the
Sullivan School in Newport, RI. It is in a partnership with Salve
Regina University. At the Sullivan School, Salve Regina students are
given opportunities to practice teaching in a real classroom. Sullivan
teachers are involved in observing these Salve Regina students, and
they can also utilize the resources of Salve Regina University for
professional development opportunities. Sullivan students go on field
trips to Salve Regina for both higher education and career awareness
activities, and the parents of these Sullivan students are also
involved and are also provided opportunities for education and
training.
This is a model of one possible way to use professional development
schools to enhance the preparation of teachers, the education of
students, and the involvement of parents.
Additional components of the TEACH Act include forging links between
a university's school of education and their schools of arts and
sciences. We have found in our discussions and research that many times
within the university itself there is no collaboration, connection and
concentration. This legislation will foster such cooperation.
The TEACH Act also encourages the development of mentoring programs
in which senior expert teachers would help younger teachers. It
emphasizes technology training, which is a key piece now of higher
education everywhere, and it recognizes that in order to be a good
teacher, you have to have time to prepare to be a good teacher. It also
would create a cadre of quality teachers that would act as a resource
to enhance the professional development of all teachers and
reestablishes principals as educational leaders.
This is not a giveaway grant program. The TEACH Act offers resources
to partnerships but it demands results. Strong evaluation provisions in
the TEACH Act require that partnerships demonstrate increased student
achievement, improved teacher preparation, increased opportunities for
professional development, and also it insists that well-qualified
teachers be placed in the classroom in order to continue to receive
this grant funding.
In addition, the legislation requires an independent national
evaluation of the short-term and long-term impacts and outcomes of
these professional development partnerships.
Mr. President, given the growing need to update and improve the
teacher training in this country, I expect we will see other proposals
to address this problem offered in this body. I would be concerned if
such proposals fell short on what we must accomplish by block granting
training programs or failing to approach the kind of rigor that is
included in the legislation I submit today. We have to have a rigorous
and demanding legislative agenda in order to inspire and act as a
catalyst for better teacher training across the country. Better teacher
training will lead to better teachers. And better teachers will lead to
better education and a better future for our children.
My legislation puts us on track to answering the call of the National
Commission on Teaching and America's Future to provide every student in
America with access to competent, qualified, and dedicated teaching by
the year 2006.
I urge my colleagues to join me in this essential endeavor and to
support the TEACH Act and help reform our system of teacher training as
well as update the skills of teachers already in the classroom.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a copy of this
legislation be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:

S. 1169

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. TEACHER EXCELLENCE IN AMERICA CHALLENGE.

Part A of title V of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20
U.S.C. 1102 et seq.) is amended to read as follows:

``PART A--TEACHER EXCELLENCE IN AMERICA CHALLENGE

``SEC. 501. SHORT TITLE.

``This part may be cited as the `Teacher Excellence in
America Challenge Act of 1997'.

``SEC. 502. PURPOSE.

``The purpose of this part is to improve the preparation
and professional development of teachers and the academic
achievement of students by encouraging partnerships among
institutions of higher education, elementary schools or
secondary schools, local educational agencies, State
educational agencies, teacher organizations, and nonprofit
organizations.

``SEC. 503. GOALS.

``The goals of this part are as follows:
``(1) To support and improve the education of students and
the achievement of higher academic standards by students,
through the enhanced professional development of teachers.
``(2) To ensure a strong and steady supply of new teachers
who are qualified, well-trained, and knowledgeable and
experienced in effective means of instruction, and who
represent the diversity of the American people, in order to
meet the challenges of working with students by strengthening
preservice education and induction of individuals into the
teaching profession.
``(3) To provide for the continuing development and
professional growth of veteran teachers.
``(4) To provide a research-based context for reinventing
schools, teacher preparation programs, and professional
development programs, for the purpose of building and
sustaining best educational practices and raising student
academic achievement.

``SEC. 504. DEFINITIONS.

``In this part:
``(1) Elementary school.--The term ``elementary school''
means a public elementary school.
``(2) Institution of higher education.--The term
`institution of higher education' means an institution of
higher education that--
``(A) has a school, college, or department of education
that is accredited by an agency recognized by the Secretary
for that purpose; or
``(B) the Secretary determines has a school, college, or
department of education of a quality equal to or exceeding
the quality of schools, colleges, or departments so
accredited.
``(3) Poverty line.--The term `poverty line' means the
poverty line (as defined by the Office of Management and
Budget, and

[[Page S9215]]

revised annually in accordance with section 673(2) of the
Community Services Block Grant Act (42 U.S.C. 9902(2))
applicable to a family of the size involved.
``(4) Professional development partnership.--The term
`professional development partnership' means a partnership
among 1 or more institutions of higher education, 1 or more
elementary schools or secondary schools, and 1 or more local
educational agency based on a mutual commitment to improve
teaching and learning. The partnership may include a State
educational agency, a teacher organization, or a nonprofit
organization whose primary purpose is education research and
development.
``(5) Professional development school.--The term
`professional development school' means an elementary school
or secondary school that collaborates with an institution of
higher education for the purpose of--
``(A) providing high quality instruction to students and
educating students to higher academic standards;
``(B) providing high quality student teaching and
internship experiences at the school for prospective and
beginning teachers; and
``(C) supporting and enabling the professional development
of veteran teachers at the school, and of faculty at the
institution of higher education.
``(6) Secondary school.--The term `secondary school' means
a public secondary school.
``(7) Teacher.--The term `teacher' means an elementary
school or secondary school teacher.''

``SEC. 505. PROGRAM AUTHORIZED.

``(a) In General.--From the amount appropriated under
section 511 and not reserved under section 509 for a fiscal
year, the Secretary may award grants, on a competitive basis,
to professional development partnerships to enable the
partnerships to pay the Federal share of the cost of
providing teacher preparation, induction, classroom
experience, and professional development opportunities to
prospective, beginning, and veteran teachers while improving
the education of students in the classroom.
``(b) Duration; Planning.--The Secretary shall award grants
under this part for a period of 5 years, the first year of
which may be used for planning to conduct the activities
described in section 506.
``(c) Payments; Federal Share; Non-Federal Share.--
``(1) Payments.--The Secretary shall make annual payments
pursuant to a grant awarded under this part.
``(2) Federal share.--The Federal share of the costs
described in subsection (a)(1) shall be 80 percent.
``(3) Non-federal share.--The non-Federal share of the
costs described in subsection (a)(1) may be in cash or in-
kind, fairly evaluated.
``(d) Continuing Eligibility.--
``(1) 2nd and 3d years.--The Secretary may make a grant
payment under this section for each of the 2 fiscal years
after the first fiscal year a professional development
partnership receives such a payment, only if the Secretary
determines that the partnership, through the activities
assisted under this part, has made reasonable progress toward
meeting the criteria described in paragraph (3).
``(2) 4th and 5th years.--The Secretary may make a grant
payment under this section for each of the 2 fiscal years
after the third fiscal year a professional development
partnership receives such a payment, only if the Secretary
determines that the partnership, through the activities
assisted under this part, has met the criteria described in
paragraph (3).
``(3) Criteria.--The criteria referred to in paragraphs (1)
and (2) are as follows:
``(A) Increased student achievement as determined by
increased graduation rates, decreased dropout rates, or
higher scores on local, State, or national assessments for a
year compared to student achievement as determined by the
rates or scores, as the case may be, for the year prior to
the year for which a grant under this part is received.
``(B) Improved teacher preparation and development
programs, and student educational programs.
``(C) Increased opportunities for enhanced and ongoing
professional development of teachers.
``(D) An increased number of well-prepared individuals
graduating from a school, college, or department of education
within an institution of higher education and entering the
teaching profession.
``(E) Increased recruitment to, and graduation from, a
school, college, or department of education within an
institution of higher education with respect to minority
individuals.
``(F) Increased placement of qualified and well-prepared
teachers in elementary schools or secondary schools, and
increased assignment of such teachers to teach the subject
matter in which the teachers received a degree or specialized
training.
``(G) Increased dissemination of teaching strategies and
best practices by teachers associated with the professional
development school and faculty at the institution of higher
education.
``(e) Priority.--In awarding grants under this part, the
Secretary shall give priority to professional development
partnerships serving elementary schools, secondary schools,
or local educational agencies, that serve high percentages of
children from families below the poverty line.

``SEC. 506. AUTHORIZED ACTIVITIES.

``(a) In General.--Each professional development
partnership receiving a grant under this part shall use the
grant funds for--
``(1) creating, restructuring, or supporting professional
development schools;
``(2) enhancing and restructuring the teacher preparation
program at the school, college, or department of education
within the institution of higher education, including--
``(A) coordinating with, and obtaining the participation
of, schools, colleges, or departments of arts and science;
``(B) preparing teachers to work with diverse student
populations; and
``(C) preparing teachers to implement research-based,
demonstrably successful, and replicable, instructional
programs and practices that increase student achievement;
``(3) incorporating clinical learning in the coursework for
prospective teachers, and in the induction activities for
beginning teachers;
``(4) mentoring of prospective and beginning teachers by
veteran teachers in instructional skills, classroom
management skills, and strategies to effectively assess
student progress and achievement;
``(5) providing high quality professional development to
veteran teachers, including the rotation, for varying periods
of time, of veteran teachers--
``(A) who are associated with the partnership to elementary
schools or secondary schools not associated with the
partnership in order to enable such veteran teachers to act
as a resource for all teachers in the local educational
agency or State; and
``(B) who are not associated with the partnership to
elementary schools or secondary schools associated with the
partnership in order to enable such veteran teachers to
observe how teaching and professional development occurs in
professional development schools;
``(6) preparation time for teachers in the professional
development school and faculty of the institution of higher
education to jointly design and implement the teacher
preparation curriculum, classroom experiences, and ongoing
professional development opportunities;
``(7) preparing teachers to use technology to teach
students to high academic standards;
``(8) developing and instituting ongoing performance-based
review procedures to assist and support teachers' learning;
``(9) activities designed to involve parents in the
partnership;
``(10) research to improve teaching and learning by
teachers in the professional development school and faculty
at the institution of higher education; and
``(11) activities designed to disseminate information,
regarding the teaching strategies and best practices
implemented by the professional development school, to--
``(A) teachers in elementary schools or secondary schools,
which are served by the local educational agency or located
in the State, that are not associated with the professional
development partnership; and
``(B) institutions of higher education in the State.
``(b) Construction Prohibited.--No grant funds provided
under this part may be used for the construction, renovation,
or repair of any school or facility.

``SEC. 507. APPLICATIONS.

``Each professional development partnership desiring a
grant under this part shall submit an application to the
Secretary at such time, in such manner, and accompanied by
such information as the Secretary may require. Each such
application shall--
``(1) describe the composition of the partnership;
``(2) describe how the partnership will include the
participation of the schools, colleges, or departments of
arts and sciences within the institution of higher education
to ensure the integration of pedagogy and content in teacher
preparation;
``(3) identify how the goals described in section 503 will
be met and the criteria that will be used to evaluate and
measure whether the partnership is meeting the goals;
``(4) describe how the partnership will restructure and
improve teaching, teacher preparation, and development
programs at the institution of higher education and the
professional development school, and how such systemic
changes will contribute to increased student achievement;
``(5) describe how the partnership will prepare teachers to
implement research-based, demonstrably successful, and
replicable, instructional programs and practices that
increase student achievement;
``(6) describe how the teacher preparation program in the
institution of higher education, and the induction activities
and ongoing professional development opportunities in the
professional development school, incorporate--
``(A) an understanding of core concepts, structure, and
tools of inquiry as a foundation for subject matter pedagogy;
and
``(B) knowledge of curriculum and assessment design as a
basis for analyzing and responding to student learning;
``(7) describe how the partnership will prepare teachers to
work with diverse student populations, including minority
individuals and individuals with disabilities;
``(8) describe how the partnership will prepare teachers to
use technology to teach students to high academic standards;

[[Page S9216]]

``(9) describe how the research and knowledge generated by
the partnership will be disseminated to and implemented in--
``(A) elementary schools or secondary schools served by the
local educational agency or located in the State; and
``(B) institutions of higher education in the State;
``(10)(A) describe how the partnership will coordinate the
activities assisted under this part with other professional
development activities for teachers, including activities
assisted under titles I and II of the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 6301 et seq., 6601
et seq.), the Goals 2000: Educate America Act (20 U.S.C. 5801
et seq.), the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (20
U.S.C. 1400 et seq.), and the Carl D. Perkins Vocational and
Applied Technology Education Act (20 U.S.C. 2301 et seq.);
and
``(B) describe how the activities assisted under this part
are consistent with Federal and State educational reform
activities that promote student achievement of higher
academic standards;
``(11) describe which member of the partnership will act as
the fiscal agent for the partnership and be responsible for
the receipt and disbursement of grant funds under this part;
``(12) describe how the grant funds will be divided among
the institution of higher education, the elementary school or
secondary school, the local educational agency, and any other
members of the partnership to support activities described in
section 506;
``(13) provide a description of the commitment of the
resources of the partnership to the activities assisted under
this part, including financial support, faculty
participation, and time commitments; and
``(14) describe the commitment of the partnership to
continue the activities assisted under this part without
grant funds provided under this part.

``SEC. 508. ASSURANCES.

``Each application submitted under this part shall contain
an assurance that the professional development partnership--
``(1) will enter into an agreement that commits the members
of the partnership to the support of students' learning, the
preparation of prospective and beginning teachers, the
continuing professional development of veteran teachers, the
periodic review of teachers, standards-based teaching and
learning, practice-based inquiry, and collaboration among
members of the partnership;
``(2) will use teachers of excellence, who have mastered
teaching techniques and subject areas, including teachers
certified by the National Board for Professional Teaching
Standards, to assist prospective and beginning teachers;
``(3) will provide for adequate preparation time to be made
available to teachers in the professional development school
and faculty at the institution of higher education to allow
the teachers and faculty time to jointly develop programs and
curricula for prospective and beginning teachers, ongoing
professional development opportunities, and the other
authorized activities described in section 506; and
``(4) will develop organizational structures that allow
principals and key administrators to devote sufficient time
to adequately participate in the professional development of
their staffs, including frequent observation and critique of
classroom instruction.

``SEC. 509. NATIONAL ACTIVITIES.

``(a) In General.--The Secretary shall reserve a total of
not more than 10 percent of the amount appropriated under
section 511 for each fiscal year for evaluation activities
under subsection (b), and the dissemination of information
under subsection (c).
``(b) National Evaluation.--The Secretary, by grant or
contract, shall provide for an annual, independent, national
evaluation of the activities of the professional development
partnerships assisted under this part. The evaluation shall
be conducted not later than 3 years after the date of
enactment of the Teacher Excellence in America Challenge Act
of 1997 and each succeeding year thereafter. The Secretary
shall report to Congress and the public the results of such
evaluation. The evaluation, at a minimum, shall assess the
short-term and long-term impacts and outcomes of the
activities assisted under this part, including--
``(1) the extent to which professional development
partnerships enhance student achievement;
``(2) how, and the extent to which, professional
development partnerships lead to improvements in the quality
of teachers;
``(3) the extent to which professional development
partnerships improve recruitment and retention rates among
beginning teachers, including beginning minority teachers;
and
``(4) the extent to which professional development
partnerships lead to the assignment of beginning teachers to
public elementary or secondary schools that have a shortage
of teachers who teach the subject matter in which the teacher
received a degree or specialized training.
``(c) Dissemination of Information.--The Secretary shall
disseminate information (including creating and maintaining a
national database) regarding outstanding professional
development schools, practices, and programs.

``SEC. 510. SUPPLEMENT NOT SUPPLANT.

``Funds appropriated under section 511 shall be used to
supplement and not supplant other Federal, State, and local
public funds expended for the professional development of
elementary school and secondary school teachers.

``SEC. 511. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

``There is authorized to be appropriated to carry out this
part $100,000,000 for fiscal year 1999, and such sums as may
be necessary for each of the fiscal years 2000 through
2003.''.

SEC. 2. REPEALS.

Part B of title V of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20
U.S.C. 1103 et seq.), subparts 1 and 3 of part C of such
title (20 U.S.C. 1104 et seq., 1106 et seq.), subparts 3 and
4 of part D of such title (20 U.S.C. 1109 et seq., 1110 et
seq.), subpart 1 of part E of such title (20 U.S.C. 1111 et
seq.), and part F of such title (20 U.S.C. 1113 et seq.), are
repealed.
______

By Ms. SNOWE:
S. 1170. A bill to establish a training voucher system, and for other
purposes; to the Committee on Labor and Human Resources.

the working american training voucher act of 1997

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President. I rise today to introduce legislation that
will address a serious need of America's workers: The need to receive
training that will prepare individuals for the workplace of the 21st
century. My legislation, entitled the ``Working American Training
Voucher Act,'' would provide $1,000 training vouchers to 1 million
working men and women who typically have little or no access to
employer-provided training.
Mr. President, many Federal programs focus on the needs of those
whose challenges and difficulties are most easily recognized and
tangible. When we see a hungry child, an unemployed adult, or an
impoverished senior citizen, we justifiably want to reach out and do
what we can to help. Indeed, I am proud to be an active voice for those
whose challenges and pains we can sometimes only imagine. However, it
is oftentimes difficult to recognize the needs of those whose
challenges are less tangible, whose concerns are less evident, or whose
sense of insecurity about the future is known only by the individual
and their family.
It is this difficulty that confronts many American workers today. In
the face of increasing global competition, many workers wonder if the
job they have today will be there for them tomorrow. They are concerned
that the advent of new technologies is making their skills and talents
less useful for their current employers which, in turn, makes them feel
more vulnerable and expendable. And they wonder if the skills they
posses today are even marketable if they are downsized or otherwise put
out of work.
Unfortunately, these types of concerns and anxieties oftentimes do
not show on the surface, so it can be difficult for others to recognize
or address them. It is too easy for many to assume that because a man
or woman is already holding down a job, all is well and his or her
future is secure. After all, how bad can it be if you're punching a
time clock and getting a paycheck? Unfortunately, such a view is not
only shortsighted, it is also misguided and could prove disastrous.
We should not wait until a worker has been laid off from their job,
or a company shuts its doors and shutters its windows, to take steps to
help the American worker. Rather, we should take steps to ensure that
our Nation's work force is confident of their future and feels prepared
to address the changes that tomorrow will bring. Not only does this
help the individual, but I think we would all agree that the best way
to reduce the impact and cost of unemployment is to take steps to keep
those who are already employed on the job.
Admittedly, many policies and decisions play an integral role in
creating a vibrant job market. The tax burden we place on businesses,
the trade agreements we sign with foreign governments, and the
regulatory load we place on employers all have a significant impact on
our economy's ability to produce and sustain good jobs. However, for
the individual, many of these polices seem too macro to have an impact
on their own employment prospects. In fact, an individual may not even
recognized the direct impact these broader policies have on their job
from day to day.
There is, however, one issue that truly strikes at the heart of how
an individual feels about the future: The degree to which he or she
knows that their skills match the needs of their

[[Page S9217]]

current employer or other prospective employers in the marketplace.
Without this knowledge, it does not matter to an individual if the
unemployment rate is as low as economists consider the natural rate of
unemployment or if the newspapers tell him or her that the economy
couldn't be better. The simple fact is that unless an individual
personally feels that their skills are up-to-date and marketable, there
will never be a complete sense of security on the job from one day to
the next.
And that's what the legislation I am introducing today is all about.
The Working American Training Voucher Act addresses the needs of the
average American worker--the individual who has a job today, but
doesn't know if he or she has the skills needed for the jobs of
tomorrow. The person who's collecting a paycheck now, but is concerned
that the rapidly changing work environment may put an end to that soon.
Mr. President, we all know new technologies and new products are
entering the workplace at an unprecedented rate and the changes these
technologies bring are substantial. Few professions and few jobs have
gone untouched by these changes--and even fewer will be immune from
change in the future. Indeed, just as computers have changed the face
of manufacturing, they have also changed the world of art and design.
Even labor intensive tasks at assembly shops have taken on a high-tech
flair thanks to new technologies.

For an individual who understands these technologies or received
training in their use, these changes present exciting new opportunities
that improve performance and ultimately give one a sense of assurance
that their skills are in demand. But for those who do not understand
these technologies or do not receive training in their use, these
technologies are nothing more than a threat and cause for anxiety.
Regrettably, even as the demand for training at all levels in the
workplace continues to grow because of these changing technologies, the
United States has historically lagged far behind our global competitors
in training workers. In fact, a study by the Congressional Office of
Technology Assessment concluded: ``When measured by international
standards, most American workers are not well trained.''
While some U.S. companies devote a substantial amount of money to
training, many of our global competitors spend considerably more. A
study by the American Society for Training and Development highlighted
this point when it found that U.S. companies spend--in the aggregate--
approximately 1.4 percent of their payroll on training, while a number
of our competitor nations actually require companies to spend 2 to 4
percent. While I would not espouse a mandatory training budget for any
business, I believe we can and should seek to improve the availability
of training for our Nation's workers--and especially for those who need
it most but are least likely to receive it. And that's precisely who
the working American training voucher is designed to reach.
Mr. President, the working American training voucher would provide
access to critically needed training for workers at businesses with 200
or fewer employees. Why is it targeted to workers in small businesses?
Quite simply, because these are the individuals who are the least
likely to receive--or be offered--employer-provided training. The same
report by the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment summarized
the plight of employees at small businesses quite succinctly: ``Many
(employees) in smaller firms receive no formal training.''
A recent report--completed by Prof. Craig Olson at the University of
Wisconsin-Madison and presented to the Senate Manufacturing Task Force
this past September--looked at the difference between the likelihood an
individual would receive training and the level of educational
achievement he or she attained, or the field he or she chose to enter.
Dr. Olson's study found that individuals with a bachelor's or master's
degree had a 50 percent chance of receiving training in the past year,
while individuals with a high school diploma had only a 17 percent
chance. Those who dropped out of high school fared even worse; their
odds of receiving training were only 5 percent.
When viewed by occupation, individuals who worked in production- or
service-related jobs had only a 16 percent and 18 percent chance of
receiving training respectively, while those in management had a 50
percent chance. When considering that only one in four American workers
received training in the past 12 months, these odds don't bode well for
many employees at small businesses whose educational attainment and
occupations fall in the categories that are the least likely to receive
training.
One might understandably ask: Why is it that small businesses often
provide so little training? The answer: cost. Small businesses are
quite often unable to afford the cost of sending an employee to a
training program. When your business is just trying to make ends meet,
it's impossible to send an employee to a training class that costs the
business both money and time away from work.
Mr. President, the working American training voucher is designed to
address this problem in a straightforward and efficient way. These
vouchers--valued at up to $1,000 each--would be made available to
employees at small businesses through the existing job training system
that is already in place as a result of the Job Training Partnership
Act, or JTPA. As my colleagues in the Senate know, State and local
governments--joined by the private sector--have primary responsibility
for the development, management, and administration of job training
programs in the JTPA, so no new distribution network would be necessary
to conduct this voucher program.
The only major requirement for receiving a voucher would be that the
employee and employer must agree on the specific training that will be
purchased with the voucher. This will ensure that the training will be
targeted specifically to the needs of the individual and the business--
money would not be spent on generic training programs that teach skills
that are of little, if any, use in a particular field or job.
Furthermore, such an agreement will ensure that workers are actively
engaged in pursuing training that will help their careers, even as
employers will be urging employees to undertake training that will help
the business.
The Senate Labor Committee will soon be preparing legislation to
recraft and consolidate many of our federally-run job training programs
in the JTPA. I am greatly concerned that none of our current 128 job
training programs is specifically targeted to training for currently
employed individuals--and I believe that the working American training
voucher would fill this void for those who need access to this training
the most. Therefore, I am hopeful that my legislation and this concept
will be incorporated in the job training reform bill when it is
reported from the Senate Labor Committee and is considered on the floor
of the Senate.
Mr. President, I believe that as we prepare our work force for the
next century, we should be encouraging workers to develop new skills
that will improve their longevity in their current jobs even as they
gain confidence that their skills will be needed in the future. Not
only will these new skills increase the confidence and performance of
the individual worker, but they will also improve the productivity of
the business who employs them. And we all know that if we improve a
business' productivity and output, that business is more likely to
survive and thrive--which means that this voucher may ultimately assist
in preserving businesses and jobs in the long run.
Furthermore, better skills and training will ensure that individuals
are able to rapidly transition to new jobs in the unfortunate event
their current job is lost for reasons beyond their control. Regardless
of how favorable the Tax Code is made or how many burdensome
regulations we remove, we will never be able to guarantee an individual
that his or her job will be around forever. But we can provide a worker
with access to training that will keep his or her skills up to date and
marketable no matter what the future holds.
Mr. President, the working American training voucher would be a
tangible, concrete, and definable program that would address a core
issue facing American workers. It will ensure that those who typically
have the least access to training will be able to acquire the skills
needed for their current jobs, while improving their jobs in the
future. It is targeted to those who are

[[Page S9218]]

most in need of assistance, and will ensure that we no longer wait
until an individual is out of work to provide help.
The Federal Government often promises the American people many
things, but we can never offer peace of mind to a worker who doesn't
know if his or her skills are adequate to keep them employed. Let's
take a step in the right direction and at least ensure that those who
have a job will not lose it due to a lack of access to training and new
skills. Let's pass the Working American Training Voucher Act.
______

By Ms. MOSLEY-BRAUN:
S. 1171. A bill for the relief of Janina Altagracia Castillo-Rojas
and her husband, Diogenes Patricio Rojas; to the Committee on the
Judiciary.

private relief legislation

Ms. MOSELEY-BRAUN. Mr. President, I am introducing this bill today to
provide relief to Janina Altagracia Castillo-Rojas and her husband,
Diogenes Patricio Rojas. These two individuals, who currently reside in
Chicago, IL, face deportation later this month to the Dominican
Republic as a result of an absurd technicality in current Federal
immigration law.
Ms. Rojas has been denied citizenship because her mother was the
child of a U.S. citizen female and foreign male. Previous law allowed
only children of U.S. citizen males and foreign females to claim U.S.
citizenship.
Simply put, Mrs. Rojas has been denied U.S. citizenship because she
had the ``misfortune'' of having a U.S. citizen grandmother instead of
a U.S. citizen grandfather.
In 1994, Senator Paul Simon passed the Immigration and Nationality
and Technical Corrections Act, which allowed individuals born overseas
before 1934 to U.S. citizen mothers, and their descendants, to claim
U.S. citizenship. As a result of that 1994 law, the mother of Janina
Rojas applied for U.S. citizenship, which she received in January 1996.
When Janina Rojas attempted to derive citizenship as a descendant of
a direct beneficiary of the 1994 law, however, her application was
denied. Despite the 1994 law, the Immigration and Naturalization
Service requires that the mother of Janina Rojas meet transmission
requirements: the mother must have been physically present in the U.S.
for 10 years prior to Janina's birth, 5 of which were after the age of
16 years, in order for Janina to derive citizenship. Since her mother
was prohibited from becoming a U.S. citizen until 1996, however, it is
unreasonable to require that she was in the U.S. for 10 years.
Clearly, while 60 years of discriminatory law was corrected in 1994,
the citizenship qualifications of the line of descendants of those U.S.
citizen females remain adversely impacted.
On May 1 of this year, I introduced a bill, S. 677, the Equity In
Transmission of Citizenship Act of 1997, that will waive the parental
transmission requirement for the grandchildren of U.S. citizen females.
That bill has been referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee. While I
am hopeful S. 677 will be promptly approved, it may not be approved
before September 27, the deportation date of Mr. and Mrs. Rojas. The
private relief bill I introduce today will provide an extension for Mr.
and Mrs. Rojas so that S. 677 can be taken up and passed.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of this bill be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:

S. 1171

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. PERMANENT RESIDENCE.

Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, for purposes
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et
seq.), Janina Altagracia Castillo-Rojas and her husband,
Diogenes Patrico Rojas, shall be held and considered to have
been lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent
residence as of the date of the enactment of this Act upon
payment of the required visa fees.

SEC. 2. REDUCTION OF NUMBER OF AVAILABLE VISAS.

Upon the granting of permanent residence to Janina
Altagracia Castillo-Rojas and her husband, Diogenes Patricio
Rojas, as provided in this Act, the Secretary of State shall
instruct the proper officer to reduce by the appropriate
number during the current fiscal year the total number of
immigrant visas available to natives of the country of the
aliens' birth under section 203(a) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1153(a)).

____________________