[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 114 (Wednesday, September 3, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S8682-S8685]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                       AMERICAN POLICY IN BOSNIA

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, having just returned from a trip to Bosnia, 
I would like to describe my impressions

[[Page S8683]]

and offer my views on American policy there, if I may.
  As many of my colleagues will remember, and some would rather not 
remember, over the last 6\1/2\ years I have been bipartisan in my 
criticism and my critical statements about our policy toward the states 
of the former Yugoslavia. I began criticizing the Bush administration 
early in 1991 and continued to criticize the Clinton administration 
until September of 1995 when it finally carried out the airstrikes that 
I had called for 3 years earlier and subsequently lifted the immoral 
and illegal arms embargo on Bosnia as part of the Dayton accords.
  Now, Mr. President, for the first time I find myself in general 
agreement with the direction of American policy. My change of opinion 
does not, however, reflect either complete satisfaction or complacency. 
We have reached a very critical point in our policy toward Bosnia, Mr. 
President, as all of my colleagues know. Resolute American action, 
combined with allied support and local compliance, can turn the corner. 
But I respectfully suggest, absent any one of those factors--resolute 
American action, combined with allied support and local compliance--we 
will not only not turn the corner; I believe we will return to the 
genocide and chaos that prevailed 6 years ago.
  To that end, we can, Mr. President, and we must, in my opinion, act 
decisively to bring indicted war criminals to trial before the 
International Tribunal in the Hague.
  We can, and must, Mr. President, induce the authorities in the 
Federation and the Republika Srpska to greatly expand the number of 
refugees returning to their prewar homes.
  We can and must, Mr. President, ensure that the countrywide municipal 
elections in mid-September and the parliamentary elections in the 
Republika Srpska in October, are held and that they are free and fair.
  We can and must, Mr. President, guarantee free access to electronic 
media for all points of view in both the Federation and the Republika 
Srpska. I hope that the agreement on the television transmitter reached 
yesterday with the Karadzic forces is a move in that direction. If they 
go back on the bargain, SFOR troops should reoccupy that transmitter 
and take it back.
  We can and must continue to support the Republika Srpska's President 
Biljana Plavsic in her struggle against indicted war criminal Radovan 
Karadzic.
  We can and must, Mr. President, ensure that the decision of the 
arbitrator on Brcko in March 1998 is accepted peacefully.
  In short, Mr. President, a lot remains to be accomplished in the 
coming months. But it is critically important for the American people 
and for my colleagues in the Congress to be clear on one fundamental 
point: Contrary to what is frequently stated, there has been progress 
on the civilian provisions of the Dayton accords, as well as on the 
well-publicized military side of the equation.
  To guarantee that this progress continues and expands, the 
international community must not withdraw its entire military 
stabilization force after June 1998. The negative consequences of 
backsliding into renewed warfare in Bosnia would far outweigh the cost 
of a continued, if scaled-down commitment with no or much fewer 
American troops.
  Let me then, Mr. President, discuss the current situation in Bosnia. 
First, the war criminals issue. The type of operation carried out in 
Prijedor in July in which British and Czech SFOR troops, supported by 
American forces, captured one indicted criminal and killed another 
indicted war criminal after being fired upon, must be repeated against 
Dr. Karadzic and General Mladic.
  After conversations with leading American military officers in 
Bosnia, I am confident that such an operation is feasible. No American 
wishes casualties to occur, but if all other means fail, force must be 
employed and risk taken in order to arrest these war criminals. I am 
confident that the opportunity will present itself, and if it is seized 
upon, the operation will succeed.
  Moreover, I suspect that after an initial angry response, most people 
in the Republika Srpska would be content to go about improving their 
impoverished lives, relieved of the plague of the authoritarian 
extortionists in Pale. Apprehension of the war criminals will not be a 
panacea for Bosnia's ills, but in my view it is a necessary 
precondition for the Dayton accords to have a chance of continuing to 
work.
  I met with opposition leaders in the Republika Srpska. I met for well 
over an hour with President Plavsic. I met with a Russian military 
commander. I met with the American military. I met with the French 
military. In fact, I met with most of the major players in Bosnia 
during the time I was there. There is not anyone who will privately 
tell you that Karadzic and Mladic on the loose and continuing to run 
the Republika Srpska does anything, anything at all positive. As a 
matter of fact, all will tell you privately, and most will tell you 
publicly, that these two must be withdrawn from the scene. They will 
say it in different ways. They will say, ``withdrawn, captured, tried 
and convicted,'' or they will say ``driven out of the country.''
  But the bottom line is that nobody believes there is any possibility 
of the Dayton accords being fully implemented if, in fact, the most 
notorious of the war criminals continue to run the Republika Srpska 
like a thug operation, undermining free elections in the Republika 
Srpska within Bosnia and undermining Mrs. Plavsic. Now Mrs. Plavsic is 
no shrinking violet, is clearly a nationalist, and is not someone we 
would choose if we could invent a President for the Republika Srpska. 
But she is, at a minimum, honest and not running the rackets. She has 
greatly undermined Mr. Karadzic's power by pointing out the corruption 
he has engaged in and how he is literally robbing the people of the 
Republika Srpska.
  There is still 90 percent unemployment there. At least in the 
Federation it has dropped from 90 percent to 50 percent. As I will 
discuss in a moment, there is progress being made in the Federation, 
slow as it may be, but there is a gigantic impediment in the Republika 
Srpska, and his name is Karadzic, an indicted war criminal. I have met 
him in the past. I told him more than 4 years ago that he was--I will 
not precisely repeat what I said--but I said bluntly to his face that 
he was a war criminal and should be tried as one. He looked at me and 
resumed talking as if he were saying, ``Lots of luck in your senior 
year. No problem; thanks for talking to me.'' This guy is a madman, and 
he is undermining the prospects of any peace for the people of Bosnia--
Serb, Croat, or Muslim alike.
  Over the last year, the government of the Federation, comprised 
mainly of Muslims and Croats, has slowly begun to take meaningful 
shape. New national, entity, and cantonal governments were chosen in 
the September 1996 elections and are starting to function. The Bosnian 
Presidency and the council of ministers meet in regular sessions.
  In Sarajevo, I had a lengthy discussion with Kresimir Zubak, the Co-
President of the National Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with 
many leading figures in the Federation administration and the Cabinet, 
and with nonnationalist Muslim and Croat opposition leaders.
  No one attempted to gloss over the friction that persists, Mr. 
President. As a matter of fact, I invited a group--and I will submit 
the list of people we invited--of leading Muslims, Croats, and Serbs to 
a dinner the first night I arrived. The first comment made by, I think, 
Federation Vice President Ejup Ganic, a Muslim, was ``Senator, we have 
not sat down at a table like this for 6 years. You have accomplished 
something all by itself just by getting 15 of us to show up.''
  I do not want to paint a picture here that things in the Federation 
are rosy and wonderful. They are not. But everybody agreed on two 
things: First, enormous progress was being made in the Federation; and 
second, it is absolutely essential for the international military force 
to remain in Bosnia after June 1998 to guarantee that progress will 
continue.
  I made clear that a partnership is a two-way street. Politicians from 
all three principal religious groups in Bosnia must make redoubled 
efforts to carry out the terms of the Dayton accords, especially the 
return of refugees.
  As Americans see evidence of increased success in civilian 
implementation, our willingness to stay the course in Bosnia will 
increase accordingly.

[[Page S8684]]

  And, Mr. President, there is much evidence to support the view that 
positive change is already occurring. Approximately 150,000 refugees 
have returned to Bosnia from abroad and another 160,000 internally 
displaced persons have returned to their homes, including a few to 
areas where they will be a distinct minority.
  Meanwhile, the Train and Equip Program, led by private American 
military instructors, retired military, is molding a Muslim-Croat 
defense force for the Government of Bosnia guaranteeing the 
Federation's security in the future. Agreements on the Federation force 
structure and command have been reached, and over 300 million dollars' 
worth of military equipment has been procured.
  Remember, Mr. President, the big problem was initially that we could 
not get the Muslim and the Croats in the Federation to agree to a joint 
military command. They would not train together. Now we have a joint 
military command. Muslims and Croats are sitting in the same 
classrooms. The officer corps and the enlisted men are all training 
together. There has been solid progress.
  In Hadzici, west of Sarajevo, I visited the headquarters of the Train 
and Equip Program and spoke with the Federation's Minister of Defense 
and his deputy, with the commanders of the Muslim and Croat forces, and 
with soldiers of both armies. The cooperation is excellent, and their 
American trainers had high praise for their eagerness to learn and 
their aptitude.
  In the Federation, joint police forces are being formed, including in 
the city of Mostar, site of the worst warfare between Muslim and 
Croats.
  Within the framework of this modicum of stability, the economy is 
beginning to revive. Real gross domestic product has nearly doubled 
since 1995. As I mentioned, unemployment has dropped from 90 percent to 
50 percent. Corruption, though, remains a major problem.
  Nonetheless, if there is continued security, political progress, and 
international technical and financial assistance, the Federation, I 
believe, can be a going concern within a few years.
  One of the nonnational opposition leaders with whom I met, Stjepan 
Kljujic, an ethnic Croat, offered the opinion that the Federation had 
to be better than the Republika Srpska politically, economically, and 
morally. Making an intriguing historical parallel, he continued that 
the Federation should become Bosnia's West Germany against the 
Republika Srpska's East Germany, even attracting guest workers from the 
latter as the economic disparity between the two entities widens. In 
this way, he felt, the two halves of the country could eventually grow 
together.
  Whatever the validity of this vision, conditions in the Republika 
Srpska are already quite different from those in the Federation because 
of Mr. Karadzic's heavy hand. The Bosnian Serb member of the tripartite 
Presidency, Momcilo Krajisnik, an ally of Karadzic, has refused all but 
minimal fulfillment of the Dayton provisions. As a result, the 
international community has withheld most of its development aid from 
the Republika Srpska.

  The economy there remains in shambles with less than 10 percent of 
the work force gainfully employed. In the midst of this misery, Dr. 
Karadzic--it is hard to even call him a doctor, but he is a doctor--and 
his cronies ostentatiously flaunt the wealth they have amassed through 
smuggling and protection rackets.
  It is no wonder, then, that Mrs. Plavsic's anticorruption message has 
struck a chord with wide segments of the population in the Republika 
Srpska. I met with her for an hour and a half in Banja Luka. We must 
not have any illusions that President Plavsic, who loudly supported 
Serbian ultranationalists and ethnic cleansing during the war, has 
suddenly become a Jeffersonian Democrat. She is, however, a realist who 
understands that the Bosnian Serb entity is in danger of total 
disintegration unless it rids itself of the lawlessness, corruption, 
and warped religious hatred of the Karadzic gang and begins to 
cooperates with the West.
  In all likelihood, by seizing the Banja Luka police headquarters, 
SFOR prevented a coup d'etat against Mrs. Plavsic last month. Our 
support of her police forces and television journalists may be turning 
the tide against the thugs in Pale, at least in the western part of the 
Republika Srpska.
  Since two-thirds of the population of the Republika Srpska lives in 
the western part of the entity, there is a good possibility that 
President Plavsic's supporters can win control of the Parliament in 
next month's election. If that occurs, we should be able to leverage 
the promise of reconstruction assistance to induce President Plavsic to 
begin to cooperate on refugee returns.
  Moreover, a lively antinationalist Serbian opposition exists in the 
Republika Srpska. In Banja Luka, I met with three of its leaders--
Miodrag Zivanovic, Mladen Ivanic, and Milorad Dodik. They feel that 
democracy is unstoppable and that Mrs. Plavsic, of whom they have been 
sworn enemies, is only a transitional figure whom they will support 
during this election as a step toward genuine democracy.
  Actually, the beginnings of refugee returns are already occurring, 
including some into areas controlled by other religious groups. I 
visited two such sites, one in the zone of separation near the critical 
northern town of Brcko, the other in Vogosca, a suburb of Sarajevo 
which was returned to the Federation as part of the Dayton settlement.
  In the Brcko area, rebuilding is proceeding under the skillful 
direction of the U.S. supervisor, Ambassador Bill Farrand, and the 
protection of the local American SFOR contingent, based nearby in Camp 
McGovern. I might add that I was amazed at how high the morale was in 
Camp McGovern and how greatly impressed I was by Brig. Gen. Mark Curran 
and Lt. Col. Bill Greer, the two senior officers, who were doing a 
phenomenal job there.
  Hostility in Brcko lies just below the surface, as shown by the riots 
organized by Karadzic loyalists less than 2 days after I left the city. 
The soldiers from Camp McGovern handled that potentially explosive 
situation with consummate professionalism, and I am confident they will 
continue to do so.
  I will digress briefly at this point, Mr. President, to mention that 
an important feature of SFOR are the Russian troops under the command 
of General Clark, the SACEUR, the [Supreme Allied Commander Europe]. At 
Camp McGovern, I met with the commanding officer of the Russian SFOR 
airborne brigade who was enthusiastic about the cooperation with our 
forces and totally supportive of our action.
  To return to refugee resettlement, unlike the palpable hostility in 
Brcko, in the Sarajevo suburb the situation was peaceful. There I saw 
Muslims, Croats, and one or two Serbs who were returning to rebuild 
their devastated homes under an imaginative program run by the United 
States Agency for International Development in cooperation with 
Catholic Relief Services.
  Mr. President, it is worth underscoring here that not only are our 
magnificent Armed Forces under the inspired command of Gen. Eric 
Shinseki playing the largest single role in SFOR, but our United States 
Government development specialists have won universal respect among the 
Bosnians for being the international community's most efficient 
providers of assistance.
  As a matter of fact, one of the Bosnian Serb opposition leaders said 
to me in Banja Luka that the Europeans are incapable of solving Bosnia 
s problems. By way of contrast he characterized the Americans as ``not 
always sensitive but very efficient.'' That is just what I would like 
us to be--``not always sensitive but very efficient.''
  In summation, where do I see Bosnia and Herzegovina heading if the 
United States and our allies stay the course? Personally, I would like 
to see a multi-ethnic, multireligious society re-emerge like the one 
that existed in Sarajevo before the war. I fear, however, that too much 
blood has been shed and too many atrocities committed for that to 
happen in the near future.
  More realistic, and politically feasible, is the development of a 
multi-ethnic state, most likely in the form of a confederation with a 
good degree of decentralization.
  My sense from this trip is that the ardor has cooled in the Republika 
Srpska for union with Serbia, since President Milosevic is regarded as 
a betrayer of the Serb cause and as a figure totally incapable of 
providing the basic material prosperity that the Bosnian Serbs so 
desperately crave.

[[Page S8685]]

  Unreconstructed Croat nationalists in Herzegovina may still long for 
union with Croatia, but as the leadership changes in Zagreb, the new 
government there will be more intent on integrating with Western Europe 
than on annexing provincial bandits.
  In short, for the first time in years, developments are moving in the 
right direction. As I have outlined, much hard political and economic 
work remains to be done, most of it by the Bosnians themselves. The 
United States and its allies can, and must, provide the framework for 
the Dayton accords to be fully implemented.
  I do not minimize the cost to the American taxpayer of our efforts. 
Neither, however, can I underestimate the cost of a failure of the 
Bosnian operation. In the near future, I will indicate in some detail 
what I think the costs would be to the United States if, in fact, 
Bosnia were to erupt once again. Suffice it to say now that not only 
would all that has been accomplished go up in smoke as fighting 
reignited, but a failure in Bosnia would signal the beginning of the 
end for NATO, which is currently restructuring itself to meet Bosnia-
like challenges in the 21st century.
  Therefore, I call upon the Clinton administration immediately to 
begin discussions with our allies about creating a post-SFOR force 
after June 1998. For months, I recommended a combined joint task force 
with our allies, which the Senate overwhelmingly advocated in July in 
the 1998 defense authorization Bill.
  The question of whether American participation in a post-SFOR force 
will be limited to air, naval, intelligence, and communications support 
with a rapid deployment force in reserve in Hungary, or also might 
include a greatly reduced ground contingent can be resolved in these 
negotiations.
  The immediate priority is to begin the negotiations now--to make 
clear to all parties in Bosnia that, if they cooperate, the security 
framework will continue for a limited time--and to make clear to the 
skeptics that the new NATO can and will be the driving force in the 
European security architecture of the 21st century.
  I thank my colleague from Arizona for his indulgence. I thank the 
President for the time.
  I yield the floor.

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