[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 112 (Friday, August 1, 1997)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E1626-E1627]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


     THE CASE FOR NATO ENLARGEMENT: THE VIEWS OF GEN. WILLIAM ODOM

                                 ______
                                 

                            HON. TOM LANTOS

                             of california

                    in the house of representatives

                        Thursday, July 31, 1997

  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, the debate over enlargement of NATO has now 
been engaged in earnest since NATO Summit in Madrid made the decision 
to extend invitations to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to 
become full-fledged members of the alliance.
  The Congress now faces important decisions regarding NATO 
enlargement. Probably next year, the Senate will consider under the 
Constitution's provision on the ratification of treaties, the admission 
of these three countries, and the House and Senate will consider 
legislation that will be necessary to implement this expansion, 
including matters relating to the cost of enlargement.
  In the wake of the Madrid Summit, the debate has been engaged on the 
merits and wisdom of expanding NATO. My position on this issue, Mr. 
Speaker, has been clear and unequivocal. As soon as the Communist 
regimes in Central Europe began to collapse in 1989, I urged the 
expansion of NATO in order to bring strategic stability, democratic 
reform and the cultivation of a civil society, development of free 
market-oriented economies, fostering of respect for human rights, and 
the institution of civilian control of the military forces in these 
emerging democracies. I continue to support strongly the enlargement of 
NATO. When the current expansion was being considered, I urged the 
inclusion of the three countries which were invited to join, as well as 
the inclusion of Romania and Slovenia. I continue to support expansion 
to include Romania and Slovenia as well as other countries which are 
prepared to contribute to NATO in the future.
  As the debate on NATO enlargement has been engaged, one of the best 
expositions of the rationale for expansion was presented by my good 
friend, Bill Odom, who has had a distinguished military career. The 
Washington Post published his view in a recent Sunday ``Outlook'' 
section. Mr. Speaker, I call the attention of my colleagues to this 
excellent analysis, and I ask that it be placed in the Record.

                [From the Washington Post, July 6, 1997]

 A Look at . . . Expanding NATO--History Tells Us the Alliance Should 
                                  Grow

                          (By William E. Odom)

       Enlarging NATO is the last major strategic challenge 
     confronting America in the 20th century. Previously in the 
     century, this nation has failed to meet only one: keeping the

[[Page E1627]]

     peace in Europe after World War I. Will it fail a second 
     time? The two cases are disturbingly analogous: Many American 
     political leaders are again obsessed with domestic issues, 
     refusing to recognize their inextricable ties to security 
     affairs and misunderstanding the new forces in Europe.
       America withdrew from Europe after World War I, leaving a 
     belt of new democracies, the so-called ``successor states,'' 
     extending from the Baltic to the Mediterranean. France, 
     Britain, Germany and the Soviet Union soon entangled them in 
     competing alliances. Although they all began as democracies, 
     by the mid-1930s all but one were dictatorships. These 
     developments ensured another war.
       History does not repeat itself, but structural continuities 
     often prompt similar political developments. That is why the 
     period between the two world wars is so instructive today. 
     The critics insist that NATO can survive without enlargement. 
     In the short term, they are right, but the longer-term 
     dynamics would inevitably fracture the alliance. Maintaining 
     the status quo is a sure formula for bringing about U.S. 
     withdrawal from Europe. Confronted by strong forces of 
     change, NATO will either enlarge to moderate them or be 
     broken by them. And the key to moderating them is Germany, 
     not Russia.
       Managing the emergence of German power peacefully has been 
     the major problem in 20th-century Europe. Not only did German 
     leaders fail in 1914, other European leaders share the blame. 
     The resulting Great War produced the Soviet problem, the 
     Nazis and a new war, the bloodiest in history.
       After 1945, the United States rectified its earlier 
     mistake, remaining engaged in Europe to resist Soviet 
     expansion. As the rationale for NATO, however, the German 
     problem loomed larger for most Europeans than the Soviet 
     threat, especially for the French. NATO proved surprisingly 
     effective in nurturing a new Germany as well as containing 
     Soviet power, but today the Soviet threat is gone while the 
     German problem is not entirely resolved. German leaders 
     understand this reality well, and that is why they strongly 
     support NATO enlargement. They seek to bind Germany within an 
     integrated Europe as a way to avoid a return to their old 
     predicament.
       The European Union's (EU) goal of a ``common foreign and 
     defense policy,'' therefore, is conceived as a lasting 
     solution to the German problem. Its realization, however, 
     remains far from complete as the EU faces the changes caused 
     by the end of the Cold War. In the absence of a multilateral 
     mechanism incorporating Central Europe, competitive policies 
     toward that region will be pursued unilaterally by Germany, 
     France, Britain, Russia and others. (A reappearance of the 
     interwar patterns of diplomacy was evident in the Europeans' 
     reaction to the breakup of Yugoslavia. Finally, NATO forces 
     were required to restore peace in Bosnia.) Thus, Central 
     Europe will again become the scene of some, if not all, of 
     the perverse dynamics of the interwar period unless NATO 
     enlarges to preempt them.
       Suppose the United States had followed the advice of the 
     critics and rejected NATO enlargement. Could NATO survive the 
     dynamics of the competition among its key members that would 
     follow? Some argue that the EU could moderate them. But that 
     is unpersuasive in light of the obstacles confronting the 
     EU's adoption of a single currency, not to mention a common 
     defense and foreign policy. Actually, Central Europe presents 
     the EU with a paralyzing dilemma: to ``widen'' or to 
     ``deepen'' its integration process? Widening into Central 
     Europe would delay the deepening of existing political and 
     military integration; deepening would leave Central Europe as 
     a zone of diplomatic competition, endangering the EU process 
     itself. Why? Germany.
       Britain and France, which were already uncomfortable with a 
     federal Europe that included a strong but divided Germany, 
     are more nervous about a unified Germany bound to be the 
     federation's dominant component. Without a federal Europe, 
     they will be tempted to engage Central Europe against 
     Germany, a game that will invite the most mischievous 
     diplomacy by Moscow. The only viable way out is through NATO 
     enlargement--that is, engaging NATO in the same role in 
     Central Europe that it has long played within Western Europe.
       The opponents of enlargement wring their hands about 
     Russia, financial costs and other problems while ignoring the 
     crucially important German problem, no matter that German 
     politicians from all parties warn against leaving Germany on 
     its own to deal with the East.
       To be sure, NATO enlargement will cause problems, but its 
     opponents focus mainly on the manageable ones. They usually 
     exaggerate the financial costs. So, too, Russia's probable 
     reaction. The venerable Russia expert George Kennan warns 
     that expansion will destroy Russian democracy. Why would 
     Russia give up democracy to spite NATO? That would harm 
     Russia, not NATO. Actually, Russia has very little 
     ``liberal'' democracy to destroy. Civil and property rights 
     do not yet enjoy effective protection in Russia. NATO 
     enlargement will undercut those neoimperialist Russian 
     politicians who oppose it and who also misrepresent Russian 
     public attitudes toward it as reflected in polling data. 
     Moreover, proponents of enlargement also urge a continuing 
     and broad Western engagement with Russia, no its isolation.
       Other problems, however, are serious, especially the 
     reactions of those countries denied membership in the first 
     round. Their plight demands effective attention--foremost, 
     credible assurance that NATO enlargement is a continuing 
     process, not a one-time affair. An active policy of 
     continuing engagement with each is equally essential.
       New members will also cause problems. Some may have 
     embarrassing political scandals involving former Communists 
     and KGB connections. Some may falter in their democratic 
     transitions. NATO, of course, has already coped with such 
     problems in some present member states.
       Finally, some critics doubt the administration's competence 
     to carry through NATO enlargement. The president has yet to 
     make the case effectively to the public, and some European 
     leaders believe they are being treated poorly (in French 
     President Jacques Chirac's quaint language, ``like crap'') in 
     the consultation process. This is worrisome, not just where 
     it concerns Senate ratification but also realities in Europe. 
     When the president told the public that American credibility 
     was at stake if we did not commit troops to the NATO force in 
     Bosnia, he also set an early date for their withdrawal, 
     thereby undermining implementation of the Dayton accord. How 
     can the United States, then, have sufficient credibility in 
     Europe for carrying through on NATO enlargement if it walks 
     away from Bosnia before peace is secure? Success in Bosnia is 
     related to NATO enlargement. Fortunately, the administration 
     evaded the one-year deadline, but the secretary of defense 
     now calls for a pullout next year. Also, President Clinton's 
     occasional remarks on reducing NATO's military essence--for 
     example, after his recent meeting with President Boris 
     Yeltsin of Russia--do not reflect clear thinking about what 
     is required for Partnership for Peace activities. Bosnia and 
     other potential military operations. This is hardly 
     reassuring U.S. leadership.
       No great strategic departure is without risks, and 
     enlarging NATO has some, as its opponents abundantly point 
     out. Likewise, there are risks in not going forward, for 
     that, too, is a strategic departure--backward from Europe.
       The reunification of Germany within NATO is the greatest 
     strategic realignment in Europe's history without a major 
     war, an achievement no pundit would have conceded beforehand 
     to be possible. But that is only half of the task. 
     Consolidating a community of liberal democracies in Central 
     Europe and beyond is the more difficult half. Failure would 
     eventually affect America's own economy and security 
     adversely, not to mention the negative political and moral 
     consequences. Is America worthy of its liberty and prosperity 
     if it no longer dares to accept such challenges with energy 
     and optimism?

     

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