[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 111 (Thursday, July 31, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S8488-S8491]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                     NATO ENLARGEMENT AFTER MADRID

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, earlier this month in Madrid the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization held a momentous summit meeting, which 
brought together the heads of state and government of its 16-member 
countries to discuss the future of the Alliance in the 21st century.
  Mr. President, I was privileged to be a member of a bipartisan, 
bicameral Congressional delegation to the summit meeting. Today, I 
would like to discuss the results of Madrid and their important 
implications for American foreign policy.
  At Madrid, NATO took the historic step of inviting Poland, the Czech 
Republic, and Hungary to begin accession talks with the alliance.
  The alliance now has several pressing priorities as a followup to the 
summit.
  As its first priority, NATO must complete these accession talks this 
fall with the three prospective new members. Poland, the Czech 
Republic, and Hungary have all met the basic alliance membership 
requirements--democracy, civilian control of the military, the rule of 
law, no conflicts with neighbors, and the willingness and ability to 
assume alliance responsibilities.
  NATO and the candidates must now assess the military capabilities of 
each of the three in detail, and must plainly state each country's 
responsibilities and tasks within the alliance.
  Of particular importance is that the issues of cost of enlargment 
must be forthrightly addressed, both by the three prospective members 
and by all the current members of the alliance.
  The goal is to successfully conclude the talks with Poland, the Czech 
Republic, and Hungary in time for the Protocol of Accession to be 
signed at the NATO ministerial meeting in December of this year. The 
next step is for each of the 16 current NATO members to begin the 
process of ratification of amending the Washington treaty. Of course, 
Mr. President, according to our constitution, it is the U.S. Senate 
that is responsible for advice and consent to treaties, and we 
anticipate that we will consider the NATO enlargement treaty amendment 
next spring.
  NATO's second major priority after Madrid is developing a 
strengthened cooperative relationship with those countries that were 
not invited to be in the first group of new members. At Madrid, NATO 
re-emphasized an ``Open Door'' policy by which the first group of 
invited countries will not be the last. Additional candidacies will be 
considered, beginning with the next NATO summit, to be held here in 
Washington in April 1999 on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the 
founding of the alliance.
  In an important gesture, the Madrid summit communique singled out for 
special mention the positive developments toward democracy and the rule 
of law in Slovenia and Romania. As many of my colleagues will remember, 
I was a strong advocate of Slovenia's being included in the first group 
of new members.
  I anticipate that both Slovenia and Romania, and perhaps other 
countries, will be invited to accession talks with NATO in 1999.
  In addition, in a thinly veiled bow to Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania, the Madrid summit communique reiterated conditions set forth 
in NATO's 1995 study whereby no European democratic country will be 
excluded from consideration for membership because of its geographic 
location.
  Translated into real English that means that NATO will not allow 
Moscow to give the three Baltic states a double whammy.
  In other words, the Soviet Union's illegal, forcible incorporation of 
the Baltic states in 1940--which, I am proud to say, was never 
recognized by the United States--will not be used as a pretext to veto 
their consideration for NATO membership.
  Mr. President, Ukraine, with an area and population the size of 
France, is arguably the most strategically important country in East-
Central Europe. At Madrid, NATO and Ukraine signed a Charter on a 
Distinctive Partnership. Ukraine is currently not seeking NATO 
membership, but under President Kuchma (KOOCH-ma) it has undertaken 
democratic and free-market reforms in an attempt to move closer to the 
West. This charter should reinforce this trend.
  In order to keep the enlargement momentum going in the countries not 
yet ready for membership, a new Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council was 
inaugurated at Madrid. This body will direct an enhanced Partnership 
for Peace Program--a program involving more than two dozen countries, 
which, incidentally, has already far exceeded our most optimistic 
expectations.
  Of vital importance to the new security architecture in Europe is 
NATO's

[[Page S8489]]

new relationship with the Russian Federation. Based on the Founding Act 
between NATO and Russia, that new relationship has begun to take shape.
  The permanent joint council, whose consultative functions are 
outlined in the Founding Act, recently held a preliminary meeting, and 
more are planned for the autumn.
  Rather than being a rival for to the North Atlantic Council, as some 
critics have asserted, the permanent joint council will be a proving 
ground where Russia can show its intention to cooperate in a positive 
spirit with the West.
  I hope and expect that it will act in this manner. If, however, 
Moscow chooses the old path of propaganda and confrontation, then the 
permanent joint council will atrophy. But, I re-emphasize, in no way 
will the permanent joint council usurp the leading role in NATO played 
by the North Atlantic Council.
  The third and final immediate priority for NATO after the Madrid 
summit is to finalize the internal adaptation of the alliance. This, 
Mr. President, is a complex and crucially important issue.
  Beginning in 1991, NATO approved a new strategic concept, which moved 
beyond the cold war focus on collective defense and toward more diverse 
tasks in a global context. In order to carry out these new tasks, the 
new strategic concept emphasized the need for NATO to achieve an 
effective force projection capability.
  At the January 1994 Brussels summit, NATO agreed to set up a more 
flexible set of options for organizing and conducting military 
operations. This goal was, and is, to be achieved through the mechanism 
of the combined joint task force, known by its acronym CJTF. Although 
there has been considerable disagreement between the United States and 
France as to the theoretical details of how the CJTF is to be 
controlled, in practice both the IFOR and SFOR operations in Bosnia 
have been unofficial combined joint task forces under NATO command and 
control.
  Mr. President, I am going into this level of detail because, as I 
will discuss shortly, the question of post-SFOR Bosnia is inextricably 
tied in with the ratification of NATO enlargement.
  Another aspect of NATO's internal adaptation concerns reforms in the 
alliance's command structure. At the June 1996 ministerial meeting in 
Berlin, NATO agreed that a European security and defense identity--
known by its initials ESDI--would be created within the framework of 
the alliance by allowing European officers to wear a Western European 
Union [WEU] command hat as well as their NATO hat.
  As part of the restructuring, NATO has already reduced the number of 
its strategic commands from three to two, and it is also planning to 
reduce the number of major subordinate commands. It is at this 
intersection of ESDI and command structure, Mr. President, that the 
expressed interests of France and the United States have collided.
  The French want to have a European officer take over from an American 
as Commander of Armed Forces South [AFSOUTH] in Naples. We have 
rejected this proposal since it would impact upon our Sixth Fleet, even 
if the Fleet would formally remain under American command. Until now, 
the dispute remains unresolved, but at Madrid the French agreed to keep 
talking. In any event, disagreements over internal adaptation will not 
threaten the enlargement process.
  Mr. President, having been privileged to have been at Madrid and 
having followed the immediate follow-up to the summit, I find my belief 
reinforced that NATO is on the right track. There remain, however, two 
challenges, which if not satisfactorily met, could well torpedo 
ratification of NATO enlargement by this body. They are, first, 
burdensharing and, second, post-SFOR Bosnia.
  The first challenge is an existential one for NATO. The heads of 
state and government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic 
Council in Madrid directed the Council to ``bring to an early 
conclusion the concrete analysis of the resource implications of the 
forthcoming enlargement.'' The coming months will see serious 
discussion and study on the actual costs of enlargement.
  The Pentagon Report to the Congress in February 1997 was an excellent 
starting point. Personally, I find its methodology and conclusions 
convincing, but they have already been challenged by some of our 
European NATO partners. On other occasions I have discussed the details 
of the Pentagon study, so I will not take time today to repeat most of 
them.
  One aspect, though, bears special mention. Because the United States 
spent considerable sums of money in the 1980's and early 1990's to make 
our Europe-based forces deployable and sustainable, the Pentagon study 
calculates our share of the total bill to be less than some Europeans 
apparently would like. I believe that, in making that criticism, the 
Europeans are forgetting that in 1991 they signed onto the new NATO 
strategic concept that emphasizes force projection, to which I referred 
earlier.
  If our European friends disagree, let them offer an alternative 
methodology in the cost negotiations that were mandated at Madrid.
  Even if the absolute cost to the United States of NATO enlargement is 
well within our capabilities--as it is likely to be--we must insist 
that the costs are fairly apportioned within the alliance.
  I regret that the Madrid summit communique did not specifically call 
for an equitable sharing of the burden of providing the resources for 
enlargement.
  Moreover, the immediate post-Madrid statements by French President 
Chirac who said that France would not spend an extra franc for 
enlargement, and by German Chancellor Kohl, who said that United States 
cost estimates of enlargement were exaggerated, were not encouraging. 
They may accurately reflect Chirac's and Kohl's views, or they may 
merely be opening negotiating positions.
  In any event, I must emphasize in the strongest possible terms that 
the North Atlantic alliance is a partnership, not an American charity 
enterprise.
  While some of our European allies are making significant 
contributions to alliance multinational military activities, to cost-
sharing for stationed U.S. forces, and to foreign assistance--all of 
which have been listed by the Pentagon as relevant burden-sharing 
criteria--only Italy, Greece, and Turkey met congressional targets last 
year on defense spending as a percentage of gross domestic product. 
And, Mr. President, one might add that the motivations of the last two 
countries include arming to defend against each other.
  I will be very surprised if NATO's definitive enlargement cost 
study--to be completed in the coming months--does not call for outlays 
that will force Western European parliaments to increase considerably 
their appropriations for defense.
  At that point, Mr. President, we will reach the alliance's moment of 
truth. Eleven NATO members are also members of the European Union. I 
have great sympathy for the European Union's strenuous efforts to 
achieve an ever closer union. Merely trying to fulfill the criteria for 
launching a common European currency is proving extremely difficult and 
causing social tensions in several Western European countries.
  But, Mr. President, we in the United States have also been taking 
painful steps to balance our own budget. The U.S. Federal work force is 
being reduced by more than a quarter-million, and our appropriations 
for many worthy social, medical, and educational causes have been 
drastically pared down on austerity grounds.
  So, Mr. President, I don't think it is too much to ask of our 
European allies what we have been asking of the American people. If one 
Europe, whole and free is worth ensuring through an enlarged NATO, then 
our European allies will take up the challenge and make the sacrifices 
that we have made. If they feel it is not worth the price, then I fear 
that the future of the entire alliance will be cast in doubt.
  A corollary of burdensharing in NATO is the responsibility that the 
United States takes for the entire free world through its military 
activities outside of Europe, especially in the Pacific and the Middle 
East. As we proceed with NATO enlargement, we must be certain not to 
use a disproportionate share of our defense funds in Europe and thereby 
weaken our ability to carry out our responsibilties elsewhere.

[[Page S8490]]

 I am confident that with equitable burdensharing of enlargement, this 
will not happen.
  The second looming challenge, Mr. President, is creating a post-SFOR 
force for Bosnia. I have long called for applying the CJTF concept, to 
which I referred earlier, to Bosnia, so that our European allies can 
provide ground forces there after June 30, 1998, supported by awesome 
American air, naval, communications, and intelligence assets and an 
over-the-horizon U.S. Ready Reserve Force in the region.
  An amendment to that effect was included in the fiscal year 1998 
Defense Authorization Bill passed by the Senate.
  If our European allies follow the logic of their repeated calls for a 
European security and defense identity within NATO, which has been 
officially recognized by the alliance, then they should seize the 
opportunity offered by the expiration of SFOR's mandate next June.
  By taking up our offer of a CJTF they can consolidate the Dayton 
peace process and remove a major impediment to the ratification of NATO 
enlargement by the U. S. Senate.
  If, on the other hand, our European allies persist in their in 
together, out together mantra, oblivious to the Madrid communique's 
call for--``a true, balanced partnership in which Europe is taking on 
greater responsibility'' then this body will come to the obvious 
conclusion that the alliance's official policy upon which enlargement 
is based no longer obtains. Such a development would have the gravest 
consequences, not only for enlargement, but for the future of NATO 
itself.
  Mr. President, I sound these warnings in the firm belief that my two 
doomsday scenarios will not come to pass. For all but the most 
provincial Europeans and isolationist Americans recognize the need for 
the United States to remain intimately involved with Europe and will 
not want to jeopardize that involvement. The history of the 20th 
century has shown that when the United States absents itself from 
European affairs, the Europeans--unfortunately--are unable peacefully 
to resolve their disputes. The result in World War I and World War II 
was an enormous American sacrifice of blood and treasure.
  In order that we should never repeat that isolationist mistake, the 
United States in 1949 led the founding of NATO, the most successful 
defensive alliance in history.
  For nearly half a century it has kept the peace in Western Europe, 
allowing its European members to rebuild, overcome their own ethnic and 
national animosities, and eventually to prosper.
  Mr. President, NATO enlargement involves serious policy commitments 
for the United States, and therefore must be held up to the closest 
scrutiny. Many of us have been posing relevant questions to the 
administration for several months, and we have received satisfactory 
answers. There will, of course, continue to be new issues to be faced 
as we get deeper into the details of enlargement. But I believe that it 
serves no useful purpose to repeatedly recycle already answered 
questions, as if possessed with a need to reinvent the wheel.
  For example, some of my colleagues recently asked, once again, what 
threat NATO enlargement is designed to counter. But both the Clinton 
administration and NATO long ago answered that question: the threat is 
instability in Central and Eastern Europe, the crucible for two world 
wars in this century. NATO enlargement will extend the decades-old zone 
of stability eastward on the continent.
  In case anyone thinks that I am only spouting theoretical political 
science phrases, let me cite an article in the July 28, 1997 edition of 
The Washington Times, which quotes the head of the Security Policy 
Division of the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry. Saying that his country 
was delighted by NATO's decision in Madrid to invite Poland, the Czech 
Republic, and Hungary to join, the Lithuanian official explained--
``because that extends the zone of stability to our borders.''
  By now we surely know that the addition of Poland, the Czech 
Republic, and Hungary, NATO is not drawing new dividing lines on the 
continent, as some of my colleagues recently suggested. I think the 
jubilant crowd that welcomed the President in Bucharest--after the 
Madrid summit--has laid that myth to rest. The Romanians knew that 
NATO, by emphasizing its open door policy at Madrid, had once again 
made clear that its goal is an undivided, peaceful, and free Europe--
and an alliance that will welcome Romania as a member in the near 
future.
  Some of my colleagues would like to come up with a finely delineated 
taxonomy of ethnic quarrels, border disputes, external aggression, and 
the like, as a precondition for moving ahead with NATO enlargement.
  But, of course, such theoretical discussions are rapidly being made 
superfluous by the lure of NATO membership. Since enlargement became a 
real possibility Hungary and Romania have formally improved their 
relationship, as have Hungary and Slovakia, Romania and Ukraine, 
Slovenia and Italy, Poland and Lithuania, Germany and the Czech 
Republic, Russia and Ukraine, and other European countries that I am 
probably forgetting.
  Mr. President, these historic reconciliations did not happen by 
accident. With the notable and sad exception of parts of the former 
Yugoslavia, the various peoples of Central and Eastern Europe are no 
longer wallowing in the swamp of ancient, tribal hatreds. Rather, they 
are attuned to the 21st century and the opportunities that NATO 
enlargement, above all, can offer.
  Some of my colleagues have asked whether NATO membership will force 
the new Eastern European democracies to spend too much on arms when 
expenditures for infrastructure critical to economic growth are more 
pressing. Leaving aside the rather patronizing tone of the question, 
the answer has been clear for months: Warsaw, Prague, and Budapest each 
has no trouble defining its national interest. Pending verification in 
this fall's accession negotiations, the Polish, Czech, and Hungarian 
procurement plans fall well within prudent limits of the free-market 
economic reforms that all three have been implementing for several 
years.
  Some of my colleagues have asked whether membership in the European 
Union might be a better option for these countries to achieve economic 
stability than NATO membership.
  Again, Mr. President, I think we must treat the Central and East 
Europeans like adults. They know what is vital to them.
  Moreover, why--other than to throw up roadblocks in the NATO 
enlargement process--would one posit an artificial dilemma? It's not an 
either or choice: many of these countries are viable candidates for 
both NATO and EU enlargement.
  In fact, earlier this month the European Union invited the first 
three NATO enlargement candidates--Poland, the Czech Republic, and 
Hungary--plus Slovenia, Estonia, and Cyprus to membership talks for the 
next round of EU enlargement.
  Some of my colleagues have asked, what have we given up in terms of 
NATO's own freedom of action to deploy forces throughout the expanded 
area of the alliance in order to obtain Russian acquiescence to the 
expansion plan?
  Well, Mr. President, the answer is a simple, nothing. We have known 
since NATO made crystal clear last March as part of its famous three 
no's declaration that the alliance has no reason, intention, or plan in 
the current and foreseeable security environment permanently to station 
substantial combat forces of current members on the territory of new 
members. Obviously, if the security environment changes, so too will 
NATO's troop stationing policy. In short, we have retained our freedom 
of action and have given up nothing--zero. I hope that issue has been 
laid to rest.
  While everyone by now admits that Russia's leaders have acquiesced to 
NATO enlargement, some of my colleagues have asked the unanswerable 
question: But what of tomorrow's Russian leaders? They wonder whether 
NATO enlargement will create an incentive for Moscow to withhold its 
support for further strategic arms reductions.
  First of all, no one can categorically disprove a negative. Some 
Russian leaders are against further strategic arms reductions for a 
variety of reasons. NATO enlargement may be one of them, although I 
seriously doubt that

[[Page S8491]]

it is one of the more important ones. Ultimately, I believe that the 
next generation of Russian leaders will see that arms control is in 
their own national self-interest.
  Additionally, we should not forget that through the NATO-Russia 
Founding Act the Russians will have the opportunity not only to observe 
NATO first hand, but will also be able to work cooperatively with it. 
They may not learn to love NATO, but at least they will see that it 
does not correspond to the aggressive, rapacious Stalinist caricature 
that they grew up with.
  Many of us in this body are justifiably concerned about the cost to 
the American taxpayer of NATO enlargement, and I have talked myself 
blue in the face to Europeans making clear my insistence on equitable 
burdensharing. But I would also remind my colleagues that freedom is 
not cost free. As a deterrerent to aggression, ethnic conflict, or 
other kinds of instability, an enlarged NATO is far less expensive than 
conducting a military operation after hostilities have broken out would 
be.
  Here again the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina is instructive. Had we 
become directly involved earlier with the lift and strike policy that I 
advocated as early as 1992, we could have prevented many of the 
quarter-million deaths and 2 million displaced persons in that 
tormented country. Moreover, we would not be saddled with the enormous 
reconstruction costs that the United States and the rest of the world 
community are now bearing.
  So while we persist in our goal of a North Atlantic alliance of truly 
shared responsibilities, let us not lose sight of the bigger picture 
that American expenditures on NATO are the best security investment 
that this country can ever make.
  Mr. President, I would summarize my thoughts since Madrid in the 
following way: NATO enlargement is on the right track. It is a vital 
force in the integration of the new Europe. Tough negotiating and 
bargaining lie ahead. Several key questions must be definitively 
answered in the coming months, above all the actual cost of enlargement 
and how it will be apportioned. We must work out a satisfactory NATO-
led, post-SFOR force for Bosnia. The Committee on Foreign Relations, 
for example, will hold an extensive series of hearings on these topics. 
But let us not confuse the debate by repeating already answered 
questions.
  I am convinced that after thorough scrutiny and debate, NATO 
enlargement will occur on schedule and will contribute to expanding and 
enhancing stability in Europe, and thereby will strengthen America's 
security.
  I thank the Chair and yield the floor.

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