[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 108 (Monday, July 28, 1997)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E1538-E1540]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                  JOHN BRADEMAS ADDRESSES CYPRUS ISSUE

                                 ______
                                 

                          HON. LEE H. HAMILTON

                               of indiana

                    in the house of representatives

                         Monday, July 28, 1997

  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, for the first time in a long while there 
is reason for guarded optimism in Cyprus.
  A few weeks ago Cyprus President Clerides and Turkish Cypriot Leader 
Ruff Denktash met in New York under the auspices of the United Nations. 
Another round of face-to-face talks, the first in over 2 years, is 
planned for later this summer.
  The Clinton administration's appointment of Richard Holbrooke as U.S. 
Special Envoy for Cyprus is the best signal yet that the administration 
intends to give high priority this year to a settlement in Cyprus and 
moving Greek-Turkish relations forward.
  It has always been my firm belief that only high-level and sustained 
United States attention will convince all parties to try to resolve the 
Cyprus issue.
  In this context, I believe that Members will read with interest an 
excellent speech on ``The Cyprus Problem: U.S. Foreign Policy and the 
Role of Congress'' by our distinguished former colleague in the House 
of Representatives, Dr. John Brademas.
  I ask that a portion Dr. Brademas' cogent remarks, delivered in 
London, England, on July 10, 1997, be inserted in the Congressional 
Record. The address follows:

    ``The Cyprus Problem: US Foreign Policy & the Role of Congress''

                         (By Dr. John Brademas)


                          The Role of Congress

       Before I address myself to the issue of Cyprus, I must say 
     a word about certain fundamental factors that characterize 
     the American form of government. You may all be familiar with 
     them but I assure you that many Americans are not.
       First, we have a separation of powers constitution; second, 
     our parties are decentralized, that is to say, by comparison 
     with parties in a parliamentary system, undisciplined.
       People know the phrase, ``separation of powers,'' but too 
     few understand its meaning. Some think that in the American 
     system, Congress exists to do whatever a president wants it 
     to do. But this is not the way the Founding Fathers intended 
     the government of the United States to work and, you must all 
     be aware, that in both domestic and foreign policy, Congress 
     has in recent decades reasserted the separation of powers 
     principle.
       Another factor complicates matters: Presidents and 
     Congresses are elected separately, by different 
     constituencies and for different periods of service. The 
     President, each Senator--there are 100--and each member of 
     the House of Representatives--there are 435--has his own 
     mandate and sense of responsibility to the people.
       In our system, as distinguished from yours, the chief 
     executive is not chosen from the legislative majority and, 
     indeed, often does not even belong to the party controlling 
     Congress. This is, of course, precisely the situation today 
     with a Democrat in the White House and Republicans in control 
     of both the Senate and House of Representatives.


                     THE AMERICAN WAY OF GOVERNING

       So the American way of governing was not designed for 
     peaceful coexistence between the executive and legislative 
     branches. The result has been a process, over two centuries 
     long, of conflict and accommodation, dispute and detente--and 
     this is the case even when, as I shall illustrate with 
     Cyprus, the president and both bodies of Congress are 
     controlled by the same party.
       Although service on the Education and Labor Committee meant 
     that most of my legislative energies were directed to 
     domestic concerns, I continued my interest of student days in 
     foreign policy. As Majority Whip of the House of 
     Representatives, I joined Speaker Thomas P. ``Tip'' O'Neill, 
     Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd and other Congressional 
     leaders for breakfast at the White House every other week 
     with President Carter, Vice President Mondale and the 
     president's top aides to discuss the entire range of issues 
     facing the president and Congress, including foreign affairs.
       Yet it was during the administration of President Lyndon 
     Johnson that I became personally engaged in a foreign policy 
     question: I made clear my strong objection to the military 
     junta in Greece that came to power in 1967. Although then the 
     only Member of Congress of Greek origin (and a Democrat), I 
     testified against the Administration's request for United 
     States military aid to Greece which, I reminded the House 
     Foreign Affairs Committee, was a member of the North Atlantic 
     Treaty Organization. The NATO Charter was created to defend 
     nations that adhere to democracy, freedom and the rule of 
     law; the military dictatorship ruling Greece, I asserted, 
     supports none of these principles. The United States should, 
     therefore, not provide Greece military assistance. During the 
     years of the junta, I refused to visit Greece or to set foot 
     in the Greek Embassy in Washington.


                           INVASION OF CYPRUS

       In 1974, however, I found myself deeply involved in 
     American policy toward Greece. In July of that year, the 
     colonels engineered an unsuccessful coup against the 
     President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios. Although the coup 
     precipitated the fall of the military regime and triggered 
     the restoration of democracy in Greece, it was also the 
     pretext for an invasion by Turkish military forces of Cyprus. 
     The initial invasion, in July, was followed, in August, by 
     Attila II, a massive intervention of 40,000 Turkish troops.
       Because the Turkish forces were equipped with weapons 
     supplied by the United States, Turkey's government was in 
     direct violation of US legal prohibitions on the use of 
     American arms for other than defensive purposes. And because 
     American law mandated an immediate termination of arms 
     transfers to any country using them for aggressive purposes, 
     I led a small delegation of Congressmen to call on Secretary 
     of State Kissinger to protest the Turkish action and insist 
     that he enforce the law, i.e., order an immediate end to 
     further shipments of American arms to Turkey. Kissinger 
     apparently did not take us seriously and neither he nor 
     President Gerald R. Ford took any action in response to our 
     admonition.


                          TURKISH ARMS EMBARGO

       Consequently, several of us in Congress, notably the late 
     Congressman Benjamin S. Rosenthal of New York, then 
     Congressman Paul S. Sarbanes of Maryland and I in the House 
     of Representatives and Senator Thomas Eagleton of Missouri 
     led a successful effort in late 1974 to impose, by 
     Congressional action, an arms embargo on Turkey. We were 
     strongly supported not only by other Democrats but by a 
     number of leading Republicans.
       In this unusual episode, my colleagues and I had active 
     allies outside Congress. Not only did we, understandably, 
     have the help of Greek American and Armenian American persons 
     and groups across the country but also of many others who 
     shared our commitment to the rule of law. The reasons my 
     colleagues and I prevailed were straightforward: We were 
     better organized politically both within Congress and in the 
     country at large and we had a superior case, both legally and 
     morally. It was this combination of factors that brought what 
     was a remarkable victory.


                         THE CURRENT SITUATION

       President Clinton's appointment last month as his Special 
     Envoy for Cyprus of Richard Holbrooke, architect of the 
     Dayton Accords and a diplomat of wide experience, is, I 
     believe, a significant indication of the priority the 
     President and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright have 
     assigned to Cyprus.
       Indeed, last month, before talks in Washington with Cypriot 
     Foreign Minister

[[Page E1539]]

     Ioannis Kasoulides, Secretary Albright said, ``In our meeting 
     today . . . I will assure the Minister of America's interest 
     in seeing the people of Cyprus achieve a lasting settlement 
     to the intercommunal dispute on their island. There could be 
     no more dramatic a demonstration of that commitment than the 
     President's decision to name Ambassador Richard Holbrooke as 
     our special emissary to promote the Cyprus settlement. . . 
     .'' She continued: `` . . . What we see is the unification of 
     Cyprus. We believe that the division of the island is 
     unacceptable. . . . [We] continue to support the 
     establishment of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. We will 
     do everything we can to bring the process forward.''


                   POTENTIAL FOR A CYPRUS SETTLEMENT

       Now, given the impasse of a near quarter century and in 
     light of the current instability of the Turkish political 
     scene, I think it would be a mistake to expect a breakthrough 
     in the short term. Holbrooke himself has said, ``This is 
     going to be a long haul. It's not going to be a short, 
     intense negotiation like Dayton was.''
       As you know, Ambassador Holbrooke has said he would not 
     ``do anything specific'' until after this week's UN-sponsored 
     talks between President Clerides and Mr. Denktash.
       I add that the distinguished British diplomat who has been 
     working on the issue, Sir David Hannay, welcomes Ambassador 
     Holbrooke's intervention as does the US Congress, which has 
     been concerned with the lack of progress on Cyprus.
       And if there is agreement between the Executive Branch and 
     Congress on the need to intensify efforts for a settlement on 
     Cyprus, there is also, especially in the House of 
     Representatives, bipartisan agreement. The International 
     Relations Committee of the House, chaired by Ben Gilman, 
     Republican of New York, joined by the senior Democrat on the 
     Committee, Lee Hamilton of Indiana, on June 25 favorably 
     reported their resolution urging ``a United States initiative 
     seeking a just and peaceful resolution of the situation on 
     Cyprus.'' The measure includes a call for ``the 
     demilitarization of Cyprus and the establishment of a 
     multinational force to ensure the security of both 
     communities.''


                        elements of a settlement

       As we meet tonight during the week of the Clerides-Denktash 
     talks, I believe I can best contribute to a discussion of the 
     Cyprus issue by telling you what, on the basis of my 
     conversations in recent weeks with a number of persons, some 
     in government and some not but all at senior levels and from 
     the various countries concerned, seem to be factors 
     fundamental, 23 years after the events of the summer of 1974, 
     both to understanding the Cyprus problem and to forging a 
     viable, realistic and just settlement of it.
       Many in this room are far more knowledgeable than I about 
     Cyprus and, of course, are free to disagree with me on any or 
     all of these points, some matters of fact, others normative.

                       1. Greek-Turkish Relations

       First, I would assert that a normalization of relations 
     between Greece and Turkey depends upon a resolution of the 
     issue of Cyprus. Indeed, a senior Turkish diplomat made this 
     same point to me a few months ago even as I heard this view 
     echoed in Istanbul in May during a Carnegie Endowment for 
     International Peace Forum. The Forum, composed of seven 
     Greeks, seven Turks and seven Americans, of whom I am one, 
     involves academic, business and political leaders from all 
     three countries, including two former Greek and two former 
     Turkish foreign ministers and senior retired military 
     officers from the two countries.
       At a dinner one night in Istanbul, a leading Turkish 
     business figure asked me what I thought was the most 
     important action to improve Greek-Turkish relations. I 
     replied, ``Cyprus.'' He said, ``I agree. And what you 
     [Americans] must do is help us [Turks] get out graciously and 
     without humiliation.''
       I must tell you that it is my impression--reinforced by the 
     comments of others--that the forces in Turkey pressing most 
     vigorously for moderation, modernization and democracy there 
     and for better relations with Greece are these top Turkish 
     businessmen. We must encourage them.

                     2. Turkey's National Interest

       Second, Turkish political and military leaders must be 
     persuaded that resolving the Cyprus question is in the 
     national interest of Turkey. I certainly think that is true.
       In economic terms, for example, Ankara's officially 
     acknowledged aid to Turkish-occupied Cyprus this year totals 
     $250 million, not including the cost of keeping 35,000 
     Turkish troops there.
       Here I would offer another argument for this proposition: 
     Turkish armed forces on the island are now considerable, of 
     such size and nature that to protect them adds further to the 
     security commitments of Turkish military commanders. It is a 
     burden that Turkish leaders have taken on themselves, and one 
     must ask, from a Turkish point of view, is it a wise one?
       But much more important than economic reasons, there is a 
     powerful political rationale for Turkey to move, at long 
     last, toward a Cyprus settlement. Consider the present 
     situation in Turkey. Beleaguered by economic troubles, 
     pressures from the military, hostility between Islamists and 
     secularists, widespread criticism on human rights and dealing 
     with the Kurds, thoughtful Turkish leaders know that the 
     occupation of Cyprus is not only a continuing financial 
     burden but a huge obstacle to Turkish ambitions for stronger 
     ties with Europe.
       Even this week the new government led by Melsut Yilmaz 
     declared, in a statement of its hope for eventual membership 
     in the European Union, ``Turkey will ensure its rightful 
     place in the new Europe that is being drawn up.'' Yet it must 
     be clear that even putting aside demands from the European 
     Parliament concerning democracy and human rights, so long as 
     the Cyprus question goes unresolved, Turkish membership in 
     the EU is not possible.
       Here I note the recent statements of Greek Foreign Minister 
     Pangalos and Undersecretary Kranidiotis that if political 
     objections can be overcome, Greece has no philosophical or 
     dogmatic objection to Turkish accession to the European 
     Union. This posture, coupled with Greek removal of a veto on 
     Turkish participation in the Customs Union with the EU, means 
     that the Greeks are saying, ``We're not the obstacle to 
     Turkish entry into Europe.'' Yet if membership in the 
     European Union is not on the immediate horizon, enhancement 
     of the relationship with the EU can be a significant 
     incentive for a Turkey that seeks to be in Europe.

                    3. Cyprus and the European Union

       Third, another basic ingredient in the search for a 
     solution, the prospect of membership by Cyprus in the EU, was 
     described by Holbrooke as the ``the biggest new factor in the 
     30-year stalemate.''
       With the commitment of the Council of Ministers of the EU 
     in 1995, following approval of the Customs Union with Turkey, 
     to start negotiations with the Republic of Cyprus on its 
     accession to the EU within six months of the end of the 
     Intergovernmental Conference (just concluded in Amsterdam), 
     no longer is Cyprus to be held hostage for membership to 
     Ankara. Certainly neither the Turkish government nor Mr. 
     Denktash should be allowed to block accession by Cyprus, and 
     the United States should continue to support Cyprus 
     membership.
       In light of Turkish objections to accession by Cyprus to 
     the EU, incentives to both Turks and Turkish Cypriots to 
     greater involvement in Europe should vigorously be explored.

                         4. Security on Cyprus

       Fourth, the matter of security--for both Greek and Turkish 
     Cypriots--is obviously among the factors indispensable to a 
     solution. For it seems to me that in any settlement 
     acceptable to both sides and to Greece and Turkey, there must 
     be, following departure of foreign troops, provisions for a 
     multinational peacekeeping force to assure such security for 
     all Cypriots.
       Such a force might well be a NATO operation for NATO is, 
     aside from the UN, of course, the one organization where 
     Greece and Turkey are on the same level. From my perspective, 
     it would be wise for such a force to include troops from the 
     United States as well as other members of NATO. Even a modest 
     commitment of US forces would represent a powerful 
     demonstration of the seriousness with which American leaders 
     of both parties in both the Administration and Congress 
     regard the importance of defusing what Dick Holbrooke has 
     rightly described as ``a time bomb.''

                           5. A United Cyprus

       Fifth, I turn to the matter of the constitutional 
     arrangements for a united Cyprus.
       The United Nations, the European Union, the United States 
     and the Republic of Cyprus are all agreed that there must be 
     on the island a bizonal, bicommunal federation, with a 
     single sovereignty.
       I remind you here of successive Security Council 
     resolutions, including Resolution 1092, adopted on December 
     23, 1996, which declares that any settlement, ``must be based 
     on a state of Cyprus with a single sovereignty and 
     international personality and a single citizenship, with its 
     independence and territorial integrity safeguarded, and 
     comprising two politically equal communities . . . in a 
     bicommunal and bizonal federation, and that such a settlement 
     must exclude union in whole or in part with any other country 
     or any form of partition or secession. . . .''
       The goal now will be to negotiate an agreement that 
     provides for such a single sovereign state within which Greek 
     Cypriots will accord a significant degree of self-government 
     to Turkish Cypriots who, in turn, must agree to territorial 
     compromises that will enable them to share in the economic 
     growth that both reunification and membership in the EU would 
     entail. After all, everyone is aware that there is a huge gap 
     in per capita annual income between Greek Cypriots--$12,000--
     and the North--$4,000.
       The challenge here must be to take into account the fears 
     and apprehensions of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots so that 
     both communities will feel they are dealt with fairly.
       I observe, by way of suggesting an example of the tone or 
     attitude that one hopes would characterize a federation that 
     can command the support of both communities on the island and 
     both Greece and Turkey, that the proposal of my friend Costa 
     Carras for cross-voting should be given serious 
     consideration. Rather than voting only for candidates of 
     their own community as before, Greek Cypriots and Turkish 
     Cypriots would vote twice, all citizens casting ballots in 
     the elections of both communities. In this way, candidates 
     and legislators from each community would for the first time 
     acquire a stake in appealing to the other.

[[Page E1540]]

       Let me add that a significant result of accession to the EU 
     by a united Cyprus would be that Turkish Cypriots would then 
     be part of a Cypriot delegation to Brussels, one way of 
     ensuring that Cyprus would not be hostile to Turkey.
       Now, I believe most of us would agree that it is unlikely--
     one never says ``never''--that there will be a sudden accord 
     on an issue that for so long has eluded resolution by so 
     many. Moreover, a breakthrough is probably not possible until 
     after the elections in Cyprus in February. Nonetheless, it is 
     important to begin laying the groundwork now, and UN 
     Secretary General Kofi Annan's talks with Clerides and 
     Denktash are part of this process as Sir David Hannay 
     observed in a thoughtful essay in yesterday's International 
     Herald Tribune (``At Long Last, Cyprus Should Seize the 
     Chance to Heal Itself''). For we must build bridges today for 
     action next spring.


                  NORMALIZING GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS

       With the end of the Cold War has come the possibility of 
     resolution of many long-simmering conflicts. As we observe in 
     the Middle East and Northern Ireland, however, not to speak 
     of the on-going drama in the former Yugoslavia, it is not 
     easy. Nonetheless, the rest of the world is moving toward 
     solving difficult problems. The North Koreans have agreed to 
     four-power talks aimed at formally ending the Korean War. The 
     Indians and Pakistanis are discussing Kashmir. Formerly 
     Communist states are being brought into NATO. China may be 
     beginning to communicate with the United States in more 
     rational terms.
       Surely it is time for Greece and Turkey to normalize their 
     relationship even as did France and Germany under de Gaulle 
     and Adenauer, thereby paving the way to progress for both.
       The report that this past Tuesday (July 8), Greece and 
     Turkey, in what the Financial Times described as ``the 
     biggest breakthrough in their strained relations for a decade 
     . . . pledged to respect one another's sovereign rights and 
     renounce the use of force in dealing with each other'' is 
     solid evidence of what the FT also called ``strong 
     pressure from the US.'' The statement by Greek Prime 
     Minister Constantine Simitis and Turkish President 
     Suleyman Demirel, the consequence of Secretary Albright's 
     determined efforts, concluded the FT, ``set a favourable 
     tone for the high-level talks over the future of Cyprus 
     which start near New York today.''
       And surely, I reiterate, key to the relationship between 
     Greece and Turkey is Cyprus. Settlement, during the year 
     ahead, of an issue over two decades old would obviously be a 
     major triumph for US foreign policy, for Europe, for Greece, 
     and, most important, for all the people of Cyprus.


    A CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND RECONCILIATION IN SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE

       Now, if I have not exhausted you, I must tell you briefly 
     of one other development that I believe relates directly to 
     what I have been saying but goes still farther.
       My own involvement in this effort is spurred in large part 
     by my chairing the National Endowment for Democracy.
       The National Endowment for Democracy, or NED, as we call 
     it, is one of the principal vehicles through which American 
     Presidents, Senators and Representatives of both political 
     parties seek to promote free, open and democratic societies. 
     Founded in 1983 by a Republican president, Ronald Reagan, and 
     a Democratic Congress, the National Endowment for Democracy 
     is a nonpartisan, nongovernmental organization that, through 
     grants to private entities in other countries, champions, 
     like your Westminster Foundation, the institutions of 
     democracy. NED grants are made to organizations dedicated to 
     promoting the rule of law, free and fair elections, a free 
     press, human rights and the other components of a genuinely 
     democratic culture.

                    A planning group for the center

       The project of which I want to say a particular word is the 
     Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeastern 
     Europe, which my colleagues and I hope to establish beginning 
     in early 1998.
       In cooperation with my friend known to many of you, Costa 
     Carras, a businessman and historian of much wisdom and a deep 
     sense of public responsibility, and Matthew Nimetz, a 
     distinguished lawyer who served as Counselor and Under 
     Secretary of State during the Carter Administration and as 
     President Clinton's Special Envoy in the 1994-1995 mediation 
     between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
     (FYROM), I convened last year a group to draw up plans to 
     create what we called a Center for Democracy and 
     Reconciliation in Southeastern Europe.
       Following earlier discussions of the idea of such a center 
     at conferences in Thessaloniki; Washington, D.C.; New York 
     City; and at Ditchley Park, our group met last November in 
     Lyon. The Planning Group, chaired by Ambassador Nimetz, is 
     composed of persons from Southeastern Europe, Western Europe 
     and the United Staets, nearly all of whom have expert 
     knowledge of the region as well as experience in business and 
     government. Unlike other organizations active in the Balkans, 
     the Center will be directed by a board a majority of whose 
     members are from the region itself. That people from Greece, 
     Turkey, Romania, FYROM, Serbia and elsewhere are joining to 
     establish the Center will give it credibility and relevance 
     that US or West European based organizations cannot attain.

                         Mission of the center

       The Center will devote attention to the fields of education 
     and market institutions as well as to the practices of a 
     pluralist democratic society, such as a strong and 
     independent judiciary, free and responsible media, vigorous 
     nongovernmental organizations, and effective and accountable 
     central administrations--with active parliamentary 
     institutions--and local governments.
       We anticipate that the Center will have its administrative 
     headquarters in Thessaloniki, Greece, which has excellent 
     transportation and communication facilities, making it easily 
     accessible throughout the region. The Center will eventually 
     sponsor programs in all the countries of Southeastern Europe, 
     including Cyprus, where a program on governance is planned, 
     and Turkey, where a program on environmental issues will be 
     established. The Center's programs are intended to be 
     multinational in scope, bringing together participants from 
     the several countries of the region.
       The purpose of the Center's multinational approach is to 
     foster greater interchange and understanding among the 
     peoples of the area and to develop networks among individuals 
     and groups committed to the democratic and peaceful 
     development of Southeastern Europe.

                         Programs of the center

       First, we intend to forge links with other nongovernmental 
     organizations (NGOs) in the region to cooperate on specific 
     projects and in some cases will establish offices in other 
     countries to focus on a particular issue or theme. More 
     broadly, the Center can be a forum to champion NGOs as 
     essential components of a civil society, particularly 
     important, of course, in Southeastern Europe where such 
     organizations are relatively new phenomena, especially in 
     former state-controlled societies.
       We want also to support development of a lively, 
     responsible and independent press, again free of state 
     control.
       The Center plans to support projects on the writing of 
     school textbooks and improving pedagogy at all levels in the 
     countries of Southeastern Europe.
       The Center will also address concerns of parliamentary and 
     local governments and we hope to sponsor exchanges of 
     parliamentarians.
       Economic development clearly offers opportunities for 
     regional cooperation and interchange. Independent business 
     associations can be an integral part of a vibrant civil 
     society.
       Environmental challenges also open doors for cooperative 
     endeavors throughout the region. Indeed, while in Istanbul 
     last month, Matthew Nimetz and I called on His Holiness, 
     Bartholomew, the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople, who 
     told us that he will shortly be leading an effort to deal 
     with environmental problems in the Black Sea, an initiative 
     that will involve Turkish government officials and business 
     leaders as well.


                               CONCLUSION

       I have told you of my own involvement in Cyprus as a Member 
     of the United States Congress and of my continuing interest 
     in improving relations between Greece and Turkey.
       I have offered a list of what seems to me to be some of the 
     factors essential to success in the on-going search for a 
     just and enduring settlement of a problem--the tragedy of a 
     divided Cyprus--that should affront the consciences of all 
     who live in civilized, democratic societies.
       I have expressed gratification that the United States is 
     now moving toward much more intensive involvement in the 
     issue.
       And I have told you of an effort, in the form of the Center 
     for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeastern Europe, that 
     although modest at the outset, can, in time, in a troubled 
     part of the world, sow seeds of hope rather than despair.
       How splendid it would be if, even before the start of the 
     next millennium, we can see a united Republic of Cyprus, in 
     which all its citizens enjoy the fruits of freedom, democracy 
     and the rule of law!

     

                          ____________________