[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 108 (Monday, July 28, 1997)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E1535]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                            NATO ENLARGEMENT

                                 ______
                                 

                          HON. LEE H. HAMILTON

                               of indiana

                    in the house of representatives

                         Monday, July 28, 1997

  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I would like to bring to my colleagues' 
attention my monthly newsletter on foreign affairs from July 1997 
entitled ``NATO Enlargement.''
  I ask that this newsletter be printed in the Congressional Record.
  The newsletter follows:

                            NATO Enlargement

       At an early July summit in Madrid, President Clinton and 
     leaders from the 16 member states of the North Atlantic 
     Treaty Organization (NATO) invited the Czech Republic, 
     Hungary, and Poland to enter talks to join the Alliance. The 
     goal is to complete negotiations in 1997 and treaty 
     ratification by 1999, so that these three countries can join 
     in time for NATO's 50th anniversary.
       A decision to forge a new system of international security 
     by enlarging NATO has been long in coming--but came as no 
     surprise. NATO established a program of cooperation with 
     former Warsaw Pact countries in 1994, the Partnership for 
     Peace, and President Clinton made clear at that time that the 
     question was when--not if--NATO would expand. NATO outlined a 
     strategy for enlargement in a 1995 report, and announced in 
     1996 that invitations would be extended to new members in 
     1997. Two months ago, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin signed 
     the NATO-Russia Founding Act. This document spells out future 
     relations between NATO and Russia, sets up a Joint Council 
     for regular consultation, and seeks to ally Russia's concerns 
     about enlargement. The Founding Act paved the way for Madrid, 
     where there were some differences between the U.S. and its 
     allies about those not invited to join NATO (Romania and 
     Slovenia)--but no suspense about the three invited.
       The spotlight on enlargement now shifts to parliaments and 
     public opinion. So far, the U.S. debate on NATO enlargement 
     has been a narrow one, attracting little interest outside of 
     ethnic communities. The President's task now is to persuade 
     the American people that it is in our national interest to 
     defend the countries of Central Europe.
       From my perspective, there are five major questions about 
     NATO enlargement--commitments, costs, relations with Russia, 
     what happens to countries not invited to join, and the impact 
     of enlargement on the Alliance itself.
       Commitments.--Twice in this century Europe exploded into 
     world wars because of events in Central Europe. The United 
     States intervened in 1917 and 1941 to protect its vital 
     interests on the European continent, and formed NATO in 1949 
     to protect western Europe against the Soviet threat. The 
     question now is whether countries in Central Europe should 
     have the same security guarantee as current NATO members. 
     This guarantee, which requires NATO allies to treat an armed 
     attack against one as an attack against all, would come at a 
     time when U.S. troop levels in Europe have been cut from 
     300,000 to 100,000 in the past six years. The threat to peace 
     in Europe today is remote, but NATO enlargement means a 
     pledge to intervene in tomorrow's unforeseen crises. The bet 
     is that the promise of sending NATO troops to defend 
     countries in Central Europe will make it unnecessary to do 
     so.
       Cost estimates of NATO enlargement vary widely, from $5 
     billion to $125 billion. The Pentagon's own estimate is $27 
     to $35 billion spread over 13 years, with a U.S. share of up 
     to $2 billion. There is reason for skepticism about all cost 
     estimates, because military budgets across Europe have been 
     declining. The three countries invited to join NATO spend a 
     total of $4 billion annually on defense, or less than Belgium 
     spends. Current NATO members see little threat, and most are 
     under pressure to cut spending to meet budget targets for 
     European Monetary Union. If Europe won't pay, the U.S. 
     Congress also will be reluctant to pay. More burdensharing 
     disputes with Europe are likely.
       Relations with Russia.--Opponents of a larger NATO stress 
     that expansion will provide hostile reaction from Russia, 
     creating a new line of division across Europe. Russia opposes 
     enlargement, but has acquiesced in its initial stages. It 
     remains to be seen how enlargement will impact on key U.S. 
     interests in Russia's ratification of the START II nuclear 
     arms reduction treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention, or 
     the future of reform in Russia. Much of the success of NATO 
     enlargement will depend on how the U.S. manages relations 
     with Russia.
       Those Not Invited To Join.--Twelve countries emerging from 
     communism applied to join NATO, and only three got what they 
     wanted in Madrid. The challenge ahead for NATO is to enhance 
     military and political cooperation with non-members. The 
     Alliance has also made clear that the door is open to future 
     members. No one knows how far NATO enlargement will go, but 
     the first wave will not be the last. The toughest question 
     here will be the Baltic States.
       Impact of Enlargement on the Alliance.--There is a tension 
     between keeping NATO's door open, and keeping the Alliance 
     functional. NATO decisions require unanimity, and so far the 
     Alliance has been able to function well on the basis of 
     consensus. It is an open question whether this round, or 
     future rounds of enlargement, will affect the cohesion and 
     integrity of the Alliance and its decision-making process.


                              Conclusions

       NATO enlargement is going to happen. I still have many 
     questions about it, and we have not had sufficient debate or 
     consideration of its impact. Yet the risks of proceeding with 
     NATO enlargement are less than the risk of not going forward. 
     Sixteen governments cannot take a decision of this magnitude 
     and then reverse course. The alternative to expansion--
     freezing NATO in its cold war membership--also carries risks 
     of irrelevance or even dissolution.
       NATO enlargement can increase the security of all of 
     Europe, and decrease the chances of future wars. NATO 
     enlargement certainly will assure new democracies in Central 
     Europe and reinforce their democratic reforms. If done right, 
     it can bring Russia into a cooperative relationship with 
     Europe. The President needs to answer questions and address 
     lingering doubts. If he articulates the case forcefully, the 
     President can win the support of the American public--and the 
     advice and consent of the Senate--for NATO enlargement.

     

                          ____________________