[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 105 (Wednesday, July 23, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S7950-S7965]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




          STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

      By Mr. DURBIN (for himself, Ms. Moseley-Braun and Mr. Reid):

[[Page S7951]]

  S. 1055. A bill to amend title 23, United States Code, to extend the 
Interstate 4R discretionary program; to the Committee on Environment 
and Public Works.


             THE INTERSTATE SYSTEM IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1997

  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, today I am introducing legislation that 
would help improve our country's aging Interstate System--the 
Interstate System Improvement Act of 1997. My colleagues, Senators 
Moseley-Braun and Reid have joined me as original cosponsors.
  This bill is simple. It would fund the discretionary Interstate 4R 
[I-4R] program at a level of $800 million annually, a significant 
increase from the current level of $66 million in fiscal year 1997. I 
believe that the I-4R program is one of the most crucial aspects of the 
upcoming Intermodal Surface Transportation and Efficiency Act [ISTEA] 
reauthorization. And, I hope to work with my colleagues on the 
Environment and Public Works Committee to incorporate this important 
measure into ISTEA legislation later this year.
  The I-4R program is critical to the resurfacing, restoration, 
rehabilitation, and reconstruction of our country's vital 
infrastructure. This year, the program is funded at $66 million. 
However, demand for funds has outpaced available money by more than 9 
to 1. For example, in fiscal year 1997, 25 States requested $1.2 
billion in I-4R funds under the discretionary program. Only six States 
received assistance, most at greatly reduced levels. Nineteen States 
will receive no I-4R discretionary funds in fiscal year 1997 and over 
$1 billion in funding requests have gone unanswered.
  States with major interstate projects would benefit greatly from this 
legislation. In Illinois alone, the State faces a highway funding 
shortage because of crucial projects like the Stevenson Expressway in 
Chicago and I-74 in Peoria. These projects are simply too important to 
delay. A healthy I-4R discretionary program is necessary in order to 
rebuild this vital infrastructure.
  Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to join me in advancing this 
important legislation.
  Ms. MOSELEY-BRAUN. Mr. President, I am pleased to introduce the 
Interstate System Improvement Act of 1997 with my colleague from 
Illinois, Senator Durbin.
  This legislation would increase the authorization for the 
discretionary I-4R program from its current level of around $60 to $800 
million annually. This change would allow States with large interstate 
improvement projects to compete for discretionary grants at the Federal 
level.
  As our Nation's interstate system ages, it is going to become more 
important for many States to have access to large, discretionary grants 
for major interstate improvement projects. For my home State of 
Illinois, this legislation would provide an opportunity to compete for 
funds to reconstruct a 15-mile segment of the aging Stevenson 
Expressway, one of the Chicago area's most important arteries, and one 
that is badly in need of repair.
  I believe this change is important to improve our current system of 
highway funding, and I urge my colleagues on the Environment and Public 
Works Committee who are involved in drafting legislation to reauthorize 
the Intermodal Surface Transportation and Efficiency Act to include 
this legislation as part of their reauthorization bill.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. BURNS (for himself, Mr. Coats, and Mr. Lugar):
  S. 1056. A bill to provide for farm-related exemptions from certain 
hazardous materials transportation requirements; to the Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation.


                  farm-related exemptions legislation

  Mr. BURNS. Mr. President, I am introducing today a bill to provide 
for farm-related exemptions for certain hazardous materials and 
transportation requirements. I send it to the desk and ask for its 
appropriate referral.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be read twice and then referred 
to the appropriate committee.
  Mr. BURNS. Mr. President, today, I rise to introduce a bill that will 
provide further regulatory relief for our farmers and ranchers.
  Let me give you some background on this issue. Earlier this year, the 
U.S. Department of Transportation published a rule under the HM-200 
docket which severely restricts the transportation of agricultural 
products classified as hazardous materials.
  This aspect of the HM-200 rule could cost the agricultural retail 
industry and the farm economy millions of dollars every year.
  Currently, States model their regulations concerning the transport of 
hazardous materials on Federal Hazardous Materials Regulations [HMR's]. 
However, some States with large farm economies provide exceptions from 
the State HMR's to the agricultural industry for the short-haul, 
intrastate, retail-to-farm transport of agricultural inputs.

  HM-200 would supersede all State HMR's, eliminate these exceptions, 
and apply Federal regulations to the short-haul, seasonal and mostly 
rural transport of farm products.
  The cost of this regulatory burden is estimated to be in excess of 
$12,300 a year for each agricultural retailer. Industrywide, it is 
estimated that it could cost the agricultural economy nearly $62 
million annually.
  We all want safe highways, safe food production, and a safe 
workplace, but when DOT, OSHA, and EPA regulations are stirred together 
in a pot, the stew can turn out to be quite rancid. Placing these 
Federal burdens on the backs of farmers and ranchers in Montana's rural 
communities, can mean the difference between flying or dying.
  HM-200 will require agricultural retailers to comply with time 
consuming and costly regulations that will not make our rural roads 
safer, but only increase the cost of doing business, cause confusion, 
and require unnecessary paperwork. These expenses will be passed on to 
farmers who already are burdened with slimming margins and ever higher 
cost of production.
  States and the agricultural community have an excellent track record 
for protecting the environment and keeping the public safe. The 
agricultural retail industry complies with numerous safety measures 
such as requiring all drivers to have Commercial Drivers Licenses 
[CDL's] drug and alcohol testing for drivers, HAZMAT handling 
experience, and so forth.
  Additionally, States which do not provide exceptions to their own 
HMR's for the agricultural community will face a new regulatory burden 
since these States rarely enforce the regulations that they have in 
place. The U.S. DOT has made it abundantly clear that they will expect 
all States to actively enforce HM-200, thereby making it an unfunded 
mandate.
  Despite petitions for reconsideration from the agricultural 
community--all of which have gone unanswered by DOT--HM-200 is due to 
be implemented on October 1, 1997--it was published in February of this 
year.
  This legislation seeks to delay implementation of HM-200 with respect 
to agricultural transports, until October 1, 1999, or until the 
reauthorization of Federal Hazardous Materials legislation. By allowing 
for a delay in HM-200 implementation, I believe we can properly address 
and examine the facts as they stand with regard to the need for this 
new regulation.
  I urge my colleagues to support this vital legislation, and help keep 
our agricultural community from having to bear a needless expense which 
has little safety value to the public.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. REED (for himself, Mr. Bryan, Mr. Hollings, and Mr. 
        Johnson):
  S. 1057. A bill to amend the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to 
require mandatory spending limits for Senate candidates and limits on 
independent expenditures, to ban soft money, and for other purposes; to 
the Committee on Rules and Administration.


               THE CAMPAIGN SPENDING CONTROL ACT OF 1997

  Mr. REED. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss legislation I have 
just introduced, the Campaign Spending Control Act of 1997. The 1996 
elections, unfortunately, will be remembered for two remarkable facts. 
First, Federal campaigns produced record spending; over $2.7 billion or 
almost $28 for every voter. Second, the election produced record-low 
voter participation: less than half of those eligible chose to vote. 
These two tragic facts are inextricably linked.
  Due to the vast sums of money spent on campaigns, most Americans 
believe

[[Page S7952]]

our current campaign system is tainted by special interest money. Under 
a flood of money and television ads, voters view their voice as 
meaningless, their concerns as unaddressed, and their votes as 
unimportant. In order to restore public confidence, campaign finance 
reform must accomplish three goals. It must significantly reduce 
campaign spending; level the playing field for those who challenge 
incumbents; and, finally, encourage greater public participation and 
debate.
  These goals cannot be successfully addressed without significantly 
changing the rules which govern campaigns. Campaign scandals have posed 
a threat to the health of our democracy throughout our Nation's 
history. In 1907, after enduring embarrassment over a campaign scandal, 
President Teddy Roosevelt championed legislation prohibiting 
corporations from financing Federal candidates. In 1974, responding to 
the scandals of the 1972 elections and the resignation of President 
Nixon, Congress overwhelmingly passed legislation limiting spending by 
candidates, parties, and wealthy individuals.
  In 1996, all the past campaign reforms imploded, with a flood of 
corporate and individual money overwhelming legal limits. Million-
dollar corporate contributions funded advertisements to impact 
Presidential and congressional campaigns. Well-funded individuals and 
organizations also got into the act. By spending a record $70 million 
on so-called issue advertising, labor unions, business organizations, 
and ideological groups circumvented limits on direct contributions to 
candidates. Thus, candidates, awash in a sea of outside money, were 
pushed to not only trounce their opponents in fundraising, but to match 
outside groups. The chase for dollars sapped candidates' time which 
could have been spent debating, attending forums, and otherwise 
engaging voters. Once solicited, most of these millions were spent on 
uninformative, 30-second advertisements, which only served to further 
alienate the electorate. Unchecked, this campaign system will spiral 
into exponential spending increases, further disenfranchisement, and 
less dialog. The system is already close to collapsing under its own 
weight; the time to act is now.
  The roots of this abysmal situation can be traced to a misguided 
Supreme Court decision. In Buckley versus Valeo, a 1976 case which 
challenged the 1974 campaign reform legislation, the Court held that, 
in order to avoid corruption, contributions to candidates and 
committees could be limited. However, the Court invalidated expenditure 
limits on candidates and independent entities as infringements on free 
speech rights. The Court surmised that unlimited spending would 
increase the number and depth of issues discussed. Twenty years of 
campaign spending has proven the Court's decision fatally flawed: fewer 
issues are discussed, less debate occurs, and voter participation has 
declined. The single most important step to reform elections and 
revitalize our democracy is to reverse the Buckley decision by limiting 
the amount of money that a candidate or his allies can spend.

  For this reason, Senators Bryan, Hollings, Johnson, and I are 
introducing legislation which directly challenges the Buckley decision 
and places mandatory limits on all campaign expenditures. These limits 
do not favor incumbents. Over the last three elections, these limits 
would have restricted 80 percent of incumbents, while only impacting 18 
percent of those who challenged incumbents. Additionally, this 
legislation would fully ban corporate contributions, as well as 
unlimited and unregulated contributions by wealthy individuals and 
organizations. Further, our bill would limit campaign expenditures by 
supposedly, neutral, independent groups, and restrict corporations, 
labor unions, and other organizations from influencing campaigns under 
the guise of issue advocacy. The end result of this legislation would 
be to eliminate over $500 million from the system, discourage 
violations, encourage challenges to incumbents, and further promote 
debate among both candidates and the electorate.
  What effect would these limits have on political debate? Contrary to 
the Supreme Court, I believe such limits would increase dialog. 
Candidates would be free from the burdens of unending fundraising and 
thus be available to participate in debates, forums, and interviews. 
With greater access to candidates and less reason to believe that 
candidates were captives of their contributors, voters might well be 
more prepared to invest the time needed to be informed on issues of 
concern and ask candidates to address them.
  Some will argue that this legislation impinges upon freedom of 
speech. The bill will marginally restrict the rights of a few to spend 
money--not speak--so that the majority of voters might restore their 
faith in the process. Thus, speech will be restricted no more than 
necessary to fulfill what I believe to be several compelling interests. 
Such a restriction conforms with constitutional jurisprudence and has 
been demonstrated necessary by history. The fact is all democratic 
debates are restricted by rules. My legislation would simply implement 
necessary rules into our campaign system. Finally, it is important to 
remember that the vast majority of Americans, 96 percent, have never 
made a political contribution at any level of government. Capping 
expenditures will truly impact very few individuals, and that 
restriction will be marginal, but necessary.
  Implementing spending caps is a grass-roots initiative. Elected 
officials from 33 States have urged that the Buckley decision be 
revisited and limits implemented. Legislative bodies in Ohio and 
Vermont have implemented sweeping reform by enacting mandatory caps on 
candidate expenditures. Other States, such as my own, have embraced 
public financing as a means of reform. Yet, today, Congress struggles 
to even consider the most modest of reforms, such as banning so called 
soft money: unlimited donations by corporations, labor unions, and 
wealthy individuals to political party committees. Unfortunately, 
because most of the current reform proposals accept the reasoning 
enunciated in the Buckley decision, they will only serve to redirect an 
unlimited flow of cash. While I enthusiastically support any 
substantive reform, if we are to address the underlying cancer which 
has disintegrated voter trust and participation, the problem of 
unlimited expenditures must be directly confronted. This is a step that 
one municipality and two States have embraced. Many more State 
officials as well as prominent constitutional law scholars have urged 
such a course. Expenditure limitations have been proposed by 
congressional reformers in the past, and it is time to rededicate 
ourselves to this goal.

  Mr. President, I have a list of the 33 State officials and 24 State 
attorneys general who have urged the reversal of Buckley. I ask 
unanimous consent that these documents be printed in the Record.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. (See 
exhibit 1.)
  Mr. REED. Mr. President, our democracy is dependent upon 
participation, stimulated by a belief that the system works for 
everyone. Just as scandals led to reform in 1907 and 1974, Congress 
must now rise to the task once again to address a threat to our 
democratic process. Polls continue to demonstrate that a majority of 
Americans believe the political process is controlled by wealthy 
interests. The most dangerous aspect of the current situation is that 
polls also show that voters have no faith in the ability of their 
representatives to implement reform. If we do not address the influence 
of money in our electoral system, the health of our democracy will 
endure increasing risk. It is time to begin true, comprehensive reform. 
I would like to thank Senators Bryan, Hollings, and Johnson for joining 
me in this endeavor. Their leadership on this issue in the past has 
proven invaluable, and I am proud that they have chosen to join me in 
this important effort. It is my hope that the Senate will now move to 
address the problem of our campaign system at its root. Finally, Mr. 
President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of this bill be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                S. 1057

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

[[Page S7953]]

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Campaign 
     Spending Control Act of 1997''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents of this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Statement of purpose.
Sec. 3. Findings of fact.

                TITLE I--SENATE ELECTION SPENDING LIMITS

Sec. 101. Senate election spending limits.

           TITLE II--COORDINATED AND INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES

Sec. 201. Adding definition of coordination to definition of 
              contribution.
Sec. 202. Treatment of certain coordinated contributions and 
              expenditures.
Sec. 203. Political party committees.
Sec. 204. Limit on independent expenditures.
Sec. 205. Clarification of definitions relating to independent 
              expenditures.
Sec. 206. Elimination of leadership PACs.

                         TITLE III--SOFT MONEY

Sec. 301. Soft money of political party committee.
Sec. 302. State party grassroots funds.
Sec. 303. Reporting requirements.
Sec. 304. Soft money of persons other than political parties.

                         TITLE IV--ENFORCEMENT

Sec. 401. Filing of reports using computers and facsimile machines.
Sec. 402. Audits.
Sec. 403. Authority to seek injunction.
Sec. 404. Increase in penalty for knowing and willful violations.
Sec. 405. Prohibition of contributions by individuals not qualified to 
              vote.
Sec. 406. Use of candidates' names.
Sec. 407. Expedited procedures.

           TITLE V--SEVERABILITY; REGULATIONS; EFFECTIVE DATE

Sec. 501. Severability.
Sec. 502. Regulations.
Sec. 503. Effective date.

     SEC. 2. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE.

       The purposes of this Act are to--
       (1) restore the public confidence in and the integrity of 
     our democratic system;
       (2) strengthen and promote full and free discussion and 
     debate during election campaigns;
       (3) relieve Federal officeholders from limitations on their 
     attention to the affairs of the Federal government that can 
     arise from excessive attention to fundraising;
       (4) relieve elective office-seekers and officeholders from 
     the limitations on purposeful political conduct and discourse 
     that can arise from excessive attention to fundraising;
       (5) reduce corruption and undue influence, or the 
     appearance thereof, in the financing of Federal election 
     campaigns; and
       (6) provide non-preferential terms of access to elected 
     Federal officeholders by all interested members of the public 
     in order to uphold the constitutionally guaranteed right to 
     petition the Government for redress of grievances.

     SEC. 3. FINDINGS OF FACT.

       Congress finds the following:
       (1) The current Federal campaign finance system, with its 
     perceived preferential access to lawmakers for interest 
     groups capable of contributing sizable sums of money to 
     lawmakers' campaigns, has caused a widespread loss of public 
     confidence in the fairness and responsiveness of elective 
     government and undermined the belief, necessary to a 
     functioning democracy, that the Government exists to serve 
     the needs of all people.
       (2) The United States Supreme Court, in Buckley v. Valeo, 
     424 U.S. 1 (1976), disapproved the use of mandatory spending 
     limits as a remedy for such effects, while approving the use 
     of campaign contribution limits.
       (3) Since that time, campaign expenditures have risen 
     steeply in Federal elections with spending by successful 
     candidates for the United States Senate between 1976 and 1996 
     rising from $609,100 to $3,775,000, an increase that is twice 
     the rate of inflation.
       (4) As campaign spending has escalated, voter turnout has 
     steadily declined and in 1996 voter turnout fell to its 
     lowest point since 1924, and stands now at the lowest level 
     of any democracy in the world.
       (5) Coupled with out-of-control campaign spending has come 
     the constant necessity of fundraising, arising, to a large 
     extent, from candidates adopting a defensive ``arms race'' 
     posture of constant readiness against the risk of massively 
     financed attacks against whatever the candidate may say or 
     do.
       (6) The current campaign finance system has had a 
     deleterious effect on those who hold public office as endless 
     fundraising pressures intrude upon the performance of 
     constitutionally required duties. Capable and dedicated 
     officials have left office in dismay over these distractions 
     and the negative public perceptions that the fundraising 
     process engenders and numerous qualified citizens have 
     declined to seek office because of the prospect of having to 
     raise the extraordinary amounts of money needed in today's 
     elections.
       (7) The requirement for candidates to fundraise, the 
     average 1996 expenditure level required a successful Senate 
     candidate to raise more than $12,099 a week for 6 years, 
     significantly impedes on the ability of Senators and other 
     officeholders to tend to their official duties, and limits 
     the ability of candidates to interact with the electorate 
     while also tending to professional responsibilities.
       (8) As talented incumbent and potential public servants are 
     deterred from seeking office in Congress because of such 
     fundraising pressures, the quality of representation suffers 
     and those who do serve are impeded in their effort to devote 
     full attention to matters of the Government by the campaign 
     financing system.
       (9) Contribution limits are inadequate to control all of 
     these trends and as long as campaign spending is effectively 
     unrestrained, supporters can find ways to protect their 
     favored candidates from being outspent. Since 1976 major 
     techniques have been found and exploited to get around and 
     evade contribution limits.
       (10) Techniques to evade contribution limits include 
     personal spending by wealthy candidates, independent 
     expenditures that assist or attack an identified candidate, 
     media campaigns by corporations, labor unions, and nonprofit 
     organizations to advocate the election or defeat of 
     candidates, and the use of national, State, or local 
     political parties as a conduit for money that assists or 
     attacks such candidates.
       (11) Wealthy candidates may, under the present Federal 
     campaign financing system, spend any amount they want out of 
     their own resources and while such spending may not be self-
     corrupting, it introduces the very defects the Supreme Court 
     wants to avoid. The effectively limitless character of such 
     resources obliges a wealthy candidate's opponent to reach for 
     larger amounts of outside support, causing the deleterious 
     effects previously described.
       (12) Experience shows that there is an identity of interest 
     between candidates and political parties because the parties 
     exist to support candidates, not the other way around. Party 
     expenditures in support of, or in opposition to, an 
     identifiable candidate are, therefore, effectively spending 
     on behalf of a candidate.
       (13) Political experience shows that so-called 
     ``independent'' support, whether by individuals, committees, 
     or other entities, can be and often is coordinated with a 
     candidate's campaign by means of tacit understandings without 
     losing its nominally independent character and, similarly, 
     contributions to a political party, ostensibly for ``party-
     building'' purposes, can be and often are routed, by 
     undeclared design, to the support of identified candidates.
       (14) The actual, case-by-case detection of coordination 
     between candidate, party, and independent contributor is, as 
     a practical matter, impossible in a fast-moving campaign 
     environment.
       (15) So-called ``issue advocacy'' communications, by or 
     through political parties or independent contributors, need 
     not, as a practical matter, advocate expressly for the 
     election or defeat of a named candidate in order to cross the 
     line into election campaign advocacy; any clear, objective 
     indication of purpose, such that voters may readily observe 
     where their electoral support is invited, can suffice as 
     evidence of intent to impact a Federal election campaign.
       (16) When State political parties or other entities 
     operating under State law receive funds, often called ``soft 
     money'', for use in Federal elections, they become de facto 
     agents of the national political party and the inclusion of 
     these funds under applicable Federal limitations is necessary 
     and proper for the effective regulation of Federal election 
     campaigns.
       (17) The exorbitant level of money in the political system 
     has served to distort our democracy by giving some 
     contributors, who constitute less than 3 percent of the 
     citizenry, the appearance of favored access to elected 
     officials, thus undermining the ability of ordinary citizens 
     to petition their Government. Concerns over the potential for 
     corruption and undue influence, and the appearances thereof, 
     has left citizens cynical, the reputation of elected 
     officials tarnished, and the moral authority of Government 
     weakened.
       (18) The 2 decades of experience since the Supreme Court's 
     Buckley v. Valeo ruling in 1976 have made it evident that 
     reasonable limits on election campaign expenditures are now 
     necessary and these limits must comprehensively address all 
     types of expenditures to prevent circumvention of such 
     limits.
       (19) The Supreme Court based its Buckley v. Valeo decision 
     on a concern that spending limits could narrow political 
     speech ``by restricting the number of issues discussed, the 
     depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience 
     reached''. The experience of the past 20 years has been 
     otherwise as experience shows that unlimited expenditures can 
     drown out or distort political discourse in a flood of 
     distractive repetition. Reasonable spending limits will 
     increase the opportunity for previously muted voices to be 
     heard and thereby increase the number, depth, and diversity 
     of ideas presented to the public.
       (20) Issue advocacy communications that do not promote or 
     oppose an identified candidate should remain unregulated, as 
     should the traditional freedom of the press to report and 
     editorialize about candidates and campaigns.
       (21) In establishing reasonable limits on campaign 
     spending, it is necessary that the limits reflect the 
     realities of modern campaigning in a large, diverse 
     population with sophisticated and expensive modes of 
     communication. The limits must allow citizens to benefit from 
     a full and free debate of issues and permit candidates to 
     garner the resources necessary to engage in that debate.

[[Page S7954]]

       (22) The expenditure limits established in this Act for 
     election to the United States Senate were determined after 
     careful review of historical spending patterns in Senate 
     campaigns as well as the particular spending level of the 3 
     most recent elections as evidenced by the following:
       (A) The limit formula allows candidates a level of spending 
     which guarantees an ability to disseminate their message by 
     accounting for the size of the population in each State as 
     well as historical spending trends including the demonstrated 
     trend of lower campaign spending per voter in larger States 
     as compared to voter spending in smaller States.
       (B) The candidate expenditure limits included in this 
     legislation would have restricted 80 percent of the incumbent 
     candidates in the last 3 elections, while only impeding 18 
     percent of the challengers.
       (C) It is clear from recent experience that expenditure 
     limits as set by the formula in this Act will be high enough 
     to allow an effective level of competition, encourage 
     candidate dialogue with constituents, and circumscribe the 
     most egregiously high spending levels, so as to be a bulwark 
     against future campaign finance excesses and the resulting 
     voter disenfranchisement.
                TITLE I--SENATE ELECTION SPENDING LIMITS

     SEC. 101. SENATE ELECTION SPENDING LIMITS.

       (a) In General.--Title III of the Federal Election Campaign 
     Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 431 et seq.) is amended by adding at 
     the end the following:

     ``SEC. 324. SPENDING LIMITS FOR SENATE ELECTION CAMPAIGNS

       ``(a) In General.--The amount of funds expended by a 
     candidate for election to the Senate and the candidate's 
     authorized committees with respect to an election may not 
     exceed the election expenditure limits of subsections (b), 
     (c), and (d).
       ``(b) Primary Election Expenditure Limit.--The aggregate 
     amount of expenditures for a primary election by a Senate 
     candidate and the candidate's authorized committees shall not 
     exceed 67 percent of the general election expenditure limit 
     under subsection (d).
       ``(c) Runoff Election Expenditure Limit.--The aggregate 
     amount of expenditures for a runoff election by a Senate 
     candidate and the candidate's authorized committees shall not 
     exceed 20 percent of the general election expenditure limit 
     under subsection (d).
       ``(d) General Election Expenditure Limit.--
       ``(1) In general.--The aggregate amount of expenditures for 
     a general election by a Senate candidate and the candidate's 
     authorized committees shall not exceed the greater of--
       ``(A) $1,182,500; or
       ``(B) $500,000; plus
       ``(i) 37.5 cents multiplied by the voting age population 
     not in excess of 4,000,000; and
       ``(ii) 31.25 cents multiplied by the voting age population 
     in excess of 4,000,000.
       ``(2) Exception.--In the case of a Senate candidate in a 
     State that has not more than 1 transmitter for a commercial 
     Very High Frequency (VHF) television station licensed to 
     operate in that State, paragraph (1)(B) shall be applied by 
     substituting--
       ``(A) `$1.00' for `37.5 cents' in clause (i); and
       ``(B) `87.5 cents' for `31.25 cents' in clause (ii).
       ``(3) Indexing.--The monetary amounts in paragraphs (1) and 
     (2) shall be increased as of the beginning of each calendar 
     year based on the increase in the price index determined 
     under section 315(c), except that the base period shall be 
     calendar year 1997.
       ``(e) Exempted Expenditures.--In determining the amount of 
     funds expended for purposes of this section, there shall be 
     excluded any amounts expended for--
       ``(1) Federal, State, or local taxes with respect to 
     earnings on contributions raised;
       ``(2) legal and accounting services provided solely in 
     connection with complying with the requirements of this Act;
       ``(3) legal services related to a recount of the results of 
     a Federal election or an election contest concerning a 
     Federal election; or
       ``(4) payments made to or on behalf of an employee of a 
     candidate's authorized committees for employee benefits--
       ``(A) including--
       ``(i) health care insurance;
       ``(ii) retirement plans; and
       ``(iii) unemployment insurance; but
       ``(B) not including salary, any form of compensation, or 
     amounts intended to reimburse the employee.''.
           TITLE II--COORDINATED AND INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES

     SEC. 201. ADDING DEFINITION OF COORDINATION TO DEFINITION OF 
                   CONTRIBUTION.

       (a) Definition of Contribution.--Section 301(8) of the 
     Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 431(8)) is 
     amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (A)--
       (A) in clause (i), by striking ``or'' at the end;
       (B) in clause (ii) by striking the period and inserting ``; 
     or''; and
       (C) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(iii) a payment made for a communication or anything of 
     value that is for the purpose of influencing an election for 
     Federal office and that is a payment made in coordination 
     with a candidate.''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(C) Payment made in coordination with.--The term `payment 
     made in coordination with' means--
       ``(i) a payment made by any person in cooperation, 
     consultation, or concert with, at the request or suggestion 
     of, or pursuant to any general or particular understanding 
     with, a candidate, a candidate's authorized committees, an 
     agent acting on behalf of a candidate or a candidate's 
     authorized committee, or (for purposes of paragraphs (9) and 
     (10) of section 315(a)) another person;
       ``(ii) the financing by any person of the dissemination, 
     distribution, or republication, in whole or in part, of any 
     broadcast or any written, graphic, or other form of campaign 
     materials prepared by the candidate or the candidate's 
     authorized committees (not including a communication 
     described in paragraph (9)(B)(i) or a communication that 
     expressly advocates the candidate's defeat); or
       ``(iii) payments made based on information about the 
     candidate's plans, projects, or needs provided to the person 
     making the payment by the candidate, the candidate's 
     authorized committees, or an agent of a candidate or a 
     candidate's authorized committees.''.
       (b) Conforming Amendments.--
       (1) Section 315.--Section 315(a)(7)(B) of the Federal 
     Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(7)(B)) is 
     amended to read as follows:
       ``(B) expenditures made in coordination with a candidate, 
     within the meaning of section 301(8)(C), shall be considered 
     to be contributions to the candidate and, in the case of 
     limitations on expenditures, shall be treated as an 
     expenditure for purposes of this section; and''.
       (2) Section 316.--Section 316(b)(2) of the Federal Election 
     Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 441b(b)(2)) is amended by 
     striking ``shall include'' and inserting ``shall have the 
     meaning given those terms in paragraphs (8) and (9) of 
     section 301 and shall also include''.

     SEC. 202. TREATMENT OF CERTAIN COORDINATED CONTRIBUTIONS AND 
                   EXPENDITURES.

       Section 315(a) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 
     (2 U.S.C. 441a(a)) is amended by adding at the end the 
     following:
       ``(9) For purposes of this section, contributions made by 
     more than 1 person in coordination with each other (within 
     the meaning of section 301(8)(C)) shall be considered to have 
     been made by a single person.
       ``(10) For purposes of this section, an independent 
     expenditure made by a person in coordination with (within the 
     meaning of section 301(8)(C)) another person shall be 
     considered to have been made by a single person.''.

     SEC. 203. POLITICAL PARTY COMMITTEES.

       (a) Limit on Coordinated and Independent Expenditures by 
     Political Party Committees.--Section 315(d) of the Federal 
     Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 441a(d)) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``and independent 
     expenditures'' after ``Federal office''; and
       (2) in paragraph (3)--
       (A) by inserting ``, including expenditures made'' after 
     ``make any expenditure''; and
       (B) by inserting ``and independent expenditures advocating 
     the election or defeat of a candidate,'' after ``such 
     party''.
       (b) Rules Applicable When Limits not in Effect.--For 
     purposes of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 
     U.S.C. 431 et seq.), during any period beginning after the 
     effective date of this Act in which the limitation under 
     section 315(d)(3) (as amended by subsection (a)) is not in 
     effect the following amendments shall be effective:
       (1) Independent versus coordinated expenditures by a 
     political party committee.--Section 315(d) of the Federal 
     Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 441a(d)) is amended--
       (A) in paragraph (1)--
       (i) by striking ``(2) and (3) of this subsection'' and 
     inserting ``(2), (3), and (4) of this subsection''; and
       (ii) by inserting ``coordinated'' after ``make'';
       (B) in paragraph (3), by inserting ``coordinated'' after 
     ``make''; and
       (C) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(4) Prohibition against making both coordinated 
     expenditures and independent expenditures.--
       ``(A) In general.--A committee of a political party shall 
     not make both a coordinated expenditure in excess of $5,000 
     and an independent expenditure with respect to the same 
     candidate during an election cycle.
       ``(B) Certification.--Before making a coordinated 
     expenditure in excess of $5,000 in connection with a general 
     election campaign for Federal office, a committee of a 
     political party that is subject to this subsection shall file 
     with the Commission a certification, signed by the treasurer, 
     stating that the committee will not make independent 
     expenditures with respect to such candidate.
       ``(C) Transfers.--A party committee that certifies under 
     this paragraph that the committee will make coordinated 
     expenditures with respect to any candidate shall not, in the 
     same election cycle, make a transfer of funds to, or receive 
     a transfer of funds from, any other party committee unless 
     that committee has certified under this paragraph that it 
     will only make coordinated expenditures with respect to 
     candidates.
       ``(D) Definition of coordinated expenditure.--In this 
     paragraph, the term `coordinated expenditure' shall have the 
     meaning given the term `payments made in coordination with' 
     in section 301(8)(C).''.
       (2) Limit on contributions to political party committees.--
     Section 315(a) of Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 
     U.S.C. 441a(a)) is amended--

[[Page S7955]]

       (A) in paragraph (1)(B), by striking ``which, in the 
     aggregate, exceed $20,000'' and inserting ``that--
       ``(i) in the case of a political committee that certifies 
     under subsection (d)(4) that it will not make independent 
     expenditures in connection with the general election campaign 
     of any candidate, in the aggregate, exceed $20,000; or
       ``(ii) in the case of a political committee that does not 
     certify under subsection (d)(4) that it will not make 
     independent expenditures in connection with the general 
     election campaign of any candidate, in the aggregate, exceed 
     $5,000''; and
       (B) in paragraph (2)(B), by striking ``which, in the 
     aggregate, exceed $15,000'' and inserting ``that--
       ``(i) in the case of a political committee that certifies 
     under subsection (d)(4) that it will not make independent 
     expenditures in connection with the general election campaign 
     of any candidate, in the aggregate, exceed $15,000; or
       ``(ii) in the case of a political committee that does not 
     certify under subsection (d)(4) that it will not make 
     independent expenditures in connection with the general 
     election campaign of any candidate, in the aggregate, exceed 
     $5,000''.
       (c) Definition of Election Cycle.--Section 301 of the 
     Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 431) is 
     amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(20) Election cycle.--The term `election cycle' means--
       ``(A) in the case of a candidate or the authorized 
     committees of a candidate, the period beginning on the day 
     after the date of the most recent general election for the 
     specific office or seat that the candidate is seeking and 
     ending on the date of the next general election for that 
     office or seat; and
       ``(B) in the case of all other persons, the period 
     beginning on the first day following the date of the last 
     general election and ending on the date of the next general 
     election.''.

     SEC. 204. LIMIT ON INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES.

       (a) In general.--Section 315 of the Federal Election 
     Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 441a) is amended by adding at 
     the end the following:
       ``(i) Limit on Independent Expenditures.--No person shall 
     make an amount of independent expenditures advocating the 
     election or defeat of a candidate during an election cycle in 
     an aggregate amount greater than the limit applicable to the 
     candidate under section 315(d)(3).''.
       (b) Rules Applicable When Rules in Subsection (a) Not in 
     Effect.--For purposes of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 
     1971, during any period beginning after the effective date of 
     this Act in which the limit on independent expenditures under 
     section 315(i) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 
     as added by subsection (a), is not in effect section 324 of 
     such Act, as added by section 101(a), is amended by adding at 
     the end the following:
       ``(f) Increase in Expenditure Limit in Response to 
     Independent Expenditures.--
       ``(1) In general.--The applicable election expenditure 
     limit for a candidate shall be increased by the aggregate 
     amount of independent expenditures made in excess of the 
     limit applicable to the candidate under section 315(d)(3)--
       ``(A) on behalf of an opponent of the candidate; or
       ``(B) in opposition to the candidate.
       ``(2) Notification.--
       ``(A) In general.--A candidate shall notify the Commission 
     of an intent to increase an expenditure limit under paragraph 
     (1).
       ``(B) Commission response.--Within 3 business days of 
     receiving a notice under subparagraph (A), the Commission 
     must approve or deny the increase in expenditure limit.
       ``(C) Additional notification.--A candidate who has 
     increased an expenditure limit under paragraph (1) shall 
     notify the Commission of each additional increase in 
     increments of $50,000.''.

     SEC. 205. CLARIFICATION OF DEFINITIONS RELATING TO 
                   INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES.

       (a) Definition of Independent Expenditure.--Section 301 of 
     the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 431) is 
     amended by striking paragraph (17) and inserting the 
     following:
       ``(17) Independent expenditure.--The term `independent 
     expenditure' means an expenditure that--
       (A) contains express advocacy; and
       (B) is made without the participation or cooperation of, or 
     without consultation with, or without coordination with a 
     candidate or a candidate's authorized committee or agent 
     (within the meaning of section 301(8)(C)).''.
       (b) Definition of Express Advocacy.--Section 301 of Federal 
     Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 431), as amended by 
     section 202(c), is amended by adding at the end the 
     following:
       ``(21) Express advocacy.--The term `express advocacy' 
     includes--
       ``(i) a communication that conveys a message that advocates 
     the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate for 
     Federal office by using an expression such as `vote for,' 
     `elect,' `support,' `vote against,' `defeat,' `reject,' 
     `(name of candidate) for Congress,' `vote pro-life,' or `vote 
     pro-choice,' accompanied by a listing or picture of a clearly 
     identified candidate described as `pro-life' or `pro-choice,' 
     `reject the incumbent,' or an expression susceptible to no 
     other reasonable interpretation but an unmistakable and 
     unambiguous exhortation to vote for or against a specific 
     candidate; or
       ``(ii) a communication that is made through a broadcast 
     medium, newspaper, magazine, billboard, direct mail, or 
     similar type of general public communication or political 
     advertising--
       ``(A) that is made on or after a date that is 90 days 
     before the date of a general election of the candidate;
       ``(B) that refers to the character, qualifications, or 
     accomplishments of a clearly identified candidate, group of 
     candidates, or candidate of a clearly identified political 
     party; and
       ``(C) that does not have as its sole purpose an attempt to 
     urge action on legislation that has been introduced in or is 
     being considered by a legislature that is in session.''.

     SEC. 206. ELIMINATION OF LEADERSHIP PACS.

       (a) Designation and Establishment of Authorized 
     Committee.--Section 302(e) of the Federal Election Campaign 
     Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 432(e)) is amended by--
       (1) striking paragraph (3) and inserting the following:
       ``(3) No political committee that supports, or has 
     supported, more than one candidate may be designated as an 
     authorized committee, except that--
       ``(A) a candidate for the office of President nominated by 
     a political party may designate the national committee of 
     such political party as the candidate's principal campaign 
     committee, if that national committee maintains separate 
     books of account with respect to its functions as a principal 
     campaign committee; and
       ``(B) a candidate may designate a political committee 
     established solely for the purpose of joint fundraising by 
     such candidates as an authorized committee.''; and
       (2) adding at the end the following:
       ``(6)(A) A candidate for Federal office or any individual 
     holding Federal office may not directly or indirectly 
     establish, finance, maintain, or control any political 
     committee other than a principal campaign committee of the 
     candidate, designated in accordance with paragraph (3). A 
     candidate for more than one Federal office may designate a 
     separate principal campaign committee for each Federal 
     office. This paragraph shall not preclude a Federal 
     officeholder who is a candidate for State or local office 
     from establishing, financing, maintaining, or controlling a 
     political committee for election of the individual to such 
     State or local office.
       ``(B) A political committee prohibited by subparagraph (A), 
     that is established before the date of enactment of this Act, 
     may continue to make contributions for a period that ends on 
     the date that is 1 year after the date of enactment of this 
     paragraph. At the end of such period the political committee 
     shall disburse all funds by 1 or more of the following means:
       ``(1) Making contributions to an entity described in 
     section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and 
     exempt from taxation under section 501(a) of such Act that is 
     not established, maintained, financed, or controlled directly 
     or indirectly by any candidate for Federal office or any 
     individual holding Federal office.
       ``(2) Making a contribution to the Treasury.
       ``(3) Making contributions to the national, State, or local 
     committees of a political party.
       ``(4) Making contributions not to exceed $1,000 to 
     candidates for elective office.''.
                         TITLE III--SOFT MONEY

     SEC. 301. SOFT MONEY OF POLITICAL PARTY COMMITTEE.

       Title III of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 
     U.S.C. 431 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the 
     following:

     ``SEC. 325. SOFT MONEY OF PARTY COMMITTEES.

       ``(a) National Committees.--A national committee of a 
     political party (including a national congressional campaign 
     committee of a political party), an entity that is directly 
     or indirectly established, financed, maintained, or 
     controlled by a national committee or its agent, an entity 
     acting on behalf of a national committee, and an officer or 
     agent acting on behalf of any such committee or entity (but 
     not including an entity regulated under subsection (b)) shall 
     not solicit or receive any contributions, donations, or 
     transfers of funds, or spend any funds, that are not subject 
     to the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements 
     of this Act.
       ``(b) State, District, and Local Committees.--
       ``(1) In general.--Any amount that is expended or disbursed 
     by a State, district, or local committee of a political party 
     (including an entity that is directly or indirectly 
     established, financed, maintained, or controlled by a State, 
     district, or local committee of a political party and an 
     officer or agent acting on behalf of any such committee or 
     entity) during a calendar year in which a Federal election is 
     held, for any activity that might affect the outcome of a 
     Federal election, including any voter registration or get-
     out-the-vote activity, any generic campaign activity, and any 
     communication that refers to a candidate (regardless of 
     whether a candidate for State or local office is also 
     mentioned or identified) shall be made from funds subject to 
     the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of 
     this Act.
       ``(2) Activity excluded from paragraph (1).--
       ``(A) In general.--Paragraph (1) shall not apply to an 
     expenditure or disbursement made by a State, district, or 
     local committee of a political party for--

[[Page S7956]]

       ``(i) a contribution to a candidate for State or local 
     office if the contribution is not designated or otherwise 
     earmarked to pay for an activity described in paragraph (1);
       ``(ii) the costs of a State, district, or local political 
     convention;
       ``(iii) the non-Federal share of a State, district, or 
     local party committee's administrative and overhead expenses 
     (but not including the compensation in any month of any 
     individual who spends more than 20 percent of the 
     individual's time on activity during the month that may 
     affect the outcome of a Federal election) except that for 
     purposes of this paragraph, the non-Federal share of a party 
     committee's administrative and overhead expenses shall be 
     determined by applying the ratio of the non-Federal 
     disbursements to the total Federal expenditures and non-
     Federal disbursements made by the committee during the 
     previous presidential election year to the committee's 
     administrative and overhead expenses in the election year in 
     question;
       ``(iv) the costs of grassroots campaign materials, 
     including buttons, bumper stickers, and yard signs that name 
     or depict only a candidate for State or local office; and
       ``(v) the cost of any campaign activity conducted solely on 
     behalf of a clearly identified candidate for State or local 
     office, if the candidate activity is not an activity 
     described in paragraph (1).
       ``(B) Fundraising costs.--Any amount spent by a national, 
     State, district, or local committee, by an entity that is 
     established, financed, maintained, or controlled by a State, 
     district, or local committee of a political party, or by an 
     agent or officer of any such committee or entity to raise 
     funds that are used, in whole or in part, to pay the costs of 
     an activity described in paragraph (1) shall be made from 
     funds subject to the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting 
     requirements of this Act.
       ``(c) Tax-exempt organizations.--A national, State, 
     district, or local committee of a political party (including 
     a national congressional campaign committee of a political 
     party, an entity that is directly or indirectly established, 
     financed, maintained, or controlled by any such national, 
     State, district, or local committee or its agent, an agent 
     acting on behalf of any such party committee, and an officer 
     or agent acting on behalf of any such party committee or 
     entity), shall not solicit any funds for or make any 
     donations to an organization that is exempt from Federal 
     taxation under section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 
     1986.
       ``(d) Candidates.--
       ``(1) In general.--A candidate, individual holding Federal 
     office, or agent of a candidate or individual holding Federal 
     office shall not--
       ``(A) solicit, receive, transfer, or spend funds in 
     connection with an election for Federal office unless the 
     funds are subject to the limitations, prohibitions, and 
     reporting requirements of this Act;
       ``(B) solicit, receive, or transfer funds that are to be 
     expended in connection with any election other than a Federal 
     election unless the funds--
       ``(i) are not in excess of the amounts permitted with 
     respect to contributions to candidates and political 
     committees under section 315(a) (1) and (2); and
       ``(ii) are not from sources prohibited by this Act from 
     making contributions with respect to an election for Federal 
     office; or
       ``(C) solicit, receive, or transfer any funds on behalf of 
     any person that are not subject to the limitations, 
     prohibitions, and reporting requirements of the Act if the 
     funds are for use in financing any campaign-related activity 
     or any communication that refers to a clearly identified 
     candidate for Federal office.
       ``(2) Exception.--Paragraph (1) does not apply to the 
     solicitation or receipt of funds by an individual who is a 
     candidate for a State or local office if the solicitation or 
     receipt of funds is permitted under State law for the 
     individual's State or local campaign committee.''.

     SEC. 302. STATE PARTY GRASSROOTS FUNDS.

       (a) Individual Contributions.--Section 315(a)(1) of the 
     Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(1)) 
     is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``or'' at the end;
       (2) in subparagraph (C), by striking the period at the end 
     and inserting ``; or''; and
       (3) by inserting after subparagraph (C) the following:
       ``(D) to--
       ``(i) a State Party Grassroots Fund established and 
     maintained by a State committee of a political party in any 
     calendar year which, in the aggregate, exceed $20,000;
       ``(ii) any other political committee established and 
     maintained by a State committee of a political party in any 
     calendar year which, in the aggregate, exceed $5,000;

     except that the aggregate contributions described in this 
     subparagraph that may be made by a person to the State Party 
     Grassroots Fund and all committees of a State Committee of a 
     political party in any State in any calendar year shall not 
     exceed $20,000.''.
       (b) Limits.--
       (1) In general.--Section 315(a) of the Federal Election 
     Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 441a(a)) is amended by 
     striking paragraph (3) and inserting the following:
       ``(3) Overall limits.--
       ``(A) Individual limit.--No individual shall make 
     contributions during any calendar year that, in the 
     aggregate, exceed $30,000.
       ``(B) Calendar year.--No individual shall make 
     contributions during any calendar year--
       ``(i) to all candidates and their authorized political 
     committees that, in the aggregate, exceed $25,000; or
       ``(ii) to all political committees established and 
     maintained by State committees of a political party that, in 
     the aggregate, exceed $20,000.
       ``(C) Nonelection years.--For purposes of subparagraph 
     (B)(i), any contribution made to a candidate or the 
     candidate's authorized political committees in a year other 
     than the calendar year in which the election is held with 
     respect to which the contribution is made shall be treated as 
     being made during the calendar year in which the election is 
     held.''.
       (c) Definitions.--Section 301 of the Federal Election 
     Campaign Act of 1970 (2 U.S.C. 431), as amended by section 
     205(b), is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(22) Generic campaign activity.--The term `generic 
     campaign activity' means a campaign activity that promotes a 
     political party and does not refer to any particular Federal 
     or non-Federal candidate.
       ``(23) State Party Grassroots Fund.--The term `State Party 
     Grassroots Fund' means a separate segregated fund established 
     and maintained by a State committee of a political party 
     solely for purposes of making expenditures and other 
     disbursements described in section 326(d).''.
       (d) State Party Grassroots Funds.--Title III of the Federal 
     Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 431 et seq.), as 
     amended by section 301, is amended by adding at the end the 
     following:

     ``SEC. 326. STATE PARTY GRASSROOTS FUNDS.

       ``(a) Definition.--In this section, the term `State or 
     local candidate committee' means a committee established, 
     financed, maintained, or controlled by a candidate for other 
     than Federal office.
       ``(b) Transfers.--Notwithstanding section 315(a)(4), no 
     funds may be transferred by a State committee of a political 
     party from its State Party Grassroots Fund to any other State 
     Party Grassroots Fund or to any other political committee, 
     except a transfer may be made to a district or local 
     committee of the same political party in the same State if 
     the district or local committee--
       ``(1) has established a separate segregated fund for the 
     purposes described in subsection (d); and
       ``(2) uses the transferred funds solely for those purposes.
       ``(c) Amounts Received by Grassroots Funds From State and 
     Local Candidate Committees.--
       ``(1) In general.--Any amount received by a State Party 
     Grassroots Fund from a State or local candidate committee for 
     expenditures described in subsection (d) that are for the 
     benefit of that candidate shall be treated as meeting the 
     requirements of 325(b)(1) and section 304(e) if--
       ``(A) the amount is derived from funds which meet the 
     requirements of this Act with respect to any limitation or 
     prohibition as to source or dollar amount specified in 
     section 315(a) (1)(A) and (2)(A); and
       ``(B) the State or local candidate committee--
       ``(i) maintains, in the account from which payment is made, 
     records of the sources and amounts of funds for purposes of 
     determining whether those requirements are met; and
       ``(ii) certifies that the requirements were met.
       ``(2) Determination of compliance.--For purposes of 
     paragraph (1)(A), in determining whether the funds 
     transferred meet the requirements of this Act described in 
     paragraph (1)(A)--
       ``(A) a State or local candidate committee's cash on hand 
     shall be treated as consisting of the funds most recently 
     received by the committee; and
       ``(B) the committee must be able to demonstrate that its 
     cash on hand contains funds meeting those requirements 
     sufficient to cover the transferred funds.
       ``(3) Reporting.--Notwithstanding paragraph (1), any State 
     Party Grassroots Fund that receives a transfer described in 
     paragraph (1) from a State or local candidate committee shall 
     be required to meet the reporting requirements of this Act, 
     and shall submit to the Commission all certifications 
     received, with respect to receipt of the transfer from the 
     candidate committee.
       ``(d) Disbursements and Expenditures.--A State committee of 
     a political party may make disbursements and expenditures 
     from its State Party Grassroots Fund only for--
       ``(1) any generic campaign activity;
       ``(2) payments described in clauses (v), (ix), and (xi) of 
     paragraph (8)(B) and clauses (iv), (viii), and (ix) of 
     paragraph (9)(B) of section 301;
       ``(3) subject to the limitations of section 315(d), 
     payments described in clause (xii) of paragraph (8)(B), and 
     clause (ix) of paragraph (9)(B), of section 301 on behalf of 
     candidates other than for President and Vice President;
       ``(4) voter registration; and
       ``(5) development and maintenance of voter files during an 
     even-numbered calendar year.''.

     SEC. 303. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

       (a) Reporting Requirements.--Section 304 of the Federal 
     Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 434) is amended by 
     adding at the end the following:
       ``(e) Political Committees.--
       ``(1) National and congressional political committees.--The 
     national committee of

[[Page S7957]]

     a political party, any congressional campaign committee of a 
     political party, and any subordinate committee of either, 
     shall report all receipts and disbursements during the 
     reporting period, whether or not in connection with an 
     election for Federal office.
       ``(2) Other political committees to which section 325 
     applies.--A political committee (not described in paragraph 
     (1)) to which section 325(b)(1) applies shall report all 
     receipts and disbursements made for activities described in 
     paragraphs (1) and (2)(iii) of section 325(b).
       (3) Other political committees.--Any political committee to 
     which paragraph (1) or (2) does not apply shall report any 
     receipts or disbursements that are used in connection with a 
     Federal election.
       ``(4) Itemization.--If a political committee has receipts 
     or disbursements to which this subsection applies from any 
     person aggregating in excess of $200 for any calendar year, 
     the political committee shall separately itemize its 
     reporting for such person in the same manner as required in 
     paragraphs (3)(A), (5), and (6) of subsection (b).
       ``(5) Reporting periods.--Reports required to be filed 
     under this subsection shall be filed for the same time 
     periods required for political committees under subsection 
     (a).''.
       (b) Building Fund Exception to the Definition of 
     Contribution.--Section 301(8) of the Federal Election 
     Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 431(8)) is amended--
       (1) by striking clause (viii); and
       (2) by redesignating clauses (ix) through (xiv) as clauses 
     (viii) through (xiii), respectively.
       (c) Reports by State Committees.--Section 304 of the 
     Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 434), as 
     amended by subsection (a), is amended by adding at the end 
     the following:
       ``(f) Filing of State Reports.--In lieu of any report 
     required to be filed by this Act, the Commission may allow a 
     State committee of a political party to file with the 
     Commission a report required to be filed under State law if 
     the Commission determines such reports contain substantially 
     the same information.''.
       (d) Other Reporting Requirements.--
       (1) Authorized committees.--Section 304(b)(4) of the 
     Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 434(b)(4)) is 
     amended--
       (A) by striking ``and'' at the end of subparagraph (H);
       (B) by inserting ``and'' at the end of subparagraph (I); 
     and
       (C) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
       ``(J) in the case of an authorized committee, disbursements 
     for the primary election, the general election, and any other 
     election in which the candidate participates;''.
       (2) Names and addresses.--Section 304(b)(5)(A) of the 
     Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 434(b)(5)(A)) 
     is amended by inserting ``, and the election to which the 
     operating expenditure relates'' after ``operating 
     expenditure''.

     SEC. 304. SOFT MONEY OF PERSONS OTHER THAN POLITICAL PARTIES.

       Section 304 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 
     U.S.C. 434), as amended by subsection 303, is amended by 
     adding at the end the following:
       ``(g) Election Activity of Persons Other Than Political 
     Parties.--
       ``(1) In general.--A person other than a committee of a 
     political party that makes aggregate disbursements totaling 
     in excess of $10,000 for activities described in paragraph 
     (2) shall file a statement with the Commission--
       ``(A) within 48 hours after the disbursements are made; or
       ``(B) in the case of disbursements that are made within 20 
     days of an election, within 24 hours after the disbursements 
     are made.
       ``(2) Activity.--The activity described in this paragraph 
     is--
       ``(A) any activity described in section 316(b)(2)(A) that 
     refers to any candidate for Federal office, any political 
     party, or any Federal election; and
       ``(B) any activity described in subparagraph (B) or (C) of 
     section 316(b)(2).
       ``(3) Additional statements.--An additional statement shall 
     be filed each time additional disbursements aggregating 
     $10,000 are made by a person described in paragraph (1).
       ``(4) Applicability.--This subsection does not apply to--
       ``(A) a candidate or a candidate's authorized committees; 
     or
       ``(B) an independent expenditure.
       ``(5) Contents.--A statement under this section shall 
     contain such information about the disbursements as the 
     Commission shall prescribe, including--
       ``(A) the name and address of the person or entity to whom 
     the disbursement was made;
       ``(B) the amount and purpose of the disbursement; and
       ``(C) if applicable, whether the disbursement was in 
     support of, or in opposition to, a candidate or a political 
     party, and the name of the candidate or the political 
     party.''.
                         TITLE IV--ENFORCEMENT

     SEC. 401. FILING OF REPORTS USING COMPUTERS AND FACSIMILE 
                   MACHINES.

       Section 302(a) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 
     (2 U.S.C. 434(a)) is amended by striking paragraph (11) and 
     inserting the following:
       ``(11) Filing of reports using computers and facsimile 
     machines.--
       ``(A) Required filing.--The Commission may promulgate a 
     regulation under which a person required to file a 
     designation, statement, or report under this Act--
       ``(i) is required to maintain and file a designation, 
     statement, or report for any calendar year in electronic form 
     accessible by computers if the person has, or has reason to 
     expect to have, aggregate contributions or expenditures in 
     excess of a threshold amount determined by the Commission; 
     and
       ``(ii) may maintain and file a designation, statement, or 
     report in that manner if not required to do so under 
     regulations prescribed under clause (i).
       ``(B) Facsimile machine.--The Commission shall promulgate a 
     regulation that allows a person to file a designation, 
     statement, or report required by this Act through the use of 
     facsimile machines.
       ``(C) Verification of signature.--
       ``(i) In general.--In promulgating a regulation under this 
     paragraph, the Commission shall provide methods (other than 
     requiring a signature on the document being filed) for 
     verifying a designation, statement, or report covered by the 
     regulations.
       ``(ii) Treatment of verification.--A document verified 
     under any of the methods shall be treated for all purposes 
     (including penalties for perjury) in the same manner as a 
     document verified by signature.''.

     SEC. 402. AUDITS.

       (a) Random Audits.--Section 311(b) of the Federal Election 
     Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 438(b)) is amended--
       (1) by inserting ``(1)'' before ``The Commission''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(2) Random audits.--
       ``(A) In general.--Notwithstanding paragraph (1), the 
     Commission may conduct random audits and investigations to 
     ensure voluntary compliance with this Act.
       ``(B) Limitation.--The Commission shall not institute an 
     audit or investigation of a candidate's authorized committee 
     under subparagraph (A) until the candidate is no longer a 
     candidate for the office sought by the candidate in that 
     election cycle.
       ``(C) Applicability.--This paragraph does not apply to an 
     authorized committee of a candidate for President or Vice 
     President subject to audit under section 9007 or 9038 of the 
     Internal Revenue Code of 1986.''.
       (b) Extension of Period During Which Campaign Audits May Be 
     Begun.--Section 311(b) of the Federal Election Campaign Act 
     of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 438(b)) is amended by striking ``6 months'' 
     and inserting ``12 months''.

     SEC. 403. AUTHORITY TO SEEK INJUNCTION.

       Section 309(a) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 
     (2 U.S.C. 437g(a)) is amended--
       (1) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(13) Authority to seek injunction.--
       ``(A) In general.--If, at any time in a proceeding 
     described in paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4), the Commission 
     believes that--
       ``(i) there is a substantial likelihood that a violation of 
     this Act is occurring or is about to occur;
       ``(ii) the failure to act expeditiously will result in 
     irreparable harm to a party affected by the potential 
     violation;
       ``(iii) expeditious action will not cause undue harm or 
     prejudice to the interests of others; and
       ``(iv) the public interest would be best served by the 
     issuance of an injunction;
     the Commission may initiate a civil action for a temporary 
     restraining order or a preliminary injunction pending the 
     outcome of the proceedings described in paragraphs (1), (2), 
     (3), and (4).
       ``(B) Venue.--An action under subparagraph (A) shall be 
     brought in the United States district court for the district 
     in which the defendant resides, transacts business, or may be 
     found, or in which the violation is occurring, has occurred, 
     or is about to occur.'';
       (2) in paragraph (7), by striking ``(5) or (6)'' and 
     inserting ``(5), (6), or (13)''; and
       (3) in paragraph (11), by striking ``(6)'' and inserting 
     ``(6) or (13)''.

     SEC. 404. INCREASE IN PENALTY FOR KNOWING AND WILLFUL 
                   VIOLATIONS.

       Section 309(a)(5)(B) of the Federal Election Campaign Act 
     of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 437g(a)(5)(B)) is amended by striking ``the 
     greater of $10,000 or an amount equal to 200 percent'' and 
     inserting ``the greater of $15,000 or an amount equal to 300 
     percent''.

     SEC. 405. PROHIBITION OF CONTRIBUTIONS BY INDIVIDUALS NOT 
                   QUALIFIED TO VOTE.

       (a) Prohibition.--Section 319 of the Federal Election 
     Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 441e) is amended--
       (1) in the heading by adding ``AND INDIVIDUALS NOT 
     QUALIFIED TO REGISTER TO VOTE'' at the end; and
       (2) in subsection (a)--
       (A) by striking ``(a) It shall'' and inserting the 
     following:
       ``(a) Prohibitions.--
       ``(1) Foreign nationals.--It shall''; and
       (B) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(2) Individuals not qualified to vote.--It shall be 
     unlawful for an individual who is not qualified to register 
     to vote in a Federal election to make a contribution, or to 
     promise expressly or impliedly to make a contribution, in 
     connection with a Federal election; or for any person to 
     knowingly solicit, accept, or receive a contribution in 
     connection with a Federal election from an individual who is 
     not qualified to register to vote in a Federal election.''.
       (b) Inclusion in Definition of Identification.--Section 
     301(13) of the Federal Election

[[Page S7958]]

     Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 431(13)) is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (A)--
       (A) by striking ``and'' the first place it appears; and
       (B) by inserting ``, and an affirmation that the individual 
     is an individual who is not prohibited by section 319 from 
     making a contribution'' after ``employer''; and
       (2) in subparagraph (B) by inserting ``and an affirmation 
     that the person is a person that is not prohibited by section 
     319 from making a contribution'' after ``such person''.

     SEC. 406. USE OF CANDIDATES' NAMES.

       Section 302(e) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 
     (2 U.S.C. 432(e)) is amended by striking paragraph (4) and 
     inserting the following:
       ``(4)(A) The name of each authorized committee shall 
     include the name of the candidate who authorized the 
     committee under paragraph (1).
       ``(B) A political committee that is not an authorized 
     committee shall not--
       ``(i) include the name of any candidate in its name, or
       ``(ii) except in the case of a national, State, or local 
     party committee, use the name of any candidate in any 
     activity on behalf of such committee in such a context as to 
     suggest that the committee is an authorized committee of the 
     candidate or that the use of the candidate's name has been 
     authorized by the candidate.''.

     SEC. 407. EXPEDITED PROCEDURES.

       Section 309(a) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 
     (2 U.S.C. 437g(a)), as amended by section 403, is amended by 
     adding at the end the following:
       ``(14) Expedited procedure.--
       ``(A) 60 days preceding an election.--If the complaint in a 
     proceeding was filed within 60 days immediately preceding a 
     general election, the Commission may take action described in 
     this subparagraph.
       ``(B) Resolution before election.--If the Commission 
     determines, on the basis of facts alleged in the complaint 
     and other facts available to the Commission, that there is 
     clear and convincing evidence that a violation of this Act 
     has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur and it 
     appears that the requirements for relief stated in paragraph 
     (13)(A) (ii), (iii), and (iv) are met, the Commission may--
       ``(i) order expedited proceedings, shortening the time 
     periods for proceedings under paragraphs (1), (2), (3), and 
     (4) as necessary to allow the matter to be resolved in 
     sufficient time before the election to avoid harm or 
     prejudice to the interests of the parties; or
       ``(ii) if the Commission determines that there is 
     insufficient time to conduct proceedings before the election, 
     immediately seek relief under paragraph (13)(A).
       ``(C) Complaint without merit.--If the Commission 
     determines, on the basis of facts alleged in the complaint 
     and other facts available to the Commission, that the 
     complaint is clearly without merit, the Commission may--
       ``(i) order expedited proceedings, shortening the time 
     periods for proceedings under paragraphs (1), (2), (3), and 
     (4) as necessary to allow the matter to be resolved in 
     sufficient time before the election to avoid harm or 
     prejudice to the interests of the parties; or
       ``(ii) if the Commission determines that there is 
     insufficient time to conduct proceedings before the election, 
     summarily dismiss the complaint.''.
           TITLE V--SEVERABILITY; REGULATIONS; EFFECTIVE DATE

     SEC. 501. SEVERABILITY.

       If any provision of this Act or amendment made by this Act, 
     or the application of a provision or amendment to any person 
     or circumstance, is held to be unconstitutional, the 
     remainder of this Act and amendments made by this Act, and 
     the application of the provisions and amendment to any person 
     or circumstance, shall not be affected by the holding.

     SEC. 502. REGULATIONS.

       The Federal Election Commission shall promulgate any 
     regulations required to carry out this Act and the amendments 
     made by this Act.

     SEC. 503. EFFECTIVE DATE.

       Except as otherwise provided in this Act, this Act and the 
     amendments made by this Act take effect on the date that is 
     30 days after the date of enactment of this Act.

                               Exhibit 1

         [From the Secretary of State, State of West Virginia]

       On May 20, officials of 33 states, including secretaries of 
     state, attorneys general and state regulators of campaign 
     finance (in those states where the secretary of state does 
     not have that responsibility) registered their support of a 
     court challenge to the 1976 U.S. Supreme Court decision in 
     the case of Buckley v. Valeo. The officials in these 33 
     states made known their support as amicus curiae in a pending 
     appeal in the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals in a case entitled 
     Kruse v. City of Cincinnati, which concerns a Cincinnati 
     ordinance limiting candidates for the city council to 
     spending no more than three times their annual salary. The 
     ordinance was declared unconstitutional by a Federal district 
     court, based on the Buckley v. Valeo decision, which ruled 
     that such limits violated First Amendment freedom of speech 
     protection. Whichever way the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals 
     rules, it is almost certain to be appealed to the U.S. 
     Supreme Court, thus paving the way for a re-argument of 
     Buckley v. Valeo.
       Officials in the following states filed the amicus brief:
       Arizona--A.G.
       Arkansas--SOS and A.G.
       Connecticut--SOS and A.G.
       Florida--SOS and A.G.
       Georgia--SOS.
       Hawaii--Campaign Spending Commisison and A.G.
       Indiana--A.G.
       Iowa--A.G.
       Kansas--A.G.
       Kentucky--Registry of Campaign Finance and A.G.
       Maine--SOS.
       Massachusetts--SOS and A.G.
       Michigan--A.G.
       Minnesota--SOS and A.G.
       Mississippi--SOS.
       Montana--SOS and A.G.
       Nevada--SOS and A.G.
       New Hampshire--SOS and A.G.
       New Mexico--SOS.
       North Carolina--Chief Elections Officer.
       North Dakota--A.G.
       Ohio--A.G.
       Oklahoma--Ethics Commission and A.G.
       Oregon--SOS and A.G.
       Rhode Island--SOS.
       South Carolina--SOS.
       South Dakota--A.G.
       Tennessee--SOS.
       Utah--A.G.
       Vermont--A.G.
       Washington--SOS and A.G.
       West Virginia--SOS and A.G.
       Wisconsin--SOS.
       Territory of Guam--Lt. Gov. and A.G.
                                                                    ____


            [From the Department of Justice, State of Iowa]


 24 state attorneys general issue call for the reversal of buckley v. 
                                 valeo

       Des Moines, Iowa--The attorneys general for twenty-four 
     states released a joint statement Tuesday calling for the 
     reversal of a 1976 Supreme Court decision which struck down 
     mandatory campaign spending limits on free speech grounds. 
     The attorneys general statement comes amidst a growing 
     national debate about the validity of that court ruling, 
     Buckley v. Valeo.
       Former U.S. Senator Bill Bradley has denounced the decision 
     and has helped lead the recent push in the U.S. Congress for 
     a constitutional amendment to allow for mandatory spending 
     limits in federal elections. The City of Cincinnati is 
     litigating the first direct court challenge to the ruling, 
     defending an ordinance passed in 1995 by the City Council 
     which sets limits in city council races. And, in late October 
     1996, a group of prominent constitutional scholars from 
     around the nation signed a statement calling for the reversal 
     of Buckley.
       The attorneys general statement reads as follows:
       ``Over two decades ago, the United States Supreme Court, in 
     Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), declared mandatory 
     campaign expenditure limits unconstitutional on First 
     Amendment grounds. We, the undersigned state attorneys 
     general, believe the time has come for that holding to be 
     revisited and reversed.
       ``U.S. Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis once wrote 
     `[I]n cases involving the Federal Constitution, where 
     correction through legislative action is practically 
     impossible, this court has often overruled its earlier 
     decision. The court bows to the lessons of experience and the 
     force of better reasoning . . .' Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas 
     Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406-408 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
       ``As state attorneys general--many of us elected--we 
     believe the experience of campaigns teaches the lesson that 
     unlimited campaign spending threatens the integrity of the 
     election process. As the chief legal officers of our 
     respective states, we believe that the force of better 
     reasoning compels the conclusion that it is the absence of 
     limits on campaign expenditures--not the restrictions--which 
     strike `at the core of our electoral process and of the First 
     Amendment freedoms.' Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39 (1976) 
     (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968).''
       The United States has witnessed a more than a 700% increase 
     in the cost of federal elections since the Buckley ruling. 
     The presidential and congressional campaigns combined spent 
     more than $2 billion this past election cycle, making the 
     1996 elections the costliest ever in U.S. history.
       Iowa Attorney General Tom Miller, Nevada Attorney General 
     Frankie Sue Del Papa, Arizona Attorney General Grant Woods, 
     and the National Voting Rights Institute of Boston initiated 
     Tuesday's statement. The Institute is a non-profit 
     organization engaged in constitutional challenges across the 
     country to the current campaign finance system. The Institute 
     serves as special counsel for the City of Cincinnati in its 
     challenge to Buckley, now in federal district court in 
     Cincinnati and due for its first court hearing on January 31,
       ``Buckley stands today as a barrier to American 
     democracy,'' says Attorney General Del Papa. ``As state 
     attorneys general, we are committed to helping remove that 
     barrier.'' Del Papa says the twenty-four state attorneys 
     general will seek to play an active role in efforts to 
     reverse the Buckley decision, including the submission of 
     friend-of-the-court briefs in emerging court cases which 
     address the ruling.
       ``Maybe it wasn't clear in 1976, but it is clear today that 
     financing of campaigns has gotten totally out of control,'' 
     says Iowa Attorney General Tom Miller. ``The state has a 
     compelling interest in bringing campaign finances back under 
     control and protecting the integrity of the electoral 
     process.''

[[Page S7959]]

       Arizona Attorney General Grant Woods adds, ``I believe that 
     it is a major stretch to say that the First Amendment 
     requires that no restrictions be placed on individual 
     campaign spending. The practical results, where millionaires 
     dominate the process to the detriment of nearly everyone who 
     cannot compete financially, have perverted the electoral 
     process in America.''
       The full listing of signatories is as follows:
       Attorney General Grant Woods of Arizona (R).
       Attorney General Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut (D).
       Attorney General Robert Butterworth of Florida (D).
       Attorney General Alan G. Lance of Idaho (R).
       Attorney General Tom Miller of Iowa (D).
       Attorney General Carla J. Stovall of Kansas (R).
       Attorney General Albert B. Chandler III of Kentucky (D).
       Attorney General Andrew Ketterer of Maine (D).
       Attorney General Scott Harshbargor of Massachusetts (D).
       Attorney General Frank Kelley of Michigan (D).
       Attorney General Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota (D).
       Attorney General Mike Moore of Mississippi (D).
       Attorney General Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana (D).
       Attorney General Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada (D).
       Attorney General Jeff Howard of New Hampshire (R).
       Attorney General Tom Udall of New Mexico (D).
       Attorney General Heidi Heitkamp of North Dakota (D).
       Attorney General Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma (D).
       Attorney General Charles W. Burson of Tennessee (D).
       Attorney General Jan Graham of Utah (D).
       Attorney General Wallace Malley of Vermont (R).
       Attorney General Darrel V. McGraw of West Virginia (D).
       Attorney General Christine O. Gregoire of Washington (D).
       Attorney General James Doyle of Wisconsin (D).
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. LAUTENBERG (for himself, Mr. Wyden, Mr. Durbin, and Mr. 
        Harkin):
  S. 1060. A bill to restrict the activities of the United States with 
respect to foreign laws that regulate the marketing of tobacco products 
and to subject cigarettes that are exported to the same restrictions on 
labeling as apply to the sale or distribution of cigarettes in the 
United States; to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation.


              the worldwide tobacco disclosure act of 1997

  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, today I am introducing the Worldwide 
Tobacco Disclosure Act of 1997. I am joined by Senators Wyden, Durbin, 
and Harkin. Our bill will address a loophole in current law that 
enables packages of cigarettes to be exported from this country without 
warning labels and to prevent the executive branch from undermining 
other countries' restrictions on tobacco.
  Within a few decades, the World Health Organization estimates that 10 
million people will die annually from tobacco-related disease, up from 
3 million per year. An astonishing 70 percent of those deaths will be 
in developing countries. To give my colleagues a basis for comparison, 
in America, today, approximately 400,000 die a year from tobacco. While 
smoking has declined 10 percent since 1990 in developed countries, the 
WHO concludes it has risen an alarming 67 percent in developing 
countries during that same period. American tobacco exports have 
increased by almost 340 percent since the mid-1970's, and these exports 
now account for more than half of our tobacco companies' sales.
  America is rightfully proud of its exports and the standards it 
upholds in international trade. But with tobacco, we're exporting 
death. We are the largest exporter of a product we know kills, and that 
is not something about which we should be proud. With marketing savvy 
and millions of dollars, American tobacco companies have significantly 
increased cigarette consumption in developing countries. It is 
estimated that cigarette consumption increased by 10 percent as a 
direct result of American tobacco companies entering the markets of 
Japan, South Korea, Thailand, and Taiwan.
  Why should Congress care if hundreds of thousands of teenage boys and 
girls in China become addicted to nicotine? Why not let their 
government deal with this matter? Mr. President, morally, we are 
obligated to warn them, to the extent we know of tobacco's dangers. We 
are obligated to support the efforts of our trading partners to protect 
the health of their citizens.
  Mr. President, cigarettes kill and the label should clearly state 
that. One component of the proposed tobacco settlement between the 
State attorneys general and the tobacco industry was stronger warning 
labels on cigarette packages, similar to those I included in 
legislation introduced earlier this year. While we are taking 
additional steps to make our citizens more aware of the dangers of 
tobacco, my colleagues may be surprised to know that our Government 
requires no warning on exported cigarette packages. We know that 
smoking is addictive and can kill, but you would never guess that by 
looking at a pack of Camels exported from this country into Africa or 
Eastern Europe. When we enacted the Federal Cigarette Labeling and 
Advertising Act of 1965, we may have thought that other countries would 
require their own warning labels and these would be adequate. We know, 
Mr. President, that this is simply not the case.

  Too many countries, especially in the developing world, have no 
warning labels on cigarette packages, and those that do, are inadequate 
to fully alert their citizens to the dangers of tobacco. Coupled with a 
poor national health system, citizens in these countries have no chance 
against tobacco promotional giveaways or slick advertising. Not knowing 
of the health risks associated with cigarettes, they are easily 
addicted and a significant percentage of them will die from this 
product.
  Mr. President, barring further steps, a health crisis resulting from 
tobacco will occur in the developing world within the next few decades. 
Our country alone spends $50 billion a year more on health care as a 
result of tobacco. Imagine what the worldwide cost of tobacco related 
illness will be in 20 years. Today limited funds are spent combating 
hunger, AIDS and other infectious diseases, and infant mortality 
worldwide. In about 10 years, we can add tobacco related illnesses to 
the list.
  One part of this legislation, Mr. President, requires exported 
packages of cigarettes to have warning labels in the language of the 
country where the cigarette will be consumed. Before exporting 
hazardous materials, Congress requires exports to alert our Government 
prior to export so that we might warn the government of the importing 
country that a certain product is being shipped to its borders. 
Cigarettes are a hazardous product and should be treated differently 
than an exported widget. Foreign subsidiaries of American tobacco 
companies will also be required to comply with this legislation because 
we do not want to put our farmers at a competitive disadvantage. This 
is a global problem that must be addressed by whatever means we have 
available. Should a country require more stringent labels than ours, 
the administration could grant a waiver of this provision for that 
country.
  Mr. President, the success tobacco companies have had selling death 
overseas is not solely due to their own own efforts. In the past, the 
U.S. Government assisted U.S. tobacco companies in hooking foreigners 
by using trade policy to dismantle foreign tobacco regulations, such as 
advertising bans, in several key markets. While most of this assistance 
occurred in the 1980's, its effects are felt today. Japan, South Korea, 
Thailand, and Taiwan were on the other side of this dispute with our 
Government over their antitobacco laws. They lost, their citizens lost, 
and the U.S. tobacco companies won. Smoking in those countries is 
higher as a result of past action by the U.S. Trade Representative.
  Our bill will prevent the USTR from undermining another country's 
tobacco restrictions if those restrictions are applied to both foreign 
and domestic products in the same manner. If a country has an 
advertising ban on tobacco products, our Government should not be 
spending money trying to dismantle that law if it equally affects 
foreign and domestic companies.
  This legislation is consistent with a GATT decision from 1990, which 
held that member nations can use various policies to protect health as 
long as they are applied evenly to domestic and foreign products, and 
with statements made by our current U.S. Trade Representative. Charlene 
Barshefsky

[[Page S7960]]

stated last year that the U.S. Government should not object when 
foreign government take steps to protect their citizens by adopting 
health measures to restrict the consumption of tobacco.
  Mr. President, I hope my colleagues would agree that we should not, 
in good conscience, turn a blind eye to the untold suffering caused by 
U.S. exports of this deadly product. We know too much about tobacco to 
sit idly by while our companies poison tens of millions throughout the 
world. And if foreign governments do not warn their citizens of 
tobacco's dangers, enacting this legislation is the very least we can 
and should do.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the full text of my 
legislation be printed in the Congressional Record along with letters 
of support for this legislation from the American Lung Association, the 
National Center for Tobacco-Free Kids, and the American Heart 
Association, and two articles from the Washington Post documenting our 
Government's actions in Asia in the 1980's and how U.S. tobacco 
companies are targeting overseas markets.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                S. 1060

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Worldwide Tobacco Disclosure 
     Act of 1997''.

     SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

       In this Act:
       (1) Cigarette.--The term ``cigarette'' means--
       (A) any roll of tobacco wrapped in paper or in any 
     substance not containing tobacco which is to be burned,
       (B) any roll of tobacco wrapped in any substance containing 
     tobacco which, because of its appearance, the type of tobacco 
     used in the filler, or its packaging and labeling is likely 
     to be offered to, or purchased by consumers as a cigarette 
     described in subparagraph (A),
       (C) little cigars which are any roll of tobacco wrapped in 
     leaf tobacco or any substance containing tobacco (other than 
     any roll of tobacco which is a cigarette within the meaning 
     of subparagraph (A)) and as to which 1000 units weigh not 
     more than 3 pounds, and
       (D) loose rolling tobacco and papers or tubes used to 
     contain such tobacco.
       (2) Domestic concern.--The term ``domestic concern'' 
     means--
       (A) any individual who is a citizen, national, or resident 
     of the United States; and
       (B) any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock 
     company, business trust, unincorporated organization, or sole 
     proprietorship which has its principal place of business in 
     the United States, or which is organized under the laws of a 
     State of the United States or a territory, possession, or 
     commonwealth of the United States.
       (3) Nondiscriminatory law or regulation.--The term 
     ``nondiscriminatory law or regulation'' means a law or 
     regulation of a foreign country that adheres to the principle 
     of national treatment and applies no less favorable treatment 
     to goods that are imported into that country than it applies 
     to like goods that are the product, growth, or manufacture of 
     that country.
       (4) Package.--The term ``package'' means a pack, box, 
     carton, or other container of any kind in which cigarettes or 
     other tobacco products are offered for sale, sold, or 
     otherwise distributed to customers.
       (5) Sale or distribution.--The term ``sale or 
     distribution'' includes sampling or any other distribution 
     not for sale.
       (6) State.--The term ``State'' includes, in addition to the 
     50 States, the District of Columbia, Guam, the Commonwealth 
     of Puerto Rico, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana 
     Islands, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, the Republic of 
     the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and 
     the Republic of Palau.
       (7) Tobacco product.--The term ``tobacco product'' means--
       (A) cigarettes;
       (B) little cigars;
       (C) cigars as defined in section 5702 of the Internal 
     Revenue Code of 1986;
       (D) pipe tobacco;
       (E) loose rolling tobacco and papers used to contain such 
     tobacco;
       (F) products referred to as spit tobacco; and
       (G) any other form of tobacco intended for human use or 
     consumption.
       (8) United states.--The term ``United States'' includes the 
     States and installations of the Armed Forces of the United 
     States located outside a State.

     SEC. 3. RESTRICTIONS ON NEGOTIATIONS REGARDING FOREIGN LAWS 
                   REGULATING TOBACCO PRODUCTS.

       No funds appropriated by law may be used by any officer, 
     employee, department, or agency of the United States--
       (1) to seek, through negotiation or otherwise, the removal 
     or reduction by any foreign country of any nondiscriminatory 
     law or regulation, or any proposed nondiscriminatory law or 
     regulation, in that country that restricts the advertising, 
     manufacture, packaging, taxation, sale, importation, 
     labeling, or distribution of tobacco products; or
       (2) to encourage or promote the export, advertising, 
     manufacture, sale, or distribution of tobacco products.

     SEC. 4. CIGARETTE EXPORT LABELING.

       (a) Labeling Requirements for Export of Cigarettes.--
       (1) In general.--It shall be unlawful for any domestic 
     concern to export from the United States, or to sell or 
     distribute in, or export from, any other country, any 
     cigarettes whose package does not contain a warning label 
     that--
       (A) complies with Federal labeling requirements for 
     cigarettes manufactured, imported, or packaged for sale or 
     distribution within the United States; and
       (B) is in the primary language of the country in which the 
     cigarettes are intended for consumption.
       (2) Labeling format.--Federal labeling format requirements 
     shall apply to a warning label described in paragraph (1) in 
     the same manner, and to the same extent, as such requirements 
     apply to cigarettes manufactured, imported, or packaged for 
     sale or distribution within the United States.
       (3) Rotation of labeling.--Federal rotation requirements 
     for warning labels shall apply to a warning label described 
     in paragraph (1) in the same manner, and to the same extent, 
     as such requirements apply to cigarettes manufactured, 
     imported, or packaged for sale or distributed within the 
     United States.
       (4) Waivers.--
       (A) In general.--The President may waive the labeling 
     requirements required by this Act for cigarettes, if the 
     cigarettes are exported to a foreign country included in the 
     list described in subparagraph (B) and if that country is the 
     country in which the cigarettes are intended for consumption. 
     A waiver under this subparagraph shall be in effect prior to 
     the exportation of any cigarettes not in compliance with the 
     requirements of this section by a person to a foreign country 
     included in the list.
       (B) List of eligible countries for waiver.--
       (i) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the President shall develop and 
     publish in the Federal Register a list of foreign countries 
     that have in effect requirements for the labeling of 
     cigarette packages substantially similar to or more stringent 
     than the requirements for labeling of cigarette packages set 
     forth in paragraphs (1) through (3). The President shall use 
     the list to grant a waiver under subparagraph (A).
       (ii) Update of list.--The President shall--

       (I) update the list described in clause (i) to include a 
     foreign country on the list if the country meets the criteria 
     described in clause (i), or to remove a foreign country from 
     the list if the country fails to meet the criteria; and
       (II) publish the updated list in the Federal Register.

       (b) Penalties.--
       (1) Fine.--Any person who violates the provisions of 
     subsection (a) shall be fined not more than $100,000 per day 
     for each such violation. Any person who knowingly reexports 
     from or transships cigarettes through a foreign country 
     included in the list described in subsection (a)(4)(B) to 
     avoid the requirements of this Act shall be fined not more 
     than $150,000 per day for each such occurrence.
       (2) Injunction proceedings.--The district courts of the 
     United States shall have jurisdiction, for cause shown, to 
     prevent and restrain violations of subsection (a) upon the 
     application of the Attorney General of the United States.
       (c) Repeal.--Section 12 of the Federal Cigarette Labeling 
     and Advertising Act (15 U.S.C. 1340) is repealed.
       (d) Regulatory Authority.--Not later than 90 days after the 
     date of enactment of this Act, the President shall promulgate 
     such regulations and orders as may be necessary to carry out 
     this section.
       (e) Effective Date.--The provisions of subsections (a) 
     through (c) shall take effect upon the effective date of the 
     regulations promulgated under subsection (d).
                                                                    ____



                                    American Lung Association,

                                    Washington, DC, July 22, 1997.
     Hon. Frank Lautenberg,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Lautenberg: The American Lung Association 
     supports your legislation addressing U.S. economic and 
     foreign policy towards the international sale and labeling of 
     tobacco products.
       Tobacco use continues to be the single most preventable 
     cause of premature death and disease in the United States. 
     Worldwide, smoking causes one death every ten seconds, 3 
     million people a year. Unless strong measures are taken, it 
     is estimated that in three decades the death toll will rise 
     to about 10 million people each year, with 70 percent of 
     those deaths occurring in developing countries.
       In the past, the United States government has assisted U.S. 
     tobacco companies in their efforts to expand tobacco 
     advertising, promotion and exports. Using Section 301 of the 
     Trade Act of 1974, previous administrations have issued 
     formal threats to force other nations to import U.S. tobacco 
     products and to weaken health laws that would reduce tobacco 
     use. Your legislation would end the

[[Page S7961]]

     U.S. government's proactive involvement in the exportation of 
     tobacco's death and disease to other countries by curtailing 
     federal agencies from intervening internationally on behalf 
     of the industry.
       The American Lung Association believes the United States 
     should be a world leader in tobacco control and that the U.S. 
     should not help open international markets so companies here 
     can profit from death and disease elsewhere. This policy is 
     unacceptable and must end. The adoption of your legislation 
     would be a major step in the right direction.
       Thank you for your leadership on this and other tobacco 
     control-related issues.
           Sincerely,
                                                    Fran Du Melle,
     Deputy Managing Director.
                                                                    ____

                                               National Center for


                                            Tobacco-Free Kids,

                                    Washington, DC, July 23, 1997.
     Hon. Frank Lautenberg,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Lautenberg: We are writing on behalf of the 
     National Center for Tobacco Free Kids to express the center's 
     strong support for your effort, as a part of the Worldwide 
     Tobacco Disclosure Act, to ensure that the United States does 
     not interfere with actions taken by foreign governments to 
     reduce the dangers that tobacco products pose to their 
     citizens. This would help to save lives and improve the 
     public health of people around the world.
       There is clear need for action to be taken to prevent the 
     spread of tobacco caused disease throughout the world. In 
     1994, over 4.6 trillion cigarettes were consumed in foreign 
     nations. In 1995, over 3.1 million people died as a result of 
     tobacco use, with over 1.2 million of those deaths occurring 
     in developing countries. As worldwide tobacco use and tobacco 
     related disease has reached astronomical levels, U.S. tobacco 
     exports have continued to climb. In 1995, the U.S. exported 
     an estimated 240 billion cigarettes, up from less than 60 
     billion ten years earlier.
       In the past, America has taken action against governments 
     that promulgate rules to curb tobacco caused disease. During 
     the previous administration, the U.S. pressured Thailand, 
     Taiwan, South Korea and other countries not to enact tough 
     new laws to curb tobacco marketing, even though these laws 
     were to be applied in a non-discriminatory manner. The U.S. 
     also encouraged Taiwan to repeal new requirements for 
     cigarette warning labels. The Worldwide Tobacco Disclosure 
     Act would prevent American officials from using economic 
     muscle to promote higher cigarette exports by blocking 
     legitimate health laws in other countries.
       We commend you for taking the lead in introducing this 
     important piece of legislation and urge the Senate to stand 
     up for the health of millions of people around the world.
           Sincerely Yours,
     William D. Novelli,
       President.
     Matthew L. Myers,
       Executive Vice President and General Counsel.
                                                                    ____



                                   American Heart Association,

                                    Washington, DC, July 23, 1997.
     Hon. Frank Lautenberg,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Lautenberg: The American Heart Association 
     (AHA) is pleased to express its strong support for your 
     legislation, the Worldwide Tobacco Disclosure Act of 1997, a 
     critical step in addressing the inadequacy of current laws on 
     U.S. economic and foreign policy regarding the international 
     sale of tobacco products. In general, we believe that the 
     U.S. should actively promote the global adoption of U.S. 
     domestic tobacco control policies.
       The AHA is a non-profit organization representing the 
     interests of over 4.6 million volunteers nationwide who give 
     their time and energies to reducing cardiovascular disease 
     and stroke, this nation's number one and three killers 
     respectively. Despite our efforts, and the efforts of our 
     partners in tobacco control, tobacco use continues to be the 
     number one preventable cause of premature death and disease 
     in the United States.
       Worldwide, smoking causes one death every 10 seconds. The 
     global smoking rate is increasing steadily, despite decreases 
     in the United States and other developed nation. The World 
     Health Organization (WHO) predicts that more than 500 million 
     people alive today eventually will die of diseases caused by 
     smoking, unless strong action is taken to stem this epidemic.
       Historically, U.S. government agencies and Congress have 
     assisted U.S. tobacco companies in their efforts to expand 
     tobacco advertising, promotion and exports around the world. 
     Previous administrations have issued formal trade threats 
     under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, to force other 
     nations to import U.S. tobacco products and to weaken health 
     laws that would reduce tobacco use.
       The AHA supports the primary goals of this legislation: 
     That exported cigarettes carry the same federal labeling 
     format requirements as those manufactured, imported or 
     packaged for sale or distribution within the United States, 
     and that there be a prohibition on the use of federal funds 
     to aid any effort by the United States, through negotiation 
     or otherwise, to weaken the tobacco control laws of foreign 
     countries.
           Sincerely,
                                     Martha, N. Hill, R.N., Ph.D.,
     President.
                                                                    ____


               [From the Washington Post, Nov. 17, 1996]

          U.S. Aided Cigarette Firms In Conquests Across Asia


           Aggressive Strategy Forced Open Lucrative Markets

                           (By Glenn Frankel)

       On the streets of Manila, ``jump boys'' as young as 10 hop 
     in and out of traffic selling Marlboros and Lucky Strikes to 
     passing motorists. In the discos and coffee shops of Seoul, 
     young Koreans light up foreign brands that a decade ago were 
     illegal to possess. Downtown Kiev has become the Ukrainian 
     version of Marlboro Country, with the gray socialist 
     cityscape punctuated with colorful billboards of cowboy 
     sunsets and chiseled faces. And in Beijing, America's biggest 
     tobacco companies are competing for the right to launch 
     cooperative projects with the state-run tobacco monopoly in 
     hopes of capturing a share of the biggest potential market in 
     the world.
       Throughout the bustling cities of a newly prosperous Asia 
     and the ruined economies of the former Soviet Bloc, the 
     American cigarette is king. It has become a symbol of 
     affluence and sophistication, a statement and an aspiration. 
     At home--where the American tobacco industry is besieged by 
     anti-smoking activists, whistle-blowers, government 
     regulators, grand juries and plaintiffs' lawyers--cigarette 
     consumption has undergone a 15-year decline. Thanks to 
     foreign sales, however, the companies are making larger 
     profits than ever before.
       But the industry did not launch its campaign for new 
     overseas markets alone. The Reagan and Bush administrations 
     used their economic and political clout to pry open markets 
     in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand and China for 
     American cigarettes. At a time when one arm of the government 
     was warning Americans about the dangers of smoking, another 
     was helping the industry recruit a new generation of smokers 
     abroad.
       To this day, many U.S. officials see cigarette exports as 
     strictly an issue of free trade and economic fairness, while 
     tobacco industry critics and public health advocates consider 
     it a moral question. Even the Clinton administration finds 
     itself torn: It is the most vocally anti-smoking 
     administration in U.S. history, yet it has been in the 
     uncomfortable role of challenging or delaying some anti-
     smoking efforts overseas.
       At the same time, fledgling anti-smoking movements are 
     rising up with support from American activists, passing 
     restrictions that in some cases are tougher than those in the 
     United States.
       Having exported its cigarette industry, the United States 
     is now in effect exporting its anti-smoking movement as well.
       Just as the industry's overseas campaign has produced new 
     smokers and new profits, it has also produced new 
     consequences. International epidemiologist Richard Peto of 
     Oxford University estimates that smoking is responsible for 3 
     million deaths per year worldwide; he projects that 30 years 
     from now the number will have reached 10 million, most of 
     them in developing nations. In China alone, Peto says 50 
     million people who are currently 18 or younger eventually 
     will die from smoking-related diseases. ``In most countries, 
     the worst is yet to come,'' he warned.
       Asia is where tobacco's search for new horizons began and 
     where the industry came to rely most on Washington's help. 
     U.S. officials in effect became the industry's lawyers, 
     agents and collaborators. Prominent politicians such as 
     Robert J. Dole, Jesse Helms, Dan Quayle and Al Gore played a 
     role. ``No matter how this process spins itself out,'' George 
     Griffin, commercial counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Seoul, 
     told Matthew N. Winokur, public affairs manager of Philip 
     Morris Asia, in a ``Dear Matt'' letter in January 1986, ``I 
     want to emphasize that the embassy and the various U.S. 
     government agencies in Washington will keep the interests of 
     Philip Morris and the other American cigarette manufacturers 
     in the forefront of our daily concerns.''
       U.S. officials not only insisted that Asian countries allow 
     American companies to sell cigarettes, they also demanded 
     that the companies be allowed to advertise, hold giveaway 
     promotions and sponsor concerts and sports events in what 
     critics say was a blatant appeal to women and young people. 
     They regularly consulted with company representatives and 
     relied upon the industry's arguments and research. They 
     ignored the protests of public health officials in the United 
     States and Asia who warned of the consequences of the market 
     openings they sought. Indeed, their constant slogan was that 
     health factors were irrelevant. This was, they insisted, 
     solely an issue of free trade.
       But then-Vice President Quayle suggested another motive 
     when he told a North Carolina farming audience in 1990 that 
     the government also was seeking to help the tobacco industry 
     compensate for shrinking markets at home. ``I don't think 
     it's any news to North Carolina tobacco farmers that the 
     American public as a whole is smoking less,'' said Quayle. 
     ``We ought to think about the exports. We ought to think 
     about opening up markets, breaking down the barriers.''
       A handful of American health officials vigorously opposed 
     the government's campaign, yet were either stymied or 
     ignored. ``I feel

[[Page S7962]]

     the most shameful thing this country did was to export 
     disease, disability and death by selling our cigarettes to 
     the world,'' said former surgeon general C. Everett Koop. 
     ``What the companies did was shocking, but even more 
     appalling was the fact that our own government helped make it 
     possible.''


                             waging the war

       Clayton Yeutter, an affable, high octane Nebraska 
     Republican with a wide smile and serious political 
     aspirations, came to the Office of the U.S. Trade 
     Representative in 1985 with a mission: to put a dent in the 
     record U.S. trade deficit by forcing foreign countries to 
     lower their barriers against American products.
       Yeutter (prounced ``Yi-ter'') took office at a time when 
     Washington was on the verge of declaring a trade war against 
     some of its staunchest allies in the Far East. Asian tigers 
     such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand were running 
     up huge trade surpluses with the United States on goods 
     ranging from T-shirts to computer chips to luxury sedans. The 
     U.S. annual trade deficit in 1984 totaled a record $123 
     billion. Congressional Democrats proposed a 25 percent 
     surcharge on products from Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and 
     Brazil, while the House and Senate overwhelmingly approved 
     resolutions calling for retaliation against Japan if it 
     didn't increase its purchases of exports.
       In heeding that warning, the Reagan administration turned 
     to a small, elite and little-known federal agency. The Office 
     of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) had only 164 
     permanent employees, but it enjoyed cabinet-level status and 
     a self-styled half-joking, half-serious reputation as ``the 
     Jedi knights of the trade world.'' Operating out of the four-
     story, Civil War-era Winder Building on 17th Street NW, 
     USTR's staff was known for its dedication and aggressiveness. 
     Most staff members came from departments such as Commerce, 
     State and Agriculture, and they saw the trade rep's office as 
     a place where they could practice their craft free from the 
     fetters of larger, more rigid bureaucracies. They worked long 
     hours and displayed a fierce loyalty to each other and the 
     agency they served.
       In 1985 they got a new boss to match their mood. Yeutter 
     had worked as a deputy trade representative during the Ford 
     administration, then went on to become president of the 
     Chicago Mercantile Exchange. He came back to Washington with 
     an eye toward using USTR as a launching pad for becoming a 
     U.S. senator, secretary of agriculture or even vice 
     president, according to friends. Yeutter was not a member of 
     Ronald Reagan's inner circle, and he was eager to show the 
     president what he could do. ``They told me they needed a 
     high-energy person,'' he recalled in a interview. ``I told 
     them I was ready to hit the ground running.''
       Yeutter knew that USTR had a weapon in its arsenal that was 
     tailor-made for softening up recalcitrant trading partners. 
     Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act empowered USTR to launch a 
     full-scale investigation of unfair trading practices and 
     required that Washington invoke retaliatory sanctions within 
     a year if a targeted government did not agree to change its 
     ways. Launching a 301 was like setting a time bomb; both 
     sides could hear the clock ticking.
       Yeutter had no trouble persuading the administration to 
     allow him to use Section 301 aggressively. ``There was a lot 
     of momentum for attempting something new,'' he said.
       The U.S. tobacco industry had been trying for years to get 
     a foothold in these promising new Asian markets. In 1981 the 
     big three--Philip Morris Inc., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. and 
     Brown & Williamson--had formed a trade group called the U.S. 
     Cigarette Export Association to pursue a joint industry-wide 
     policy on the issue. But the companies had felt frustrated 
     during the first term of the Reagan administration.
       Japan, the West's second largest market for cigarettes, 
     remained virtually closed to American brands due to high 
     tariffs and discriminatory distribution. South Korean law 
     effectively made it a crime to buy or sell a pack of foreign 
     cigarettes. Taiwan and Thailand remained tightly shut. All of 
     these countries but Taiwan were signatories to the General 
     Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and Taipei hoped to join 
     soon. Yet each appeared to violate free trade principles.
       ``In international trade terms, it's really very rare that 
     the issues are so clear-cut and so blatant,'' recalled Owen 
     C. Smith, a Philip Morris foreign trade expert who serves as 
     president of the association. ``These countries were sitting 
     with published laws which on their face discriminated against 
     American products. It was an untenable situation. . . . These 
     were, frankly, open-and-shut cases.''
       When Yeutter and his staff looked at the cigarette business 
     in these countries, they saw blatant hypocrisy. Each Asian 
     government sought to justify its ban on imported cigarettes 
     in the name of public health, yet each had its own protected, 
     state-controlled tobacco monopoly that manufactured and sold 
     cigarettes--and provided large amounts of tax revenue to the 
     government. The state companies' marketing techniques were in 
     many ways just as cynical as those of the American companies. 
     In Taiwan, for example, the most popular state brand was 
     called Long Life. These were classic, state-run companies; 
     bloated and inefficient, they produced overpriced, low-
     quality and poorly marketed cigarettes that could never 
     compete with jazzier American brands in free competition.
       Health was simply a smoke screen, Yeutter quickly decided, 
     raised by recalcitrant foreign governments hooked on 
     cigarette profits. ``I would have had no problem with Japan 
     or Korean or Taiwan putting up genuine health restrictions,'' 
     he insisted. ``But that's not what these governments were 
     doing. They were restricting trade, and it was just 
     blatant.''
       What Yeutter didn't seem to appreciate was that the very 
     flaws of the state-run monopolies were exactly what a doctor 
     might have ordered: Their high price and poor quality had 
     helped limit smoking mostly to older men who had the money 
     and taste for harsh, tar-heavy local brands. The monopolies 
     seldom, if ever, advertised and did not target the great 
     untapped markets of women and young people. Per capita sales 
     remained low in every country except Japan. From a public 
     health standpoint, maintaining the monopolies was far 
     preferable to opening the gates to American companies with 
     their milder blends and state-of-the-art marketing.
       ``When the multinational companies penetrate a new country, 
     they not only sell U.S. cigarettes but they transform the 
     entire market,'' said Gregory Connolly, a veteran anti-
     smoking activist who heads the Massachusetts Tobacco Control 
     Program. ``They transform how tobacco is presented, how it's 
     advertised, how it's promoted. And the result is the creation 
     of new demand, especially among women and young people.''
       Connolly, who traveled widely through Asia, documented how 
     American companies skirted advertising restrictions by 
     sponsoring televised rock concerts and sporting events, 
     placing cigarette brands in movies and lending their brand 
     names to non-tobacco products such as clothing and sports 
     gear. A Madonna concert in Spain became a ``Salem Madonna 
     Concert'' when televised in Hong Kong, while the U.S. Open 
     tennis tournament in New York became the ``Salem Tennis 
     Open'' in Malaysia. Tennis stars Pat Cash, Michael Chang, 
     Jimmy Connors and John McEnroe appeared in live matches in 
     Malaysia sponsored by RJR.
       None of this troubled Yeutter and his trade warriors. They 
     saw foreign advertising restrictions as one more form of 
     trade discrimination. The interagency committee that advised 
     Yeutter on the issue consisted of representatives from State, 
     Agriculture, Commerce, Labor and Treasury, but not from 
     Health and Human Services. There was no one with a public 
     health or tobacco control background to argue that there was 
     a link between advertising and health.
       The companies convinced Yeutter that helping them sell 
     cigarettes meant helping American trade. They produced 
     studies showing that aside from heavy aviation parts, 
     cigarettes were America's most successful manufactured export 
     in terms of the net balance of trade. They estimated that 
     cigarette exports--largely to Western Europe and Latin 
     America--accounted for 250,000 full-time jobs in the United 
     States and contributed more than $4 billion to the positive 
     side of the trade ledger.
       The industry also turned up the political heat. In a 
     January 1984 letter to an official in the Commerce 
     Department, Robert H. Bockman, then director of corporate 
     affairs for Philip Morris Asia, described trade barriers 
     against his company's products in South Korea. He then went 
     on to discuss what he called ``the politics of tobacco in 
     this election year. Attached please find a listing of the 
     1980 election results in the major tobacco-growing areas in 
     the United States. You will note that the margin of victory 
     for the president [Ronald Reagan] was narrow in some key 
     areas.''
       Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), who at the time chaired the Senate 
     Agriculture Committee, also intervened. In July 1986 Helms 
     wrote to Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone 
     congratulating him on his recent election victory and 
     pointing out that American cigarettes accounted for less than 
     2 percent of the Japanese market. ``Your friends in Congress 
     will have a better chance to stem the tide of anti-Japanese 
     trade sentiment if and when they can cite tangible examples 
     of your doors being opened to American products,'' wrote 
     Helms. ``I urge that you make a commitment to establish 
     timetable for allowing U.S. cigarettes a specific share of 
     your market. May I suggest a goal of 20 percent within the 
     next 18 months.''
       At Yeutter's urging, Reagan decided not to wait for a 
     formal filing from the industry against Japan. Instead, for 
     the first time the White House filed three 301 complaints 
     with USTR in September 1985, one of them against Japanese 
     restrictions on the sale of U.S. cigarettes.
       According to the USTR log of the case, U.S. officials 
     presented a lengthy questionnaire at their opening session 
     with Japanese trade representatives, demanding detailed data 
     on the Japanese market. Meanwhile, other U.S. bureaucrats 
     began drawing up lists of products for possible retaliation--
     all part of what one negotiator called the ``ratcheting-up 
     process.''
       Japanese negotiators hung tough over the course of 14 
     sessions. Joseph A. Massey, who was in charge of trade 
     negotiations with Japan, recalled they argued that Japan 
     Tobacco, the state-run cigarette monopoly, was too 
     inefficient to withstand U.S. competition, and that in any 
     case the Americans should continue the previous long-standing 
     practice of giving Japan an indefinite time period to comply.
       Massey recalled one other unusual aspect of the 
     negotiation: Industry representatives

[[Page S7963]]

     from both sides sat in on bargaining sessions. ``The Japanese 
     insisted that Japan Tobacco should be in the room,'' he said. 
     ``We said, `If that's the case, there needs to be 
     parallelism.' . . . They did not sit at the table. They sat 
     quietly along the back wall.''
       Finally in late September 1986, a year after the 301 
     complaint was filed, Yeutter received a phone call at his 
     McLean home late one evening from Japanese Finance Minister 
     Kiichi Miyazawa. The minister wanted more time, but Yeutter 
     was unrelenting. He recalls telling Miyazawa that the 
     completed retaliation documents were to be forwarded to the 
     White House the following day. ``I said, `I'm sorry, Mr. 
     Minister, but your government has run out of time,' '' 
     Yeutter recalled.
       Within days the Japanese capitulated, signing an agreement 
     allowing in American-made cigarettes. By giving in on such a 
     politically well-connected product as cigarettes, Japanese 
     commentators said, Tokyo hoped to buy time on other trade 
     issues. It was, commented the Asahi Shimbun newspaper, a 
     ``blood offering.''
       And so Japan was transformed into a battleground for the 
     world's biggest tobacco companies. Philip Morris aimed at 
     Japanese women with Virginia Slims; Japan Tobacco fought back 
     with Misty, a thin, mildblended cigarette. When RJR wooed 
     young smokers with Joe Camel, JT countered with Dean, named 
     after fabled actor James Dean. Cigarettes became the second 
     most-advertised product on television in Tokyo--up from 40th 
     just a year earlier.
       Today, imported brands control 21 percent of the Japanese 
     market and earn more than $7 billion in annual sales. Female 
     smoking is at an all-time high, according to Japan Tobacco's 
     surveys, and one study showed female college freshmen four 
     times more likely to smoke than their mothers.
       Yeutter and his colleagues insisted they had done nothing 
     for tobacco they would not have done for any other industry. 
     But the fact remained that at a time when the United States 
     could not overcome Japan's resistance on a broad range of 
     exports--from beef to cars to super-computers--U.S. 
     cigarettes flourished, thanks to the perseverance of the 
     trade warriors.


                            Into South Korea

       The next target was South Korea, which had a $1.7 billion 
     domestic tobacco market. The U.S. tobacco industry filed a 
     301 complaint against Seoul in January 1988, and USTR 
     initiated its investigation a month later, South Korea's 
     state cigarette monopoly had done little advertising over the 
     years, and a few months before the 301 case, the Seoul 
     government had formally outlawed cigarette ads. But the 
     United States insisted on defining ``fair access'' as 
     including the right to advertise.
       Even before the formal complaint was filed, tobacco state 
     lawmakers and their allies had supported opening South 
     Korea's market. Senators Dole (R-Kan.) and Helms and 14 
     others--including Gore, then a senator from Tennessee--wrote 
     to South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan in July 1987 
     demanding that tobacco companies be allowed ``the right to 
     import and distribute without discriminatory taxes and 
     duties, as well as the right to advertise and promote their 
     products.''
       The companies did their own work as well. RJR hired former 
     Reagan national security adviser Richard Allen to lobby the 
     government in Seoul and give the company more influence than 
     its corporate rivals. Philip Morris gave a $250,000 contract 
     to former White House aide Michael Deaver, who hired two 
     former USTR officials and later obtained a $475,000 lobbying 
     contract with the South Korean government, according to 
     testimony at his 1987 trial for perjury. (Deaver was 
     convicted of lying to Congress about his lobbying activities 
     after he left the White House.)
       In May 1988 Seoul formally agreed to open its doors to 
     American brands. The deal allowed cigarette signs and 
     promotions at shops, 120 pages of advertisements in magazines 
     and cigarette company sponsorship of social, cultural and 
     sporting events. Cigarettes quickly became one of the most 
     heavily advertised products in South Korea; from no 
     advertising in 1986, American tobacco companies spent $25 
     million in 1988. Student activists, anti-smoking groups, the 
     South Korean consumers' union and the local cigarette retail 
     association all staged protests against ``tobacco 
     imperialism'' and boycotted American cigarettes, and the 
     companies accused the state cigarette monopoly of constant 
     violations of the agreement. Still, within a year, American 
     companies had captured 6 percent of the market.
       USTR also made fast work of Taiwan. On the heels of the 
     Japanese agreement, Taiwan had agreed in October 1985 to 
     liberalize barriers to wine, beer and cigarettes. But a year 
     passed and the market remained effectively closed. Reagan 
     then ordered Yeutter to propose ``proportional 
     countermeasures,'' while U.S. officials threatened to oppose 
     Taiwan's application for membership in GATT.
       ``Since Taiwan wasn't a GATT member, we were not under GATT 
     constraints,'' said a senior USTR negotiator. ``I hate to say 
     it, but you can do whatever you want with Taiwan and Taiwan 
     knows it. They're much more vulnerable than other 
     countries.''
       Six weeks after Reagan's order, Taiwan folded. ``The 
     atmosphere in the negotiations was very bad for us,'' 
     recalled Chien-Shien Wang, then deputy minister of commerce, 
     who was Taiwan's chief negotiator. ``We were told the U.S. 
     had lost patience with us and was about to put us on the 301 
     list. So we had no choice but to agree.''
       While some USTR officials now concede they were uneasy 
     about using their power on behalf of America's most 
     controversial industry, they say they had no choice.
       ``For us it was an issue of, it's a U.S. product and it 
     deserves fair market access,'' said Robert Cassidy, the 
     current assistant U.S. trade representative for Asia and the 
     Pacific. ``There are lots of products people here might 
     prefer not to pursue--I myself didn't much like exporting 
     machines to manufacture bullets. But that's not the issue. 
     The issue was, is this discriminatory treatment or not?''
       Following the agreement, consumption of imported cigarettes 
     in Taiwan soared. According to one industry trade journal, 
     foreign brands went from 1 percent of annual cigarette sales 
     to more than 20 percent in less than two years, while state-
     manufactured brands declined accordingly. RJR sponsored a 
     dance at a Taipei disco popular with teenagers and offered 
     free admission for five empty packs of Winstons. Studies by 
     Taiwanese public health specialist Ted Chen, now a professor 
     at Tulane University Medical Center, tracked a steadily 
     rising rate of smoking among high schoolers.


                        the anti-smoking crusade

       The 301 cases were a boon to the industry. The Boston-based 
     National Bureau of Economic Research estimated in a recent 
     report that sales of American cigarettes were 600 percent 
     higher in the targeted countries in 1991 then they would have 
     been without U.S. intervention. In 1990, after he became 
     secretary of agriculture, Yeutter told a news conference, ``I 
     just saw the figures on tobacco exports here a few days ago 
     and, my, have the turned out to be a marvelous success 
     story.''
       The tobacco companies insist that the government's efforts 
     merely allowed them to gain a fair share of existing markets. 
     But the National Bureau projected that American entry pushed 
     up average cigarette consumption per capita by nearly 10 
     percent in the targeted countries. The report said fiercer 
     price competition and sophisticated advertising campaigns had 
     stimulated the increase.
       Then-surgeon general Koop, a fierce critic of the industry, 
     first heard about the 301s when he visited the Japanese 
     Health Ministry during the swing through the Far East in the 
     mid-1980s. ``They greeted me with, `What are you trying to do 
     for us? We will never be able to pay the medical bill,' '' he 
     recalled. ``I had no idea what they were talking about.''
       Koop soon found out that USTR was, in his words, ``trading 
     Marlboros for Toyotas.'' But it took several years for anti-
     smoking activists to become mobilized. In 1988 Koop attempted 
     to hold a hearing on cigarette exports in his Interagency 
     Committee on Smoking and Health, but said he was advised a 
     few days before that the Reagan White House wanted him to 
     drop the subject and uninvite witnesses such as Judith 
     Mackay, a prominent anti-smoking activist from Hong Kong.
       Koop refused. Officials from State and Commerce who had 
     agreed to appear suddenly withdrew, but Mackay and a parade 
     of critics testified. She accused the United States of waging 
     ``a new Opium War'' against Asia, an allusion to Britain's 
     19th-century effort to force China to allow trade of the 
     addictive drug.
       When Yeutter learned of the criticism, he wrote to Koop to 
     defend his record. ``I have never smoked, have no desire to 
     do so and believe this addiction to be a terrible human 
     tragedy,'' he told Koop. ``However, what we are about in our 
     trade relationships is something entirely different.''
       Koop found Yeutter's letter unconvincing. ``I'm a firm 
     believer in the difference between a moral compromise and a 
     political compromise,'' Koop said in a recent interview. ``I 
     suppose Yeutter can say he was just doing his job, but when 
     you really are exporting death and disease to the Third 
     World, that's a moral compromise that I would never make.''
       During congressional hearings on the trade issue in May 
     1990, the government's sole witness was Sandra Kristoff, then 
     assistant trade representative for Asia and the Pacific, who 
     had negotiated the agreements with South Korea and Taiwan and 
     who vigorously defended USTR's role. She mocked the idea of 
     taking into account health issues in trade policy matters, 
     saying such considerations might result in banning trade in 
     cholesterol-laden cookies ``or hormones in red meat. . . . 
     U.S. trade policy is not in the business of picking winners 
     or losers in terms of products.''
       After the hearing, two lobbyists for Philip Morris wrote a 
     memo to their boss praising her testimony. ``The best witness 
     we had was USTR Representative Sandy Kristoff . . . ,'' they 
     wrote. ``She was tremendously effective.'' Kristoff, who now 
     serves on the staff of the National Security Council, 
     declined to be interviewed.


                           eyeing new markets

       When anti-smoking activist Gregory Connolly toured Asia in 
     1988 he was astonished by how entrenched American cigarettes 
     already had become. In Taipei he discovered 17 billboards 
     advertising foreign cigarettes within sight of a local high 
     school. In Bangkok he was shown student notebooks decorated 
     with the Marlboro logo. In Manila he took photographs of jump 
     boys huddling

[[Page S7964]]

     in an alley smoking Marlboros. Afterward, he protested to 
     Filipino health activist Phyllis Tabla: ``You've got to do 
     something about this!''
       Her reply: ``Don't lecture us! It's not us! It's you!''
       Philip Morris was so delighted with the success of the 301 
     cases that when Yeutter left USTR in 1989 to become secretary 
     of agriculture in the Bush administration, the company threw 
     a celebration in his honor at the Decatur Club here. When 
     critics raised questions about the reception, Yeutter told 
     the Senate Agriculture Committee: ``It's unfortunate that 
     when people try to say thank you, it becomes a potential 
     conflict of interest issue, but that's the way the world is 
     these days.''
       Looking back, Yeutter said he now feels the reception was a 
     mistake. ``Philip Morris shouldn't have done it,'' he said, 
     ``They were simply trying to be gracious. . . . It simply was 
     not good judgment on their part. And in retrospect I probably 
     should have done more to discourage it.''
       Today Yeutter practices international trade law from a 
     corner office at Hogan & Hartson, Washington's largest law 
     firm. He also sits on the board of British-American Tobacco 
     (BAT), the British-based tobacco conglomerate that owns Brown 
     & Williamson, the Louisville-based cigarette manufacturer 
     that was one of the participants in the 301s. He insists he 
     has not changed his mind about the dangers of smoking. But 
     cigarettes remain a legal product, and, he says, BAT is an 
     excellent, well-run company that he is proud to serve.
       When Yeutter moved to Agriculture, incoming President Bush 
     appointed Carla Hills, a highly regarded lawyer and former 
     housing and urban development secretary, to succeed him at 
     USTR. One canny political pro replaced another. And USTR set 
     its sights on opening more cigarette markets in Asia.
       Next on the agenda was Thailand.
       Conditions there were similar to those in Japan, South 
     Korea and Taiwan: a very promising market in a country 
     undergoing explosive economic growth; a state-run monopoly: 
     tight restrictions on imported cigarettes; an advertising ban 
     purportedly based on health claims.
       After their success in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, 
     officials were highly optimistic about Thailand.
       The Thai Finance Ministry already was holding discussions 
     about opening its market.
       Thailand, both U.S. officials and industry representatives 
     agreed, would be easy.
       Only they were wrong. As they were about to find out, in 
     pressing on into Thailand, Washington and the industry had 
     gone a country too far.
                                                                    ____


                        Two on Top of the World


 the largest independent tobacco merchants are based in va. but their 
                            growth is abroad

               (By Frank Swoboda and Martha M. Hamilton)

       Richmond.--The faint, pungent smell of tobacco leaf is the 
     first thing you notice when you enter the second-floor 
     executive offices of Universal Corp., the world's largest 
     independent tobacco leaf merchant.
       At Universal, as at the Danville, Va., headquarters of its 
     second largest rival, Dimon, Inc., the smell of tobacco is 
     the smell of money.
       The two companies (and their only other major competitor, 
     Standard Universal Corp. of North Carolina) are the middlemen 
     in the world tobacco industry. They don't make cigarettes or 
     other consumer tobacco products. Instead, they buy, ship, 
     process, pack, store and finance leaf tobacco for sale to 
     cigarette manufacturers.
       Together the two had $5.7 billion in revenue in 1996 from 
     operations in locations that included the United States, 
     Brazil, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Italy, Bulgaria and China. 
     Despite declining U.S. consumption, and a multibillion-dollar 
     legal settlement by manufacturers that is apt to cut domestic 
     consumption even further, there is no sense of panic in the 
     corridors of these tobacco merchants. Universal and Dimon 
     know the world market--it's enormous and still growing.
       ``The world market is where the bulk of the growth is,'' 
     said Universal Vice President James H. Starkey III. Worldwide 
     tobacco consumption has been rising by 1.2 percent to 1.5 
     percent a year, providing Universal with a consistent 18 
     percent to 19 percent annual return on equity.
       About a third of the tobacco grown in the United States is 
     exported. Last year, that came to 340 million tons of flue-
     cured tobacco, which is harvested over a several-week period 
     and cured by heat, and about 160 million tons of burley 
     tobacco, which is hung to dry and cure, according to Randy 
     Weber, associate administrator for the Farm Service Agency of 
     the U.S. Department of Agriculture.
       ``I don't see us shifting away from tobacco. We have 
     continued to reinvest in tobacco as opportunities arise. 
     We're constantly looking for opportunities for expansion,'' 
     said Starkey.
       His optimism is echoed by those who follow the industry, 
     ``I'd say the future is very strong, although there are going 
     to be short-term ripples because of the cigarette settlement 
     and the imposition of higher prices,'' said David A. Goldman, 
     an industry analyst with Robinson-Humphrey in Atlanta.
       Universal noted in its annual report to stockholders that 
     ``demand for leaf continues to increase in response to an 
     estimated 1 percent annual growth in world cigarette 
     consumption and consumption of American-blend cigarettes is 
     increasing by 3 to 4 percent annually.''
       There is a growing global market for the mild tobacco 
     mixture known as ``American blend'' and for American-style 
     cigarettes, of which Universal is a major supplier. More and 
     more of the leaf that goes into those products is being 
     harvested abroad, putting pressure on U.S. growers but 
     increasing profitability for processors by lowering the price 
     of tobacco. As an example of the shift, Starkey points to 
     France, where, he said, the public is beginning to move away 
     from ``dark tobacco'' cigarettes such as the well-known 
     Gaulois to milder, American blend cigarettes as manufacturers 
     introduce low-cost, generic brands to cultivate a taste for 
     the new blend with the smoking public.
       Universal has operations in 30 countries around the globe. 
     It first went into China in the 1920s, and there and 
     elsewhere it has survived civil wars, communist takeovers and 
     political unrest. ``The one thing we've been good at is 
     managing through instability. We stick to our knitting. We 
     don't get involved in politics,'' Starkey said.
       Karen W.L. Whelan, Universal's treasurer, said the company 
     keeps ``liaison people'' at its headquarters who travel back 
     and forth to various countries to help it keep track of 
     changes overseas.
       The search for new markets has taken Universal from Eastern 
     Europe to the emerging nations of Africa. In the early 1990s, 
     Universal and Philip Morris purchased the largest tobacco 
     processing company in Kazakhstan from the government. In 
     China--the world's largest tobacco producer, growing more 
     than half the world's supply of flue-cured tobacco--Universal 
     manages a new leaf processing plant near Bengbu for the 
     Shanghai Tobacco Co.
       Universal buys the leaf processed at the Chinese plant and 
     has agreed to export a minimum of 70 percent of the tobacco. 
     ``It's the only export operation in China managed by a 
     foreign company,'' Starkey said.
       The company first entered China in 1925, and it remained 
     until the communist takeover. It returned to China when the 
     Nixon administration reopened relations with the Asian nation 
     in the 1970s.
       Like almost all the other U.S.-based multinationals, 
     America's tobacco merchants are watching the vast Chinese 
     market closely, for an obvious reason: Smokers in China 
     consume approximately 1.7 trillion cigarettes a year, far 
     more than the 450 billion a year smoked by U.S. consumers, 
     according to Scott & Stringfellow analyst John F. Kasprzak.
       More than just a tobacco merchant, Universal's interests 
     include lumber and building products distribution in the 
     Netherlands and Belgium. It also buys, processes and 
     distributes tea, rubber, sunflower seeds, dried fruits and 
     seasonings as part of a joint venture with COSUN, a Dutch 
     sugar cooperative. But tobacco is by far its biggest 
     business, accounting for 71 percent of the company's revenues 
     and 83 percent of its operating profits.
       Rival Dimon Inc. is also enjoying an up-curve, reaching 
     almost $2.2 billion in sales last year. Dimon operates in 36 
     countries, and like its Richmond competitor its business is 
     not one-dimensional: It ranks as the world's largest exporter 
     and distributor of fresh-cut flowers. Dimon was formed in 
     1995 by a merger of 120-year-old Dibrell Bros. Inc. of 
     Danville with tobacco processor Monk-Austin of Farmville, 
     N.C. That union created a company that ranked second in its 
     industry to Universal; a deal consummated earlier this year 
     in which Dimon acquired British-based Intabex Holdings 
     Worldwide SA narrowed the gap between the two companies.
       Intabex was a privately-owned company that was the fourth-
     largest leaf tobacco dealer in the world. It owned tobacco 
     buying, processing and exporting operations in the United 
     States, Brazil, Argentina, Malawi, Italy and Thailand and was 
     affiliated with a Zimbabwe company that Dimon also acquired. 
     Its acquisition will offer Dimon considerable opportunity to 
     cut costs, Kasprzak said, by consolidating operations and 
     refinancing Intabex's considerable debt.
       Officials from Dimon declined to be interviewed for this 
     story.
       Both Universal and Dimon have benefited from industry 
     consolidation, which has in the past several years cut the 
     number of major leaf merchants from eight to three. But the 
     same consolidation has hurt U.S. tobacco growers, said Jerry 
     Jenkins, a grower in Lunenberg County, Va., who is also 
     chairman of Tobacco Associates, the export promotion 
     organization for the nation's flue-cured growers.
       ``The problem with the recent mergers and consolidations in 
     the industry is that they reduce competition,'' said Jenkins, 
     who farms about 30 acres of flue-cured tobacco and 3.5 acres 
     of dark fire-cured tobacco. ``It's generally not to the 
     benefit of the seller of the product.''
       Virginia farmers grow flue-cured tobacco on approximately 
     40,000 acres and burley tobacco on about 10,000 acres. 
     Maryland is also a tobacco-growing state but on a much 
     smaller level. Only about 8,000 acres there are devoted to 
     tobacco cultivation, according to the USDA's Weber.
       The increasing worldwide demand for tobacco that is filling 
     the coffers of Universal and Dimon may not be the long-term 
     salvation of these farmers. Although the world's

[[Page S7965]]

     smokers are developing a taste for American blend, U.S.-grown 
     tobacco is simply too expensive for many world markets. U.S. 
     tobacco is still as much as 30 percent higher in price than 
     competitive tobacco products from Brazil and Zimbabwe, 
     according to Universal's Starkey.
       Perhaps an even greater problem for American growers is the 
     financing role the processing companies play in overseas 
     markets. According to analyst Goldman, companies like Dimon 
     contract with a cigarette maker like R.J. Reynolds Tobacco 
     Co. to deliver a certain grade of tobacco a year from now and 
     ask for a down payment. They then use that down payment to 
     provide cash advances to growers in countries such as Brazil, 
     helping to finance farmers there without putting their own 
     funds at risk.
       ``When you're loaning a man money to grow a crop or 
     underwriting his loan and furnishing technical advice, it 
     only seems natural that you're going to want to buy his crop 
     first to recoup that investment,'' said tobacco grower 
     Jenkins. To compete, tobacco growers in Virginia have had to 
     cultivate larger acreages to achieve efficiencies of scale, 
     he said.
       ``We don't like to buy without having an order,'' said 
     Universal's Whelan, adding that most of the company's tobacco 
     purchases are made at local auction, which is how tobacco is 
     sold in this country. She said that in only a handful of 
     countries does Universal have advance contracts with growers, 
     in countries such as Brazil, Guatemala, Mexico and Italy.
       The next possible target for expansion for Universal, Dimon 
     and Standard may be processing tobacco for U.S. cigarette 
     manufacturers who now do their own processing, said Scott & 
     Stringfellow's Kasprzak. In recent years Lorillard Tobacco 
     and RJR turned over their leaf purchasing and some processing 
     to Dimon's predecessors, and others may follow suit.
       In the meantime, Virginia's tobacco merchants can look 
     forward to doing business in a world that every year consumes 
     more cigarettes with no sign of slowing down.

                          ____________________