[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 105 (Wednesday, July 23, 1997)]
[House]
[Pages H5584-H5622]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                     BUDGET ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1997

  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call 
up House Resolution 192 and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

                              H. Res. 192

       Resolved, That upon the adoption of this resolution it 
     shall be in order to consider in the House the bill (H.R. 
     2003) to reform the budget process and enforce the bipartisan 
     balanced budget agreement of 1997. The bill shall be 
     considered as read for amendment. The previous question shall 
     be considered as ordered on the bill to final passage without 
     intervening motion except: (1) one hour of debate equally 
     divided and controlled by Representative Barton of Texas or 
     his designee and a Member opposed to the bill; and (2) one 
     motion to recommit.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] is 
recognized for 1 hour.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of debate only, I yield the 
customary 30 minutes to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Frost], my 
colleague and friend, pending which I yield myself such time as I may 
consume. During consideration of this resolution all time yielded is 
for the purpose of debate only.
  (Mr. GOSS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks and to include extraneous material.)
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, this rule and today's debate reflect the 
essence of an agreement reached on June 25 as the House moved to pass 
legislation implementing the historic budget agreement. That agreement 
was to allow an up or down vote prior to July 24 on H.R. 2003, which 
had been offered as an amendment to reconciliation by the gentleman 
from Texas [Mr. Barton], the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. Minge], and 
some of our other colleagues. This rule fulfills that agreement. 
Promises made; promises kept.
  Today this House will vote on H.R. 2003, a budget process reform 
proposal advocated by a bipartisan group of Members. This rule is 
limited just to provide for the agreement and it does not allow 
amendment. Not only is this customary for legislation that deals with 
entitlement and tax legislation within the jurisdiction of the 
Committee on Ways and Means, but it also captures the moment at which 
the actual agreement was made to bring this forward to allow the House 
to consider H.R. 2003 as presented on June 25.
  The rule provides for 1 hour of debate in the House to be equally 
divided by the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Barton] and an opponent. We 
have discussed in the Committee on Rules that the time will be divided 
in such a way as to accommodate Members from both sides of the aisle on 
both sides of the issue and for all of the committees with an interest. 
Managers will yield floor time appropriately. In addition the rule 
provides for the customary motion to recommit.
  Mr. Speaker, as I have outlined, Members understand that we have gone 
through an unusual process here to get to this point. All three of the 
primary committees with jurisdiction over this legislation, that is, 
the Committee on the Budget, the Committee on Ways and Means, and the 
Committee on Rules, have agreed to waive their right to weigh in on 
this proposal in the interest of granting H.R. 2003 its unfettered vote 
as promised.
  For something of this magnitude and complexity, that in itself is 
rather extraordinary under Republican leadership. In addition, in doing 
this Members should be aware of a process that has been under way for 
some time in the Committee on the Budget, the Committee on Rules, in 
the policy committee and among various groups of individual Members to 
reach deliberative and consensus solutions on how best to reform our 
budget process. In other words, we are focusing on this anyway, and we 
are now taking this extra step because of this arrangement with the 
gentleman from Texas [Mr. Barton] and the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. 
Minge].
  I think we all agree that there is a very real need for review and 
reform of the process of our budget. But that effort should be done, in 
my view, in a deliberate and inclusive way that takes full advantage of 
the expertise that can be found within our committee system which has 
served this institution and this country so well over the years. I have 
always argued that changing the budget process must lead to an 
improvement in the process, not just a different, equally flawed 
approach. Change for change's sake is not going to get us anywhere.
  As chairman of the Subcommittee on Legislative and Budget Process, I 
am a little bit familiar with the problems of our current budget 
framework. Not only is it complicated and hard to understand, but it 
frankly does not work very well and it does not hold elected officials 
accountable enough, of course. Moreover, I agree with the proponents of 
the legislation before us today that

[[Page H5585]]

our current budget process does not adequately confront the challenge 
of imposing discipline on entitlement spending, which is a very tough 
subject.
  In the Committee on Rules we held three hearings in the last Congress 
on the subject of budget reform. We have been working closely with the 
Committee on the Budget this year to develop proposals for reform. The 
gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon] and the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. 
Kasich] have committed to developing a comprehensive budget process 
reform package in this Congress. So we are on our way to doing this 
anyway.
  In the short-term I have been very pleased with the cooperative 
effort we have had with the Committee on the Budget on a bipartisan 
basis vetting what I will call cleanup provisions in reconciliation to 
streamline existing procedures. This is an important first step in 
budget process reform but obviously it is not comprehensive or 
complete.
  The bill before us today has a different parentage. It is not the 
business as usual approach of the committee system. It is a product of 
an evolution from Member to Member, and outside group to outside group 
over several years. It has not been properly vetted through the 
committee system, and its authors have admitted as much by saying that 
further changes are needed.
  In the Committee on Rules last night we heard discussion of the need 
for ``technical amendments and revisions in this bill.''

                              {time}  1045

  So it is not quite right even yet.
  In my view, the problems with this bill go beyond drafting errors 
into substance. For instance, I do not think we will be improving the 
transparency and the credibility of our budget process by grafting 15 
new very complicated sections onto the already complicated Budget Act.
  In addition, I am troubled by the authority this bill cedes to the 
President to define the parameters of budget enforcement.
  I also have concerns that this bill represents a first step down the 
very dangerous road toward automatic tax increases. That is what I 
said. Automatic tax increases. I do not think we are ready for that 
yet. It threatens to undo all the agreements and commitments that have 
been made to provide genuine tax relief to America's taxpayers.
  I cannot support an approach that gives the President the authority 
to set in motion indefinite delay in the child tax credit that we are 
working so hard for, or delay of the capital gains tax we are working 
so hard for, or delay of the estate tax reduction we are working so 
hard for, or a host of the indexing provisions we are talking about.
  Our budget problems are not the result of too little revenue. They 
are the problem of too much spending and too much government and we all 
know it. In this regard, this bill operates under a basic flawed 
assumption.
  With respect to entitlements, this bill is also troubling. I served 
on the Kerrey Commission on entitlement and tax reform, and I learned a 
great deal in the process. I well understand the problem we have with 
entitlements. We are on an unsustainable trend and we have to make some 
tough decisions, but this bill raises almost as many questions as it 
answers in terms of the process by which the very important decisions 
about handling entitlement spending would be made. It puts Social 
Security COLA's at risk of automatic spending cuts.
  Now, I cannot imagine anybody who really would stand up for that 
proposition to say we are going to put Social Security COLA's into an 
automatic spending cut process. That is not going to hack it with the 
people that we represent and it should not.
  Also, this approach that we are going to consider today provides for 
the possibility of automatic increases in Medicare premiums. Again, I 
do not think the constituency we represent, certainly not mine in 
southwest Florida, is going to jump up and applaud very loudly 
automatic increases in Medicare premiums.
  Mr. Speaker, the proponents of this legislation are sincere in their 
effort and I congratulate them on it. They are striving to get 
enforcement teeth into the budget process, and we need it and I agree. 
It is just a question of how and when, and I do not think their 
approach today is how or when.
  I admire their persistence in getting today's debate. It shows good 
leadership and good commitment, and I welcome them into our process 
through the committee process of budget reform, particularly focusing 
on enforcement with teeth.
  I find the product we are working with today seriously flawed. I hope 
the House will defeat it so we can get back to work in developing the 
budget process reform that we have been working on.
  Mr. Speaker, I submit for the Record the following section-by-section 
summary of H.R. 2003 and several letters concerning this issue:

 Section-By-Section Summary of H.R. 2003, the ``Budget Enforcement Act 
  of 1997'' Prepared by the Majority Staff of the Committee on Rules, 
                             July 22, 1997


                            General Summary

       H.R. 2003 establishes a new set of budget enforcement 
     procedures specifically for the purpose of enforcing the 
     direct spending levels and the deficit and revenue targets 
     assumed in the Bipartisan Balanced Budget Agreement of 1997. 
     This Act would be a free-standing set of procedures, another 
     layer of budget rules and requirements laid over top of the 
     existing Budget Act. The President and Congress would now be 
     required to follow the rules and procedures of three 
     different, yet comprehensive statutes (the Congressional 
     Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, the Balanced 
     Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 and the 
     Budget Enforcement Act of 1997), all designed to dictate the 
     actions of the budget process.
       This Act contains two titles. The first outlines how the 
     goals of the budget agreement will be measured and monitored 
     and what the distinct roles of the President and the Congress 
     would be in this monitoring process. The second title 
     provides the methods by which the spending levels and the 
     revenue and deficit targets will be enforced through 
     sequestration and/or a delay of tax reductions.
     Section 1: Short Title and Table of Contents
       This section grants this Act the title of the ``Budget 
     Enforcement Act of 1997''. This section also lays out the 
     table of contents for the Act's 15 new free standing budget 
     process provisions.
     Section 2: Definitions
       This section provides the definitions for various budgetary 
     terms as they are to be understood in implementing the 
     provisions of this Act including the following: ``eligible 
     population,'' ``sequester and sequestration,'' ``breach,'' 
     ``baseline,'' ``budgetary resources,'' ``discretionary 
     appropriations,'' ``direct spending,'' ``entitlement 
     authority,'' ``current,'' ``account,'' ``budget year,'' 
     ``current year,'' ``outyear,'' ``OMB,'' ``CBO,'' ``budget 
     outlays and outlays,'' ``budget authority and new budget 
     authority,'' ``appropriation act,'' ``consolidated deficit,'' 
     ``surplus,'' and ``direct spending caps.''
       Many of these terms and definitions are similar to those 
     currently used and defined in the Congressional Budget Act of 
     1974 and the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control 
     Act of 1985 (the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act). However, there 
     are some new terms and some old terms with new definitions. 
     For example, the definition of ``sequester and 
     sequestration'' is the same as that used in Gramm-Rudman-
     Hollings while the definition of what constitutes a 
     ``breach'' is different than that contained in current law. 
     Under current law ``the term `breach' means, for any 
     fiscal year, the amount (if any) by which new budget 
     authority or outlays for that year (within a category of 
     discretionary appropriations) is above that category's 
     discretionary spending limit for new budget authority or 
     outlays for that year, as the case may be.'' \1\ Under 
     H.R. 2003 ``the term `breach' means, for any fiscal year, 
     the amount (if any) by which outlays for that year (within 
     a category of direct spending) is above that category's 
     direct sending cap for that fiscal year.'' For the 
     purposes of this Act a ``breach'' is defined as first only 
     applying to direct spending and secondly as only applying 
     to budget outlays as opposed to budget authority or 
     outlays. Since the Act does not repeal any of the current 
     Budget Act, this bill adds a second definition to what 
     constitutes a ``breach''. Other new terms include ``direct 
     spending caps'' and ``consolidated deficit''. Other older 
     terms with new definitions include ``discretionary 
     appropriations'' and ``baseline''.
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     * Footnotes at end of article.
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 Title I--Ensure that the Bipartisan Balanced Budget Agreement of 1997 
                           Achieves Its Goal

     Section 101: Timetable
       This section establishes a new timetable for completion of 
     the new requirements placed on the President and Congress 
     under this Act. This timetable would be an addition to the 
     current timetable relating to the submission of the 
     President's budget, congressional consideration of a budget 
     resolution and any required reconciliation legislation and 
     any sequestration or budget reports required of OMB or 
     CBO.\2\

[[Page H5586]]

       Due to the fact that these new procedures would be an 
     addition to the current rules, certain difficulties and 
     complications arise. For example, the Congressional Budget 
     Office would now be required to submit two reports to 
     Congress, one by January 15 \3\ and another by February 
     15.\4\ There is no explanation as to who the two required 
     reports differ or are similar. They are simply required.
       Also, under current law, the President is required to 
     submit his budget proposal by the first Monday in February. 
     H.R. 2003 also requires the President to submit a ``budget 
     update based on new assumptions'' by this same deadline. What 
     this actually requires is unclear. Would this require the 
     President to submit two budget proposals based on two 
     different assumptions? Section 103 of the Act actually 
     establishes a new point of order against Congressional 
     consideration of any budget proposal that is not based on the 
     ``new assumptions'' or that is consistent with the levels of 
     this Act. Furthermore, having two timetables for the budget 
     process, each with different requirements for both the 
     President and Congress, in two different statues, further 
     complicates the budget process.
     Section 102: Procedures to Avoid Sequestration or Delay of 
         New Revenue Reductions
       Under this section the President is required to submit to 
     Congress a legislative remedy if the required report by 
     November 1 (and as soon as practical after the end of the 
     fiscal year) of the Office of Management and Budget indicates 
     any of the following:
       1. deficits in the most recently completed year exceeded or 
     in the budget year are projected to exceed the deficit 
     targets established in this Act; or
       2. revenues in the most recently completed year were less 
     than or in the budget year are projected to be less than the 
     revenue targets in this Act; or
       3. outlays in the most recently completed fiscal year 
     exceeded or in the budget year are projected to exceed the 
     spending caps established in this Act.
       The President's legislative remedy may take any one or a 
     combination of three forms:
       1. a reduction in outlays;
       2. an increase in revenues, or
       3. an increase in the deficit targets or spending caps or a 
     reduction in the revenue targets.

     However, the Act is unclear whether the President may propose 
     a remedy that seeks to adjust the caps or targets for only a 
     part of the breach or violation or whether the President must 
     adjust the caps or targets to cover the entire breach. While 
     one subsection of the bill lists it as an option for the 
     President's package that same subsection also contains 
     language preventing the President from using such an option. 
     The President may also submit in writing, that because of 
     economic or programmatic reasons none of the variances from 
     the balanced budget plan should be offset. There is no 
     definition as to what constitutes a programmatic reason for 
     not offsetting the variance.\5\
       Upon receipt of this report, with its proposed legislative 
     remedy, Congress is required by November 15 to introduce the 
     President's package as a joint resolution by the Chairmen of 
     the Budget Committees of the House and the Senate. If the 
     chairmen do not introduce the bill, any Member of the House 
     or Senate may introduce the joint resolution after November 
     15. Also, by November 15, the Budget Committees are required 
     to report the joint resolution with or without amendment. The 
     timeline set out these expedited procedures is inconsistent 
     as both the introduction and committee action must be 
     completed by the same date.
       Specifically, the Committee may either recommend the 
     President's proposal or may recommend changes similar to 
     those recommended by the President. However, if the President 
     had recommended to adjust the caps or targets, the Committees 
     could not recommend doing so by any amount greater than that 
     originally recommended by the President. In this way the 
     President solely determines the scope of the actions 
     permissible by Congress.
       If the Committees do not report by November 20, the 
     committee is automatically discharged from consideration of 
     the joint resolution reflecting the President's 
     recommendation. (There is no explanation as to why the 
     committee has until November 15 to report the joint 
     resolution when the committee is not automatically discharged 
     from further consideration until November 20.) Furthermore, 
     the Act sets up that, upon this discharge, any Member may 
     move to consider the resolution. There is no notice or 
     time layover requirement stated. (Although, the next 
     subsection says that the joint resolution would be 
     considered pursuant to Section 305 of the Budget Act, 
     which states that it is not in order to consider a 
     resolution and its report--at which this point there would 
     not be one--that has not laid over for five days. \6\) The 
     joint resolution would be considered under the same 
     procedures as that required for consideration of a 
     concurrent resolution on the budget. Special procedures 
     for consideration by the Senate and a conference are 
     established. Most notable is the automatic discharge of 
     the Committee on the Budget of the Senate by December 1 of 
     any joint resolution passed by the House and transmitted 
     to the House after a one day layover. Also, the Senate may 
     initially consider a joint resolution which may propose to 
     offset all or part of any reported breach. However, when 
     the joint resolution reaches the stage of a conference, 
     the conference committee may only report a resolution that 
     proposes to offset the entire breach. The most glaring 
     error of these procedures is that they fail to take into 
     consideration the possibility that Congress may have 
     adjourned sine die prior to this report having even been 
     received by Congress. This may actually necessitate 
     Congress coming into a special session after an election. 
     In non-election years, Congress may actually be forced to 
     stay in session until November 1 when the OMB report is 
     due. These procedures are fatally flawed in many areas.
     Section 103: Effect on President's Budget Submissions; Point 
         of Order
       The President is prohibited by this section from submitting 
     a budget pursuant to Title 31 of the United States Code that 
     is inconsistent with the spending, revenue and deficit levels 
     established by this Act unless it recommends changes to those 
     levels. This section also establishes a new point of order 
     against the consideration of any concurrent resolution on the 
     budget that is inconsistent with the levels established in 
     this Act.
       First of all, while the President is able to get around the 
     prohibition placed on the Administration's budget submission 
     by proposing to change the levels, Congress is not granted 
     any exception to the point of order against consideration of 
     a budget resolution that is different. In other words, in 
     order for Congress to consider a budget resolution that calls 
     for changes in the levels, it would have to waive the 
     provisions of this section in order to even consider the 
     President's recommendations. Congress is prohibited from 
     considering the President's recommended changes. Furthermore, 
     the actual legislative vehicle for consideration of changes 
     in caps and/or targets is a reconciliation bill rather than a 
     budget resolution since the latter is not signed into law.
       Secondly, while the requirements of the President apply 
     only to the budget submissions for fiscal years 1998 through 
     2002, the point of order in the House and Senate is 
     indefinite.
     Section 104: Deficit and Revenue Targets
       This Act places in law the actual dollar levels of the 
     Consolidated Deficit (or Surplus) targets called for in the 
     Bipartisan Budget Agreement for fiscal years 1998 through 
     2002. It also establishes the consolidated revenue targets 
     assumed in the Agreement for fiscal years 1998 through 
     2002.
       Section 1 of H.R. 2003 defines the ``consolidated deficit 
     target'' to mean ``with respect to a fiscal year, the amount 
     by which total outlays exceed total receipts during that 
     year.'' The term ``consolidated revenue target'' is not 
     defined.
     Section 105: Direct Spending Caps
       This section establishes direct spending caps on the 
     following major entitlements: the Earned Income Tax Credit, 
     Family Support programs, Federal Retirement (Civilian and 
     Military), Medicaid, Medicare, Social Security, Supplemental 
     Security Income, Unemployment Compensation, and Veterans' 
     Benefits. All other entitlements and mandatory spending 
     programs not included in these major categories are to be 
     lumped together under one account. Furthermore, one overall 
     aggregate cap is to be placed over all of these individual 
     direct spending caps.
       Within thirty days of the enactment of this Act, the House 
     and Senate Budget Committees are required to file identical 
     reports containing the account numbers and spending levels 
     for each specific category. Also, within thirty days of the 
     enactment of this Act, OMB is required to submit to the 
     President and Congress a report containing account numbers 
     and spending levels for each category. The specific amounts 
     for each category contained in these reports is deemed to 
     have been adopted as part of H.R. 2003.
       While the specific category spending limits established 
     under this section are to be used for the purposes of 
     measurement, monitoring and eventually enforcement, certain 
     complications could arise. First, the reports filed by the 
     House and Senate Budget Committees are nothing more than a 
     statement of the priorities of these committees. The levels 
     in the OMB report are the levels that actually are utilized. 
     While the House and the Senate reports are required to be 
     identical, there is nothing requiring the OMB report to be 
     similar to that issued by these committees. The sole 
     responsibility for determining these individual direct 
     spending caps rests with the executive branch. Consequently, 
     OMB will most probably use their account numbers and category 
     spending limits for the reports they must file. Furthermore, 
     the CBO has no role in these determinations.
     Section 106: Economic Assumptions
       The entire budget process established under this Act is to 
     be monitored under common economic assumptions as set forth 
     in the joint explanatory statement of managers accompanying 
     H.Con.Res. 84, the budget resolution for fiscal year 1998. 
     Any changes to the caps or targets must be computed using 
     these same assumptions. There is no explanation as to who 
     will be the final arbiter between the CBO and the OMB if any 
     disagreements over economic assumptions arise over the next 
     five fiscal years.
     Section 107: Revisions to Deficit and Revenue Targets and to 
         the Caps for Entitlements and Other Mandatory Spending
       This section establishes procedures for the implementation 
     and consideration and/or

[[Page H5587]]

     consultation by Congress of any changes to the spending caps 
     or revenue and deficit targets. Upon the submission of the 
     President's budget proposal in February, the OMB is required 
     to include adjustments to the revenue levels for changes in 
     revenue growth and inflation; adjustments to the direct 
     spending caps for changes in concepts and definitions, net 
     outlays, inflation, eligible populations and intra-budgetary 
     payments; and adjustments to deficit targets as necessitated 
     by adjustments in the other levels. These adjustments would 
     be automatic and would not necessarily need Congressional 
     approval. This type of adjustment is somewhat consistent with 
     current law as applied to the discretionary spending 
     limits.\7\
       However, the Act establishes various obstacles in the path 
     of adjusting the caps for any other reason. First, to amend 
     the direct spending caps would require a recorded vote in the 
     House and the Senate. It is also deemed to be a ``matter of 
     highest privilege'' for any Member to insist on a recorded 
     vote. This is required even though Congress did not 
     originally have a recorded vote on establishing each direct 
     spending cap in the first place. Also, there is no current 
     understanding as to what a matter of ``highest privilege'' 
     is. Presumably, such a motion as intended by the sponsors 
     would preclude a motion to rise if in the Committee of the 
     Whole or to adjourn if in the House.
       Finally, this section places an unprecedented prohibition 
     on the ability of the Rules Committee to waive any of the 
     provisions of this subsection. (However, the Senate can do so 
     by a three-fifth vote). The rules and procedures relating to 
     the congressional budget process are exclusively within the 
     jurisdiction of the Rules Committee and every legislative 
     initiative enacted with respect to the budget process is done 
     within the Constitutional rule-making authority of the House 
     of Representatives. The Rules Committee still could waive the 
     provisions of this section because it would merely have to 
     report a resolution, which waives this section with respect 
     to another resolution that ``violates'' this section. This is 
     the so called two-step rule.

                    Title II: Enforcement Provisions

     Section 201: Reporting Excess Spending
       At the end of each fiscal year, OMB is required to compile 
     a statement of actual deficits, revenues and direct spending 
     for the fiscal year just completed. Specifically, the direct 
     spending levels would be identified by the categories 
     contained in section 105.
       Based on this statement, OMB is required to issue a report 
     to the President and Congress by December 15 for any year in 
     which there is a breach, by more than 1% of the applicable 
     total revenues or direct spending, of the targets or caps 
     establish under this Act. The report will include the 
     following:
       1. each instance in which a direct spending cap has been 
     breached;
       2. the difference between the amount of spending under the 
     direct spending caps for the current year and the estimated 
     actual spending for the categories associated with such caps;
       3. the amounts by which direct spending would need to be 
     reduced so that the total amount of direct spending, both 
     actual and estimated, for all of the categories would not 
     exceed the amounts available under the direct caps for the 
     applicable fiscal years; and,
       4. the amount of excess spending attributable to changes in 
     inflation or eligible populations.
       This report is triggered only if the total violation of the 
     revenue targets or spending caps exceeds 1% of the applicable 
     total revenues or direct spending for that year. A lower 
     percentage violation is deemed to be all right.
     Section 202: Enforcing Direct Spending Caps
       In any year in which direct spending exceeds the applicable 
     direct spending cap--the individual or the aggregate--the 
     breach would be eliminated pursuant to a sequester. This 
     sequester would apply a uniform percentage reduction to all 
     non-exempt accounts within that category in which the breach 
     occurred. Sequestration in accounts for which obligations are 
     indefinite would occur in a manner to ensure that obligations 
     in the fiscal year in which the sequester occurred and 
     succeeding fiscal years, are reduced. Furthermore, any 
     ``budgetary resources'' sequestered from an account are 
     permanently canceled. This sequester mechanism is similar in 
     many respects to that under current law.\8\
     Section 203: Sequestration Rules
       In applying the sequester mechanism to the direct spending 
     caps, this section establishes certain general rules to apply 
     to all categories and certain special rules to apply to some 
     categories. In general, a sequester is triggered if total 
     direct spending subject to the caps exceeds or is projected 
     to exceed the aggregate cap for the current or immediately 
     preceding fiscal year. Also, a sequester will reduce spending 
     under each separate direct spending cap by the proportion of 
     the amounts each category breached its applicable spending 
     cap.
       Special rules are included with respect to the application 
     of a sequester to certain entitlements involving indexed 
     benefit payments, loan programs, insurance programs, and 
     programs with state grant formulas.
       Section 203 also provides that if a law is enacted prior to 
     July 1 of a fiscal year that provides direct spending that 
     would result in a breach of any direct spending cap during 
     the current year, a within-session sequester should occur to 
     eliminate the breach. Again this is similar to the within-
     session sequester under current law with respect to the 
     enforcement of the discretionary spending limits.\9\
     Section 204: Enforcing Revenue Targets
       In any fiscal year in which actual revenues are less than 
     the applicable revenue target in the preceding fiscal year or 
     projected to be less than the applicable revenue target in 
     the current year, the mechanism in this section takes effect. 
     Based upon the statement of OMB pursuant to section 201(a), 
     OMB shall issue a report to the President and the Congress by 
     December 15 of any year in which revenues were less than the 
     revenue target established under this Act for the preceding 
     fiscal year or are projected to be less than the revenue 
     target established for the current fiscal year if such a 
     violation is more than 1 percent of the applicable total 
     revenue target for such year. This report shall include the 
     following:
       1. all existing laws and policies enacted as part of any 
     reconciliation legislation in calendar year 1997 which would 
     cause revenues to decline in the calendar year which begins 
     January 1, compared to those laws and policies in effect as 
     of December 15 (i.e. any tax cuts scheduled to be phased in 
     during the upcoming fiscal year under current law);
       2. the amounts by which revenues would be reduced by the 
     provisions of this section compared to policies in effect on 
     December 15; and,
       3. whether delaying the implementation of the provisions 
     called for under current law would cause the total revenues 
     in the current fiscal year and actual revenues in the 
     immediately preceding fiscal year to equal or exceed the 
     total of the applicable targets.
       If a revenue target was not met in the preceding fiscal 
     year or is not projected to be met in the current fiscal 
     year, this section requires that no provision of the Revenue 
     Reconciliation Act of 1997 establishing or increasing any 
     credit, deduction, exclusion, or eligibility limit or 
     reducing any rate shall take effect. It also requires the 
     suspension of any new adjustments for inflation scheduled to 
     be made to any credit, deduction or exclusion.
       In the event a revenue target is not met this section would 
     require that any remaining tax reductions already enacted 
     into law be suspended indefinitely. There is no provision 
     allowing these scheduled tax cuts to be reinstated should a 
     projection be inaccurate or for Congress to substitute 
     further spending reductions for the loss in revenue. If fact, 
     the various procedural obstacles contained in section 102, 
     section 103, and section 107 of this Act virtually assure 
     that the only option available to remedy the target violation 
     will be a suspension of the tax relief. The President is 
     required to remedy the violation unless Congress and the 
     President can write a new law between November 1 and December 
     15 of the applicable calendar year resolving the issue in 
     another manner. Allowing the process to proceed by itself 
     will result in an automatic tax increase with respect to 
     current law. Furthermore, there is no discretion given to the 
     President to delay some while implementing others. In any 
     affected year all of the scheduled tax relief for that fiscal 
     year must be suspended permanently.
     Section 205: Exempt Programs and Activities
       This section outlines those programs which would be exempt 
     from the sequestration mechanism established under this Act. 
     As compared to current law,\10\ this section removes from the 
     list of exempted programs the following major programs: 
     Social Security and Tier I Railroad Retirement Benefits, 
     Veterans programs, the Earned Income Tax Credit, Child 
     Nutrition, the Food Stamp Program, Medicaid, Supplemental 
     Security Income, and Women, Infants and Children. The Act 
     retains the current law optional exemption of military 
     personnel from the uniform percentage reductions taken under 
     this Act.\11\
       It should be noted that these modifications to the list of 
     programs exempt from sequestration only apply to the 
     implementation of the sequester mechanism established under 
     this Act and not to that under current law. Different rules 
     apply to the application of the two sequester mechanisms.
     Section 206: Special Rules
       Section 206 establishes further special rules for the 
     application of the sequester mechanism to certain programs 
     such as the Child Support Enforcement Program, the Commodity 
     Credit Corporation, the Dairy Program, the Earned Income Tax 
     Credit, Unemployment Compensation, the Federal Employees 
     Health Benefits Fund, the Federal Housing Finance Board, 
     Federal Pay, Medicare, the Postal Service Fund, Power 
     Marketing Administrations and the T.V.A. and to business-like 
     transactions of the Federal government.
       However, each of these special rules do not provide 
     exemptions for these programs but rather spell out in advance 
     how a sequester is to be applied in each respective case. For 
     example, under any program that provides a business-like 
     service in exchange for a fee, sequestration would be 
     accomplished through a uniform increase in the fees paid for 
     the service whatever it may be. In the case of Medicare, 
     sequestration would be instituted under complex procedures 
     which would result in, among other things, increases in Part 
     B premiums for beneficiaries.
       Furthermore, in each of the cases, this budget process 
     reform bill establishes how programmatic changes would occur 
     in each of these direct spending programs in order to

[[Page H5588]]

     produce the required levels of savings in the applicable 
     program. In many of these cases, the proposed method of 
     programmatic change actually conflicts with the stated intent 
     of the underlying policy of the Bipartisan Balanced Budget 
     Agreement which this entire Act is supposed to enforce.
     Section 207: The Current Law Baseline
       By January 15 of each year, OMB and CBO are required to 
     submit to Congress and the President reports which set forth 
     the budget baselines for the budget year and the next nine 
     fiscal years. These budget baselines are to be based on the 
     common economic assumptions set forth in section 106 of this 
     Act.\12\ This new budget baseline would apply to the 
     budget projections of revenues, deficits and spending into 
     the budget year and the relevant outyears based on current 
     enacted laws as of the date of the projection. The 
     baseline for discretionary spending items would remain 
     those for the discretionary spending caps in effect under 
     current law at the time.\13\ Revisions to the baseline 
     would occur through adjustments for economic assumptions 
     when CBO issues its Economic and Budget Update and when 
     OMB submits its budget update. Further adjustments could 
     occur as needed by August 1 of each year when CBO and OMB 
     submit their midyear reviews.
       The dilemma facing this construct of the budget baseline is 
     the assumption that the baseline and any revisions thereto 
     will remain common economic assumptions throughout the period 
     of FY 1998 through 2002. There is no explanation as to what 
     must occur if CBO and OMB cannot agree on common economic 
     assumptions pursuant to section 106 of this Act.
     Section 208: Limitations on Emergency Spending
       In an attempt to enable Congress to respond more 
     effectively to natural disasters and other emergencies, this 
     section requires that 1 percent of the total budget authority 
     and outlays available to be allocated, be withheld from 
     allocation to the appropriate committees as reserves to pay 
     for disasters and emergencies. These reserved amounts may be 
     made available for allocation to committees only if three 
     things occur:
       1. the President has made a request for these funds,
       2. the programs to be funded are included in such a 
     request, and
       3. ``the projected obligations for unforeseen emergency 
     needs exceed the 10-year rolling average annual expenditures 
     for existing programs included in the Presidential request 
     for the applicable fiscal year.''

     This grants the President an enormous advantage over the 
     congressional prerogative to allocate and spend the reserved 
     amounts. Congress cannot allocate these funds without the 
     prior approval of the President. Therefore, it cannot, 
     without violating these provisions, act unilaterally to 
     respond to any emergency prior to a Presidential declaration 
     of one.
       This Act also prohibits states or localities from using any 
     disaster reserve funds to offset state or locality matching 
     requirements. Furthermore, it forbids the President from 
     taking administrative action to waive these matching 
     requirements. Waiving these matching requirements via 
     legislation would require a two-thirds vote of both Houses. 
     These prohibitions seem to go beyond the stated intent of 
     this section.
       Furthermore, there seems to be different types of disasters 
     and emergencies (including natural disasters and national 
     security emergencies) referred to in various subsections of 
     this section. It is not clear whether the prohibitions on the 
     availability of these funds would be applicable to both. Some 
     subsections appear to allow its use while others do not.
       This final section is the only section of H.R. 2003 that 
     actually amends the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. Section 
     208 would add a new point of order under Title IV of the 
     Budget Act to prevent the consideration in the House and 
     Senate of any bill, joint resolution or amendment thereto or 
     conference report thereon that is designated as an emergency, 
     if it also contains a non-emergency appropriation or direct 
     spending provision.\14\ This is similar to the House rule 
     XXI(2)(e) adopted at the beginning of the 104th Congress. The 
     language is almost identical to that contained in the House 
     rule. The effect of amending the Budget Act would apply the 
     provisions of this rule to both the House and the Senate.


                               footnotes

     \1\ Section 250(c)(3) of the Deficit Control Act of 1985.
     \2\ Section 300 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974.
     \3\ Section 101 of H.R. 2003, as introduced by Rep. Barton on 
     June 20, 1997.
     \4\ Section 300 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974.
     \5\ Section 102(a)(3)(C)(iii) of H.R. 2003 as introduced by 
     Rep. Barton on June 20, 1997.
     \6\ Section 305(a)(1) of the Congressional Budget Act of 
     1974.
     \7\ Section 251(b) of the Deficit Control Act of 1985.
     \8\ Section 251 and Section 254 of the Deficit Control Act of 
     1985.
     \9\ Section 251(a)(6) of the Deficit Control Act of 1985.
     \10\ Section 255 of the Deficit Control Act of 1985.
     \11\ Section 255(h) of the Deficit Control Act of 1985. Note 
     the correct cite should be designated as subsection (j).
     \12\ This is summarized in the joint explanatory statement of 
     managers accompanying H. Con. Res. 84, the budget resolution 
     for fiscal year 1998.
     \13\ Section 601(a)(2) of the Congressional Budget Act of 
     1974.
     \14\ Emergency designations are made pursuant to section 
     251(b)(2)(D) or section 252(e) of the Balanced Budget and 
     Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 or of section 208 of 
     the Balanced Budget Enforcement Act of 1997. The bill 
     actually refers to the latter Act as section 207 of the 
     Balanced Budget Assurance Act of 1997. The correct cite is 
     section 208 of the Balanced Budget Enforcement Act of 1997.

                                      Committee on Ways and Means,


                                U.S. House of Representatives,

                                    Washington, DC, July 18, 1997.
     Hon. Newt Gingrich,
     The Speaker, The Capitol,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Speaker: I am writing regarding consideration of 
     H.R. 2003, the ``Budget Enforcement Act of 1997,'' which was 
     introduced on June 20, 1997, by Representative Joe Barton, 
     et. al. The bill, as introduced, was referred to the 
     Committee on Budget, and in addition, to the Committees on 
     Ways and Means and Rules.
       Among other things, the bill would separate direct spending 
     caps of the Earned Income Tax Credit, Family Support, 
     Medicare, Social Security, SSI, and Unemployment Compensation 
     programs which are within the jurisdiction of the Committee 
     on Ways and Means. The caps would be enforced through 
     targeted sequestrations of these programs. This could include 
     automatic delays in cost of living adjustments and premium 
     increases. In addition, the bill would provide, if certain 
     revenue targets are not met, for the suspension of the phase-
     in of any tax reductions provided in the 1997 Taxpayer Relief 
     Act, and suspension of inflation-based adjustments to any 
     credit, deduction, or exclusion enacted as part of the tax 
     bill.
       During the recent floor debate on the reconciliation 
     legislation, Representative Barton stated his understanding 
     that the Leadership and the committees of jurisdiction would 
     work in an expeditious fashion to allow H.R. 2003 to receive 
     floor consideration prior to July 24. I now understand that 
     the bill may be scheduled for floor action as early as the 
     week of July 21.
       Therefore, in order to expedite consideration of this 
     legislation by the full House, the Committee on Ways and 
     Means will not be marking up H.R. 2003. However, this is only 
     with the understanding that it does not in any way prejudice 
     the Committee's jurisdictional prerogatives in the future 
     with respect to this measure or any similar legislation, and 
     it should not be considered as precedent for consideration of 
     matters of jurisdictional interest to the Committee on Ways 
     and Means in the future.
       Thank you for consideration of this matter. With best 
     personal regards.
           Sincerely,
     Bill Archer, Chairman.
                                                                    ____

                                               Committee on Rules,


                                U.S. House of Representatives,

                                    Washington, DC, July 21, 1997.
     Hon. Newt Gingrich,
     Speaker of the House,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Speaker: I respectfully ask that the Committee on 
     Rules be discharged from the further consideration of H.R. 
     2003, the Budget Enforcement Act of 1997.
       H.R. 2003 was introduced on June 20, 1997 by 
     Representatives Barton and Minge, and others, and was 
     referred to the Committees on the Budget, Rules, and Ways and 
     Means. During the consideration of a rule for H.R. 2015, the 
     Balanced Budget Act and H.R. 2014, the Taxpayer Relief Act, 
     Representatives Barton and Minge filed an amendment with the 
     Committee on Rules relating to budget enforcement procedures 
     and consisting of the text of H.R. 2003.
       In the furtherance of an agreement reached between 
     Representative Barton and the Republican Leadership on June 
     25, 1997, the Committee on Rules has agreed to waive its 
     original jurisdiction over H.R. 2003 and allow it to be 
     considered by the House of Representatives without committee 
     action. However, I believe the legislation is seriously 
     flawed and I intend to oppose it.
       To facilitate the orderly consideration of H.R. 2003 and to 
     uphold the terms of the agreement, it is my intention to 
     report a closed rule for this measure this week.
           Sincerely,
     Gerald B. Solomon, Chairman.
                                                                    ____

                                    U.S. House of Representatives,


                                       Committee on the Budget

                                    Washington, DC, July 22, 1997.
     Hon. Newt Gingrich,
     Speaker of the House,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Speaker: I respectfully request that the Committee 
     on the Budget be discharged from the further consideration of 
     H.R. 2003, the Budget Enforcement Act of 1997.
       Consistent with an agreement reached between Representative 
     Barton and the Republican Leadership on June 25, 1997, the 
     Committee on the Budget has agreed to waive its original 
     jurisdiction over H.R. 2003 and allow it to be considered by 
     the House without committee action. Nevertheless, this 
     legislation is seriously flawed and I will oppose this bill. 
     Among various other problems, this bill would jeopardize the 
     tax relief we have worked so hard to secure for America's 
     families.
       H.R. 2003 was introduced on June 20, 1997 by 
     Representatives Barton, Minge, and others, and was referred 
     to the Committees on the Budget, Rules, and Ways and Means. 
     During the consideration of the rule for H.R. 2015, the 
     Balanced Budget Act, and H.R. 2014, the Taxpayer Relief Act, 
     Representatives Barton and Minge filed an amendment with

[[Page H5589]]

     the Committee on Rules relating to budget enforcement 
     procedures and consisting of the text of H.R. 2003. It was at 
     this point that the sponsors agreed to drop their proposed 
     amendment to H.R. 2014, and the Committee on the Budget 
     agreed, in return, to waive its jurisdiction.
           Sincerely,
                                         John R. Kasich, Chairman.

  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, when the Committee on Rules met in June to consider a 
rule for the reconciliation bill, our colleagues, the gentleman from 
Texas [Mr. Barton] and the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. Minge], 
appealed to the committee to make in order as an amendment to the 
reconciliation package the text of their bill, H.R. 2003. At that time 
the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon] opposed including H.R. 2003 
as an amendment in the rule, but he did assure supporters of H.R. 2003 
that the rule would have an opportunity to consider budget process 
reform legislation during the 105th Congress.
  The next day, during the debate on the rule on reconciliation, the 
gentleman from Texas [Mr. Barton], announced that he had reached an 
understanding with the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon] that H.R. 
2003 or an amended version of the bill would be brought to the floor 
for an up or down vote no later than July 24. It is because of that 
agreement, Mr. Speaker, that we are here today considering the rule.
  I should point out that the gentleman from New York, in acknowledging 
that agreement, said that the consideration of H.R. 2003 in no way 
prejudices the ability of those committees with jurisdiction over the 
budget process to consider other budget reform proposals at a later 
date.
  As the ranking minority member of the Subcommittee on Legislative and 
Budget Process of the Committee on Rules, I would like to appeal to the 
Republican majority to take advantage of the committee process if the 
House is to consider significant changes in the congressional budget 
process. I would hope that in the future that significant proposals 
such as H.R. 2003 would be considered under regular order.
  That being said, Mr. Speaker, the sponsors of H.R. 2003 were 
guaranteed a vote on their proposal, and I am happy to see that the 
commitment is being fulfilled. I do have a reservation about the rule 
reported from the Committee on Rules, since it is a closed rule 
providing only for an up or down vote on H.R. 2003 as introduced and 
not in the improved form that its supporters proposed to bring to the 
floor.
  The gentleman from Texas and the other Members of the group pushing 
this legislation have had an opportunity to review and make changes to 
their bill since June, and I think, at the very least, if the House is 
to consider significant changes to the way our budget process works, 
the House might at least have the opportunity to consider the best work 
product possible.
  It seems that the Committee on Rules is now embarking on making in 
order bills and amendments which are not what the authors of their 
proposals bring to the committee, and I would caution my Republican 
colleagues that to continue to operate in this manner might prove 
disruptive to the regular order of the House.
  Finally, Mr. Speaker, the rule divides the general debate time 
between the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Barton] and an opponent of H.R. 
2003. I want to make clear the understanding that the Democratic 
members of the Committee on Rules have about the division of the time, 
and if this is not what is intended, I would greatly appreciate my 
colleague, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss], clarifying that 
understanding.
  I am given to understand that the gentleman from Texas intends to 
yield one-half of his time to the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. Minge].
  Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. FROST. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.
  Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I have given the gentleman from 
Minnesota, David Minge, and the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. 
Moakley, my word that half of the time that I will control, that I will 
ask unanimous consent to yield it to the gentleman from Minnesota so 
that he may control that time as he sees fit.
  Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, I appreciate the 
assurance of the gentleman.
  It is also my understanding that the manager of the opposition to the 
bill will be the gentleman from Ohio, the chairman of the Committee on 
the Budget [Mr. Kasich], who will yield half of his allotted time to 
the ranking minority member, the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. 
Spratt].
  I think such a division of time is equitable to all sides and I would 
ask my colleague, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss], if that 
division of the debate time regarding the time in opposition is indeed 
what will happen once we get to general debate?
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. FROST. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, my understanding permits me to answer in the 
affirmative, and that these arrangements have been made and the 
gentleman from Iowa [Mr. Nussle], has also assured me that the 
potential person who will rise in opposition, that he is prepared to 
yield 7\1/2\ minutes to that side also.
  Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, once again reclaiming my time, I thank the 
gentleman for that assurance and for his clarification.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from Glens Falls, NY [Mr. Solomon], the distinguished 
chairman of the Committee on Rules.
  Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time.
  Let me say to my good friend from Texas that if it were not for a 
special agreement that was made with the sponsors of this legislation, 
we would, without question, be following regular order. And let me say 
that when this is over, we will go back to regular order and our 
committees will reclaim our jurisdiction with the help of the gentleman 
from Texas.
  Mr. Speaker, I want to speak to three aspects of the debate: the 
rule, the budget process reform efforts in the House, and the bill 
itself.
  First, the rule before the House today represents the fulfillment of 
a commitment of the House Republican leadership. Earlier this year, on 
June 25, during the consideration of this rule on the two 
reconciliation bills for fiscal year 1998, a public commitment was made 
by the Republican leadership to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Barton], 
the gentleman from Delaware [Mr. Castle], the gentleman from Tennessee 
[Mr. Wamp], the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. Minge], and others to 
consider H.R. 2003 on the House floor before July 24. Today is July 23 
and we are doing just that.
  Furthermore, as part of the agreement, the three committees of 
jurisdiction over this bill, namely the Committee on the Budget, the 
Committee on Rules, and the Committee on Ways and Means, agreed to be 
discharged from further consideration of the bill as introduced on June 
20 by Mr. Barton and others.
  Now, in response to those Members who have claimed that the rule did 
not allow the sponsors of the bill to make further substantive changes 
to the bill, I would make five observations:
  First, the agreement between the Republican leadership, the chairmen 
of the committees of jurisdiction, and the gentlemen from Texas and 
Delaware involved the bill as pending before the Committee on Rules as 
an amendment to the budget reconciliation bill.
  Second, the text of that amendment was identical to that introduced 
on June 20 by the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Barton].
  Three, each of the three committees of jurisdiction; namely, the 
Committee on the Budget, the Committee on Ways and Means, and the 
Committee on Rules, all agreed as part of those discussions to be 
discharged from further consideration of the bill, with the expectation 
that that version of the bill would be the version considered on this 
House floor.
  Fourth, at the point at which the agreement was made, the only text 
before the Members was that of H.R. 2003, as introduced; and any 
additional

[[Page H5590]]

changes, whether technical or substantive, are outside the scope of 
this agreement. Think about that.
  Finally, no other Member of the House, whether Republican or 
Democrat, and no committees of jurisdiction are able to offer 
amendments or make changes to this bill.
  The Committee on Rules' action was fair to all Members of the House 
and it was consistent with the original agreement, which went outside 
regular order, which I objected to in the very beginning.
  The second important aspect of this debate involves the overall 
budget process. During the 104th Congress, the Committee on Rules held 
three original jurisdictional hearings under the leadership of our 
colleague, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] over here on budget 
process reform. During these hearings we heard testimony from dozens of 
witnesses on the need for further budget process reform, which we all 
agree is needed badly.
  Also, during the 104th Congress the Committee on the Budget held a 
hearing on budget process reform. Both committees have been proactive 
in the drive to determine just how we can best reform the budget 
process.
  It also must be recognized that there are over a dozen different 
budget process reform bills that have been introduced during this 
Congress that are now pending before both the Committee on Rules and 
the Committee on the Budget. Some have many sponsors, some only a few. 
Many of the ideas that have been proposed I agree with and many I do 
not agree with.
  H.R. 2003, the bill before us today, is not the only option pending 
before this House. The gentleman from California [Mr. Cox] has 
introduced a comprehensive bill and has been working on this for 11 
years now. The gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Visclosky] also has a 
complex package.
  The point is that we have a committee system through which to 
comprehensively consider this issue and all the bills seeking to reform 
it, and we do not need piecemeal legislation on this floor superseding 
the regular committee process. In addition, we already have the two 
chairmen of the committees of jurisdiction publicly committed to 
working with Members on both sides of the aisle and with other 
interested committees, including the Republican Policy Committee, to 
devise a budget process reform bill that strengthens those parts of the 
Budget Act that work and reform those parts that do not work.
  The committees have, over the last 2 years, compiled research on 
which they have begun to work with all interested Members in building 
reform.
  Mr. Speaker, finally, while all three chairmen of the committees of 
jurisdiction applaud the efforts of our good friends who have worked on 
this bill, the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Kasich], myself, the gentleman 
from Texas [Mr. Archer], all stated our opposition to this bill, strong 
opposition.
  It is unfortunate that we have to take this position, but H.R. 2003 
is a seriously flawed bill. The substantive flaws of this bill can be 
summed up under three headings, and I think Members back in their 
offices had better listen because this affects them politically and it 
affects the operations and the workings of this House.
  No. 1, an increase in procedural complexity; No. 2, a diminishment of 
Congress' role in the budget process; and No. 3, an incentive toward 
increased taxes. And that will happen over my dead body.
  First, H.R. 2003 greatly increases the complexity of the budget 
process. Without any hearings at all, the bill adds 15 new sections of 
law to the budget process. The President and Congress would now be 
required to follow the rules and procedures of three different, yet 
comprehensive statutes, the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the 
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, and now the 
Budget Enforcement Act of 1997, all designed to dictate the budget 
process.
  Not one section of the current budget rules are repealed or reformed 
in this legislation before us, despite the fact that many of the bill's 
new provisions actually conflict with or further complicate the 
understanding of how the whole process works.
  Furthermore, the bill creates a series of new points of order 
designed to address serious concerns, but they may actually hinder the 
ability of this House to effectively govern this institution. The bill 
places unconstitutional prohibitions on the ability of the Committee on 
Rules to craft rules by actually prohibiting the Committee on Rules 
from ever waiving certain provisions of this act.

                              {time}  1100

  In addition, the timetable established in the expedited procedures 
created to provide for consideration of any needed legislation to 
remedy a breach of the direct spending caps are unworkable, confusing, 
and do not meet their stated objectives.
  The bill also diminishes the role of Congress in the budget process. 
And my colleagues ought to listen to this back in their offices: The 
executive branch's authority in the process is greatly enhanced at the 
expense of this Congress, by an expansion of the role and authority of 
Office of Management and Budget and the Congressional Budget Office. Is 
that what Members want; by a permanent reliance on common economic 
assumptions, whatever that might be, for the creation of budget 
baselines; by a delegation to OMB of the responsibility to determine 
the actual dollar amounts for each direct spending cap; by granting the 
President the authority to adjust the direct spending caps, but 
actually prohibiting we, the Congress, from considering his 
recommendations; and by establishing a requirement that only the 
President can determine what constitutes an emergency spending item?
  Finally, and my colleagues better listen to this, perhaps the most 
fatal flaw of this bill is its impact on the ability of this 
representative body to provide tax relief to the American people.
  Since Ronald Reagan delivered the historic tax relief package on the 
floor of this Congress in 1981, the American people have demanded 
further tax relief from Washington, because they are taxed too much. 
Sixteen years later, this Congress now stands on the threshold of 
delivering America's families and businesses a long-awaited second tax 
relief package. That is what we are doing here this week.
  However, this bill will jeopardize the ability of those families to 
actually receive this tax relief by allowing the implementation of 
these tax cuts to be permanently suspended if revenue projections do 
not hold true. Think about that. Under this bill, if revenues fall 
below estimated levels, then any tax cut that we might enact this week 
not fully phased in, such as the capital gains tax cut, the child tax 
credit and estate tax relief provisions, would be suspended 
indefinitely.
  In other words, planned tax cuts already enacted into current law 
could be withheld, listen to this, if the President and the Office of 
Management and Budget say that Washington is not receiving what it is 
projected to receive in tax revenues. There goes the tax cuts out the 
window. Not only would this mechanism suspend tax relief if the 
previous year's revenue levels fall short, but it also would revoke, 
listen to this, it would revoke these tax cuts if the next fiscal 
year's revenue levels are projected to fall short. In other words, 
without any action by this Congress, the tax cuts are null and void.
  Furthermore, under this bill there are no provisions for the 
scheduled tax cuts to be reinstated should a budget projection be 
inaccurate, or for Congress to substitute further spending reductions 
for the loss in revenues so that we can keep those taxes in place. In 
fact, the various procedural obstacles contained in this bill virtually 
assure that the only option available to remedy a revenue target 
violation will be a suspension of the tax relief. That is what we are 
going to be voting on here today.
  I would like to just close my remarks with a brief story that back in 
the Middle Ages, in medieval England, a debate raged between the 
Parliament and the King of England over who possessed the power to tax 
the people to raise the funds needed to defend the country. Both sides 
claimed an exclusive right to this power. Out of that 13th century 
struggle emerged the Cornwall rebellion in my ancestral home of 
Scotland, which settled the debate. The people were the final judges 
over taxation, and their opinions could not be ignored. This historical 
struggle is partly credited as genesis of the concept we now refer to 
as parliamentary government, which is what we have here today, which in 
turn the American

[[Page H5591]]

colonies transformed into our representative Government.
  The debate and bargain over taxes between the king and Parliament and 
now between the President and Congress lies at the very essence of our 
political system. No enforcement policy or budget process should take 
away the ability of the American people to express their opinions on 
the level of their taxes through their representative Government.
  Mr. Speaker, this bill's automatic revocation of enacted tax relief, 
if Washington spends more than they raise, chips away at the very heart 
of this representative process. Again, I am disappointed that I have to 
oppose this legislation.
  Finally, let me just say, if any of the sponsors of this bill, and 
that includes the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Barton], the gentleman from 
Delaware [Mr. Castle], and the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. Wamp] that 
are Republicans, or the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. Minge] or the 
gentleman from Texas [Mr. Stenholm] or the gentlewoman from California 
[Mrs. Tauscher] decide to vote against this rule, for whatever reason, 
then I would argue that we all ought to vote against this rule. But if 
they are going to come here and vote for the rule, then I am going to 
urge support for that rule to bring the agreement we made with these 
sponsors to bring this bill to the floor so that we can have an up-or-
down vote, and then I would urge the defeat of the bill.
  I appreciate the gentleman yielding me the time.
  Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Minnesota [Mr. Minge].
  Mr. MINGE. Mr. Speaker, this morning we are debating both the rule 
and, shortly, legislation that deals with the process that this 
institution feels would be the correct process for this Nation to 
follow in attempting to ensure that we actually keep our commitment to 
balance the budget.
  Many may say ``process'' and yawn. ``What is its significance?'' 
``Where does it take us?'' The fact of the matter is that if we attempt 
to actually follow through and balance the budget as we have promised, 
we must make sure that we have discipline to do that; and if we are to 
have the discipline to do that, we must have a process to impose that 
discipline. That is what this bill is about.
  The debate that we are having at this moment centers around what is 
the best way to ensure that this process will be workable. One of the 
tragedies of the rule that has been presented for the consideration of 
the legislation is that we have been denied the opportunity to improve 
the legislation, to improve that process.
  To be sure, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Barton], my cosponsor, and 
I are pleased that the legislation is up for consideration. But we 
would like to have it be the best legislation. We have worked to 
improve that legislation. We appeared before the Committee on Rules 
last night with a substitute bill. It is a common occurrence that the 
proponents of legislation, the chairs of committees, say at the point 
of consideration in the Committee on Rules that this proposal ought to 
be adjusted, it ought to be improved. And as a routine matter of 
courtesy, the Committee on Rules allows the chairman of the committee, 
the proponent of the legislation, to improve that bill.
  We were denied that opportunity. I submit we were denied that 
opportunity because the leadership in this institution wanted to see 
the weakest possible bill before the body for a vote, hoping that this 
bill could be defeated.
  What we need to do, I submit, is all of us stand tall and say to the 
leadership in this institution and of the Committee on Rules, we demand 
fair treatment for legislation when it comes to the floor. We will not 
accept second-class treatment of legislation.
  If we do not have the opportunity to vote on the best possible bill, 
then, unfortunately, we have to count on the conference committee or 
the Senate to improve the product. And altogether too often, that is 
what happens in this institution, as well.
  I urge my colleagues to join with me in supporting this legislation 
today to bring it to a successful conclusion.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, may I have a status report on the time, 
please?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaTourette). The gentleman from Florida 
[Mr. Goss] has 10 minutes remaining. The gentleman from Texas [Mr. 
Frost] has 22\1/2\ minutes remaining.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Texas 
[Mr. Barton], the distinguished sponsor of the bill.
  (Mr. BARTON of Texas asked and was given permission to revise and 
extend his remarks.)
  Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Florida 
[Mr. Goss], the distinguished subcommittee chairman of the Committee on 
Rules for yielding me the time.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the rule to bring H.R. 2003 to the 
House floor as one of the chief sponsors, along with the gentleman from 
Delaware [Mr. Castle] and the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. Wamp]. I 
think it is long overdue that we attempt to enforce the budget 
agreement that we are currently negotiating with the President and with 
the Senate of the United States of America.
  If we go back to 1975 or 1972, my colleagues will see that most of 
the spending in the Federal budget at that time was discretionary 
spending. We could control it so that the Congress could work its will. 
In the budget year that we are in now, we can see that that has been 
reversed. Fifty-two percent of the budget is entitlement spending. It 
is uncontrollable. And if we combine that with the red part of the pie 
chart, which is interest on the debt, two-thirds of the total Federal 
budget is off budget, it is uncontrollable. That is a problem. We need 
to do something about it.
  The budget agreement that is before us, in general, by the year 2002, 
which is the last year of the budget agreement, 58 percent of the 
budget agreement is going to be entitlements. Another 14 or 15 percent 
is going to be interest on the debt. That is, three-fourths of the 
total Federal budget is uncontrollable.
  My colleagues, if we do not do something to really enforce this 
agreement, we are not going to have a balanced budget in the year 2002. 
If we look at the components of entitlement spending, these are the top 
11. The Federal budget, in their annual rate of growth by program over 
the last several years, we can see that the Medicaid Program has been 
growing at 16 percent a year. That is unsustainable over time.
  The budget agreement that is currently in negotiations with the 
President reins in the overall rate of growth in entitlement spending 
to approximately 7 percent on an annual basis. But there are higher 
rates of growth for Medicare and Medicaid and lower rates of growth for 
some of the others.
  What we have done, in a bipartisan fashion, with the gentleman from 
Minnesota [Mr. Minge], the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Stenholm], the 
gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. Tanner], and others on the Democratic 
side is come up with a simple concept: If we are going to enforce the 
budget agreement, we have got to enforce everything. What makes up an 
agreement? Spending and revenues.
  So we take on the revenue side and say that $85 billion tax cut 
package over 5 years is on the table. On the spending side, we say all 
spending, including entitlement spending, is on the table. This chart 
right here shows entitlement spending, first year of the budget 
agreement, $900 billion; tax cuts about $5 billion. Over the life of 
the agreement, $85 billion in tax cuts, $5 trillion in entitlement 
spending. That is 50-to-1 spending versus revenue.
  How does our enforcement mechanism work? If any target is broached on 
the revenue side, the President and the Congress can vote to change the 
package so that the targets are met. The President and the Congress can 
vote to waive the cap, saying we are not going to force that part of 
the agreement this year. But if the Congress and the President 
consciously decide to do nothing, the deficit does not go up. The 
deficit does not go up. If the Congress and the President decide to do 
nothing, there is an automatic enforcement that reins in the tax cuts 
that have not yet been put into place until the revenues are met.
  The same thing happens on the spending side. Every program has a

[[Page H5592]]

cap. Every program that spends $20 billion or more has its own cap. If 
a program is within its budget, nothing happens. If the program goes 
over the budget, the President and the Congress can fix that program, 
they can decide to waive the cap on that program. But if they do 
nothing, a procedure called sequestration goes into effect that brings 
that program back under the cap.
  My colleagues, we need to pass this amendment. Vote for the rule. 
Vote for the bill.
  Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Texas 
[Mr. Stenholm].
  (Mr. STENHOLM asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Speaker, I come to the floor in opposition to a 
rule that is a tremendous disappointment to those of us who are serious 
about budget enforcement. This rule does not provide the type of debate 
that an issue of this importance deserves. We want the legislative 
process to work to produce the best possible bill. This rule does not 
let the legislative process work. We wanted the committee process to 
work.
  We were greatly disappointed when the committees of jurisdiction 
failed to consider this bill. It is disingenuous for committees to now 
criticize the process that has brought this bill to the floor and argue 
that the committee process has been thwarted because they chose not to 
consider the bill. We have listened to the criticisms that have been 
raised by the Committee on Ways and Means and the Committee on the 
Budget and Members on both sides of the bill, both sides of the aisle, 
as well as the administration, an outside organization.

                              {time}  1115

  The bill's sponsors have agreed to several technical changes and 
other improvements to the bill in response to those concerns that were 
raised. This rule does not allow us to make those improvements. We 
wanted this bill to be considered under an open rule so that Members 
who had additional concerns or criticisms could offer constructive 
improvements to the bill. We wanted Members who have different ideas on 
budget process reform to have an opportunity to raise those ideas. This 
rule prevents the House from working its will on this issue.
  Mr. Speaker, I was very disturbed by the threat from the chairman of 
the Committee on Rules a moment ago to people like me if we have the 
audacity to oppose this rule, he might just take this bill down and not 
in fact consider it. It should not be any surprise, ladies and 
gentlemen. That is what this House has been doing for the last week. 
Now we have got a threat of a gag rule on the agricultural 
appropriation bill later today. Why? Not because the ag appropriation 
bill is any problem, but because this same committee that has been 
gagging the House from allowing Members to have their ideas voted in a 
responsible way have refused to allow that to happen.
  The gentleman from Texas [Mr. Frost] stated a moment ago that if 
rules like this one continue, the House might find itself disrupted 
from its regular order of business. I suggest that we are going to have 
that to happen. It would be extremely unfair for Members to support a 
rule that prevents us from making improvements to the bill and then 
criticize this bill for technical improvements, bringing up Social 
Security as was heard a moment ago. The gentleman who made that knows 
there is no possible way Social Security is going to be affected by 
this bill. But he raises that in order to raise the temperature around 
here. And Congress being taken out of the process? They have not even 
read the bill. Listen to what the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Barton] 
said a moment ago. Look at the bill before criticizing it. All Members 
who care about the integrity of the legislative process and believe 
that we should strive to pass the best possible legislation should vote 
against this rule.
  Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Illinois [Mr. Evans].
  Mr. EVANS. I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to this rule. Last night I 
testified before the Committee on Rules on behalf of an amendment I 
would like to offer to H.R. 2003, the Budget Enforcement Act of 1997. 
The Committee on Rules did not choose to make in order my amendment, 
and our Nation's veterans and their families may suffer as a result. If 
entitlement program costs are underestimated or if revenue collections 
fail to meet projected targets, enactment of the Budget Enforcement Act 
could be no less than catastrophic for many of our Nation's veterans 
and their dependents. That is why I am asking Members to vote against 
the proposed rule. By voting no on the rule, Members have the chance to 
say yes to our Nation's veterans and their families. My amendment 
exempts veterans benefits and programs from potentially devastating 
effects of this legislation if cost savings and revenue projections are 
miscalculated. If enacted without amendment, the Budget Enforcement Act 
would continue the Congress on a troubling path of neglect toward our 
Nation's veterans. Adoption of my amendment would be one important way 
to show that we in Congress are not willing to abandon the obligations 
we have to the men and women who have faithfully served our country. I 
urge my colleagues to vote no on the rule and vote yes for our Nation's 
veterans.
  Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Filner].
  Mr. FILNER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to the rule, 
also. Like the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Stenholm], I believe that this 
rule prevents real debate on the real issues. The gentleman from 
Illinois [Mr. Evans] who just spoke offered an amendment last night 
that would protect the benefits earned by America's veterans from 
permanent reduction. Remarkably, this amendment was defeated on a party 
line vote by the Committee on Rules last night. As written, H.R. 2003 
would decimate the benefit programs our grateful Nation has provided 
for America's heroes, our veterans. It does not protect them. It does 
not protect service-disabled veterans. It does not protect those who 
suffered in the Persian Gulf War and who are now sick as a result of 
that service. I urge my colleagues to defeat the rule so that we can 
all have the opportunity to vote on the important amendment of the 
gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Evans] and tell our veterans that we 
support them.
  Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
Texas [Ms. Jackson-Lee].
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. I thank the gentleman very much for 
yielding me this time.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today to ask for opposition to this rule. I rise 
in particular as someone who supported the initial budget agreement in 
a bipartisan manner to emphasize that we can work on the effort of 
deficit reduction and treating people fairly together. But I would call 
this rule the hatchet job on the most vulnerable rule. The hatchet job 
on the most vulnerable. For without any notice whatsoever, this rule 
would kick in an absolute cut, an automatic cut on those needing Social 
Security, Medicare, Medicaid, veterans benefits.
  I applaud the work of the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Stenholm] and 
others who worked to ensure that we might have a protected budget 
agreement. But this is not the agreement. This is not even the 
discussion. This is simply a rule that says those who cannot speak for 
themselves, those who are outside the circle of power, we will make 
sure that if there is any problem with this budget down the road, we 
will make sure that we take from those most vulnerable. It ensures that 
we will take from those who need food stamps, from those who are on 
SSI. Particularly Medicaid when we are trying now to establish health 
care for our children, we would cut Medicaid that treats the most 
vulnerable in this community, those who are most poor and our children.
  Mr. Speaker, this is not a fair enforcement rule. This is an 
enforcement act that takes the enforcement part of it to the very 
extreme. I would ask my colleagues to recognize, let us not do a 
hatchet job on those in particular who have given to this Nation, our 
senior citizens who have worked hard all of their lives and our 
veterans who have given very much their service to this Nation to 
protect our freedoms. I

[[Page H5593]]

would argue that it is important now to stand up for those who count, 
those who have already taken a measure of hit from this budget who have 
come to the table and wanted a fair budget. This is a bad rule. I ask 
everyone to vote against it.
  Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas 
[Mr. Doggett].
  Mr. DOGGETT. Mr. Speaker, there are a number of rules that people say 
apply here in Washington that we do not think a lot of down in Texas. 
The first of these is that in Washington apparently a promise is never 
a guarantee. We have the promise of a balanced budget, but those who 
have taken the grandstand the greatest portion of the time to talk 
about how wonderful this balanced budget agreement is, they are 
unwilling to give us the guarantee of a balanced budget, and that is 
why this piece of legislation is necessary.
  A second rule said to apply here in Washington is that the fact that 
it did not work the first time does not mean we will not try it again. 
This is not the first time we have had the promise of a balanced 
budget. It has happened over and over again. We keep trying the same 
old thing without having a real guarantee, an enforcement mechanism to 
be sure we in fact get a balanced budget. There is one gimmick after 
another in this proposed agreement, as proposed by both sides. If we 
are to achieve a true balanced budget, it will take an enforcement 
mechanism like this.
  I would suggest that there is a third rule that applies here in 
Washington, that we are seeing worked out here on the floor today. It 
is that treachery knows no limits. We saw during this balanced budget 
agreement a Member stand here on the floor, one Republican promising to 
another that if we would all just vote for this balanced budget 
agreement that they would in a matter of weeks have an enforcement 
mechanism here on the floor. They have honored their agreement in word, 
but certainly not in spirit, because they have come before us today and 
they have presented a proposal in a way that they are sure it will be 
defeated. If they had any confidence in the notion that we will really 
get a balanced budget by 2002, indeed we could really have it next 
year. If we would effectively enforce this agreement, they would be 
here cheering us on and working to develop this agreement.
  Mr. Speaker, I am not for this bill in the form that it is here this 
morning. I am not sure I am for it as it is proposed to be changed. But 
I know we have to have an enforcement mechanism, and this is the only 
way to get it.
  Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
California [Mrs. Tauscher].
  (Mrs. TAUSCHER asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
her remarks.)
  Mrs. TAUSCHER. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to support this rule because 
I frankly have no other choice. As a strong advocate of a balanced 
budget and a supporter of the balanced budget agreement agreed to by 
Congress and the President, I am very pleased that we are on the path 
toward eliminating the deficit. But without strong enforcement language 
in the reconciliation bills, there is no guarantee that the goal will 
be met.
  When the House considered the budget reconciliation spending and 
revenue bills, a bipartisan group of Members, including myself, 
attempted to offer enforcement language as an amendment. The House 
leadership back in June refused to make our amendment in order and 
instead promised that our amendment would be brought to the floor as a 
freestanding bill. What were we thinking about a month ago when we 
allowed that promise to be given with no guarantee that we would ever 
see this bill on the floor?
  In the intervening 3 weeks, we have responded to some of the 
criticisms of the bill and made changes to improve it. The Committee on 
Rules, however, last night decided not to allow us to bring forward 
that amended bill and has reported a rule that forbids any amendments. 
This is in direct violation of an agreement by the gentleman from New 
York [Mr. Solomon] chairman of the Committee on Rules, reported in the 
Congressional Record of June 25 to make in order an amended version of 
our bill by no later than July 24.
  Mr. Speaker, this is one more example of the duplicitous manner in 
which the House leadership treats its Members. I am forced to vote for 
this rule, and I encourage my colleagues to do the same, because it is 
the only way we can consider budget enforcement legislation. But this 
is not the way the House business should be done.
  Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Tennessee [Mr. Tanner].
  Mr. TANNER. Mr. Speaker, I, too, would like to echo what the 
gentlewoman from California [Mrs. Tauscher] said about this. This is 
unfortunate. It is sad. We are here and elected by our constituencies 
to come and try to do the best job we can regardless of party 
affiliation.
  Three weeks ago we were told that if certain things happened in 
relation to a rule vote at that time, we would be allowed the 
opportunity to offer a budget enforcement mechanism before July 24. It 
was pointed out, and there may be some disagreement, but regardless of 
that, this is the vehicle that translates the idea of financial 
integrity in this country and in the Nation's books being balanced from 
an idea to reality for all of these young children that are here today 
and around the country. And for the Committee on Rules to not allow 
that to happen last night is just simply sad. I have been here 9 years 
and I will be the first to vote and did vote against my leadership when 
they abused the Committee on Rules and did not allow things to come 
forward for the will of the House to work itself. I would ask the 
Republican rank and file to do the same today, because without regard 
of who said what and when, this is a better piece of legislation that 
we were denied the opportunity to vote on today.
  Mr. Speaker, I have been here 9 years. If there was ever a day that 
Members ought to put their country ahead of their political party, the 
time is now on this budget enforcement bill. I just hope that the rank 
and file Members of both sides of the aisle will do that today.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the distinguished 
gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Smith].
  Mr. SMITH of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I am very disappointed that we 
are not going to engage in real, hard debate having aggressive 
committee consideration of this kind of bill. I have introduced a 
budget reform bill for the last 4 years. I would like that debate on a 
budget reform bill include consideration of provisions I think are 
important. I have also introduced a different budget enforcement bill, 
H.R. 2037, that was made part of the budget reconciliation language. 
The bill before us needs more consideration and debate than simply the 
brief 1 hour debate on the floor. I am disappointed that the rule does 
not have the options for amendments and debate. I am disappointed that 
this bill is before us today without being considered by committee or 
at the very least, requiring a two-third majority like any other 
suspension bill that has not gone through the committee process.

                              {time}  1130

  Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from North 
Dakota [Mr. Pomeroy].
  Mr. POMEROY. Mr. Speaker, I take the well to protest the unfair rule 
before us. Legislation is a work in progress. We all know that. No one 
gets it perfect the first time. And so there is give and take as we 
listen to concerns and move to change the bill to address those 
concerns.
  Mr. Speaker, that is precisely what has been taking place with this 
enforcement act.
  Now I do not think the act is there yet. I think there are still some 
changes that need to be made, and I am going to oppose it. But for this 
rule to bar from consideration the improvements that have been 
negotiated over the last several days I just think is unconscionable.
  Why in the world would they give this House only the flawed first 
version to consider? It is, I think, really a diabolical, empty gesture 
to say, ``Okay, you've got your vote, now leave us alone,'' when indeed 
they owed them much more than that. They owed them a straight-up vote 
on the best budget enforcement package that the sponsors care to offer, 
and it is a pity the rule did not allow that.
  Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Wisconsin [Mr. Kind].

[[Page H5594]]

  Mr. KIND. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding this time 
to me.
  I rise today in strong opposition to the rule today, and as a new 
Member of Congress, we soon realize that a good piece of legislation is 
not drafted, is not submitted and drafted with just one crack at it. 
This has been an ongoing process. There have been concerns raised about 
the Budget Enforcement Act, considerations that have been taken and 
drafted into the recent piece of legislation. But we are not going to 
have an opportunity to present the best piece of policy, the best piece 
of legislation that we can offer to the American people, because of the 
way that the rule has been set up.
  Now I am not familiar with the politics of the Committee on Rules, 
but I am learning some lessons awfully fast here, and it is 
disappointing that our best piece of legislation to enforce a budget 
agreement is not going to be given a fair consideration or hearing or 
debate on the House floor today, and that is unfortunate.
  But I do not understand what is going on here. What is the message we 
are seeing? What is everyone so concerned about in regard to the Budget 
Enforcement Act? All this says is that if the targets are not reached, 
if they are not able to practice fiscal responsibility year after year 
after year, then it is time to go back and change some policies.
  That is all that we are asking here.
  Is it any wonder that over 80 percent of the American people in a 
recent poll have no confidence at all that this institution is capable 
of balancing the books?
  I mean sure, if my colleagues worship at the idol of tax cuts and tax 
relief or if they worship at the idol of more spending and unrestrained 
spending growths, then, yes, oppose the Balanced Budget Enforcement 
Act. But that does not make any sense.
  I have a son who is almost 1 year old, and I want to be able to go 
home every day after work, look him in the eyes and tell him that I am 
working in his best interests, that I am working in the best interests 
of all the children in this country and future generations, and that if 
we do pull up short, if the economy does slow down, we do not have the 
projected revenue growth or the corresponding spending reductions to 
meet our balanced budget guidelines, that we as an institution have a 
capability of addressing it again; but if we do not, that there is a 
hammer held over our heads, this Budget Enforcement Act, which will do 
the job that we should have the courage to do on our own.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from New 
York [Mr. Solomon], the distinguished chairman of the Committee on 
Rules.
  Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, the previous speaker wants to know what the 
problem is. Let me tell him what the problem is, my colleagues. We pass 
tax cuts here in this body today, and then next week, next month, next 
year this Congress fails to bite the bullet, they fail to vote for the 
cuts on the bills that come on this floor every day, and this happens 
time and time again, and the Tax Code cuts go out the window.
  That is the problem, my colleagues. The American people are 
overtaxed. We are going to cut their taxes. That is why we need to 
defeat this bill today. Think about that, my colleagues.
  Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Florida [Mr. Boyd].
  Mr. BOYD. Mr. Speaker, I want to tell my colleagues that this is not 
about whether the tax cuts will be enforced or not. All this means, 
this relates to the tax side. It just means that one will meet those 
projections, revenue projections, that are in place.
  Mr. Speaker, as my colleagues know, we learn a lot about a body after 
we are in it after a short period of time, and there are 71 other 
freshman Members along with myself in this body, and we learn something 
about how that body operates.
  Now we read every day about the problems the leadership is having in 
this body, and it is no wonder after what has happened here the last 
couple of days in reference to this Budget Enforcement Act.
  There has been a brilliant strategy move pull by the leadership of 
this House in getting people who support a budget enforcement and have 
been working on that for months and months and month, even years, 
together now are up here speaking for, some for the rule and some 
against the rule. It is a brilliant strategy move, and it is going to 
mean that this piece of legislation will go down.
  But I must tell my colleagues, just think about that when they read 
about the problems that exist in the leadership of this House, and 
there will be more as a result of this particular piece of legislation. 
The people who support this legislation have been tricked just like the 
people of the United States of America have been tricked in the 
previous balanced budget agreements in 1981, 1985, and 1990 when they 
were told there was going to be a balanced budget, and we did not have 
one.
  Do my colleagues know why? Because we did not have enforcement in 
place. So, my colleagues, we will get enforcement at some period of 
time, but I think we have a little ways to go, and the American people 
have to understand a little bit more about what is happening here in 
this U.S. House of Representatives.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I am delighted to hear that we have a 
brilliant strategy over here.
  I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Delaware [Mr. 
Castle], my friend, who has been a sponsor and has a strong commitment 
to this particular piece of legislation.
  Mr. CASTLE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding this time 
to me, and I do not have any brilliant strategy to come forward with, 
but I feel very strongly about this piece of legislation, and I, too, 
would have liked to have seen it amended, and I too am concerned that 
the rules process did not allow that to happen. I have heard the 
explanations.
  But having said that, I regretfully support the rule, regretfully 
because I think there could have been changes to improve this 
legislation, and that is what we should have done in the best interests 
of the American people. But we did not do that.
  However having said that, I think we also need to move forward with 
the legislation; and to not support it I think would be a great 
mistake.
  Why should we move forward with this legislation?
  I heard some of the reservations, and I have tremendous support for 
the Hall of Fame Members of this Congress who have united in opposition 
to this; but we, the foot soldiers, I think, need to be heard on this 
as well. And in my judgment, this piece of legislation is a vital cog 
to the balancing of the budget of the United States in the future. We 
are going to pass a 5-year balanced budget plan this year, but we are 
not going to have enforcement mechanisms.
  And everybody can cite back over 20 years when we have done something 
similar to that in Congress and we have not been able to balance the 
budget out in the different years that come up in the 5-year period, 
and I am afraid it is going to happen again this year.
  There is a great deal of flexibility in this plan. It is not afraid 
to address any parts of the budget, be they discretionary or 
entitlements or the tax cuts. But it basically says that somehow the 
revenue picture changes or spending number changes, we are going to go 
back and look at it.
  And that is all the Congress is requested to do; we have to look at 
it, and we should do that. That is an absolute responsibility.
  How can we vote for a balanced budget amendment, how can we vote for 
a balanced budget but not be willing to enforce it? And that is what 
Alan Greenspan essentially agrees, it is what Tim Penny and Bill 
Frenzel have written today in the Washington Post, it is what almost 
all budget economic experts across this country have stated, and this 
is not something that a few of us can come up with in a back room. This 
was something that was put together by experts who believe in this as 
well.
  Support this outstanding legislation.
  Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New 
Jersey [Mr. Andrews].
  Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Texas [Mr. 
Frost] for yielding this time to me.
  Mr. Speaker, there is some brilliant strategy at work here. This 
legislation which I strongly support has managed to perform the miracle 
of bringing all different kinds of people together. People who love to 
see the Government

[[Page H5595]]

spend more money oppose this legislation because it would stop the 
spending from going on. People who love to pay for tax cuts by 
borrowing money and increasing the deficit oppose this legislation 
because they hold the tax cuts sacrosanct. Those who worship the 
committee process do not like this legislation because it did not pass 
through their portals. I with some sorrow predict that we will not get 
many votes for this legislation when it comes to the floor because all 
the interests are offended by it.
  People who like this legislation are those that are in the huge 
majority of taxpaying Americans who really want to see us do what we 
purport to be doing here, which is to adopt a balanced budget plan and 
make it work year in and year out, whether the revenues fall or drop, 
whether the entitlements rise or fall.
  This is an idea which will in all likelihood not succeed today, but 
we will succeed in bringing it back to the floor and succeed in 
enacting it in the future.
  Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Texas 
[Mr. Turner].
  Mr. TURNER. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in opposition to the rule 
because I am greatly disturbed that the most important element of the 
balanced budget, the budget enforcement provisions, have been 
compromised by failure of the Committee on Rules to allow full 
amendments that were brought before the committee.
  As my colleagues know, we passed a budget resolution here in this 
Congress a few weeks ago. The problem is a budget resolution is a whole 
lot like a New Years resolution. It is easy to make but hard to keep. 
This Congress has been in a long courtship with the balanced budget. We 
finally got to the point where we adopted a budget resolution, we have 
made great steps toward achieving the goal of a balanced budget, and 
yet we are not able to assure the American people that the courtship 
that we have had and the marriage that will take place when we pass the 
reconciliation bill is to carry out this budget agreement. We cannot 
assure the American people that this marriage will last.
  I think that we have made a terrible mistake not dealing with the 
budget enforcement provisions in a serious manner in the Committee on 
Rules, and for that reason I will oppose the rule.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Iowa [Mr. Nussle].
  Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding this time 
to me.
  First of all, I do not question anybody. There has been some question 
about motivation for why people have done what they have done here 
today, and I do not question the motivation of any Member up here who 
has spoken in favor or against this particular piece of legislation. In 
fact, if my colleagues just look around the Chamber at the people who 
have spoken here today, these are the Hall of Famers. I would say to my 
friend from Delaware, these are the Hall of Famers in balancing the 
budget and making sure that we enforce it, and I would start with that.
  We have enforcement mechanisms within this budget, within the budget 
process currently. Are they perfect? No. We all agree that we want to 
improve the current budget process.
  Now the question that we are posed with here today is, is this the 
time and is this the bill? This is not the time because we are 
currently in the middle of the negotiations. We are currently in the 
middle of the process to get to a balanced budget. We do not change the 
rules in the middle of the game. As much as I would love to at 
different times during legislation, we do not make that kind of 
judgment right now during the heat of the battle. We have tried that in 
the past. Those mechanisms have never worked.
  This is also not the bill, and in fact it is interesting to hear all 
of these folks come forward and say, ``Boy, I love this bill. It isn't 
quite perfect, and I'd love to see this amendment or that amendment,'' 
or ``Hey, I know, I've got an idea. Hey, I know, let's put this 
amendment in. Let's put this mechanism in. Hey, I know.''
  We should not legislate by ``Hey, I know.''
  Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, we have no further speakers at this time, and 
I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I think we are going to have a multiple choice test for Members after 
the conclusion of this debate to see if anybody understands what 
actually has been discussed.

                              {time}  1145

  As the gentlewoman from Texas alleged, this is a rule that cuts 
something. This rule does not cut anything. Rules do not cut anything. 
Anybody who believes that has not quite read the rule.
  Mr. Speaker, we have had a lot of comment about somehow or other this 
was a perfect product back on June 25 when it was offered, but somehow 
or other it is not a perfect product now, and somehow or other the 
Committee on Rules has failed to do its job on that. We need more 
deliberations, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Stenholm] says. Others say 
no, we need to pass this right away.
  The point is we have a committee system here that works. We have had 
commitments to proceed with a budget reform process and budget 
enforcement. That is going to happen. We today are looking at an up-or-
down vote that was promised in a deal with the leadership on a 25 of 
June package to have that vote before July 24. Promises made, promises 
kept. That is what is going on here today.
  Some have said the Committee on Rules did not do its job, did not 
consider waivers or exceptions last night. That is a little 
disingenuous. We heard the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Evans] speak 
today about a request for exemptions for one class of people. If we 
opened this up to exemptions to the enforcement of budget, everybody 
will come forward with an exemption, and we will have a hollow process 
of enforcement. We all know that. That is why we promised an up-or-down 
vote.
  This is an up-or-down vote on the package of June 25, put together by 
the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Barton] and the gentleman from Minnesota 
[Mr. Minge]. That is what we promised. That is what is on the floor.
  Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question on resolution.
  The previous question was ordered.
  The resolution was agreed to.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
  Mr. CASTLE. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to the rule, I call up the bill 
(H.R. 2003) to reform the budget process and enforce the bipartisan 
balanced budget agreement of 1997, and ask for its immediate 
consideration.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaTourette). Is the gentleman from 
Delaware [Mr. Castle] the designee of the gentleman from Texas [Mr. 
Barton]?
  Mr. CASTLE. Yes, Mr. Speaker.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the title of the bill.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The text of H.R. 2003 is as follows:

                               H.R. 2003

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE AND TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Budet 
     Enforcement Act of 1997''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--

Sec. 1. Short title and table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.

 TITLE I--ENSURE THAT THE BIPARTISAN BALANCED BUDGET AGREEMENT OF 1997 
                           ACHIEVES ITS GOAL

Sec. 101. Timetable.
Sec. 102. Procedures to avoid sequestration or delay of new revenue 
              reductions.
Sec. 103. Effect on Presidents' budget submissions; point of order.
Sec. 104. Deficit and revenue targets.
Sec. 105. Direct spending caps.
Sec. 106. Economic assumptions.
Sec. 107. Revisions to the caps for entitlements and other spending and 
              to the revenue and deficit targets in this Act.

                    TITLE II--ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS

Sec. 201. Reporting excess spending.
Sec. 202. Enforcing direct spending caps.
Sec. 203. Sequestration rules.
Sec. 204. Revenue enforcement.
Sec. 205. Exempt programs and activities.
Sec. 206. Special rules.
Sec. 207. The current law baseline.
Sec. 208. Limitations on emergency spending.

     SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

       For purposes of this Act:

[[Page H5596]]

       (1) Eligible population.--The term ``eligible population'' 
     shall mean those individuals to whom the United States is 
     obligated to make a payment under the provisions of a law 
     creating entitlement authority. Such term shall not include 
     States, localities, corporations or other nonliving entities.
       (2) Sequester and sequestration.--The terms ``sequester'' 
     and ``sequestration'' refer to or mean the cancellation of 
     budgetary resources provided by discretionary appropriations 
     or direct spending law.
       (3) Breach.--The term ``breach'' means, for any fiscal 
     year, the amount (if any) by which outlays for that year 
     (within a category of direct spending) is above that 
     category's direct spending cap for that year.
       (4) Baseline.--The term ``baseline'' means the projection 
     (described in section 207) of current levels of new budget 
     authority, outlays, receipts, and the surplus or deficit into 
     the budget year and the outyears.
       (5) Budgetary resources.--The term ``budgetary resources'' 
     means new budget authority, unobligated balances, direct 
     spending authority, and obligation limitations.
       (6) Discretionary appropriations.--The term ``discretionary 
     appropriations'' means budgetary resources (except to fund 
     direct spending programs) provided in appropriation Acts. If 
     an appropriation Act alters the level of direct spending or 
     offsetting collections, that effect shall be treated as 
     direct spending. Classifications of new accounts or 
     activities and changes in classifications shall be made in 
     consultation with the Committees on Appropriations and the 
     Budget of the House of Representatives and the Senate and 
     with CBO and OMB.
       (7) Direct spending.--The term ``direct spending'' means--
       (A) budget authority provided by law other than 
     appropriation Acts, including entitlement authority;
       (B) entitlement authority; and
       (C) the food stamp program.

     If a law other than an appropriation Act alters the level of 
     discretionary appropriations or offsetting collections, that 
     effect shall be treated as direct spending.
       (8) Entitlement authority.--The term ``entitlement 
     authority'' means authority (whether temporary or permanent) 
     to make payments (including loans and grants), the budget 
     authority for which is not provided for in advance by 
     appropriation Acts, to any person or government if, under the 
     provisions of the law containing such authority, the United 
     States is obligated to make such payments to persons or 
     governments who meet the requirements established by such 
     law.
       (9) Current.--The term ``current'' means, with respect to 
     OMB estimates included with a budget submission under section 
     1105(a) of title 31 U.S.C., the estimates consistent with the 
     economic and technical assumptions underlying that budget.
       (10) Account.--The term ``account'' means an item for which 
     there is a designated budget account designation number in 
     the President's budget.
       (11) Budget year.--The term ``budget year'' means the 
     fiscal year of the Government that starts on the next October 
     1.
       (12) Current year.--The term ``current year'' means, with 
     respect to a budget year, the fiscal year that immediately 
     precedes that budget year.
       (13) Outyear.--The term ``outyear'' means, with respect to 
     a budget year, any of the fiscal years that follow the budget 
     year.
       (14) OMB.--The term ``OMB'' means the Director of the 
     Office of Management and Budget.
       (15) CBO.--The term ``CBO'' means the Director of the 
     Congressional Budget Office.
       (16) Budget outlays and outlays.--The terms ``budget 
     outlays'' and ``outlays'' mean, with respect to any fiscal 
     year, expenditures of funds under budget authority during 
     such year.
       (17) Budget authority and new budget authority.--The terms 
     ``budget authority'' and ``new budget authority'' have the 
     meanings given to them in section 3 of the Congressional 
     Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974.
       (18) Appropriation act.--The term ``appropriation Act'' 
     means an Act referred to in section 105 of title 1 of the 
     United States Code.
       (19) Consolidated deficit.--The term ``consolidated 
     deficit'' means, with respect to a fiscal year, the amount by 
     which total outlays exceed total receipts during that year.
       (20) Surplus.--The term ``surplus'' means, with respect to 
     a fiscal year, the amount by which total receipts exceed 
     total outlays during that year.
       (21) Direct spending caps.--The term ``direct spending 
     caps'' means the nominal dollar limits for entitlements and 
     other mandatory spending pursuant to section 105 (as modified 
     by any revisions provided for in this Act).
 TITLE I--ENSURE THAT THE BIPARTISAN BALANCED BUDGET AGREEMENT OF 1997 
                           ACHIEVES ITS GOAL

     SEC. 101. TIMETABLE.

Action to be completed:
CBO economic and budget update.........................................
President's budget update based on new assumptions.....................
CBO and OMB updates....................................................
Preview report.........................................................
Not later than November 1 (and as soon as practical after the end of 
OMB and CBO Analyses of Deficits, Revenues and Spending Levels and ....
  Projections for the Upcoming Year.
Congressional action to avoid sequestration............................
OMB issues final (look back) report for prior year and preview for ....
  current year.
Presidential sequester order or order delaying new/additional revenues 
  reductions scheduled to take effect pursuant to reconciliation 
  legislation enacted in calendar year 1997.

     SEC. 102. PROCEDURES TO AVOID SEQUESTRATION OR DELAY OF NEW 
                   REVENUE REDUCTIONS.

       (a) Special Message.--If the OMB Analysis of Actual 
     Spending Levels and Projections for the Upcoming Year 
     indicates that--
       (1) deficits in the most recently completed fiscal year 
     exceeded, or the deficits in the budget year are projected to 
     exceed, the deficit targets in section 104;
       (2) revenues in the most recently completed fiscal year 
     were less than, or revenues in the current year are projected 
     to be less than, the revenue targets in section 104; or
       (3) outlays in the most recently completed fiscal year 
     exceeded, or outlays in the current year are projected to 
     exceed, the caps in section 104;

     the President shall submit to Congress with the OMB Analysis 
     of Actual Spending Levels and Projections for the Upcoming 
     Year a special message that includes proposed legislative 
     changes to--
       (A) offset the net deficit or outlay excess;
       (B) offset any revenue shortfall; or
       (C) revise the deficit or revenue targets or the outlay 
     caps contained in this Act;

     through any combination of--
       (i) reductions in outlays;
       (ii) increases in revenues; or
       (iii) increases in the deficit targets or expenditure caps, 
     or reductions in the revenue targets, if the President 
     submits a written determination that, because of economic or 
     programmatic reasons, none of the variances from the balanced 
     budget plan should be offset.
       (b) Introduction of the President's Package.--Not later 
     than November 15, the message from the President required 
     pursuant to subsection (a) shall be introduced as a joint 
     resolution in the House of Representatives or the Senate by 
     the chairman of its Committee on the Budget. If the chairman 
     fails to do so, after November 15, the joint resolution may 
     be introduced by any Member of that House of Congress and 
     shall be referred to the Committee on the Budget of that 
     House.
       (c) House Budget Committee Action.--The Committee on the 
     Budget of the House of Representatives shall, by November 15, 
     report a joint resolution containing--
       (1) the recommendations in the President's message, or 
     different policies and proposed legislative changes than 
     those contained in the message of the President, to 
     ameliorate or eliminate any excess deficits or expenditures 
     or any revenue shortfalls, or
       (2) any changes to the deficit or revenue targets or 
     expenditure caps contained in this Act, except that any 
     changes to the deficit or revenue targets or expenditure caps 
     cannot be greater than the changes recommended in the message 
     submitted by the President.
       (d) Procedure if the Committees on the Budget of the House 
     of Representatives or Senate Fails To Report Required 
     Resolution.--
       (1) Automatic discharge of committees on the budget of the 
     house.--If the Committee on the Budget of the House of 
     Representatives fails, by November 20, to report a resolution 
     meeting the requirements of subsection (c), the committee 
     shall be automatically discharged from further consideration 
     of the joint resolution reflecting the President's 
     recommendations introduced pursuant to subsection (a), and 
     the joint resolution shall be placed on the appropriate 
     calendar.
       (2) Consideration of discharge resolution in the house.--If 
     the Committee has been discharged under paragraph (1) above, 
     any Member may move that the House of Representatives 
     consider the resolution. Such motion shall be highly 
     privileged and not debatable. It shall not be in order to 
     consider any amendment to the resolution except amendments 
     which are germane and which do not change the net deficit 
     impact of the resolution.
       (e) Consideration of Joint Resolution in the House.--
     Consideration of resolution reported pursuant to subsection 
     (c) or (d) shall be pursuant to the procedures set forth in 
     section 305 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 and 
     subsection (d).
       (f) Transmittal to Senate.--If a joint resolution passes 
     the House of Representatives pursuant to subsection (e), the 
     Clerk of the House of Representatives shall cause the 
     resolution to be engrossed, certified, and transmitted to the 
     Senate within 1 calendar day of the day on which the 
     resolution is passed. The resolution shall be referred to the 
     Senate Committee on the Budget.
       (g) Requirements for Special Joint Resolution in the 
     Senate.--The Committee on the Budget of the Senate shall 
     report not later than December 1--
       (1) a joint resolution reflecting the message of the 
     President; or
       (2) the joint resolution passed by the House of 
     Representatives, with or without amendment; or
       (3) a joint resolution containing different policies and 
     proposed legislative changes

[[Page H5597]]

     than those contained in either the message of the President 
     or the resolution passed by the House of Representatives, to 
     eliminate all or part of any excess deficits or expenditures 
     or any revenue shortfalls, or
       (4) any changes to the deficit or revenue targets, or to 
     the expenditure caps, contained in this Act, except that any 
     changes to the deficit or revenue targets or expenditure caps 
     cannot be greater than the changes recommended in the message 
     submitted by the President.
       (h) Procedure if the Senate Budget Committee Fails To 
     Report Required Resolution.--
       (1) Automatic discharge of senate budget committee.--In the 
     event that the Committee on the Budget of the Senate fails, 
     by December 1, to report a resolution meeting the 
     requirements of subsection (g), the committee shall be 
     automatically discharged from further consideration of the 
     joint resolution reflecting the President's recommendations 
     introduced pursuant to subsection (a) and of the resolution 
     passed by the House of Representatives, and both joint 
     resolutions shall be placed on the appropriate calendar.
       (2) Consideration of discharge resolution in the senate.--
     (A) If the Committee has been discharged under paragraph (1), 
     any member may move that the Senate consider the resolution. 
     Such motion shall be highly privileged and not debatable. It 
     shall not be in order to consider any amendment to the 
     resolution except amendments which are germane and which do 
     not change the net deficit impact of the resolution.
       (B) Consideration of resolutions reported pursuant to 
     subsections (c) or (d) shall be pursuant to the procedures 
     set forth in section 305 of the Congressional Budget Act of 
     1974 and subsection (d).
       (C) If the joint resolution reported by the Committees on 
     the Budget pursuant to subsection (c) or (g) or a joint 
     resolution discharged in the House of Representatives or the 
     Senate pursuant to subsection (d)(1) or (h)(1) would 
     eliminate less than--
       (i) the entire amount by which actual or projected deficits 
     exceed, or revenues fall short of, the targets in this Act; 
     or
       (ii) the entire amount by which actual or projected outlays 
     exceed the caps contained in this Act;

     then the Committee on the Budget of the Senate shall report a 
     joint resolution, raising the deficit targets or outlay caps, 
     or reducing the revenue targets for any year in which actual 
     or projected spending, revenues or deficits would not conform 
     to the deficit and revenue targets or expenditure caps in 
     this Act.
       (k)  Conference Reports Shall Fully Address Deficit 
     Excess.--It shall not be in order in the House of 
     Representatives or the Senate to consider a conference report 
     on a joint resolution to eliminate all or part of any excess 
     deficits or outlays or to eliminate all or part of any 
     revenue shortfall compared to the deficit and revenue targets 
     and the expenditure caps contained in this Act, unless--
       (1) the joint resolution offsets the entire amount of any 
     overage or shortfall; or
       (2) the House of Representatives and Senate both pass the 
     joint resolution reported pursuant to subsection (j)(2).

     The vote on any resolution reported pursuant to subsection 
     (j)(2) shall be solely on the subject of changing the deficit 
     or revenue targets or the expenditure limits in this Act.

     SEC. 103. EFFECT ON PRESIDENTS' BUDGET SUBMISSIONS; POINT OF 
                   ORDER.

       (a) Budget Submission.--Any budget submitted by the 
     President pursuant to section 1105(a) of title 31, United 
     States Code, for each of fiscal years 1998 through 2007 shall 
     be consistent with the spending, revenue, and deficit levels 
     established in sections 104 and 105 or it shall recommend 
     changes to those levels.
       (b) Point of Order.--It shall not be in order in the House 
     of Representatives or the Senate to consider any concurrent 
     resolution on the budget unless it is consistent with the 
     spending, revenue, and deficit levels established in sections 
     104 and 105.

     SEC. 104. DEFICIT AND REVENUE TARGETS.

       (a) Consolidated Deficit (or Surplus) Targets.--For 
     purposes of sections 102 and 107, the consolidated deficit 
     targets shall be--
       (1) for fiscal year 1998, $90,500,000,000;
       (2) for fiscal year 1999, $89,700,000,000;
       (3) for fiscal year 2000, $83,000,000,000;
       (4) for fiscal year 2001, $53,300,000,000; and
       (5) for fiscal year 2002, there shall be a surplus of not 
     less than $1,400,000,000.
       (b) Consolidated Revenue Targets.--For purposes of sections 
     102, 107, 201, and 204, the consolidated revenue targets 
     shall be--
       (1) for fiscal year 1998, $1,601,800,000,000;
       (2) for fiscal year 1999, $1,664,200,000,000;
       (3) for fiscal year 2000, $1,728,100,000,000;
       (4) for fiscal year 2001, $1,805,100,000,000; and
       (5) for fiscal year 2002, $1,890,400,000,000.

     SEC. 105. DIRECT SPENDING CAPS.

       (a) In General.--Effective upon submission of the report by 
     OMB pursuant to subsection (c), direct spending caps shall 
     apply to all entitlement authority except for undistributed 
     offsetting receipts and net interest outlays. For purposes of 
     enforcing direct spending caps under this Act, each separate 
     program shown in the table set forth in subsection (d) shall 
     be deemed to be a category.
       (b) Budget Committee Reports.--Within 30 days after 
     enactment of this Act, the Budget Committees of the House of 
     Representatives and the Senate shall file with their 
     respective Houses identical reports containing account 
     numbers and spending levels for each specific category.
       (c) Report by OMB.--Within 30 days after enactment of this 
     Act, OMB shall submit to the President and each House of 
     Congress a report containing account numbers and spending 
     limits for each specific category.
       (d) Contents of Reports.--All direct spending accounts not 
     included in these reports under separate categories shall be 
     included under the heading ``Other Entitlements and Mandatory 
     Spending''. These reports may include adjustments among the 
     caps set forth in this Act as required below, however the 
     aggregate amount available under the ``Total Entitlements and 
     Other Mandatory Spending'' cap shall be identical in each 
     such report and in this Act and shall be deemed to have been 
     adopted as part of this Act. Each such report shall include 
     the actual amounts of the caps for each year of fiscal years 
     1998 through 2002 consistent with the concurrent resolution 
     on the budget for FY 1998 for each of the following 
     categories:
       Earned Income Tax Credit,
       Family Support,
       Federal retirement:
       Civilian/other,
       Military,
       Medicaid,
       Medicare,
       Social security,
       Supplemental security income,
       Unemployment compensation,
       Veterans' benefits,
       Medicare,
       Other entitlements and mandatory spending, and
       Aggregate entitlements and other mandatory spending.
       (e) Additional Spending Limits.--Legislation enacted 
     subsequent to this Act may include additional caps to limit 
     spending for specific programs, activities, or accounts with 
     these categories. Those additional caps (if any) shall be 
     enforced in the same manner as the limits set forth in such 
     joint explanatory statement.

     SEC. 106. ECONOMIC ASSUMPTIONS.

       Subject to periodic reestimation based on changed economic 
     conditions or changes in eligible population, determinations 
     of the direct spending caps under section 105, any breaches 
     of such caps, and actions necessary to remedy such breaches 
     shall be based upon the economic assumptions set forth in the 
     joint explanatory statement of managers accompanying the 
     concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal year 1998 
     (House Concurrent Resolution 84, 105th Congress).

     SEC. 107. REVISIONS TO DEFICIT AND REVENUE TARGETS AND TO THE 
                   CAPS FOR ENTITLEMENTS AND OTHER MANDATORY 
                   SPENDING.

       (a) Automatic Adjustments to Deficit and Revenue Targets 
     and to Caps for Entitlements and Other Mandatory Spending.--
     When the President submits the budget under section 1105(a) 
     of title 31, United States Code, for any year, OMB shall 
     calculate (in the order set forth below), and the budget and 
     reports shall include, adjustments to the deficit and revenue 
     targets, and to the direct spending caps (and those limits as 
     cumulatively adjusted) for the current year, the budget year, 
     and each outyear, to reflect the following:
       (1) Changes to revenue targets.--
       (A) Changes in growth.--For Federal revenues and deficits 
     under laws and policies enacted or effective before July 1, 
     1997, growth adjustment factors shall equal the ratio between 
     the level of year-over-year growth measured for the fiscal 
     year most recently completed and the applicable estimated 
     level for that year as described in section 105.
       (B) Changes in inflation.--For Federal revenues and 
     deficits under laws and policies enacted or effective before 
     July 1, 1997, inflation adjustment factors shall equal the 
     ratio between the level of year-over-year growth measured for 
     the fiscal year most recently completed and the applicable 
     estimated level for that year as described in section 105.
       (2) Adjustments to direct spending caps.--
       (A) Changes in concepts and definitions.--The adjustments 
     produced by changes in concepts and definitions shall equal 
     the baseline levels of new budget authority and outlays using 
     up-to-date concepts and definitions minus those levels using 
     the concepts and definitions in effect before such changes. 
     Such changes in concepts and definitions may only be made in 
     consultation with the Committees on Appropriations, the 
     Budget, and Government Reform and Oversight and Governmental 
     Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Senate.
       (B) Changes in net outlays.--Changes in net outlays for all 
     programs and activities exempt from sequestration under 
     section 204.
       (C) Changes in inflation.--For direct spending under laws 
     and policies enacted or effective on or before July 1, 1997, 
     inflation adjustment factors shall equal the ratio between 
     the level of year-over-year inflation measured for the fiscal 
     year most recently completed and the applicable estimated 
     level for that years as described in section 105 (relating to 
     economic assumptions). For direct spending under laws and 
     policies enacted or effective after July 1, 1997, there shall 
     be no adjustment to the direct spending caps (for changes in 
     economic conditions including inflation, nor for changes in 
     numbers of eligible beneficiaries) unless--
       (i) the Act or the joint explanatory statement of managers 
     accompanying such Act

[[Page H5598]]

     providing new direct spending includes economic projections 
     and projections of numbers of beneficiaries; and
       (ii) such Act specifically provides for automatic 
     adjustments to the direct spending caps in section 105 based 
     on those projections.
       (D) Changes in eligible populations.--For direct spending 
     under laws and policies enacted or effective on or before 
     July 1, 1997, the basis for adjustments under this section 
     shall be the same as the projections underlying Table A-4, 
     CBO Baseline Projections of  Mandatory Spending, Including 
     Deposit Insurance (by fiscal year, in billions of 
     dollars), published in An Analysis of the President's 
     Budgetary Proposals for Fiscal Year 1998, March 1997, page 
     53. For direct spending under laws and policies enacted or 
     effective after July 1, 1997, there shall be no adjustment 
     to the direct spending caps for changes in numbers of 
     eligible beneficiaries unless--
       (i) the Act or the joint explanatory statement of managers 
     accompanying such Act providing new direct spending includes 
     economic projections and projections of numbers of 
     beneficiaries; and
       (ii) such Act specifically provides for automatic 
     adjustments to the direct spending caps in section 105 based 
     on those projections.
       (E) Intra-budgetary payments.--From discretionary accounts 
     to mandatory accounts. The baseline and the discretionary 
     spending caps shall be adjusted to reflect those changes.
       (c) Changes to Deficit Targets.--The deficit targets in 
     section 104 shall be adjusted to reflect changes to the 
     revenue targets or changes to the caps for entitlements and 
     other mandatory spending pursuant to subsection (a).
       (d) Permissible Revisions to Deficit and Revenue Targets 
     and Direct Spending Caps.--Deficit and revenue targets and 
     direct spending caps as enacted pursuant to sections 104 and 
     105 may be revised as follows: Except as required pursuant to 
     section 105(a), direct spending caps may only be amended by 
     recorded vote. It shall be a matter of highest privilege in 
     the House of Representatives and the Senate for a Member of 
     the House of Representatives or the Senate to insist on a 
     recorded vote solely on the question of amending such caps. 
     It shall not be in order for the Committee on Rules of the 
     House of Representatives to report a resolution waiving the 
     provisions of this subsection. This subsection may be waived 
     in the Senate only by an affirmative vote of three-fifths of 
     the Members duly chosen and sworn.
                    TITLE II--ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS

     SEC. 201. REPORTING EXCESS SPENDING.

       (a) Analysis of Actual Deficit, Revenue, and Spending 
     Levels.--As soon as practicable after any fiscal year, OMB 
     shall compile a statement of actual deficits, revenues, and 
     direct spending for that year. The statement shall identify 
     such spending by categories contained in section 105.
       (b) Estimate of Necessary Spending Reduction.--Based on the 
     statement provided under subsection (a), the OMB shall issue 
     a report to the President and the Congress on December 15 of 
     any year in which such statement identifies actual or 
     projected deficits, revenues, or spending in the current or 
     immediately preceding fiscal years in violation of the 
     revenue targets or direct spending caps in section 104 or 
     105, by more than one percent of the applicable total 
     revenues or direct spending for such year. The report shall 
     include:
       (1) All instances in which actual direct spending has 
     exceeded the applicable direct spending cap.
       (2) The difference between the amount of spending available 
     under the direct spending caps for the current year and 
     estimated actual spending for the categories associated with 
     such caps.
       (3) The amounts by which direct spending shall be reduced 
     in the current fiscal year so that total actual and estimated 
     direct spending for all cap categories for the current and 
     immediately preceding fiscal years shall not exceed the 
     amounts available under the direct spending caps for such 
     fiscal years.
       (4) The amount of excess spending attributable solely to 
     changes in inflation or eligible populations.

     SEC. 202. ENFORCING DIRECT SPENDING CAPS.

       (a) Purpose.--This title provides enforcement of the direct 
     spending caps on categories of spending established pursuant 
     to section 105. This section shall apply for any fiscal year 
     in which direct spending exceeds the applicable direct 
     spending cap.
       (b) General Rules.--
       (1) Eliminating a breach.--Each non-exempt account within a 
     category shall be reduced by a dollar amount calculated by 
     multiplying the baseline level of sequestrable budgetary 
     resources in that account at that time by the uniform 
     percentage necessary to eliminate a breach within that 
     category.
       (2) Programs, projects, or activities.--Except as otherwise 
     provided, the same percentage sequestration shall apply to 
     all programs, projects and activities within a budget 
     account.
       (3) Indefinite authority.--Except as otherwise provided, 
     sequestration in accounts for which obligations are 
     indefinite shall be taken in a manner to ensure that 
     obligations in the fiscal year of a sequestration and 
     succeeding fiscal years are reduced, from the level that 
     would actually have occurred, by the applicable sequestration 
     percentage or percentages.
       (4) Cancellation of budgetary resources.--Budgetary 
     resources sequestered from any account other than an trust, 
     special or revolving fund shall revert to the Treasury and be 
     permanently canceled.
       (5) Implementing regulations.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of law, administrative rules or similar actions 
     implementing any sequestration shall take effect within 30 
     days after that sequestration.

     SEC. 203. SEQUESTRATION RULES.

       (a) General Rules.--For programs subject to direct spending 
     caps:
       (1) Triggering of sequestration.--Sequestration is 
     triggered if total direct spending subject to the caps 
     exceeds or is projected to exceed the aggregate cap for 
     direct spending for the current or immediately preceding 
     fiscal year.
       (2) Calculation of reductions.--Sequestration shall reduce 
     spending under each separate direct spending cap in 
     proportion to the amounts each category of direct spending 
     exceeded the applicable cap.
       (3) Uniform percentages.--In calculating the uniform 
     percentage applicable to the sequestration of all spending 
     programs or activities within each category, or the uniform 
     percentage applicable to the sequestration of nonexempt 
     direct spending programs or activities, the sequestrable base 
     for direct spending programs and activities is the total 
     level of outlays for the fiscal year for those programs or 
     activities in the current law baseline.
       (4) Permanent sequestration of direct spending.--
     Obligations in sequestered direct spending accounts shall be 
     reduced in the fiscal year in which a sequestration occurs 
     and in all succeeding fiscal years. Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of this section, after the first direct spending 
     sequestration, any later sequestration shall reduce direct 
     spending by an amount in addition to, rather than in lieu of, 
     the reduction in direct spending in place under the existing 
     sequestration or sequestrations.
       (5) Special rule.--For any direct spending program in 
     which--
       (A) outlays pay for entitlement benefits;
       (B) a current-year sequestration takes effect after the 1st 
     day of the budget year;
       (C) that delay reduces the amount of entitlement authority 
     that is subject to sequestration in the budget; and
       (D) the uniform percentage otherwise applicable to the 
     budget-year sequestration of a program or activity is 
     increased due to the delay;

     then the uniform percentage shall revert to the uniform 
     percentage calculated under paragraph (3) when the budget 
     year is completed.
       (6) Indexed benefit payments.--If, under any entitlement 
     program--
       (A) benefit payments are made to persons or governments 
     more frequently than once a year; and
       (B) the amount of entitlement authority is periodically 
     adjusted under existing law to reflect changes in a price 
     index (commonly called ``cost of living adjustments'');

     sequestration shall first be applied to the cost of living 
     adjustment before reductions are made to the base benefit. 
     For the first fiscal year to which a sequestration applies, 
     the benefit payment reductions in such programs accomplished 
     by the order shall take effect starting with the payment made 
     at the beginning of January following a final sequester. For 
     the purposes of this subsection, veterans' compensation shall 
     be considered a program that meets the conditions of the 
     preceding sentence.
       (7) Loan programs.--For all loans made, extended, or 
     otherwise modified on or after any sequestration under loan 
     programs subject to direct spending caps--
       (A) the sequestrable base shall be total fees associated 
     with all loans made extended or otherwise modified on or 
     after the date of sequestration; and
       (B) the fees paid by borrowers shall be increased by a 
     uniform percentage sufficient to produce the dollar savings 
     in such loan programs for the fiscal year or years of the 
     sequestrations required by this section.

     Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in any year in 
     which a sequestration is in effect, all subsequent fees shall 
     be increased by the uniform percentage and all proceeds from 
     such fees shall be paid into the general fund of the 
     Treasury.
       (8) Insurance programs.--Any sequestration of a Federal 
     program that sells insurance contracts to the public 
     (including the Federal Crop Insurance Fund, the National 
     Insurance Development Fund, the National Flood Insurance 
     fund, insurance activities of the Overseas Private 
     Insurance Corporation, and Veterans' Life insurance 
     programs) shall be accomplished by increasing premiums on 
     contracts entered into extended or otherwise modified, 
     after the date a sequestration order takes effect by the 
     uniform sequestration percentage. Notwithstanding any 
     other provision of law, for any year in which a 
     sequestration affecting such programs is in effect, 
     subsequent premiums shall be increased by the uniform 
     percentage and all proceeds from the premium increase 
     shall be paid from the insurance fund or account to the 
     general fund of the Treasury.
       (9) State grant formulas.--For all State grant programs 
     subject to direct spending caps--
       (A) the total amount of funds available for all States 
     shall be reduced by the amount required to be sequestered; 
     and

[[Page H5599]]

       (B) if States are projected to receive increased funding in 
     the budget year compared to the immediately preceding fiscal 
     year, sequestration shall first be applied to the estimated 
     increases before reductions are made compared to actual 
     payments to States in the previous year--
       (i) the reductions shall be applied first to the total 
     estimated increases for all States; then
       (ii) the uniform reduction shall be made from each State's 
     grant; and
       (iii) the uniform reduction shall apply to the base funding 
     levels available to states in the immediately preceding 
     fiscal year only to the extent necessary to eliminate any 
     remaining excess over the applicable direct spending cap.
       (10) Special rule for certain programs.--Except matters 
     exempted under section 204 and programs subject to special 
     rules set forth under section 205 and notwithstanding any 
     other provisions of law, any sequestration required under 
     this Act shall reduce benefit levels by an amount sufficient 
     to eliminate all excess spending identified in the report 
     issued pursuant to section 201, while maintaining the same 
     uniform percentage reduction in the monetary value of 
     benefits subject to reduction under this subsection.
       (b) Within-Session Sequester.--If a bill or resolution 
     providing direct spending for the current year is enacted 
     before July 1 of that fiscal year and causes a breach within 
     any direct spending cap for that fiscal year, 15 days later 
     there shall be a sequestration to eliminate that breach 
     within that cap.

     SEC. 204. ENFORCING REVENUE TARGETS.

       (a) Purpose.--This section enforces the revenue targets 
     established pursuant to section 104. This section shall apply 
     for any year in which actual revenues were less than the 
     applicable revenue target in the preceding fiscal year or are 
     projected to be less than the applicable revenue target in 
     the current year.
       (b) Estimate of Necessity To Suspend New Revenue 
     Reductions.--Based on the statement provided under section 
     201(a), OMB shall issue a report to the President and the 
     Congress on December 15 of any year in which such statement 
     identifies actual or projected revenues in the current or 
     immediately preceding fiscal years lower than the applicable 
     revenue target in section 104, as adjusted pursuant to 
     section 106, by more than 1 percent of the applicable total 
     revenue target for such year. The report shall include--
       (1) all existing laws and policies enacted as part of any 
     reconciliation legislation in calendar 1997 which would cause 
     revenues to decline in the calendar year which begins January 
     1, compared to laws and policies in effect on December 15;
       (2) the amounts by which revenues would be reduced by 
     implementation of the provisions of law described in 
     paragraph (1) compared to provisions of law in effect on 
     December 15; and
       (3) whether delaying implementation of the provisions of 
     law described in paragraph (1) would cause the total for 
     revenues in the projected revenues in the current fiscal year 
     and actual revenues in the immediately preceding fiscal year 
     to equal or exceed the total of the targets for the 
     applicable years.
       (c) General Rules.--
       (1) Delayed phase-in of new tax cuts.--No provision of the 
     Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1997--
       (A) establishing or increasing any credit, deduction, 
     exclusion or eligibility limit; or
       (B) reducing any rate

     shall first take effect in the calendar year following a year 
     in which actual revenues were less than the applicable 
     revenue target or revenues in the current year are projected 
     to be less than the applicable target.
       (2) Suspension of indexation.--No new adjustment for 
     inflation shall be made to any credit, deduction, or 
     exclusion enacted as part of the Revenue Reconciliation Act 
     of 1997 if revenues in the preceding year were below the 
     applicable revenue target or revenues in the current year are 
     projected to be less than the applicable target.
       (d) Special Rules.--(1) All provisions of law included in 
     the report pursuant to subsection (b)(1) shall be suspended 
     until such time as the total of projected revenues in the 
     current fiscal year and actual revenues in the immediately 
     preceding fiscal year is equal to or greater than the 
     relevant revenue targets in section 104; and
       (2) If subsection (c) would cause the total of projected 
     revenues in the current year and actual revenues in the 
     preceding fiscal year to exceed the relevant revenue targets 
     in section 104, new policies to reduce revenues shall be 
     modified sufficiently to raise revenues to the level of the 
     targets for the relevant years.

     SEC. 205. EXEMPT PROGRAMS AND ACTIVITIES.

       The following budget accounts, activities within accounts, 
     or income shall be exempt from sequestration--
       (1) net interest;
       (2) all payments to trust funds from excise taxes or other 
     receipts or collections properly creditable to those trust 
     funds;
       (3) offsetting receipts and collections;
       (4) all payments from one Federal direct spending budget 
     account to another Federal budget account;
       (5) all intragovernmental funds including those from which 
     funding is derived primarily from other Government accounts;
       (6) expenses to the extent they result from private 
     donations, bequests, or voluntary contributions to the 
     Government;
       (7) nonbudgetary activities, including but not limited to--
       (A) credit liquidating and financing accounts;
       (B) the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation Trust Funds;
       (C) the Thrift Savings Fund;
       (D) the Federal Reserve System; and
       (E) appropriations for the District of Columbia to the 
     extent they are appropriations of locally raised funds;
       (8) payments resulting from Government insurance, 
     Government guarantees, or any other form of contingent 
     liability, to the extent those payments result from 
     contractual or other legally binding commitments of the 
     Government at the time of any sequestration;
       (9) the following accounts, which largely fulfill 
     requirements of the Constitution or otherwise make payments 
     to which the Government is committed--
       Bureau of Indian Affairs, miscellaneous trust funds, tribal 
     trust funds (14-9973-0-7-999);
       Claims, defense;
       Claims, judgments and relief act (20-1895-0-1-806);
       Compact of Free Association, economic assistance pursuant 
     to Public Law 99-658 (14-0415-0-1-806);
       Compensation of the President (11-0001-0-1-802);
       Customs Service, miscellaneous permanent appropriations 
     (20-9992-0-2-852);
       Eastern Indian land claims settlement fund (14-2202-0-1-
     806);
       Farm Credit System Financial Assistance Corporation, 
     interest payments (20-1850-0-1-351);
       Internal Revenue collections of Puerto Rico (20-5737-0-2-
     852);
       Payments of Vietnam and USS Pueblo prisoner-of-war claims 
     (15-0104-0-1-153):
       Payments to copyright owners (03-5175-0-2-376);
       Salaries of Article III judges (not including cost of 
     living adjustments);
       Soldier's and Airman's Home, payment of claims (84-8930-0-
     7-705);
       Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, interest 
     payments (46-0300-0-1-401);
       (10) the following noncredit special, revolving, or trust-
     revolving funds--
       Exchange Stabilization Fund (20-4444-0-3-155); and
       Foreign Military Sales trust fund (11-82232-0-7-155).
       (j) Optional Exemption of Military Personnel.--
       (1) The President may, with respect to any military 
     personnel account, exempt that account from sequestration or 
     provide for a lower uniform percentage reduction that 
     would otherwise apply.
       (2) The President may not use the authority provided by 
     paragraph (1) unless he notifies the Congress of the manner 
     in which such authority will be exercised on or before the 
     initial snapshot date for the budget year.

     SEC. 206. SPECIAL RULES.

       (a) Child Support Enforcement Program.--Any sequestration 
     order shall accomplish the full amount of any required 
     reduction in payments under sections 455 and 458 of the 
     Social Security Act by reducing the Federal matching rate for 
     State administrative costs under the program, as specified 
     (for the fiscal year involved) in section 455(a) of such Act, 
     to the extent necessary to reduce such expenditures by that 
     amount.
       (b) Commodity Credit Corporation.--
       (1) Effective date.--For the Commodity Credit Corporation, 
     the date on which a sequestration order takes effect in a 
     fiscal year shall vary for each crop of a commodity. In 
     general, the sequestration order shall take effect when 
     issued, but for each crop of a commodity for which 1-year 
     contracts are issued as an entitlement, the sequestration 
     order shall take effect with the start of the sign-up period 
     for that crop that begins after the sequestration order is 
     issued. Payments for each contract in such a crop shall be 
     reduced under the same terms and conditions.
       (2) Dairy program.--
       (A) As the sole means of achieving any reduction in outlays 
     under the milk price-support program, the Secretary of 
     Agriculture shall provide for a reduction to be made in the 
     price received by producers for all milk in the United States 
     and marketed by producers for commercial use.
       (B) That price reduction (measured in cents per hundred-
     weight of milk marketed) shall occur under subparagraph (A) 
     of section 201(d)(2) of the Agricultural Act of 1949 (7 
     U.S.C. 1446(d)(2)(A)), shall begin on the day any 
     sequestration order is issued, and shall not exceed the 
     aggregate amount of the reduction in outlays under the milk 
     price-support program, that otherwise would have been 
     achieved by reducing payments made for the purchase of milk 
     or the products of milk under this subsection during that 
     fiscal year.
       (3) Effect of delay.--For purposes of subsection (b)(1), 
     the sequestrable base for Commodity Credit Corporation is the 
     current-year level of gross outlays resulting from new budget 
     authority that is subject to reduction under paragraphs (1) 
     and (2).
       (4) Certain authority not to be limited.--Nothing in this 
     Act shall restrict the Corporation in the discharge of its 
     authority and responsibility as a corporation to buy and sell 
     commodities in world trade, or limit or reduce in any way any 
     appropriation that provides the Corporation with funds to 
     cover its realized losses.

[[Page H5600]]

       (c) Earned Income Tax Credit.--
       (1) The sequestrable base for earned income tax credit 
     program is the dollar value of all current year benefits to 
     the entire eligible population.
       (2) In the event sequestration is triggered to reduce 
     earned income tax credits, all earned income tax credits 
     shall be reduced, whether or not such credits otherwise would 
     result in cash payments to beneficiaries, by a uniform 
     percentage sufficient to produce the dollar savings required 
     by the sequestration.
       (d) Regular and Extended Unemployment Compensation.--
       (1) A State may reduce each weekly benefit payment made 
     under the regular and extended unemployment benefit programs 
     for any week of unemployment occurring during any period with 
     respect to which payments are reduced under any sequestration 
     order by a percentage not to exceed the percentage by which 
     the Federal payment to the State is to be reduced for such 
     week as a result of such order.
       (2) A reduction by a State in accordance with paragraph (1) 
     shall not be considered as a failure to fulfill the 
     requirements of section 3304(a)(11) of the Internal Revenue 
     Code of 1986.
       (e) Federal Employees Health Benefits Fund.-- For the 
     Federal Employees Health Benefits Fund, a sequestration order 
     shall take effect with the next open season. The 
     sequestration shall be accomplished by annual payments from 
     that Fund to the General Fund of the Treasury. Those annual 
     payments shall be financed solely by charging higher 
     premiums. The sequestrable base for the Fund is the current-
     year level of gross outlays resulting from claims paid after 
     the sequestration order takes effect.
       (f) Federal Housing Finance Board.-- Any sequestration of 
     the Federal Housing Board shall be accomplished by annual 
     payments (by the end of each fiscal year) from that Board to 
     the general fund of the Treasury, in amounts equal to the 
     uniform sequestration percentage for that year times the 
     gross obligations of the Board in that year.
       (g) Federal Pay.--
       (1) In general.-- New budget authority to pay Federal 
     personnel from direct spending accounts shall be reduced by 
     the uniform percentage calculated under section 203(c)(3), as 
     applicable, but no sequestration order may reduce or have the 
     effect of reducing the rate of pay to which any individual is 
     entitled under any statutory pay system (as increased by any 
     amount payable under section 5304 of title 5, United States 
     Code, or any increase in rates of pay which is scheduled to 
     take effect under section 5303 of title 5, United States 
     Code, section 1109 of title 37, United States Code, or any 
     other provision of law.
       (2) Definitions.--For purposes of this subsection--
       (A) the term ``statutory pay system'' shall have the 
     meaning given that term in section 5302(1) of title 5, United 
     States Code;
       (B) the term ``elements of military pay'' means--
       (i) the elements of compensation of members of the 
     uniformed services specified in section 1009 of title 37, 
     United States Code;
       (ii) allowances provided members of the uniformed services 
     under sections 403(a) and 405 of such title; and
       (iii) cadet pay and midshipman pay under section 203(c) of 
     such title; and
       (C) the term ``uniformed services'' shall have the same 
     meaning given that term in section 101(3) of title 37, United 
     States Code.
       (h) Medicare.--
       (1) Timing of application of reductions.--
       (A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph (B), if 
     a reduction is made in payment amounts pursuant to 
     sequestration order, the reduction shall be applied to 
     payment for services furnished after the effective date of 
     the order. For purposes of the previous sentence, in the case 
     of inpatient services furnished for an individual, the 
     services shall be considered to be furnished on the date of 
     the individual's discharge from the inpatient facility.
       (B) Payment on the basis of cost reporting periods.-- In 
     the case in which payment for services of a provider of 
     services is made under title XVIII of the Social Security Act 
     on a basis relating to the reasonable cost incurred for the 
     services during a cost reporting period of the provider, if a 
     reduction is made in payment amounts pursuant to a 
     sequestration order, the reduction shall be applied to 
     payment for costs for such services incurred at any time 
     during each cost reporting period of the provider any part of 
     which occurs after the effective date of order, but only (for 
     each such cost reporting period) in the same proportion as 
     the fraction of the cost reporting period that occurs after 
     the effective date of the order.
       (2) No increase in beneficiary charges in assignment-
     related cases.--If a reduction in payment amounts is made 
     pursuant to a sequestration order for services for which 
     payment under part B of title XVIII of the Social Security 
     Act is made on the basis of an assignment described in 
     section 1842(b)(3)(B)(ii), in accordance with section 
     1842(b)(6)(B), or under the procedure described in section 
     1870(f)(1) of such Act, the person furnishing the services 
     shall be considered to have accepted payment of the 
     reasonable charge for the services, less any reduction in 
     payment amount made pursuant to a sequestration order, as 
     payment in full.
       (3) Part b premiums.--In computing the amount and method of 
     sequestration from part B of title XVIII of the Social 
     Security Act--
       (A) the amount of sequestration shall be calculated by 
     multiplying the total amount by which Medicare spending 
     exceeds the appropriate spending cap by a percentage that 
     reflects the ratio of total spending under Part B to total 
     Medicare spending; and
       (B) sequestration in the Part B program shall be 
     accomplished by increasing premiums to beneficiaries.
       (4) No effect on computation of aapcc.--In computing the 
     adjusted average per capita cost for purposes of section 
     1876(a)(4) of the Social Security Act, the Secretary of 
     Health and Human Services shall not take into account any 
     reductions in payment amounts which have been or may be 
     effected under this part.
       (i) Postal Service Fund.-- Any sequestration of the Postal 
     Service Fund shall be accomplished by annual payments from 
     that Fund to the General Fund of the Treasury, and the 
     Postmaster General of the United States and shall have the 
     duty to make those payments during the first fiscal year 
     to which the sequestration order applies and each 
     succeeding fiscal year. The amount of each annual payment 
     shall be--
       (1) the uniform sequestration percentage, times
       (2) the estimated gross obligations of the Postal Service 
     Fund in that year other than those obligations financed with 
     an appropriation for revenue forgone that year.

     Any such payment for a fiscal year shall be made as soon as 
     possible during the fiscal year, except that it may be made 
     in installments within that year if the payment schedule is 
     approved by the Secretary of the Treasury. Within 30 days 
     after the sequestration order is issued, the Postmaster 
     General shall submit to the Postal Rate Commission a plan for 
     financing the annual payment for that fiscal year and publish 
     that plan in the Federal Register. The plan may assume 
     efficiencies in the operation of the Postal Service, 
     reductions in capital expenditures, increases in the prices 
     of services, or any combination, but may not assume a lower 
     Fund surplus or higher Fund deficit and shall follow the 
     requirements of existing law governing the Postal Service in 
     all other respects. Within 30 days of the receipt of that 
     plan, the Postal Rate Commission shall approve the plan or 
     modify it in the manner that modifications are allowed under 
     current law. If the Postal Rate Commission does not respond 
     to the plan within 30 days, the plan submitted by the 
     Postmaster General shall go into effect. Any plan may be 
     later revised by the submission of a new plan to the Postal 
     Rate Commission, which may approve or modify it.
       (j) Power Marketing Administrations and T.V.A.-- Any 
     sequestration of the Department of Energy power marketing 
     administration funds or the Tennessee Valley Authority fund 
     shall be accomplished by annual payments from those funds to 
     the General Fund of the Treasury, and the administrators of 
     those funds shall have the duty to make those payments during 
     the fiscal year to which the sequestration order applies and 
     each succeeding fiscal year. The amount of each payment by a 
     fund shall be--
       (1) the direct spending uniform sequestration percentage, 
     times
       (2) the estimated gross obligations of the fund in that 
     year other than those obligations financed from discretionary 
     appropriations for that year.

     Any such payment for a fiscal year shall be made as soon as 
     possible during the fiscal year, except that it may be made 
     in installments within that year if the payment schedule is 
     approved by the Secretary of the Treasury. Annual payments by 
     a fund may be financed by reductions in costs required to 
     produce the pre-sequester amount of power (but those 
     reductions shall not include reductions in the amount of 
     power supplied by the fund), by reductions in capital 
     expenditures, by increases in tax rates, or by any 
     combination, but may not be financed by a lower fund surplus, 
     a higher fund deficit, additional borrowing, delay in 
     repayment of principal on outstanding debt and shall follow 
     the requirements of existing law governing the fund in all 
     other respects. The administrator of a fund or the TVA Board 
     is authorized to take the actions specified in this 
     subsection in order to make the annual payments to the 
     Treasury.
       (k) Business-Like Transactions.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of law, for programs which provide a business-like 
     service in exchange for a fee, sequestration shall be 
     accomplished through a uniform increase in fees (sufficient 
     to produce the dollar savings in such programs for the fiscal 
     year of the sequestration required by section 201(a)(2), all 
     subsequent fees shall be increased by the same percentage, 
     and all proceeds from such fees shall be paid into the 
     general fund of the Treasury, in any year for which a 
     sequester affecting such programs are in effect.

     SEC. 207. THE CURRENT LAW BASELINE.

       (a) Submission of Reports.--CBO and OMB shall submit to the 
     President and the Congress reports setting forth the budget 
     baselines for the budget year and the next nine fiscal years. 
     The CBO report shall be submitted on or before January 15. 
     The OMB report shall accompany the President's budget.
       (b) Determination of the Budget Baseline.--(1) The budget 
     baseline shall be based on the common economic assumptions 
     set forth in section 106, adjusted to reflect revisions 
     pursuant to subsection (c).

[[Page H5601]]

       (2) The budget baseline shall consist of a projection of 
     current year levels of budget authority, outlays, revenues 
     and the surplus or deficit into the budget year and the 
     relevant outyears based on current enacted laws as of the 
     date of the projection.
       (3) For discretionary spending items, the baseline shall be 
     the spending caps in effect pursuant to section 601(a)(2) of 
     the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. For years for which 
     there are no caps, the baseline for discretionary spending 
     shall be the same as the last year for which there were 
     statutory caps.
       (4) For all other expenditures and for revenues, the 
     baseline shall be adjusted by comparing unemployment, 
     inflation, interest rates, growth and other economic 
     indicators-and changes ineligible population-for the most 
     recent period for which actual data are available, compared 
     to the assumptions contained in section 106.
       (c) Revisions to the Baseline.--The baseline shall be 
     adjusted for up-to-date economic assumptions when CBO submits 
     its Economic and Budget Update and when OMB submits its 
     budget update, and by August 1 each year, when CBO and OBM 
     submit their midyear reviews.

     SEC. 208. LIMITATIONS ON EMERGENCY SPENDING.

       (a) In General.--(1) Within the discretionary caps for each 
     fiscal year contained in this Act, an amount shall be 
     withheld from allocation to the appropriate committees of the 
     House of Representatives and of the Senate and reserved for 
     natural disasters and other emergency purposes.
       (2) Such amount for each such fiscal year shall not be less 
     than 1 percent of total budget authority and outlays 
     available within those caps for that fiscal year.
       (3) The amounts reserved pursuant to this subsection shall 
     be made available for allocation to such committees only if--
       (A) the President has made a request for such disaster 
     funds;
       (B) the programs to be funded are included in such request; 
     and
       (C) the projected obligations for unforeseen emergency 
     needs exceed the 10-year rolling average annual expenditures 
     for existing programs included in the Presidential request 
     for the applicable fiscal year.
       (4) Notwithstanding any other provision of law--
       (A) States and localities shall be required to maintain 
     effort and ensure that Federal assistance payments do not 
     replace, subvert or otherwise have the effect of reducing 
     regularly budgeted State and local expenditures for law 
     enforcement, refighting, road construction and maintenance, 
     building construction and maintenance or any other category 
     of regular government expenditure (to ensure that Federal 
     disaster payments are made only for incremental costs 
     directly attributable to unforeseen disasters, and do not 
     replace or reduce regular State and local expenditures for 
     the same purposes);
       (B) the President may not take administrative action to 
     waive any requirement for States or localities to make 
     minimum matching payments as a condition or receiving Federal 
     disaster assistance and prohibit the President from taking 
     administrative action to waive all or part of any repayment 
     of Federal loans for the State or local matching share 
     required as a condition of receiving Federal disaster 
     assistance, and this clause shall apply to all matching share 
     requirements and loans to meet matching share requirements 
     under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 
     Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.) and any other Acts 
     pursuant to which the President may declare a disaster or 
     disasters and States and localities otherwise qualify for 
     Federal disaster assistance; and
       (C) a two-thirds vote in each House of Congress shall be 
     required for each emergency to reduce or waive the State 
     matching requirement of to forgive all or part of loans for 
     the State matching share as required under the Robert T. 
     Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act.
       (b) Effect Budget Resolutions.--(1) All concurrent 
     resolutions on the budget (including revisions) shall specify 
     the amount of new budget authority and outlays within the 
     discretionary spending cap that shall be withheld from 
     allocation to the committees and reserved for natural 
     disasters, and a procedure for releasing such funds for 
     allocation to the appropriate committee. The amount withheld 
     shall be equal to 1 percent of the total discretionary 
     spending cap for fiscal year covered by the resolution, 
     unless additional amounts are specified.
       (2) The procedure for allocation of the amounts pursuant to 
     paragraph (1) shall ensure that the funds are released for 
     allocation only pursuant to the conditions contained in 
     subsection (a)(3)(A) through (C).
       (c) Restriction on Use of Funds.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of law, the amount reserved pursuant to subsection 
     (a) shall not be available for other than emergency funding 
     requirements for particular natural disasters or national 
     security emergencies so designated by Acts of Congress.
       (d) New Point of Order.--(1) Title IV of the Congressional 
     Budget Act of 1974 is amended by adding at the end the 
     following new section:


                 ``point of order regarding emergencies

       ``Sec. 408. It shall not be in order in the House of 
     Representatives or the Senate to consider any bill or joint 
     resolution, or amendment thereto or conference report 
     thereon, containing an emergency designation for purposes of 
     section 251(b)(2)(D) or 252(e) of the Balanced Budget and 
     Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 or of section 207 of 
     the Balanced Budget Assurance Act of 1997 if it also provides 
     an appropriation or direct spending for any other item or 
     contains any other matter, but that bill or joint resolution, 
     amendment, or conference report may contain rescissions of 
     budget authority or reductions of direct spending, or that 
     amendment may reduce amounts for that emergency.''.
       (2) The table of contents set forth in section 1(b) of the 
     Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 is 
     amended by inserting after the item relating to section 407 
     the following new item:

``Sec. 408. Point of order regarding emergencies.''.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 192, the 
gentleman from Delaware [Mr. Castle] and a Member opposed each will 
control 30 minutes.
  Is there a Member opposed to the bill?
  Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Speaker, I am opposed to the bill, and request the 
time in opposition.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Iowa [Mr. Nussle] will be 
recognized for 30 minutes.
  Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that 15 minutes of 
the time in opposition be shared with the distinguished gentleman from 
South Carolina [Mr. Spratt].
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Iowa?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. CASTLE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that 15 minutes of 
the time in support of the legislation be yielded to the gentleman from 
Minnesota [Mr. Minge].
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Delaware?
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from 
Delaware [Mr. Castle].
  Mr. CASTLE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, we have had some discussion of this legislation already 
in the rule discussion, and we will have additional discussion here. 
But there are those of us in this Congress, and I hope it is a large 
majority of the Congress, who feel very strongly that if we are indeed 
ever going to balance the budget of the United States of America, we 
have to do more than just pass something which is going to balance the 
budget in 5 years. Remember, there will be two elections to Congress in 
the interim period, as well as an election of the President of the 
United States during that time. There will have been changes, economic 
variables that will come into play. It is very possible we will never 
get to a balanced budget.
  We believe strongly that we should have a budget enforcement 
mechanism. We have worked extremely hard in order to put together a 
piece of legislation which would do that. I should say this is not 
something that was drafted by those of us who will speak to it today. 
This was worked on and drafted by budget experts across the United 
States of America. It has been reviewed by a lot of people.
  It simply has several provisions in it which we will be expanding on, 
but it says that we have to look forward and look back each year to 
ascertain where we are with respect to the different aspects of the 
budget itself, the different components that make up our budget in 
mandatory and discretionary spending, as well as in the tax cuts which 
are going into place. And if indeed they fall out of line and do not 
add up to the numbers, as in the budget reconciliation which we will 
have this year, then we, the Congress, can either do nothing, in which 
case there will be self-enacting mechanisms to bring it back into line, 
or we can step forward and act.
  I think the stepping forward and acting is a more likely consequence 
of this, and it is a reason that those who might say this could impact 
future tax cuts or Social Security in my judgment just completely 
overlook the fact that Congress is not going to allow that to happen. 
The bottom line is that this would be, I think, the ultimate way it 
would be worked out. We would come back as a Congress and look at it.
  We simply have to do this. We have to have a method. We have to have 
a mechanism. It is like buying a car. We need a guarantee or warranty 
on that

[[Page H5602]]

car. It is what we expect in this day and age. What is going to happen 
to the engine and the tires and the body of the car, down the line? We 
feel the same way about the budget.
  This is bipartisan. It has been worked on by Members who care a great 
deal about it. In my judgment, anyone who believes in a balanced budget 
in this body, of the 435 Members of us, those of us who voted for those 
balanced budgets in the past, those who voted for constitutional 
guarantees of a balanced budget, should be supportive of this 
legislation.
  So it is for all of these reasons that I would encourage each and 
every one of us to follow this argument carefully, to not go for the 
scare tactics that may be put forward, and to make sure we cast an 
affirmative vote when it is all said and done.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Michigan [Mr. Smith], a member of the Committee on the Budget.
  Mr. SMITH of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I think part of the problem is 
that we have not debated this bill. There are a lot of good things in 
this budget enforcement proposal before us. However, we do have 
enforcement within the reconciliation bill that is going to be put 
before this body in the next few weeks.
  My bill, H.R. 2037, included the enforcement provision that is going 
to be in reconciliation. It says, put caps and limits on discretionary 
spending, have sequesters, maintain the pay-go provisions for 
entitlement and tax changes.
  So the question before us is; are we prepared to pass this kind of 
legislation implementing dramatic budget reform and the budget process 
without undergoing more through examination and consideration of the 
Committee on the Budget? Legislation such as this, should also be 
considered by the Committee on Ways and Means and other committees, to 
bring a studied bill before this body rather then a mostly unread and 
unconsidered bill with no chance of amendments.
  I introduced for the last 4 years budget reform legislation. I am 
convinced that some of those items that are not in this bill should be 
considered by this House when we finally pass a budget bill that is 
going to dramatically change the way this Congress does budget 
business.
  Mr. MINGE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania [Mr. Doyle].
  (Mr. DOYLE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. DOYLE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Budget Enforcement 
Act of 1997. If history is any kind of lesson, it is obvious that the 
strong targeted enforcement mechanisms provided by this bill are needed 
to ensure the budget is balanced by 2002.
  Some 229 Members of this House cosponsored the balanced budget 
amendment. I cannot understand why any of these Members would not 
support H.R. 2003. However, we are now hearing from Members who 
cosponsored the BBA, voted for the budget agreement and voted for both 
reconciliation bills, that the most serious problem with the Budget 
Enforcement Act is the fact that it may postpone tax cuts for their 
supporters.
  In a sense, they are right. If we enact this bill, tax cuts will 
indeed be delayed if the country is short of the money needed to 
balance the budget. But once we are on track, cuts can be enacted. I 
see nothing wrong with this approach. If we can afford certain tax 
cuts, let them go through. If we cannot, then we are just going to have 
to wait. In fact, if Members think it is more important to eliminate 
the deficit than it is to give away tax breaks that we cannot afford, 
this should be an easy vote.
  Let me close by saying I am disappointed that the Committee on Rules 
has decided to play politics with this issue, rather than debate it on 
its merits. The sponsors of this bill have discovered some needed 
changes. However, the Committee on Rules would not allow these 
corrections to be added to the bill, and it is my understanding they 
may be included in a motion to recommit. Consequently, anyone who is 
serious about deficit reduction should support the motion to recommit.
  In addition, even if this motion is not agreed to, I believe it is 
still crucial we enact this bill. The underlying principles are too 
important to ignore, and modification can always be made in conference. 
I urge my colleagues to vote for responsibility. Support the motion to 
recommit and support the underlying bill.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Budget Enforcement Act of 1997. 
If history is any kind of lesson, it is obvious that the strong, 
targeted enforcement mechanisms provided by this bill are needed to 
ensure the budget is balanced in 2002.
  During the 1980's and early 1990's, public officials said time and 
time again that the budget would be balanced in a number of years. But, 
time and time again, the Government lacked the discipline to follow 
through on these promises.
  Attempts were made to hold lawmakers to their word. No one should 
forget the noble failures of Gramm-Rudman. Unfortunately, these well-
intentioned efforts contained a number of loopholes and shortcomings 
which allowed past Congresses and administrations to tear through the 
paper ceilings they established. Clearly, something stronger is needed.
  A balanced budget amendment would be a strong device, but it is 
obviously not available at this time. While we did not even have the 
opportunity to vote on a balanced budget amendment this year, we do 
have the chance to enact the next best thing--the bipartisan Budget 
Enforcement Act.
  Some 229 Members of this House cosponsored the balanced budget 
amendment, and I cannot understand why any of these Members would not 
support H.R. 2003. However, we are now hearing from Members who 
cosponsored the BBA, voted for the budget agreement, and voted for both 
reconciliation bills that the most serious problem with the Budget 
Enforcement Act is that fact that it may postpone tax cuts for their 
supporters. In a sense, they are right. If we enact this bill, tax cuts 
will, indeed, be delayed if the country is short of the money needed to 
balance the budget. But, once we are on tract, cuts can be enacted. I 
see nothing wrong with this approach. If we can afford certain tax 
cuts, let them go through. If not, we may just have to wait. In fact, 
if you think it is more important to eliminate the deficit than it is 
to give away tax breaks we cannot afford, this should be an easy vote.
  I know there are those concerned that H.R. 2003 will lead to 
reductions in important programs. I would like to ease these concerns 
by pointing out that this bill does not demand cuts. Instead, it 
demands that we adhere to our objectives. Congress and the President 
will be provided with ample time to avert automatic corrections. 
Similarly, reductions will not be triggered by extra spending that 
results from inflation or some increased demand for services. To avoid 
cuts, Congress and the President will have to put more careful 
consideration into crafting budgets. We will have to work within 
responsible guidelines, adopt a more long-term outlook, and employ 
highly accurate economic forecasts. Mr. Speaker, we should have been 
working this way all along.
  Now, thanks to a thriving economy and a handful of tough votes, a 
balanced budget is within our grasp. This time we cannot allow it to 
slip away. If all parties involved can show more discipline and 
tenacity than they have in the past, we will achieve this elusive goal. 
The bipartisan Budget Enforcement Act will provide the incentives to 
ensure that we do.
  Let me close by saying I am disappointed that the Rules Committee has 
decided to play politics with this issue, rather than debate it on its 
merits. The sponsors of this bill have discovered some needed technical 
changes. However, because the Rules Committee would not allow these 
corrections to be added to the bill, they have been included in the 
motion to recommit. Consequently, anyone who is serious about deficit 
reduction should support the motion to recommit. In addition, even if 
this motion is not agreed to, I believe it is still crucial that we 
enact this bill. The underlying principles are too important to ignore, 
and modifications can always be made in conference. I urge my 
colleagues to vote for responsibility--support the motion to recommit 
and support the underlying bill.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 3\1/2\ minutes.
  Mr. Speaker, this debate is not about ends, it is about means, 
because I emphatically share the same ends as the sponsor of this bill, 
which is to balance the budget and balance it for good by no later than 
2002.
  I will be the first to admit that their bill springs from a valid 
concern. It is concern that the budget we may soon pass could fall 
short of its goal. That concerns us because it has happened before. It 
happened with Gramm-Rudman-Hollings in 1986, for which I voted, and it 
happened with the budget summit in 1990. In each case the spending cuts 
we passed did not cut spending in

[[Page H5603]]

fact by as much as we figured. As a result, the deficit did not drop as 
much as we hoped.
  This bill is to ensure that that will not happen again. That is a 
valid concern, but for one very basic fact: We have a solution. It is 
in place and it is working. When we adopted the Deficit Reduction Act 
back in 1993, we carried forth the discretionary spending caps and the 
pay-as-you-go rules that were first adopted in the Budget Enforcement 
Act of 1990. In a word, they work. Since 1993, discretionary spending 
has been held at or below the statutory caps and new entitlement 
spending has been checked by the pay-as-you-go rule.
  In addition, we included in that Deficit Reduction Act back in 1993 
an enforcement procedure which I recall well because it was my 
amendment. That procedure was dropped from the bill in the other body 
because of the Byrd rule, but the President imposed it by Executive 
order and the House has adopted it as a rule of procedure.
  Basically, this rule says that whenever entitlement spending exceeds 
a given year's baseline, the President with his budget has to report 
that variance to the Congress, and also recommend to the Congress how 
the overrun should be rectified. Congress has to take a record vote on 
the President's recommended action or our alternative before we can 
take the first step in the budget process. We can vote to do nothing, 
but we have to vote. We cannot duck the problem. That is a rule of the 
House. That is an Executive order of the Government.
  This procedure has never been invoked because it has never been 
needed. That is the irony of our situation today. This bill deals with 
a problem that has not presented itself for the last 5 years, because 
unlike Gramm-Rudman in 1986 and the budget summit in 1990, the deficit 
since 1993 has followed the downward, declining path that was plotted 
in the 1993 budget. In fact, it is running well below that path and 
headed to a deficit this year of less than $40 billion. So all of this 
concern about the need for enforcement because we may not attain our 
balanced budget flies in the face of the facts of the last 5 years.
  What is more, what this bill offers is a solution or solutions that 
are unwieldy and extremely cumbersome and extremely complex. Let me 
give a few of the problems that I have with the complex processes that 
this bill would impose.
  First of all, it does not address what in my opinion is the largest 
problem. The largest problem of risk, looking down the next 5 to 10 
years, if we adopt the budget bill and the tax reconciliation bill that 
we have under consideration, is exploding outyear revenues.

                              {time}  1200

  While this bill comes down hard on spending, it says, as to tax cuts, 
we will defer or postpone only those that have not been implemented for 
1 year. There is a disparity of treatment here that means that we will 
come down a lot harder on spending than on tax cuts, and it leaves an 
imbalance in this bill.
  I will return to this subject again as the debate goes on and deal 
with other practical problems that I have with this bill. It is well-
intentioned but we do not need it at this particular time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore [Mr. Bonilla]. Does the gentleman from Texas 
[Mr. Barton] seek to control the time originally designated to the 
gentleman from Delaware [Mr. Castle]?
  Mr. BARTON of Texas. Yes, Mr. Speaker, I do.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Texas [Mr. Barton] is 
recognized to yield time.
  Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, could I inquire as to how much time 
I have remaining?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Texas [Mr. Barton] has 12 
minutes remaining.
  Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman 
from Michigan [Mr. Upton].
  Mr. UPTON. Mr. Speaker, I thank my good friend from Texas, Mr. 
Barton, and the gentleman from Delaware, Mr. Castle, as well for their 
fine work to get this bill on the floor today for a vote.
  For my colleagues I have to say that this bill is much along the 
lines of the Castle-Upton-Martini approach that was adopted in the last 
Congress and was supported in fact by the chairman of the Committee on 
the Budget as well as the chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means. 
I am proud to be labeled as the deficit hawk because I know that 
deficits are harmful to our economic growth and our future prosperity. 
All of us in this body are heartened by the recent news that the 
deficit in fact is coming down. Who would have guessed the deficit this 
year could have been as low perhaps as $50 billion?
  I once worked at the Office of Management and Budget. I watched a 
Congress that back in the 1980's promised to cut taxes and cut 
spending. They only did one: cut taxes, did not cut spending. We saw 
the deficit balloon by trillions of dollars, of which we are paying 
almost some $300 billion in interest just this year.
  Our country has always been based on checks and balances. That is 
what this bill does. If we do not hit the deficit target, we will not 
see the tax cuts come into play. We need this. We need this measure as 
some version of an accountability so that we can reach a balanced 
budget. We will not see our deficits increasing the debt. I would urge 
all of my colleagues to vote for this.
  Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
Kentucky [Mrs. Northup].
  Mrs. NORTHUP. Mr. Speaker, I would like to speak against the Budget 
Enforcement Act. I really have great appreciation for what the authors 
are trying to achieve. I believe it is important that we focus on 
achieving those goals. However, I do not think this is the way to go 
about it.
  I want to emphasize the importance of creative solutions. I believe 
in 1994 that there was a revolution. It was not just a revolution of 
who served. It was not just a revolution about where we were trying to 
go. It was a revolution of we are going to start to think out of the 
box. We are going to stop doing things that we have always done and get 
what we have always gotten.
  So Congress and the people that were involved in public policy began 
to think of new ways to fashion new solutions. It is very important 
that we deal with each one of our spending challenges and each one of 
our challenges that we face and look for creative solutions. Think 
about 20 years ago when so many of us were concerned in this country 
that we would never be internationally competitive. We wondered if our 
ability to trade competitively, as we saw other countries buying up 
American industries, would ever return. It was the creative solutions 
of business, it was the ability to find new ways of doing things, a new 
way to handle inventory, a new way to downsize businesses that gave us 
back our competitive edge and made us so internationally competitive. 
That is true with government.
  As we look at Medicaid, as we look at Medicare, as we look at Social 
Security, I am absolutely convinced that we can make those programs 
strong. We can make them solvent. We can keep them from absorbing all 
of our children's income in creative ways instead of putting this 
government on automatic pilot and letting it happen for us in ways that 
we do not believe are the best.
  Mr. MINGE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Indiana [Mr. Visclosky].
  Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the 
time.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the bipartisan Budget 
Enforcement Act, and I want to thank my colleagues, the gentleman from 
Texas [Mr. Barton] and the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. Minge] for 
their hard work in bringing this bill to a vote today.
  The lessons of the previous budget plans are that agreeing to balance 
the budget is not going to provide a solution. For example, in 1982 the 
budget resolution called for a balanced budget by 1984. We did not. In 
1985, under Gramm-Rudman I, we were told we were going to balance the 
budget by 1991; we did not. In 1987, under Gramm-Rudman II, we were 
told that the budget would be balanced by 1993; and it was not. During 
the 1990 budget agreement, we were told that finally the budget would 
be balanced. It was not.
  There was a common thread in all of these agreements. There were no 
enforcement provisions included.

[[Page H5604]]

  Critics today have said that the proposal before us is not perfect. I 
would respond that neither is the budget agreement we are attempting to 
enforce. We should not let the perfect be the enemy of the good we want 
to do today.
  Critics have charged that our enforcement provisions are unpalatable. 
I could not agree more. I remind our colleagues that this is an 
enforcement bill. It should not feel good if we do not keep our 
agreement with the American people.
  Critics charge that the legislation is too soft on the revenue side. 
Guilty. But look at the letter that the Republican leadership has sent 
out. I am convinced that what started out as a budget agreement to 
balance the budget this year is simply a facade to hide a tax cut. 
Please support this imperfect legislation. It is an imperfect world but 
we want to do good today. We do want to enforce an agreement to balance 
the budget by the year 2002. I congratulate my colleagues, the 
gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. Minge] and the gentleman from Texas [Mr. 
Barton] and all of the Members who have participated in a bipartisan 
fashion in this endeavor.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the Bipartisan Budget 
Enforcement Act, and I want to thank my colleagues, Joe Barton and 
David Minge, for their hard work in bringing this bill to a vote today.
  There is hardly a Member of this institution who does not believe 
that balancing the Federal budget is important to the future of this 
country. For 35 years, the U.S. Government has failed to balance its 
budget, running deficits of up to $290 billion per year. Since 1980, 
runaway deficit spending has caused the national debt to more than 
quintuple in size. The debt is now more than $5.3 trillion, or about 70 
percent of the country's gross domestic product [GDP]. Compare this 
figure to 1979, when the national debt stood at $829 billion, or 33 
percent of GDP.
  The size and scope of the current Federal debt have a terrible 
negative impact on the lives of working American families. By consuming 
nearly 15 percent of all Federal spending, interest on the debt acts to 
crowd out funding for programs that could be used to invest in our 
country's infrastructure, hire more police officers, and sustain a 
healthy economy. The debt also contributes to higher interest rates for 
everyday expenses, such as home mortgages and car loans. In the end, 
balancing the budget will reduce interest rates, spur economic growth, 
and put more money in the pockets of American families.
  The failure of past efforts to balance the Federal budget shows how 
important it is to enforce balanced budget plans like the one Congress 
and the President agreed to in June.
  The lessons of previous budget plans prove that agreeing to balance 
the budget does not guarantee that the budget will actually be 
balanced. No fewer than four times over the past 15 years, Congress has 
approved agreements that were supposed to get us to a balanced budget, 
but failed to actually do so.
  For example, in 1982, the budget resolution called for a balanced 
budget in 1984. Yet, the budget was not balanced by that date. In 1985, 
under Gramm-Rudman I, we were told that the budget would be balanced in 
1991. It was not.
  In 1987, under Gramm-Rudman II, we were told that the budget would be 
balanced in 1993, but it was not. During the 1990 budget agreement, we 
were told that, finally, the budget would be balanced in 1994. Again, 
it was not.
  The common thread in each of these failed attempts to balance the 
budget was the lack of a meaningful enforcement mechanism.
  Over the years, many of us have come to realize that the only way to 
achieve a balanced budget is to pass legislation that would add 
meaningful enforcement procedures to the budget process. That is why 
for the past two Congresses, I, along with Congressman Stenholm and 
Congressman Minge, have introduced the Balanced Budget Enforcement Act. 
Originally sponsored by then-chairman of the Budget Committee Leon 
Panetta and, after that, our former colleague from Minnesota, Tim 
Penny, this legislation was one of the first comprehensive efforts to 
address the issue of budget enforcement.
  The Budget Enforcement Act before us today is the next logical step 
in the fight to enact meaningful enforcement legislation.
  Forged by a bipartisan group of Members from across the ideological 
spectrum, this legislation takes a commonsense approach to enforcing 
the budget process. It acknowledges that our best hope of actually 
balancing the budget is to put every section of the budget on the 
table--accountable for actually balancing the budget by the year 2002.
  Put in simple terms, this bill puts in place critical enforcement 
procedures by establishing caps on the mandatory spending and a floor 
on revenue at the levels set by this year's budget resolution. If 
spending goes above the targets, or the tax cuts explode beyond what is 
projected, comprehensive enforcement procedures will be triggered to 
make sure that the budget remains on track to balance and the deficit 
stays under control.
  I would like to warn Members against complacency. Though the economy 
is doing well now and the deficit has been reduced over the past 
several years, there is no guarantee that these rosy economic times 
will continue. One of the major failings of past balanced budget 
agreements is that they failed to anticipate downturns in the economy, 
and were thrown off track by these changes. Passing this enforcement 
legislation is the best way to ensure that the balanced budget stays on 
track, even in the event of an economic downturn.
  In many ways, the vote on this bill will be a measure of the 
Congress's willingness to make the tough decisions needed to balance 
the budget--this vote is a test of our resolve.
  Critics have said that its not perfect. I would respond that neither 
is the budget agreement we are attempting to enforce, and we should not 
let the perfect by the enemy of the good we can do today.
  Critics charge that our enforcement provisions are unpalatable. I 
couldn't agree more. I remind my colleagues that this is an 
``enforcement'' bill. It's not supposed to feel good if you fail to 
keep your promise.
  Critics charge that the legislation is too soft on the revenue side. 
Well, given the letter that the Republican leadership has sent out in 
opposition to this bill, it's clear to me that they are using the 
balanced budget agreement as a facade for a tax cut and this was the 
strongest provision we were going to be allowed in a bipartisan 
measure.
  We have tried many times to reach a balanced budget, but failed in 
each case because the Congress lacked the political will to follow 
through on its promises. Passage of this legislation will ensure that 
the Congress does not walk away from the promise it has made to the 
American people to balance the budget by 2002. It will restore the 
faith of the American people that the Congress has the will to balance 
the budget, and show that we are not afraid of making the difficult 
choices needed to get us there.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to vote in favor of the Bipartisan 
Budget Enforcement Act.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Minnesota [Mr. Sabo], distinguished former chairman of the Committee on 
the Budget.
  (Mr. SABO asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. SABO. Mr. Speaker, I thank the ranking member for yielding me the 
time.
  Sometimes I think we keep fighting old fights. We are fighting the 
problems of Gramm-Rudman. That is long passed. The reality is that the 
budget enforcement mechanisms of 1990, extended to 1993 and extended 
this year, work. Discretionary spending caps, with some flexibility for 
emergencies, worked. The pay-as-you-go provisions that are current law 
as they relate to new entitlements have worked.
  What cannot work under our current law unfortunately and is not 
solved by the Minge-Barton bill are the structures of tax cuts that 
explode beyond the 5-year limit. Those games are being played with 
backloaded IRA's and capital gains that explode in the outyears. 
Current provisions cannot prevent it. Unfortunately the current 
proposal before us solves none of that problem.
  The only way we can deal with that problem, where we have backloaded 
tax cuts that explode in the future, is to say no to those kinds of 
proposals when they come before the House. The proposed bill does not 
solve that problem because it is a 5-year bill. And if we extend it 
beyond 5 years, we then have new baselines from which we are operating.
  I urge defeat of this bill. Do not undo a system that is working with 
ration and reason today.
  Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman 
from Tennessee [Mr. Wamp], the father of Weston Wamp, one of the chief 
sponsors of our legislation.
  Mr. WAMP. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the 
time.
  I quit using the word revolution because it implies bloodshed, maybe 
even chaos. Started using the word correction where all of us, 
Democrats, Republicans, Independents could follow through on our word, 
just be consistent, clean this place up together.

[[Page H5605]]

  I do not want to start on a negative here but, if we lose this bill 
and lose this vote, it will be basically for three reasons: First, it 
is a true bipartisan effort. Unfortunately, that is not the way things 
are done in this city. Actually, we have got Members from all over the 
place here. We have got Liberals, Conservatives, Democrats, 
Republicans, we cannot tell who is controlling the time from which side 
of the aisle because it is a true bipartisan effort and some folks do 
not like that.
  Second, fear is an easy mechanism to use. We are going to hear all 
kinds of fears. I have heard caps. I have heard delays. I have heard 
even the word cuts used here today in Social Security, Medicare, that 
the tax cuts would be delayed or postponed. That is all a what-if 
scenario.
  Theoretically, if Congress and the administration absolutely do 
nothing, heck, if we did not come back here between now and October 1, 
the Government would shut down again, but the Congress is not going to 
let that happen. We should not let this decision be driven by fear of 
what if. We are responsible Members. We will do what is right for the 
American folks and they know it.
  The third thing is a technicality. There are a couple of technical 
flaws in this bill that we tried to get corrected, and the Committee on 
Rules said no. I think that is unfortunate. The Committee on Rules 
should allow us to improve the bill, and I understand that there was an 
agreement reached, and in the letter of the law we were going to submit 
the bill that was on the floor a month ago; but we tried to improve the 
bill, and we can still improve this bill, and it is not a reason to 
vote against it.
  I am down here in support of this effort because from 1965 to now, 
the portion of the Federal budget that the Congress actually 
appropriates has gone from two-thirds of the total budget to one-third. 
Entitlements are on automatic pilot, and they are running away with the 
American taxpayers' dollars, and we must rein it in, not cut anybody's 
benefits, not reduce anybody's benefits, just slow down the growth and 
be responsible.
  As a member of the Committee on Appropriations, I can tell my 
colleagues that, if the economy hiccups or belches a few times along 
the road in the next 5 years, all of the offsets, all of the reductions 
are going to have to come from the Committee on Appropriations. That is 
going to put pressure on student loans, on cancer research, on the 
investment dollars in the next generation. We cannot let that happen.
  We are going to hear folks from one side of the aisle say, whoa to 
tax cuts, tax cuts are ok if we are still meeting the discipline and 
the fiscal restraint on the other side of the ledger. You are going to 
hear Members on one side of the aisle say, you cannot slow down 
entitlements.
  We must come together and do it all and be serious with the American 
people. That is what this is about. All of my colleagues should vote 
``yes.''
  Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. MINGE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from 
California [Mrs. Tauscher].
  Mrs. TAUSCHER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the 
time.
  Mr. Speaker, four times in the last 15 years Congress and the 
President have told the American people that they had reached an 
agreement to balance the budget. In each case however, the deficit 
continued to grow. We now have the opportunity once again to make good 
on our word. Congress and the President have agreed on the outlines of 
a deficit reduction plan that will restore fiscal responsibility to our 
Nation's budget.
  Unfortunately the success of this effort hinges on key enforcement 
provisions that are not yet part of this agreement. The bipartisan 
Budget Enforcement Act would put in place a mechanism to force Congress 
and the President to actively address spending that is higher than 
expected or where revenues have fallen short of expectations. Instead 
of ignoring excessive spending or revenue shortfalls, we would be 
forced to confront the causes of the problem and make adjustments 
accordingly.
  We have made historic steps toward placing our economy on a sound 
footing for the first time in a generation. But without a strong budget 
enforcement mechanism, there is no guarantee that we will reach the 
goal of eliminating the deficit and living up to our agreement. I 
encourage my colleagues to support the motion to recommit on H.R. 2003.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New 
York [Mr. Rangel], ranking member of the Committee on Ways and Means.
  (Mr. RANGEL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)

                              {time}  1215

  Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to H.R. 2003. Although 
I agree with the principles in which we should have some way of 
enforcing the budget agreement and reducing the deficit, the way this 
does that, it actually shatters the integrity of the entire House 
system as we know it, and it jeopardizes the jurisdiction of the 
authorizing committees as well as the appropriating committees.
  Those of us that serve on committee, we take great pride, at least we 
did before the contract violated that, in the ability that allowed us 
to legislate, allowed us to get the bills passed to the House, and 
allowed the conferees to decide what to do.
  In this, we will have some separate body outside of the ordinary 
legislative process making decisions, so that even if we found that the 
Medicare provisions were out of whack with what we had perceived, the 
first thing that is attacked is not the cost that the doctors would 
cause us, but we go straight to the premiums. Some of us would like to 
believe that there might be a more equitable way to do it.
  The same thing applies to Social Security, if that falls short. 
Instead of trying to see whether we can make it even to enforce the 
budget, the first thing we go after is the cost-of-living increases and 
not really trying to see whether we can do something to resolve it.
  It requires more cuts in the individual entitlement programs, even if 
overall there is a surplus in the entitlement programs. Of course, if 
one were to suspect that entitlement programs is the subject or the 
target to wipe out, then I would suggest this is the way to do it. But 
knowing that we are merely trying to enforce the budget agreement, it 
would seem to me that entitlement programs and spending generally 
should be what we are looking at and not just waiting for one program 
to fall behind.
  This bill also would require spending cuts, but the tax increases 
would not be subjected to this even if the deficit is on the right 
track. So I really think that it hurts the House of Representatives as 
well as the Senate in years to come.
  Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman 
from Maryland [Mrs. Morella].
  (Mrs. MORELLA asked and was given permission to revise and extend her 
remarks.)
  Mrs. MORELLA. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding this 
time to me, and I rise in support of H.R. 2003, the bipartisan Budget 
Enforcement Act.
  Without this legislation, the balanced budget agreement will be 
devoid of any enforcement mechanism, and it runs the danger of joining 
the many past well-intentioned and long since forgotten efforts to 
balance the budget.
  The truth is that once a balanced budget agreement is approved, 
history has demonstrated that it unravels as time passes and economic 
conditions change. Budget enforcement provisions are necessary to avoid 
this outcome and to ensure that we will follow-through on this 
agreement.
  The bill has been drafted to prevent problems that developed with 
past budget enforcement proposals. It is important to remember that we 
are proposing enforcement of an already existing budget agreement. We 
are not trying to bypass difficult future decisions.
  The act also applies evenly to all parts of the budget agreement, 
both spending and revenue provisions. And the bill provides flexibility 
in the case of changing economic circumstances.
  Mr. Speaker, these enforcement provisions should serve as a deterrent 
for any failure to meet the provisions of the balanced budget 
agreement. Let us translate the rhetoric into action.
  Mr. Speaker, these enforcement provisions should serve as a deterrent 
for any failure to

[[Page H5606]]

meet the provisions of the balanced budget agreement. Because every 
program is included, there will be strong pressure to adhere to the 
decisions made in the agreement--advocates for every Federal program 
and advocates for tax cuts will have an equal stake in reaching a 
balanced budget. Let me repeat: these enforcement provisions are 
intended to ensure that we keep to our agreement. It is interesting to 
note that so many Members seem to assume that we will be unable to do 
so. It is precisely because of this fear that H.R. 2003 is so critical.
  Mr. Speaker, a number of Members who oppose this enforcement bill 
cite their concerns for the potential impact on various elements of the 
budget agreement--but that is exactly why this legislation is so 
effective and important. It treats both spending and revenues alike. If 
revenue projections fall short of the budget agreement, then further 
tax cuts would be delayed until revenues meet the targets. If 
entitlement programs grow beyond projected rates, corrective action 
would be necessary to avoid sequestration. Congress would have the 
power and adequate time to make alternative policy changes if they are 
necessary.
  Why do some Members find this threatening? I strongly believe that we 
should delay tax cuts if we find that revenues are inadequate in the 
later years of the agreement. I also believe that we must control the 
growth of our entitlement programs--which are still allowed to grow 
under this bipartisan budget agreement, but which must be reined in if 
we are to maintain their future stability.
  If we say we are committed to a balanced budget and agree that we 
must avoid the failures of the past, then there is no choice but to 
vote for H.R. 2003.
  Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from 
Kentucky [Mr. Bunning], a true Hall of Famer.
  We have been talking about Hall of Famers today, but we have a true 
Hall of Famer, the very distinguished chairman of the Subcommittee on 
Social Security from the Committee on Ways and Means.
  (Mr. BUNNING asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. BUNNING. Mr. Speaker, ever since I came to Congress in 1987, I 
have worked hard for a balanced budget. A balanced budget is the finest 
guarantee that Government will be able to honor its commitments, and I 
believe we will keep our promise to balance the budget.
  As chairman of the Subcommittee on Social Security under the 
Committee on Ways and Means, I have made it my job to protect Social 
Security and make sure benefits will be there for our senior citizens.
  Over 43 million people, 43 million, receive Social Security benefits 
overall. Social Security makes up 40 percent of all the retirement 
income in this country--40 percent. We cannot desert the people who 
have worked for 20, 30, 40, 50 years and will soon retire. We must keep 
our promises. We must not jeopardize their benefits.
  That is why I am not going to vote for the Budget Enforcement Act. 
The fact is the bill caps entitlements, including Social Security. If 
the Social Security cap is breached, the bill specifies that any cost-
of-living adjustment be reduced or eliminated as a first step toward 
eliminating that breach. This just is not right and it is not fair.
  As we all know, Social Security has the largest, best organized, most 
vocal constituency of any program. Americans are not looking for any 
nifty fixes to ensure the future of Social Security. Americans want 
real reform based on informed, thorough, and deliberative debate.
  Such a debate is happening now in the Subcommittee on Social Security 
through an ongoing hearing series on the future of Social Security for 
this generation and the next. We have already held five hearings.
  Social Security must not be the subject of an arbitrary cap. We must 
step up to the challenge and to our responsibility to protect the 
future of all Americans through real Social Security reform.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to vote ``no'' on this Budget 
Enforcement Act.
  Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes.
  Mr. Speaker, I think we need to address directly what the gentleman 
from Kentucky [Mr. Bunning] has just talked about.
  First of all, he is absolutely correct that Social Security is a very 
important program and a very special program. I want to point out that 
it is a Federal entitlement program. It is an earned entitlement 
program, but it is a Federal program, so it should be a part of any 
comprehensive enforcement mechanism.
  I would also point out that the caps on Social Security in our bill 
are not arbitrary caps. They are the estimates of spending on Social 
Security over the next 5 years that have been put into the bill by the 
President and the congressional leadership. There is nothing arbitrary 
about them at all. They are based on the very best estimates of a very 
well run program.
  I would also point out that under our procedure on Social Security, 
the President and the Congress have three options: They can vote to 
waive the cap on Social Security, if they want to; they can vote to 
make some programmatic changes in Social Security, if they want to; and 
only as a last resort would sequestration go into effect.
  Last, I would point out that because of the special nature of the 
Social Security Program, and the concerns that the gentleman from 
Kentucky and others have raised, we did offer to the Committee on Rules 
an amendment yesterday that would have taken the first $100 billion of 
any budget surpluses and put that towards the Social Security trust 
fund, to actually put real dollars in the trust fund. The Committee on 
Rules decided not to make that in order.
  So I ask my colleagues not to be scared off by a diatribe or at least 
an attack on our overall bill because of Social Security. It is a 
Federal program. We know it is a special Federal program. We want to 
protect it. We have a lot of flexibilities in our bill to protect 
Social Security. But we cannot assume that just because it is Social 
Security, that it should be totally off limits.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Does the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Stenholm] 
seek to control the time previously controlled by the gentleman from 
Minnesota [Mr. Minge]?
  Mr. STENHOLM. I do, Mr. Speaker.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Texas [Mr. Stenholm] is 
recognized.
  Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman 
from Florida [Mr. Boyd].
  (Mr. BOYD asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. BOYD. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in very strong support of the 
bipartisan Budget Enforcement Act. I want to thank the gentleman from 
Texas [Mr. Barton], the gentleman from Delaware [Mr. Castle], and the 
gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. Wamp] for their work; and also the 
gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. Minge] and the gentleman from Texas [Mr. 
Stenholm] for getting us to this point where we can now address this 
issue on the floor.
  I have heard Members who claim they support the balanced budget 
agreement and they support the balanced budget resolution; yet if asked 
to set their promises into law and make them enforceable, according to 
many of them, then every program will be cut and tax cuts will not take 
place.
  Either we believe the economic assumptions are correct and the budget 
will be balanced in 2002 or we do not. Many of my colleagues are trying 
to have it both ways. They voted for H.R. 2014 and H.R. 2015 and sent 
out press releases trumpeting their support for a balanced budget 
agreement. Yet when they are asked to place these promises into law and 
make them enforceable, they talk about how programs will exceed the 
caps and revenue will not equal the projections.
  This is incredible to me, because it becomes painfully obvious that 
they do not think the balanced budget agreement will truly balance the 
budget.
  While I am new to Congress, this issue is not new. In 1982 we had a 
balanced budget agreement. In 1985 we had another balanced budget 
agreement, followed by another one in 1987, and yet another agreement 
in 1990. None of them succeeded because they were not enforced.
  One of the things that is supposed to define intelligence is the 
ability to learn from our mistakes, and we must learn from those 
mistakes that we made previously. I ask my colleagues to support the 
Balanced Budget Enforcement Act.

[[Page H5607]]

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair would advise Members that the 
gentleman from Texas [Mr. Barton] has 5 minutes remaining; the 
gentleman from Iowa [Mr. Nussle] has 9\1/2\ minutes remaining; the 
gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spratt] has 7\1/2\ minutes; and the 
gentleman from Texas [Mr. Stenholm] has 8\1/2\ minutes remaining.
  Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, who has the right to close debate?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Texas [Mr. Barton] has 
the right to close.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
North Dakota [Mr. Pomeroy].
  Mr. POMEROY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time.
  Mr. Speaker, while in concept adding budget safeguards that ensure we 
stay on track to balance the budget makes all the sense in the world, 
the measure before us fails to advance that goal in an acceptable 
fashion.
  Now, we all know that the devil is in the details, and the 
shortcomings in the details before us are very significant. They are 
much too significant to overlook or to brush aside because we like the 
notion of budget enforcement.
  I want to focus on three of the most glaring deficiencies.
  Looking at the budget deal presently being negotiated, this historic 
effort to balance the budget, I believe that the most significant 
threats are exploding tax cuts, specifically indexing capital gains, or 
backloaded IRA's, these that have very dynamic revenue losses in the 
outyears but not in the early years.
  Those tax cuts would not in any way be touched by this measure. This 
measure is a toothless tiger relative to addressing exploding tax cuts.
  Second, it places an exceptionally convoluted process in place that 
totally tips on its head the standing jurisdictions of this House. 
Between November and December 15 the Committee on the Budget is given 
sole discretion over reconciling the accounts. That means jurisdiction 
over all standing authorizing committees, over the Committee on 
Appropriations, and over the Committee on Ways and Means. It is as 
though those committees have no expertise whatsoever. The Committee on 
the Budget is the where-all and the end-all of the decision-making if 
this bill would kick in.
  Finally, if Congress would not act, it would just be the automatic 
sequester blade coming down and cutting, and that would include cuts on 
Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, veterans' benefits, military 
retirement.
  My goodness, these programs are much too vital to put on automatic 
pilot heading on down the slicing machine. We can do better than that. 
We must do better than that.
  Budget enforcement, yes, but not this budget enforcement. Vote 
``no.''
  Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 4 minutes.
  Mr. Speaker, we heard earlier someone say something close to this. I 
will put it a little differently: ``If you always do what you always 
did, you will always get what you always got.'' And that is pretty much 
what we have always learned here in the U.S. Congress.
  Whenever we try to come in here in a rush to try to change the rules 
in the middle of the game in order to affect a particular outcome, what 
invariably happens is that we have an outcome which is not exactly what 
we intended. In fact, we heard here earlier about the deals and 
enforcements of 1984 and 1988 and 1989 and 1990 and all sorts of other 
enforcement provisions in the past. And the question was asked, well, 
was there a single thread? And the thread was, yes, it was done in a 
rush.

                              {time}  1230

  I would suggest to my colleagues that that is the thread that runs 
through much of this, is that we try to craft a little gimmick at the 
end in order to get the job done and get the ball over the goal line to 
score what we all want to do. And that is make sure that we have a 
balanced budget that it is enforceable, that we give to the American 
people tax relief, that we provide for spending reductions, and we do 
this in a way that we can all be proud of. And, so, we try to figure 
out little ways to do that.
  But what we have done here, I believe, is a rush job, which I do not 
question as far as motivation, but I do question as far as whether or 
not it has been thought out to enough of a degree that it will, in 
fact, work. In fact, I believe this is much akin to ``hey, I know'' 
kind of legislation. We rush in here and we say, ``hey, I know; I have 
got an idea.''
  In fact, we are going to hear a ``hey, I know'' idea at the very end 
of this on the motion to recommit. Someone is going to run in here and 
say, ``hey, I know; I know there is a problem with Social Security. Let 
us exempt that from this particular enforcement mechanism,'' or say, 
``hey, I know; the veterans have a problem with it. Let us exempt them 
from this motion to recommit,'' or, ``hey, I know; we want to protect 
these tax cuts, so let us exempt that,'' or, ``hey, I know; let us come 
up with something else to make sure that we do not do damage to one 
particular constituency or allay the concerns of one particular part of 
the membership so that we can get this bill passed.''
  We should not legislate by ``hey, I know.'' We should send this to 
committee. We should go through the process which has been promised by 
the chairman of Committee on Rules, the chairman of the Committee on 
the Budget, the chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means so that we 
can bring back to the floor before the end of the Congress, which has 
been the goal and commitment of both sides of the aisle, an enforcement 
mechanism within an overall process reform for this budget. We should 
do it under the auspices of the committee system with hearings which 
are ongoing. We should not do it when we know, in fact, that there are 
problems with this bill.
  The chairman of the Subcommittee on Social Security was just down in 
the well explaining exactly how this might, in fact, affect Social 
Security. I am not suggesting that it does. We do not know. Part of 
this whole debate here today is the lack of clarity.
  So what I would suggest to Members that are unsure about their vote 
on this particular bill, because I rise in opposition even though I 
want an enforcement mechanism, I want budget process reform; and so I 
know the angst that Members are going through right now saying, ``Gosh, 
I wish this was the one. It is really imperfect. It does not quite meet 
the standards of budget process reform. But I just want to do 
something.''
  I would ask my colleagues to consider this: If they are crystal clear 
about what this is going to do to Social Security, come down here and 
vote yes. If they are not quite sure, though, they better consider 
voting no. If they are clear about what this will do to tax increases 
in the future, come down here and vote yes. But if they think this 
could, in fact, raise taxes, they better come down here and vote no.
  Mr. MINGE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from 
California [Ms. Sanchez].
  Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Speaker, today we are opening the doors of Congress 
to the public. Twenty years ago, sunshine laws brought the light of 
public scrutiny to the once-secret committee rooms, but those laws did 
nothing to stop the secret dealings in smoke-filled rooms when it came 
time to write our Nation's budget.
  The public wants a true balanced budget. They want an end to the 
trillion-dollar debt. They want real middle-class tax relief. Well, my 
friends, the only way the public is going to get what they want is to 
know that we have truly kept our promises, and that is through the 
Budget Enforcement Act.
  This bill locks into law the goals of the balanced budget agreement. 
If Congress and the President want to change the terms of the deal, 
then they must pass a law to do so. This means that public hearings 
must be held and Congress can no longer rig the books in the dead of 
the night.
  I am a businesswoman, and in business the marketplace is a gun to the 
head of any CEO to produce a bottom line and to make a profit. In 
government, that gun is the balanced budget. We must open up Congress 
to the public.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Illinois [Mr. Evans], the ranking member of the Committee on Veterans' 
Affairs.
  Mr. EVANS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from South Carolina 
[Mr. Spratt] for yielding me the time.
  I oppose the Budget Enforcement Act because I believe our Nation's 
veterans

[[Page H5608]]

and their families may suffer if this bill is passed. If sequestration 
procedures were triggered, the Budget Enforcement Act could permanently 
reduce VA compensation benefits for more than 2.5 million service-
connected disabled veterans and their surviving spouses next year. At 
the same time, needs-based pension programs for 710,000 low-income 
wartime veterans could be reduced, insurance premiums for more than 1.5 
million veterans could be increased, and 30,000 veterans could be 
denied health care from the VA in 1998.
  The Budget Enforcement Act would continue Congress' role in neglect 
toward our Nation's veterans. According to a recent Congressional 
Research Service report on Federal social spending, veterans benefits 
programs are the only Federal social programs in the recently adopted 
budget to suffer a real reduction in purchasing power over the next 5 
fiscal years.
  We in Congress are not willing to abandon our obligations to men and 
women who have served in this country. I urge my colleagues to defeat 
this bill and protect our Nation's veterans.
  Mr. MINGE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas 
[Mr. Stenholm].
  (Mr. STENHOLM asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Speaker, listening to this debate, I am reminded of 
the wisdom of Will Rogers when he observed, ``It ain't people's 
ignorance that bothers me so much. It's them knowing so much that ain't 
so which is the problem.''
  This bill does not cut Social Security, does not cut veterans' 
benefits, does not raise taxes, does not put the Government on 
autopilot. It takes us off autopilot. It simply requires the Congress 
to act if we do not meet our promise to the people of 2002.
  Last fall, many of us ran on a platform of fiscal responsibility. 
They made countless speeches about balancing the budget, and that plank 
helped in their election to the House. In March, after voting for the 
successful balanced budget constitutional amendment, they sent out the 
press release claiming their portion of that success. In May, my 
colleagues joined in the press conference hailing the balanced budget 
agreement between the President and Congress, and they endorsed the 
plan by voting for the House-passed reconciliation bills in June.
  In every townhall meeting this year, my colleagues have insisted to 
skeptical constituents that, at long last, Congress can be trusted to 
balance the budget. Just like the national polls say, about four out of 
every five of their constituents say they do not think the Government 
can really do that. But my colleagues reassure them, after years of 
broken promises, this time we really are going to balance the Federal 
budget and keep it balanced.

  That scenario really does not require much imagination, does it? For 
the vast majority of this body, it is our story. Now imagine this: It 
is the first week of August and you are addressing the first of two 
dozen townhall meetings that you will face over the next month. The 
first person up to the microphone, the one your opponent always plants 
in these meetings, asks, ``Congressman, how are you going to keep your 
promises to us? How did you vote on that bill which makes sure we 
really get a balanced budget, the one that enforces the spending and 
revenue targets laid out in the budget?''
  I do not know about my colleagues, but there is only one answer I can 
imagine giving to that question: Seal that answer today. Vote ``yes'' 
on the bipartisan enforcement bill. Take us off autopilot. And force 
the Congress to act if we do not do that which we say we are doing.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Filner].
  Mr. FILNER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from South Carolina 
[Mr. Spratt] for yielding me the time.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to the so-called Budget 
Enforcement Act. H.R. 2003 will lead to permanent reductions in 
veterans' benefits. Although its supporters describe this bill as a 
neutral and benign enforcement mechanism, in reality it would decimate 
the benefit programs our grateful Nation has provided for America's 
heroes, our veterans.
  If this bill passes, education benefits for veterans would be cut. 
More than 345,000 men and women who served in our Nation's Armed Forces 
would be affected. Compensation provided for the men and women disabled 
as a result of their military service would be permanently reduced. 
More than 2.5 million veterans and their widows would be affected. The 
safety net we provide for our aging war veterans would be torn. More 
than 700,000 old and sick wartime veterans would be affected.
  Let us not support a bill that would endanger the benefits earned by 
America's veterans. Let us tell our veterans that we support them. Vote 
``no'' on H.R. 2003.
  Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the 
distinguished gentleman from Delaware [Mr. Castle], the chief cosponsor 
and former Governor of Delaware.
  Mr. CASTLE. Mr. Speaker, we have heard the scare tactics they talked 
about earlier. We heard about Social Security and maybe there will not 
be increases in Social Security. We heard about possible cuts in the 
veterans' programs. We heard that tax reductions will not go into 
place.
  What has happened because of what Congress has done over many decades 
now? We have had this tremendous deficit adding to the debt of the 
United States. About 16 percent of the cost of the budget goes to pay 
the interest on the debt of the United States of America. We have had 
tax increases because of that.
  We have to make changes. We need the budget enforcement. The budget 
enforcement bill provides that if there is a problem in terms of 
getting to where we need to be over those 5 years that we, the 
Congress, can waive the caps, that we, the Congress, can make 
programmatic changes, all of which we would do to protect Social 
Security or the veterans or the tax reductions; or we could do nothing 
and by sequestration it would be resolved.
  I do not think that is going to happen. I think these are scare 
tactics. I believe that, if we believe that we should balance the 
budget of the United States of America, that we have to do more than 
just say that, we have to have a budget enforcement mechanism; and that 
is what this legislation is. Vote ``yes'' today.
  Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 3 minutes to ask a question 
of the distinguished gentleman from Delaware [Mr. Castle].
  He mentioned that there has been some scare tactics today. I do not 
think there has been scare tactics as much as there has been 
uncertainty. And that is really what I was trying to bring out. Is the 
gentleman from Delaware [Mr. Castle] clear on the fact that Social 
Security, under his provision, would never be cut or veterans' 
benefits?
  That is what we are suggesting, is that we are unclear. I think 
Members that are coming here to vote are not necessarily persuaded that 
there are definite sequestrations because they did build into this some 
mechanisms. But the concern is that it is unclear, and that is what I 
think raises so much concern from those of us that oppose this 
particular enforcement mechanism.
  Mr. CASTLE. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. NUSSLE. I yield to the gentleman from Delaware.
  Mr. CASTLE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. Nussle] 
for yielding. I am clear that if we pass the budget enforcement 
mechanisms here that we are going to have better protection of the 
programs, such as Social Security, than if we do not. We are facing 
crises in Social Security sometime in the near future. In this way, we 
can look at it and we can make corrections if the money is not there.
  I think this is an improved mechanism in terms of dealing with not 
just Social Security but all of the entitlement programs, the concerns 
that have been expressed here today.
  Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, my concern, however, is 
this: It is easy to suggest that my colleagues are clear about this, 
but then my understanding is that what we are hearing is that there is 
going to be a motion to recommit that is going to be rushed in here 
that says, ``because we are real concerned about Social Security, and 
since my colleagues seem to

[[Page H5609]]

be so concerned about Social Security, we will exempt it,'' or 
veterans, ``we will exempt that,'' or tax cuts, ``we will exempt 
that.'' Something is going to be exempted because of all of this 
concern.
  So either we are concerned and unclear or we are clear and not 
concerned. And that is why I think Members out there, while they want 
to support reform and enforcement, are concerned that this may not be 
the exact bill that we want to support to get that job done.
  I yield to the gentleman.
  Mr. CASTLE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. Nussle] 
for yielding.
  With respect to Social Security, it will not be exempted in the bill 
that we actually presented to the Committee on Rules yesterday. I do 
not know if it will be in the motion to recommit or if there will be 
one here today. What it will do, essentially, is start to deal with the 
debt of Social Security, which is something I think we need to do. We 
are building a deficit there. We are having a problem not having the 
trust fund. That is why we are going to have economic problems with 
Social Security in the future.
  This will be a great mechanism if we could add it to our bill. We 
probably will not be able to, but I would love to do that. But it does 
not exempt it per se.
  Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time further, I understand 
that there may be some certainty on the part of the authors based on 
their careful work on their particular provision. But the rest of us 
have not had an opportunity to have the hearings, to think through the 
legislation, to consider all of its ramifications within a total 
process reform measure. And that is what concerns us.

                              {time}  1245

  I think the proof will be in the motion to recommit. If in fact we 
think this is such a good bill, the motion to recommit will be just 
some easy motion to recommit. But my feeling is that there is going to 
be a motion to recommit that comes down here that is going to say, 
``Hey, wait a minute, we've got problems. We better move to recommit 
this and exempt Social Security.'' Or move to recommit this and exempt 
veterans. Or all of them.
  I would suggest to my colleagues on both sides of the aisle that in 
fact if we believe this is such good legislation and if we believe the 
enforcement in this legislation is so perfect, then why do we on the 
one hand say it is not tough enough to take care of Social Security and 
on the other hand rush in here with a motion to recommit to try and fix 
it? We need to perfect this legislation in committee.
  Mr. MINGE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Dooley].
  (Mr. DOOLEY of California asked and was given permission to revise 
and extend his remarks.)
  Mr. DOOLEY of California. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of 
the bipartisan Budget Enforcement Act. For the vast majority of 
Republicans and Democrats who stood up and voted for the balanced 
budget agreement, we were in fact making a promise, a commitment to the 
American people that we are ensuring that we will balance our budget 
while protecting the priorities of our American families and also by 
providing a responsible level of tax reduction.
  What this bipartisan Budget Enforcement Act does is it basically 
provides the American people with an insurance policy, to ensure that 
Congress will not renege on the promises that are a part of the 
balanced budget agreement. It is a responsible measure that has the 
protections for entitlement programs in times of recession. For those 
people who contend that it is going to cut veterans benefits, it is 
going to cut Social Security, that it is going to cut entitlement 
programs, that will only happen if Congress and the President fail to 
live up to their elected responsibilities of providing some leadership 
to address some of the problems that emerge when we find that our 
spending is no longer in line with our revenues, by coming forth to the 
American people and telling them that we have to make some 
modifications in order to ensure that we can continue to provide the 
veterans with the benefits that they need.
  Also, it gives us the opportunity to tell the American people that we 
do not have the ability. This is the enforcement mechanism for us to 
provide the leadership that the American people deserve.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Massachusetts [Mr. Olver].
  Mr. OLVER. I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.
  Mr. Speaker, I oppose the Budget Enforcement Act because it would 
widen the divide between the wealthy and the poor in America. The 
legislation enforces spending and revenue targets agreed to in the 
budget agreement by a combination of entitlement caps and deferred tax 
breaks. But the bill treats entitlements that benefit the poor 
differently from tax cuts that benefit the wealthy. This act would 
permanently cut entitlement spending if it exceeds its cap while it 
places only a temporary delay on tax cuts if revenues fall short. The 
bill protects the capital gains cuts for the wealthy, but leaves basic 
assistance to families, children and the elderly on the chopping block.
  Mr. Speaker, this Congress does not need another scheme to widen the 
gap between the rich and families struggling to get by. I urge that we 
vote against the Budget Enforcement Act today.
  Mr. MINGE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from 
California [Ms. Harman].
  (Ms. HARMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend her 
remarks.)
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time and commend him above all others in this body for his perseverance 
on behalf of this important issue. I am pleased to cosponsor this 
legislation, but also urge support for the motion to recommit, which 
contains an even more perfected version of it.
  As the mother of the deficit lock box, I have seen that mechanism 
work to reduce the deficit. Some of us insisted as a condition to 
supporting the 1993 budget agreement that the lock box be attached in 
Executive order. The result has been unprecedented growth.
  Similarly, for those who support the balanced budget agreement, we 
need an enforcement mechanism, and this is the best we can come up with 
on a bipartisan basis. If we are going to lengths to balance the 
budget, why are we not going to lengths to enforce that budget?
  I urge support for the motion to recommit. Failing that, I urge 
support for the legislation. A cut must be a cut and a balanced budget 
must be enforced.
  Mr. MINGE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New 
Jersey [Mr. Andrews].
  Mr. ANDREWS. I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.
  Mr. Speaker, over the last number of years, we have all heard the 
voices of alarm that we are hearing again today. Those voices are 
wrong. As the gentleman from Delaware [Mr. Castle] said earlier, this 
bill will not cut Social Security. It will not cut veterans benefits. 
It will not take well-earned tax reductions away from taxpayers. If 
Members choose to listen to those voices, I assume that they will have 
a short-term political gain because they will not be criticized for 
voting for those things. But we have done enough around here for the 
last 30 years of making short-term political gains at the expense of 
the long-term health of the economy of this country.
  If my colleagues believe in the terms of the balanced budget 
agreement, then put it into the law. If my colleagues believe it can 
and will work the way it has been planned by the President and the 
congressional leadership, then make sure it works by putting it into 
the law. Our motto around here for the last 30 years has been, ``The 
check is in the mail.'' Let us do something real this time. Let us make 
this agreement enforceable and real for the American people. Vote 
``yes'' on this legislation.
  Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute.
  Mr. Speaker, if it does not cut Social Security and if it does not 
cut veterans benefits and if it does not cut Medicare and if it does 
not affect the taxes and if it does not affect any other sacred cow in 
the Federal Government, how is it an enforcement mechanism? Everybody 
is rushing down here and we are

[[Page H5610]]

going to get a motion to recommit saying, ``Oh, don't worry about 
Social Security; don't worry about veterans benefits; don't worry about 
this. This really isn't as tough as everybody out there is saying it 
is.'' Then what does this do?
  I have been patient about this and I am not going to question 
anybody's motive. But if in fact this does not do any of those things 
which it is advertised to do, then we better send this back and find 
out what it does do, because if it does not do all of those things, 
then it does not work. And if it does not work, why are we passing it 
here today in a big rush to say, ``Yeah, we're tough on budgets and, 
yeah, we're going to balance it and, yeah, we're going to put some 
teeth into this process''?
  Come on. It is either going to be tough or it is not going to be 
tough. The groups out there that have studied this say it is pretty 
tough. Let us advertise it that way.
  Mr. MINGE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 15 seconds.
  Mr. Speaker, this bill is tough because it requires us in Congress to 
be responsible. That is something that is tough news for all of us, and 
I hope that we can accept it.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. 
Tanner].
  Mr. TANNER. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. Minge] is 
right. It requires Congress to act. That is why it is tough and that is 
why it is so necessary.
  Mr. Speaker, a nation that is bankrupt is a nation that is 
vulnerable. It is no more complicated than that. By 2003 if we do not 
do anything, over 70 percent of the money that comes to Washington will 
be obligated. We will be on a collision course with debt and deficit. 
We got here together, Democrats and Republicans, equally responsible 
for the situation we find ourselves in. We are going to solve it 
together. This is a bipartisan bill from the rank and file Members of 
this House. This, make no mistake about it, is the only vehicle to 
translate the idea of balancing our Nation's budget today from an idea 
to reality. There is nothing else on the floor that will do it. Today 
is the time, and I hope that people in this House will have the 
opportunity to put their country ahead of partisan politics for once. 
Today is the day to do it.
  Mr. MINGE. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from Iowa [Mr. Boswell].
  (Mr. BOSWELL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. BOSWELL. Mr. Speaker, I have some difficulties with the bill.
  Mr. MINGE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Bonilla). The gentleman from Minnesota 
is recognized for 1\1/4\ minutes.
  Mr. MINGE. Mr. Speaker, we have been journeying on a noble course 
here. It is a bipartisan course. It is a rank and file course. The 
leadership on both sides of the aisle has been either lukewarm or 
opposed to what we are doing. The White House has declined to provide 
us with any support. But instead Members of this body from around the 
country, from both parties, from all ends of the political spectrum, 
have seen that if we are not willing to stand up and take 
responsibility for what we do, hold ourselves accountable, introduce 
some discipline to the budget process, that we do not deserve to serve 
in this institution.
  We feel that strong bipartisan budget enforcement is long overdue. It 
should not just apply to discretionary spending. It should apply to the 
entitlement programs. We ought to hold our tax cuts to the same 
standards. For those on my side of the aisle, indeed I would have 
written this bill differently if I had the opportunity to do it just 
for myself. I am sure that on the other side of the aisle, the feeling 
is mutual. But we attempted to come together and craft a bill that 
would have bipartisan support. It is ironic that the Democrats feel it 
does not deal harshly enough with the tax cuts. The Republicans feel it 
deals too harshly. Let us come together and get the job done.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from South Carolina is 
recognized for 2 minutes.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, as we close this debate, I think it is well 
to remember that deficits have come down. The promises we made in 1993 
have been kept. We adopted that budget in a year when the deficit the 
prior year had been $290 billion. The Bush administration projected the 
deficit that year would be $332 billion. It was not. It was $255 
billion. The next year it was $203 billion. In 1995, it was $164 
billion. In 1996, last year, it was $107.8, and this year in a few 
weeks we will find that it is less than $40 billion.
  So in the face of those facts, we are now looking at a hugely complex 
process to deal with a problem that has not presented itself for the 
last 5 years. We are imposing enormous complexity on the process. Let 
me give just one practical problem. This bill dictates that the 
President and OMB within 30 days of the close of the fiscal year, when 
the numbers are just coming in, must analyze every entitlement program 
and propose spending cuts that will not only rectify any past year 
overrun but also eliminate any excess in the year to come. Then it 
requires Congress to act on this hastily submitted proposal within less 
than 45 days, and that 45 days falls in a period when Congress is 
rarely in session. Indeed, every other year the House will be in a lame 
duck session.
  So the Congress can act within this tight time frame, this bill 
dispenses with the jurisdiction of the authorizing committees and the 
appropriations committees and vests extraordinary jurisdiction in the 
Committee on the Budget. When the Committee on the Budget bring its 
bill to the floor, it dispenses with the Committee on Rules and allows 
any Member under the 5-minute rule to present any amendment that is 
germane to tax or spending measures in the bill before us.

                              {time}  1300

  Added to these extraordinary procedures is something else buried in 
the bill, one other example which deals with disaster relief. It sets 
up a reserve fund for disaster relief each year and pulls $5.5 billion 
out of discretionary spending.
  Now in the budget agreement, we have cut discretionary spending to 
the bone. This would take it down another $27 billion over the next 5 
years.
  It is too much, it is not needed, it is well intentioned, but it 
should not be passed and is not required.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Bonilla). The gentleman from Iowa [Mr. 
Nussle] is recognized for his remaining 1\1/2\ minutes.
  Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Speaker, look, there is nobody who really wants to 
come down here and oppose reform because, quite honestly, I think there 
is major bipartisan support for reform. In fact, we have seen it here 
today. I commend, even though I have some concerns with this bill and I 
oppose it, I commend my friends and colleagues on the committee on 
which I serve and the conference in which I am proud to be a member and 
the Congress of which I enjoy the kind of bipartisanship on this 
particular issue and others. I commend them for the work that they have 
done.
  We have bipartisan opposition, however, as well. I mean I want my 
colleagues to understand that, yes, there is bipartisan support, but 
that also means there is bipartisan opposition, and quite strong I 
would suggest. The committee chairs, the ranking members of the 
different committees of jurisdiction who want to move forward with 
legislation and reform are all standing foursquare in opposition to 
this here today.
  I am worried about the advertising, quite honestly. And I do not 
question the motives of the Members that have written this particular 
bill, but I am worried about the advertising. This is either advertised 
as tough enforcement with teeth that is going to do the job once and 
for all, that is going to hold our feet to the fire, that is going to 
be automatic, that is going to have tough caps, or it is not. It either 
is going to go after some of these programs that we have been concerned 
about on the floor here today by various Members, such as Social 
Security, Medicare, veterans, all assorted programs that have obvious 
constituencies within the House and the country, or it does not.
  We are not sure, and I think the proof is in the uncertainty. Send us 
back to committee. Vote against the bill and the motion to recommit.
  Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman 
from

[[Page H5611]]

Wisconsin [Mr. Neumann], one of the most passionate balanced budgeters 
in the Congress.
  Mr. NEUMANN. Mr. Speaker, I would like to specifically address my 
good friend from Iowa [Mr. Nussle] and his most recent comments about 
Social Security. This bill is very important. It does not go after 
Social Security in any way, shape, or form. In fact, the people in 
Washington, DC, are already going after Social Security because Social 
Security collects more money than it pays back out to our senior 
citizens in benefits every year.
  That money is supposed to be sitting out here in Washington in a 
savings account. There is no savings account. Washington puts that 
money in the general fund, it spends all the money out of the general 
fund and then some; that is the deficit, and there is no money left to 
put in the Social Security trust fund so they simply put IOU's in 
there.
  Let me finish; I only got 1 minute. To my good friend, I would 
normally be happy to yield. The bottom line is this: that money that is 
supposed to be in the Social Security trust fund is not there, and what 
we had proposed last night in amendment to this bill is that we take 
the first money from surpluses, the first hundred billion dollars, and 
set it aside to start preserving Social Security for our senior 
citizens. By the year 2012 not 2029, 2012, there is not enough money 
coming into the Social Security system to make good on our promises to 
seniors.
  This bill does not go after Social Security. As a matter of fact it 
does not go far enough on stopping the people in Washington from going 
after Social Security.
  Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of the 
time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Texas is recognized for 3 
minutes.
  Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield for a question very 
briefly?
  Mr. BARTON of Texas. If it does not come out of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. It does come out of the time of the 
gentleman from Texas.
  Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I will yield to the gentleman very 
briefly.
  Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Speaker, why is there a cap if this does not affect 
Social Security?
  Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, last Saturday I took my daughter 
Kristin and my wife Janet to Philadelphia, the birthplace of freedom in 
this Nation. I stood in the room where Thomas Jefferson wrote the 
Declaration of Independence. In the beginning of that declaration it 
says:

       We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are 
     created equal, they are endowed by their Creator with certain 
     unalienable rights, and among those rights are the right to 
     life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

  Those are very famous words that continue to echo down through the 
centuries.
  I stand on the floor of the House of Representatives today to issue 
the following declaration of budget accountability: We hold these 
truths to be self-evident, that all items in the budget should be on 
the table, that enforcement mechanisms are necessary and that to 
implement those mechanisms we should have a bipartisan approach to 
budget enforcement.
  The bill before us today does that.
  I would like to point out that the caps and the targets in our bill 
are not something that the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. Minge] and the 
gentleman from Texas [Mr. Barton] and the gentleman from Delaware [Mr. 
Castle] and the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. Wamp] and the gentleman 
from Texas [Mr. Stenholm] came up with, they are numbers that President 
Clinton and the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Kasich] and the gentleman from 
Georgia [Mr. Gingrich] and the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. Gephardt] 
and Mr. Daschle and Mr. Lott came up with. They are not our numbers; 
they are the agreed-upon numbers.
  I would point out that this is a budget accountability bill. It 
forces us to address the problems.
  When the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. Nussle] asked is it hard or is it 
soft, the truth is that as a last resort it is a hard enforcement bill. 
But the first resort is to give the President and the Congress the 
opportunity to waive any part of the cap or any part of the revenue 
target that we consciously vote on the floor to do so. The second 
option is to reform any program or any contingent tax cut that we 
consciously vote to do so, but as a last resort.
  If we stick our head in the sand and do nothing, under this bill the 
deficit is not going to go up, it is going to stay within the caps. 
That is what sequestration is all about or the delayed tax cut is all 
about.
  I would like to point out what the options are. If the spending does 
not come within the cap, Congress and the President can vote to waive 
the cap, Congress and the President can change the program, and as a 
last resort we can do this sequestration.
  Everything in our budget under our bill is on the table. Everything. 
It has to be, my colleagues. Look at this chart. If we do nothing, the 
uncontrollable part of the budget with interest on the debt is going to 
be 70 percent in the year 2002, 70 percent. That is a complete reversal 
of what it was 25 years ago.
  Our opponents have said we have to have budget enforcement; they just 
do not want to do it today or they do not want to do it like this.
  I will urge my colleagues to vote for the bill. Let us do the right 
thing and let us do it now.
  Mr. BOSWELL. Mr. Speaker, during the initial stages of the drafting 
of the Budget Enforcement Act I was supportive of the concept. 
Unfortunately, today I cannot support the final version of the act. I 
do however continue my strong support to the concept of enforcing the 
parameters agreed to in the budget reconciliation. I regret that I 
cannot support this legislation I had signed as a cosponsor. Sometimes 
in the legislative process the devil is in the details. Careful 
examination of the bill's language revealed the potential of severe 
reductions to vital programs for Iowans. Tax reductions and spending 
cuts to programs such as veterans benefits, Social Security, Medicare, 
and Medicaid could be mandated without the matter being brought to a 
vote in Congress. In this case as the details of the bill came to the 
surface and were not allowed to be corrected, it became apparent I 
could not support this legislation in its final form.
  The people of Iowa sent me here to Washington to bring our Nation's 
fiscal house in order and I am working toward that end everyday. One of 
my first acts in Congress was to cosponsor the balanced budget 
amendment. I have also supported the reconciliation bill and both the 
spending and tax reduction bills. However I cannot support today's 
enforcement bill.
  The Rules Committee passed a rule baring any amendments to the bill, 
forcing a vote on a bill which even many of its supporters including 
myself desired to amend when we discovered the need to improve the 
bill. Under the current version of the bill, if spending reduction and 
tax revenue targets are not met, any necessary revisions would be 
either mandatorily and arbitrarily imposed without a vote by Congress, 
or the Budget Committee would have jurisdiction over legislation 
designed to make any corrections to reach these targets. Neither of 
these processes are appropriate.
  Months of hearings were held by the appropriate committees in an 
effort to fine tune the intricate details of the spending and taxation 
provisions of the budget. To throw out the knowledge and expertise of 
these committee members and place the entire burden on the Budget 
Committee or arbitrary across the board cuts is an abrogation of our 
legislative responsibility and squanders this knowledge base. The 
House's committee system exists for a purpose, to allow for thoughtful 
debate over policy considerations by members who know the most about 
that particular area. To subrogate these policy decision to the rushed, 
politically charged judgment of one committee is a misguided approach.
  Additionally, the final version of the bill lacked sufficient 
incentives to force Congress to make the appropriate charges if 
spending and revenue targets are not met. The targets could be adjusted 
by a simple majority vote and therefore avoid the difficult decisions 
required to reach the end result of a balance budget in 2002.
  Although I strongly support efforts to help ensure we do reach a 
balanced budget in 2002, I cannot support this enforcement bill in its 
current form.
  Mr. STUMP. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to H.R. 2003.
  The VA Committee was able to meet our reconciliation targets in the 
traditional manner as envisioned by the bipartisan budget agreement.
  We have a long tradition of complying with reconciliation directives. 
However, despite our record of responsible stewardship of veterans'

[[Page H5612]]

programs, H.R. 2003 would strip authority from the VA Committee and 
other authorizing committees. Its enforcement mechanism could create 
unfair results.
  If an estimate of projected spending for Social Security or Medicaid 
turns out to be wrong, why should veterans pay the price?
  Under H.R. 2003, that is exactly what could happen if an entitlement 
program exceeds its target in a given year.
  In our budget process, the VA Committee relied on CBO budget 
estimates and then used our expertise in veterans affairs to meet our 
reconciliation targets.
  H.R. 2003 would take away the VA Committee's ability to provide 
veterans benefits in an equitable manner.
  For example, if the cost of veterans' disability compensation grew 
past its target because the department ruled that new or additional 
ailments were service-connected, the caps on allowable expenditures for 
veterans' entitlements would not be adjusted upward.
  Although H.R. 2003 provides for alternatives to automatic cuts, it 
provides no assurance that benefits will continue to be paid as they 
are authorized.
  Our Nation's veterans are willing to play their part in balancing the 
budget as long as it is done in a fair way.
  The current paygo procedures have contained most increases in 
entitlement spending in the past and should continue to do so.
  Let's move forward with the bipartisan budget agreement and the 
reconciliation bills and balance the budget.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I rise this morning to voice 
my opposition to H.R. 2003, the Budget Enforcement Act. I share with 
the authors of this legislation commitment to a balanced Federal budget 
and while I respect the principle underlying this legislation, I cannot 
support H.R. 2003.
  H.R. 2003 is often described by its proponents as a straightforward 
piece of legislation that is neutral with respect to benefit programs 
and tax cuts and seeks simply to enforce the bipartisan budget 
agreement. Such a cursory descriptions of H.R. 2003 fails to provide a 
full picture of how it would work or the effects it would have. H.R. 
2003 is neither simple nor neutral in its impact on benefit programs 
and tax cuts. In fact, it would have disturbing consequences.
  H.R. 2003 would not treat revenue shortfalls and entitlement programs 
which exceed their target spending figures in the same manner. Under 
the bill's enforcement provisions, entitlement spending excesses are 
permanently canceled if spending levels exceeds target levels. These 
cuts would be triggered, even if the Government was running a surplus. 
Thus, if expenditures for programs like Medicare and veterans' pensions 
were slightly higher than forecast, they could be subject to across-
the-board cuts although the budget was running a surplus.
  Tax cuts, however, are simply delayed until revenue increases to 
target levels. Therefore, while the bill's provisions to avert revenue 
shortfalls are weak, on the entitlement side they are like a blunt 
instrument inflicting permanent loss.
  Additionally, while some of the biggest tax cuts for the well-to-do 
would be shielded from the revenue control mechanisms of the bill, 
regardless of how much these tax cuts ultimately cost, none of the 
entitlement programs would be, not even programs providing basic 
benefits to the poorest children or the elderly and disabled. As a 
consequence, the bill could easily cause the gaps between the wealthy 
and other Americans to widen further.
  Finally, H.R. 2003 would have no impact whatsoever in preventing an 
explosion of the costs of the tax cuts after 2002.
  I urge my colleagues to join me in opposing H.R. 2003 and in so doing 
vote to protect programs for our Nation's most vulnerable citizens.
  Mr. DAVIS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, today I rise in strong support of 
H.R. 2003, the Budget Enforcement Act. This legislation represents a 
commitment by this Congress not only to pass a plan to balance the 
budget, but to follow up with tough enforcement to ensure that this 
goal is met.
  During the past 5 years, the budget deficit has been reduced 
dramatically from an all-time high of over $290 billion in 1992, to a 
level estimated to be well under $50 billion this year. Among the 
reasons we have been able to bring the deficit down are the statutory 
budget enforcement provisions covering discretionary spending which 
were put in place in 1990 and extended in the budget agreement of 1993. 
This bill builds on the success of those statutory enforcement 
provisions and for the first time applies similar restraints, with 
clearly defined safeguards, to mandatory spending and revenues.
  For too long, Congress and the President have promised the American 
people a balanced budget with the result being continued deficits and 
an escalating national debt. Even after passage of the historic 
bipartisan agreement earlier this year and strong commitments by both 
sides of the aisle to this important goal, the American people do not 
sufficiently believe that the budget will actually be balanced. This 
skepticism is the result of broken promises of the past and the stark 
reality that no matter how carefully crafted the plan there are no 
guarantees of a balanced budget unless strong enforcement language is 
included. This bill represents a commitment to the American people that 
we, in Congress, will follow up our rhetoric with tough actions.
  Opponents of the bill have argued that the enforceable caps will 
cause automatic cuts in Social Security and other important entitlement 
programs. These caps, however, will be adjusted for inflation, economic 
downturns, and growths in the eligible populations. Therefore, Social 
Security will not be put at risk. Furthermore, the enforcement 
provisions simply say that if we are spending much more than we 
intended on any particular program, then Congress and the President 
will have to make changes to bring that spending in line with previous 
estimates. There is also the option of Congress to agree to raising the 
caps if no agreement can be reached on the necessary changes. Only as a 
last resort would automatic cuts in any programs be triggered. 
Unfortunately, history has proven that without an unappealing hammer 
such as sequestration, Congress will always favor inaction over action.
  Furthermore, this legislation for the first time attempts to put some 
controls on the revenue side of the budget. I believe the greatest 
threats to maintaining balance over the course of this budget agreement 
are some of the proposed tax cuts, many of which could explode in the 
outyears. This enforcement mechanism, although not as tough as I would 
like, at least prevents a bad situation from getting worse by delaying 
the phasein of any of the tax provisions if our established deficit 
targets are not met.
  H.R. 2003 is far from perfect and my support for it today does not 
mean that I am in agreement with all the provisions included in the 
bill. It is truly unfortunate that improvements to the bill were not 
made in order by the Rules Committee or that the committees of 
jurisdiction, including the Budget Committee on which I serve, did not 
consider the bill. Specifically, there remain valid questions over the 
timeline established for action, the impact on automatic economic 
stabilizers, and the effectiveness in controlling exploding tax cuts. 
But I do not believe that we should make the perfect the enemy of the 
good. This bill is a strong step in the right direction and I believe 
these and other questions undoubtedly will be addressed as the bill 
moves forward.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge all of my colleagues to support this legislation 
and commit to backing up the balanced budget agreement with a strong 
enforcement mechanism, guaranteeing that the budget will, in fact, be 
balanced no later than 2002.
  Mr. BALLENGER. Mr. Speaker, I am proud to report that I am a 
cosponsor of the Budget Enforcement Act, a bill to reform the Federal 
budget process. If enacted, this bill will establish in law the 
budgetary outcomes projected to result from the 1997 balanced budget 
agreement, as well as provide for their enforcement. In addition, it 
includes long-overdue changes to emergency spending rules.
  I wish to commend the bipartisan group of House Members who put this 
bill together. They have worked hard for years to craft this 
enforcement mechanism. They forced the leadership to allow a floor vote 
and sought to address everyone's concerns over the impact of this 
important legislation.
  While I do not believe this legislation is perfect, I believe it 
represents an honest, bipartisan effort to ensure spending and revenue 
targets, agreed to by the Congress and the President, will actually be 
adhered to. We are working together to achieve the best alternative to 
address our Nation's deficit problems and respond to our constituents' 
concerns over our inability to live within the budgets we adopt.
  My interest in the Budget Enforcement Act was sparked, in part, by a 
constituent letter which I received some months ago. My constituent 
challenged me to explain how the 5-year budget agreement of 1997 
differed from other budget balancing plans which have gone by the 
wayside. He remembered well the grand promises Congress made to the 
American people following the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings budget deal in 1985 
and three subsequent efforts to balance the budget.
  Despite the good intentions of the authors of these budget balancing 
plans, we have yet to reach balance. Perhaps most disturbing is the 
fact that the national debt quintupled, to $5.3 trillion, during this 
sustained period of deficit spending.
  For the record, I favor tax cuts every bit as much as my conservative 
colleagues who argue that the Budget Enforcement Act will result in a 
suspension of the budget's tax relief--or worse, will permit new tax 
increases and user fees to pay for deficits. In fact, passage of the 
Budget Enforcement Act will not

[[Page H5613]]

force any rollback of any tax cut that will already have taken effect. 
Among the respected groups making this analysis of the bill's impact on 
taxes is the National Taxpayers Union, which considers a ``yes'' vote 
to be a key vote for its rating of Members in the 105th Congress.
  Some opponents of the Budget Enforcement Act argue that the most 
serious problem with this bill is that it would jeopardize the tax 
relief in the budget reconciliation bill. However, I do not view this 
as a major problem. Any unlikely delay in promised tax relief can be 
addressed immediately after we balance the budget and secure a budget 
surplus to enable us to take the Social Security trust funds off-
budget.
  The Budget Enforcement Act provides a separate cap for Social 
Security which would be adjusted for changes in numbers of 
beneficiaries and inflation. Since there are no other factors which can 
cause Social Security costs to rise, Social Security would not be 
affected. While the Budget Enforcement Act would not cut Social 
Security, we want to reassure seniors who will be the target of 
politically motivated distortion campaigns engineered by advocates of 
higher Federal spending. As such, the bill's supporters had prepared an 
amendment specifically to protect the Social Security trust funds.
  We received a commitment from the House leadership that this 
amendment to reassure our Nation's seniors would be made in order 
during floor debate. Since the Rules Committee violated this pledge 
with its passage of a closed rule, I intend to vote against the rule on 
the Budget Enforcement Act. I strongly urge my colleagues to do the 
same.
  Mr. PITTS. Mr. Speaker, Republicans have always maintained that 
fiscal restraint is the key to balancing our budget and generating 
economic growth. While liberals have attempted to balance the budget on 
the backs of taxpaying families, Republicans have continuously worked 
to get to balance by limiting our Government's size, scope, and 
spending.
  I believe the only way we can balance our Federal budget is with 
increased tax relief and decreased Government. That is why I am 
introducing the Tax Relief Guarantee Act today.
  The Tax Relief Guarantee Act accomplishes three important goals as we 
try to ensure tax relief and a balanced budget by the year 2002. First, 
my bill allows any Member of Congress to stop consideration of a bill 
which raises taxes to enforce the balanced budget agreement. Second, 
the Tax Relief Guarantee Act prohibits the suspension or revocation of 
any tax relief given over the next 5 years. And finally, this 
legislation requires that the budget be in balance by the year 2002.
  The Tax Relief Guarantee Act essentially ensures that any revenue 
shortfall in the balanced budget agreement be mitigated by decreases in 
spending, not an increase in taxes or a suspension of tax relief. 
Liberal still contend that we must balance the budget through tax 
increases in the event of revenue shortfalls. But I think it's about 
time that we promise the American people that we will not take their 
money away if difficulties arise in balancing our budget.
  Since the beginning of the 105th Congress, my top priorities have 
been to provide American families permanent tax relief and to balance 
the budget by 2002. Members of Congress must prove that we have the 
courage to put money back into the pockets of hard-working Americans, 
and take it out of the hands of the Washington bureaucrats. I believe 
that the Tax Relief Guarantee Act will ensure permanent tax relief, and 
will require Washington to scale back its frivolous spending. Mr. 
Speaker, I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this bill and 
locking in tax relief for all Americans.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time for debate has expired.
  Pursuant to House Resolution 192, the bill is considered read for 
amendment, and the previous question is ordered.
  The question is on engrossment and third reading of the bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was 
read the third time.


               Motion To Recommit Offered By Mrs. Thurman

  Mrs. THURMAN. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to recommit.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentlewoman opposed to the bill?
  Mrs. THURMAN. Yes, Mr. Speaker.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion to 
recommit.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Mrs. Thurman moves to recommit the bill to the Committee on 
     the Budget with instructions to report the bill back to the 
     House forthwith, with the following amendment:
       Strike all after the enacting clause and insert in lieu 
     thereof the following:

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE AND TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Balanced 
     Budget Assurance Act of 1997''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--

Sec. 1. Short title and table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.

 Title I--Ensure That the Bipartisan Balanced Budget Agreement of 1997 
                           Achieves Its Goal

Sec. 101. Timetable.
Sec. 102. Procedures to avoid sequestration or delay of new revenue 
              reductions.
Sec. 103. Effect on Presidents' budget submissions; point of order.
Sec. 104. Deficit and revenue targets.
Sec. 105. Direct spending caps.
Sec. 106. Economic assumptions.
Sec. 107. Revisions to deficit and revenue targets and to the caps for 
              entitlements and other mandatory spending.

                    Title II--Enforcement Provisions

Sec. 201. Reporting excess spending.
Sec. 202. Enforcing direct spending caps.
Sec. 203. Sequestration rules.
Sec. 204. Enforcing revenue targets.
Sec. 205. Exempt programs and activities.
Sec. 206. Special rules.
Sec. 207. The current law baseline.
Sec. 208. Limitations on emergency spending.

Title III--Use of Budget Surplus to Preserve Social Security Trust Fund

Sec. 301. Ending Use of Receipts of Social Security Trust Fund for 
              Other Programs and Activities.

     SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

       For purposes of this Act:
       (1) Eligible population.--The term ``eligible population'' 
     shall mean those individuals to whom the United States is 
     obligated to make a payment under the provisions of a law 
     creating entitlement authority. Such term shall not include 
     States, localities, corporations or other nonliving entities.
       (2) Sequester and sequestration.--The terms ``sequester'' 
     and ``sequestration'' refer to or mean the cancellation of 
     budgetary resources provided by discretionary appropriations 
     or direct spending law.
       (3) Breach.--The term ``breach'' means, for any fiscal 
     year, the amount (if any) by which outlays for that year 
     (within a category of direct spending) is above that 
     category's direct spending cap for that year.
       (4) Baseline.--The term ``baseline'' means the projection 
     (described in section 207) of current levels of new budget 
     authority, outlays, receipts, and the surplus or deficit into 
     the budget year and the outyears.
       (5) Budgetary resources.--The term ``budgetary resources'' 
     means new budget authority, unobligated balances, direct 
     spending authority, and obligation limitations.
       (6) Discretionary appropriations.--The term ``discretionary 
     appropriations'' means budgetary resources (except to fund 
     direct spending programs) provided in appropriation Acts. If 
     an appropriation Act alters the level of direct spending or 
     offsetting collections, that effect shall be treated as 
     direct spending. Classifications of new accounts or 
     activities and changes in classifications shall be made in 
     consultation with the Committees on Appropriations and the 
     Budget of the House of Representatives and the Senate and 
     with CBO and OMB.
       (7) Direct spending.--The term ``direct spending'' means--
       (A) budget authority provided by law other than 
     appropriation Acts, including entitlement authority;
       (B) entitlement authority; and
       (C) the food stamp program.

     If a law other than an appropriation Act alters the level of 
     discretionary appropriations or offsetting collections, that 
     effect shall be treated as direct spending.
       (8) Entitlement authority.--The term ``entitlement 
     authority'' means authority (whether temporary or permanent) 
     to make payments (including loans and grants), the budget 
     authority for which is not provided for in advance by 
     appropriation Acts, to any person or government if, under the 
     provisions of the law containing such authority, the United 
     States is obligated to make such payments to persons or 
     governments who meet the requirements established by such 
     law.
       (9) Current.--The term ``current'' means, with respect to 
     OMB estimates included with a budget submission under section 
     1105(a) of title 31 U.S.C., the estimates consistent with the 
     economic and technical assumptions underlying that budget.
       (10) Account.--The term ``account'' means an item for which 
     there is a designated budget account designation number in 
     the President's budget.
       (11) Budget year.--The term ``budget year'' means the 
     fiscal year of the Government that starts on the next October 
     1.
       (12) Current year.--The term ``current year'' means, with 
     respect to a budget year, the fiscal year that immediately 
     precedes that budget year.
       (13) Outyear.--The term ``outyear'' means, with respect to 
     a budget year, any of the fiscal years that follow the budget 
     year.
       (14) OMB.--The term ``OMB'' means the Director of the 
     Office of Management and Budget.
       (15) CBO.--The term ``CBO'' means the Director of the 
     Congressional Budget Office.
       (16) Budget outlays and outlays.--The terms ``budget 
     outlays'' and ``outlays'' mean, with respect to any fiscal 
     year, expenditures

[[Page H5614]]

     of funds under budget authority during such year.
       (17) Budget authority and new budget authority.--The terms 
     ``budget authority'' and ``new budget authority'' have the 
     meanings given to them in section 3 of the Congressional 
     Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974.
       (18) Appropriation act.--The term ``appropriation Act'' 
     means an Act referred to in section 105 of title 1 of the 
     United States Code.
       (19) Consolidated deficit.--The term ``consolidated 
     deficit'' means, with respect to a fiscal year, the amount by 
     which total outlays exceed total receipts during that year.
       (20) Surplus.--The term ``surplus'' means, with respect to 
     a fiscal year, the amount by which total receipts exceed 
     total outlays during that year.
       (21) Direct spending caps.--The term ``direct spending 
     caps'' means the nominal dollar limits for entitlements and 
     other mandatory spending pursuant to section 105 (as modified 
     by any revisions provided for in this Act).
 TITLE I--ENSURE THAT THE BIPARTISAN BALANCED BUDGET AGREEMENT OF 1997 
                           ACHIEVES ITS GOAL

     SEC. 101. TIMETABLE.

Action to be completed:
CBO economic and budget update.........................................
President's budget update based on new assumptions.....................
CBO and OMB updates....................................................
Preview report.........................................................
Not later than November 1 (and as soon as practical after the end of 
OMB and CBO Analyses of Deficits, Revenues and Spending Levels and ....
  Projections for the Upcoming Year.
Congressional action to avoid sequestration............................
OMB issues final (look back) report for prior year and preview for ....
  current year.
Presidential sequester order or order delaying new/additional revenues 
  reductions scheduled to take effect pursuant to reconciliation 
  legislation enacted in calendar year 1997.

     SEC. 102. PROCEDURES TO AVOID SEQUESTRATION OR DELAY OF NEW 
                   REVENUE REDUCTIONS.

       (a) Special Message.--If the OMB Analysis of Actual 
     Spending Levels and Projections for the Upcoming Year 
     indicates that--
       (1) deficits in the most recently completed fiscal year 
     exceeded, or the deficits in the budget year are projected to 
     exceed, the deficit targets in section 104, as adjusted 
     pursuant to section 107;
       (2) revenues in the most recently completed fiscal year 
     were less than, or revenues in the current year are projected 
     to be less than, the revenue targets in section 104, as 
     adjusted pursuant to section 107; or
       (3) outlays in the most recently completed fiscal year 
     exceeded, or outlays in the current year are projected to 
     exceed, the caps in section 104, as adjusted pursuant to 
     section 107;

     the President shall submit to Congress with the OMB Analysis 
     of Actual Spending Levels and Projections for the Upcoming 
     Year a special message that includes proposed legislative 
     changes to--
       (A) offset all or part of net deficit or outlay excess;
       (B) offset all or part of any revenue shortfall; or
       (C) revise the deficit or revenue targets or the outlay 
     caps contained in this Act;

     through any combination of--
       (i) reductions in outlays;
       (ii) increases in revenues; or
       (iii) increases in the deficit targets or expenditure caps, 
     or reductions in the revenue targets, if the President 
     submits a written determination that, because of economic or 
     programmatic reasons, less than the entire amount of the 
     variances from the balanced budget plan should be offset.
       (b) Introduction of the President's Package.--Not later 
     than November 15, the message from the President required 
     pursuant to subsection (a) shall be introduced as a joint 
     resolution in the House of Representatives or the Senate by 
     the chairman of its Committee on the Budget. If the chairman 
     fails to do so, after November 15, the joint resolution may 
     be introduced by any Member of that House of Congress and 
     shall be referred to the Committee on the Budget of that 
     House.
       (c) House Committee Action.--The Committee on the Budget, 
     in consultation with the committees of jurisdiction, or, in 
     the case of revenue shortfalls, the Committee on Ways and 
     Means of the House of Representatives shall, by November 15, 
     report a joint resolution containing--
       (1) the recommendations in the President's message, or 
     different policies and proposed legislative changes than 
     those contained in the message of the President, to 
     ameliorate or eliminate any excess deficits or expenditures 
     or any revenue shortfalls, or
       (2) any changes to the deficit or revenue targets or 
     expenditure caps contained in this Act, except that any 
     changes to the deficit or revenue targets or expenditure caps 
     cannot be greater than the changes recommended in the message 
     submitted by the President.
       (d) Procedure if the Appropriate Committee of the House of 
     Representatives Fails To Report Required Resolution.--
       (1) Automatic discharge of committees on the budget of the 
     house.--If the Committee on the Budget of the House of 
     Representatives fails, by November 20, to report a resolution 
     meeting the requirements of subsection (c), the committee 
     shall be automatically discharged from further consideration 
     of the joint resolution reflecting the President's 
     recommendations introduced pursuant to subsection (a), and 
     the joint resolution shall be placed on the appropriate 
     calendar.
       (2) Consideration of discharge resolution in the house.--If 
     the Committee has been discharged under paragraph (1) above, 
     any Member may move that the House of Representatives 
     consider the resolution. Such motion shall be highly 
     privileged and not debatable. It shall not be in order to 
     consider any amendment to the resolution except amendments 
     which are germane and which do not change the net deficit 
     impact of the resolution.
       (e) Consideration of Joint Resolutions in the House.--
     Consideration of resolutions reported pursuant to subsection 
     (c) or (d) shall be pursuant to the procedures set forth in 
     section 305 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 and 
     subsection (d). Notwithstanding subsection (d) and any other 
     rule or order of the House of Representatives or the Senate, 
     it shall be in order to consider amendments to ameliorate any 
     excess spending or revenue shortfalls through different 
     policies and proposed legislation and which do not change the 
     net deficit impact of the resolution.
       (f) Transmittal to Senate.--If a joint resolution passes 
     the House of Representatives pursuant to subsection (e), the 
     Clerk of the House of Representatives shall cause the 
     resolution to be engrossed, certified, and transmitted to the 
     Senate within 1 calendar day of the day on which the 
     resolution is passed. The resolution shall be referred to the 
     Senate Committee on the Budget.
       (g) Requirements for Special Joint Resolution in the 
     Senate.--The Committee on the Budget, in consultation with 
     the committees of jurisdiction, or, in the case of revenue 
     shortfalls, the Committee on Finance of the Senate shall 
     report not later than December 1--
       (1) a joint resolution reflecting the message of the 
     President; or
       (2) the joint resolution passed by the House of 
     Representatives, with or without amendment; or
       (3) a joint resolution containing different policies and 
     proposed legislative changes than those contained in either 
     the message of the President or the resolution passed by the 
     House of Representatives, to eliminate all or part of any 
     excess deficits or expenditures or any revenue shortfalls, or
       (4) any changes to the deficit or revenue targets, or to 
     the expenditure caps, contained in this Act, except that any 
     changes to the deficit or revenue targets or expenditure caps 
     cannot be greater than the changes recommended in the message 
     submitted by the President.
       (h) Procedure if the Appropriate Committee of the Senate 
     Fails To Report Required Resolution.--(1) In the event that 
     the Committee on the Budget of the Senate fails, by December 
     1, to report a resolution meeting the requirements of 
     subsection (g), the committee shall be automatically 
     discharged from further consideration of the joint resolution 
     reflecting the President's recommendations introduced 
     pursuant to subsection (a) and of the resolution passed by 
     the House of Representatives, and both joint resolutions 
     shall be placed on the appropriate calendar.
       (2) Any member may move that the Senate consider the 
     resolution passed by the House of Representatives or the 
     resolution introduced pursuant to subsection (b).
       (i) Consideration of Joint Resolution in the Senate.--
     Consideration of resolutions reported pursuant to subsections 
     (c) or (d) shall be pursuant to the procedures set forth in 
     section 305 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 and 
     subsection (d).
       (j) Procedure if Joint Resolution Does Not Eliminate 
     Deficit Excess.--If the joint resolution reported by the 
     Committee on the Budget, Way and Means, or Finance pursuant 
     to subsection (c) or (g) or a joint resolution discharged in 
     the House of Representatives or the Senate pursuant to 
     subsection (d)(1) or (h) would eliminate less than--
       (1) the entire amount by which actual or projected deficits 
     exceed, or revenues fall short of, the targets in this Act; 
     or
       (2) the entire amount by which actual or projected outlays 
     exceed the caps contained in this Act;

     then the Committee on the Budget of the Senate shall report a 
     joint resolution, raising the deficit targets or outlay caps, 
     or reducing the revenue targets for any year in which actual 
     or projected spending, revenues or deficits would not conform 
     to the deficit and revenue targets or expenditure caps in 
     this Act.
       (k)  Conference Reports Shall Fully Address Deficit 
     Excess.--It shall not be in order in the House of 
     Representatives or the Senate to consider a conference report 
     on a joint resolution to eliminate all or part of any excess 
     deficits or outlays or to eliminate all or part of any 
     revenue shortfall compared to the deficit and revenue targets 
     and the expenditure caps contained in this Act, unless--
       (1) the joint resolution offsets the entire amount of any 
     overage or shortfall; or
       (2) the House of Representatives and Senate both pass the 
     joint resolution reported pursuant to subsection (j)(2).


[[Page H5615]]


     The vote on any resolution reported pursuant to subsection 
     (j)(2) shall be solely on the subject of changing the deficit 
     or revenue targets or the expenditure limits in this Act.

     SEC. 103. EFFECT ON PRESIDENTS' BUDGET SUBMISSIONS; POINT OF 
                   ORDER.

       (a) Budget Submission.--Any budget submitted by the 
     President pursuant to section 1105(a) of title 31, United 
     States Code, for each of fiscal years 1998 through 2002 shall 
     be consistent with the spending, revenue, and deficit levels 
     established in sections 104 and 105, as adjusted pursuant to 
     section 107, or it shall recommend changes to those levels
       (b) Point of Order.--It shall not be in order in the House 
     of Representatives or the Senate to consider any concurrent 
     resolution on the budget unless it is consistent with the 
     spending, revenue, and deficit levels established in sections 
     104 and 105, as adjusted pursuant to section 107.

     SEC. 104. DEFICIT AND REVENUE TARGETS.

       (a) Consolidated Deficit (or Surplus) Targets.--For 
     purposes of sections 102 and 107, the consolidated deficit 
     targets shall be--
       (1) for fiscal year 1998, $90,500,000,000;
       (2) for fiscal year 1999, $89,700,000,000;
       (3) for fiscal year 2000, $83,000,000,000;
       (4) for fiscal year 2001, $53,300,000,000; and
       (5) for fiscal year 2002, there shall be a surplus of not 
     less than $1,400,000,000.
       (b) Consolidated Revenue Targets.--For purposes of sections 
     102, 107, 201, and 204, the consolidated revenue targets 
     shall be--
       (1) for fiscal year 1998, $1,601,800,000,000;
       (2) for fiscal year 1999, $1,664,200,000,000;
       (3) for fiscal year 2000, $1,728,100,000,000;
       (4) for fiscal year 2001, $1,805,100,000,000; and
       (5) for fiscal year 2002, $1,890,400,000,000.

     SEC. 105. DIRECT SPENDING CAPS.

       (a) In General.--Effective upon submission of the report by 
     OMB pursuant to subsection (c), direct spending caps shall 
     apply to all entitlement authority except for undistributed 
     offsetting receipts and net interest outlays, subject to 
     adjustments for changes in eligible populations and inflation 
     pursuant to section 107. For purposes of enforcing direct 
     spending caps under this Act, each separate program shown in 
     the table set forth in subsection (d) shall be deemed to be a 
     category.
       (b) Budget Committee Reports.--Within 30 days after 
     enactment of this Act, the Budget Committees of the House of 
     Representatives and the Senate shall file with their 
     respective Houses identical reports containing account 
     numbers and spending levels for each specific category.
       (c) Report by OMB.--Within 30 days after enactment of this 
     Act, OMB shall submit to the President and each House of 
     Congress a report containing account numbers and spending 
     limits for each specific category.
       (d) Contents of Reports.--All direct spending accounts not 
     included in these reports under separate categories shall be 
     included under the heading ``Other Entitlements and Mandatory 
     Spending''. These reports may include adjustments among the 
     caps set forth in this Act as required below, however the 
     aggregate amount available under the ``Total Entitlements and 
     Other Mandatory Spending'' cap shall be identical in each 
     such report and in this Act and shall be deemed to have been 
     adopted as part of this Act. Each such report shall include 
     the actual amounts of the caps for each year of fiscal years 
     1998 through 2002 consistent with the concurrent resolution 
     on the budget for FY 1998 for each of the following 
     categories:
       Earned Income Tax Credit,
       Family Support,
       Civilian and other Federal retirement:
       Military retirement,
       Food stamps,
       Medicaid,
       Medicare,
       Social security,
       Supplemental security income,
       Unemployment compensation,
       Veterans' benefits,
       Other entitlements and mandatory spending, and
       Aggregate entitlements and other mandatory spending.
       (e) Additional Spending Limits.--Legislation enacted 
     subsequent to this Act may include additional caps to limit 
     spending for specific programs, activities, or accounts with 
     these categories. Those additional caps (if any) shall be 
     enforced in the same manner as the limits set forth in such 
     joint explanatory statement.

     SEC. 106. ECONOMIC ASSUMPTIONS.

       Subject to periodic reestimation based on changed economic 
     conditions or changes in eligible population, determinations 
     of the direct spending caps under section 105, any breaches 
     of such caps, and actions necessary to remedy such breaches 
     shall be based upon the economic assumptions set forth in the 
     joint explanatory statement of managers accompanying the 
     concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal year 1998 
     (House Concurrent Resolution 84, 105th Congress). At the same 
     time as the submission of the report by OMB pursuant to 
     section 104(c), OMB shall submit to the President and 
     Congress a report setting forth the economic assumptions in 
     the joint explanatory statement of managers accompanying the 
     concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal year 1998 and 
     the assumptions regarding eligible populations used in 
     preparing the report submitted pursuant to section 104(c).

     SEC. 107. REVISIONS TO DEFICIT AND REVENUE TARGETS AND TO THE 
                   CAPS FOR ENTITLEMENTS AND OTHER MANDATORY 
                   SPENDING.

       (a) Automatic Adjustments to Deficit and Revenue Targets 
     and to Caps for Entitlements and Other Mandatory Spending.--
     When the President submits the budget under section 1105(a) 
     of title 31, United States Code, and upon submission of the 
     OMB report pursuant to section 201(a) for any year, OMB shall 
     calculate (in the order set forth below), and the budget and 
     reports shall include, adjustments to the deficit and revenue 
     targets, and to the direct spending caps (and those limits as 
     cumulatively adjusted) for the current year, the budget year, 
     and each outyear, to reflect the following:
       (1) Changes to revenue targets.--
       (A) Changes in growth.--For Federal revenues and deficits 
     under laws and policies enacted or effective before July 1, 
     1997, growth adjustment factors shall equal the ratio between 
     the level of year-over-year Gross Domestic Product, as 
     adjusted by the chain-weighted GDP deflator measured for the 
     fiscal year most recently completed and the applicable 
     estimated level for that year as described in section 106.
       (B) Changes in inflation.--For Federal revenues and 
     deficits under laws and policies enacted or effective before 
     July 1, 1997, inflation adjustment factors shall equal the 
     ratio between the level of year-over-year change in the 
     Consumer Price Index measured for the fiscal year most 
     recently completed and the applicable estimated level for 
     that year as described in section 106.
       (2) Adjustments to direct spending caps.--
       (A) Changes in concepts and definitions.--The adjustments 
     produced by changes in concepts and definitions shall equal 
     the baseline levels of new budget authority and outlays using 
     up-to-date concepts and definitions minus those levels using 
     the concepts and definitions in effect before such changes. 
     Such changes in concepts and definitions may only be made in 
     consultation with the Committees on Appropriations, the 
     Budget, and Government Reform and Oversight and Governmental 
     Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Senate.
       (B) Changes in net outlays.--Changes in net outlays for all 
     programs and activities exempt from sequestration under 
     section 204.
       (C) Changes in inflation.--For direct spending under laws 
     and policies enacted or effective on or before July 1, 1997, 
     inflation adjustment factors shall equal the ratio between 
     the level of year-over-year change in the Consumer Price 
     Index measured for the fiscal year most recently completed 
     and the applicable estimated level for that year as described 
     in section 106 (relating to economic assumptions). For direct 
     spending under laws and policies enacted or effective after 
     July 1, 1997, there shall be no adjustment to the direct 
     spending caps (for changes in economic conditions including 
     inflation, nor for changes in numbers of eligible 
     beneficiaries) unless--
       (i) the Act or the joint explanatory statement of managers 
     accompanying such Act providing new direct spending includes 
     economic projections and projections of numbers of 
     beneficiaries; and
       (ii) such Act specifically provides for automatic 
     adjustments to the direct spending caps in section 105 based 
     on those projections.
       (D) Changes in eligible populations.--For direct spending 
     under laws and policies enacted or effective on or before 
     July 1, 1997, the direct spending caps shall be adjusted to 
     reflect changes in eligible populations, based on the 
     assumptions set forth in the OMB report submitted pursuant to 
     section 106. In making such adjustments, OMB shall estimate 
     the changes in spending resulting from the change in eligible 
     populations. For direct spending under laws and policies 
     enacted or effective after July 1, 1997, there shall be no 
     adjustment to the direct spending caps for changes in numbers 
     of eligible beneficiaries unless--
       (i) the Act or the joint explanatory statement of managers 
     accompanying such Act providing new direct spending includes 
     economic projections and projections of numbers of 
     beneficiaries; and
       (ii) such Act specifically provides for automatic 
     adjustments to the direct spending caps in section 105 based 
     on those projections.
       (E) Intra-budgetary payments.--From discretionary accounts 
     to mandatory accounts. The baseline and the discretionary 
     spending caps shall be adjusted to reflect those changes.
       (b) Changes to Deficit Targets.--The deficit targets in 
     section 104 shall be adjusted to reflect changes to the 
     revenue targets or changes to the caps for entitlements and 
     other mandatory spending pursuant to subsection (a).
       (c) Permissible Revisions to Deficit and Revenue Targets 
     and Direct Spending Caps.--Deficit and revenue targets and 
     direct spending caps as enacted pursuant to sections 104 and 
     105 may be revised as follows: Except as required pursuant to 
     subsection (a) and (b), deficit, revenue, and direct spending 
     caps may only be adjusted by recorded vote. It shall be a 
     matter of highest privilege in the House of Representatives 
     and the Senate for a Member of the House of Representatives 
     or the Senate to insist on a recorded vote solely on the 
     question of amending such caps. It shall not be in order for 
     the Committee on Rules of the House of Representatives to 
     report a resolution waiving the provisions of this 
     subsection. This subsection may be waived in the Senate

[[Page H5616]]

     only by an affirmative vote of three-fifths of the Members 
     duly chosen and sworn.
                    TITLE II--ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS

     SEC. 201. REPORTING EXCESS SPENDING.

       (a) Analysis of Actual Deficit, Revenue, and Spending 
     Levels.--As soon as practicable after any fiscal year, OMB 
     shall compile a statement of actual and projected deficits, 
     revenues, and direct spending for that year and the current 
     fiscal year. The statement shall identify such spending by 
     categories contained in section 105.
       (b) Estimate of Necessary Spending Reduction.--Based on the 
     statement provided under subsection (a), the OMB shall issue 
     a report to the President and the Congress on December 15 of 
     any year in which such statement identifies actual or 
     projected deficits, revenues, or spending in the current or 
     immediately preceding fiscal years in violation of the 
     revenue targets or direct spending caps in section 104 or 
     105, as adjusted pursuant to section 107, by more than one-
     tenth of one percent of the applicable total revenues or 
     direct spending for such year. The report shall include:
       (1) The amount, if any, that total direct spending 
     exceeded, or is projected to exceed, the aggregate direct 
     spending cap in section 105, as adjusted pursuant to section 
     107.
       (2) All instances in which actual direct spending has 
     exceeded the applicable direct spending cap.
       (3) The difference between the amount of spending available 
     under the direct spending caps for the current year and 
     estimated actual spending for the categories associated with 
     such caps.
       (4) The amounts by which direct spending shall be reduced 
     in the current fiscal year to offset the net amount that 
     actual direct spending in the preceding fiscal year and 
     projected direct spending in the current fiscal year exceeds 
     the amounts available for each cap category.

     SEC. 202. ENFORCING DIRECT SPENDING CAPS.

       (a) Purpose.--This subtitle provides enforcement of the 
     direct spending caps on categories of spending established 
     pursuant to section 105. This section shall apply for any 
     fiscal year in which the statement provided under section 201 
     identifies actual direct spending in the preceding fiscal 
     year or projected direct spending in the current year in 
     excess of the aggregate direct spending cap, as adjusted 
     pursuant to section 107.
       (b) General Rules.--
       (1) Eliminating a breach.--Each non-exempt account within a 
     category shall be reduced by a dollar amount calculated by 
     multiplying the baseline level of sequestrable budgetary 
     resources in that account at that time by the uniform 
     percentage necessary to eliminate a breach within that 
     category.
       (2) Programs, projects, or activities.--Except as otherwise 
     provided, the same percentage sequestration shall apply to 
     all programs, projects and activities within a budget 
     account.
       (3) Indefinite authority.--Except as otherwise provided, 
     sequestration in accounts for which obligations are 
     indefinite shall be taken in a manner to ensure that 
     obligations in the fiscal year of a sequestration and 
     succeeding fiscal years are reduced, from the level that 
     would actually have occurred, by the applicable sequestration 
     percentage or percentages.
       (4) Cancellation of budgetary resources.--Budgetary 
     resources sequestered from any account other than an trust, 
     special or revolving fund shall revert to the Treasury and be 
     permanently canceled.
       (5) Implementing regulations.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of law, administrative rules or similar actions 
     implementing any sequestration shall take effect within 30 
     days after that sequestration.

     SEC. 203. SEQUESTRATION RULES.

       (a) General Rules.--For programs subject to direct spending 
     caps:
       (1) Triggering of sequestration.--Sequestration is 
     triggered if total direct spending subject to the caps in the 
     preceding fiscal year and projected direct spending subject 
     to the caps in the current fiscal year exceeds the total of 
     aggregate caps for direct spending for the current and 
     immediately preceding fiscal year.
       (2) Calculation of reductions.--The amount to be 
     sequestered from direct spending programs under each separate 
     cap shall be determined by multiplying the total amount that 
     direct spending in that category exceeded or is projected to 
     exceed the direct spending cap for that category by--
       (A) the net amount that total direct spending exceeded, or 
     is projected to exceed, the aggregate spending caps, as 
     identified pursuant to paragraph 201(b)(1); multiplied by
       (B) the net amount that direct spending by which the 
     category exceeded and is projected to exceed the direct 
     spending cap for that category, divided by the net amount 
     that total spending exceeded and is projected to exceed the 
     applicable direct spending cap for all categories in which 
     spending exceeds the applicable direct spending caps.
       (3) Uniform percentages.--In calculating the uniform 
     percentage applicable to the sequestration of all spending 
     programs or activities within each category, or the uniform 
     percentage applicable to the sequestration of nonexempt 
     direct spending programs or activities, the sequestrable base 
     for direct spending programs and activities is the total 
     level of outlays for the fiscal year for those programs or 
     activities in the current law baseline.
       (4) Permanent sequestration of direct spending.--
     Obligations in sequestered direct spending accounts shall be 
     reduced in the fiscal year in which a sequestration occurs 
     and in all succeeding fiscal years. Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of this section, after the first direct spending 
     sequestration, any later sequestration shall reduce direct 
     spending by an amount in addition to, rather than in lieu of, 
     the reduction in direct spending in place under the existing 
     sequestration or sequestrations.
       (5) Special rule.--For any direct spending program in 
     which--
       (A) outlays pay for entitlement benefits;
       (B) a current-year sequestration takes effect after the 1st 
     day of the budget year;
       (C) that delay reduces the amount of entitlement authority 
     that is subject to sequestration in the budget; and
       (D) the uniform percentage otherwise applicable to the 
     budget-year sequestration of a program or activity is 
     increased due to the delay;

     then the uniform percentage shall revert to the uniform 
     percentage calculated under paragraph (3) when the budget 
     year is completed.
       (6) Indexed benefit payments.--If, under any entitlement 
     program--
       (A) benefit payments are made to persons or governments 
     more frequently than once a year; and
       (B) the amount of entitlement authority is periodically 
     adjusted under existing law to reflect changes in a price 
     index (commonly called ``cost of living adjustments'');

     sequestration shall first be applied to the cost of living 
     adjustment before reductions are made to the base benefit. 
     For the first fiscal year to which a sequestration applies, 
     the benefit payment reductions in such programs accomplished 
     by the order shall take effect starting with the payment made 
     at the beginning of January following a final sequester. For 
     the purposes of this subsection, veterans' compensation shall 
     be considered a program that meets the conditions of the 
     preceding sentence.
       (7) Loan programs.--For all loans made, extended, or 
     otherwise modified on or after any sequestration under loan 
     programs subject to direct spending caps--
       (A) the sequestrable base shall be total fees associated 
     with all loans made extended or otherwise modified on or 
     after the date of sequestration; and
       (B) the fees paid by borrowers shall be increased by a 
     uniform percentage sufficient to produce the dollar savings 
     in such loan programs for the fiscal year or years of the 
     sequestrations required by this section.

     Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in any year in 
     which a sequestration is in effect, all subsequent fees shall 
     be increased by the uniform percentage and all proceeds from 
     such fees shall be paid into the general fund of the 
     Treasury.
       (8) Insurance programs.--Any sequestration of a Federal 
     program that sells insurance contracts to the public 
     (including the Federal Crop Insurance Fund, the National 
     Insurance Development Fund, the National Flood Insurance 
     fund, insurance activities of the Overseas Private Insurance 
     Corporation, and Veterans' Life insurance programs) shall be 
     accomplished by increasing premiums on contracts entered into 
     extended or otherwise modified, after the date a 
     sequestration order takes effect by the uniform sequestration 
     percentage. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, for 
     any year in which a sequestration affecting such programs is 
     in effect, subsequent premiums shall be increased by the 
     uniform percentage and all proceeds from the premium increase 
     shall be paid from the insurance fund or account to the 
     general fund of the Treasury.
       (9) State grant formulas.--For all State grant programs 
     subject to direct spending caps--
       (A) the total amount of funds available for all States 
     shall be reduced by the amount required to be sequestered; 
     and
       (B) if States are projected to receive increased funding in 
     the budget year compared to the immediately preceding fiscal 
     year, sequestration shall first be applied to the estimated 
     increases before reductions are made compared to actual 
     payments to States in the previous year--
       (i) the reductions shall be applied first to the total 
     estimated increases for all States; then
       (ii) the uniform reduction shall be made from each State's 
     grant; and
       (iii) the uniform reduction shall apply to the base funding 
     levels available to states in the immediately preceding 
     fiscal year only to the extent necessary to eliminate any 
     remaining excess over the applicable direct spending cap.
       (10) Special rule for certain programs.--Except matters 
     exempted under section 205 and programs subject to special 
     rules set forth under section 206 and notwithstanding any 
     other provisions of law, any sequestration required under 
     this Act shall reduce benefit levels by an amount sufficient 
     to eliminate all excess spending identified in the report 
     issued pursuant to section 201, while maintaining the same 
     uniform percentage reduction in the monetary value of 
     benefits subject to reduction under this subsection.
       (b) Within-Session Sequester.--If a bill or resolution 
     providing direct spending for the current year is enacted 
     before July 1 of that fiscal year and causes a breach within 
     any direct spending cap for that fiscal year, 15 days later 
     there shall be a sequestration to eliminate that breach 
     within that cap.

[[Page H5617]]

     SEC. 204. ENFORCING REVENUE TARGETS.

       (a) Purpose.--This section enforces the revenue targets 
     established pursuant to section 104. This section shall apply 
     for any year in which actual revenues in the preceding fiscal 
     year or projected revenues in the current year are less than 
     the applicable revenue target, as adjusted pursuant to 
     section 107.
       (b) Estimate of Necessity To Suspend New Revenue 
     Reductions.--Based on the statement provided under section 
     201(a), OMB shall issue a report to the President and the 
     Congress on December 15 of any year in which such statement 
     identifies actual or projected revenues in the current or 
     immediately preceding fiscal years lower than the applicable 
     revenue target in section 104, as adjusted pursuant to 
     section 107, by more than 0.1 percent of the applicable total 
     revenue target for such year. The report shall include--
       (1) all laws and policies described in subsection (c) which 
     would cause revenues to decline in the calendar year which 
     begins January 1 compared to the provisions of law in effect 
     on December 15;
       (2) the amounts by which revenues would be reduced by 
     implementation of the provisions of law described in 
     paragraph (1) compared to provisions of law in effect on 
     December 15; and
       (3) whether delaying implementation of the provisions of 
     law described in paragraph (1) would cause the total for 
     revenues in the current fiscal year and actual revenues in 
     the immediately preceding fiscal year to equal or exceed the 
     total of the targets for the applicable years.
       (c) No Credits, Deductions, Exclusions, Preferential Rate 
     of Tax, Etc.--(1) If any provision of the Internal Revenue 
     Code of 1986 added by the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1997 
     establishing or increasing any credit, deduction, exclusion, 
     or eligibility limit or reducing any rate would (but for this 
     section) first take effect in a tax benefit suspension year, 
     and would reduce revenues over the 5-year period beginning 
     with the tax benefit suspension year, such provision shall 
     not take effect until the first calendar year which is not a 
     tax benefit suspension year.
       (2) Suspension of Indexation.--No new adjustment for 
     inflation shall be made to any credit, deduction, or 
     exclusion enacted as part of the Revenue Reconciliation Act 
     of 1997 in a tax benefit suspension year.
       (d) End of Session.--If the OMB report issued under 
     subsection (a) indicates that the total revenues projected in 
     the current year and actual revenues in the immediately 
     preceding year will equal or exceed the applicable targets, 
     the President shall sign an order ending the delayed phase-in 
     of new tax cuts effective January 1. Such order shall provide 
     that the new tax cuts and adjustments for inflation shall 
     take effect as if the provisions of this section had not 
     taken effect.
       (e) Suspension of New Benefits Being Phased In.--If, under 
     any provision of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 added by 
     the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1997, there is an increase 
     in any benefit which would (but for this section) take effect 
     with respect to a tax benefit suspension year, in lieu of 
     applying subsection (c)--
       (1) any increase in the benefit under such section with 
     respect to such year and each subsequent calendar year shall 
     be delayed 1 calendar year, and
       (2) the level of benefit under such section with respect to 
     the prior calendar year shall apply to such tax benefit 
     suspension year.
       (f) Percentage Suspension Where Full Suspension Unnecessary 
     To Achieve Revenue Target.--If the application of subsections 
     (c), (d), and (e) to any tax benefit suspension year would 
     result in total revenues in the current year to equal or 
     exceed the targets described in section 104 such that the 
     amount of each benefit which is denied is only the percentage 
     of such benefit which is necessary to result in revenues 
     equal to such target. Such percentage shall be determined by 
     OMB, and the same percentage shall apply to such benefits.
       (g) Tax Benefit Suspension Year.--For purposes of this 
     section, the term ``tax benefit suspension year'' means any 
     calendar year if the statement issued under subsection (b) 
     during the preceding calendar year indicates that--
       (1) for the fiscal year ending in such preceding calendar 
     year, actual revenues were lower than the applicable revenue 
     target in section 104, as adjusted pursuant to section 106, 
     for such fiscal year by more than 1 percent of such target, 
     or
       (2) for the fiscal year beginning in such preceding 
     calendar year, projected revenues (determined without regard 
     to this section) are estimated to be lower than the 
     applicable revenue target in section 104, as adjusted 
     pursuant to section 106, for such fiscal year by more than 
     0.1 percent of such target.

     SEC. 205. EXEMPT PROGRAMS AND ACTIVITIES.

       The following budget accounts, activities within accounts, 
     or income shall be exempt from sequestration--
       (1) net interest;
       (2) all payments to trust funds from excise taxes or other 
     receipts or collections properly creditable to those trust 
     funds;
       (3) offsetting receipts and collections;
       (4) all payments from one Federal direct spending budget 
     account to another Federal budget account;
       (5) all intragovernmental funds including those from which 
     funding is derived primarily from other Government accounts;
       (6) expenses to the extent they result from private 
     donations, bequests, or voluntary contributions to the 
     Government;
       (7) nonbudgetary activities, including but not limited to--
       (A) credit liquidating and financing accounts;
       (B) the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation Trust Funds;
       (C) the Thrift Savings Fund;
       (D) the Federal Reserve System; and
       (E) appropriations for the District of Columbia to the 
     extent they are appropriations of locally raised funds;
       (8) payments resulting from Government insurance, 
     Government guarantees, or any other form of contingent 
     liability, to the extent those payments result from 
     contractual or other legally binding commitments of the 
     Government at the time of any sequestration;
       (9) the following accounts, which largely fulfill 
     requirements of the Constitution or otherwise make payments 
     to which the Government is committed--
       Bureau of Indian Affairs, miscellaneous trust funds, tribal 
     trust funds (14-9973-0-7-999);
       Claims, defense;
       Claims, judgments and relief act (20-1895-0-1-806);
       Compact of Free Association, economic assistance pursuant 
     to Public Law 99-658 (14-0415-0-1-806);
       Compensation of the President (11-0001-0-1-802);
       Customs Service, miscellaneous permanent appropriations 
     (20-9992-0-2-852);
       Eastern Indian land claims settlement fund (14-2202-0-1-
     806);
       Farm Credit System Financial Assistance Corporation, 
     interest payments (20-1850-0-1-351);
       Internal Revenue collections of Puerto Rico (20-5737-0-2-
     852);
       Payments of Vietnam and USS Pueblo prisoner-of-war claims 
     (15-0104-0-1-153):
       Payments to copyright owners (03-5175-0-2-376);
       Salaries of Article III judges (not including cost of 
     living adjustments);
       Soldier's and Airman's Home, payment of claims (84-8930-0-
     7-705);
       Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, interest 
     payments (46-0300-0-1-401);
       (10) the following noncredit special, revolving, or trust-
     revolving funds--
       Exchange Stabilization Fund (20-4444-0-3-155); and
       Foreign Military Sales trust fund (11-82232-0-7-155).

     SEC. 206. SPECIAL RULES.

       (a) Child Support Enforcement Program.--Any sequestration 
     order shall accomplish the full amount of any required 
     reduction in payments under sections 455 and 458 of the 
     Social Security Act by reducing the Federal matching rate for 
     State administrative costs under the program, as specified 
     (for the fiscal year involved) in section 455(a) of such Act, 
     to the extent necessary to reduce such expenditures by that 
     amount.
       (b) Commodity Credit Corporation.--
       (1) Effective date.--For the Commodity Credit Corporation, 
     the date on which a sequestration order takes effect in a 
     fiscal year shall vary for each crop of a commodity. In 
     general, the sequestration order shall take effect when 
     issued, but for each crop of a commodity for which 1-year 
     contracts are issued as an entitlement, the sequestration 
     order shall take effect with the start of the sign-up period 
     for that crop that begins after the sequestration order is 
     issued. Payments for each contract in such a crop shall be 
     reduced under the same terms and conditions.
       (2) Dairy program.--
       (A) As the sole means of achieving any reduction in outlays 
     under the milk price-support program, the Secretary of 
     Agriculture shall provide for a reduction to be made in the 
     price received by producers for all milk in the United States 
     and marketed by producers for commercial use.
       (B) That price reduction (measured in cents per hundred-
     weight of milk marketed) shall occur under subparagraph (A) 
     of section 201(d)(2) of the Agricultural Act of 1949 (7 
     U.S.C. 1446(d)(2)(A)), shall begin on the day any 
     sequestration order is issued, and shall not exceed the 
     aggregate amount of the reduction in outlays under the milk 
     price-support program, that otherwise would have been 
     achieved by reducing payments made for the purchase of milk 
     or the products of milk under this subsection during that 
     fiscal year.
       (3) Certain authority not to be limited.--Nothing in this 
     Act shall restrict the Corporation in the discharge of its 
     authority and responsibility as a corporation to buy and sell 
     commodities in international trade, or limit or reduce in any 
     way any appropriation that provides the Corporation with 
     funds to cover its realized losses.
       (c) Earned Income Tax Credit.--
       (1) The sequestrable base for earned income tax credit 
     program is the dollar value of all current year benefits to 
     the entire eligible population.
       (2) In the event sequestration is triggered to reduce 
     earned income tax credits, all earned income tax credits 
     shall be reduced, whether or not such credits otherwise would 
     result in cash payments to beneficiaries, by a uniform 
     percentage sufficient to produce the dollar savings required 
     by the sequestration.
       (d) Regular and Extended Unemployment Compensation.--
       (1) A State may reduce each weekly benefit payment made 
     under the regular and extended unemployment benefit programs 
     for

[[Page H5618]]

     any week of unemployment occurring during any period with 
     respect to which payments are reduced under any sequestration 
     order by a percentage not to exceed the percentage by which 
     the Federal payment to the State is to be reduced for such 
     week as a result of such order.
       (2) A reduction by a State in accordance with paragraph (1) 
     shall not be considered as a failure to fulfill the 
     requirements of section 3304(a)(11) of the Internal Revenue 
     Code of 1986.
       (e) Federal Employees Health Benefits Fund.-- For the 
     Federal Employees Health Benefits Fund, a sequestration order 
     shall take effect with the next open season. The 
     sequestration shall be accomplished by annual payments from 
     that Fund to the General Fund of the Treasury. Those annual 
     payments shall be financed solely by charging higher 
     premiums. The sequestrable base for the Fund is the current-
     year level of gross outlays resulting from claims paid after 
     the sequestration order takes effect.
       (f) Federal Housing Finance Board.-- Any sequestration of 
     the Federal Housing Board shall be accomplished by annual 
     payments (by the end of each fiscal year) from that Board to 
     the general fund of the Treasury, in amounts equal to the 
     uniform sequestration percentage for that year times the 
     gross obligations of the Board in that year.
       (g) Federal Pay.--
       (1) In general.-- New budget authority to pay Federal 
     personnel from direct spending accounts shall be reduced by 
     the uniform percentage calculated under section 203(c)(3), as 
     applicable, but no sequestration order may reduce or have the 
     effect of reducing the rate of pay to which any individual is 
     entitled under any statutory pay system as increased by any 
     amount payable under section 5304 of title 5, United States 
     Code, or any increase in rates of pay which is scheduled to 
     take effect under section 5303 of title 5, United States 
     Code, section 1109 of title 37, United States Code, or any 
     other provision of law.
       (2) Definitions.--For purposes of this subsection--
       (A) the term ``statutory pay system'' shall have the 
     meaning given that term in section 5302(1) of title 5, United 
     States Code;
      term ``elements of military pay'' means--
       (i) the elements of compensation of members of the 
     uniformed services specified in section 1009 of title 37, 
     United States Code;
       (ii) allowances provided members of the uniformed services 
     under sections 403(a) and 405 of such title; and
       (iii) cadet pay and midshipman pay under section 203(c) of 
     such title; and
       (C) the term ``uniformed services'' shall have the same 
     meaning given that term in section 101(3) of title 37, United 
     States Code.
       (h) Medicare.--
       (1) In general.--Any sequestration shall accomplish 90% of 
     the required reduction by reductions in payments for services 
     under title XVIII of the Social Security Act and +10% of the 
     required reduction through increases in beneficiary premiums 
     under part B of title XVIII of the Social Security Act.
       (2) Timing of application of reductions.--
       (A) In general.-- Except as provided in subparagraph (B), 
     if a reduction is made in payment amounts pursuant to 
     sequestration order, the reduction shall be applied to 
     payment for services furnished after the effective date of 
     the order. For purposes of the previous sentence, in the case 
     of inpatient services furnished for an individual, the 
     services shall be considered to be furnished on the date of 
     the individual's discharge from the inpatient facility.
       (B) Payment on the basis of cost reporting periods.-- In 
     the case in which payment for services of a provider of 
     services is made under title XVIII of the Social Security Act 
     on a basis relating to the reasonable cost incurred for the 
     services during a cost reporting period of the provider, if a 
     reduction is made in payment amounts pursuant to a 
     sequestration order, the reduction shall be applied to 
     payment for costs for such services incurred at any time 
     during each cost reporting period of the provider any part of 
     which occurs after the effective date of order, but only (for 
     each such cost reporting period) in the same proportion as 
     the fraction of the cost reporting period that occurs after 
     the effective date of the order.
       (3) No increase in beneficiary charges in assignment-
     related cases.--If a reduction in payment amounts is made 
     pursuant to a sequestration order for services for which 
     payment under part B of title XVIII of the Social Security 
     Act is made on the basis of an assignment described in 
     section 1842(b)(3)(B)(ii), in accordance with section 
     1842(b)(6)(B), or under the procedure described in section 
     1870(f)(1) of such Act, the person furnishing the services 
     shall be considered to have accepted payment of the 
     reasonable charge for the services, less any reduction in 
     payment amount made pursuant to a sequestration order, as 
     payment in full.
       (4) Part b premiums.--In computing the amount and method, 
     part B premiums shall be increased by a percentage to be 
     determined by dividing 10% of the amount that medicare 
     spending exceeds the applicable cap by the total amount of 
     all premium collections. All beneficiary premiums shall be 
     increased by the percentage calculated pursuant to the 
     preceding sentence, except that no increase in the premium 
     shall result in a reduction in social security benefit 
     payments to any beneficiary.
       (5) No effect on computation of aapcc.--In computing the 
     adjusted average per capita cost for purposes of section 
     1876(a)(4) of the Social Security Act, the Secretary of 
     Health and Human Services shall not take into account any 
     reductions in payment amounts which have been or may be 
     effected under this part.
       (i) Postal Service Fund.-- Any sequestration of the Postal 
     Service Fund shall be accomplished by annual payments from 
     that Fund to the General Fund of the Treasury, and the 
     Postmaster General of the United States and shall have the 
     duty to make those payments during the first fiscal year to 
     which the sequestration order applies and each succeeding 
     fiscal year. The amount of each annual payment shall be--
       (1) the uniform sequestration percentage, times
       (2) the estimated gross obligations of the Postal Service 
     Fund in that year other than those obligations financed with 
     an appropriation for revenue forgone that year.

     Any such payment for a fiscal year shall be made as soon as 
     possible during the fiscal year, except that it may be made 
     in installments within that year if the payment schedule is 
     approved by the Secretary of the Treasury. Within 30 days 
     after the sequestration order is issued, the Postmaster 
     General shall submit to the Postal Rate Commission a plan for 
     financing the annual payment for that fiscal year and publish 
     that plan in the Federal Register. The plan may assume 
     efficiencies in the operation of the Postal Service, 
     reductions in capital expenditures, increases in the prices 
     of services, or any combination, but may not assume a lower 
     Fund surplus or higher Fund deficit and shall follow the 
     requirements of existing law governing the Postal Service in 
     all other respects. Within 30 days of the receipt of that 
     plan, the Postal Rate Commission shall approve the plan or 
     modify it in the manner that modifications are allowed under 
     current law. If the Postal Rate Commission does not respond 
     to the plan within 30 days, the plan submitted by the 
     Postmaster General shall go into effect. Any plan may be 
     later revised by the submission of a new plan to the Postal 
     Rate Commission, which may approve or modify it.
       (j) Power Marketing Administrations and T.V.A.-- Any 
     sequestration of the Department of Energy power marketing 
     administration funds or the Tennessee Valley Authority fund 
     shall be accomplished by annual payments from those funds to 
     the General Fund of the Treasury, and the administrators of 
     those funds shall have the duty to make those payments during 
     the fiscal year to which the sequestration order applies and 
     each succeeding fiscal year. The amount of each payment by a 
     fund shall be--
       (1) the direct spending uniform sequestration percentage, 
     times
       (2) the estimated gross obligations of the fund in that 
     year other than those obligations financed from discretionary 
     appropriations for that year.

     Any such payment for a fiscal year shall be made as soon as 
     possible during the fiscal year, except that it may be made 
     in installments within that year if the payment schedule is 
     approved by the Secretary of the Treasury. Annual payments by 
     a fund may be financed by reductions in costs required to 
     produce the pre-sequester amount of power (but those 
     reductions shall not include reductions in the amount of 
     power supplied by the fund), by reductions in capital 
     expenditures, by increases in tax rates, or by any 
     combination, but may not be financed by a lower fund surplus, 
     a higher fund deficit, additional borrowing, delay in 
     repayment of principal on outstanding debt and shall follow 
     the requirements of existing law governing the fund in all 
     other respects. The administrator of a fund or the TVA Board 
     is authorized to take the actions specified in this 
     subsection in order to make the annual payments to the 
     Treasury.
       (k) Business-like Transactions.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of law, for programs which provide a business-like 
     service in exchange for a fee, sequestration shall be 
     accomplished through a uniform increase in fees (sufficient 
     to produce the dollar savings in such programs for the fiscal 
     year of the sequestration required by section 201(a)(2), all 
     subsequent fees shall be increased by the same percentage, 
     and all proceeds from such fees shall be paid into the 
     general fund of the Treasury, in any year for which a 
     sequester affecting such programs are in effect.

     SEC. 207. THE CURRENT LAW BASELINE.

       (a) Submission of Reports.--CBO and OMB shall submit to the 
     President and the Congress reports setting forth the budget 
     baselines for the budget year and the next nine fiscal years. 
     The CBO report shall be submitted on or before January 15. 
     The OMB report shall accompany the President's budget.
       (b) Determination of the Budget Baseline.--(1) The budget 
     baseline shall be based on the common economic assumptions 
     set forth in section 106, adjusted to reflect revisions 
     pursuant to subsection (c).
       (2) The budget baseline shall consist of a projection of 
     current year levels of budget authority, outlays, revenues 
     and the surplus or deficit into the budget year and the 
     relevant outyears based on current enacted laws as of the 
     date of the projection.
       (3) For discretionary spending items, the baseline shall be 
     the spending caps in effect pursuant to section 601(a)(2) of 
     the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. For years for which 
     there are no caps, the baseline for discretionary spending 
     shall be the same as the last year for which there were 
     statutory caps.

[[Page H5619]]

       (4) For all other expenditures and for revenues, the 
     baseline shall be adjusted by comparing unemployment, 
     inflation, interest rates, growth and eligible population for 
     the most recent period for which actual data are available, 
     compared to the assumptions contained in section 107.
       (c) Revisions to the Baseline.--The baseline shall be 
     adjusted for up-to-date economic assumptions for all reports 
     issued pursuant to section 107 of this Act and section 254 of 
     the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 
     1985.

     SEC. 208. LIMITATIONS ON EMERGENCY SPENDING.

       (a) In General.--(1) Within the discretionary caps for each 
     fiscal year contained in this Act, an amount shall be 
     withheld from allocation to the appropriate committees of the 
     House of Representatives and of the Senate and reserved for 
     natural disasters and other emergency purposes.
       (2) Such amount for each such fiscal year shall not be less 
     than 1 percent of total budget authority and outlays 
     available within those caps for that fiscal year.
       (3) No adjustments shall be made to the discretionary 
     spending limits under section 251(b)(2)(D) of the Balanced 
     Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 unless the 
     amount appropriated for discretionary accounts that have been 
     designated as emergency requirements exceed the amount 
     reserved pursuant to paragraph (1). Any adjustment shall be 
     limited to the amount that total appropriations designated as 
     emergency requirements for the fiscal year exceeds the amount 
     reserved pursuant to paragraph (1).
       (4) The amounts reserved pursuant to this subsection shall 
     be made available for allocation to such committees only if--
       (A) the President has made a request for such disaster 
     funds;
       (B) the programs to be funded are included in such request; 
     and
       (C) the projected obligations for unforeseen emergency 
     needs exceed the 10-year rolling average annual expenditures 
     for existing programs included in the Presidential request 
     for the applicable fiscal year.
       (5) Notwithstanding any other provision of law--
       (A) States and localities shall be required to maintain 
     effort and ensure that Federal assistance payments do not 
     replace, subvert or otherwise have the effect of reducing 
     regularly budgeted State and local expenditures for law 
     enforcement, firefighting, road construction and maintenance, 
     building construction and maintenance or any other category 
     of regular government expenditure (to ensure that Federal 
     disaster payments are made only for incremental costs 
     directly attributable to unforeseen disasters, and do not 
     replace or reduce regular State and local expenditures for 
     the same purposes);
       (B) the President may not take administrative action to 
     waive any requirement for States or localities to make 
     minimum matching payments as a condition or receiving Federal 
     disaster assistance or take administrative action to waive 
     all or part of any repayment of Federal loans for the State 
     or local matching share required as a condition of receiving 
     Federal disaster assistance. This clause shall apply to all 
     matching share requirements and loans to meet matching share 
     requirements under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and 
     Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.) and any 
     other Acts pursuant to which the President may declare a 
     disaster or disasters and States and localities otherwise 
     qualify for Federal disaster assistance; and
       (C) a two-thirds vote in each House of Congress shall be 
     required for each emergency to reduce or waive the State 
     matching requirement or to forgive all or part of loans for 
     the State matching share as required under the Robert T. 
     Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act.
       (b) Effect Budget Resolutions.--(1) All concurrent 
     resolutions on the budget (including revisions) shall specify 
     the amount of new budget authority and outlays within the 
     discretionary spending cap that shall be withheld from 
     allocation to the committees and reserved for natural 
     disasters, and a procedure for releasing such funds for 
     allocation to the appropriate committee. The amount withheld 
     shall be equal to 1 percent of the total discretionary 
     spending cap for fiscal year covered by the resolution, 
     unless additional amounts are specified.
       (2) The procedure for allocation of the amounts pursuant to 
     paragraph (1) shall ensure that the funds are released for 
     allocation only pursuant to the conditions contained in 
     subsection (a)(3)(A) through (C).
       (c) Restriction on Use of Funds.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of law, the amount reserved pursuant to subsection 
     (a) shall not be available for other than emergency funding 
     requirements for particular natural disasters or national 
     security emergencies so designated by Acts of Congress.
       (d) New Point of Order.--(1) Title IV of the Congressional 
     Budget Act of 1974 is amended by adding at the end the 
     following new section:


                 ``point of order regarding emergencies

       ``Sec. 408. It shall not be in order in the House of 
     Representatives or the Senate to consider any bill or joint 
     resolution, or amendment thereto or conference report 
     thereon, containing an emergency designation for purposes of 
     section 251(b)(2)(D) or 252(e) of the Balanced Budget and 
     Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 or of section 208 of 
     the Budget Enforcement Act of 1997 if it also provides an 
     appropriation or direct spending for any other item or 
     contains any other matter, but that bill or joint resolution, 
     amendment, or conference report may contain rescissions of 
     budget authority or reductions of direct spending, or that 
     amendment may reduce amounts for that emergency.''.
       (2) The table of contents set forth in section 1(b) of the 
     Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 is 
     amended by inserting after the item relating to section 407 
     the following new item:

``Sec. 408. Point of order regarding emergencies.''.

TITLE III--USE OF BUDGET SURPLUS TO PRESERVE SOCIAL SECURITY TRUST FUND

     SEC. 301. ENDING USE OF RECEIPTS OF SOCIAL SECURITY TRUST 
                   FUND FOR OTHER PROGRAMS AND ACTIVITIES.

       (a) If, in any year, revenues are higher than the targets 
     in Section 104, as adjusted pursuant to Section 107, or 
     spending is lower than the caps in Section 105, as adjusted, 
     and the deficits are lower than the targets in Section 105, 
     as adjusted pursuant to Section 107, those amounts shall be 
     applied pursuant to subsection (b).
       (b) All funds described in subsection (a) up to $100 
     billion shall be used to reduce the consolidated budget 
     deficit and, to the extent that funds are available to 
     eliminate the consolidated budget deficit, to retire the 
     outstanding debt of the United States Government held by the 
     public.
       (c) Any use of funds described in subsection (a) for any 
     purpose other than provided in subsection (b) shall be 
     subject to the requirements of Section 252 of the Balanced 
     Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, and any 
     reduction in the amounts described in subsection (a) shall be 
     considered as an increase in the deficit.
       (d) When the President submits the budget under section 
     1105(a) of Title 31, United States Code for any year, OMB 
     shall adjust the Social Security Trust Fund surpluses for 
     each year under this Section, based on the most recent 
     estimates of such surpluses to be provided to OMB by the 
     Secretary of the Treasury.

  Mrs. THURMAN (during the reading). Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous 
consent that the motion be considered as read and printed in the 
Record.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentlewoman from Florida?
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentlewoman from 
Florida [Mrs. Thurman] is recognized for 5 minutes in support of her 
motion to recommit.
  Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Speaker, I reserve a point of order against the 
motion to recommit.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Iowa [Mr. Nussle] 
reserves a point of order.
  The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Florida [Mrs. Thurman] for 
5 minutes.
  Mrs. THURMAN. Mr. Speaker, after the Republican leadership promised 
to bring this bill to the floor, it was reviewed, as many bills are, by 
many experts in the various committees and outside organizations who 
have pointed out several problems in the bill. As a firm supporter of 
the concept behind this legislation, I believe it is extremely 
important to correct these problems. I strongly support the principle 
behind this legislation. We should enforce the budget agreement to 
ensure that this budget agreement delivers on the promise of a balanced 
budget.
  Everyone in this body agrees that the best thing we can do for 
working men and women is to ensure that we actually balance the budget. 
If we do not add legislation enforcing the budget agreement, we could 
repeat the history of past failed efforts to balance the budget. 
Because this issue is so important, we should correct these problems so 
that we can pass an enforcement bill that does not have these problems.
  This motion to recommit would correct the unintended problems with 
the bill that have been pointed out by many of its critics. This motion 
makes several important improvements to the bill:
  First, it begins the process of restoring the integrity of the Social 
Security trust fund by reserving the first hundred billion dollars of 
any surplus to take the Social Security trust fund off budget.
  Second, it protects Medicare beneficiaries by addressing the concern 
that Medicare beneficiaries would bear an unreasonable burden of 
sequestration.
  Third, it protects the jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and 
Means over enforcement of the revenue provisions.
  Finally, it makes several other technical corrections to correct 
unanticipated problems with this bill.
  This motion is in an effort to ensure that the legislation that the 
House

[[Page H5620]]

votes on today is our best effort on this issue. We should not ever 
vote on legislation that we all know has problems. We should fix those 
problems with this legislation before we vote on it.
  So I agree with the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. Nussle]. We should 
recommit this bill, we should take it back to the committees, we should 
look at the issues that have been raised here and issues of outside 
critics, and we should adopt this motion to recommit.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Neumann].
  Mr. NEUMANN. Mr. Speaker, first off, I would like to also commend the 
Republican leadership for keeping their word and bringing this bill to 
the floor. The most important part, in my opinion, of this motion to 
recommit that is being made here is that we will start to address the 
Social Security issue. This has gone on since 1983 that this extra 
money that is being taken out of the paychecks of hardworking Americans 
that was supposed to be set aside to preserve and protect Social 
Security, it is going into the general fund, and it is being spent on 
other Government programs instead of being put aside to preserve and 
protect Social Security.
  This motion to recommit would instruct the committee to take the 
first hundred billion dollars of surplus and actually start reserving 
it for Social Security so that when the time comes in the year 2012 
that there is not enough money to make good on the promises to our 
senior citizens, the money would then be available if this motion to 
recommit were sent back and then the bill were passed and signed into 
law.
  So in my opinion, the most important part of this is that we would 
start to address a very serious problem facing this Nation, and that is 
that the money that is supposed to be set aside for Social Security in 
this savings account, it is not there. It is IOU;s. And under this 
movement we would force this Government to actually start setting aside 
money so that Social Security once again would be safe and secure for 
our senior citizens.
  Mrs. THURMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Minnesota 
[Mr. Minge].
  Mr. MINGE. Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank the gentlewoman for 
yielding this time to me.
  We have had a great deal of discussion today about the inadequacy of 
the rule, and I am pleased to be able to report that in this motion to 
recommit we address the problem with the rule and the bill that was 
offered as a substitute is now available for a vote.
  This is a bill that was revised to take into account the criticisms 
that came from both sides of the aisle to try to make this a better 
bill. The critics are saying we are looking for the perfect bill. I 
have heard this over and over in this institution. But let us not make 
the perfect enemy of the good.
  At the same time, let us recognize that if we want any type of 
enforcement mechanism that deals with the revenue side and the 
entitlement programs, that we have to move this legislation through the 
House of Representatives to the conference committee.
  This motion to recommit gives us the best shot at providing the 
conference committee on the reconciliation bills with our best product 
at this point in time. If it is important to us in the House of 
Representatives to see the budget balanced and kept in balance, let us 
move the process ahead.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time has expired for the gentlewoman 
from Florida [Mrs. Thurman].
  Does the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. Nussle] insist on his point of 
order?
  Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation on the point of 
order, and I rise in opposition to the motion.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Iowa [Mr. Nussle] is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the motion to 
recommit.
  Mr. Speaker, I told you so. There were problems with this bill, and 
what happened? Here at the last minute, in a rush, without any 
consideration, without any light of day, without any committee process, 
without any disclosure to the other side, without any chance for the 
committees of jurisdiction to look at it, in comes the rushed motion to 
recommit. Just like my dad used to when as a family we used to go in 
and raid the refrigerator. We used to call it ``oosh-cum-noosht.'' This 
is ``oosh-cum-noosht''; that is what this is.

                              {time}  1315

  That is what this is. People came out and they said, hey, I know, we 
can fix Social Security. Let us put in this little provision. We can 
fix veterans. Let us put in this provision. We can fix Medicare. Let us 
put in this provision. It does not have enough teeth here. It has too 
much teeth there. Let us rush in and let us do this, because we want to 
make sure that in fact we are able to improve this particular piece of 
legislation at the last minute in a way to save the reform process.
  Mr. Speaker, we do not need to save the reform process in this 
particular motion to recommit. The reform process has a strong 
foundation, laid very carefully by my good friends and colleagues that 
have spoken here today. That reform process will go forward. It must. 
If we are going to save this country from rampant deficits and national 
debt and bankrupt Social Security and many other problems that face 
this Nation, we have to go through the entire process, not a rushed 
bill, not a quick fix, not a quick address of the problems we heard 
within the debate with a motion to recommit. We have to come in and we 
have to go through the careful consideration and hearings and processes 
in order to get this job done.
  First we had it down here and we heard there was too much teeth. Then 
the advertising changed and it was, do not worry about it, there are no 
teeth. Then we come in and find there are even less teeth. We find out 
that Social Security is not going to quite have as much teeth, Medicare 
will not have as much teeth, the spending sequestrations are not going 
to have as much teeth. Is this really reform?
  Mr. Speaker, we need to have a careful process to go through in order 
to get this job done. This motion to recommit clearly does not even 
come close to that. I think the effort was admirable. The result missed 
the mark. This is only the first shot in an effort to reform the budget 
process. While it missed the mark, it will be heard throughout this 
Congress, throughout the committees. We will reform the budget process; 
not today.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. NUSSLE. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman yielding to me.
  Again, it seems to me like we ought to have some kind of a multiple 
choice test on this thing, based on the debate today, there is so much 
confusion about it.
  I guess what I would say is this. This was advertised as a perfect 
product on June 25. We were going to bring this forward and we were 
going to vote on it as part of the deal then. The point was that a 
commitment was made for an up-or-down vote on that package, the June 25 
package. The deal was an up-or-down vote on that. That is what we have 
brought to the floor today. It is what has been discussed.
  As we said at the time, it was not ready. It is not ripe. This is too 
complex, it is too technical, there are too many people involved in it. 
We need to work it out through the normal process. We have a commitment 
from Chairman Solomon, we have a commitment from Chairman Archer, we 
have a commitment from Chairman Kasich to go forward in the regular 
process to do this the right way.
  Trying to write budget reform and budget enforcement at this point in 
a motion to recommit on the floor is insanity. We all know it. Let the 
process work. The pledges are there, the commitments are there, the 
homework is there, the record is there, the good will and commitment 
and bright ideas of all the people who have brought this forward are 
there.
  Not only that, we have a whole bunch of people, of organizations, 
that have suddenly woken up to this and said this is a very poor way to 
do this, because they have been listening to the debate and they have 
been understanding that, oh, my gosh, all of a sudden there may be a 
need for an exemption from the enforcement.
  We have the American Legion, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the 
Disabled American Veterans, the Paralyzed Veterans of America, AMVETS, 
Retired Enlisted Association, Blinded Veterans Association, 
Noncommissioned Officers

[[Page H5621]]

Association, Military Order of Purple Heart, Jewish War Veterans, 
Retired Officers, Fleet Reserve, the AARP, and a whole bunch of other 
people out there saying, hold on, there is a problem. This is not the 
way to do this.
  Mr. Speaker, I would urge that we defeat the motion to recommit, we 
defeat H.R. 2003, and we simply go about the normal process of getting 
on with budget reform.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the previous question is 
ordered on the motion to recommit.
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to recommit.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a 
quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not 
present.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Evidently a quorum is not present.
  The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.
  Pursuant to the provisions of clause 5 of rule XV, the Chair 
announces that he will reduce to a minimum of 5 minutes the period of 
time within which a vote by electronic device, if ordered, will be 
taken on the question of passage.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 148, 
nays 279, answered ``present'' 1, not voting 6, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 300]

                               YEAS--148

     Abercrombie
     Allen
     Andrews
     Baesler
     Ballenger
     Barcia
     Barrett (WI)
     Barton
     Bass
     Bentsen
     Bilirakis
     Bishop
     Blumenauer
     Boswell
     Boyd
     Brady
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Camp
     Campbell
     Canady
     Carson
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chenoweth
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Coburn
     Combest
     Condit
     Cramer
     Danner
     Davis (FL)
     Deal
     DeFazio
     Deutsch
     Doggett
     Dooley
     Doyle
     Duncan
     Edwards
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Farr
     Forbes
     Fox
     Furse
     Ganske
     Gilchrest
     Goode
     Gordon
     Green
     Greenwood
     Gutknecht
     Hall (TX)
     Hamilton
     Harman
     Hefner
     Hill
     Hilliard
     Hinojosa
     Holden
     Hooley
     Horn
     Houghton
     Hunter
     Inglis
     Jefferson
     John
     Johnson (WI)
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kind (WI)
     Kleczka
     Klug
     Lampson
     Lantos
     Largent
     LaTourette
     Lazio
     Leach
     Luther
     Maloney (CT)
     Maloney (NY)
     Manton
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum
     McHale
     McIntosh
     McIntyre
     McKinney
     Meehan
     Miller (CA)
     Minge
     Mink
     Moran (VA)
     Morella
     Murtha
     Neumann
     Ney
     Norwood
     Paxon
     Pease
     Peterson (MN)
     Pickett
     Porter
     Portman
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Riggs
     Roemer
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Rush
     Sanchez
     Sandlin
     Sanford
     Schaefer, Dan
     Schaffer, Bob
     Scott
     Sherman
     Shimkus
     Sisisky
     Skaggs
     Smith, Adam
     Smith, Linda
     Stabenow
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Stupak
     Talent
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Thompson
     Thurman
     Turner
     Upton
     Visclosky
     Wamp
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Wexler
     Weygand
     Woolsey
     Yates

                               NAYS--279

     Ackerman
     Aderholt
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baker
     Baldacci
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Bateman
     Becerra
     Bereuter
     Berman
     Berry
     Bilbray
     Blagojevich
     Bliley
     Blunt
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bonior
     Bono
     Borski
     Boucher
     Brown (OH)
     Bryant
     Bunning
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Cannon
     Capps
     Cardin
     Chambliss
     Christensen
     Clay
     Clayton
     Coble
     Collins
     Conyers
     Cook
     Cooksey
     Costello
     Cox
     Coyne
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cubin
     Cummings
     Cunningham
     Davis (IL)
     Davis (VA)
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     DeLay
     Dellums
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Doolittle
     Dreier
     Dunn
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     Engel
     English
     Evans
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fattah
     Fawell
     Fazio
     Filner
     Flake
     Foglietta
     Foley
     Ford
     Fowler
     Frank (MA)
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frost
     Gallegly
     Gejdenson
     Gekas
     Gephardt
     Gibbons
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Goss
     Graham
     Granger
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hansen
     Hastert
     Hastings (FL)
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hilleary
     Hinchey
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hostettler
     Hoyer
     Hulshof
     Hyde
     Istook
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jenkins
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones
     Kasich
     Kelly
     Kennedy (MA)
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kennelly
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kim
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Klink
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Kucinich
     LaFalce
     LaHood
     Latham
     Levin
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (GA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     Lipinski
     Livingston
     LoBiondo
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Lucas
     Manzullo
     Markey
     Martinez
     Mascara
     Matsui
     McCrery
     McDade
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McKeon
     McNulty
     Meek
     Menendez
     Metcalf
     Mica
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller (FL)
     Moakley
     Molinari
     Mollohan
     Moran (KS)
     Myrick
     Nadler
     Neal
     Nethercutt
     Northup
     Nussle
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Owens
     Oxley
     Packard
     Pappas
     Parker
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Paul
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Pombo
     Pomeroy
     Poshard
     Price (NC)
     Pryce (OH)
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Redmond
     Reyes
     Riley
     Rivers
     Rodriguez
     Rogan
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Rothman
     Roukema
     Roybal-Allard
     Royce
     Ryun
     Sabo
     Salmon
     Sanders
     Sawyer
     Saxton
     Scarborough
     Schumer
     Sensenbrenner
     Serrano
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Shuster
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (OR)
     Smith (TX)
     Snowbarger
     Snyder
     Solomon
     Souder
     Spence
     Spratt
     Stokes
     Strickland
     Stump
     Sununu
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Thune
     Tiahrt
     Tierney
     Torres
     Towns
     Traficant
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Walsh
     Waters
     Watkins
     Watt (NC)
     Watts (OK)
     Waxman
     Weldon (FL)
     White
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wise
     Wolf
     Wynn
     Young (FL)

                        ANSWERED ``PRESENT''--1

       
     Ensign
       

                             NOT VOTING--6

     Gonzalez
     Hutchinson
     Pallone
     Schiff
     Stark
     Young (AK)

                              {time}  1344

  Mrs. LOWEY and Messrs. RAHALL, SMITH of Michigan, JACKSON of 
Illinois, NEAL of Massachusetts, OBERSTAR, GEPHARDT, KENNEDY of 
Massachusetts, McNULTY, GEJDENSON, HASTINGS of Florida, KILDEE, BROWN 
of Ohio, WISE, BORSKI, VENTO, RODRIGUEZ, REYES, and ROTHMAN, Ms. 
ROYBAL-ALLARD, and Messrs. DIAZ-BALART, SCHUMER, ORTIZ, OWENS, MATSUI, 
TOWNS, and ENGEL, Ms. SLAUGHTER, Mr. PAYNE, Mr. HINCHEY, Ms. DeGETTE, 
and Messrs. RANGEL, DICKS, and ACKERMAN changed their vote from ``yea'' 
to ``nay.''
  Ms. WOOLSEY, Ms. FURSE, Mr. RIGGS, Mrs. CHENOWETH, Ms. KAPTUR, and 
Messrs. WELDON of Pennsylvania, SHIMKUS, BOB SCHAFFER of Colorado, 
LAMPSON, and SANDLIN changed their vote from ``nay'' to ``yea.''

                              {time}  1345

  So the motion to recommit was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Bonilla). The question is on the passage 
of the bill.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the noes appeared to have it.


                             Recorded Vote

  Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. This will be a 5-minute vote.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 81, 
noes 347, not voting 6, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 301]

                                AYES--81

     Andrews
     Ballenger
     Barcia
     Barrett (WI)
     Barton
     Bass
     Bliley
     Blumenauer
     Blunt
     Boyd
     Brady
     Campbell
     Castle
     Chambliss
     Coburn
     Combest
     Condit
     Davis (FL)
     DeFazio
     Deutsch
     Doggett
     Dooley
     Doyle
     Duncan
     Ehlers
     Fawell
     Forbes
     Gekas
     Goode
     Goodling
     Graham
     Gutknecht
     Hall (TX)
     Hamilton
     Harman
     Hefner
     Hoekstra
     Horn
     Houghton
     Inglis
     John
     Kind (WI)
     Kingston
     Klug
     Kolbe
     Largent
     Livingston
     Luther
     McHale
     McInnis
     McIntyre
     McKinney
     Meehan
     Minge
     Morella
     Neumann
     Norwood
     Peterson (MN)
     Petri
     Porter
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Roemer
     Rohrabacher
     Royce
     Sanchez
     Sanford
     Schaffer, Bob
     Sensenbrenner
     Sisisky
     Smith (TX)
     Stenholm
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Turner
     Upton
     Visclosky
     Wamp

[[Page H5622]]



                               NOES--347

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Aderholt
     Allen
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baesler
     Baker
     Baldacci
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Bateman
     Becerra
     Bentsen
     Bereuter
     Berman
     Berry
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop
     Blagojevich
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bonior
     Bono
     Borski
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Bryant
     Bunning
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Canady
     Cannon
     Capps
     Cardin
     Carson
     Chabot
     Chenoweth
     Christensen
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Collins
     Conyers
     Cook
     Cooksey
     Costello
     Cox
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cubin
     Cummings
     Cunningham
     Danner
     Davis (IL)
     Davis (VA)
     Deal
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     DeLay
     Dellums
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Doolittle
     Dreier
     Dunn
     Edwards
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     Engel
     English
     Ensign
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Evans
     Everett
     Ewing
     Farr
     Fattah
     Fazio
     Filner
     Flake
     Foglietta
     Foley
     Ford
     Fowler
     Fox
     Frank (MA)
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frost
     Furse
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Goodlatte
     Gordon
     Goss
     Granger
     Green
     Greenwood
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hansen
     Hastert
     Hastings (FL)
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hill
     Hilleary
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hobson
     Holden
     Hooley
     Hostettler
     Hoyer
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hyde
     Istook
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     Jenkins
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (WI)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kasich
     Kelly
     Kennedy (MA)
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kennelly
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kim
     King (NY)
     Kleczka
     Klink
     Knollenberg
     Kucinich
     LaFalce
     LaHood
     Lampson
     Lantos
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lazio
     Leach
     Levin
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (GA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     Lipinski
     LoBiondo
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Lucas
     Maloney (CT)
     Maloney (NY)
     Manton
     Manzullo
     Markey
     Martinez
     Mascara
     Matsui
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McDade
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McHugh
     McIntosh
     McKeon
     McNulty
     Meek
     Menendez
     Metcalf
     Mica
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller (CA)
     Miller (FL)
     Mink
     Moakley
     Molinari
     Mollohan
     Moran (KS)
     Moran (VA)
     Murtha
     Myrick
     Nadler
     Neal
     Nethercutt
     Ney
     Northup
     Nussle
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Owens
     Oxley
     Packard
     Pappas
     Parker
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Paul
     Paxon
     Payne
     Pease
     Pelosi
     Peterson (PA)
     Pickering
     Pickett
     Pitts
     Pombo
     Pomeroy
     Portman
     Poshard
     Price (NC)
     Pryce (OH)
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Redmond
     Reyes
     Riggs
     Riley
     Rivers
     Rodriguez
     Rogan
     Rogers
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Rothman
     Roukema
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Ryun
     Sabo
     Salmon
     Sanders
     Sandlin
     Sawyer
     Saxton
     Scarborough
     Schaefer, Dan
     Schumer
     Scott
     Serrano
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Sherman
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Skaggs
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (OR)
     Smith, Adam
     Smith, Linda
     Snowbarger
     Snyder
     Solomon
     Souder
     Spence
     Spratt
     Stabenow
     Stearns
     Stokes
     Strickland
     Stump
     Stupak
     Sununu
     Talent
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thornberry
     Thune
     Thurman
     Tiahrt
     Tierney
     Torres
     Towns
     Traficant
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Walsh
     Waters
     Watkins
     Watt (NC)
     Watts (OK)
     Waxman
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Wexler
     Weygand
     White
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wise
     Wolf
     Woolsey
     Wynn
     Yates
     Young (FL)

                             NOT VOTING--6

     Gonzalez
     Hutchinson
     Pallone
     Schiff
     Stark
     Young (AK)

                              {time}  1354

  Mrs. CHENOWETH, Mr. STUPAK, and Mr. CRAPO changed their vote from 
``aye'' to ``no.''
  So the bill was not passed.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

                          ____________________