[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 105 (Wednesday, July 23, 1997)]
[House]
[Pages H5584-H5622]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
BUDGET ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1997
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call
up House Resolution 192 and ask for its immediate consideration.
The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:
H. Res. 192
Resolved, That upon the adoption of this resolution it
shall be in order to consider in the House the bill (H.R.
2003) to reform the budget process and enforce the bipartisan
balanced budget agreement of 1997. The bill shall be
considered as read for amendment. The previous question shall
be considered as ordered on the bill to final passage without
intervening motion except: (1) one hour of debate equally
divided and controlled by Representative Barton of Texas or
his designee and a Member opposed to the bill; and (2) one
motion to recommit.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] is
recognized for 1 hour.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of debate only, I yield the
customary 30 minutes to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Frost], my
colleague and friend, pending which I yield myself such time as I may
consume. During consideration of this resolution all time yielded is
for the purpose of debate only.
(Mr. GOSS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks and to include extraneous material.)
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, this rule and today's debate reflect the
essence of an agreement reached on June 25 as the House moved to pass
legislation implementing the historic budget agreement. That agreement
was to allow an up or down vote prior to July 24 on H.R. 2003, which
had been offered as an amendment to reconciliation by the gentleman
from Texas [Mr. Barton], the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. Minge], and
some of our other colleagues. This rule fulfills that agreement.
Promises made; promises kept.
Today this House will vote on H.R. 2003, a budget process reform
proposal advocated by a bipartisan group of Members. This rule is
limited just to provide for the agreement and it does not allow
amendment. Not only is this customary for legislation that deals with
entitlement and tax legislation within the jurisdiction of the
Committee on Ways and Means, but it also captures the moment at which
the actual agreement was made to bring this forward to allow the House
to consider H.R. 2003 as presented on June 25.
The rule provides for 1 hour of debate in the House to be equally
divided by the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Barton] and an opponent. We
have discussed in the Committee on Rules that the time will be divided
in such a way as to accommodate Members from both sides of the aisle on
both sides of the issue and for all of the committees with an interest.
Managers will yield floor time appropriately. In addition the rule
provides for the customary motion to recommit.
Mr. Speaker, as I have outlined, Members understand that we have gone
through an unusual process here to get to this point. All three of the
primary committees with jurisdiction over this legislation, that is,
the Committee on the Budget, the Committee on Ways and Means, and the
Committee on Rules, have agreed to waive their right to weigh in on
this proposal in the interest of granting H.R. 2003 its unfettered vote
as promised.
For something of this magnitude and complexity, that in itself is
rather extraordinary under Republican leadership. In addition, in doing
this Members should be aware of a process that has been under way for
some time in the Committee on the Budget, the Committee on Rules, in
the policy committee and among various groups of individual Members to
reach deliberative and consensus solutions on how best to reform our
budget process. In other words, we are focusing on this anyway, and we
are now taking this extra step because of this arrangement with the
gentleman from Texas [Mr. Barton] and the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr.
Minge].
I think we all agree that there is a very real need for review and
reform of the process of our budget. But that effort should be done, in
my view, in a deliberate and inclusive way that takes full advantage of
the expertise that can be found within our committee system which has
served this institution and this country so well over the years. I have
always argued that changing the budget process must lead to an
improvement in the process, not just a different, equally flawed
approach. Change for change's sake is not going to get us anywhere.
As chairman of the Subcommittee on Legislative and Budget Process, I
am a little bit familiar with the problems of our current budget
framework. Not only is it complicated and hard to understand, but it
frankly does not work very well and it does not hold elected officials
accountable enough, of course. Moreover, I agree with the proponents of
the legislation before us today that
[[Page H5585]]
our current budget process does not adequately confront the challenge
of imposing discipline on entitlement spending, which is a very tough
subject.
In the Committee on Rules we held three hearings in the last Congress
on the subject of budget reform. We have been working closely with the
Committee on the Budget this year to develop proposals for reform. The
gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon] and the gentleman from Ohio [Mr.
Kasich] have committed to developing a comprehensive budget process
reform package in this Congress. So we are on our way to doing this
anyway.
In the short-term I have been very pleased with the cooperative
effort we have had with the Committee on the Budget on a bipartisan
basis vetting what I will call cleanup provisions in reconciliation to
streamline existing procedures. This is an important first step in
budget process reform but obviously it is not comprehensive or
complete.
The bill before us today has a different parentage. It is not the
business as usual approach of the committee system. It is a product of
an evolution from Member to Member, and outside group to outside group
over several years. It has not been properly vetted through the
committee system, and its authors have admitted as much by saying that
further changes are needed.
In the Committee on Rules last night we heard discussion of the need
for ``technical amendments and revisions in this bill.''
{time} 1045
So it is not quite right even yet.
In my view, the problems with this bill go beyond drafting errors
into substance. For instance, I do not think we will be improving the
transparency and the credibility of our budget process by grafting 15
new very complicated sections onto the already complicated Budget Act.
In addition, I am troubled by the authority this bill cedes to the
President to define the parameters of budget enforcement.
I also have concerns that this bill represents a first step down the
very dangerous road toward automatic tax increases. That is what I
said. Automatic tax increases. I do not think we are ready for that
yet. It threatens to undo all the agreements and commitments that have
been made to provide genuine tax relief to America's taxpayers.
I cannot support an approach that gives the President the authority
to set in motion indefinite delay in the child tax credit that we are
working so hard for, or delay of the capital gains tax we are working
so hard for, or delay of the estate tax reduction we are working so
hard for, or a host of the indexing provisions we are talking about.
Our budget problems are not the result of too little revenue. They
are the problem of too much spending and too much government and we all
know it. In this regard, this bill operates under a basic flawed
assumption.
With respect to entitlements, this bill is also troubling. I served
on the Kerrey Commission on entitlement and tax reform, and I learned a
great deal in the process. I well understand the problem we have with
entitlements. We are on an unsustainable trend and we have to make some
tough decisions, but this bill raises almost as many questions as it
answers in terms of the process by which the very important decisions
about handling entitlement spending would be made. It puts Social
Security COLA's at risk of automatic spending cuts.
Now, I cannot imagine anybody who really would stand up for that
proposition to say we are going to put Social Security COLA's into an
automatic spending cut process. That is not going to hack it with the
people that we represent and it should not.
Also, this approach that we are going to consider today provides for
the possibility of automatic increases in Medicare premiums. Again, I
do not think the constituency we represent, certainly not mine in
southwest Florida, is going to jump up and applaud very loudly
automatic increases in Medicare premiums.
Mr. Speaker, the proponents of this legislation are sincere in their
effort and I congratulate them on it. They are striving to get
enforcement teeth into the budget process, and we need it and I agree.
It is just a question of how and when, and I do not think their
approach today is how or when.
I admire their persistence in getting today's debate. It shows good
leadership and good commitment, and I welcome them into our process
through the committee process of budget reform, particularly focusing
on enforcement with teeth.
I find the product we are working with today seriously flawed. I hope
the House will defeat it so we can get back to work in developing the
budget process reform that we have been working on.
Mr. Speaker, I submit for the Record the following section-by-section
summary of H.R. 2003 and several letters concerning this issue:
Section-By-Section Summary of H.R. 2003, the ``Budget Enforcement Act
of 1997'' Prepared by the Majority Staff of the Committee on Rules,
July 22, 1997
General Summary
H.R. 2003 establishes a new set of budget enforcement
procedures specifically for the purpose of enforcing the
direct spending levels and the deficit and revenue targets
assumed in the Bipartisan Balanced Budget Agreement of 1997.
This Act would be a free-standing set of procedures, another
layer of budget rules and requirements laid over top of the
existing Budget Act. The President and Congress would now be
required to follow the rules and procedures of three
different, yet comprehensive statutes (the Congressional
Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, the Balanced
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 and the
Budget Enforcement Act of 1997), all designed to dictate the
actions of the budget process.
This Act contains two titles. The first outlines how the
goals of the budget agreement will be measured and monitored
and what the distinct roles of the President and the Congress
would be in this monitoring process. The second title
provides the methods by which the spending levels and the
revenue and deficit targets will be enforced through
sequestration and/or a delay of tax reductions.
Section 1: Short Title and Table of Contents
This section grants this Act the title of the ``Budget
Enforcement Act of 1997''. This section also lays out the
table of contents for the Act's 15 new free standing budget
process provisions.
Section 2: Definitions
This section provides the definitions for various budgetary
terms as they are to be understood in implementing the
provisions of this Act including the following: ``eligible
population,'' ``sequester and sequestration,'' ``breach,''
``baseline,'' ``budgetary resources,'' ``discretionary
appropriations,'' ``direct spending,'' ``entitlement
authority,'' ``current,'' ``account,'' ``budget year,''
``current year,'' ``outyear,'' ``OMB,'' ``CBO,'' ``budget
outlays and outlays,'' ``budget authority and new budget
authority,'' ``appropriation act,'' ``consolidated deficit,''
``surplus,'' and ``direct spending caps.''
Many of these terms and definitions are similar to those
currently used and defined in the Congressional Budget Act of
1974 and the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control
Act of 1985 (the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act). However, there
are some new terms and some old terms with new definitions.
For example, the definition of ``sequester and
sequestration'' is the same as that used in Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings while the definition of what constitutes a
``breach'' is different than that contained in current law.
Under current law ``the term `breach' means, for any
fiscal year, the amount (if any) by which new budget
authority or outlays for that year (within a category of
discretionary appropriations) is above that category's
discretionary spending limit for new budget authority or
outlays for that year, as the case may be.'' \1\ Under
H.R. 2003 ``the term `breach' means, for any fiscal year,
the amount (if any) by which outlays for that year (within
a category of direct spending) is above that category's
direct sending cap for that fiscal year.'' For the
purposes of this Act a ``breach'' is defined as first only
applying to direct spending and secondly as only applying
to budget outlays as opposed to budget authority or
outlays. Since the Act does not repeal any of the current
Budget Act, this bill adds a second definition to what
constitutes a ``breach''. Other new terms include ``direct
spending caps'' and ``consolidated deficit''. Other older
terms with new definitions include ``discretionary
appropriations'' and ``baseline''.
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* Footnotes at end of article.
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Title I--Ensure that the Bipartisan Balanced Budget Agreement of 1997
Achieves Its Goal
Section 101: Timetable
This section establishes a new timetable for completion of
the new requirements placed on the President and Congress
under this Act. This timetable would be an addition to the
current timetable relating to the submission of the
President's budget, congressional consideration of a budget
resolution and any required reconciliation legislation and
any sequestration or budget reports required of OMB or
CBO.\2\
[[Page H5586]]
Due to the fact that these new procedures would be an
addition to the current rules, certain difficulties and
complications arise. For example, the Congressional Budget
Office would now be required to submit two reports to
Congress, one by January 15 \3\ and another by February
15.\4\ There is no explanation as to who the two required
reports differ or are similar. They are simply required.
Also, under current law, the President is required to
submit his budget proposal by the first Monday in February.
H.R. 2003 also requires the President to submit a ``budget
update based on new assumptions'' by this same deadline. What
this actually requires is unclear. Would this require the
President to submit two budget proposals based on two
different assumptions? Section 103 of the Act actually
establishes a new point of order against Congressional
consideration of any budget proposal that is not based on the
``new assumptions'' or that is consistent with the levels of
this Act. Furthermore, having two timetables for the budget
process, each with different requirements for both the
President and Congress, in two different statues, further
complicates the budget process.
Section 102: Procedures to Avoid Sequestration or Delay of
New Revenue Reductions
Under this section the President is required to submit to
Congress a legislative remedy if the required report by
November 1 (and as soon as practical after the end of the
fiscal year) of the Office of Management and Budget indicates
any of the following:
1. deficits in the most recently completed year exceeded or
in the budget year are projected to exceed the deficit
targets established in this Act; or
2. revenues in the most recently completed year were less
than or in the budget year are projected to be less than the
revenue targets in this Act; or
3. outlays in the most recently completed fiscal year
exceeded or in the budget year are projected to exceed the
spending caps established in this Act.
The President's legislative remedy may take any one or a
combination of three forms:
1. a reduction in outlays;
2. an increase in revenues, or
3. an increase in the deficit targets or spending caps or a
reduction in the revenue targets.
However, the Act is unclear whether the President may propose
a remedy that seeks to adjust the caps or targets for only a
part of the breach or violation or whether the President must
adjust the caps or targets to cover the entire breach. While
one subsection of the bill lists it as an option for the
President's package that same subsection also contains
language preventing the President from using such an option.
The President may also submit in writing, that because of
economic or programmatic reasons none of the variances from
the balanced budget plan should be offset. There is no
definition as to what constitutes a programmatic reason for
not offsetting the variance.\5\
Upon receipt of this report, with its proposed legislative
remedy, Congress is required by November 15 to introduce the
President's package as a joint resolution by the Chairmen of
the Budget Committees of the House and the Senate. If the
chairmen do not introduce the bill, any Member of the House
or Senate may introduce the joint resolution after November
15. Also, by November 15, the Budget Committees are required
to report the joint resolution with or without amendment. The
timeline set out these expedited procedures is inconsistent
as both the introduction and committee action must be
completed by the same date.
Specifically, the Committee may either recommend the
President's proposal or may recommend changes similar to
those recommended by the President. However, if the President
had recommended to adjust the caps or targets, the Committees
could not recommend doing so by any amount greater than that
originally recommended by the President. In this way the
President solely determines the scope of the actions
permissible by Congress.
If the Committees do not report by November 20, the
committee is automatically discharged from consideration of
the joint resolution reflecting the President's
recommendation. (There is no explanation as to why the
committee has until November 15 to report the joint
resolution when the committee is not automatically discharged
from further consideration until November 20.) Furthermore,
the Act sets up that, upon this discharge, any Member may
move to consider the resolution. There is no notice or
time layover requirement stated. (Although, the next
subsection says that the joint resolution would be
considered pursuant to Section 305 of the Budget Act,
which states that it is not in order to consider a
resolution and its report--at which this point there would
not be one--that has not laid over for five days. \6\) The
joint resolution would be considered under the same
procedures as that required for consideration of a
concurrent resolution on the budget. Special procedures
for consideration by the Senate and a conference are
established. Most notable is the automatic discharge of
the Committee on the Budget of the Senate by December 1 of
any joint resolution passed by the House and transmitted
to the House after a one day layover. Also, the Senate may
initially consider a joint resolution which may propose to
offset all or part of any reported breach. However, when
the joint resolution reaches the stage of a conference,
the conference committee may only report a resolution that
proposes to offset the entire breach. The most glaring
error of these procedures is that they fail to take into
consideration the possibility that Congress may have
adjourned sine die prior to this report having even been
received by Congress. This may actually necessitate
Congress coming into a special session after an election.
In non-election years, Congress may actually be forced to
stay in session until November 1 when the OMB report is
due. These procedures are fatally flawed in many areas.
Section 103: Effect on President's Budget Submissions; Point
of Order
The President is prohibited by this section from submitting
a budget pursuant to Title 31 of the United States Code that
is inconsistent with the spending, revenue and deficit levels
established by this Act unless it recommends changes to those
levels. This section also establishes a new point of order
against the consideration of any concurrent resolution on the
budget that is inconsistent with the levels established in
this Act.
First of all, while the President is able to get around the
prohibition placed on the Administration's budget submission
by proposing to change the levels, Congress is not granted
any exception to the point of order against consideration of
a budget resolution that is different. In other words, in
order for Congress to consider a budget resolution that calls
for changes in the levels, it would have to waive the
provisions of this section in order to even consider the
President's recommendations. Congress is prohibited from
considering the President's recommended changes. Furthermore,
the actual legislative vehicle for consideration of changes
in caps and/or targets is a reconciliation bill rather than a
budget resolution since the latter is not signed into law.
Secondly, while the requirements of the President apply
only to the budget submissions for fiscal years 1998 through
2002, the point of order in the House and Senate is
indefinite.
Section 104: Deficit and Revenue Targets
This Act places in law the actual dollar levels of the
Consolidated Deficit (or Surplus) targets called for in the
Bipartisan Budget Agreement for fiscal years 1998 through
2002. It also establishes the consolidated revenue targets
assumed in the Agreement for fiscal years 1998 through
2002.
Section 1 of H.R. 2003 defines the ``consolidated deficit
target'' to mean ``with respect to a fiscal year, the amount
by which total outlays exceed total receipts during that
year.'' The term ``consolidated revenue target'' is not
defined.
Section 105: Direct Spending Caps
This section establishes direct spending caps on the
following major entitlements: the Earned Income Tax Credit,
Family Support programs, Federal Retirement (Civilian and
Military), Medicaid, Medicare, Social Security, Supplemental
Security Income, Unemployment Compensation, and Veterans'
Benefits. All other entitlements and mandatory spending
programs not included in these major categories are to be
lumped together under one account. Furthermore, one overall
aggregate cap is to be placed over all of these individual
direct spending caps.
Within thirty days of the enactment of this Act, the House
and Senate Budget Committees are required to file identical
reports containing the account numbers and spending levels
for each specific category. Also, within thirty days of the
enactment of this Act, OMB is required to submit to the
President and Congress a report containing account numbers
and spending levels for each category. The specific amounts
for each category contained in these reports is deemed to
have been adopted as part of H.R. 2003.
While the specific category spending limits established
under this section are to be used for the purposes of
measurement, monitoring and eventually enforcement, certain
complications could arise. First, the reports filed by the
House and Senate Budget Committees are nothing more than a
statement of the priorities of these committees. The levels
in the OMB report are the levels that actually are utilized.
While the House and the Senate reports are required to be
identical, there is nothing requiring the OMB report to be
similar to that issued by these committees. The sole
responsibility for determining these individual direct
spending caps rests with the executive branch. Consequently,
OMB will most probably use their account numbers and category
spending limits for the reports they must file. Furthermore,
the CBO has no role in these determinations.
Section 106: Economic Assumptions
The entire budget process established under this Act is to
be monitored under common economic assumptions as set forth
in the joint explanatory statement of managers accompanying
H.Con.Res. 84, the budget resolution for fiscal year 1998.
Any changes to the caps or targets must be computed using
these same assumptions. There is no explanation as to who
will be the final arbiter between the CBO and the OMB if any
disagreements over economic assumptions arise over the next
five fiscal years.
Section 107: Revisions to Deficit and Revenue Targets and to
the Caps for Entitlements and Other Mandatory Spending
This section establishes procedures for the implementation
and consideration and/or
[[Page H5587]]
consultation by Congress of any changes to the spending caps
or revenue and deficit targets. Upon the submission of the
President's budget proposal in February, the OMB is required
to include adjustments to the revenue levels for changes in
revenue growth and inflation; adjustments to the direct
spending caps for changes in concepts and definitions, net
outlays, inflation, eligible populations and intra-budgetary
payments; and adjustments to deficit targets as necessitated
by adjustments in the other levels. These adjustments would
be automatic and would not necessarily need Congressional
approval. This type of adjustment is somewhat consistent with
current law as applied to the discretionary spending
limits.\7\
However, the Act establishes various obstacles in the path
of adjusting the caps for any other reason. First, to amend
the direct spending caps would require a recorded vote in the
House and the Senate. It is also deemed to be a ``matter of
highest privilege'' for any Member to insist on a recorded
vote. This is required even though Congress did not
originally have a recorded vote on establishing each direct
spending cap in the first place. Also, there is no current
understanding as to what a matter of ``highest privilege''
is. Presumably, such a motion as intended by the sponsors
would preclude a motion to rise if in the Committee of the
Whole or to adjourn if in the House.
Finally, this section places an unprecedented prohibition
on the ability of the Rules Committee to waive any of the
provisions of this subsection. (However, the Senate can do so
by a three-fifth vote). The rules and procedures relating to
the congressional budget process are exclusively within the
jurisdiction of the Rules Committee and every legislative
initiative enacted with respect to the budget process is done
within the Constitutional rule-making authority of the House
of Representatives. The Rules Committee still could waive the
provisions of this section because it would merely have to
report a resolution, which waives this section with respect
to another resolution that ``violates'' this section. This is
the so called two-step rule.
Title II: Enforcement Provisions
Section 201: Reporting Excess Spending
At the end of each fiscal year, OMB is required to compile
a statement of actual deficits, revenues and direct spending
for the fiscal year just completed. Specifically, the direct
spending levels would be identified by the categories
contained in section 105.
Based on this statement, OMB is required to issue a report
to the President and Congress by December 15 for any year in
which there is a breach, by more than 1% of the applicable
total revenues or direct spending, of the targets or caps
establish under this Act. The report will include the
following:
1. each instance in which a direct spending cap has been
breached;
2. the difference between the amount of spending under the
direct spending caps for the current year and the estimated
actual spending for the categories associated with such caps;
3. the amounts by which direct spending would need to be
reduced so that the total amount of direct spending, both
actual and estimated, for all of the categories would not
exceed the amounts available under the direct caps for the
applicable fiscal years; and,
4. the amount of excess spending attributable to changes in
inflation or eligible populations.
This report is triggered only if the total violation of the
revenue targets or spending caps exceeds 1% of the applicable
total revenues or direct spending for that year. A lower
percentage violation is deemed to be all right.
Section 202: Enforcing Direct Spending Caps
In any year in which direct spending exceeds the applicable
direct spending cap--the individual or the aggregate--the
breach would be eliminated pursuant to a sequester. This
sequester would apply a uniform percentage reduction to all
non-exempt accounts within that category in which the breach
occurred. Sequestration in accounts for which obligations are
indefinite would occur in a manner to ensure that obligations
in the fiscal year in which the sequester occurred and
succeeding fiscal years, are reduced. Furthermore, any
``budgetary resources'' sequestered from an account are
permanently canceled. This sequester mechanism is similar in
many respects to that under current law.\8\
Section 203: Sequestration Rules
In applying the sequester mechanism to the direct spending
caps, this section establishes certain general rules to apply
to all categories and certain special rules to apply to some
categories. In general, a sequester is triggered if total
direct spending subject to the caps exceeds or is projected
to exceed the aggregate cap for the current or immediately
preceding fiscal year. Also, a sequester will reduce spending
under each separate direct spending cap by the proportion of
the amounts each category breached its applicable spending
cap.
Special rules are included with respect to the application
of a sequester to certain entitlements involving indexed
benefit payments, loan programs, insurance programs, and
programs with state grant formulas.
Section 203 also provides that if a law is enacted prior to
July 1 of a fiscal year that provides direct spending that
would result in a breach of any direct spending cap during
the current year, a within-session sequester should occur to
eliminate the breach. Again this is similar to the within-
session sequester under current law with respect to the
enforcement of the discretionary spending limits.\9\
Section 204: Enforcing Revenue Targets
In any fiscal year in which actual revenues are less than
the applicable revenue target in the preceding fiscal year or
projected to be less than the applicable revenue target in
the current year, the mechanism in this section takes effect.
Based upon the statement of OMB pursuant to section 201(a),
OMB shall issue a report to the President and the Congress by
December 15 of any year in which revenues were less than the
revenue target established under this Act for the preceding
fiscal year or are projected to be less than the revenue
target established for the current fiscal year if such a
violation is more than 1 percent of the applicable total
revenue target for such year. This report shall include the
following:
1. all existing laws and policies enacted as part of any
reconciliation legislation in calendar year 1997 which would
cause revenues to decline in the calendar year which begins
January 1, compared to those laws and policies in effect as
of December 15 (i.e. any tax cuts scheduled to be phased in
during the upcoming fiscal year under current law);
2. the amounts by which revenues would be reduced by the
provisions of this section compared to policies in effect on
December 15; and,
3. whether delaying the implementation of the provisions
called for under current law would cause the total revenues
in the current fiscal year and actual revenues in the
immediately preceding fiscal year to equal or exceed the
total of the applicable targets.
If a revenue target was not met in the preceding fiscal
year or is not projected to be met in the current fiscal
year, this section requires that no provision of the Revenue
Reconciliation Act of 1997 establishing or increasing any
credit, deduction, exclusion, or eligibility limit or
reducing any rate shall take effect. It also requires the
suspension of any new adjustments for inflation scheduled to
be made to any credit, deduction or exclusion.
In the event a revenue target is not met this section would
require that any remaining tax reductions already enacted
into law be suspended indefinitely. There is no provision
allowing these scheduled tax cuts to be reinstated should a
projection be inaccurate or for Congress to substitute
further spending reductions for the loss in revenue. If fact,
the various procedural obstacles contained in section 102,
section 103, and section 107 of this Act virtually assure
that the only option available to remedy the target violation
will be a suspension of the tax relief. The President is
required to remedy the violation unless Congress and the
President can write a new law between November 1 and December
15 of the applicable calendar year resolving the issue in
another manner. Allowing the process to proceed by itself
will result in an automatic tax increase with respect to
current law. Furthermore, there is no discretion given to the
President to delay some while implementing others. In any
affected year all of the scheduled tax relief for that fiscal
year must be suspended permanently.
Section 205: Exempt Programs and Activities
This section outlines those programs which would be exempt
from the sequestration mechanism established under this Act.
As compared to current law,\10\ this section removes from the
list of exempted programs the following major programs:
Social Security and Tier I Railroad Retirement Benefits,
Veterans programs, the Earned Income Tax Credit, Child
Nutrition, the Food Stamp Program, Medicaid, Supplemental
Security Income, and Women, Infants and Children. The Act
retains the current law optional exemption of military
personnel from the uniform percentage reductions taken under
this Act.\11\
It should be noted that these modifications to the list of
programs exempt from sequestration only apply to the
implementation of the sequester mechanism established under
this Act and not to that under current law. Different rules
apply to the application of the two sequester mechanisms.
Section 206: Special Rules
Section 206 establishes further special rules for the
application of the sequester mechanism to certain programs
such as the Child Support Enforcement Program, the Commodity
Credit Corporation, the Dairy Program, the Earned Income Tax
Credit, Unemployment Compensation, the Federal Employees
Health Benefits Fund, the Federal Housing Finance Board,
Federal Pay, Medicare, the Postal Service Fund, Power
Marketing Administrations and the T.V.A. and to business-like
transactions of the Federal government.
However, each of these special rules do not provide
exemptions for these programs but rather spell out in advance
how a sequester is to be applied in each respective case. For
example, under any program that provides a business-like
service in exchange for a fee, sequestration would be
accomplished through a uniform increase in the fees paid for
the service whatever it may be. In the case of Medicare,
sequestration would be instituted under complex procedures
which would result in, among other things, increases in Part
B premiums for beneficiaries.
Furthermore, in each of the cases, this budget process
reform bill establishes how programmatic changes would occur
in each of these direct spending programs in order to
[[Page H5588]]
produce the required levels of savings in the applicable
program. In many of these cases, the proposed method of
programmatic change actually conflicts with the stated intent
of the underlying policy of the Bipartisan Balanced Budget
Agreement which this entire Act is supposed to enforce.
Section 207: The Current Law Baseline
By January 15 of each year, OMB and CBO are required to
submit to Congress and the President reports which set forth
the budget baselines for the budget year and the next nine
fiscal years. These budget baselines are to be based on the
common economic assumptions set forth in section 106 of this
Act.\12\ This new budget baseline would apply to the
budget projections of revenues, deficits and spending into
the budget year and the relevant outyears based on current
enacted laws as of the date of the projection. The
baseline for discretionary spending items would remain
those for the discretionary spending caps in effect under
current law at the time.\13\ Revisions to the baseline
would occur through adjustments for economic assumptions
when CBO issues its Economic and Budget Update and when
OMB submits its budget update. Further adjustments could
occur as needed by August 1 of each year when CBO and OMB
submit their midyear reviews.
The dilemma facing this construct of the budget baseline is
the assumption that the baseline and any revisions thereto
will remain common economic assumptions throughout the period
of FY 1998 through 2002. There is no explanation as to what
must occur if CBO and OMB cannot agree on common economic
assumptions pursuant to section 106 of this Act.
Section 208: Limitations on Emergency Spending
In an attempt to enable Congress to respond more
effectively to natural disasters and other emergencies, this
section requires that 1 percent of the total budget authority
and outlays available to be allocated, be withheld from
allocation to the appropriate committees as reserves to pay
for disasters and emergencies. These reserved amounts may be
made available for allocation to committees only if three
things occur:
1. the President has made a request for these funds,
2. the programs to be funded are included in such a
request, and
3. ``the projected obligations for unforeseen emergency
needs exceed the 10-year rolling average annual expenditures
for existing programs included in the Presidential request
for the applicable fiscal year.''
This grants the President an enormous advantage over the
congressional prerogative to allocate and spend the reserved
amounts. Congress cannot allocate these funds without the
prior approval of the President. Therefore, it cannot,
without violating these provisions, act unilaterally to
respond to any emergency prior to a Presidential declaration
of one.
This Act also prohibits states or localities from using any
disaster reserve funds to offset state or locality matching
requirements. Furthermore, it forbids the President from
taking administrative action to waive these matching
requirements. Waiving these matching requirements via
legislation would require a two-thirds vote of both Houses.
These prohibitions seem to go beyond the stated intent of
this section.
Furthermore, there seems to be different types of disasters
and emergencies (including natural disasters and national
security emergencies) referred to in various subsections of
this section. It is not clear whether the prohibitions on the
availability of these funds would be applicable to both. Some
subsections appear to allow its use while others do not.
This final section is the only section of H.R. 2003 that
actually amends the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. Section
208 would add a new point of order under Title IV of the
Budget Act to prevent the consideration in the House and
Senate of any bill, joint resolution or amendment thereto or
conference report thereon that is designated as an emergency,
if it also contains a non-emergency appropriation or direct
spending provision.\14\ This is similar to the House rule
XXI(2)(e) adopted at the beginning of the 104th Congress. The
language is almost identical to that contained in the House
rule. The effect of amending the Budget Act would apply the
provisions of this rule to both the House and the Senate.
footnotes
\1\ Section 250(c)(3) of the Deficit Control Act of 1985.
\2\ Section 300 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974.
\3\ Section 101 of H.R. 2003, as introduced by Rep. Barton on
June 20, 1997.
\4\ Section 300 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974.
\5\ Section 102(a)(3)(C)(iii) of H.R. 2003 as introduced by
Rep. Barton on June 20, 1997.
\6\ Section 305(a)(1) of the Congressional Budget Act of
1974.
\7\ Section 251(b) of the Deficit Control Act of 1985.
\8\ Section 251 and Section 254 of the Deficit Control Act of
1985.
\9\ Section 251(a)(6) of the Deficit Control Act of 1985.
\10\ Section 255 of the Deficit Control Act of 1985.
\11\ Section 255(h) of the Deficit Control Act of 1985. Note
the correct cite should be designated as subsection (j).
\12\ This is summarized in the joint explanatory statement of
managers accompanying H. Con. Res. 84, the budget resolution
for fiscal year 1998.
\13\ Section 601(a)(2) of the Congressional Budget Act of
1974.
\14\ Emergency designations are made pursuant to section
251(b)(2)(D) or section 252(e) of the Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 or of section 208 of
the Balanced Budget Enforcement Act of 1997. The bill
actually refers to the latter Act as section 207 of the
Balanced Budget Assurance Act of 1997. The correct cite is
section 208 of the Balanced Budget Enforcement Act of 1997.
Committee on Ways and Means,
U.S. House of Representatives,
Washington, DC, July 18, 1997.
Hon. Newt Gingrich,
The Speaker, The Capitol,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Speaker: I am writing regarding consideration of
H.R. 2003, the ``Budget Enforcement Act of 1997,'' which was
introduced on June 20, 1997, by Representative Joe Barton,
et. al. The bill, as introduced, was referred to the
Committee on Budget, and in addition, to the Committees on
Ways and Means and Rules.
Among other things, the bill would separate direct spending
caps of the Earned Income Tax Credit, Family Support,
Medicare, Social Security, SSI, and Unemployment Compensation
programs which are within the jurisdiction of the Committee
on Ways and Means. The caps would be enforced through
targeted sequestrations of these programs. This could include
automatic delays in cost of living adjustments and premium
increases. In addition, the bill would provide, if certain
revenue targets are not met, for the suspension of the phase-
in of any tax reductions provided in the 1997 Taxpayer Relief
Act, and suspension of inflation-based adjustments to any
credit, deduction, or exclusion enacted as part of the tax
bill.
During the recent floor debate on the reconciliation
legislation, Representative Barton stated his understanding
that the Leadership and the committees of jurisdiction would
work in an expeditious fashion to allow H.R. 2003 to receive
floor consideration prior to July 24. I now understand that
the bill may be scheduled for floor action as early as the
week of July 21.
Therefore, in order to expedite consideration of this
legislation by the full House, the Committee on Ways and
Means will not be marking up H.R. 2003. However, this is only
with the understanding that it does not in any way prejudice
the Committee's jurisdictional prerogatives in the future
with respect to this measure or any similar legislation, and
it should not be considered as precedent for consideration of
matters of jurisdictional interest to the Committee on Ways
and Means in the future.
Thank you for consideration of this matter. With best
personal regards.
Sincerely,
Bill Archer, Chairman.
____
Committee on Rules,
U.S. House of Representatives,
Washington, DC, July 21, 1997.
Hon. Newt Gingrich,
Speaker of the House,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Speaker: I respectfully ask that the Committee on
Rules be discharged from the further consideration of H.R.
2003, the Budget Enforcement Act of 1997.
H.R. 2003 was introduced on June 20, 1997 by
Representatives Barton and Minge, and others, and was
referred to the Committees on the Budget, Rules, and Ways and
Means. During the consideration of a rule for H.R. 2015, the
Balanced Budget Act and H.R. 2014, the Taxpayer Relief Act,
Representatives Barton and Minge filed an amendment with the
Committee on Rules relating to budget enforcement procedures
and consisting of the text of H.R. 2003.
In the furtherance of an agreement reached between
Representative Barton and the Republican Leadership on June
25, 1997, the Committee on Rules has agreed to waive its
original jurisdiction over H.R. 2003 and allow it to be
considered by the House of Representatives without committee
action. However, I believe the legislation is seriously
flawed and I intend to oppose it.
To facilitate the orderly consideration of H.R. 2003 and to
uphold the terms of the agreement, it is my intention to
report a closed rule for this measure this week.
Sincerely,
Gerald B. Solomon, Chairman.
____
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on the Budget
Washington, DC, July 22, 1997.
Hon. Newt Gingrich,
Speaker of the House,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Speaker: I respectfully request that the Committee
on the Budget be discharged from the further consideration of
H.R. 2003, the Budget Enforcement Act of 1997.
Consistent with an agreement reached between Representative
Barton and the Republican Leadership on June 25, 1997, the
Committee on the Budget has agreed to waive its original
jurisdiction over H.R. 2003 and allow it to be considered by
the House without committee action. Nevertheless, this
legislation is seriously flawed and I will oppose this bill.
Among various other problems, this bill would jeopardize the
tax relief we have worked so hard to secure for America's
families.
H.R. 2003 was introduced on June 20, 1997 by
Representatives Barton, Minge, and others, and was referred
to the Committees on the Budget, Rules, and Ways and Means.
During the consideration of the rule for H.R. 2015, the
Balanced Budget Act, and H.R. 2014, the Taxpayer Relief Act,
Representatives Barton and Minge filed an amendment with
[[Page H5589]]
the Committee on Rules relating to budget enforcement
procedures and consisting of the text of H.R. 2003. It was at
this point that the sponsors agreed to drop their proposed
amendment to H.R. 2014, and the Committee on the Budget
agreed, in return, to waive its jurisdiction.
Sincerely,
John R. Kasich, Chairman.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, when the Committee on Rules met in June to consider a
rule for the reconciliation bill, our colleagues, the gentleman from
Texas [Mr. Barton] and the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. Minge],
appealed to the committee to make in order as an amendment to the
reconciliation package the text of their bill, H.R. 2003. At that time
the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon] opposed including H.R. 2003
as an amendment in the rule, but he did assure supporters of H.R. 2003
that the rule would have an opportunity to consider budget process
reform legislation during the 105th Congress.
The next day, during the debate on the rule on reconciliation, the
gentleman from Texas [Mr. Barton], announced that he had reached an
understanding with the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon] that H.R.
2003 or an amended version of the bill would be brought to the floor
for an up or down vote no later than July 24. It is because of that
agreement, Mr. Speaker, that we are here today considering the rule.
I should point out that the gentleman from New York, in acknowledging
that agreement, said that the consideration of H.R. 2003 in no way
prejudices the ability of those committees with jurisdiction over the
budget process to consider other budget reform proposals at a later
date.
As the ranking minority member of the Subcommittee on Legislative and
Budget Process of the Committee on Rules, I would like to appeal to the
Republican majority to take advantage of the committee process if the
House is to consider significant changes in the congressional budget
process. I would hope that in the future that significant proposals
such as H.R. 2003 would be considered under regular order.
That being said, Mr. Speaker, the sponsors of H.R. 2003 were
guaranteed a vote on their proposal, and I am happy to see that the
commitment is being fulfilled. I do have a reservation about the rule
reported from the Committee on Rules, since it is a closed rule
providing only for an up or down vote on H.R. 2003 as introduced and
not in the improved form that its supporters proposed to bring to the
floor.
The gentleman from Texas and the other Members of the group pushing
this legislation have had an opportunity to review and make changes to
their bill since June, and I think, at the very least, if the House is
to consider significant changes to the way our budget process works,
the House might at least have the opportunity to consider the best work
product possible.
It seems that the Committee on Rules is now embarking on making in
order bills and amendments which are not what the authors of their
proposals bring to the committee, and I would caution my Republican
colleagues that to continue to operate in this manner might prove
disruptive to the regular order of the House.
Finally, Mr. Speaker, the rule divides the general debate time
between the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Barton] and an opponent of H.R.
2003. I want to make clear the understanding that the Democratic
members of the Committee on Rules have about the division of the time,
and if this is not what is intended, I would greatly appreciate my
colleague, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss], clarifying that
understanding.
I am given to understand that the gentleman from Texas intends to
yield one-half of his time to the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. Minge].
Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. FROST. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.
Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I have given the gentleman from
Minnesota, David Minge, and the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr.
Moakley, my word that half of the time that I will control, that I will
ask unanimous consent to yield it to the gentleman from Minnesota so
that he may control that time as he sees fit.
Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, I appreciate the
assurance of the gentleman.
It is also my understanding that the manager of the opposition to the
bill will be the gentleman from Ohio, the chairman of the Committee on
the Budget [Mr. Kasich], who will yield half of his allotted time to
the ranking minority member, the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr.
Spratt].
I think such a division of time is equitable to all sides and I would
ask my colleague, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss], if that
division of the debate time regarding the time in opposition is indeed
what will happen once we get to general debate?
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. FROST. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, my understanding permits me to answer in the
affirmative, and that these arrangements have been made and the
gentleman from Iowa [Mr. Nussle], has also assured me that the
potential person who will rise in opposition, that he is prepared to
yield 7\1/2\ minutes to that side also.
Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, once again reclaiming my time, I thank the
gentleman for that assurance and for his clarification.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the
gentleman from Glens Falls, NY [Mr. Solomon], the distinguished
chairman of the Committee on Rules.
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this
time.
Let me say to my good friend from Texas that if it were not for a
special agreement that was made with the sponsors of this legislation,
we would, without question, be following regular order. And let me say
that when this is over, we will go back to regular order and our
committees will reclaim our jurisdiction with the help of the gentleman
from Texas.
Mr. Speaker, I want to speak to three aspects of the debate: the
rule, the budget process reform efforts in the House, and the bill
itself.
First, the rule before the House today represents the fulfillment of
a commitment of the House Republican leadership. Earlier this year, on
June 25, during the consideration of this rule on the two
reconciliation bills for fiscal year 1998, a public commitment was made
by the Republican leadership to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Barton],
the gentleman from Delaware [Mr. Castle], the gentleman from Tennessee
[Mr. Wamp], the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. Minge], and others to
consider H.R. 2003 on the House floor before July 24. Today is July 23
and we are doing just that.
Furthermore, as part of the agreement, the three committees of
jurisdiction over this bill, namely the Committee on the Budget, the
Committee on Rules, and the Committee on Ways and Means, agreed to be
discharged from further consideration of the bill as introduced on June
20 by Mr. Barton and others.
Now, in response to those Members who have claimed that the rule did
not allow the sponsors of the bill to make further substantive changes
to the bill, I would make five observations:
First, the agreement between the Republican leadership, the chairmen
of the committees of jurisdiction, and the gentlemen from Texas and
Delaware involved the bill as pending before the Committee on Rules as
an amendment to the budget reconciliation bill.
Second, the text of that amendment was identical to that introduced
on June 20 by the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Barton].
Three, each of the three committees of jurisdiction; namely, the
Committee on the Budget, the Committee on Ways and Means, and the
Committee on Rules, all agreed as part of those discussions to be
discharged from further consideration of the bill, with the expectation
that that version of the bill would be the version considered on this
House floor.
Fourth, at the point at which the agreement was made, the only text
before the Members was that of H.R. 2003, as introduced; and any
additional
[[Page H5590]]
changes, whether technical or substantive, are outside the scope of
this agreement. Think about that.
Finally, no other Member of the House, whether Republican or
Democrat, and no committees of jurisdiction are able to offer
amendments or make changes to this bill.
The Committee on Rules' action was fair to all Members of the House
and it was consistent with the original agreement, which went outside
regular order, which I objected to in the very beginning.
The second important aspect of this debate involves the overall
budget process. During the 104th Congress, the Committee on Rules held
three original jurisdictional hearings under the leadership of our
colleague, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] over here on budget
process reform. During these hearings we heard testimony from dozens of
witnesses on the need for further budget process reform, which we all
agree is needed badly.
Also, during the 104th Congress the Committee on the Budget held a
hearing on budget process reform. Both committees have been proactive
in the drive to determine just how we can best reform the budget
process.
It also must be recognized that there are over a dozen different
budget process reform bills that have been introduced during this
Congress that are now pending before both the Committee on Rules and
the Committee on the Budget. Some have many sponsors, some only a few.
Many of the ideas that have been proposed I agree with and many I do
not agree with.
H.R. 2003, the bill before us today, is not the only option pending
before this House. The gentleman from California [Mr. Cox] has
introduced a comprehensive bill and has been working on this for 11
years now. The gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Visclosky] also has a
complex package.
The point is that we have a committee system through which to
comprehensively consider this issue and all the bills seeking to reform
it, and we do not need piecemeal legislation on this floor superseding
the regular committee process. In addition, we already have the two
chairmen of the committees of jurisdiction publicly committed to
working with Members on both sides of the aisle and with other
interested committees, including the Republican Policy Committee, to
devise a budget process reform bill that strengthens those parts of the
Budget Act that work and reform those parts that do not work.
The committees have, over the last 2 years, compiled research on
which they have begun to work with all interested Members in building
reform.
Mr. Speaker, finally, while all three chairmen of the committees of
jurisdiction applaud the efforts of our good friends who have worked on
this bill, the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Kasich], myself, the gentleman
from Texas [Mr. Archer], all stated our opposition to this bill, strong
opposition.
It is unfortunate that we have to take this position, but H.R. 2003
is a seriously flawed bill. The substantive flaws of this bill can be
summed up under three headings, and I think Members back in their
offices had better listen because this affects them politically and it
affects the operations and the workings of this House.
No. 1, an increase in procedural complexity; No. 2, a diminishment of
Congress' role in the budget process; and No. 3, an incentive toward
increased taxes. And that will happen over my dead body.
First, H.R. 2003 greatly increases the complexity of the budget
process. Without any hearings at all, the bill adds 15 new sections of
law to the budget process. The President and Congress would now be
required to follow the rules and procedures of three different, yet
comprehensive statutes, the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, and now the
Budget Enforcement Act of 1997, all designed to dictate the budget
process.
Not one section of the current budget rules are repealed or reformed
in this legislation before us, despite the fact that many of the bill's
new provisions actually conflict with or further complicate the
understanding of how the whole process works.
Furthermore, the bill creates a series of new points of order
designed to address serious concerns, but they may actually hinder the
ability of this House to effectively govern this institution. The bill
places unconstitutional prohibitions on the ability of the Committee on
Rules to craft rules by actually prohibiting the Committee on Rules
from ever waiving certain provisions of this act.
{time} 1100
In addition, the timetable established in the expedited procedures
created to provide for consideration of any needed legislation to
remedy a breach of the direct spending caps are unworkable, confusing,
and do not meet their stated objectives.
The bill also diminishes the role of Congress in the budget process.
And my colleagues ought to listen to this back in their offices: The
executive branch's authority in the process is greatly enhanced at the
expense of this Congress, by an expansion of the role and authority of
Office of Management and Budget and the Congressional Budget Office. Is
that what Members want; by a permanent reliance on common economic
assumptions, whatever that might be, for the creation of budget
baselines; by a delegation to OMB of the responsibility to determine
the actual dollar amounts for each direct spending cap; by granting the
President the authority to adjust the direct spending caps, but
actually prohibiting we, the Congress, from considering his
recommendations; and by establishing a requirement that only the
President can determine what constitutes an emergency spending item?
Finally, and my colleagues better listen to this, perhaps the most
fatal flaw of this bill is its impact on the ability of this
representative body to provide tax relief to the American people.
Since Ronald Reagan delivered the historic tax relief package on the
floor of this Congress in 1981, the American people have demanded
further tax relief from Washington, because they are taxed too much.
Sixteen years later, this Congress now stands on the threshold of
delivering America's families and businesses a long-awaited second tax
relief package. That is what we are doing here this week.
However, this bill will jeopardize the ability of those families to
actually receive this tax relief by allowing the implementation of
these tax cuts to be permanently suspended if revenue projections do
not hold true. Think about that. Under this bill, if revenues fall
below estimated levels, then any tax cut that we might enact this week
not fully phased in, such as the capital gains tax cut, the child tax
credit and estate tax relief provisions, would be suspended
indefinitely.
In other words, planned tax cuts already enacted into current law
could be withheld, listen to this, if the President and the Office of
Management and Budget say that Washington is not receiving what it is
projected to receive in tax revenues. There goes the tax cuts out the
window. Not only would this mechanism suspend tax relief if the
previous year's revenue levels fall short, but it also would revoke,
listen to this, it would revoke these tax cuts if the next fiscal
year's revenue levels are projected to fall short. In other words,
without any action by this Congress, the tax cuts are null and void.
Furthermore, under this bill there are no provisions for the
scheduled tax cuts to be reinstated should a budget projection be
inaccurate, or for Congress to substitute further spending reductions
for the loss in revenues so that we can keep those taxes in place. In
fact, the various procedural obstacles contained in this bill virtually
assure that the only option available to remedy a revenue target
violation will be a suspension of the tax relief. That is what we are
going to be voting on here today.
I would like to just close my remarks with a brief story that back in
the Middle Ages, in medieval England, a debate raged between the
Parliament and the King of England over who possessed the power to tax
the people to raise the funds needed to defend the country. Both sides
claimed an exclusive right to this power. Out of that 13th century
struggle emerged the Cornwall rebellion in my ancestral home of
Scotland, which settled the debate. The people were the final judges
over taxation, and their opinions could not be ignored. This historical
struggle is partly credited as genesis of the concept we now refer to
as parliamentary government, which is what we have here today, which in
turn the American
[[Page H5591]]
colonies transformed into our representative Government.
The debate and bargain over taxes between the king and Parliament and
now between the President and Congress lies at the very essence of our
political system. No enforcement policy or budget process should take
away the ability of the American people to express their opinions on
the level of their taxes through their representative Government.
Mr. Speaker, this bill's automatic revocation of enacted tax relief,
if Washington spends more than they raise, chips away at the very heart
of this representative process. Again, I am disappointed that I have to
oppose this legislation.
Finally, let me just say, if any of the sponsors of this bill, and
that includes the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Barton], the gentleman from
Delaware [Mr. Castle], and the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. Wamp] that
are Republicans, or the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. Minge] or the
gentleman from Texas [Mr. Stenholm] or the gentlewoman from California
[Mrs. Tauscher] decide to vote against this rule, for whatever reason,
then I would argue that we all ought to vote against this rule. But if
they are going to come here and vote for the rule, then I am going to
urge support for that rule to bring the agreement we made with these
sponsors to bring this bill to the floor so that we can have an up-or-
down vote, and then I would urge the defeat of the bill.
I appreciate the gentleman yielding me the time.
Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Minnesota [Mr. Minge].
Mr. MINGE. Mr. Speaker, this morning we are debating both the rule
and, shortly, legislation that deals with the process that this
institution feels would be the correct process for this Nation to
follow in attempting to ensure that we actually keep our commitment to
balance the budget.
Many may say ``process'' and yawn. ``What is its significance?''
``Where does it take us?'' The fact of the matter is that if we attempt
to actually follow through and balance the budget as we have promised,
we must make sure that we have discipline to do that; and if we are to
have the discipline to do that, we must have a process to impose that
discipline. That is what this bill is about.
The debate that we are having at this moment centers around what is
the best way to ensure that this process will be workable. One of the
tragedies of the rule that has been presented for the consideration of
the legislation is that we have been denied the opportunity to improve
the legislation, to improve that process.
To be sure, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Barton], my cosponsor, and
I are pleased that the legislation is up for consideration. But we
would like to have it be the best legislation. We have worked to
improve that legislation. We appeared before the Committee on Rules
last night with a substitute bill. It is a common occurrence that the
proponents of legislation, the chairs of committees, say at the point
of consideration in the Committee on Rules that this proposal ought to
be adjusted, it ought to be improved. And as a routine matter of
courtesy, the Committee on Rules allows the chairman of the committee,
the proponent of the legislation, to improve that bill.
We were denied that opportunity. I submit we were denied that
opportunity because the leadership in this institution wanted to see
the weakest possible bill before the body for a vote, hoping that this
bill could be defeated.
What we need to do, I submit, is all of us stand tall and say to the
leadership in this institution and of the Committee on Rules, we demand
fair treatment for legislation when it comes to the floor. We will not
accept second-class treatment of legislation.
If we do not have the opportunity to vote on the best possible bill,
then, unfortunately, we have to count on the conference committee or
the Senate to improve the product. And altogether too often, that is
what happens in this institution, as well.
I urge my colleagues to join with me in supporting this legislation
today to bring it to a successful conclusion.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, may I have a status report on the time,
please?
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaTourette). The gentleman from Florida
[Mr. Goss] has 10 minutes remaining. The gentleman from Texas [Mr.
Frost] has 22\1/2\ minutes remaining.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Texas
[Mr. Barton], the distinguished sponsor of the bill.
(Mr. BARTON of Texas asked and was given permission to revise and
extend his remarks.)
Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Florida
[Mr. Goss], the distinguished subcommittee chairman of the Committee on
Rules for yielding me the time.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the rule to bring H.R. 2003 to the
House floor as one of the chief sponsors, along with the gentleman from
Delaware [Mr. Castle] and the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. Wamp]. I
think it is long overdue that we attempt to enforce the budget
agreement that we are currently negotiating with the President and with
the Senate of the United States of America.
If we go back to 1975 or 1972, my colleagues will see that most of
the spending in the Federal budget at that time was discretionary
spending. We could control it so that the Congress could work its will.
In the budget year that we are in now, we can see that that has been
reversed. Fifty-two percent of the budget is entitlement spending. It
is uncontrollable. And if we combine that with the red part of the pie
chart, which is interest on the debt, two-thirds of the total Federal
budget is off budget, it is uncontrollable. That is a problem. We need
to do something about it.
The budget agreement that is before us, in general, by the year 2002,
which is the last year of the budget agreement, 58 percent of the
budget agreement is going to be entitlements. Another 14 or 15 percent
is going to be interest on the debt. That is, three-fourths of the
total Federal budget is uncontrollable.
My colleagues, if we do not do something to really enforce this
agreement, we are not going to have a balanced budget in the year 2002.
If we look at the components of entitlement spending, these are the top
11. The Federal budget, in their annual rate of growth by program over
the last several years, we can see that the Medicaid Program has been
growing at 16 percent a year. That is unsustainable over time.
The budget agreement that is currently in negotiations with the
President reins in the overall rate of growth in entitlement spending
to approximately 7 percent on an annual basis. But there are higher
rates of growth for Medicare and Medicaid and lower rates of growth for
some of the others.
What we have done, in a bipartisan fashion, with the gentleman from
Minnesota [Mr. Minge], the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Stenholm], the
gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. Tanner], and others on the Democratic
side is come up with a simple concept: If we are going to enforce the
budget agreement, we have got to enforce everything. What makes up an
agreement? Spending and revenues.
So we take on the revenue side and say that $85 billion tax cut
package over 5 years is on the table. On the spending side, we say all
spending, including entitlement spending, is on the table. This chart
right here shows entitlement spending, first year of the budget
agreement, $900 billion; tax cuts about $5 billion. Over the life of
the agreement, $85 billion in tax cuts, $5 trillion in entitlement
spending. That is 50-to-1 spending versus revenue.
How does our enforcement mechanism work? If any target is broached on
the revenue side, the President and the Congress can vote to change the
package so that the targets are met. The President and the Congress can
vote to waive the cap, saying we are not going to force that part of
the agreement this year. But if the Congress and the President
consciously decide to do nothing, the deficit does not go up. The
deficit does not go up. If the Congress and the President decide to do
nothing, there is an automatic enforcement that reins in the tax cuts
that have not yet been put into place until the revenues are met.
The same thing happens on the spending side. Every program has a
[[Page H5592]]
cap. Every program that spends $20 billion or more has its own cap. If
a program is within its budget, nothing happens. If the program goes
over the budget, the President and the Congress can fix that program,
they can decide to waive the cap on that program. But if they do
nothing, a procedure called sequestration goes into effect that brings
that program back under the cap.
My colleagues, we need to pass this amendment. Vote for the rule.
Vote for the bill.
Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Texas
[Mr. Stenholm].
(Mr. STENHOLM asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Speaker, I come to the floor in opposition to a
rule that is a tremendous disappointment to those of us who are serious
about budget enforcement. This rule does not provide the type of debate
that an issue of this importance deserves. We want the legislative
process to work to produce the best possible bill. This rule does not
let the legislative process work. We wanted the committee process to
work.
We were greatly disappointed when the committees of jurisdiction
failed to consider this bill. It is disingenuous for committees to now
criticize the process that has brought this bill to the floor and argue
that the committee process has been thwarted because they chose not to
consider the bill. We have listened to the criticisms that have been
raised by the Committee on Ways and Means and the Committee on the
Budget and Members on both sides of the bill, both sides of the aisle,
as well as the administration, an outside organization.
{time} 1115
The bill's sponsors have agreed to several technical changes and
other improvements to the bill in response to those concerns that were
raised. This rule does not allow us to make those improvements. We
wanted this bill to be considered under an open rule so that Members
who had additional concerns or criticisms could offer constructive
improvements to the bill. We wanted Members who have different ideas on
budget process reform to have an opportunity to raise those ideas. This
rule prevents the House from working its will on this issue.
Mr. Speaker, I was very disturbed by the threat from the chairman of
the Committee on Rules a moment ago to people like me if we have the
audacity to oppose this rule, he might just take this bill down and not
in fact consider it. It should not be any surprise, ladies and
gentlemen. That is what this House has been doing for the last week.
Now we have got a threat of a gag rule on the agricultural
appropriation bill later today. Why? Not because the ag appropriation
bill is any problem, but because this same committee that has been
gagging the House from allowing Members to have their ideas voted in a
responsible way have refused to allow that to happen.
The gentleman from Texas [Mr. Frost] stated a moment ago that if
rules like this one continue, the House might find itself disrupted
from its regular order of business. I suggest that we are going to have
that to happen. It would be extremely unfair for Members to support a
rule that prevents us from making improvements to the bill and then
criticize this bill for technical improvements, bringing up Social
Security as was heard a moment ago. The gentleman who made that knows
there is no possible way Social Security is going to be affected by
this bill. But he raises that in order to raise the temperature around
here. And Congress being taken out of the process? They have not even
read the bill. Listen to what the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Barton]
said a moment ago. Look at the bill before criticizing it. All Members
who care about the integrity of the legislative process and believe
that we should strive to pass the best possible legislation should vote
against this rule.
Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Illinois [Mr. Evans].
Mr. EVANS. I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to this rule. Last night I
testified before the Committee on Rules on behalf of an amendment I
would like to offer to H.R. 2003, the Budget Enforcement Act of 1997.
The Committee on Rules did not choose to make in order my amendment,
and our Nation's veterans and their families may suffer as a result. If
entitlement program costs are underestimated or if revenue collections
fail to meet projected targets, enactment of the Budget Enforcement Act
could be no less than catastrophic for many of our Nation's veterans
and their dependents. That is why I am asking Members to vote against
the proposed rule. By voting no on the rule, Members have the chance to
say yes to our Nation's veterans and their families. My amendment
exempts veterans benefits and programs from potentially devastating
effects of this legislation if cost savings and revenue projections are
miscalculated. If enacted without amendment, the Budget Enforcement Act
would continue the Congress on a troubling path of neglect toward our
Nation's veterans. Adoption of my amendment would be one important way
to show that we in Congress are not willing to abandon the obligations
we have to the men and women who have faithfully served our country. I
urge my colleagues to vote no on the rule and vote yes for our Nation's
veterans.
Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
California [Mr. Filner].
Mr. FILNER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to the rule,
also. Like the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Stenholm], I believe that this
rule prevents real debate on the real issues. The gentleman from
Illinois [Mr. Evans] who just spoke offered an amendment last night
that would protect the benefits earned by America's veterans from
permanent reduction. Remarkably, this amendment was defeated on a party
line vote by the Committee on Rules last night. As written, H.R. 2003
would decimate the benefit programs our grateful Nation has provided
for America's heroes, our veterans. It does not protect them. It does
not protect service-disabled veterans. It does not protect those who
suffered in the Persian Gulf War and who are now sick as a result of
that service. I urge my colleagues to defeat the rule so that we can
all have the opportunity to vote on the important amendment of the
gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Evans] and tell our veterans that we
support them.
Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from
Texas [Ms. Jackson-Lee].
Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. I thank the gentleman very much for
yielding me this time.
Mr. Speaker, I rise today to ask for opposition to this rule. I rise
in particular as someone who supported the initial budget agreement in
a bipartisan manner to emphasize that we can work on the effort of
deficit reduction and treating people fairly together. But I would call
this rule the hatchet job on the most vulnerable rule. The hatchet job
on the most vulnerable. For without any notice whatsoever, this rule
would kick in an absolute cut, an automatic cut on those needing Social
Security, Medicare, Medicaid, veterans benefits.
I applaud the work of the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Stenholm] and
others who worked to ensure that we might have a protected budget
agreement. But this is not the agreement. This is not even the
discussion. This is simply a rule that says those who cannot speak for
themselves, those who are outside the circle of power, we will make
sure that if there is any problem with this budget down the road, we
will make sure that we take from those most vulnerable. It ensures that
we will take from those who need food stamps, from those who are on
SSI. Particularly Medicaid when we are trying now to establish health
care for our children, we would cut Medicaid that treats the most
vulnerable in this community, those who are most poor and our children.
Mr. Speaker, this is not a fair enforcement rule. This is an
enforcement act that takes the enforcement part of it to the very
extreme. I would ask my colleagues to recognize, let us not do a
hatchet job on those in particular who have given to this Nation, our
senior citizens who have worked hard all of their lives and our
veterans who have given very much their service to this Nation to
protect our freedoms. I
[[Page H5593]]
would argue that it is important now to stand up for those who count,
those who have already taken a measure of hit from this budget who have
come to the table and wanted a fair budget. This is a bad rule. I ask
everyone to vote against it.
Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas
[Mr. Doggett].
Mr. DOGGETT. Mr. Speaker, there are a number of rules that people say
apply here in Washington that we do not think a lot of down in Texas.
The first of these is that in Washington apparently a promise is never
a guarantee. We have the promise of a balanced budget, but those who
have taken the grandstand the greatest portion of the time to talk
about how wonderful this balanced budget agreement is, they are
unwilling to give us the guarantee of a balanced budget, and that is
why this piece of legislation is necessary.
A second rule said to apply here in Washington is that the fact that
it did not work the first time does not mean we will not try it again.
This is not the first time we have had the promise of a balanced
budget. It has happened over and over again. We keep trying the same
old thing without having a real guarantee, an enforcement mechanism to
be sure we in fact get a balanced budget. There is one gimmick after
another in this proposed agreement, as proposed by both sides. If we
are to achieve a true balanced budget, it will take an enforcement
mechanism like this.
I would suggest that there is a third rule that applies here in
Washington, that we are seeing worked out here on the floor today. It
is that treachery knows no limits. We saw during this balanced budget
agreement a Member stand here on the floor, one Republican promising to
another that if we would all just vote for this balanced budget
agreement that they would in a matter of weeks have an enforcement
mechanism here on the floor. They have honored their agreement in word,
but certainly not in spirit, because they have come before us today and
they have presented a proposal in a way that they are sure it will be
defeated. If they had any confidence in the notion that we will really
get a balanced budget by 2002, indeed we could really have it next
year. If we would effectively enforce this agreement, they would be
here cheering us on and working to develop this agreement.
Mr. Speaker, I am not for this bill in the form that it is here this
morning. I am not sure I am for it as it is proposed to be changed. But
I know we have to have an enforcement mechanism, and this is the only
way to get it.
Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from
California [Mrs. Tauscher].
(Mrs. TAUSCHER asked and was given permission to revise and extend
her remarks.)
Mrs. TAUSCHER. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to support this rule because
I frankly have no other choice. As a strong advocate of a balanced
budget and a supporter of the balanced budget agreement agreed to by
Congress and the President, I am very pleased that we are on the path
toward eliminating the deficit. But without strong enforcement language
in the reconciliation bills, there is no guarantee that the goal will
be met.
When the House considered the budget reconciliation spending and
revenue bills, a bipartisan group of Members, including myself,
attempted to offer enforcement language as an amendment. The House
leadership back in June refused to make our amendment in order and
instead promised that our amendment would be brought to the floor as a
freestanding bill. What were we thinking about a month ago when we
allowed that promise to be given with no guarantee that we would ever
see this bill on the floor?
In the intervening 3 weeks, we have responded to some of the
criticisms of the bill and made changes to improve it. The Committee on
Rules, however, last night decided not to allow us to bring forward
that amended bill and has reported a rule that forbids any amendments.
This is in direct violation of an agreement by the gentleman from New
York [Mr. Solomon] chairman of the Committee on Rules, reported in the
Congressional Record of June 25 to make in order an amended version of
our bill by no later than July 24.
Mr. Speaker, this is one more example of the duplicitous manner in
which the House leadership treats its Members. I am forced to vote for
this rule, and I encourage my colleagues to do the same, because it is
the only way we can consider budget enforcement legislation. But this
is not the way the House business should be done.
Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Tennessee [Mr. Tanner].
Mr. TANNER. Mr. Speaker, I, too, would like to echo what the
gentlewoman from California [Mrs. Tauscher] said about this. This is
unfortunate. It is sad. We are here and elected by our constituencies
to come and try to do the best job we can regardless of party
affiliation.
Three weeks ago we were told that if certain things happened in
relation to a rule vote at that time, we would be allowed the
opportunity to offer a budget enforcement mechanism before July 24. It
was pointed out, and there may be some disagreement, but regardless of
that, this is the vehicle that translates the idea of financial
integrity in this country and in the Nation's books being balanced from
an idea to reality for all of these young children that are here today
and around the country. And for the Committee on Rules to not allow
that to happen last night is just simply sad. I have been here 9 years
and I will be the first to vote and did vote against my leadership when
they abused the Committee on Rules and did not allow things to come
forward for the will of the House to work itself. I would ask the
Republican rank and file to do the same today, because without regard
of who said what and when, this is a better piece of legislation that
we were denied the opportunity to vote on today.
Mr. Speaker, I have been here 9 years. If there was ever a day that
Members ought to put their country ahead of their political party, the
time is now on this budget enforcement bill. I just hope that the rank
and file Members of both sides of the aisle will do that today.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the distinguished
gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Smith].
Mr. SMITH of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I am very disappointed that we
are not going to engage in real, hard debate having aggressive
committee consideration of this kind of bill. I have introduced a
budget reform bill for the last 4 years. I would like that debate on a
budget reform bill include consideration of provisions I think are
important. I have also introduced a different budget enforcement bill,
H.R. 2037, that was made part of the budget reconciliation language.
The bill before us needs more consideration and debate than simply the
brief 1 hour debate on the floor. I am disappointed that the rule does
not have the options for amendments and debate. I am disappointed that
this bill is before us today without being considered by committee or
at the very least, requiring a two-third majority like any other
suspension bill that has not gone through the committee process.
{time} 1130
Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from North
Dakota [Mr. Pomeroy].
Mr. POMEROY. Mr. Speaker, I take the well to protest the unfair rule
before us. Legislation is a work in progress. We all know that. No one
gets it perfect the first time. And so there is give and take as we
listen to concerns and move to change the bill to address those
concerns.
Mr. Speaker, that is precisely what has been taking place with this
enforcement act.
Now I do not think the act is there yet. I think there are still some
changes that need to be made, and I am going to oppose it. But for this
rule to bar from consideration the improvements that have been
negotiated over the last several days I just think is unconscionable.
Why in the world would they give this House only the flawed first
version to consider? It is, I think, really a diabolical, empty gesture
to say, ``Okay, you've got your vote, now leave us alone,'' when indeed
they owed them much more than that. They owed them a straight-up vote
on the best budget enforcement package that the sponsors care to offer,
and it is a pity the rule did not allow that.
Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Wisconsin [Mr. Kind].
[[Page H5594]]
Mr. KIND. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding this time
to me.
I rise today in strong opposition to the rule today, and as a new
Member of Congress, we soon realize that a good piece of legislation is
not drafted, is not submitted and drafted with just one crack at it.
This has been an ongoing process. There have been concerns raised about
the Budget Enforcement Act, considerations that have been taken and
drafted into the recent piece of legislation. But we are not going to
have an opportunity to present the best piece of policy, the best piece
of legislation that we can offer to the American people, because of the
way that the rule has been set up.
Now I am not familiar with the politics of the Committee on Rules,
but I am learning some lessons awfully fast here, and it is
disappointing that our best piece of legislation to enforce a budget
agreement is not going to be given a fair consideration or hearing or
debate on the House floor today, and that is unfortunate.
But I do not understand what is going on here. What is the message we
are seeing? What is everyone so concerned about in regard to the Budget
Enforcement Act? All this says is that if the targets are not reached,
if they are not able to practice fiscal responsibility year after year
after year, then it is time to go back and change some policies.
That is all that we are asking here.
Is it any wonder that over 80 percent of the American people in a
recent poll have no confidence at all that this institution is capable
of balancing the books?
I mean sure, if my colleagues worship at the idol of tax cuts and tax
relief or if they worship at the idol of more spending and unrestrained
spending growths, then, yes, oppose the Balanced Budget Enforcement
Act. But that does not make any sense.
I have a son who is almost 1 year old, and I want to be able to go
home every day after work, look him in the eyes and tell him that I am
working in his best interests, that I am working in the best interests
of all the children in this country and future generations, and that if
we do pull up short, if the economy does slow down, we do not have the
projected revenue growth or the corresponding spending reductions to
meet our balanced budget guidelines, that we as an institution have a
capability of addressing it again; but if we do not, that there is a
hammer held over our heads, this Budget Enforcement Act, which will do
the job that we should have the courage to do on our own.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from New
York [Mr. Solomon], the distinguished chairman of the Committee on
Rules.
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, the previous speaker wants to know what the
problem is. Let me tell him what the problem is, my colleagues. We pass
tax cuts here in this body today, and then next week, next month, next
year this Congress fails to bite the bullet, they fail to vote for the
cuts on the bills that come on this floor every day, and this happens
time and time again, and the Tax Code cuts go out the window.
That is the problem, my colleagues. The American people are
overtaxed. We are going to cut their taxes. That is why we need to
defeat this bill today. Think about that, my colleagues.
Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Florida [Mr. Boyd].
Mr. BOYD. Mr. Speaker, I want to tell my colleagues that this is not
about whether the tax cuts will be enforced or not. All this means,
this relates to the tax side. It just means that one will meet those
projections, revenue projections, that are in place.
Mr. Speaker, as my colleagues know, we learn a lot about a body after
we are in it after a short period of time, and there are 71 other
freshman Members along with myself in this body, and we learn something
about how that body operates.
Now we read every day about the problems the leadership is having in
this body, and it is no wonder after what has happened here the last
couple of days in reference to this Budget Enforcement Act.
There has been a brilliant strategy move pull by the leadership of
this House in getting people who support a budget enforcement and have
been working on that for months and months and month, even years,
together now are up here speaking for, some for the rule and some
against the rule. It is a brilliant strategy move, and it is going to
mean that this piece of legislation will go down.
But I must tell my colleagues, just think about that when they read
about the problems that exist in the leadership of this House, and
there will be more as a result of this particular piece of legislation.
The people who support this legislation have been tricked just like the
people of the United States of America have been tricked in the
previous balanced budget agreements in 1981, 1985, and 1990 when they
were told there was going to be a balanced budget, and we did not have
one.
Do my colleagues know why? Because we did not have enforcement in
place. So, my colleagues, we will get enforcement at some period of
time, but I think we have a little ways to go, and the American people
have to understand a little bit more about what is happening here in
this U.S. House of Representatives.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I am delighted to hear that we have a
brilliant strategy over here.
I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Delaware [Mr.
Castle], my friend, who has been a sponsor and has a strong commitment
to this particular piece of legislation.
Mr. CASTLE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding this time
to me, and I do not have any brilliant strategy to come forward with,
but I feel very strongly about this piece of legislation, and I, too,
would have liked to have seen it amended, and I too am concerned that
the rules process did not allow that to happen. I have heard the
explanations.
But having said that, I regretfully support the rule, regretfully
because I think there could have been changes to improve this
legislation, and that is what we should have done in the best interests
of the American people. But we did not do that.
However having said that, I think we also need to move forward with
the legislation; and to not support it I think would be a great
mistake.
Why should we move forward with this legislation?
I heard some of the reservations, and I have tremendous support for
the Hall of Fame Members of this Congress who have united in opposition
to this; but we, the foot soldiers, I think, need to be heard on this
as well. And in my judgment, this piece of legislation is a vital cog
to the balancing of the budget of the United States in the future. We
are going to pass a 5-year balanced budget plan this year, but we are
not going to have enforcement mechanisms.
And everybody can cite back over 20 years when we have done something
similar to that in Congress and we have not been able to balance the
budget out in the different years that come up in the 5-year period,
and I am afraid it is going to happen again this year.
There is a great deal of flexibility in this plan. It is not afraid
to address any parts of the budget, be they discretionary or
entitlements or the tax cuts. But it basically says that somehow the
revenue picture changes or spending number changes, we are going to go
back and look at it.
And that is all the Congress is requested to do; we have to look at
it, and we should do that. That is an absolute responsibility.
How can we vote for a balanced budget amendment, how can we vote for
a balanced budget but not be willing to enforce it? And that is what
Alan Greenspan essentially agrees, it is what Tim Penny and Bill
Frenzel have written today in the Washington Post, it is what almost
all budget economic experts across this country have stated, and this
is not something that a few of us can come up with in a back room. This
was something that was put together by experts who believe in this as
well.
Support this outstanding legislation.
Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New
Jersey [Mr. Andrews].
Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Texas [Mr.
Frost] for yielding this time to me.
Mr. Speaker, there is some brilliant strategy at work here. This
legislation which I strongly support has managed to perform the miracle
of bringing all different kinds of people together. People who love to
see the Government
[[Page H5595]]
spend more money oppose this legislation because it would stop the
spending from going on. People who love to pay for tax cuts by
borrowing money and increasing the deficit oppose this legislation
because they hold the tax cuts sacrosanct. Those who worship the
committee process do not like this legislation because it did not pass
through their portals. I with some sorrow predict that we will not get
many votes for this legislation when it comes to the floor because all
the interests are offended by it.
People who like this legislation are those that are in the huge
majority of taxpaying Americans who really want to see us do what we
purport to be doing here, which is to adopt a balanced budget plan and
make it work year in and year out, whether the revenues fall or drop,
whether the entitlements rise or fall.
This is an idea which will in all likelihood not succeed today, but
we will succeed in bringing it back to the floor and succeed in
enacting it in the future.
Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Texas
[Mr. Turner].
Mr. TURNER. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in opposition to the rule
because I am greatly disturbed that the most important element of the
balanced budget, the budget enforcement provisions, have been
compromised by failure of the Committee on Rules to allow full
amendments that were brought before the committee.
As my colleagues know, we passed a budget resolution here in this
Congress a few weeks ago. The problem is a budget resolution is a whole
lot like a New Years resolution. It is easy to make but hard to keep.
This Congress has been in a long courtship with the balanced budget. We
finally got to the point where we adopted a budget resolution, we have
made great steps toward achieving the goal of a balanced budget, and
yet we are not able to assure the American people that the courtship
that we have had and the marriage that will take place when we pass the
reconciliation bill is to carry out this budget agreement. We cannot
assure the American people that this marriage will last.
I think that we have made a terrible mistake not dealing with the
budget enforcement provisions in a serious manner in the Committee on
Rules, and for that reason I will oppose the rule.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from Iowa [Mr. Nussle].
Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding this time
to me.
First of all, I do not question anybody. There has been some question
about motivation for why people have done what they have done here
today, and I do not question the motivation of any Member up here who
has spoken in favor or against this particular piece of legislation. In
fact, if my colleagues just look around the Chamber at the people who
have spoken here today, these are the Hall of Famers. I would say to my
friend from Delaware, these are the Hall of Famers in balancing the
budget and making sure that we enforce it, and I would start with that.
We have enforcement mechanisms within this budget, within the budget
process currently. Are they perfect? No. We all agree that we want to
improve the current budget process.
Now the question that we are posed with here today is, is this the
time and is this the bill? This is not the time because we are
currently in the middle of the negotiations. We are currently in the
middle of the process to get to a balanced budget. We do not change the
rules in the middle of the game. As much as I would love to at
different times during legislation, we do not make that kind of
judgment right now during the heat of the battle. We have tried that in
the past. Those mechanisms have never worked.
This is also not the bill, and in fact it is interesting to hear all
of these folks come forward and say, ``Boy, I love this bill. It isn't
quite perfect, and I'd love to see this amendment or that amendment,''
or ``Hey, I know, I've got an idea. Hey, I know, let's put this
amendment in. Let's put this mechanism in. Hey, I know.''
We should not legislate by ``Hey, I know.''
Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, we have no further speakers at this time, and
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I think we are going to have a multiple choice test for Members after
the conclusion of this debate to see if anybody understands what
actually has been discussed.
{time} 1145
As the gentlewoman from Texas alleged, this is a rule that cuts
something. This rule does not cut anything. Rules do not cut anything.
Anybody who believes that has not quite read the rule.
Mr. Speaker, we have had a lot of comment about somehow or other this
was a perfect product back on June 25 when it was offered, but somehow
or other it is not a perfect product now, and somehow or other the
Committee on Rules has failed to do its job on that. We need more
deliberations, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Stenholm] says. Others say
no, we need to pass this right away.
The point is we have a committee system here that works. We have had
commitments to proceed with a budget reform process and budget
enforcement. That is going to happen. We today are looking at an up-or-
down vote that was promised in a deal with the leadership on a 25 of
June package to have that vote before July 24. Promises made, promises
kept. That is what is going on here today.
Some have said the Committee on Rules did not do its job, did not
consider waivers or exceptions last night. That is a little
disingenuous. We heard the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Evans] speak
today about a request for exemptions for one class of people. If we
opened this up to exemptions to the enforcement of budget, everybody
will come forward with an exemption, and we will have a hollow process
of enforcement. We all know that. That is why we promised an up-or-down
vote.
This is an up-or-down vote on the package of June 25, put together by
the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Barton] and the gentleman from Minnesota
[Mr. Minge]. That is what we promised. That is what is on the floor.
Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question on resolution.
The previous question was ordered.
The resolution was agreed to.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
Mr. CASTLE. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to the rule, I call up the bill
(H.R. 2003) to reform the budget process and enforce the bipartisan
balanced budget agreement of 1997, and ask for its immediate
consideration.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaTourette). Is the gentleman from
Delaware [Mr. Castle] the designee of the gentleman from Texas [Mr.
Barton]?
Mr. CASTLE. Yes, Mr. Speaker.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the title of the bill.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The text of H.R. 2003 is as follows:
H.R. 2003
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE AND TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Budet
Enforcement Act of 1997''.
(b) Table of Contents.--
Sec. 1. Short title and table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
TITLE I--ENSURE THAT THE BIPARTISAN BALANCED BUDGET AGREEMENT OF 1997
ACHIEVES ITS GOAL
Sec. 101. Timetable.
Sec. 102. Procedures to avoid sequestration or delay of new revenue
reductions.
Sec. 103. Effect on Presidents' budget submissions; point of order.
Sec. 104. Deficit and revenue targets.
Sec. 105. Direct spending caps.
Sec. 106. Economic assumptions.
Sec. 107. Revisions to the caps for entitlements and other spending and
to the revenue and deficit targets in this Act.
TITLE II--ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS
Sec. 201. Reporting excess spending.
Sec. 202. Enforcing direct spending caps.
Sec. 203. Sequestration rules.
Sec. 204. Revenue enforcement.
Sec. 205. Exempt programs and activities.
Sec. 206. Special rules.
Sec. 207. The current law baseline.
Sec. 208. Limitations on emergency spending.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
For purposes of this Act:
[[Page H5596]]
(1) Eligible population.--The term ``eligible population''
shall mean those individuals to whom the United States is
obligated to make a payment under the provisions of a law
creating entitlement authority. Such term shall not include
States, localities, corporations or other nonliving entities.
(2) Sequester and sequestration.--The terms ``sequester''
and ``sequestration'' refer to or mean the cancellation of
budgetary resources provided by discretionary appropriations
or direct spending law.
(3) Breach.--The term ``breach'' means, for any fiscal
year, the amount (if any) by which outlays for that year
(within a category of direct spending) is above that
category's direct spending cap for that year.
(4) Baseline.--The term ``baseline'' means the projection
(described in section 207) of current levels of new budget
authority, outlays, receipts, and the surplus or deficit into
the budget year and the outyears.
(5) Budgetary resources.--The term ``budgetary resources''
means new budget authority, unobligated balances, direct
spending authority, and obligation limitations.
(6) Discretionary appropriations.--The term ``discretionary
appropriations'' means budgetary resources (except to fund
direct spending programs) provided in appropriation Acts. If
an appropriation Act alters the level of direct spending or
offsetting collections, that effect shall be treated as
direct spending. Classifications of new accounts or
activities and changes in classifications shall be made in
consultation with the Committees on Appropriations and the
Budget of the House of Representatives and the Senate and
with CBO and OMB.
(7) Direct spending.--The term ``direct spending'' means--
(A) budget authority provided by law other than
appropriation Acts, including entitlement authority;
(B) entitlement authority; and
(C) the food stamp program.
If a law other than an appropriation Act alters the level of
discretionary appropriations or offsetting collections, that
effect shall be treated as direct spending.
(8) Entitlement authority.--The term ``entitlement
authority'' means authority (whether temporary or permanent)
to make payments (including loans and grants), the budget
authority for which is not provided for in advance by
appropriation Acts, to any person or government if, under the
provisions of the law containing such authority, the United
States is obligated to make such payments to persons or
governments who meet the requirements established by such
law.
(9) Current.--The term ``current'' means, with respect to
OMB estimates included with a budget submission under section
1105(a) of title 31 U.S.C., the estimates consistent with the
economic and technical assumptions underlying that budget.
(10) Account.--The term ``account'' means an item for which
there is a designated budget account designation number in
the President's budget.
(11) Budget year.--The term ``budget year'' means the
fiscal year of the Government that starts on the next October
1.
(12) Current year.--The term ``current year'' means, with
respect to a budget year, the fiscal year that immediately
precedes that budget year.
(13) Outyear.--The term ``outyear'' means, with respect to
a budget year, any of the fiscal years that follow the budget
year.
(14) OMB.--The term ``OMB'' means the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget.
(15) CBO.--The term ``CBO'' means the Director of the
Congressional Budget Office.
(16) Budget outlays and outlays.--The terms ``budget
outlays'' and ``outlays'' mean, with respect to any fiscal
year, expenditures of funds under budget authority during
such year.
(17) Budget authority and new budget authority.--The terms
``budget authority'' and ``new budget authority'' have the
meanings given to them in section 3 of the Congressional
Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974.
(18) Appropriation act.--The term ``appropriation Act''
means an Act referred to in section 105 of title 1 of the
United States Code.
(19) Consolidated deficit.--The term ``consolidated
deficit'' means, with respect to a fiscal year, the amount by
which total outlays exceed total receipts during that year.
(20) Surplus.--The term ``surplus'' means, with respect to
a fiscal year, the amount by which total receipts exceed
total outlays during that year.
(21) Direct spending caps.--The term ``direct spending
caps'' means the nominal dollar limits for entitlements and
other mandatory spending pursuant to section 105 (as modified
by any revisions provided for in this Act).
TITLE I--ENSURE THAT THE BIPARTISAN BALANCED BUDGET AGREEMENT OF 1997
ACHIEVES ITS GOAL
SEC. 101. TIMETABLE.
Action to be completed:
CBO economic and budget update.........................................
President's budget update based on new assumptions.....................
CBO and OMB updates....................................................
Preview report.........................................................
Not later than November 1 (and as soon as practical after the end of
OMB and CBO Analyses of Deficits, Revenues and Spending Levels and ....
Projections for the Upcoming Year.
Congressional action to avoid sequestration............................
OMB issues final (look back) report for prior year and preview for ....
current year.
Presidential sequester order or order delaying new/additional revenues
reductions scheduled to take effect pursuant to reconciliation
legislation enacted in calendar year 1997.
SEC. 102. PROCEDURES TO AVOID SEQUESTRATION OR DELAY OF NEW
REVENUE REDUCTIONS.
(a) Special Message.--If the OMB Analysis of Actual
Spending Levels and Projections for the Upcoming Year
indicates that--
(1) deficits in the most recently completed fiscal year
exceeded, or the deficits in the budget year are projected to
exceed, the deficit targets in section 104;
(2) revenues in the most recently completed fiscal year
were less than, or revenues in the current year are projected
to be less than, the revenue targets in section 104; or
(3) outlays in the most recently completed fiscal year
exceeded, or outlays in the current year are projected to
exceed, the caps in section 104;
the President shall submit to Congress with the OMB Analysis
of Actual Spending Levels and Projections for the Upcoming
Year a special message that includes proposed legislative
changes to--
(A) offset the net deficit or outlay excess;
(B) offset any revenue shortfall; or
(C) revise the deficit or revenue targets or the outlay
caps contained in this Act;
through any combination of--
(i) reductions in outlays;
(ii) increases in revenues; or
(iii) increases in the deficit targets or expenditure caps,
or reductions in the revenue targets, if the President
submits a written determination that, because of economic or
programmatic reasons, none of the variances from the balanced
budget plan should be offset.
(b) Introduction of the President's Package.--Not later
than November 15, the message from the President required
pursuant to subsection (a) shall be introduced as a joint
resolution in the House of Representatives or the Senate by
the chairman of its Committee on the Budget. If the chairman
fails to do so, after November 15, the joint resolution may
be introduced by any Member of that House of Congress and
shall be referred to the Committee on the Budget of that
House.
(c) House Budget Committee Action.--The Committee on the
Budget of the House of Representatives shall, by November 15,
report a joint resolution containing--
(1) the recommendations in the President's message, or
different policies and proposed legislative changes than
those contained in the message of the President, to
ameliorate or eliminate any excess deficits or expenditures
or any revenue shortfalls, or
(2) any changes to the deficit or revenue targets or
expenditure caps contained in this Act, except that any
changes to the deficit or revenue targets or expenditure caps
cannot be greater than the changes recommended in the message
submitted by the President.
(d) Procedure if the Committees on the Budget of the House
of Representatives or Senate Fails To Report Required
Resolution.--
(1) Automatic discharge of committees on the budget of the
house.--If the Committee on the Budget of the House of
Representatives fails, by November 20, to report a resolution
meeting the requirements of subsection (c), the committee
shall be automatically discharged from further consideration
of the joint resolution reflecting the President's
recommendations introduced pursuant to subsection (a), and
the joint resolution shall be placed on the appropriate
calendar.
(2) Consideration of discharge resolution in the house.--If
the Committee has been discharged under paragraph (1) above,
any Member may move that the House of Representatives
consider the resolution. Such motion shall be highly
privileged and not debatable. It shall not be in order to
consider any amendment to the resolution except amendments
which are germane and which do not change the net deficit
impact of the resolution.
(e) Consideration of Joint Resolution in the House.--
Consideration of resolution reported pursuant to subsection
(c) or (d) shall be pursuant to the procedures set forth in
section 305 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 and
subsection (d).
(f) Transmittal to Senate.--If a joint resolution passes
the House of Representatives pursuant to subsection (e), the
Clerk of the House of Representatives shall cause the
resolution to be engrossed, certified, and transmitted to the
Senate within 1 calendar day of the day on which the
resolution is passed. The resolution shall be referred to the
Senate Committee on the Budget.
(g) Requirements for Special Joint Resolution in the
Senate.--The Committee on the Budget of the Senate shall
report not later than December 1--
(1) a joint resolution reflecting the message of the
President; or
(2) the joint resolution passed by the House of
Representatives, with or without amendment; or
(3) a joint resolution containing different policies and
proposed legislative changes
[[Page H5597]]
than those contained in either the message of the President
or the resolution passed by the House of Representatives, to
eliminate all or part of any excess deficits or expenditures
or any revenue shortfalls, or
(4) any changes to the deficit or revenue targets, or to
the expenditure caps, contained in this Act, except that any
changes to the deficit or revenue targets or expenditure caps
cannot be greater than the changes recommended in the message
submitted by the President.
(h) Procedure if the Senate Budget Committee Fails To
Report Required Resolution.--
(1) Automatic discharge of senate budget committee.--In the
event that the Committee on the Budget of the Senate fails,
by December 1, to report a resolution meeting the
requirements of subsection (g), the committee shall be
automatically discharged from further consideration of the
joint resolution reflecting the President's recommendations
introduced pursuant to subsection (a) and of the resolution
passed by the House of Representatives, and both joint
resolutions shall be placed on the appropriate calendar.
(2) Consideration of discharge resolution in the senate.--
(A) If the Committee has been discharged under paragraph (1),
any member may move that the Senate consider the resolution.
Such motion shall be highly privileged and not debatable. It
shall not be in order to consider any amendment to the
resolution except amendments which are germane and which do
not change the net deficit impact of the resolution.
(B) Consideration of resolutions reported pursuant to
subsections (c) or (d) shall be pursuant to the procedures
set forth in section 305 of the Congressional Budget Act of
1974 and subsection (d).
(C) If the joint resolution reported by the Committees on
the Budget pursuant to subsection (c) or (g) or a joint
resolution discharged in the House of Representatives or the
Senate pursuant to subsection (d)(1) or (h)(1) would
eliminate less than--
(i) the entire amount by which actual or projected deficits
exceed, or revenues fall short of, the targets in this Act;
or
(ii) the entire amount by which actual or projected outlays
exceed the caps contained in this Act;
then the Committee on the Budget of the Senate shall report a
joint resolution, raising the deficit targets or outlay caps,
or reducing the revenue targets for any year in which actual
or projected spending, revenues or deficits would not conform
to the deficit and revenue targets or expenditure caps in
this Act.
(k) Conference Reports Shall Fully Address Deficit
Excess.--It shall not be in order in the House of
Representatives or the Senate to consider a conference report
on a joint resolution to eliminate all or part of any excess
deficits or outlays or to eliminate all or part of any
revenue shortfall compared to the deficit and revenue targets
and the expenditure caps contained in this Act, unless--
(1) the joint resolution offsets the entire amount of any
overage or shortfall; or
(2) the House of Representatives and Senate both pass the
joint resolution reported pursuant to subsection (j)(2).
The vote on any resolution reported pursuant to subsection
(j)(2) shall be solely on the subject of changing the deficit
or revenue targets or the expenditure limits in this Act.
SEC. 103. EFFECT ON PRESIDENTS' BUDGET SUBMISSIONS; POINT OF
ORDER.
(a) Budget Submission.--Any budget submitted by the
President pursuant to section 1105(a) of title 31, United
States Code, for each of fiscal years 1998 through 2007 shall
be consistent with the spending, revenue, and deficit levels
established in sections 104 and 105 or it shall recommend
changes to those levels.
(b) Point of Order.--It shall not be in order in the House
of Representatives or the Senate to consider any concurrent
resolution on the budget unless it is consistent with the
spending, revenue, and deficit levels established in sections
104 and 105.
SEC. 104. DEFICIT AND REVENUE TARGETS.
(a) Consolidated Deficit (or Surplus) Targets.--For
purposes of sections 102 and 107, the consolidated deficit
targets shall be--
(1) for fiscal year 1998, $90,500,000,000;
(2) for fiscal year 1999, $89,700,000,000;
(3) for fiscal year 2000, $83,000,000,000;
(4) for fiscal year 2001, $53,300,000,000; and
(5) for fiscal year 2002, there shall be a surplus of not
less than $1,400,000,000.
(b) Consolidated Revenue Targets.--For purposes of sections
102, 107, 201, and 204, the consolidated revenue targets
shall be--
(1) for fiscal year 1998, $1,601,800,000,000;
(2) for fiscal year 1999, $1,664,200,000,000;
(3) for fiscal year 2000, $1,728,100,000,000;
(4) for fiscal year 2001, $1,805,100,000,000; and
(5) for fiscal year 2002, $1,890,400,000,000.
SEC. 105. DIRECT SPENDING CAPS.
(a) In General.--Effective upon submission of the report by
OMB pursuant to subsection (c), direct spending caps shall
apply to all entitlement authority except for undistributed
offsetting receipts and net interest outlays. For purposes of
enforcing direct spending caps under this Act, each separate
program shown in the table set forth in subsection (d) shall
be deemed to be a category.
(b) Budget Committee Reports.--Within 30 days after
enactment of this Act, the Budget Committees of the House of
Representatives and the Senate shall file with their
respective Houses identical reports containing account
numbers and spending levels for each specific category.
(c) Report by OMB.--Within 30 days after enactment of this
Act, OMB shall submit to the President and each House of
Congress a report containing account numbers and spending
limits for each specific category.
(d) Contents of Reports.--All direct spending accounts not
included in these reports under separate categories shall be
included under the heading ``Other Entitlements and Mandatory
Spending''. These reports may include adjustments among the
caps set forth in this Act as required below, however the
aggregate amount available under the ``Total Entitlements and
Other Mandatory Spending'' cap shall be identical in each
such report and in this Act and shall be deemed to have been
adopted as part of this Act. Each such report shall include
the actual amounts of the caps for each year of fiscal years
1998 through 2002 consistent with the concurrent resolution
on the budget for FY 1998 for each of the following
categories:
Earned Income Tax Credit,
Family Support,
Federal retirement:
Civilian/other,
Military,
Medicaid,
Medicare,
Social security,
Supplemental security income,
Unemployment compensation,
Veterans' benefits,
Medicare,
Other entitlements and mandatory spending, and
Aggregate entitlements and other mandatory spending.
(e) Additional Spending Limits.--Legislation enacted
subsequent to this Act may include additional caps to limit
spending for specific programs, activities, or accounts with
these categories. Those additional caps (if any) shall be
enforced in the same manner as the limits set forth in such
joint explanatory statement.
SEC. 106. ECONOMIC ASSUMPTIONS.
Subject to periodic reestimation based on changed economic
conditions or changes in eligible population, determinations
of the direct spending caps under section 105, any breaches
of such caps, and actions necessary to remedy such breaches
shall be based upon the economic assumptions set forth in the
joint explanatory statement of managers accompanying the
concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal year 1998
(House Concurrent Resolution 84, 105th Congress).
SEC. 107. REVISIONS TO DEFICIT AND REVENUE TARGETS AND TO THE
CAPS FOR ENTITLEMENTS AND OTHER MANDATORY
SPENDING.
(a) Automatic Adjustments to Deficit and Revenue Targets
and to Caps for Entitlements and Other Mandatory Spending.--
When the President submits the budget under section 1105(a)
of title 31, United States Code, for any year, OMB shall
calculate (in the order set forth below), and the budget and
reports shall include, adjustments to the deficit and revenue
targets, and to the direct spending caps (and those limits as
cumulatively adjusted) for the current year, the budget year,
and each outyear, to reflect the following:
(1) Changes to revenue targets.--
(A) Changes in growth.--For Federal revenues and deficits
under laws and policies enacted or effective before July 1,
1997, growth adjustment factors shall equal the ratio between
the level of year-over-year growth measured for the fiscal
year most recently completed and the applicable estimated
level for that year as described in section 105.
(B) Changes in inflation.--For Federal revenues and
deficits under laws and policies enacted or effective before
July 1, 1997, inflation adjustment factors shall equal the
ratio between the level of year-over-year growth measured for
the fiscal year most recently completed and the applicable
estimated level for that year as described in section 105.
(2) Adjustments to direct spending caps.--
(A) Changes in concepts and definitions.--The adjustments
produced by changes in concepts and definitions shall equal
the baseline levels of new budget authority and outlays using
up-to-date concepts and definitions minus those levels using
the concepts and definitions in effect before such changes.
Such changes in concepts and definitions may only be made in
consultation with the Committees on Appropriations, the
Budget, and Government Reform and Oversight and Governmental
Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Senate.
(B) Changes in net outlays.--Changes in net outlays for all
programs and activities exempt from sequestration under
section 204.
(C) Changes in inflation.--For direct spending under laws
and policies enacted or effective on or before July 1, 1997,
inflation adjustment factors shall equal the ratio between
the level of year-over-year inflation measured for the fiscal
year most recently completed and the applicable estimated
level for that years as described in section 105 (relating to
economic assumptions). For direct spending under laws and
policies enacted or effective after July 1, 1997, there shall
be no adjustment to the direct spending caps (for changes in
economic conditions including inflation, nor for changes in
numbers of eligible beneficiaries) unless--
(i) the Act or the joint explanatory statement of managers
accompanying such Act
[[Page H5598]]
providing new direct spending includes economic projections
and projections of numbers of beneficiaries; and
(ii) such Act specifically provides for automatic
adjustments to the direct spending caps in section 105 based
on those projections.
(D) Changes in eligible populations.--For direct spending
under laws and policies enacted or effective on or before
July 1, 1997, the basis for adjustments under this section
shall be the same as the projections underlying Table A-4,
CBO Baseline Projections of Mandatory Spending, Including
Deposit Insurance (by fiscal year, in billions of
dollars), published in An Analysis of the President's
Budgetary Proposals for Fiscal Year 1998, March 1997, page
53. For direct spending under laws and policies enacted or
effective after July 1, 1997, there shall be no adjustment
to the direct spending caps for changes in numbers of
eligible beneficiaries unless--
(i) the Act or the joint explanatory statement of managers
accompanying such Act providing new direct spending includes
economic projections and projections of numbers of
beneficiaries; and
(ii) such Act specifically provides for automatic
adjustments to the direct spending caps in section 105 based
on those projections.
(E) Intra-budgetary payments.--From discretionary accounts
to mandatory accounts. The baseline and the discretionary
spending caps shall be adjusted to reflect those changes.
(c) Changes to Deficit Targets.--The deficit targets in
section 104 shall be adjusted to reflect changes to the
revenue targets or changes to the caps for entitlements and
other mandatory spending pursuant to subsection (a).
(d) Permissible Revisions to Deficit and Revenue Targets
and Direct Spending Caps.--Deficit and revenue targets and
direct spending caps as enacted pursuant to sections 104 and
105 may be revised as follows: Except as required pursuant to
section 105(a), direct spending caps may only be amended by
recorded vote. It shall be a matter of highest privilege in
the House of Representatives and the Senate for a Member of
the House of Representatives or the Senate to insist on a
recorded vote solely on the question of amending such caps.
It shall not be in order for the Committee on Rules of the
House of Representatives to report a resolution waiving the
provisions of this subsection. This subsection may be waived
in the Senate only by an affirmative vote of three-fifths of
the Members duly chosen and sworn.
TITLE II--ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS
SEC. 201. REPORTING EXCESS SPENDING.
(a) Analysis of Actual Deficit, Revenue, and Spending
Levels.--As soon as practicable after any fiscal year, OMB
shall compile a statement of actual deficits, revenues, and
direct spending for that year. The statement shall identify
such spending by categories contained in section 105.
(b) Estimate of Necessary Spending Reduction.--Based on the
statement provided under subsection (a), the OMB shall issue
a report to the President and the Congress on December 15 of
any year in which such statement identifies actual or
projected deficits, revenues, or spending in the current or
immediately preceding fiscal years in violation of the
revenue targets or direct spending caps in section 104 or
105, by more than one percent of the applicable total
revenues or direct spending for such year. The report shall
include:
(1) All instances in which actual direct spending has
exceeded the applicable direct spending cap.
(2) The difference between the amount of spending available
under the direct spending caps for the current year and
estimated actual spending for the categories associated with
such caps.
(3) The amounts by which direct spending shall be reduced
in the current fiscal year so that total actual and estimated
direct spending for all cap categories for the current and
immediately preceding fiscal years shall not exceed the
amounts available under the direct spending caps for such
fiscal years.
(4) The amount of excess spending attributable solely to
changes in inflation or eligible populations.
SEC. 202. ENFORCING DIRECT SPENDING CAPS.
(a) Purpose.--This title provides enforcement of the direct
spending caps on categories of spending established pursuant
to section 105. This section shall apply for any fiscal year
in which direct spending exceeds the applicable direct
spending cap.
(b) General Rules.--
(1) Eliminating a breach.--Each non-exempt account within a
category shall be reduced by a dollar amount calculated by
multiplying the baseline level of sequestrable budgetary
resources in that account at that time by the uniform
percentage necessary to eliminate a breach within that
category.
(2) Programs, projects, or activities.--Except as otherwise
provided, the same percentage sequestration shall apply to
all programs, projects and activities within a budget
account.
(3) Indefinite authority.--Except as otherwise provided,
sequestration in accounts for which obligations are
indefinite shall be taken in a manner to ensure that
obligations in the fiscal year of a sequestration and
succeeding fiscal years are reduced, from the level that
would actually have occurred, by the applicable sequestration
percentage or percentages.
(4) Cancellation of budgetary resources.--Budgetary
resources sequestered from any account other than an trust,
special or revolving fund shall revert to the Treasury and be
permanently canceled.
(5) Implementing regulations.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, administrative rules or similar actions
implementing any sequestration shall take effect within 30
days after that sequestration.
SEC. 203. SEQUESTRATION RULES.
(a) General Rules.--For programs subject to direct spending
caps:
(1) Triggering of sequestration.--Sequestration is
triggered if total direct spending subject to the caps
exceeds or is projected to exceed the aggregate cap for
direct spending for the current or immediately preceding
fiscal year.
(2) Calculation of reductions.--Sequestration shall reduce
spending under each separate direct spending cap in
proportion to the amounts each category of direct spending
exceeded the applicable cap.
(3) Uniform percentages.--In calculating the uniform
percentage applicable to the sequestration of all spending
programs or activities within each category, or the uniform
percentage applicable to the sequestration of nonexempt
direct spending programs or activities, the sequestrable base
for direct spending programs and activities is the total
level of outlays for the fiscal year for those programs or
activities in the current law baseline.
(4) Permanent sequestration of direct spending.--
Obligations in sequestered direct spending accounts shall be
reduced in the fiscal year in which a sequestration occurs
and in all succeeding fiscal years. Notwithstanding any other
provision of this section, after the first direct spending
sequestration, any later sequestration shall reduce direct
spending by an amount in addition to, rather than in lieu of,
the reduction in direct spending in place under the existing
sequestration or sequestrations.
(5) Special rule.--For any direct spending program in
which--
(A) outlays pay for entitlement benefits;
(B) a current-year sequestration takes effect after the 1st
day of the budget year;
(C) that delay reduces the amount of entitlement authority
that is subject to sequestration in the budget; and
(D) the uniform percentage otherwise applicable to the
budget-year sequestration of a program or activity is
increased due to the delay;
then the uniform percentage shall revert to the uniform
percentage calculated under paragraph (3) when the budget
year is completed.
(6) Indexed benefit payments.--If, under any entitlement
program--
(A) benefit payments are made to persons or governments
more frequently than once a year; and
(B) the amount of entitlement authority is periodically
adjusted under existing law to reflect changes in a price
index (commonly called ``cost of living adjustments'');
sequestration shall first be applied to the cost of living
adjustment before reductions are made to the base benefit.
For the first fiscal year to which a sequestration applies,
the benefit payment reductions in such programs accomplished
by the order shall take effect starting with the payment made
at the beginning of January following a final sequester. For
the purposes of this subsection, veterans' compensation shall
be considered a program that meets the conditions of the
preceding sentence.
(7) Loan programs.--For all loans made, extended, or
otherwise modified on or after any sequestration under loan
programs subject to direct spending caps--
(A) the sequestrable base shall be total fees associated
with all loans made extended or otherwise modified on or
after the date of sequestration; and
(B) the fees paid by borrowers shall be increased by a
uniform percentage sufficient to produce the dollar savings
in such loan programs for the fiscal year or years of the
sequestrations required by this section.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in any year in
which a sequestration is in effect, all subsequent fees shall
be increased by the uniform percentage and all proceeds from
such fees shall be paid into the general fund of the
Treasury.
(8) Insurance programs.--Any sequestration of a Federal
program that sells insurance contracts to the public
(including the Federal Crop Insurance Fund, the National
Insurance Development Fund, the National Flood Insurance
fund, insurance activities of the Overseas Private
Insurance Corporation, and Veterans' Life insurance
programs) shall be accomplished by increasing premiums on
contracts entered into extended or otherwise modified,
after the date a sequestration order takes effect by the
uniform sequestration percentage. Notwithstanding any
other provision of law, for any year in which a
sequestration affecting such programs is in effect,
subsequent premiums shall be increased by the uniform
percentage and all proceeds from the premium increase
shall be paid from the insurance fund or account to the
general fund of the Treasury.
(9) State grant formulas.--For all State grant programs
subject to direct spending caps--
(A) the total amount of funds available for all States
shall be reduced by the amount required to be sequestered;
and
[[Page H5599]]
(B) if States are projected to receive increased funding in
the budget year compared to the immediately preceding fiscal
year, sequestration shall first be applied to the estimated
increases before reductions are made compared to actual
payments to States in the previous year--
(i) the reductions shall be applied first to the total
estimated increases for all States; then
(ii) the uniform reduction shall be made from each State's
grant; and
(iii) the uniform reduction shall apply to the base funding
levels available to states in the immediately preceding
fiscal year only to the extent necessary to eliminate any
remaining excess over the applicable direct spending cap.
(10) Special rule for certain programs.--Except matters
exempted under section 204 and programs subject to special
rules set forth under section 205 and notwithstanding any
other provisions of law, any sequestration required under
this Act shall reduce benefit levels by an amount sufficient
to eliminate all excess spending identified in the report
issued pursuant to section 201, while maintaining the same
uniform percentage reduction in the monetary value of
benefits subject to reduction under this subsection.
(b) Within-Session Sequester.--If a bill or resolution
providing direct spending for the current year is enacted
before July 1 of that fiscal year and causes a breach within
any direct spending cap for that fiscal year, 15 days later
there shall be a sequestration to eliminate that breach
within that cap.
SEC. 204. ENFORCING REVENUE TARGETS.
(a) Purpose.--This section enforces the revenue targets
established pursuant to section 104. This section shall apply
for any year in which actual revenues were less than the
applicable revenue target in the preceding fiscal year or are
projected to be less than the applicable revenue target in
the current year.
(b) Estimate of Necessity To Suspend New Revenue
Reductions.--Based on the statement provided under section
201(a), OMB shall issue a report to the President and the
Congress on December 15 of any year in which such statement
identifies actual or projected revenues in the current or
immediately preceding fiscal years lower than the applicable
revenue target in section 104, as adjusted pursuant to
section 106, by more than 1 percent of the applicable total
revenue target for such year. The report shall include--
(1) all existing laws and policies enacted as part of any
reconciliation legislation in calendar 1997 which would cause
revenues to decline in the calendar year which begins January
1, compared to laws and policies in effect on December 15;
(2) the amounts by which revenues would be reduced by
implementation of the provisions of law described in
paragraph (1) compared to provisions of law in effect on
December 15; and
(3) whether delaying implementation of the provisions of
law described in paragraph (1) would cause the total for
revenues in the projected revenues in the current fiscal year
and actual revenues in the immediately preceding fiscal year
to equal or exceed the total of the targets for the
applicable years.
(c) General Rules.--
(1) Delayed phase-in of new tax cuts.--No provision of the
Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1997--
(A) establishing or increasing any credit, deduction,
exclusion or eligibility limit; or
(B) reducing any rate
shall first take effect in the calendar year following a year
in which actual revenues were less than the applicable
revenue target or revenues in the current year are projected
to be less than the applicable target.
(2) Suspension of indexation.--No new adjustment for
inflation shall be made to any credit, deduction, or
exclusion enacted as part of the Revenue Reconciliation Act
of 1997 if revenues in the preceding year were below the
applicable revenue target or revenues in the current year are
projected to be less than the applicable target.
(d) Special Rules.--(1) All provisions of law included in
the report pursuant to subsection (b)(1) shall be suspended
until such time as the total of projected revenues in the
current fiscal year and actual revenues in the immediately
preceding fiscal year is equal to or greater than the
relevant revenue targets in section 104; and
(2) If subsection (c) would cause the total of projected
revenues in the current year and actual revenues in the
preceding fiscal year to exceed the relevant revenue targets
in section 104, new policies to reduce revenues shall be
modified sufficiently to raise revenues to the level of the
targets for the relevant years.
SEC. 205. EXEMPT PROGRAMS AND ACTIVITIES.
The following budget accounts, activities within accounts,
or income shall be exempt from sequestration--
(1) net interest;
(2) all payments to trust funds from excise taxes or other
receipts or collections properly creditable to those trust
funds;
(3) offsetting receipts and collections;
(4) all payments from one Federal direct spending budget
account to another Federal budget account;
(5) all intragovernmental funds including those from which
funding is derived primarily from other Government accounts;
(6) expenses to the extent they result from private
donations, bequests, or voluntary contributions to the
Government;
(7) nonbudgetary activities, including but not limited to--
(A) credit liquidating and financing accounts;
(B) the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation Trust Funds;
(C) the Thrift Savings Fund;
(D) the Federal Reserve System; and
(E) appropriations for the District of Columbia to the
extent they are appropriations of locally raised funds;
(8) payments resulting from Government insurance,
Government guarantees, or any other form of contingent
liability, to the extent those payments result from
contractual or other legally binding commitments of the
Government at the time of any sequestration;
(9) the following accounts, which largely fulfill
requirements of the Constitution or otherwise make payments
to which the Government is committed--
Bureau of Indian Affairs, miscellaneous trust funds, tribal
trust funds (14-9973-0-7-999);
Claims, defense;
Claims, judgments and relief act (20-1895-0-1-806);
Compact of Free Association, economic assistance pursuant
to Public Law 99-658 (14-0415-0-1-806);
Compensation of the President (11-0001-0-1-802);
Customs Service, miscellaneous permanent appropriations
(20-9992-0-2-852);
Eastern Indian land claims settlement fund (14-2202-0-1-
806);
Farm Credit System Financial Assistance Corporation,
interest payments (20-1850-0-1-351);
Internal Revenue collections of Puerto Rico (20-5737-0-2-
852);
Payments of Vietnam and USS Pueblo prisoner-of-war claims
(15-0104-0-1-153):
Payments to copyright owners (03-5175-0-2-376);
Salaries of Article III judges (not including cost of
living adjustments);
Soldier's and Airman's Home, payment of claims (84-8930-0-
7-705);
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, interest
payments (46-0300-0-1-401);
(10) the following noncredit special, revolving, or trust-
revolving funds--
Exchange Stabilization Fund (20-4444-0-3-155); and
Foreign Military Sales trust fund (11-82232-0-7-155).
(j) Optional Exemption of Military Personnel.--
(1) The President may, with respect to any military
personnel account, exempt that account from sequestration or
provide for a lower uniform percentage reduction that
would otherwise apply.
(2) The President may not use the authority provided by
paragraph (1) unless he notifies the Congress of the manner
in which such authority will be exercised on or before the
initial snapshot date for the budget year.
SEC. 206. SPECIAL RULES.
(a) Child Support Enforcement Program.--Any sequestration
order shall accomplish the full amount of any required
reduction in payments under sections 455 and 458 of the
Social Security Act by reducing the Federal matching rate for
State administrative costs under the program, as specified
(for the fiscal year involved) in section 455(a) of such Act,
to the extent necessary to reduce such expenditures by that
amount.
(b) Commodity Credit Corporation.--
(1) Effective date.--For the Commodity Credit Corporation,
the date on which a sequestration order takes effect in a
fiscal year shall vary for each crop of a commodity. In
general, the sequestration order shall take effect when
issued, but for each crop of a commodity for which 1-year
contracts are issued as an entitlement, the sequestration
order shall take effect with the start of the sign-up period
for that crop that begins after the sequestration order is
issued. Payments for each contract in such a crop shall be
reduced under the same terms and conditions.
(2) Dairy program.--
(A) As the sole means of achieving any reduction in outlays
under the milk price-support program, the Secretary of
Agriculture shall provide for a reduction to be made in the
price received by producers for all milk in the United States
and marketed by producers for commercial use.
(B) That price reduction (measured in cents per hundred-
weight of milk marketed) shall occur under subparagraph (A)
of section 201(d)(2) of the Agricultural Act of 1949 (7
U.S.C. 1446(d)(2)(A)), shall begin on the day any
sequestration order is issued, and shall not exceed the
aggregate amount of the reduction in outlays under the milk
price-support program, that otherwise would have been
achieved by reducing payments made for the purchase of milk
or the products of milk under this subsection during that
fiscal year.
(3) Effect of delay.--For purposes of subsection (b)(1),
the sequestrable base for Commodity Credit Corporation is the
current-year level of gross outlays resulting from new budget
authority that is subject to reduction under paragraphs (1)
and (2).
(4) Certain authority not to be limited.--Nothing in this
Act shall restrict the Corporation in the discharge of its
authority and responsibility as a corporation to buy and sell
commodities in world trade, or limit or reduce in any way any
appropriation that provides the Corporation with funds to
cover its realized losses.
[[Page H5600]]
(c) Earned Income Tax Credit.--
(1) The sequestrable base for earned income tax credit
program is the dollar value of all current year benefits to
the entire eligible population.
(2) In the event sequestration is triggered to reduce
earned income tax credits, all earned income tax credits
shall be reduced, whether or not such credits otherwise would
result in cash payments to beneficiaries, by a uniform
percentage sufficient to produce the dollar savings required
by the sequestration.
(d) Regular and Extended Unemployment Compensation.--
(1) A State may reduce each weekly benefit payment made
under the regular and extended unemployment benefit programs
for any week of unemployment occurring during any period with
respect to which payments are reduced under any sequestration
order by a percentage not to exceed the percentage by which
the Federal payment to the State is to be reduced for such
week as a result of such order.
(2) A reduction by a State in accordance with paragraph (1)
shall not be considered as a failure to fulfill the
requirements of section 3304(a)(11) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986.
(e) Federal Employees Health Benefits Fund.-- For the
Federal Employees Health Benefits Fund, a sequestration order
shall take effect with the next open season. The
sequestration shall be accomplished by annual payments from
that Fund to the General Fund of the Treasury. Those annual
payments shall be financed solely by charging higher
premiums. The sequestrable base for the Fund is the current-
year level of gross outlays resulting from claims paid after
the sequestration order takes effect.
(f) Federal Housing Finance Board.-- Any sequestration of
the Federal Housing Board shall be accomplished by annual
payments (by the end of each fiscal year) from that Board to
the general fund of the Treasury, in amounts equal to the
uniform sequestration percentage for that year times the
gross obligations of the Board in that year.
(g) Federal Pay.--
(1) In general.-- New budget authority to pay Federal
personnel from direct spending accounts shall be reduced by
the uniform percentage calculated under section 203(c)(3), as
applicable, but no sequestration order may reduce or have the
effect of reducing the rate of pay to which any individual is
entitled under any statutory pay system (as increased by any
amount payable under section 5304 of title 5, United States
Code, or any increase in rates of pay which is scheduled to
take effect under section 5303 of title 5, United States
Code, section 1109 of title 37, United States Code, or any
other provision of law.
(2) Definitions.--For purposes of this subsection--
(A) the term ``statutory pay system'' shall have the
meaning given that term in section 5302(1) of title 5, United
States Code;
(B) the term ``elements of military pay'' means--
(i) the elements of compensation of members of the
uniformed services specified in section 1009 of title 37,
United States Code;
(ii) allowances provided members of the uniformed services
under sections 403(a) and 405 of such title; and
(iii) cadet pay and midshipman pay under section 203(c) of
such title; and
(C) the term ``uniformed services'' shall have the same
meaning given that term in section 101(3) of title 37, United
States Code.
(h) Medicare.--
(1) Timing of application of reductions.--
(A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph (B), if
a reduction is made in payment amounts pursuant to
sequestration order, the reduction shall be applied to
payment for services furnished after the effective date of
the order. For purposes of the previous sentence, in the case
of inpatient services furnished for an individual, the
services shall be considered to be furnished on the date of
the individual's discharge from the inpatient facility.
(B) Payment on the basis of cost reporting periods.-- In
the case in which payment for services of a provider of
services is made under title XVIII of the Social Security Act
on a basis relating to the reasonable cost incurred for the
services during a cost reporting period of the provider, if a
reduction is made in payment amounts pursuant to a
sequestration order, the reduction shall be applied to
payment for costs for such services incurred at any time
during each cost reporting period of the provider any part of
which occurs after the effective date of order, but only (for
each such cost reporting period) in the same proportion as
the fraction of the cost reporting period that occurs after
the effective date of the order.
(2) No increase in beneficiary charges in assignment-
related cases.--If a reduction in payment amounts is made
pursuant to a sequestration order for services for which
payment under part B of title XVIII of the Social Security
Act is made on the basis of an assignment described in
section 1842(b)(3)(B)(ii), in accordance with section
1842(b)(6)(B), or under the procedure described in section
1870(f)(1) of such Act, the person furnishing the services
shall be considered to have accepted payment of the
reasonable charge for the services, less any reduction in
payment amount made pursuant to a sequestration order, as
payment in full.
(3) Part b premiums.--In computing the amount and method of
sequestration from part B of title XVIII of the Social
Security Act--
(A) the amount of sequestration shall be calculated by
multiplying the total amount by which Medicare spending
exceeds the appropriate spending cap by a percentage that
reflects the ratio of total spending under Part B to total
Medicare spending; and
(B) sequestration in the Part B program shall be
accomplished by increasing premiums to beneficiaries.
(4) No effect on computation of aapcc.--In computing the
adjusted average per capita cost for purposes of section
1876(a)(4) of the Social Security Act, the Secretary of
Health and Human Services shall not take into account any
reductions in payment amounts which have been or may be
effected under this part.
(i) Postal Service Fund.-- Any sequestration of the Postal
Service Fund shall be accomplished by annual payments from
that Fund to the General Fund of the Treasury, and the
Postmaster General of the United States and shall have the
duty to make those payments during the first fiscal year
to which the sequestration order applies and each
succeeding fiscal year. The amount of each annual payment
shall be--
(1) the uniform sequestration percentage, times
(2) the estimated gross obligations of the Postal Service
Fund in that year other than those obligations financed with
an appropriation for revenue forgone that year.
Any such payment for a fiscal year shall be made as soon as
possible during the fiscal year, except that it may be made
in installments within that year if the payment schedule is
approved by the Secretary of the Treasury. Within 30 days
after the sequestration order is issued, the Postmaster
General shall submit to the Postal Rate Commission a plan for
financing the annual payment for that fiscal year and publish
that plan in the Federal Register. The plan may assume
efficiencies in the operation of the Postal Service,
reductions in capital expenditures, increases in the prices
of services, or any combination, but may not assume a lower
Fund surplus or higher Fund deficit and shall follow the
requirements of existing law governing the Postal Service in
all other respects. Within 30 days of the receipt of that
plan, the Postal Rate Commission shall approve the plan or
modify it in the manner that modifications are allowed under
current law. If the Postal Rate Commission does not respond
to the plan within 30 days, the plan submitted by the
Postmaster General shall go into effect. Any plan may be
later revised by the submission of a new plan to the Postal
Rate Commission, which may approve or modify it.
(j) Power Marketing Administrations and T.V.A.-- Any
sequestration of the Department of Energy power marketing
administration funds or the Tennessee Valley Authority fund
shall be accomplished by annual payments from those funds to
the General Fund of the Treasury, and the administrators of
those funds shall have the duty to make those payments during
the fiscal year to which the sequestration order applies and
each succeeding fiscal year. The amount of each payment by a
fund shall be--
(1) the direct spending uniform sequestration percentage,
times
(2) the estimated gross obligations of the fund in that
year other than those obligations financed from discretionary
appropriations for that year.
Any such payment for a fiscal year shall be made as soon as
possible during the fiscal year, except that it may be made
in installments within that year if the payment schedule is
approved by the Secretary of the Treasury. Annual payments by
a fund may be financed by reductions in costs required to
produce the pre-sequester amount of power (but those
reductions shall not include reductions in the amount of
power supplied by the fund), by reductions in capital
expenditures, by increases in tax rates, or by any
combination, but may not be financed by a lower fund surplus,
a higher fund deficit, additional borrowing, delay in
repayment of principal on outstanding debt and shall follow
the requirements of existing law governing the fund in all
other respects. The administrator of a fund or the TVA Board
is authorized to take the actions specified in this
subsection in order to make the annual payments to the
Treasury.
(k) Business-Like Transactions.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, for programs which provide a business-like
service in exchange for a fee, sequestration shall be
accomplished through a uniform increase in fees (sufficient
to produce the dollar savings in such programs for the fiscal
year of the sequestration required by section 201(a)(2), all
subsequent fees shall be increased by the same percentage,
and all proceeds from such fees shall be paid into the
general fund of the Treasury, in any year for which a
sequester affecting such programs are in effect.
SEC. 207. THE CURRENT LAW BASELINE.
(a) Submission of Reports.--CBO and OMB shall submit to the
President and the Congress reports setting forth the budget
baselines for the budget year and the next nine fiscal years.
The CBO report shall be submitted on or before January 15.
The OMB report shall accompany the President's budget.
(b) Determination of the Budget Baseline.--(1) The budget
baseline shall be based on the common economic assumptions
set forth in section 106, adjusted to reflect revisions
pursuant to subsection (c).
[[Page H5601]]
(2) The budget baseline shall consist of a projection of
current year levels of budget authority, outlays, revenues
and the surplus or deficit into the budget year and the
relevant outyears based on current enacted laws as of the
date of the projection.
(3) For discretionary spending items, the baseline shall be
the spending caps in effect pursuant to section 601(a)(2) of
the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. For years for which
there are no caps, the baseline for discretionary spending
shall be the same as the last year for which there were
statutory caps.
(4) For all other expenditures and for revenues, the
baseline shall be adjusted by comparing unemployment,
inflation, interest rates, growth and other economic
indicators-and changes ineligible population-for the most
recent period for which actual data are available, compared
to the assumptions contained in section 106.
(c) Revisions to the Baseline.--The baseline shall be
adjusted for up-to-date economic assumptions when CBO submits
its Economic and Budget Update and when OMB submits its
budget update, and by August 1 each year, when CBO and OBM
submit their midyear reviews.
SEC. 208. LIMITATIONS ON EMERGENCY SPENDING.
(a) In General.--(1) Within the discretionary caps for each
fiscal year contained in this Act, an amount shall be
withheld from allocation to the appropriate committees of the
House of Representatives and of the Senate and reserved for
natural disasters and other emergency purposes.
(2) Such amount for each such fiscal year shall not be less
than 1 percent of total budget authority and outlays
available within those caps for that fiscal year.
(3) The amounts reserved pursuant to this subsection shall
be made available for allocation to such committees only if--
(A) the President has made a request for such disaster
funds;
(B) the programs to be funded are included in such request;
and
(C) the projected obligations for unforeseen emergency
needs exceed the 10-year rolling average annual expenditures
for existing programs included in the Presidential request
for the applicable fiscal year.
(4) Notwithstanding any other provision of law--
(A) States and localities shall be required to maintain
effort and ensure that Federal assistance payments do not
replace, subvert or otherwise have the effect of reducing
regularly budgeted State and local expenditures for law
enforcement, refighting, road construction and maintenance,
building construction and maintenance or any other category
of regular government expenditure (to ensure that Federal
disaster payments are made only for incremental costs
directly attributable to unforeseen disasters, and do not
replace or reduce regular State and local expenditures for
the same purposes);
(B) the President may not take administrative action to
waive any requirement for States or localities to make
minimum matching payments as a condition or receiving Federal
disaster assistance and prohibit the President from taking
administrative action to waive all or part of any repayment
of Federal loans for the State or local matching share
required as a condition of receiving Federal disaster
assistance, and this clause shall apply to all matching share
requirements and loans to meet matching share requirements
under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.) and any other Acts
pursuant to which the President may declare a disaster or
disasters and States and localities otherwise qualify for
Federal disaster assistance; and
(C) a two-thirds vote in each House of Congress shall be
required for each emergency to reduce or waive the State
matching requirement of to forgive all or part of loans for
the State matching share as required under the Robert T.
Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act.
(b) Effect Budget Resolutions.--(1) All concurrent
resolutions on the budget (including revisions) shall specify
the amount of new budget authority and outlays within the
discretionary spending cap that shall be withheld from
allocation to the committees and reserved for natural
disasters, and a procedure for releasing such funds for
allocation to the appropriate committee. The amount withheld
shall be equal to 1 percent of the total discretionary
spending cap for fiscal year covered by the resolution,
unless additional amounts are specified.
(2) The procedure for allocation of the amounts pursuant to
paragraph (1) shall ensure that the funds are released for
allocation only pursuant to the conditions contained in
subsection (a)(3)(A) through (C).
(c) Restriction on Use of Funds.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, the amount reserved pursuant to subsection
(a) shall not be available for other than emergency funding
requirements for particular natural disasters or national
security emergencies so designated by Acts of Congress.
(d) New Point of Order.--(1) Title IV of the Congressional
Budget Act of 1974 is amended by adding at the end the
following new section:
``point of order regarding emergencies
``Sec. 408. It shall not be in order in the House of
Representatives or the Senate to consider any bill or joint
resolution, or amendment thereto or conference report
thereon, containing an emergency designation for purposes of
section 251(b)(2)(D) or 252(e) of the Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 or of section 207 of
the Balanced Budget Assurance Act of 1997 if it also provides
an appropriation or direct spending for any other item or
contains any other matter, but that bill or joint resolution,
amendment, or conference report may contain rescissions of
budget authority or reductions of direct spending, or that
amendment may reduce amounts for that emergency.''.
(2) The table of contents set forth in section 1(b) of the
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 is
amended by inserting after the item relating to section 407
the following new item:
``Sec. 408. Point of order regarding emergencies.''.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 192, the
gentleman from Delaware [Mr. Castle] and a Member opposed each will
control 30 minutes.
Is there a Member opposed to the bill?
Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Speaker, I am opposed to the bill, and request the
time in opposition.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Iowa [Mr. Nussle] will be
recognized for 30 minutes.
Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that 15 minutes of
the time in opposition be shared with the distinguished gentleman from
South Carolina [Mr. Spratt].
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Iowa?
There was no objection.
Mr. CASTLE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that 15 minutes of
the time in support of the legislation be yielded to the gentleman from
Minnesota [Mr. Minge].
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Delaware?
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
Delaware [Mr. Castle].
Mr. CASTLE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, we have had some discussion of this legislation already
in the rule discussion, and we will have additional discussion here.
But there are those of us in this Congress, and I hope it is a large
majority of the Congress, who feel very strongly that if we are indeed
ever going to balance the budget of the United States of America, we
have to do more than just pass something which is going to balance the
budget in 5 years. Remember, there will be two elections to Congress in
the interim period, as well as an election of the President of the
United States during that time. There will have been changes, economic
variables that will come into play. It is very possible we will never
get to a balanced budget.
We believe strongly that we should have a budget enforcement
mechanism. We have worked extremely hard in order to put together a
piece of legislation which would do that. I should say this is not
something that was drafted by those of us who will speak to it today.
This was worked on and drafted by budget experts across the United
States of America. It has been reviewed by a lot of people.
It simply has several provisions in it which we will be expanding on,
but it says that we have to look forward and look back each year to
ascertain where we are with respect to the different aspects of the
budget itself, the different components that make up our budget in
mandatory and discretionary spending, as well as in the tax cuts which
are going into place. And if indeed they fall out of line and do not
add up to the numbers, as in the budget reconciliation which we will
have this year, then we, the Congress, can either do nothing, in which
case there will be self-enacting mechanisms to bring it back into line,
or we can step forward and act.
I think the stepping forward and acting is a more likely consequence
of this, and it is a reason that those who might say this could impact
future tax cuts or Social Security in my judgment just completely
overlook the fact that Congress is not going to allow that to happen.
The bottom line is that this would be, I think, the ultimate way it
would be worked out. We would come back as a Congress and look at it.
We simply have to do this. We have to have a method. We have to have
a mechanism. It is like buying a car. We need a guarantee or warranty
on that
[[Page H5602]]
car. It is what we expect in this day and age. What is going to happen
to the engine and the tires and the body of the car, down the line? We
feel the same way about the budget.
This is bipartisan. It has been worked on by Members who care a great
deal about it. In my judgment, anyone who believes in a balanced budget
in this body, of the 435 Members of us, those of us who voted for those
balanced budgets in the past, those who voted for constitutional
guarantees of a balanced budget, should be supportive of this
legislation.
So it is for all of these reasons that I would encourage each and
every one of us to follow this argument carefully, to not go for the
scare tactics that may be put forward, and to make sure we cast an
affirmative vote when it is all said and done.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Michigan [Mr. Smith], a member of the Committee on the Budget.
Mr. SMITH of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I think part of the problem is
that we have not debated this bill. There are a lot of good things in
this budget enforcement proposal before us. However, we do have
enforcement within the reconciliation bill that is going to be put
before this body in the next few weeks.
My bill, H.R. 2037, included the enforcement provision that is going
to be in reconciliation. It says, put caps and limits on discretionary
spending, have sequesters, maintain the pay-go provisions for
entitlement and tax changes.
So the question before us is; are we prepared to pass this kind of
legislation implementing dramatic budget reform and the budget process
without undergoing more through examination and consideration of the
Committee on the Budget? Legislation such as this, should also be
considered by the Committee on Ways and Means and other committees, to
bring a studied bill before this body rather then a mostly unread and
unconsidered bill with no chance of amendments.
I introduced for the last 4 years budget reform legislation. I am
convinced that some of those items that are not in this bill should be
considered by this House when we finally pass a budget bill that is
going to dramatically change the way this Congress does budget
business.
Mr. MINGE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Pennsylvania [Mr. Doyle].
(Mr. DOYLE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. DOYLE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Budget Enforcement
Act of 1997. If history is any kind of lesson, it is obvious that the
strong targeted enforcement mechanisms provided by this bill are needed
to ensure the budget is balanced by 2002.
Some 229 Members of this House cosponsored the balanced budget
amendment. I cannot understand why any of these Members would not
support H.R. 2003. However, we are now hearing from Members who
cosponsored the BBA, voted for the budget agreement and voted for both
reconciliation bills, that the most serious problem with the Budget
Enforcement Act is the fact that it may postpone tax cuts for their
supporters.
In a sense, they are right. If we enact this bill, tax cuts will
indeed be delayed if the country is short of the money needed to
balance the budget. But once we are on track, cuts can be enacted. I
see nothing wrong with this approach. If we can afford certain tax
cuts, let them go through. If we cannot, then we are just going to have
to wait. In fact, if Members think it is more important to eliminate
the deficit than it is to give away tax breaks that we cannot afford,
this should be an easy vote.
Let me close by saying I am disappointed that the Committee on Rules
has decided to play politics with this issue, rather than debate it on
its merits. The sponsors of this bill have discovered some needed
changes. However, the Committee on Rules would not allow these
corrections to be added to the bill, and it is my understanding they
may be included in a motion to recommit. Consequently, anyone who is
serious about deficit reduction should support the motion to recommit.
In addition, even if this motion is not agreed to, I believe it is
still crucial we enact this bill. The underlying principles are too
important to ignore, and modification can always be made in conference.
I urge my colleagues to vote for responsibility. Support the motion to
recommit and support the underlying bill.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Budget Enforcement Act of 1997.
If history is any kind of lesson, it is obvious that the strong,
targeted enforcement mechanisms provided by this bill are needed to
ensure the budget is balanced in 2002.
During the 1980's and early 1990's, public officials said time and
time again that the budget would be balanced in a number of years. But,
time and time again, the Government lacked the discipline to follow
through on these promises.
Attempts were made to hold lawmakers to their word. No one should
forget the noble failures of Gramm-Rudman. Unfortunately, these well-
intentioned efforts contained a number of loopholes and shortcomings
which allowed past Congresses and administrations to tear through the
paper ceilings they established. Clearly, something stronger is needed.
A balanced budget amendment would be a strong device, but it is
obviously not available at this time. While we did not even have the
opportunity to vote on a balanced budget amendment this year, we do
have the chance to enact the next best thing--the bipartisan Budget
Enforcement Act.
Some 229 Members of this House cosponsored the balanced budget
amendment, and I cannot understand why any of these Members would not
support H.R. 2003. However, we are now hearing from Members who
cosponsored the BBA, voted for the budget agreement, and voted for both
reconciliation bills that the most serious problem with the Budget
Enforcement Act is that fact that it may postpone tax cuts for their
supporters. In a sense, they are right. If we enact this bill, tax cuts
will, indeed, be delayed if the country is short of the money needed to
balance the budget. But, once we are on tract, cuts can be enacted. I
see nothing wrong with this approach. If we can afford certain tax
cuts, let them go through. If not, we may just have to wait. In fact,
if you think it is more important to eliminate the deficit than it is
to give away tax breaks we cannot afford, this should be an easy vote.
I know there are those concerned that H.R. 2003 will lead to
reductions in important programs. I would like to ease these concerns
by pointing out that this bill does not demand cuts. Instead, it
demands that we adhere to our objectives. Congress and the President
will be provided with ample time to avert automatic corrections.
Similarly, reductions will not be triggered by extra spending that
results from inflation or some increased demand for services. To avoid
cuts, Congress and the President will have to put more careful
consideration into crafting budgets. We will have to work within
responsible guidelines, adopt a more long-term outlook, and employ
highly accurate economic forecasts. Mr. Speaker, we should have been
working this way all along.
Now, thanks to a thriving economy and a handful of tough votes, a
balanced budget is within our grasp. This time we cannot allow it to
slip away. If all parties involved can show more discipline and
tenacity than they have in the past, we will achieve this elusive goal.
The bipartisan Budget Enforcement Act will provide the incentives to
ensure that we do.
Let me close by saying I am disappointed that the Rules Committee has
decided to play politics with this issue, rather than debate it on its
merits. The sponsors of this bill have discovered some needed technical
changes. However, because the Rules Committee would not allow these
corrections to be added to the bill, they have been included in the
motion to recommit. Consequently, anyone who is serious about deficit
reduction should support the motion to recommit. In addition, even if
this motion is not agreed to, I believe it is still crucial that we
enact this bill. The underlying principles are too important to ignore,
and modifications can always be made in conference. I urge my
colleagues to vote for responsibility--support the motion to recommit
and support the underlying bill.
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 3\1/2\ minutes.
Mr. Speaker, this debate is not about ends, it is about means,
because I emphatically share the same ends as the sponsor of this bill,
which is to balance the budget and balance it for good by no later than
2002.
I will be the first to admit that their bill springs from a valid
concern. It is concern that the budget we may soon pass could fall
short of its goal. That concerns us because it has happened before. It
happened with Gramm-Rudman-Hollings in 1986, for which I voted, and it
happened with the budget summit in 1990. In each case the spending cuts
we passed did not cut spending in
[[Page H5603]]
fact by as much as we figured. As a result, the deficit did not drop as
much as we hoped.
This bill is to ensure that that will not happen again. That is a
valid concern, but for one very basic fact: We have a solution. It is
in place and it is working. When we adopted the Deficit Reduction Act
back in 1993, we carried forth the discretionary spending caps and the
pay-as-you-go rules that were first adopted in the Budget Enforcement
Act of 1990. In a word, they work. Since 1993, discretionary spending
has been held at or below the statutory caps and new entitlement
spending has been checked by the pay-as-you-go rule.
In addition, we included in that Deficit Reduction Act back in 1993
an enforcement procedure which I recall well because it was my
amendment. That procedure was dropped from the bill in the other body
because of the Byrd rule, but the President imposed it by Executive
order and the House has adopted it as a rule of procedure.
Basically, this rule says that whenever entitlement spending exceeds
a given year's baseline, the President with his budget has to report
that variance to the Congress, and also recommend to the Congress how
the overrun should be rectified. Congress has to take a record vote on
the President's recommended action or our alternative before we can
take the first step in the budget process. We can vote to do nothing,
but we have to vote. We cannot duck the problem. That is a rule of the
House. That is an Executive order of the Government.
This procedure has never been invoked because it has never been
needed. That is the irony of our situation today. This bill deals with
a problem that has not presented itself for the last 5 years, because
unlike Gramm-Rudman in 1986 and the budget summit in 1990, the deficit
since 1993 has followed the downward, declining path that was plotted
in the 1993 budget. In fact, it is running well below that path and
headed to a deficit this year of less than $40 billion. So all of this
concern about the need for enforcement because we may not attain our
balanced budget flies in the face of the facts of the last 5 years.
What is more, what this bill offers is a solution or solutions that
are unwieldy and extremely cumbersome and extremely complex. Let me
give a few of the problems that I have with the complex processes that
this bill would impose.
First of all, it does not address what in my opinion is the largest
problem. The largest problem of risk, looking down the next 5 to 10
years, if we adopt the budget bill and the tax reconciliation bill that
we have under consideration, is exploding outyear revenues.
{time} 1200
While this bill comes down hard on spending, it says, as to tax cuts,
we will defer or postpone only those that have not been implemented for
1 year. There is a disparity of treatment here that means that we will
come down a lot harder on spending than on tax cuts, and it leaves an
imbalance in this bill.
I will return to this subject again as the debate goes on and deal
with other practical problems that I have with this bill. It is well-
intentioned but we do not need it at this particular time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore [Mr. Bonilla]. Does the gentleman from Texas
[Mr. Barton] seek to control the time originally designated to the
gentleman from Delaware [Mr. Castle]?
Mr. BARTON of Texas. Yes, Mr. Speaker, I do.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Texas [Mr. Barton] is
recognized to yield time.
Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, could I inquire as to how much time
I have remaining?
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Texas [Mr. Barton] has 12
minutes remaining.
Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman
from Michigan [Mr. Upton].
Mr. UPTON. Mr. Speaker, I thank my good friend from Texas, Mr.
Barton, and the gentleman from Delaware, Mr. Castle, as well for their
fine work to get this bill on the floor today for a vote.
For my colleagues I have to say that this bill is much along the
lines of the Castle-Upton-Martini approach that was adopted in the last
Congress and was supported in fact by the chairman of the Committee on
the Budget as well as the chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means.
I am proud to be labeled as the deficit hawk because I know that
deficits are harmful to our economic growth and our future prosperity.
All of us in this body are heartened by the recent news that the
deficit in fact is coming down. Who would have guessed the deficit this
year could have been as low perhaps as $50 billion?
I once worked at the Office of Management and Budget. I watched a
Congress that back in the 1980's promised to cut taxes and cut
spending. They only did one: cut taxes, did not cut spending. We saw
the deficit balloon by trillions of dollars, of which we are paying
almost some $300 billion in interest just this year.
Our country has always been based on checks and balances. That is
what this bill does. If we do not hit the deficit target, we will not
see the tax cuts come into play. We need this. We need this measure as
some version of an accountability so that we can reach a balanced
budget. We will not see our deficits increasing the debt. I would urge
all of my colleagues to vote for this.
Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from
Kentucky [Mrs. Northup].
Mrs. NORTHUP. Mr. Speaker, I would like to speak against the Budget
Enforcement Act. I really have great appreciation for what the authors
are trying to achieve. I believe it is important that we focus on
achieving those goals. However, I do not think this is the way to go
about it.
I want to emphasize the importance of creative solutions. I believe
in 1994 that there was a revolution. It was not just a revolution of
who served. It was not just a revolution about where we were trying to
go. It was a revolution of we are going to start to think out of the
box. We are going to stop doing things that we have always done and get
what we have always gotten.
So Congress and the people that were involved in public policy began
to think of new ways to fashion new solutions. It is very important
that we deal with each one of our spending challenges and each one of
our challenges that we face and look for creative solutions. Think
about 20 years ago when so many of us were concerned in this country
that we would never be internationally competitive. We wondered if our
ability to trade competitively, as we saw other countries buying up
American industries, would ever return. It was the creative solutions
of business, it was the ability to find new ways of doing things, a new
way to handle inventory, a new way to downsize businesses that gave us
back our competitive edge and made us so internationally competitive.
That is true with government.
As we look at Medicaid, as we look at Medicare, as we look at Social
Security, I am absolutely convinced that we can make those programs
strong. We can make them solvent. We can keep them from absorbing all
of our children's income in creative ways instead of putting this
government on automatic pilot and letting it happen for us in ways that
we do not believe are the best.
Mr. MINGE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Indiana [Mr. Visclosky].
Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the
time.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the bipartisan Budget
Enforcement Act, and I want to thank my colleagues, the gentleman from
Texas [Mr. Barton] and the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. Minge] for
their hard work in bringing this bill to a vote today.
The lessons of the previous budget plans are that agreeing to balance
the budget is not going to provide a solution. For example, in 1982 the
budget resolution called for a balanced budget by 1984. We did not. In
1985, under Gramm-Rudman I, we were told we were going to balance the
budget by 1991; we did not. In 1987, under Gramm-Rudman II, we were
told that the budget would be balanced by 1993; and it was not. During
the 1990 budget agreement, we were told that finally the budget would
be balanced. It was not.
There was a common thread in all of these agreements. There were no
enforcement provisions included.
[[Page H5604]]
Critics today have said that the proposal before us is not perfect. I
would respond that neither is the budget agreement we are attempting to
enforce. We should not let the perfect be the enemy of the good we want
to do today.
Critics have charged that our enforcement provisions are unpalatable.
I could not agree more. I remind our colleagues that this is an
enforcement bill. It should not feel good if we do not keep our
agreement with the American people.
Critics charge that the legislation is too soft on the revenue side.
Guilty. But look at the letter that the Republican leadership has sent
out. I am convinced that what started out as a budget agreement to
balance the budget this year is simply a facade to hide a tax cut.
Please support this imperfect legislation. It is an imperfect world but
we want to do good today. We do want to enforce an agreement to balance
the budget by the year 2002. I congratulate my colleagues, the
gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. Minge] and the gentleman from Texas [Mr.
Barton] and all of the Members who have participated in a bipartisan
fashion in this endeavor.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the Bipartisan Budget
Enforcement Act, and I want to thank my colleagues, Joe Barton and
David Minge, for their hard work in bringing this bill to a vote today.
There is hardly a Member of this institution who does not believe
that balancing the Federal budget is important to the future of this
country. For 35 years, the U.S. Government has failed to balance its
budget, running deficits of up to $290 billion per year. Since 1980,
runaway deficit spending has caused the national debt to more than
quintuple in size. The debt is now more than $5.3 trillion, or about 70
percent of the country's gross domestic product [GDP]. Compare this
figure to 1979, when the national debt stood at $829 billion, or 33
percent of GDP.
The size and scope of the current Federal debt have a terrible
negative impact on the lives of working American families. By consuming
nearly 15 percent of all Federal spending, interest on the debt acts to
crowd out funding for programs that could be used to invest in our
country's infrastructure, hire more police officers, and sustain a
healthy economy. The debt also contributes to higher interest rates for
everyday expenses, such as home mortgages and car loans. In the end,
balancing the budget will reduce interest rates, spur economic growth,
and put more money in the pockets of American families.
The failure of past efforts to balance the Federal budget shows how
important it is to enforce balanced budget plans like the one Congress
and the President agreed to in June.
The lessons of previous budget plans prove that agreeing to balance
the budget does not guarantee that the budget will actually be
balanced. No fewer than four times over the past 15 years, Congress has
approved agreements that were supposed to get us to a balanced budget,
but failed to actually do so.
For example, in 1982, the budget resolution called for a balanced
budget in 1984. Yet, the budget was not balanced by that date. In 1985,
under Gramm-Rudman I, we were told that the budget would be balanced in
1991. It was not.
In 1987, under Gramm-Rudman II, we were told that the budget would be
balanced in 1993, but it was not. During the 1990 budget agreement, we
were told that, finally, the budget would be balanced in 1994. Again,
it was not.
The common thread in each of these failed attempts to balance the
budget was the lack of a meaningful enforcement mechanism.
Over the years, many of us have come to realize that the only way to
achieve a balanced budget is to pass legislation that would add
meaningful enforcement procedures to the budget process. That is why
for the past two Congresses, I, along with Congressman Stenholm and
Congressman Minge, have introduced the Balanced Budget Enforcement Act.
Originally sponsored by then-chairman of the Budget Committee Leon
Panetta and, after that, our former colleague from Minnesota, Tim
Penny, this legislation was one of the first comprehensive efforts to
address the issue of budget enforcement.
The Budget Enforcement Act before us today is the next logical step
in the fight to enact meaningful enforcement legislation.
Forged by a bipartisan group of Members from across the ideological
spectrum, this legislation takes a commonsense approach to enforcing
the budget process. It acknowledges that our best hope of actually
balancing the budget is to put every section of the budget on the
table--accountable for actually balancing the budget by the year 2002.
Put in simple terms, this bill puts in place critical enforcement
procedures by establishing caps on the mandatory spending and a floor
on revenue at the levels set by this year's budget resolution. If
spending goes above the targets, or the tax cuts explode beyond what is
projected, comprehensive enforcement procedures will be triggered to
make sure that the budget remains on track to balance and the deficit
stays under control.
I would like to warn Members against complacency. Though the economy
is doing well now and the deficit has been reduced over the past
several years, there is no guarantee that these rosy economic times
will continue. One of the major failings of past balanced budget
agreements is that they failed to anticipate downturns in the economy,
and were thrown off track by these changes. Passing this enforcement
legislation is the best way to ensure that the balanced budget stays on
track, even in the event of an economic downturn.
In many ways, the vote on this bill will be a measure of the
Congress's willingness to make the tough decisions needed to balance
the budget--this vote is a test of our resolve.
Critics have said that its not perfect. I would respond that neither
is the budget agreement we are attempting to enforce, and we should not
let the perfect by the enemy of the good we can do today.
Critics charge that our enforcement provisions are unpalatable. I
couldn't agree more. I remind my colleagues that this is an
``enforcement'' bill. It's not supposed to feel good if you fail to
keep your promise.
Critics charge that the legislation is too soft on the revenue side.
Well, given the letter that the Republican leadership has sent out in
opposition to this bill, it's clear to me that they are using the
balanced budget agreement as a facade for a tax cut and this was the
strongest provision we were going to be allowed in a bipartisan
measure.
We have tried many times to reach a balanced budget, but failed in
each case because the Congress lacked the political will to follow
through on its promises. Passage of this legislation will ensure that
the Congress does not walk away from the promise it has made to the
American people to balance the budget by 2002. It will restore the
faith of the American people that the Congress has the will to balance
the budget, and show that we are not afraid of making the difficult
choices needed to get us there.
Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to vote in favor of the Bipartisan
Budget Enforcement Act.
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Minnesota [Mr. Sabo], distinguished former chairman of the Committee on
the Budget.
(Mr. SABO asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. SABO. Mr. Speaker, I thank the ranking member for yielding me the
time.
Sometimes I think we keep fighting old fights. We are fighting the
problems of Gramm-Rudman. That is long passed. The reality is that the
budget enforcement mechanisms of 1990, extended to 1993 and extended
this year, work. Discretionary spending caps, with some flexibility for
emergencies, worked. The pay-as-you-go provisions that are current law
as they relate to new entitlements have worked.
What cannot work under our current law unfortunately and is not
solved by the Minge-Barton bill are the structures of tax cuts that
explode beyond the 5-year limit. Those games are being played with
backloaded IRA's and capital gains that explode in the outyears.
Current provisions cannot prevent it. Unfortunately the current
proposal before us solves none of that problem.
The only way we can deal with that problem, where we have backloaded
tax cuts that explode in the future, is to say no to those kinds of
proposals when they come before the House. The proposed bill does not
solve that problem because it is a 5-year bill. And if we extend it
beyond 5 years, we then have new baselines from which we are operating.
I urge defeat of this bill. Do not undo a system that is working with
ration and reason today.
Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman
from Tennessee [Mr. Wamp], the father of Weston Wamp, one of the chief
sponsors of our legislation.
Mr. WAMP. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the
time.
I quit using the word revolution because it implies bloodshed, maybe
even chaos. Started using the word correction where all of us,
Democrats, Republicans, Independents could follow through on our word,
just be consistent, clean this place up together.
[[Page H5605]]
I do not want to start on a negative here but, if we lose this bill
and lose this vote, it will be basically for three reasons: First, it
is a true bipartisan effort. Unfortunately, that is not the way things
are done in this city. Actually, we have got Members from all over the
place here. We have got Liberals, Conservatives, Democrats,
Republicans, we cannot tell who is controlling the time from which side
of the aisle because it is a true bipartisan effort and some folks do
not like that.
Second, fear is an easy mechanism to use. We are going to hear all
kinds of fears. I have heard caps. I have heard delays. I have heard
even the word cuts used here today in Social Security, Medicare, that
the tax cuts would be delayed or postponed. That is all a what-if
scenario.
Theoretically, if Congress and the administration absolutely do
nothing, heck, if we did not come back here between now and October 1,
the Government would shut down again, but the Congress is not going to
let that happen. We should not let this decision be driven by fear of
what if. We are responsible Members. We will do what is right for the
American folks and they know it.
The third thing is a technicality. There are a couple of technical
flaws in this bill that we tried to get corrected, and the Committee on
Rules said no. I think that is unfortunate. The Committee on Rules
should allow us to improve the bill, and I understand that there was an
agreement reached, and in the letter of the law we were going to submit
the bill that was on the floor a month ago; but we tried to improve the
bill, and we can still improve this bill, and it is not a reason to
vote against it.
I am down here in support of this effort because from 1965 to now,
the portion of the Federal budget that the Congress actually
appropriates has gone from two-thirds of the total budget to one-third.
Entitlements are on automatic pilot, and they are running away with the
American taxpayers' dollars, and we must rein it in, not cut anybody's
benefits, not reduce anybody's benefits, just slow down the growth and
be responsible.
As a member of the Committee on Appropriations, I can tell my
colleagues that, if the economy hiccups or belches a few times along
the road in the next 5 years, all of the offsets, all of the reductions
are going to have to come from the Committee on Appropriations. That is
going to put pressure on student loans, on cancer research, on the
investment dollars in the next generation. We cannot let that happen.
We are going to hear folks from one side of the aisle say, whoa to
tax cuts, tax cuts are ok if we are still meeting the discipline and
the fiscal restraint on the other side of the ledger. You are going to
hear Members on one side of the aisle say, you cannot slow down
entitlements.
We must come together and do it all and be serious with the American
people. That is what this is about. All of my colleagues should vote
``yes.''
Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. MINGE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from
California [Mrs. Tauscher].
Mrs. TAUSCHER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the
time.
Mr. Speaker, four times in the last 15 years Congress and the
President have told the American people that they had reached an
agreement to balance the budget. In each case however, the deficit
continued to grow. We now have the opportunity once again to make good
on our word. Congress and the President have agreed on the outlines of
a deficit reduction plan that will restore fiscal responsibility to our
Nation's budget.
Unfortunately the success of this effort hinges on key enforcement
provisions that are not yet part of this agreement. The bipartisan
Budget Enforcement Act would put in place a mechanism to force Congress
and the President to actively address spending that is higher than
expected or where revenues have fallen short of expectations. Instead
of ignoring excessive spending or revenue shortfalls, we would be
forced to confront the causes of the problem and make adjustments
accordingly.
We have made historic steps toward placing our economy on a sound
footing for the first time in a generation. But without a strong budget
enforcement mechanism, there is no guarantee that we will reach the
goal of eliminating the deficit and living up to our agreement. I
encourage my colleagues to support the motion to recommit on H.R. 2003.
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New
York [Mr. Rangel], ranking member of the Committee on Ways and Means.
(Mr. RANGEL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
{time} 1215
Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to H.R. 2003. Although
I agree with the principles in which we should have some way of
enforcing the budget agreement and reducing the deficit, the way this
does that, it actually shatters the integrity of the entire House
system as we know it, and it jeopardizes the jurisdiction of the
authorizing committees as well as the appropriating committees.
Those of us that serve on committee, we take great pride, at least we
did before the contract violated that, in the ability that allowed us
to legislate, allowed us to get the bills passed to the House, and
allowed the conferees to decide what to do.
In this, we will have some separate body outside of the ordinary
legislative process making decisions, so that even if we found that the
Medicare provisions were out of whack with what we had perceived, the
first thing that is attacked is not the cost that the doctors would
cause us, but we go straight to the premiums. Some of us would like to
believe that there might be a more equitable way to do it.
The same thing applies to Social Security, if that falls short.
Instead of trying to see whether we can make it even to enforce the
budget, the first thing we go after is the cost-of-living increases and
not really trying to see whether we can do something to resolve it.
It requires more cuts in the individual entitlement programs, even if
overall there is a surplus in the entitlement programs. Of course, if
one were to suspect that entitlement programs is the subject or the
target to wipe out, then I would suggest this is the way to do it. But
knowing that we are merely trying to enforce the budget agreement, it
would seem to me that entitlement programs and spending generally
should be what we are looking at and not just waiting for one program
to fall behind.
This bill also would require spending cuts, but the tax increases
would not be subjected to this even if the deficit is on the right
track. So I really think that it hurts the House of Representatives as
well as the Senate in years to come.
Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman
from Maryland [Mrs. Morella].
(Mrs. MORELLA asked and was given permission to revise and extend her
remarks.)
Mrs. MORELLA. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding this
time to me, and I rise in support of H.R. 2003, the bipartisan Budget
Enforcement Act.
Without this legislation, the balanced budget agreement will be
devoid of any enforcement mechanism, and it runs the danger of joining
the many past well-intentioned and long since forgotten efforts to
balance the budget.
The truth is that once a balanced budget agreement is approved,
history has demonstrated that it unravels as time passes and economic
conditions change. Budget enforcement provisions are necessary to avoid
this outcome and to ensure that we will follow-through on this
agreement.
The bill has been drafted to prevent problems that developed with
past budget enforcement proposals. It is important to remember that we
are proposing enforcement of an already existing budget agreement. We
are not trying to bypass difficult future decisions.
The act also applies evenly to all parts of the budget agreement,
both spending and revenue provisions. And the bill provides flexibility
in the case of changing economic circumstances.
Mr. Speaker, these enforcement provisions should serve as a deterrent
for any failure to meet the provisions of the balanced budget
agreement. Let us translate the rhetoric into action.
Mr. Speaker, these enforcement provisions should serve as a deterrent
for any failure to
[[Page H5606]]
meet the provisions of the balanced budget agreement. Because every
program is included, there will be strong pressure to adhere to the
decisions made in the agreement--advocates for every Federal program
and advocates for tax cuts will have an equal stake in reaching a
balanced budget. Let me repeat: these enforcement provisions are
intended to ensure that we keep to our agreement. It is interesting to
note that so many Members seem to assume that we will be unable to do
so. It is precisely because of this fear that H.R. 2003 is so critical.
Mr. Speaker, a number of Members who oppose this enforcement bill
cite their concerns for the potential impact on various elements of the
budget agreement--but that is exactly why this legislation is so
effective and important. It treats both spending and revenues alike. If
revenue projections fall short of the budget agreement, then further
tax cuts would be delayed until revenues meet the targets. If
entitlement programs grow beyond projected rates, corrective action
would be necessary to avoid sequestration. Congress would have the
power and adequate time to make alternative policy changes if they are
necessary.
Why do some Members find this threatening? I strongly believe that we
should delay tax cuts if we find that revenues are inadequate in the
later years of the agreement. I also believe that we must control the
growth of our entitlement programs--which are still allowed to grow
under this bipartisan budget agreement, but which must be reined in if
we are to maintain their future stability.
If we say we are committed to a balanced budget and agree that we
must avoid the failures of the past, then there is no choice but to
vote for H.R. 2003.
Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from
Kentucky [Mr. Bunning], a true Hall of Famer.
We have been talking about Hall of Famers today, but we have a true
Hall of Famer, the very distinguished chairman of the Subcommittee on
Social Security from the Committee on Ways and Means.
(Mr. BUNNING asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. BUNNING. Mr. Speaker, ever since I came to Congress in 1987, I
have worked hard for a balanced budget. A balanced budget is the finest
guarantee that Government will be able to honor its commitments, and I
believe we will keep our promise to balance the budget.
As chairman of the Subcommittee on Social Security under the
Committee on Ways and Means, I have made it my job to protect Social
Security and make sure benefits will be there for our senior citizens.
Over 43 million people, 43 million, receive Social Security benefits
overall. Social Security makes up 40 percent of all the retirement
income in this country--40 percent. We cannot desert the people who
have worked for 20, 30, 40, 50 years and will soon retire. We must keep
our promises. We must not jeopardize their benefits.
That is why I am not going to vote for the Budget Enforcement Act.
The fact is the bill caps entitlements, including Social Security. If
the Social Security cap is breached, the bill specifies that any cost-
of-living adjustment be reduced or eliminated as a first step toward
eliminating that breach. This just is not right and it is not fair.
As we all know, Social Security has the largest, best organized, most
vocal constituency of any program. Americans are not looking for any
nifty fixes to ensure the future of Social Security. Americans want
real reform based on informed, thorough, and deliberative debate.
Such a debate is happening now in the Subcommittee on Social Security
through an ongoing hearing series on the future of Social Security for
this generation and the next. We have already held five hearings.
Social Security must not be the subject of an arbitrary cap. We must
step up to the challenge and to our responsibility to protect the
future of all Americans through real Social Security reform.
Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to vote ``no'' on this Budget
Enforcement Act.
Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes.
Mr. Speaker, I think we need to address directly what the gentleman
from Kentucky [Mr. Bunning] has just talked about.
First of all, he is absolutely correct that Social Security is a very
important program and a very special program. I want to point out that
it is a Federal entitlement program. It is an earned entitlement
program, but it is a Federal program, so it should be a part of any
comprehensive enforcement mechanism.
I would also point out that the caps on Social Security in our bill
are not arbitrary caps. They are the estimates of spending on Social
Security over the next 5 years that have been put into the bill by the
President and the congressional leadership. There is nothing arbitrary
about them at all. They are based on the very best estimates of a very
well run program.
I would also point out that under our procedure on Social Security,
the President and the Congress have three options: They can vote to
waive the cap on Social Security, if they want to; they can vote to
make some programmatic changes in Social Security, if they want to; and
only as a last resort would sequestration go into effect.
Last, I would point out that because of the special nature of the
Social Security Program, and the concerns that the gentleman from
Kentucky and others have raised, we did offer to the Committee on Rules
an amendment yesterday that would have taken the first $100 billion of
any budget surpluses and put that towards the Social Security trust
fund, to actually put real dollars in the trust fund. The Committee on
Rules decided not to make that in order.
So I ask my colleagues not to be scared off by a diatribe or at least
an attack on our overall bill because of Social Security. It is a
Federal program. We know it is a special Federal program. We want to
protect it. We have a lot of flexibilities in our bill to protect
Social Security. But we cannot assume that just because it is Social
Security, that it should be totally off limits.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Does the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Stenholm]
seek to control the time previously controlled by the gentleman from
Minnesota [Mr. Minge]?
Mr. STENHOLM. I do, Mr. Speaker.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Texas [Mr. Stenholm] is
recognized.
Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman
from Florida [Mr. Boyd].
(Mr. BOYD asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. BOYD. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in very strong support of the
bipartisan Budget Enforcement Act. I want to thank the gentleman from
Texas [Mr. Barton], the gentleman from Delaware [Mr. Castle], and the
gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. Wamp] for their work; and also the
gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. Minge] and the gentleman from Texas [Mr.
Stenholm] for getting us to this point where we can now address this
issue on the floor.
I have heard Members who claim they support the balanced budget
agreement and they support the balanced budget resolution; yet if asked
to set their promises into law and make them enforceable, according to
many of them, then every program will be cut and tax cuts will not take
place.
Either we believe the economic assumptions are correct and the budget
will be balanced in 2002 or we do not. Many of my colleagues are trying
to have it both ways. They voted for H.R. 2014 and H.R. 2015 and sent
out press releases trumpeting their support for a balanced budget
agreement. Yet when they are asked to place these promises into law and
make them enforceable, they talk about how programs will exceed the
caps and revenue will not equal the projections.
This is incredible to me, because it becomes painfully obvious that
they do not think the balanced budget agreement will truly balance the
budget.
While I am new to Congress, this issue is not new. In 1982 we had a
balanced budget agreement. In 1985 we had another balanced budget
agreement, followed by another one in 1987, and yet another agreement
in 1990. None of them succeeded because they were not enforced.
One of the things that is supposed to define intelligence is the
ability to learn from our mistakes, and we must learn from those
mistakes that we made previously. I ask my colleagues to support the
Balanced Budget Enforcement Act.
[[Page H5607]]
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair would advise Members that the
gentleman from Texas [Mr. Barton] has 5 minutes remaining; the
gentleman from Iowa [Mr. Nussle] has 9\1/2\ minutes remaining; the
gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spratt] has 7\1/2\ minutes; and the
gentleman from Texas [Mr. Stenholm] has 8\1/2\ minutes remaining.
Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, who has the right to close debate?
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Texas [Mr. Barton] has
the right to close.
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
North Dakota [Mr. Pomeroy].
Mr. POMEROY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this
time.
Mr. Speaker, while in concept adding budget safeguards that ensure we
stay on track to balance the budget makes all the sense in the world,
the measure before us fails to advance that goal in an acceptable
fashion.
Now, we all know that the devil is in the details, and the
shortcomings in the details before us are very significant. They are
much too significant to overlook or to brush aside because we like the
notion of budget enforcement.
I want to focus on three of the most glaring deficiencies.
Looking at the budget deal presently being negotiated, this historic
effort to balance the budget, I believe that the most significant
threats are exploding tax cuts, specifically indexing capital gains, or
backloaded IRA's, these that have very dynamic revenue losses in the
outyears but not in the early years.
Those tax cuts would not in any way be touched by this measure. This
measure is a toothless tiger relative to addressing exploding tax cuts.
Second, it places an exceptionally convoluted process in place that
totally tips on its head the standing jurisdictions of this House.
Between November and December 15 the Committee on the Budget is given
sole discretion over reconciling the accounts. That means jurisdiction
over all standing authorizing committees, over the Committee on
Appropriations, and over the Committee on Ways and Means. It is as
though those committees have no expertise whatsoever. The Committee on
the Budget is the where-all and the end-all of the decision-making if
this bill would kick in.
Finally, if Congress would not act, it would just be the automatic
sequester blade coming down and cutting, and that would include cuts on
Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, veterans' benefits, military
retirement.
My goodness, these programs are much too vital to put on automatic
pilot heading on down the slicing machine. We can do better than that.
We must do better than that.
Budget enforcement, yes, but not this budget enforcement. Vote
``no.''
Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 4 minutes.
Mr. Speaker, we heard earlier someone say something close to this. I
will put it a little differently: ``If you always do what you always
did, you will always get what you always got.'' And that is pretty much
what we have always learned here in the U.S. Congress.
Whenever we try to come in here in a rush to try to change the rules
in the middle of the game in order to affect a particular outcome, what
invariably happens is that we have an outcome which is not exactly what
we intended. In fact, we heard here earlier about the deals and
enforcements of 1984 and 1988 and 1989 and 1990 and all sorts of other
enforcement provisions in the past. And the question was asked, well,
was there a single thread? And the thread was, yes, it was done in a
rush.
{time} 1230
I would suggest to my colleagues that that is the thread that runs
through much of this, is that we try to craft a little gimmick at the
end in order to get the job done and get the ball over the goal line to
score what we all want to do. And that is make sure that we have a
balanced budget that it is enforceable, that we give to the American
people tax relief, that we provide for spending reductions, and we do
this in a way that we can all be proud of. And, so, we try to figure
out little ways to do that.
But what we have done here, I believe, is a rush job, which I do not
question as far as motivation, but I do question as far as whether or
not it has been thought out to enough of a degree that it will, in
fact, work. In fact, I believe this is much akin to ``hey, I know''
kind of legislation. We rush in here and we say, ``hey, I know; I have
got an idea.''
In fact, we are going to hear a ``hey, I know'' idea at the very end
of this on the motion to recommit. Someone is going to run in here and
say, ``hey, I know; I know there is a problem with Social Security. Let
us exempt that from this particular enforcement mechanism,'' or say,
``hey, I know; the veterans have a problem with it. Let us exempt them
from this motion to recommit,'' or, ``hey, I know; we want to protect
these tax cuts, so let us exempt that,'' or, ``hey, I know; let us come
up with something else to make sure that we do not do damage to one
particular constituency or allay the concerns of one particular part of
the membership so that we can get this bill passed.''
We should not legislate by ``hey, I know.'' We should send this to
committee. We should go through the process which has been promised by
the chairman of Committee on Rules, the chairman of the Committee on
the Budget, the chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means so that we
can bring back to the floor before the end of the Congress, which has
been the goal and commitment of both sides of the aisle, an enforcement
mechanism within an overall process reform for this budget. We should
do it under the auspices of the committee system with hearings which
are ongoing. We should not do it when we know, in fact, that there are
problems with this bill.
The chairman of the Subcommittee on Social Security was just down in
the well explaining exactly how this might, in fact, affect Social
Security. I am not suggesting that it does. We do not know. Part of
this whole debate here today is the lack of clarity.
So what I would suggest to Members that are unsure about their vote
on this particular bill, because I rise in opposition even though I
want an enforcement mechanism, I want budget process reform; and so I
know the angst that Members are going through right now saying, ``Gosh,
I wish this was the one. It is really imperfect. It does not quite meet
the standards of budget process reform. But I just want to do
something.''
I would ask my colleagues to consider this: If they are crystal clear
about what this is going to do to Social Security, come down here and
vote yes. If they are not quite sure, though, they better consider
voting no. If they are clear about what this will do to tax increases
in the future, come down here and vote yes. But if they think this
could, in fact, raise taxes, they better come down here and vote no.
Mr. MINGE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from
California [Ms. Sanchez].
Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Speaker, today we are opening the doors of Congress
to the public. Twenty years ago, sunshine laws brought the light of
public scrutiny to the once-secret committee rooms, but those laws did
nothing to stop the secret dealings in smoke-filled rooms when it came
time to write our Nation's budget.
The public wants a true balanced budget. They want an end to the
trillion-dollar debt. They want real middle-class tax relief. Well, my
friends, the only way the public is going to get what they want is to
know that we have truly kept our promises, and that is through the
Budget Enforcement Act.
This bill locks into law the goals of the balanced budget agreement.
If Congress and the President want to change the terms of the deal,
then they must pass a law to do so. This means that public hearings
must be held and Congress can no longer rig the books in the dead of
the night.
I am a businesswoman, and in business the marketplace is a gun to the
head of any CEO to produce a bottom line and to make a profit. In
government, that gun is the balanced budget. We must open up Congress
to the public.
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Illinois [Mr. Evans], the ranking member of the Committee on Veterans'
Affairs.
Mr. EVANS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from South Carolina
[Mr. Spratt] for yielding me the time.
I oppose the Budget Enforcement Act because I believe our Nation's
veterans
[[Page H5608]]
and their families may suffer if this bill is passed. If sequestration
procedures were triggered, the Budget Enforcement Act could permanently
reduce VA compensation benefits for more than 2.5 million service-
connected disabled veterans and their surviving spouses next year. At
the same time, needs-based pension programs for 710,000 low-income
wartime veterans could be reduced, insurance premiums for more than 1.5
million veterans could be increased, and 30,000 veterans could be
denied health care from the VA in 1998.
The Budget Enforcement Act would continue Congress' role in neglect
toward our Nation's veterans. According to a recent Congressional
Research Service report on Federal social spending, veterans benefits
programs are the only Federal social programs in the recently adopted
budget to suffer a real reduction in purchasing power over the next 5
fiscal years.
We in Congress are not willing to abandon our obligations to men and
women who have served in this country. I urge my colleagues to defeat
this bill and protect our Nation's veterans.
Mr. MINGE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas
[Mr. Stenholm].
(Mr. STENHOLM asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Speaker, listening to this debate, I am reminded of
the wisdom of Will Rogers when he observed, ``It ain't people's
ignorance that bothers me so much. It's them knowing so much that ain't
so which is the problem.''
This bill does not cut Social Security, does not cut veterans'
benefits, does not raise taxes, does not put the Government on
autopilot. It takes us off autopilot. It simply requires the Congress
to act if we do not meet our promise to the people of 2002.
Last fall, many of us ran on a platform of fiscal responsibility.
They made countless speeches about balancing the budget, and that plank
helped in their election to the House. In March, after voting for the
successful balanced budget constitutional amendment, they sent out the
press release claiming their portion of that success. In May, my
colleagues joined in the press conference hailing the balanced budget
agreement between the President and Congress, and they endorsed the
plan by voting for the House-passed reconciliation bills in June.
In every townhall meeting this year, my colleagues have insisted to
skeptical constituents that, at long last, Congress can be trusted to
balance the budget. Just like the national polls say, about four out of
every five of their constituents say they do not think the Government
can really do that. But my colleagues reassure them, after years of
broken promises, this time we really are going to balance the Federal
budget and keep it balanced.
That scenario really does not require much imagination, does it? For
the vast majority of this body, it is our story. Now imagine this: It
is the first week of August and you are addressing the first of two
dozen townhall meetings that you will face over the next month. The
first person up to the microphone, the one your opponent always plants
in these meetings, asks, ``Congressman, how are you going to keep your
promises to us? How did you vote on that bill which makes sure we
really get a balanced budget, the one that enforces the spending and
revenue targets laid out in the budget?''
I do not know about my colleagues, but there is only one answer I can
imagine giving to that question: Seal that answer today. Vote ``yes''
on the bipartisan enforcement bill. Take us off autopilot. And force
the Congress to act if we do not do that which we say we are doing.
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
California [Mr. Filner].
Mr. FILNER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from South Carolina
[Mr. Spratt] for yielding me the time.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to the so-called Budget
Enforcement Act. H.R. 2003 will lead to permanent reductions in
veterans' benefits. Although its supporters describe this bill as a
neutral and benign enforcement mechanism, in reality it would decimate
the benefit programs our grateful Nation has provided for America's
heroes, our veterans.
If this bill passes, education benefits for veterans would be cut.
More than 345,000 men and women who served in our Nation's Armed Forces
would be affected. Compensation provided for the men and women disabled
as a result of their military service would be permanently reduced.
More than 2.5 million veterans and their widows would be affected. The
safety net we provide for our aging war veterans would be torn. More
than 700,000 old and sick wartime veterans would be affected.
Let us not support a bill that would endanger the benefits earned by
America's veterans. Let us tell our veterans that we support them. Vote
``no'' on H.R. 2003.
Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the
distinguished gentleman from Delaware [Mr. Castle], the chief cosponsor
and former Governor of Delaware.
Mr. CASTLE. Mr. Speaker, we have heard the scare tactics they talked
about earlier. We heard about Social Security and maybe there will not
be increases in Social Security. We heard about possible cuts in the
veterans' programs. We heard that tax reductions will not go into
place.
What has happened because of what Congress has done over many decades
now? We have had this tremendous deficit adding to the debt of the
United States. About 16 percent of the cost of the budget goes to pay
the interest on the debt of the United States of America. We have had
tax increases because of that.
We have to make changes. We need the budget enforcement. The budget
enforcement bill provides that if there is a problem in terms of
getting to where we need to be over those 5 years that we, the
Congress, can waive the caps, that we, the Congress, can make
programmatic changes, all of which we would do to protect Social
Security or the veterans or the tax reductions; or we could do nothing
and by sequestration it would be resolved.
I do not think that is going to happen. I think these are scare
tactics. I believe that, if we believe that we should balance the
budget of the United States of America, that we have to do more than
just say that, we have to have a budget enforcement mechanism; and that
is what this legislation is. Vote ``yes'' today.
Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 3 minutes to ask a question
of the distinguished gentleman from Delaware [Mr. Castle].
He mentioned that there has been some scare tactics today. I do not
think there has been scare tactics as much as there has been
uncertainty. And that is really what I was trying to bring out. Is the
gentleman from Delaware [Mr. Castle] clear on the fact that Social
Security, under his provision, would never be cut or veterans'
benefits?
That is what we are suggesting, is that we are unclear. I think
Members that are coming here to vote are not necessarily persuaded that
there are definite sequestrations because they did build into this some
mechanisms. But the concern is that it is unclear, and that is what I
think raises so much concern from those of us that oppose this
particular enforcement mechanism.
Mr. CASTLE. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. NUSSLE. I yield to the gentleman from Delaware.
Mr. CASTLE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. Nussle]
for yielding. I am clear that if we pass the budget enforcement
mechanisms here that we are going to have better protection of the
programs, such as Social Security, than if we do not. We are facing
crises in Social Security sometime in the near future. In this way, we
can look at it and we can make corrections if the money is not there.
I think this is an improved mechanism in terms of dealing with not
just Social Security but all of the entitlement programs, the concerns
that have been expressed here today.
Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, my concern, however, is
this: It is easy to suggest that my colleagues are clear about this,
but then my understanding is that what we are hearing is that there is
going to be a motion to recommit that is going to be rushed in here
that says, ``because we are real concerned about Social Security, and
since my colleagues seem to
[[Page H5609]]
be so concerned about Social Security, we will exempt it,'' or
veterans, ``we will exempt that,'' or tax cuts, ``we will exempt
that.'' Something is going to be exempted because of all of this
concern.
So either we are concerned and unclear or we are clear and not
concerned. And that is why I think Members out there, while they want
to support reform and enforcement, are concerned that this may not be
the exact bill that we want to support to get that job done.
I yield to the gentleman.
Mr. CASTLE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. Nussle]
for yielding.
With respect to Social Security, it will not be exempted in the bill
that we actually presented to the Committee on Rules yesterday. I do
not know if it will be in the motion to recommit or if there will be
one here today. What it will do, essentially, is start to deal with the
debt of Social Security, which is something I think we need to do. We
are building a deficit there. We are having a problem not having the
trust fund. That is why we are going to have economic problems with
Social Security in the future.
This will be a great mechanism if we could add it to our bill. We
probably will not be able to, but I would love to do that. But it does
not exempt it per se.
Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time further, I understand
that there may be some certainty on the part of the authors based on
their careful work on their particular provision. But the rest of us
have not had an opportunity to have the hearings, to think through the
legislation, to consider all of its ramifications within a total
process reform measure. And that is what concerns us.
{time} 1245
I think the proof will be in the motion to recommit. If in fact we
think this is such a good bill, the motion to recommit will be just
some easy motion to recommit. But my feeling is that there is going to
be a motion to recommit that comes down here that is going to say,
``Hey, wait a minute, we've got problems. We better move to recommit
this and exempt Social Security.'' Or move to recommit this and exempt
veterans. Or all of them.
I would suggest to my colleagues on both sides of the aisle that in
fact if we believe this is such good legislation and if we believe the
enforcement in this legislation is so perfect, then why do we on the
one hand say it is not tough enough to take care of Social Security and
on the other hand rush in here with a motion to recommit to try and fix
it? We need to perfect this legislation in committee.
Mr. MINGE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
California [Mr. Dooley].
(Mr. DOOLEY of California asked and was given permission to revise
and extend his remarks.)
Mr. DOOLEY of California. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of
the bipartisan Budget Enforcement Act. For the vast majority of
Republicans and Democrats who stood up and voted for the balanced
budget agreement, we were in fact making a promise, a commitment to the
American people that we are ensuring that we will balance our budget
while protecting the priorities of our American families and also by
providing a responsible level of tax reduction.
What this bipartisan Budget Enforcement Act does is it basically
provides the American people with an insurance policy, to ensure that
Congress will not renege on the promises that are a part of the
balanced budget agreement. It is a responsible measure that has the
protections for entitlement programs in times of recession. For those
people who contend that it is going to cut veterans benefits, it is
going to cut Social Security, that it is going to cut entitlement
programs, that will only happen if Congress and the President fail to
live up to their elected responsibilities of providing some leadership
to address some of the problems that emerge when we find that our
spending is no longer in line with our revenues, by coming forth to the
American people and telling them that we have to make some
modifications in order to ensure that we can continue to provide the
veterans with the benefits that they need.
Also, it gives us the opportunity to tell the American people that we
do not have the ability. This is the enforcement mechanism for us to
provide the leadership that the American people deserve.
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Massachusetts [Mr. Olver].
Mr. OLVER. I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.
Mr. Speaker, I oppose the Budget Enforcement Act because it would
widen the divide between the wealthy and the poor in America. The
legislation enforces spending and revenue targets agreed to in the
budget agreement by a combination of entitlement caps and deferred tax
breaks. But the bill treats entitlements that benefit the poor
differently from tax cuts that benefit the wealthy. This act would
permanently cut entitlement spending if it exceeds its cap while it
places only a temporary delay on tax cuts if revenues fall short. The
bill protects the capital gains cuts for the wealthy, but leaves basic
assistance to families, children and the elderly on the chopping block.
Mr. Speaker, this Congress does not need another scheme to widen the
gap between the rich and families struggling to get by. I urge that we
vote against the Budget Enforcement Act today.
Mr. MINGE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from
California [Ms. Harman].
(Ms. HARMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend her
remarks.)
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this
time and commend him above all others in this body for his perseverance
on behalf of this important issue. I am pleased to cosponsor this
legislation, but also urge support for the motion to recommit, which
contains an even more perfected version of it.
As the mother of the deficit lock box, I have seen that mechanism
work to reduce the deficit. Some of us insisted as a condition to
supporting the 1993 budget agreement that the lock box be attached in
Executive order. The result has been unprecedented growth.
Similarly, for those who support the balanced budget agreement, we
need an enforcement mechanism, and this is the best we can come up with
on a bipartisan basis. If we are going to lengths to balance the
budget, why are we not going to lengths to enforce that budget?
I urge support for the motion to recommit. Failing that, I urge
support for the legislation. A cut must be a cut and a balanced budget
must be enforced.
Mr. MINGE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New
Jersey [Mr. Andrews].
Mr. ANDREWS. I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.
Mr. Speaker, over the last number of years, we have all heard the
voices of alarm that we are hearing again today. Those voices are
wrong. As the gentleman from Delaware [Mr. Castle] said earlier, this
bill will not cut Social Security. It will not cut veterans benefits.
It will not take well-earned tax reductions away from taxpayers. If
Members choose to listen to those voices, I assume that they will have
a short-term political gain because they will not be criticized for
voting for those things. But we have done enough around here for the
last 30 years of making short-term political gains at the expense of
the long-term health of the economy of this country.
If my colleagues believe in the terms of the balanced budget
agreement, then put it into the law. If my colleagues believe it can
and will work the way it has been planned by the President and the
congressional leadership, then make sure it works by putting it into
the law. Our motto around here for the last 30 years has been, ``The
check is in the mail.'' Let us do something real this time. Let us make
this agreement enforceable and real for the American people. Vote
``yes'' on this legislation.
Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute.
Mr. Speaker, if it does not cut Social Security and if it does not
cut veterans benefits and if it does not cut Medicare and if it does
not affect the taxes and if it does not affect any other sacred cow in
the Federal Government, how is it an enforcement mechanism? Everybody
is rushing down here and we are
[[Page H5610]]
going to get a motion to recommit saying, ``Oh, don't worry about
Social Security; don't worry about veterans benefits; don't worry about
this. This really isn't as tough as everybody out there is saying it
is.'' Then what does this do?
I have been patient about this and I am not going to question
anybody's motive. But if in fact this does not do any of those things
which it is advertised to do, then we better send this back and find
out what it does do, because if it does not do all of those things,
then it does not work. And if it does not work, why are we passing it
here today in a big rush to say, ``Yeah, we're tough on budgets and,
yeah, we're going to balance it and, yeah, we're going to put some
teeth into this process''?
Come on. It is either going to be tough or it is not going to be
tough. The groups out there that have studied this say it is pretty
tough. Let us advertise it that way.
Mr. MINGE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 15 seconds.
Mr. Speaker, this bill is tough because it requires us in Congress to
be responsible. That is something that is tough news for all of us, and
I hope that we can accept it.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr.
Tanner].
Mr. TANNER. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. Minge] is
right. It requires Congress to act. That is why it is tough and that is
why it is so necessary.
Mr. Speaker, a nation that is bankrupt is a nation that is
vulnerable. It is no more complicated than that. By 2003 if we do not
do anything, over 70 percent of the money that comes to Washington will
be obligated. We will be on a collision course with debt and deficit.
We got here together, Democrats and Republicans, equally responsible
for the situation we find ourselves in. We are going to solve it
together. This is a bipartisan bill from the rank and file Members of
this House. This, make no mistake about it, is the only vehicle to
translate the idea of balancing our Nation's budget today from an idea
to reality. There is nothing else on the floor that will do it. Today
is the time, and I hope that people in this House will have the
opportunity to put their country ahead of partisan politics for once.
Today is the day to do it.
Mr. MINGE. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the
gentleman from Iowa [Mr. Boswell].
(Mr. BOSWELL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. BOSWELL. Mr. Speaker, I have some difficulties with the bill.
Mr. MINGE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Bonilla). The gentleman from Minnesota
is recognized for 1\1/4\ minutes.
Mr. MINGE. Mr. Speaker, we have been journeying on a noble course
here. It is a bipartisan course. It is a rank and file course. The
leadership on both sides of the aisle has been either lukewarm or
opposed to what we are doing. The White House has declined to provide
us with any support. But instead Members of this body from around the
country, from both parties, from all ends of the political spectrum,
have seen that if we are not willing to stand up and take
responsibility for what we do, hold ourselves accountable, introduce
some discipline to the budget process, that we do not deserve to serve
in this institution.
We feel that strong bipartisan budget enforcement is long overdue. It
should not just apply to discretionary spending. It should apply to the
entitlement programs. We ought to hold our tax cuts to the same
standards. For those on my side of the aisle, indeed I would have
written this bill differently if I had the opportunity to do it just
for myself. I am sure that on the other side of the aisle, the feeling
is mutual. But we attempted to come together and craft a bill that
would have bipartisan support. It is ironic that the Democrats feel it
does not deal harshly enough with the tax cuts. The Republicans feel it
deals too harshly. Let us come together and get the job done.
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from South Carolina is
recognized for 2 minutes.
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, as we close this debate, I think it is well
to remember that deficits have come down. The promises we made in 1993
have been kept. We adopted that budget in a year when the deficit the
prior year had been $290 billion. The Bush administration projected the
deficit that year would be $332 billion. It was not. It was $255
billion. The next year it was $203 billion. In 1995, it was $164
billion. In 1996, last year, it was $107.8, and this year in a few
weeks we will find that it is less than $40 billion.
So in the face of those facts, we are now looking at a hugely complex
process to deal with a problem that has not presented itself for the
last 5 years. We are imposing enormous complexity on the process. Let
me give just one practical problem. This bill dictates that the
President and OMB within 30 days of the close of the fiscal year, when
the numbers are just coming in, must analyze every entitlement program
and propose spending cuts that will not only rectify any past year
overrun but also eliminate any excess in the year to come. Then it
requires Congress to act on this hastily submitted proposal within less
than 45 days, and that 45 days falls in a period when Congress is
rarely in session. Indeed, every other year the House will be in a lame
duck session.
So the Congress can act within this tight time frame, this bill
dispenses with the jurisdiction of the authorizing committees and the
appropriations committees and vests extraordinary jurisdiction in the
Committee on the Budget. When the Committee on the Budget bring its
bill to the floor, it dispenses with the Committee on Rules and allows
any Member under the 5-minute rule to present any amendment that is
germane to tax or spending measures in the bill before us.
{time} 1300
Added to these extraordinary procedures is something else buried in
the bill, one other example which deals with disaster relief. It sets
up a reserve fund for disaster relief each year and pulls $5.5 billion
out of discretionary spending.
Now in the budget agreement, we have cut discretionary spending to
the bone. This would take it down another $27 billion over the next 5
years.
It is too much, it is not needed, it is well intentioned, but it
should not be passed and is not required.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Bonilla). The gentleman from Iowa [Mr.
Nussle] is recognized for his remaining 1\1/2\ minutes.
Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Speaker, look, there is nobody who really wants to
come down here and oppose reform because, quite honestly, I think there
is major bipartisan support for reform. In fact, we have seen it here
today. I commend, even though I have some concerns with this bill and I
oppose it, I commend my friends and colleagues on the committee on
which I serve and the conference in which I am proud to be a member and
the Congress of which I enjoy the kind of bipartisanship on this
particular issue and others. I commend them for the work that they have
done.
We have bipartisan opposition, however, as well. I mean I want my
colleagues to understand that, yes, there is bipartisan support, but
that also means there is bipartisan opposition, and quite strong I
would suggest. The committee chairs, the ranking members of the
different committees of jurisdiction who want to move forward with
legislation and reform are all standing foursquare in opposition to
this here today.
I am worried about the advertising, quite honestly. And I do not
question the motives of the Members that have written this particular
bill, but I am worried about the advertising. This is either advertised
as tough enforcement with teeth that is going to do the job once and
for all, that is going to hold our feet to the fire, that is going to
be automatic, that is going to have tough caps, or it is not. It either
is going to go after some of these programs that we have been concerned
about on the floor here today by various Members, such as Social
Security, Medicare, veterans, all assorted programs that have obvious
constituencies within the House and the country, or it does not.
We are not sure, and I think the proof is in the uncertainty. Send us
back to committee. Vote against the bill and the motion to recommit.
Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman
from
[[Page H5611]]
Wisconsin [Mr. Neumann], one of the most passionate balanced budgeters
in the Congress.
Mr. NEUMANN. Mr. Speaker, I would like to specifically address my
good friend from Iowa [Mr. Nussle] and his most recent comments about
Social Security. This bill is very important. It does not go after
Social Security in any way, shape, or form. In fact, the people in
Washington, DC, are already going after Social Security because Social
Security collects more money than it pays back out to our senior
citizens in benefits every year.
That money is supposed to be sitting out here in Washington in a
savings account. There is no savings account. Washington puts that
money in the general fund, it spends all the money out of the general
fund and then some; that is the deficit, and there is no money left to
put in the Social Security trust fund so they simply put IOU's in
there.
Let me finish; I only got 1 minute. To my good friend, I would
normally be happy to yield. The bottom line is this: that money that is
supposed to be in the Social Security trust fund is not there, and what
we had proposed last night in amendment to this bill is that we take
the first money from surpluses, the first hundred billion dollars, and
set it aside to start preserving Social Security for our senior
citizens. By the year 2012 not 2029, 2012, there is not enough money
coming into the Social Security system to make good on our promises to
seniors.
This bill does not go after Social Security. As a matter of fact it
does not go far enough on stopping the people in Washington from going
after Social Security.
Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of the
time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Texas is recognized for 3
minutes.
Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield for a question very
briefly?
Mr. BARTON of Texas. If it does not come out of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. It does come out of the time of the
gentleman from Texas.
Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I will yield to the gentleman very
briefly.
Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Speaker, why is there a cap if this does not affect
Social Security?
Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, last Saturday I took my daughter
Kristin and my wife Janet to Philadelphia, the birthplace of freedom in
this Nation. I stood in the room where Thomas Jefferson wrote the
Declaration of Independence. In the beginning of that declaration it
says:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are
created equal, they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable rights, and among those rights are the right to
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
Those are very famous words that continue to echo down through the
centuries.
I stand on the floor of the House of Representatives today to issue
the following declaration of budget accountability: We hold these
truths to be self-evident, that all items in the budget should be on
the table, that enforcement mechanisms are necessary and that to
implement those mechanisms we should have a bipartisan approach to
budget enforcement.
The bill before us today does that.
I would like to point out that the caps and the targets in our bill
are not something that the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. Minge] and the
gentleman from Texas [Mr. Barton] and the gentleman from Delaware [Mr.
Castle] and the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. Wamp] and the gentleman
from Texas [Mr. Stenholm] came up with, they are numbers that President
Clinton and the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Kasich] and the gentleman from
Georgia [Mr. Gingrich] and the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. Gephardt]
and Mr. Daschle and Mr. Lott came up with. They are not our numbers;
they are the agreed-upon numbers.
I would point out that this is a budget accountability bill. It
forces us to address the problems.
When the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. Nussle] asked is it hard or is it
soft, the truth is that as a last resort it is a hard enforcement bill.
But the first resort is to give the President and the Congress the
opportunity to waive any part of the cap or any part of the revenue
target that we consciously vote on the floor to do so. The second
option is to reform any program or any contingent tax cut that we
consciously vote to do so, but as a last resort.
If we stick our head in the sand and do nothing, under this bill the
deficit is not going to go up, it is going to stay within the caps.
That is what sequestration is all about or the delayed tax cut is all
about.
I would like to point out what the options are. If the spending does
not come within the cap, Congress and the President can vote to waive
the cap, Congress and the President can change the program, and as a
last resort we can do this sequestration.
Everything in our budget under our bill is on the table. Everything.
It has to be, my colleagues. Look at this chart. If we do nothing, the
uncontrollable part of the budget with interest on the debt is going to
be 70 percent in the year 2002, 70 percent. That is a complete reversal
of what it was 25 years ago.
Our opponents have said we have to have budget enforcement; they just
do not want to do it today or they do not want to do it like this.
I will urge my colleagues to vote for the bill. Let us do the right
thing and let us do it now.
Mr. BOSWELL. Mr. Speaker, during the initial stages of the drafting
of the Budget Enforcement Act I was supportive of the concept.
Unfortunately, today I cannot support the final version of the act. I
do however continue my strong support to the concept of enforcing the
parameters agreed to in the budget reconciliation. I regret that I
cannot support this legislation I had signed as a cosponsor. Sometimes
in the legislative process the devil is in the details. Careful
examination of the bill's language revealed the potential of severe
reductions to vital programs for Iowans. Tax reductions and spending
cuts to programs such as veterans benefits, Social Security, Medicare,
and Medicaid could be mandated without the matter being brought to a
vote in Congress. In this case as the details of the bill came to the
surface and were not allowed to be corrected, it became apparent I
could not support this legislation in its final form.
The people of Iowa sent me here to Washington to bring our Nation's
fiscal house in order and I am working toward that end everyday. One of
my first acts in Congress was to cosponsor the balanced budget
amendment. I have also supported the reconciliation bill and both the
spending and tax reduction bills. However I cannot support today's
enforcement bill.
The Rules Committee passed a rule baring any amendments to the bill,
forcing a vote on a bill which even many of its supporters including
myself desired to amend when we discovered the need to improve the
bill. Under the current version of the bill, if spending reduction and
tax revenue targets are not met, any necessary revisions would be
either mandatorily and arbitrarily imposed without a vote by Congress,
or the Budget Committee would have jurisdiction over legislation
designed to make any corrections to reach these targets. Neither of
these processes are appropriate.
Months of hearings were held by the appropriate committees in an
effort to fine tune the intricate details of the spending and taxation
provisions of the budget. To throw out the knowledge and expertise of
these committee members and place the entire burden on the Budget
Committee or arbitrary across the board cuts is an abrogation of our
legislative responsibility and squanders this knowledge base. The
House's committee system exists for a purpose, to allow for thoughtful
debate over policy considerations by members who know the most about
that particular area. To subrogate these policy decision to the rushed,
politically charged judgment of one committee is a misguided approach.
Additionally, the final version of the bill lacked sufficient
incentives to force Congress to make the appropriate charges if
spending and revenue targets are not met. The targets could be adjusted
by a simple majority vote and therefore avoid the difficult decisions
required to reach the end result of a balance budget in 2002.
Although I strongly support efforts to help ensure we do reach a
balanced budget in 2002, I cannot support this enforcement bill in its
current form.
Mr. STUMP. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to H.R. 2003.
The VA Committee was able to meet our reconciliation targets in the
traditional manner as envisioned by the bipartisan budget agreement.
We have a long tradition of complying with reconciliation directives.
However, despite our record of responsible stewardship of veterans'
[[Page H5612]]
programs, H.R. 2003 would strip authority from the VA Committee and
other authorizing committees. Its enforcement mechanism could create
unfair results.
If an estimate of projected spending for Social Security or Medicaid
turns out to be wrong, why should veterans pay the price?
Under H.R. 2003, that is exactly what could happen if an entitlement
program exceeds its target in a given year.
In our budget process, the VA Committee relied on CBO budget
estimates and then used our expertise in veterans affairs to meet our
reconciliation targets.
H.R. 2003 would take away the VA Committee's ability to provide
veterans benefits in an equitable manner.
For example, if the cost of veterans' disability compensation grew
past its target because the department ruled that new or additional
ailments were service-connected, the caps on allowable expenditures for
veterans' entitlements would not be adjusted upward.
Although H.R. 2003 provides for alternatives to automatic cuts, it
provides no assurance that benefits will continue to be paid as they
are authorized.
Our Nation's veterans are willing to play their part in balancing the
budget as long as it is done in a fair way.
The current paygo procedures have contained most increases in
entitlement spending in the past and should continue to do so.
Let's move forward with the bipartisan budget agreement and the
reconciliation bills and balance the budget.
Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I rise this morning to voice
my opposition to H.R. 2003, the Budget Enforcement Act. I share with
the authors of this legislation commitment to a balanced Federal budget
and while I respect the principle underlying this legislation, I cannot
support H.R. 2003.
H.R. 2003 is often described by its proponents as a straightforward
piece of legislation that is neutral with respect to benefit programs
and tax cuts and seeks simply to enforce the bipartisan budget
agreement. Such a cursory descriptions of H.R. 2003 fails to provide a
full picture of how it would work or the effects it would have. H.R.
2003 is neither simple nor neutral in its impact on benefit programs
and tax cuts. In fact, it would have disturbing consequences.
H.R. 2003 would not treat revenue shortfalls and entitlement programs
which exceed their target spending figures in the same manner. Under
the bill's enforcement provisions, entitlement spending excesses are
permanently canceled if spending levels exceeds target levels. These
cuts would be triggered, even if the Government was running a surplus.
Thus, if expenditures for programs like Medicare and veterans' pensions
were slightly higher than forecast, they could be subject to across-
the-board cuts although the budget was running a surplus.
Tax cuts, however, are simply delayed until revenue increases to
target levels. Therefore, while the bill's provisions to avert revenue
shortfalls are weak, on the entitlement side they are like a blunt
instrument inflicting permanent loss.
Additionally, while some of the biggest tax cuts for the well-to-do
would be shielded from the revenue control mechanisms of the bill,
regardless of how much these tax cuts ultimately cost, none of the
entitlement programs would be, not even programs providing basic
benefits to the poorest children or the elderly and disabled. As a
consequence, the bill could easily cause the gaps between the wealthy
and other Americans to widen further.
Finally, H.R. 2003 would have no impact whatsoever in preventing an
explosion of the costs of the tax cuts after 2002.
I urge my colleagues to join me in opposing H.R. 2003 and in so doing
vote to protect programs for our Nation's most vulnerable citizens.
Mr. DAVIS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, today I rise in strong support of
H.R. 2003, the Budget Enforcement Act. This legislation represents a
commitment by this Congress not only to pass a plan to balance the
budget, but to follow up with tough enforcement to ensure that this
goal is met.
During the past 5 years, the budget deficit has been reduced
dramatically from an all-time high of over $290 billion in 1992, to a
level estimated to be well under $50 billion this year. Among the
reasons we have been able to bring the deficit down are the statutory
budget enforcement provisions covering discretionary spending which
were put in place in 1990 and extended in the budget agreement of 1993.
This bill builds on the success of those statutory enforcement
provisions and for the first time applies similar restraints, with
clearly defined safeguards, to mandatory spending and revenues.
For too long, Congress and the President have promised the American
people a balanced budget with the result being continued deficits and
an escalating national debt. Even after passage of the historic
bipartisan agreement earlier this year and strong commitments by both
sides of the aisle to this important goal, the American people do not
sufficiently believe that the budget will actually be balanced. This
skepticism is the result of broken promises of the past and the stark
reality that no matter how carefully crafted the plan there are no
guarantees of a balanced budget unless strong enforcement language is
included. This bill represents a commitment to the American people that
we, in Congress, will follow up our rhetoric with tough actions.
Opponents of the bill have argued that the enforceable caps will
cause automatic cuts in Social Security and other important entitlement
programs. These caps, however, will be adjusted for inflation, economic
downturns, and growths in the eligible populations. Therefore, Social
Security will not be put at risk. Furthermore, the enforcement
provisions simply say that if we are spending much more than we
intended on any particular program, then Congress and the President
will have to make changes to bring that spending in line with previous
estimates. There is also the option of Congress to agree to raising the
caps if no agreement can be reached on the necessary changes. Only as a
last resort would automatic cuts in any programs be triggered.
Unfortunately, history has proven that without an unappealing hammer
such as sequestration, Congress will always favor inaction over action.
Furthermore, this legislation for the first time attempts to put some
controls on the revenue side of the budget. I believe the greatest
threats to maintaining balance over the course of this budget agreement
are some of the proposed tax cuts, many of which could explode in the
outyears. This enforcement mechanism, although not as tough as I would
like, at least prevents a bad situation from getting worse by delaying
the phasein of any of the tax provisions if our established deficit
targets are not met.
H.R. 2003 is far from perfect and my support for it today does not
mean that I am in agreement with all the provisions included in the
bill. It is truly unfortunate that improvements to the bill were not
made in order by the Rules Committee or that the committees of
jurisdiction, including the Budget Committee on which I serve, did not
consider the bill. Specifically, there remain valid questions over the
timeline established for action, the impact on automatic economic
stabilizers, and the effectiveness in controlling exploding tax cuts.
But I do not believe that we should make the perfect the enemy of the
good. This bill is a strong step in the right direction and I believe
these and other questions undoubtedly will be addressed as the bill
moves forward.
Mr. Chairman, I urge all of my colleagues to support this legislation
and commit to backing up the balanced budget agreement with a strong
enforcement mechanism, guaranteeing that the budget will, in fact, be
balanced no later than 2002.
Mr. BALLENGER. Mr. Speaker, I am proud to report that I am a
cosponsor of the Budget Enforcement Act, a bill to reform the Federal
budget process. If enacted, this bill will establish in law the
budgetary outcomes projected to result from the 1997 balanced budget
agreement, as well as provide for their enforcement. In addition, it
includes long-overdue changes to emergency spending rules.
I wish to commend the bipartisan group of House Members who put this
bill together. They have worked hard for years to craft this
enforcement mechanism. They forced the leadership to allow a floor vote
and sought to address everyone's concerns over the impact of this
important legislation.
While I do not believe this legislation is perfect, I believe it
represents an honest, bipartisan effort to ensure spending and revenue
targets, agreed to by the Congress and the President, will actually be
adhered to. We are working together to achieve the best alternative to
address our Nation's deficit problems and respond to our constituents'
concerns over our inability to live within the budgets we adopt.
My interest in the Budget Enforcement Act was sparked, in part, by a
constituent letter which I received some months ago. My constituent
challenged me to explain how the 5-year budget agreement of 1997
differed from other budget balancing plans which have gone by the
wayside. He remembered well the grand promises Congress made to the
American people following the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings budget deal in 1985
and three subsequent efforts to balance the budget.
Despite the good intentions of the authors of these budget balancing
plans, we have yet to reach balance. Perhaps most disturbing is the
fact that the national debt quintupled, to $5.3 trillion, during this
sustained period of deficit spending.
For the record, I favor tax cuts every bit as much as my conservative
colleagues who argue that the Budget Enforcement Act will result in a
suspension of the budget's tax relief--or worse, will permit new tax
increases and user fees to pay for deficits. In fact, passage of the
Budget Enforcement Act will not
[[Page H5613]]
force any rollback of any tax cut that will already have taken effect.
Among the respected groups making this analysis of the bill's impact on
taxes is the National Taxpayers Union, which considers a ``yes'' vote
to be a key vote for its rating of Members in the 105th Congress.
Some opponents of the Budget Enforcement Act argue that the most
serious problem with this bill is that it would jeopardize the tax
relief in the budget reconciliation bill. However, I do not view this
as a major problem. Any unlikely delay in promised tax relief can be
addressed immediately after we balance the budget and secure a budget
surplus to enable us to take the Social Security trust funds off-
budget.
The Budget Enforcement Act provides a separate cap for Social
Security which would be adjusted for changes in numbers of
beneficiaries and inflation. Since there are no other factors which can
cause Social Security costs to rise, Social Security would not be
affected. While the Budget Enforcement Act would not cut Social
Security, we want to reassure seniors who will be the target of
politically motivated distortion campaigns engineered by advocates of
higher Federal spending. As such, the bill's supporters had prepared an
amendment specifically to protect the Social Security trust funds.
We received a commitment from the House leadership that this
amendment to reassure our Nation's seniors would be made in order
during floor debate. Since the Rules Committee violated this pledge
with its passage of a closed rule, I intend to vote against the rule on
the Budget Enforcement Act. I strongly urge my colleagues to do the
same.
Mr. PITTS. Mr. Speaker, Republicans have always maintained that
fiscal restraint is the key to balancing our budget and generating
economic growth. While liberals have attempted to balance the budget on
the backs of taxpaying families, Republicans have continuously worked
to get to balance by limiting our Government's size, scope, and
spending.
I believe the only way we can balance our Federal budget is with
increased tax relief and decreased Government. That is why I am
introducing the Tax Relief Guarantee Act today.
The Tax Relief Guarantee Act accomplishes three important goals as we
try to ensure tax relief and a balanced budget by the year 2002. First,
my bill allows any Member of Congress to stop consideration of a bill
which raises taxes to enforce the balanced budget agreement. Second,
the Tax Relief Guarantee Act prohibits the suspension or revocation of
any tax relief given over the next 5 years. And finally, this
legislation requires that the budget be in balance by the year 2002.
The Tax Relief Guarantee Act essentially ensures that any revenue
shortfall in the balanced budget agreement be mitigated by decreases in
spending, not an increase in taxes or a suspension of tax relief.
Liberal still contend that we must balance the budget through tax
increases in the event of revenue shortfalls. But I think it's about
time that we promise the American people that we will not take their
money away if difficulties arise in balancing our budget.
Since the beginning of the 105th Congress, my top priorities have
been to provide American families permanent tax relief and to balance
the budget by 2002. Members of Congress must prove that we have the
courage to put money back into the pockets of hard-working Americans,
and take it out of the hands of the Washington bureaucrats. I believe
that the Tax Relief Guarantee Act will ensure permanent tax relief, and
will require Washington to scale back its frivolous spending. Mr.
Speaker, I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this bill and
locking in tax relief for all Americans.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time for debate has expired.
Pursuant to House Resolution 192, the bill is considered read for
amendment, and the previous question is ordered.
The question is on engrossment and third reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was
read the third time.
Motion To Recommit Offered By Mrs. Thurman
Mrs. THURMAN. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to recommit.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentlewoman opposed to the bill?
Mrs. THURMAN. Yes, Mr. Speaker.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion to
recommit.
The Clerk read as follows:
Mrs. Thurman moves to recommit the bill to the Committee on
the Budget with instructions to report the bill back to the
House forthwith, with the following amendment:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert in lieu
thereof the following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE AND TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Balanced
Budget Assurance Act of 1997''.
(b) Table of Contents.--
Sec. 1. Short title and table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
Title I--Ensure That the Bipartisan Balanced Budget Agreement of 1997
Achieves Its Goal
Sec. 101. Timetable.
Sec. 102. Procedures to avoid sequestration or delay of new revenue
reductions.
Sec. 103. Effect on Presidents' budget submissions; point of order.
Sec. 104. Deficit and revenue targets.
Sec. 105. Direct spending caps.
Sec. 106. Economic assumptions.
Sec. 107. Revisions to deficit and revenue targets and to the caps for
entitlements and other mandatory spending.
Title II--Enforcement Provisions
Sec. 201. Reporting excess spending.
Sec. 202. Enforcing direct spending caps.
Sec. 203. Sequestration rules.
Sec. 204. Enforcing revenue targets.
Sec. 205. Exempt programs and activities.
Sec. 206. Special rules.
Sec. 207. The current law baseline.
Sec. 208. Limitations on emergency spending.
Title III--Use of Budget Surplus to Preserve Social Security Trust Fund
Sec. 301. Ending Use of Receipts of Social Security Trust Fund for
Other Programs and Activities.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
For purposes of this Act:
(1) Eligible population.--The term ``eligible population''
shall mean those individuals to whom the United States is
obligated to make a payment under the provisions of a law
creating entitlement authority. Such term shall not include
States, localities, corporations or other nonliving entities.
(2) Sequester and sequestration.--The terms ``sequester''
and ``sequestration'' refer to or mean the cancellation of
budgetary resources provided by discretionary appropriations
or direct spending law.
(3) Breach.--The term ``breach'' means, for any fiscal
year, the amount (if any) by which outlays for that year
(within a category of direct spending) is above that
category's direct spending cap for that year.
(4) Baseline.--The term ``baseline'' means the projection
(described in section 207) of current levels of new budget
authority, outlays, receipts, and the surplus or deficit into
the budget year and the outyears.
(5) Budgetary resources.--The term ``budgetary resources''
means new budget authority, unobligated balances, direct
spending authority, and obligation limitations.
(6) Discretionary appropriations.--The term ``discretionary
appropriations'' means budgetary resources (except to fund
direct spending programs) provided in appropriation Acts. If
an appropriation Act alters the level of direct spending or
offsetting collections, that effect shall be treated as
direct spending. Classifications of new accounts or
activities and changes in classifications shall be made in
consultation with the Committees on Appropriations and the
Budget of the House of Representatives and the Senate and
with CBO and OMB.
(7) Direct spending.--The term ``direct spending'' means--
(A) budget authority provided by law other than
appropriation Acts, including entitlement authority;
(B) entitlement authority; and
(C) the food stamp program.
If a law other than an appropriation Act alters the level of
discretionary appropriations or offsetting collections, that
effect shall be treated as direct spending.
(8) Entitlement authority.--The term ``entitlement
authority'' means authority (whether temporary or permanent)
to make payments (including loans and grants), the budget
authority for which is not provided for in advance by
appropriation Acts, to any person or government if, under the
provisions of the law containing such authority, the United
States is obligated to make such payments to persons or
governments who meet the requirements established by such
law.
(9) Current.--The term ``current'' means, with respect to
OMB estimates included with a budget submission under section
1105(a) of title 31 U.S.C., the estimates consistent with the
economic and technical assumptions underlying that budget.
(10) Account.--The term ``account'' means an item for which
there is a designated budget account designation number in
the President's budget.
(11) Budget year.--The term ``budget year'' means the
fiscal year of the Government that starts on the next October
1.
(12) Current year.--The term ``current year'' means, with
respect to a budget year, the fiscal year that immediately
precedes that budget year.
(13) Outyear.--The term ``outyear'' means, with respect to
a budget year, any of the fiscal years that follow the budget
year.
(14) OMB.--The term ``OMB'' means the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget.
(15) CBO.--The term ``CBO'' means the Director of the
Congressional Budget Office.
(16) Budget outlays and outlays.--The terms ``budget
outlays'' and ``outlays'' mean, with respect to any fiscal
year, expenditures
[[Page H5614]]
of funds under budget authority during such year.
(17) Budget authority and new budget authority.--The terms
``budget authority'' and ``new budget authority'' have the
meanings given to them in section 3 of the Congressional
Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974.
(18) Appropriation act.--The term ``appropriation Act''
means an Act referred to in section 105 of title 1 of the
United States Code.
(19) Consolidated deficit.--The term ``consolidated
deficit'' means, with respect to a fiscal year, the amount by
which total outlays exceed total receipts during that year.
(20) Surplus.--The term ``surplus'' means, with respect to
a fiscal year, the amount by which total receipts exceed
total outlays during that year.
(21) Direct spending caps.--The term ``direct spending
caps'' means the nominal dollar limits for entitlements and
other mandatory spending pursuant to section 105 (as modified
by any revisions provided for in this Act).
TITLE I--ENSURE THAT THE BIPARTISAN BALANCED BUDGET AGREEMENT OF 1997
ACHIEVES ITS GOAL
SEC. 101. TIMETABLE.
Action to be completed:
CBO economic and budget update.........................................
President's budget update based on new assumptions.....................
CBO and OMB updates....................................................
Preview report.........................................................
Not later than November 1 (and as soon as practical after the end of
OMB and CBO Analyses of Deficits, Revenues and Spending Levels and ....
Projections for the Upcoming Year.
Congressional action to avoid sequestration............................
OMB issues final (look back) report for prior year and preview for ....
current year.
Presidential sequester order or order delaying new/additional revenues
reductions scheduled to take effect pursuant to reconciliation
legislation enacted in calendar year 1997.
SEC. 102. PROCEDURES TO AVOID SEQUESTRATION OR DELAY OF NEW
REVENUE REDUCTIONS.
(a) Special Message.--If the OMB Analysis of Actual
Spending Levels and Projections for the Upcoming Year
indicates that--
(1) deficits in the most recently completed fiscal year
exceeded, or the deficits in the budget year are projected to
exceed, the deficit targets in section 104, as adjusted
pursuant to section 107;
(2) revenues in the most recently completed fiscal year
were less than, or revenues in the current year are projected
to be less than, the revenue targets in section 104, as
adjusted pursuant to section 107; or
(3) outlays in the most recently completed fiscal year
exceeded, or outlays in the current year are projected to
exceed, the caps in section 104, as adjusted pursuant to
section 107;
the President shall submit to Congress with the OMB Analysis
of Actual Spending Levels and Projections for the Upcoming
Year a special message that includes proposed legislative
changes to--
(A) offset all or part of net deficit or outlay excess;
(B) offset all or part of any revenue shortfall; or
(C) revise the deficit or revenue targets or the outlay
caps contained in this Act;
through any combination of--
(i) reductions in outlays;
(ii) increases in revenues; or
(iii) increases in the deficit targets or expenditure caps,
or reductions in the revenue targets, if the President
submits a written determination that, because of economic or
programmatic reasons, less than the entire amount of the
variances from the balanced budget plan should be offset.
(b) Introduction of the President's Package.--Not later
than November 15, the message from the President required
pursuant to subsection (a) shall be introduced as a joint
resolution in the House of Representatives or the Senate by
the chairman of its Committee on the Budget. If the chairman
fails to do so, after November 15, the joint resolution may
be introduced by any Member of that House of Congress and
shall be referred to the Committee on the Budget of that
House.
(c) House Committee Action.--The Committee on the Budget,
in consultation with the committees of jurisdiction, or, in
the case of revenue shortfalls, the Committee on Ways and
Means of the House of Representatives shall, by November 15,
report a joint resolution containing--
(1) the recommendations in the President's message, or
different policies and proposed legislative changes than
those contained in the message of the President, to
ameliorate or eliminate any excess deficits or expenditures
or any revenue shortfalls, or
(2) any changes to the deficit or revenue targets or
expenditure caps contained in this Act, except that any
changes to the deficit or revenue targets or expenditure caps
cannot be greater than the changes recommended in the message
submitted by the President.
(d) Procedure if the Appropriate Committee of the House of
Representatives Fails To Report Required Resolution.--
(1) Automatic discharge of committees on the budget of the
house.--If the Committee on the Budget of the House of
Representatives fails, by November 20, to report a resolution
meeting the requirements of subsection (c), the committee
shall be automatically discharged from further consideration
of the joint resolution reflecting the President's
recommendations introduced pursuant to subsection (a), and
the joint resolution shall be placed on the appropriate
calendar.
(2) Consideration of discharge resolution in the house.--If
the Committee has been discharged under paragraph (1) above,
any Member may move that the House of Representatives
consider the resolution. Such motion shall be highly
privileged and not debatable. It shall not be in order to
consider any amendment to the resolution except amendments
which are germane and which do not change the net deficit
impact of the resolution.
(e) Consideration of Joint Resolutions in the House.--
Consideration of resolutions reported pursuant to subsection
(c) or (d) shall be pursuant to the procedures set forth in
section 305 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 and
subsection (d). Notwithstanding subsection (d) and any other
rule or order of the House of Representatives or the Senate,
it shall be in order to consider amendments to ameliorate any
excess spending or revenue shortfalls through different
policies and proposed legislation and which do not change the
net deficit impact of the resolution.
(f) Transmittal to Senate.--If a joint resolution passes
the House of Representatives pursuant to subsection (e), the
Clerk of the House of Representatives shall cause the
resolution to be engrossed, certified, and transmitted to the
Senate within 1 calendar day of the day on which the
resolution is passed. The resolution shall be referred to the
Senate Committee on the Budget.
(g) Requirements for Special Joint Resolution in the
Senate.--The Committee on the Budget, in consultation with
the committees of jurisdiction, or, in the case of revenue
shortfalls, the Committee on Finance of the Senate shall
report not later than December 1--
(1) a joint resolution reflecting the message of the
President; or
(2) the joint resolution passed by the House of
Representatives, with or without amendment; or
(3) a joint resolution containing different policies and
proposed legislative changes than those contained in either
the message of the President or the resolution passed by the
House of Representatives, to eliminate all or part of any
excess deficits or expenditures or any revenue shortfalls, or
(4) any changes to the deficit or revenue targets, or to
the expenditure caps, contained in this Act, except that any
changes to the deficit or revenue targets or expenditure caps
cannot be greater than the changes recommended in the message
submitted by the President.
(h) Procedure if the Appropriate Committee of the Senate
Fails To Report Required Resolution.--(1) In the event that
the Committee on the Budget of the Senate fails, by December
1, to report a resolution meeting the requirements of
subsection (g), the committee shall be automatically
discharged from further consideration of the joint resolution
reflecting the President's recommendations introduced
pursuant to subsection (a) and of the resolution passed by
the House of Representatives, and both joint resolutions
shall be placed on the appropriate calendar.
(2) Any member may move that the Senate consider the
resolution passed by the House of Representatives or the
resolution introduced pursuant to subsection (b).
(i) Consideration of Joint Resolution in the Senate.--
Consideration of resolutions reported pursuant to subsections
(c) or (d) shall be pursuant to the procedures set forth in
section 305 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 and
subsection (d).
(j) Procedure if Joint Resolution Does Not Eliminate
Deficit Excess.--If the joint resolution reported by the
Committee on the Budget, Way and Means, or Finance pursuant
to subsection (c) or (g) or a joint resolution discharged in
the House of Representatives or the Senate pursuant to
subsection (d)(1) or (h) would eliminate less than--
(1) the entire amount by which actual or projected deficits
exceed, or revenues fall short of, the targets in this Act;
or
(2) the entire amount by which actual or projected outlays
exceed the caps contained in this Act;
then the Committee on the Budget of the Senate shall report a
joint resolution, raising the deficit targets or outlay caps,
or reducing the revenue targets for any year in which actual
or projected spending, revenues or deficits would not conform
to the deficit and revenue targets or expenditure caps in
this Act.
(k) Conference Reports Shall Fully Address Deficit
Excess.--It shall not be in order in the House of
Representatives or the Senate to consider a conference report
on a joint resolution to eliminate all or part of any excess
deficits or outlays or to eliminate all or part of any
revenue shortfall compared to the deficit and revenue targets
and the expenditure caps contained in this Act, unless--
(1) the joint resolution offsets the entire amount of any
overage or shortfall; or
(2) the House of Representatives and Senate both pass the
joint resolution reported pursuant to subsection (j)(2).
[[Page H5615]]
The vote on any resolution reported pursuant to subsection
(j)(2) shall be solely on the subject of changing the deficit
or revenue targets or the expenditure limits in this Act.
SEC. 103. EFFECT ON PRESIDENTS' BUDGET SUBMISSIONS; POINT OF
ORDER.
(a) Budget Submission.--Any budget submitted by the
President pursuant to section 1105(a) of title 31, United
States Code, for each of fiscal years 1998 through 2002 shall
be consistent with the spending, revenue, and deficit levels
established in sections 104 and 105, as adjusted pursuant to
section 107, or it shall recommend changes to those levels
(b) Point of Order.--It shall not be in order in the House
of Representatives or the Senate to consider any concurrent
resolution on the budget unless it is consistent with the
spending, revenue, and deficit levels established in sections
104 and 105, as adjusted pursuant to section 107.
SEC. 104. DEFICIT AND REVENUE TARGETS.
(a) Consolidated Deficit (or Surplus) Targets.--For
purposes of sections 102 and 107, the consolidated deficit
targets shall be--
(1) for fiscal year 1998, $90,500,000,000;
(2) for fiscal year 1999, $89,700,000,000;
(3) for fiscal year 2000, $83,000,000,000;
(4) for fiscal year 2001, $53,300,000,000; and
(5) for fiscal year 2002, there shall be a surplus of not
less than $1,400,000,000.
(b) Consolidated Revenue Targets.--For purposes of sections
102, 107, 201, and 204, the consolidated revenue targets
shall be--
(1) for fiscal year 1998, $1,601,800,000,000;
(2) for fiscal year 1999, $1,664,200,000,000;
(3) for fiscal year 2000, $1,728,100,000,000;
(4) for fiscal year 2001, $1,805,100,000,000; and
(5) for fiscal year 2002, $1,890,400,000,000.
SEC. 105. DIRECT SPENDING CAPS.
(a) In General.--Effective upon submission of the report by
OMB pursuant to subsection (c), direct spending caps shall
apply to all entitlement authority except for undistributed
offsetting receipts and net interest outlays, subject to
adjustments for changes in eligible populations and inflation
pursuant to section 107. For purposes of enforcing direct
spending caps under this Act, each separate program shown in
the table set forth in subsection (d) shall be deemed to be a
category.
(b) Budget Committee Reports.--Within 30 days after
enactment of this Act, the Budget Committees of the House of
Representatives and the Senate shall file with their
respective Houses identical reports containing account
numbers and spending levels for each specific category.
(c) Report by OMB.--Within 30 days after enactment of this
Act, OMB shall submit to the President and each House of
Congress a report containing account numbers and spending
limits for each specific category.
(d) Contents of Reports.--All direct spending accounts not
included in these reports under separate categories shall be
included under the heading ``Other Entitlements and Mandatory
Spending''. These reports may include adjustments among the
caps set forth in this Act as required below, however the
aggregate amount available under the ``Total Entitlements and
Other Mandatory Spending'' cap shall be identical in each
such report and in this Act and shall be deemed to have been
adopted as part of this Act. Each such report shall include
the actual amounts of the caps for each year of fiscal years
1998 through 2002 consistent with the concurrent resolution
on the budget for FY 1998 for each of the following
categories:
Earned Income Tax Credit,
Family Support,
Civilian and other Federal retirement:
Military retirement,
Food stamps,
Medicaid,
Medicare,
Social security,
Supplemental security income,
Unemployment compensation,
Veterans' benefits,
Other entitlements and mandatory spending, and
Aggregate entitlements and other mandatory spending.
(e) Additional Spending Limits.--Legislation enacted
subsequent to this Act may include additional caps to limit
spending for specific programs, activities, or accounts with
these categories. Those additional caps (if any) shall be
enforced in the same manner as the limits set forth in such
joint explanatory statement.
SEC. 106. ECONOMIC ASSUMPTIONS.
Subject to periodic reestimation based on changed economic
conditions or changes in eligible population, determinations
of the direct spending caps under section 105, any breaches
of such caps, and actions necessary to remedy such breaches
shall be based upon the economic assumptions set forth in the
joint explanatory statement of managers accompanying the
concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal year 1998
(House Concurrent Resolution 84, 105th Congress). At the same
time as the submission of the report by OMB pursuant to
section 104(c), OMB shall submit to the President and
Congress a report setting forth the economic assumptions in
the joint explanatory statement of managers accompanying the
concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal year 1998 and
the assumptions regarding eligible populations used in
preparing the report submitted pursuant to section 104(c).
SEC. 107. REVISIONS TO DEFICIT AND REVENUE TARGETS AND TO THE
CAPS FOR ENTITLEMENTS AND OTHER MANDATORY
SPENDING.
(a) Automatic Adjustments to Deficit and Revenue Targets
and to Caps for Entitlements and Other Mandatory Spending.--
When the President submits the budget under section 1105(a)
of title 31, United States Code, and upon submission of the
OMB report pursuant to section 201(a) for any year, OMB shall
calculate (in the order set forth below), and the budget and
reports shall include, adjustments to the deficit and revenue
targets, and to the direct spending caps (and those limits as
cumulatively adjusted) for the current year, the budget year,
and each outyear, to reflect the following:
(1) Changes to revenue targets.--
(A) Changes in growth.--For Federal revenues and deficits
under laws and policies enacted or effective before July 1,
1997, growth adjustment factors shall equal the ratio between
the level of year-over-year Gross Domestic Product, as
adjusted by the chain-weighted GDP deflator measured for the
fiscal year most recently completed and the applicable
estimated level for that year as described in section 106.
(B) Changes in inflation.--For Federal revenues and
deficits under laws and policies enacted or effective before
July 1, 1997, inflation adjustment factors shall equal the
ratio between the level of year-over-year change in the
Consumer Price Index measured for the fiscal year most
recently completed and the applicable estimated level for
that year as described in section 106.
(2) Adjustments to direct spending caps.--
(A) Changes in concepts and definitions.--The adjustments
produced by changes in concepts and definitions shall equal
the baseline levels of new budget authority and outlays using
up-to-date concepts and definitions minus those levels using
the concepts and definitions in effect before such changes.
Such changes in concepts and definitions may only be made in
consultation with the Committees on Appropriations, the
Budget, and Government Reform and Oversight and Governmental
Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Senate.
(B) Changes in net outlays.--Changes in net outlays for all
programs and activities exempt from sequestration under
section 204.
(C) Changes in inflation.--For direct spending under laws
and policies enacted or effective on or before July 1, 1997,
inflation adjustment factors shall equal the ratio between
the level of year-over-year change in the Consumer Price
Index measured for the fiscal year most recently completed
and the applicable estimated level for that year as described
in section 106 (relating to economic assumptions). For direct
spending under laws and policies enacted or effective after
July 1, 1997, there shall be no adjustment to the direct
spending caps (for changes in economic conditions including
inflation, nor for changes in numbers of eligible
beneficiaries) unless--
(i) the Act or the joint explanatory statement of managers
accompanying such Act providing new direct spending includes
economic projections and projections of numbers of
beneficiaries; and
(ii) such Act specifically provides for automatic
adjustments to the direct spending caps in section 105 based
on those projections.
(D) Changes in eligible populations.--For direct spending
under laws and policies enacted or effective on or before
July 1, 1997, the direct spending caps shall be adjusted to
reflect changes in eligible populations, based on the
assumptions set forth in the OMB report submitted pursuant to
section 106. In making such adjustments, OMB shall estimate
the changes in spending resulting from the change in eligible
populations. For direct spending under laws and policies
enacted or effective after July 1, 1997, there shall be no
adjustment to the direct spending caps for changes in numbers
of eligible beneficiaries unless--
(i) the Act or the joint explanatory statement of managers
accompanying such Act providing new direct spending includes
economic projections and projections of numbers of
beneficiaries; and
(ii) such Act specifically provides for automatic
adjustments to the direct spending caps in section 105 based
on those projections.
(E) Intra-budgetary payments.--From discretionary accounts
to mandatory accounts. The baseline and the discretionary
spending caps shall be adjusted to reflect those changes.
(b) Changes to Deficit Targets.--The deficit targets in
section 104 shall be adjusted to reflect changes to the
revenue targets or changes to the caps for entitlements and
other mandatory spending pursuant to subsection (a).
(c) Permissible Revisions to Deficit and Revenue Targets
and Direct Spending Caps.--Deficit and revenue targets and
direct spending caps as enacted pursuant to sections 104 and
105 may be revised as follows: Except as required pursuant to
subsection (a) and (b), deficit, revenue, and direct spending
caps may only be adjusted by recorded vote. It shall be a
matter of highest privilege in the House of Representatives
and the Senate for a Member of the House of Representatives
or the Senate to insist on a recorded vote solely on the
question of amending such caps. It shall not be in order for
the Committee on Rules of the House of Representatives to
report a resolution waiving the provisions of this
subsection. This subsection may be waived in the Senate
[[Page H5616]]
only by an affirmative vote of three-fifths of the Members
duly chosen and sworn.
TITLE II--ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS
SEC. 201. REPORTING EXCESS SPENDING.
(a) Analysis of Actual Deficit, Revenue, and Spending
Levels.--As soon as practicable after any fiscal year, OMB
shall compile a statement of actual and projected deficits,
revenues, and direct spending for that year and the current
fiscal year. The statement shall identify such spending by
categories contained in section 105.
(b) Estimate of Necessary Spending Reduction.--Based on the
statement provided under subsection (a), the OMB shall issue
a report to the President and the Congress on December 15 of
any year in which such statement identifies actual or
projected deficits, revenues, or spending in the current or
immediately preceding fiscal years in violation of the
revenue targets or direct spending caps in section 104 or
105, as adjusted pursuant to section 107, by more than one-
tenth of one percent of the applicable total revenues or
direct spending for such year. The report shall include:
(1) The amount, if any, that total direct spending
exceeded, or is projected to exceed, the aggregate direct
spending cap in section 105, as adjusted pursuant to section
107.
(2) All instances in which actual direct spending has
exceeded the applicable direct spending cap.
(3) The difference between the amount of spending available
under the direct spending caps for the current year and
estimated actual spending for the categories associated with
such caps.
(4) The amounts by which direct spending shall be reduced
in the current fiscal year to offset the net amount that
actual direct spending in the preceding fiscal year and
projected direct spending in the current fiscal year exceeds
the amounts available for each cap category.
SEC. 202. ENFORCING DIRECT SPENDING CAPS.
(a) Purpose.--This subtitle provides enforcement of the
direct spending caps on categories of spending established
pursuant to section 105. This section shall apply for any
fiscal year in which the statement provided under section 201
identifies actual direct spending in the preceding fiscal
year or projected direct spending in the current year in
excess of the aggregate direct spending cap, as adjusted
pursuant to section 107.
(b) General Rules.--
(1) Eliminating a breach.--Each non-exempt account within a
category shall be reduced by a dollar amount calculated by
multiplying the baseline level of sequestrable budgetary
resources in that account at that time by the uniform
percentage necessary to eliminate a breach within that
category.
(2) Programs, projects, or activities.--Except as otherwise
provided, the same percentage sequestration shall apply to
all programs, projects and activities within a budget
account.
(3) Indefinite authority.--Except as otherwise provided,
sequestration in accounts for which obligations are
indefinite shall be taken in a manner to ensure that
obligations in the fiscal year of a sequestration and
succeeding fiscal years are reduced, from the level that
would actually have occurred, by the applicable sequestration
percentage or percentages.
(4) Cancellation of budgetary resources.--Budgetary
resources sequestered from any account other than an trust,
special or revolving fund shall revert to the Treasury and be
permanently canceled.
(5) Implementing regulations.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, administrative rules or similar actions
implementing any sequestration shall take effect within 30
days after that sequestration.
SEC. 203. SEQUESTRATION RULES.
(a) General Rules.--For programs subject to direct spending
caps:
(1) Triggering of sequestration.--Sequestration is
triggered if total direct spending subject to the caps in the
preceding fiscal year and projected direct spending subject
to the caps in the current fiscal year exceeds the total of
aggregate caps for direct spending for the current and
immediately preceding fiscal year.
(2) Calculation of reductions.--The amount to be
sequestered from direct spending programs under each separate
cap shall be determined by multiplying the total amount that
direct spending in that category exceeded or is projected to
exceed the direct spending cap for that category by--
(A) the net amount that total direct spending exceeded, or
is projected to exceed, the aggregate spending caps, as
identified pursuant to paragraph 201(b)(1); multiplied by
(B) the net amount that direct spending by which the
category exceeded and is projected to exceed the direct
spending cap for that category, divided by the net amount
that total spending exceeded and is projected to exceed the
applicable direct spending cap for all categories in which
spending exceeds the applicable direct spending caps.
(3) Uniform percentages.--In calculating the uniform
percentage applicable to the sequestration of all spending
programs or activities within each category, or the uniform
percentage applicable to the sequestration of nonexempt
direct spending programs or activities, the sequestrable base
for direct spending programs and activities is the total
level of outlays for the fiscal year for those programs or
activities in the current law baseline.
(4) Permanent sequestration of direct spending.--
Obligations in sequestered direct spending accounts shall be
reduced in the fiscal year in which a sequestration occurs
and in all succeeding fiscal years. Notwithstanding any other
provision of this section, after the first direct spending
sequestration, any later sequestration shall reduce direct
spending by an amount in addition to, rather than in lieu of,
the reduction in direct spending in place under the existing
sequestration or sequestrations.
(5) Special rule.--For any direct spending program in
which--
(A) outlays pay for entitlement benefits;
(B) a current-year sequestration takes effect after the 1st
day of the budget year;
(C) that delay reduces the amount of entitlement authority
that is subject to sequestration in the budget; and
(D) the uniform percentage otherwise applicable to the
budget-year sequestration of a program or activity is
increased due to the delay;
then the uniform percentage shall revert to the uniform
percentage calculated under paragraph (3) when the budget
year is completed.
(6) Indexed benefit payments.--If, under any entitlement
program--
(A) benefit payments are made to persons or governments
more frequently than once a year; and
(B) the amount of entitlement authority is periodically
adjusted under existing law to reflect changes in a price
index (commonly called ``cost of living adjustments'');
sequestration shall first be applied to the cost of living
adjustment before reductions are made to the base benefit.
For the first fiscal year to which a sequestration applies,
the benefit payment reductions in such programs accomplished
by the order shall take effect starting with the payment made
at the beginning of January following a final sequester. For
the purposes of this subsection, veterans' compensation shall
be considered a program that meets the conditions of the
preceding sentence.
(7) Loan programs.--For all loans made, extended, or
otherwise modified on or after any sequestration under loan
programs subject to direct spending caps--
(A) the sequestrable base shall be total fees associated
with all loans made extended or otherwise modified on or
after the date of sequestration; and
(B) the fees paid by borrowers shall be increased by a
uniform percentage sufficient to produce the dollar savings
in such loan programs for the fiscal year or years of the
sequestrations required by this section.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in any year in
which a sequestration is in effect, all subsequent fees shall
be increased by the uniform percentage and all proceeds from
such fees shall be paid into the general fund of the
Treasury.
(8) Insurance programs.--Any sequestration of a Federal
program that sells insurance contracts to the public
(including the Federal Crop Insurance Fund, the National
Insurance Development Fund, the National Flood Insurance
fund, insurance activities of the Overseas Private Insurance
Corporation, and Veterans' Life insurance programs) shall be
accomplished by increasing premiums on contracts entered into
extended or otherwise modified, after the date a
sequestration order takes effect by the uniform sequestration
percentage. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, for
any year in which a sequestration affecting such programs is
in effect, subsequent premiums shall be increased by the
uniform percentage and all proceeds from the premium increase
shall be paid from the insurance fund or account to the
general fund of the Treasury.
(9) State grant formulas.--For all State grant programs
subject to direct spending caps--
(A) the total amount of funds available for all States
shall be reduced by the amount required to be sequestered;
and
(B) if States are projected to receive increased funding in
the budget year compared to the immediately preceding fiscal
year, sequestration shall first be applied to the estimated
increases before reductions are made compared to actual
payments to States in the previous year--
(i) the reductions shall be applied first to the total
estimated increases for all States; then
(ii) the uniform reduction shall be made from each State's
grant; and
(iii) the uniform reduction shall apply to the base funding
levels available to states in the immediately preceding
fiscal year only to the extent necessary to eliminate any
remaining excess over the applicable direct spending cap.
(10) Special rule for certain programs.--Except matters
exempted under section 205 and programs subject to special
rules set forth under section 206 and notwithstanding any
other provisions of law, any sequestration required under
this Act shall reduce benefit levels by an amount sufficient
to eliminate all excess spending identified in the report
issued pursuant to section 201, while maintaining the same
uniform percentage reduction in the monetary value of
benefits subject to reduction under this subsection.
(b) Within-Session Sequester.--If a bill or resolution
providing direct spending for the current year is enacted
before July 1 of that fiscal year and causes a breach within
any direct spending cap for that fiscal year, 15 days later
there shall be a sequestration to eliminate that breach
within that cap.
[[Page H5617]]
SEC. 204. ENFORCING REVENUE TARGETS.
(a) Purpose.--This section enforces the revenue targets
established pursuant to section 104. This section shall apply
for any year in which actual revenues in the preceding fiscal
year or projected revenues in the current year are less than
the applicable revenue target, as adjusted pursuant to
section 107.
(b) Estimate of Necessity To Suspend New Revenue
Reductions.--Based on the statement provided under section
201(a), OMB shall issue a report to the President and the
Congress on December 15 of any year in which such statement
identifies actual or projected revenues in the current or
immediately preceding fiscal years lower than the applicable
revenue target in section 104, as adjusted pursuant to
section 107, by more than 0.1 percent of the applicable total
revenue target for such year. The report shall include--
(1) all laws and policies described in subsection (c) which
would cause revenues to decline in the calendar year which
begins January 1 compared to the provisions of law in effect
on December 15;
(2) the amounts by which revenues would be reduced by
implementation of the provisions of law described in
paragraph (1) compared to provisions of law in effect on
December 15; and
(3) whether delaying implementation of the provisions of
law described in paragraph (1) would cause the total for
revenues in the current fiscal year and actual revenues in
the immediately preceding fiscal year to equal or exceed the
total of the targets for the applicable years.
(c) No Credits, Deductions, Exclusions, Preferential Rate
of Tax, Etc.--(1) If any provision of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986 added by the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1997
establishing or increasing any credit, deduction, exclusion,
or eligibility limit or reducing any rate would (but for this
section) first take effect in a tax benefit suspension year,
and would reduce revenues over the 5-year period beginning
with the tax benefit suspension year, such provision shall
not take effect until the first calendar year which is not a
tax benefit suspension year.
(2) Suspension of Indexation.--No new adjustment for
inflation shall be made to any credit, deduction, or
exclusion enacted as part of the Revenue Reconciliation Act
of 1997 in a tax benefit suspension year.
(d) End of Session.--If the OMB report issued under
subsection (a) indicates that the total revenues projected in
the current year and actual revenues in the immediately
preceding year will equal or exceed the applicable targets,
the President shall sign an order ending the delayed phase-in
of new tax cuts effective January 1. Such order shall provide
that the new tax cuts and adjustments for inflation shall
take effect as if the provisions of this section had not
taken effect.
(e) Suspension of New Benefits Being Phased In.--If, under
any provision of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 added by
the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1997, there is an increase
in any benefit which would (but for this section) take effect
with respect to a tax benefit suspension year, in lieu of
applying subsection (c)--
(1) any increase in the benefit under such section with
respect to such year and each subsequent calendar year shall
be delayed 1 calendar year, and
(2) the level of benefit under such section with respect to
the prior calendar year shall apply to such tax benefit
suspension year.
(f) Percentage Suspension Where Full Suspension Unnecessary
To Achieve Revenue Target.--If the application of subsections
(c), (d), and (e) to any tax benefit suspension year would
result in total revenues in the current year to equal or
exceed the targets described in section 104 such that the
amount of each benefit which is denied is only the percentage
of such benefit which is necessary to result in revenues
equal to such target. Such percentage shall be determined by
OMB, and the same percentage shall apply to such benefits.
(g) Tax Benefit Suspension Year.--For purposes of this
section, the term ``tax benefit suspension year'' means any
calendar year if the statement issued under subsection (b)
during the preceding calendar year indicates that--
(1) for the fiscal year ending in such preceding calendar
year, actual revenues were lower than the applicable revenue
target in section 104, as adjusted pursuant to section 106,
for such fiscal year by more than 1 percent of such target,
or
(2) for the fiscal year beginning in such preceding
calendar year, projected revenues (determined without regard
to this section) are estimated to be lower than the
applicable revenue target in section 104, as adjusted
pursuant to section 106, for such fiscal year by more than
0.1 percent of such target.
SEC. 205. EXEMPT PROGRAMS AND ACTIVITIES.
The following budget accounts, activities within accounts,
or income shall be exempt from sequestration--
(1) net interest;
(2) all payments to trust funds from excise taxes or other
receipts or collections properly creditable to those trust
funds;
(3) offsetting receipts and collections;
(4) all payments from one Federal direct spending budget
account to another Federal budget account;
(5) all intragovernmental funds including those from which
funding is derived primarily from other Government accounts;
(6) expenses to the extent they result from private
donations, bequests, or voluntary contributions to the
Government;
(7) nonbudgetary activities, including but not limited to--
(A) credit liquidating and financing accounts;
(B) the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation Trust Funds;
(C) the Thrift Savings Fund;
(D) the Federal Reserve System; and
(E) appropriations for the District of Columbia to the
extent they are appropriations of locally raised funds;
(8) payments resulting from Government insurance,
Government guarantees, or any other form of contingent
liability, to the extent those payments result from
contractual or other legally binding commitments of the
Government at the time of any sequestration;
(9) the following accounts, which largely fulfill
requirements of the Constitution or otherwise make payments
to which the Government is committed--
Bureau of Indian Affairs, miscellaneous trust funds, tribal
trust funds (14-9973-0-7-999);
Claims, defense;
Claims, judgments and relief act (20-1895-0-1-806);
Compact of Free Association, economic assistance pursuant
to Public Law 99-658 (14-0415-0-1-806);
Compensation of the President (11-0001-0-1-802);
Customs Service, miscellaneous permanent appropriations
(20-9992-0-2-852);
Eastern Indian land claims settlement fund (14-2202-0-1-
806);
Farm Credit System Financial Assistance Corporation,
interest payments (20-1850-0-1-351);
Internal Revenue collections of Puerto Rico (20-5737-0-2-
852);
Payments of Vietnam and USS Pueblo prisoner-of-war claims
(15-0104-0-1-153):
Payments to copyright owners (03-5175-0-2-376);
Salaries of Article III judges (not including cost of
living adjustments);
Soldier's and Airman's Home, payment of claims (84-8930-0-
7-705);
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, interest
payments (46-0300-0-1-401);
(10) the following noncredit special, revolving, or trust-
revolving funds--
Exchange Stabilization Fund (20-4444-0-3-155); and
Foreign Military Sales trust fund (11-82232-0-7-155).
SEC. 206. SPECIAL RULES.
(a) Child Support Enforcement Program.--Any sequestration
order shall accomplish the full amount of any required
reduction in payments under sections 455 and 458 of the
Social Security Act by reducing the Federal matching rate for
State administrative costs under the program, as specified
(for the fiscal year involved) in section 455(a) of such Act,
to the extent necessary to reduce such expenditures by that
amount.
(b) Commodity Credit Corporation.--
(1) Effective date.--For the Commodity Credit Corporation,
the date on which a sequestration order takes effect in a
fiscal year shall vary for each crop of a commodity. In
general, the sequestration order shall take effect when
issued, but for each crop of a commodity for which 1-year
contracts are issued as an entitlement, the sequestration
order shall take effect with the start of the sign-up period
for that crop that begins after the sequestration order is
issued. Payments for each contract in such a crop shall be
reduced under the same terms and conditions.
(2) Dairy program.--
(A) As the sole means of achieving any reduction in outlays
under the milk price-support program, the Secretary of
Agriculture shall provide for a reduction to be made in the
price received by producers for all milk in the United States
and marketed by producers for commercial use.
(B) That price reduction (measured in cents per hundred-
weight of milk marketed) shall occur under subparagraph (A)
of section 201(d)(2) of the Agricultural Act of 1949 (7
U.S.C. 1446(d)(2)(A)), shall begin on the day any
sequestration order is issued, and shall not exceed the
aggregate amount of the reduction in outlays under the milk
price-support program, that otherwise would have been
achieved by reducing payments made for the purchase of milk
or the products of milk under this subsection during that
fiscal year.
(3) Certain authority not to be limited.--Nothing in this
Act shall restrict the Corporation in the discharge of its
authority and responsibility as a corporation to buy and sell
commodities in international trade, or limit or reduce in any
way any appropriation that provides the Corporation with
funds to cover its realized losses.
(c) Earned Income Tax Credit.--
(1) The sequestrable base for earned income tax credit
program is the dollar value of all current year benefits to
the entire eligible population.
(2) In the event sequestration is triggered to reduce
earned income tax credits, all earned income tax credits
shall be reduced, whether or not such credits otherwise would
result in cash payments to beneficiaries, by a uniform
percentage sufficient to produce the dollar savings required
by the sequestration.
(d) Regular and Extended Unemployment Compensation.--
(1) A State may reduce each weekly benefit payment made
under the regular and extended unemployment benefit programs
for
[[Page H5618]]
any week of unemployment occurring during any period with
respect to which payments are reduced under any sequestration
order by a percentage not to exceed the percentage by which
the Federal payment to the State is to be reduced for such
week as a result of such order.
(2) A reduction by a State in accordance with paragraph (1)
shall not be considered as a failure to fulfill the
requirements of section 3304(a)(11) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986.
(e) Federal Employees Health Benefits Fund.-- For the
Federal Employees Health Benefits Fund, a sequestration order
shall take effect with the next open season. The
sequestration shall be accomplished by annual payments from
that Fund to the General Fund of the Treasury. Those annual
payments shall be financed solely by charging higher
premiums. The sequestrable base for the Fund is the current-
year level of gross outlays resulting from claims paid after
the sequestration order takes effect.
(f) Federal Housing Finance Board.-- Any sequestration of
the Federal Housing Board shall be accomplished by annual
payments (by the end of each fiscal year) from that Board to
the general fund of the Treasury, in amounts equal to the
uniform sequestration percentage for that year times the
gross obligations of the Board in that year.
(g) Federal Pay.--
(1) In general.-- New budget authority to pay Federal
personnel from direct spending accounts shall be reduced by
the uniform percentage calculated under section 203(c)(3), as
applicable, but no sequestration order may reduce or have the
effect of reducing the rate of pay to which any individual is
entitled under any statutory pay system as increased by any
amount payable under section 5304 of title 5, United States
Code, or any increase in rates of pay which is scheduled to
take effect under section 5303 of title 5, United States
Code, section 1109 of title 37, United States Code, or any
other provision of law.
(2) Definitions.--For purposes of this subsection--
(A) the term ``statutory pay system'' shall have the
meaning given that term in section 5302(1) of title 5, United
States Code;
term ``elements of military pay'' means--
(i) the elements of compensation of members of the
uniformed services specified in section 1009 of title 37,
United States Code;
(ii) allowances provided members of the uniformed services
under sections 403(a) and 405 of such title; and
(iii) cadet pay and midshipman pay under section 203(c) of
such title; and
(C) the term ``uniformed services'' shall have the same
meaning given that term in section 101(3) of title 37, United
States Code.
(h) Medicare.--
(1) In general.--Any sequestration shall accomplish 90% of
the required reduction by reductions in payments for services
under title XVIII of the Social Security Act and +10% of the
required reduction through increases in beneficiary premiums
under part B of title XVIII of the Social Security Act.
(2) Timing of application of reductions.--
(A) In general.-- Except as provided in subparagraph (B),
if a reduction is made in payment amounts pursuant to
sequestration order, the reduction shall be applied to
payment for services furnished after the effective date of
the order. For purposes of the previous sentence, in the case
of inpatient services furnished for an individual, the
services shall be considered to be furnished on the date of
the individual's discharge from the inpatient facility.
(B) Payment on the basis of cost reporting periods.-- In
the case in which payment for services of a provider of
services is made under title XVIII of the Social Security Act
on a basis relating to the reasonable cost incurred for the
services during a cost reporting period of the provider, if a
reduction is made in payment amounts pursuant to a
sequestration order, the reduction shall be applied to
payment for costs for such services incurred at any time
during each cost reporting period of the provider any part of
which occurs after the effective date of order, but only (for
each such cost reporting period) in the same proportion as
the fraction of the cost reporting period that occurs after
the effective date of the order.
(3) No increase in beneficiary charges in assignment-
related cases.--If a reduction in payment amounts is made
pursuant to a sequestration order for services for which
payment under part B of title XVIII of the Social Security
Act is made on the basis of an assignment described in
section 1842(b)(3)(B)(ii), in accordance with section
1842(b)(6)(B), or under the procedure described in section
1870(f)(1) of such Act, the person furnishing the services
shall be considered to have accepted payment of the
reasonable charge for the services, less any reduction in
payment amount made pursuant to a sequestration order, as
payment in full.
(4) Part b premiums.--In computing the amount and method,
part B premiums shall be increased by a percentage to be
determined by dividing 10% of the amount that medicare
spending exceeds the applicable cap by the total amount of
all premium collections. All beneficiary premiums shall be
increased by the percentage calculated pursuant to the
preceding sentence, except that no increase in the premium
shall result in a reduction in social security benefit
payments to any beneficiary.
(5) No effect on computation of aapcc.--In computing the
adjusted average per capita cost for purposes of section
1876(a)(4) of the Social Security Act, the Secretary of
Health and Human Services shall not take into account any
reductions in payment amounts which have been or may be
effected under this part.
(i) Postal Service Fund.-- Any sequestration of the Postal
Service Fund shall be accomplished by annual payments from
that Fund to the General Fund of the Treasury, and the
Postmaster General of the United States and shall have the
duty to make those payments during the first fiscal year to
which the sequestration order applies and each succeeding
fiscal year. The amount of each annual payment shall be--
(1) the uniform sequestration percentage, times
(2) the estimated gross obligations of the Postal Service
Fund in that year other than those obligations financed with
an appropriation for revenue forgone that year.
Any such payment for a fiscal year shall be made as soon as
possible during the fiscal year, except that it may be made
in installments within that year if the payment schedule is
approved by the Secretary of the Treasury. Within 30 days
after the sequestration order is issued, the Postmaster
General shall submit to the Postal Rate Commission a plan for
financing the annual payment for that fiscal year and publish
that plan in the Federal Register. The plan may assume
efficiencies in the operation of the Postal Service,
reductions in capital expenditures, increases in the prices
of services, or any combination, but may not assume a lower
Fund surplus or higher Fund deficit and shall follow the
requirements of existing law governing the Postal Service in
all other respects. Within 30 days of the receipt of that
plan, the Postal Rate Commission shall approve the plan or
modify it in the manner that modifications are allowed under
current law. If the Postal Rate Commission does not respond
to the plan within 30 days, the plan submitted by the
Postmaster General shall go into effect. Any plan may be
later revised by the submission of a new plan to the Postal
Rate Commission, which may approve or modify it.
(j) Power Marketing Administrations and T.V.A.-- Any
sequestration of the Department of Energy power marketing
administration funds or the Tennessee Valley Authority fund
shall be accomplished by annual payments from those funds to
the General Fund of the Treasury, and the administrators of
those funds shall have the duty to make those payments during
the fiscal year to which the sequestration order applies and
each succeeding fiscal year. The amount of each payment by a
fund shall be--
(1) the direct spending uniform sequestration percentage,
times
(2) the estimated gross obligations of the fund in that
year other than those obligations financed from discretionary
appropriations for that year.
Any such payment for a fiscal year shall be made as soon as
possible during the fiscal year, except that it may be made
in installments within that year if the payment schedule is
approved by the Secretary of the Treasury. Annual payments by
a fund may be financed by reductions in costs required to
produce the pre-sequester amount of power (but those
reductions shall not include reductions in the amount of
power supplied by the fund), by reductions in capital
expenditures, by increases in tax rates, or by any
combination, but may not be financed by a lower fund surplus,
a higher fund deficit, additional borrowing, delay in
repayment of principal on outstanding debt and shall follow
the requirements of existing law governing the fund in all
other respects. The administrator of a fund or the TVA Board
is authorized to take the actions specified in this
subsection in order to make the annual payments to the
Treasury.
(k) Business-like Transactions.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, for programs which provide a business-like
service in exchange for a fee, sequestration shall be
accomplished through a uniform increase in fees (sufficient
to produce the dollar savings in such programs for the fiscal
year of the sequestration required by section 201(a)(2), all
subsequent fees shall be increased by the same percentage,
and all proceeds from such fees shall be paid into the
general fund of the Treasury, in any year for which a
sequester affecting such programs are in effect.
SEC. 207. THE CURRENT LAW BASELINE.
(a) Submission of Reports.--CBO and OMB shall submit to the
President and the Congress reports setting forth the budget
baselines for the budget year and the next nine fiscal years.
The CBO report shall be submitted on or before January 15.
The OMB report shall accompany the President's budget.
(b) Determination of the Budget Baseline.--(1) The budget
baseline shall be based on the common economic assumptions
set forth in section 106, adjusted to reflect revisions
pursuant to subsection (c).
(2) The budget baseline shall consist of a projection of
current year levels of budget authority, outlays, revenues
and the surplus or deficit into the budget year and the
relevant outyears based on current enacted laws as of the
date of the projection.
(3) For discretionary spending items, the baseline shall be
the spending caps in effect pursuant to section 601(a)(2) of
the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. For years for which
there are no caps, the baseline for discretionary spending
shall be the same as the last year for which there were
statutory caps.
[[Page H5619]]
(4) For all other expenditures and for revenues, the
baseline shall be adjusted by comparing unemployment,
inflation, interest rates, growth and eligible population for
the most recent period for which actual data are available,
compared to the assumptions contained in section 107.
(c) Revisions to the Baseline.--The baseline shall be
adjusted for up-to-date economic assumptions for all reports
issued pursuant to section 107 of this Act and section 254 of
the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of
1985.
SEC. 208. LIMITATIONS ON EMERGENCY SPENDING.
(a) In General.--(1) Within the discretionary caps for each
fiscal year contained in this Act, an amount shall be
withheld from allocation to the appropriate committees of the
House of Representatives and of the Senate and reserved for
natural disasters and other emergency purposes.
(2) Such amount for each such fiscal year shall not be less
than 1 percent of total budget authority and outlays
available within those caps for that fiscal year.
(3) No adjustments shall be made to the discretionary
spending limits under section 251(b)(2)(D) of the Balanced
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 unless the
amount appropriated for discretionary accounts that have been
designated as emergency requirements exceed the amount
reserved pursuant to paragraph (1). Any adjustment shall be
limited to the amount that total appropriations designated as
emergency requirements for the fiscal year exceeds the amount
reserved pursuant to paragraph (1).
(4) The amounts reserved pursuant to this subsection shall
be made available for allocation to such committees only if--
(A) the President has made a request for such disaster
funds;
(B) the programs to be funded are included in such request;
and
(C) the projected obligations for unforeseen emergency
needs exceed the 10-year rolling average annual expenditures
for existing programs included in the Presidential request
for the applicable fiscal year.
(5) Notwithstanding any other provision of law--
(A) States and localities shall be required to maintain
effort and ensure that Federal assistance payments do not
replace, subvert or otherwise have the effect of reducing
regularly budgeted State and local expenditures for law
enforcement, firefighting, road construction and maintenance,
building construction and maintenance or any other category
of regular government expenditure (to ensure that Federal
disaster payments are made only for incremental costs
directly attributable to unforeseen disasters, and do not
replace or reduce regular State and local expenditures for
the same purposes);
(B) the President may not take administrative action to
waive any requirement for States or localities to make
minimum matching payments as a condition or receiving Federal
disaster assistance or take administrative action to waive
all or part of any repayment of Federal loans for the State
or local matching share required as a condition of receiving
Federal disaster assistance. This clause shall apply to all
matching share requirements and loans to meet matching share
requirements under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.) and any
other Acts pursuant to which the President may declare a
disaster or disasters and States and localities otherwise
qualify for Federal disaster assistance; and
(C) a two-thirds vote in each House of Congress shall be
required for each emergency to reduce or waive the State
matching requirement or to forgive all or part of loans for
the State matching share as required under the Robert T.
Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act.
(b) Effect Budget Resolutions.--(1) All concurrent
resolutions on the budget (including revisions) shall specify
the amount of new budget authority and outlays within the
discretionary spending cap that shall be withheld from
allocation to the committees and reserved for natural
disasters, and a procedure for releasing such funds for
allocation to the appropriate committee. The amount withheld
shall be equal to 1 percent of the total discretionary
spending cap for fiscal year covered by the resolution,
unless additional amounts are specified.
(2) The procedure for allocation of the amounts pursuant to
paragraph (1) shall ensure that the funds are released for
allocation only pursuant to the conditions contained in
subsection (a)(3)(A) through (C).
(c) Restriction on Use of Funds.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, the amount reserved pursuant to subsection
(a) shall not be available for other than emergency funding
requirements for particular natural disasters or national
security emergencies so designated by Acts of Congress.
(d) New Point of Order.--(1) Title IV of the Congressional
Budget Act of 1974 is amended by adding at the end the
following new section:
``point of order regarding emergencies
``Sec. 408. It shall not be in order in the House of
Representatives or the Senate to consider any bill or joint
resolution, or amendment thereto or conference report
thereon, containing an emergency designation for purposes of
section 251(b)(2)(D) or 252(e) of the Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 or of section 208 of
the Budget Enforcement Act of 1997 if it also provides an
appropriation or direct spending for any other item or
contains any other matter, but that bill or joint resolution,
amendment, or conference report may contain rescissions of
budget authority or reductions of direct spending, or that
amendment may reduce amounts for that emergency.''.
(2) The table of contents set forth in section 1(b) of the
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 is
amended by inserting after the item relating to section 407
the following new item:
``Sec. 408. Point of order regarding emergencies.''.
TITLE III--USE OF BUDGET SURPLUS TO PRESERVE SOCIAL SECURITY TRUST FUND
SEC. 301. ENDING USE OF RECEIPTS OF SOCIAL SECURITY TRUST
FUND FOR OTHER PROGRAMS AND ACTIVITIES.
(a) If, in any year, revenues are higher than the targets
in Section 104, as adjusted pursuant to Section 107, or
spending is lower than the caps in Section 105, as adjusted,
and the deficits are lower than the targets in Section 105,
as adjusted pursuant to Section 107, those amounts shall be
applied pursuant to subsection (b).
(b) All funds described in subsection (a) up to $100
billion shall be used to reduce the consolidated budget
deficit and, to the extent that funds are available to
eliminate the consolidated budget deficit, to retire the
outstanding debt of the United States Government held by the
public.
(c) Any use of funds described in subsection (a) for any
purpose other than provided in subsection (b) shall be
subject to the requirements of Section 252 of the Balanced
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, and any
reduction in the amounts described in subsection (a) shall be
considered as an increase in the deficit.
(d) When the President submits the budget under section
1105(a) of Title 31, United States Code for any year, OMB
shall adjust the Social Security Trust Fund surpluses for
each year under this Section, based on the most recent
estimates of such surpluses to be provided to OMB by the
Secretary of the Treasury.
Mrs. THURMAN (during the reading). Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous
consent that the motion be considered as read and printed in the
Record.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentlewoman from Florida?
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentlewoman from
Florida [Mrs. Thurman] is recognized for 5 minutes in support of her
motion to recommit.
Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Speaker, I reserve a point of order against the
motion to recommit.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Iowa [Mr. Nussle]
reserves a point of order.
The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Florida [Mrs. Thurman] for
5 minutes.
Mrs. THURMAN. Mr. Speaker, after the Republican leadership promised
to bring this bill to the floor, it was reviewed, as many bills are, by
many experts in the various committees and outside organizations who
have pointed out several problems in the bill. As a firm supporter of
the concept behind this legislation, I believe it is extremely
important to correct these problems. I strongly support the principle
behind this legislation. We should enforce the budget agreement to
ensure that this budget agreement delivers on the promise of a balanced
budget.
Everyone in this body agrees that the best thing we can do for
working men and women is to ensure that we actually balance the budget.
If we do not add legislation enforcing the budget agreement, we could
repeat the history of past failed efforts to balance the budget.
Because this issue is so important, we should correct these problems so
that we can pass an enforcement bill that does not have these problems.
This motion to recommit would correct the unintended problems with
the bill that have been pointed out by many of its critics. This motion
makes several important improvements to the bill:
First, it begins the process of restoring the integrity of the Social
Security trust fund by reserving the first hundred billion dollars of
any surplus to take the Social Security trust fund off budget.
Second, it protects Medicare beneficiaries by addressing the concern
that Medicare beneficiaries would bear an unreasonable burden of
sequestration.
Third, it protects the jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and
Means over enforcement of the revenue provisions.
Finally, it makes several other technical corrections to correct
unanticipated problems with this bill.
This motion is in an effort to ensure that the legislation that the
House
[[Page H5620]]
votes on today is our best effort on this issue. We should not ever
vote on legislation that we all know has problems. We should fix those
problems with this legislation before we vote on it.
So I agree with the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. Nussle]. We should
recommit this bill, we should take it back to the committees, we should
look at the issues that have been raised here and issues of outside
critics, and we should adopt this motion to recommit.
Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Neumann].
Mr. NEUMANN. Mr. Speaker, first off, I would like to also commend the
Republican leadership for keeping their word and bringing this bill to
the floor. The most important part, in my opinion, of this motion to
recommit that is being made here is that we will start to address the
Social Security issue. This has gone on since 1983 that this extra
money that is being taken out of the paychecks of hardworking Americans
that was supposed to be set aside to preserve and protect Social
Security, it is going into the general fund, and it is being spent on
other Government programs instead of being put aside to preserve and
protect Social Security.
This motion to recommit would instruct the committee to take the
first hundred billion dollars of surplus and actually start reserving
it for Social Security so that when the time comes in the year 2012
that there is not enough money to make good on the promises to our
senior citizens, the money would then be available if this motion to
recommit were sent back and then the bill were passed and signed into
law.
So in my opinion, the most important part of this is that we would
start to address a very serious problem facing this Nation, and that is
that the money that is supposed to be set aside for Social Security in
this savings account, it is not there. It is IOU;s. And under this
movement we would force this Government to actually start setting aside
money so that Social Security once again would be safe and secure for
our senior citizens.
Mrs. THURMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Minnesota
[Mr. Minge].
Mr. MINGE. Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank the gentlewoman for
yielding this time to me.
We have had a great deal of discussion today about the inadequacy of
the rule, and I am pleased to be able to report that in this motion to
recommit we address the problem with the rule and the bill that was
offered as a substitute is now available for a vote.
This is a bill that was revised to take into account the criticisms
that came from both sides of the aisle to try to make this a better
bill. The critics are saying we are looking for the perfect bill. I
have heard this over and over in this institution. But let us not make
the perfect enemy of the good.
At the same time, let us recognize that if we want any type of
enforcement mechanism that deals with the revenue side and the
entitlement programs, that we have to move this legislation through the
House of Representatives to the conference committee.
This motion to recommit gives us the best shot at providing the
conference committee on the reconciliation bills with our best product
at this point in time. If it is important to us in the House of
Representatives to see the budget balanced and kept in balance, let us
move the process ahead.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time has expired for the gentlewoman
from Florida [Mrs. Thurman].
Does the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. Nussle] insist on his point of
order?
Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation on the point of
order, and I rise in opposition to the motion.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Iowa [Mr. Nussle] is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the motion to
recommit.
Mr. Speaker, I told you so. There were problems with this bill, and
what happened? Here at the last minute, in a rush, without any
consideration, without any light of day, without any committee process,
without any disclosure to the other side, without any chance for the
committees of jurisdiction to look at it, in comes the rushed motion to
recommit. Just like my dad used to when as a family we used to go in
and raid the refrigerator. We used to call it ``oosh-cum-noosht.'' This
is ``oosh-cum-noosht''; that is what this is.
{time} 1315
That is what this is. People came out and they said, hey, I know, we
can fix Social Security. Let us put in this little provision. We can
fix veterans. Let us put in this provision. We can fix Medicare. Let us
put in this provision. It does not have enough teeth here. It has too
much teeth there. Let us rush in and let us do this, because we want to
make sure that in fact we are able to improve this particular piece of
legislation at the last minute in a way to save the reform process.
Mr. Speaker, we do not need to save the reform process in this
particular motion to recommit. The reform process has a strong
foundation, laid very carefully by my good friends and colleagues that
have spoken here today. That reform process will go forward. It must.
If we are going to save this country from rampant deficits and national
debt and bankrupt Social Security and many other problems that face
this Nation, we have to go through the entire process, not a rushed
bill, not a quick fix, not a quick address of the problems we heard
within the debate with a motion to recommit. We have to come in and we
have to go through the careful consideration and hearings and processes
in order to get this job done.
First we had it down here and we heard there was too much teeth. Then
the advertising changed and it was, do not worry about it, there are no
teeth. Then we come in and find there are even less teeth. We find out
that Social Security is not going to quite have as much teeth, Medicare
will not have as much teeth, the spending sequestrations are not going
to have as much teeth. Is this really reform?
Mr. Speaker, we need to have a careful process to go through in order
to get this job done. This motion to recommit clearly does not even
come close to that. I think the effort was admirable. The result missed
the mark. This is only the first shot in an effort to reform the budget
process. While it missed the mark, it will be heard throughout this
Congress, throughout the committees. We will reform the budget process;
not today.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. NUSSLE. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman yielding to me.
Again, it seems to me like we ought to have some kind of a multiple
choice test on this thing, based on the debate today, there is so much
confusion about it.
I guess what I would say is this. This was advertised as a perfect
product on June 25. We were going to bring this forward and we were
going to vote on it as part of the deal then. The point was that a
commitment was made for an up-or-down vote on that package, the June 25
package. The deal was an up-or-down vote on that. That is what we have
brought to the floor today. It is what has been discussed.
As we said at the time, it was not ready. It is not ripe. This is too
complex, it is too technical, there are too many people involved in it.
We need to work it out through the normal process. We have a commitment
from Chairman Solomon, we have a commitment from Chairman Archer, we
have a commitment from Chairman Kasich to go forward in the regular
process to do this the right way.
Trying to write budget reform and budget enforcement at this point in
a motion to recommit on the floor is insanity. We all know it. Let the
process work. The pledges are there, the commitments are there, the
homework is there, the record is there, the good will and commitment
and bright ideas of all the people who have brought this forward are
there.
Not only that, we have a whole bunch of people, of organizations,
that have suddenly woken up to this and said this is a very poor way to
do this, because they have been listening to the debate and they have
been understanding that, oh, my gosh, all of a sudden there may be a
need for an exemption from the enforcement.
We have the American Legion, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the
Disabled American Veterans, the Paralyzed Veterans of America, AMVETS,
Retired Enlisted Association, Blinded Veterans Association,
Noncommissioned Officers
[[Page H5621]]
Association, Military Order of Purple Heart, Jewish War Veterans,
Retired Officers, Fleet Reserve, the AARP, and a whole bunch of other
people out there saying, hold on, there is a problem. This is not the
way to do this.
Mr. Speaker, I would urge that we defeat the motion to recommit, we
defeat H.R. 2003, and we simply go about the normal process of getting
on with budget reform.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the previous question is
ordered on the motion to recommit.
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to recommit.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a
quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not
present.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Evidently a quorum is not present.
The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.
Pursuant to the provisions of clause 5 of rule XV, the Chair
announces that he will reduce to a minimum of 5 minutes the period of
time within which a vote by electronic device, if ordered, will be
taken on the question of passage.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 148,
nays 279, answered ``present'' 1, not voting 6, as follows:
[Roll No. 300]
YEAS--148
Abercrombie
Allen
Andrews
Baesler
Ballenger
Barcia
Barrett (WI)
Barton
Bass
Bentsen
Bilirakis
Bishop
Blumenauer
Boswell
Boyd
Brady
Brown (CA)
Brown (FL)
Camp
Campbell
Canady
Carson
Castle
Chabot
Chenoweth
Clement
Clyburn
Coburn
Combest
Condit
Cramer
Danner
Davis (FL)
Deal
DeFazio
Deutsch
Doggett
Dooley
Doyle
Duncan
Edwards
Eshoo
Etheridge
Farr
Forbes
Fox
Furse
Ganske
Gilchrest
Goode
Gordon
Green
Greenwood
Gutknecht
Hall (TX)
Hamilton
Harman
Hefner
Hill
Hilliard
Hinojosa
Holden
Hooley
Horn
Houghton
Hunter
Inglis
Jefferson
John
Johnson (WI)
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kind (WI)
Kleczka
Klug
Lampson
Lantos
Largent
LaTourette
Lazio
Leach
Luther
Maloney (CT)
Maloney (NY)
Manton
McCarthy (MO)
McCarthy (NY)
McCollum
McHale
McIntosh
McIntyre
McKinney
Meehan
Miller (CA)
Minge
Mink
Moran (VA)
Morella
Murtha
Neumann
Ney
Norwood
Paxon
Pease
Peterson (MN)
Pickett
Porter
Portman
Ramstad
Regula
Riggs
Roemer
Ros-Lehtinen
Rush
Sanchez
Sandlin
Sanford
Schaefer, Dan
Schaffer, Bob
Scott
Sherman
Shimkus
Sisisky
Skaggs
Smith, Adam
Smith, Linda
Stabenow
Stearns
Stenholm
Stupak
Talent
Tanner
Tauscher
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Thompson
Thurman
Turner
Upton
Visclosky
Wamp
Weldon (PA)
Weller
Wexler
Weygand
Woolsey
Yates
NAYS--279
Ackerman
Aderholt
Archer
Armey
Bachus
Baker
Baldacci
Barr
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Bateman
Becerra
Bereuter
Berman
Berry
Bilbray
Blagojevich
Bliley
Blunt
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bonior
Bono
Borski
Boucher
Brown (OH)
Bryant
Bunning
Burr
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Calvert
Cannon
Capps
Cardin
Chambliss
Christensen
Clay
Clayton
Coble
Collins
Conyers
Cook
Cooksey
Costello
Cox
Coyne
Crane
Crapo
Cubin
Cummings
Cunningham
Davis (IL)
Davis (VA)
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
DeLay
Dellums
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Dicks
Dingell
Dixon
Doolittle
Dreier
Dunn
Ehlers
Ehrlich
Emerson
Engel
English
Evans
Everett
Ewing
Fattah
Fawell
Fazio
Filner
Flake
Foglietta
Foley
Ford
Fowler
Frank (MA)
Franks (NJ)
Frelinghuysen
Frost
Gallegly
Gejdenson
Gekas
Gephardt
Gibbons
Gillmor
Gilman
Goodlatte
Goodling
Goss
Graham
Granger
Gutierrez
Hall (OH)
Hansen
Hastert
Hastings (FL)
Hastings (WA)
Hayworth
Hefley
Herger
Hilleary
Hinchey
Hobson
Hoekstra
Hostettler
Hoyer
Hulshof
Hyde
Istook
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jenkins
Johnson (CT)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnson, Sam
Jones
Kasich
Kelly
Kennedy (MA)
Kennedy (RI)
Kennelly
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kim
King (NY)
Kingston
Klink
Knollenberg
Kolbe
Kucinich
LaFalce
LaHood
Latham
Levin
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (GA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
Lipinski
Livingston
LoBiondo
Lofgren
Lowey
Lucas
Manzullo
Markey
Martinez
Mascara
Matsui
McCrery
McDade
McDermott
McGovern
McHugh
McInnis
McKeon
McNulty
Meek
Menendez
Metcalf
Mica
Millender-McDonald
Miller (FL)
Moakley
Molinari
Mollohan
Moran (KS)
Myrick
Nadler
Neal
Nethercutt
Northup
Nussle
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Owens
Oxley
Packard
Pappas
Parker
Pascrell
Pastor
Paul
Payne
Pelosi
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pickering
Pitts
Pombo
Pomeroy
Poshard
Price (NC)
Pryce (OH)
Quinn
Radanovich
Rahall
Rangel
Redmond
Reyes
Riley
Rivers
Rodriguez
Rogan
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Rothman
Roukema
Roybal-Allard
Royce
Ryun
Sabo
Salmon
Sanders
Sawyer
Saxton
Scarborough
Schumer
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Sessions
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Shuster
Skeen
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (OR)
Smith (TX)
Snowbarger
Snyder
Solomon
Souder
Spence
Spratt
Stokes
Strickland
Stump
Sununu
Thomas
Thornberry
Thune
Tiahrt
Tierney
Torres
Towns
Traficant
Velazquez
Vento
Walsh
Waters
Watkins
Watt (NC)
Watts (OK)
Waxman
Weldon (FL)
White
Whitfield
Wicker
Wise
Wolf
Wynn
Young (FL)
ANSWERED ``PRESENT''--1
Ensign
NOT VOTING--6
Gonzalez
Hutchinson
Pallone
Schiff
Stark
Young (AK)
{time} 1344
Mrs. LOWEY and Messrs. RAHALL, SMITH of Michigan, JACKSON of
Illinois, NEAL of Massachusetts, OBERSTAR, GEPHARDT, KENNEDY of
Massachusetts, McNULTY, GEJDENSON, HASTINGS of Florida, KILDEE, BROWN
of Ohio, WISE, BORSKI, VENTO, RODRIGUEZ, REYES, and ROTHMAN, Ms.
ROYBAL-ALLARD, and Messrs. DIAZ-BALART, SCHUMER, ORTIZ, OWENS, MATSUI,
TOWNS, and ENGEL, Ms. SLAUGHTER, Mr. PAYNE, Mr. HINCHEY, Ms. DeGETTE,
and Messrs. RANGEL, DICKS, and ACKERMAN changed their vote from ``yea''
to ``nay.''
Ms. WOOLSEY, Ms. FURSE, Mr. RIGGS, Mrs. CHENOWETH, Ms. KAPTUR, and
Messrs. WELDON of Pennsylvania, SHIMKUS, BOB SCHAFFER of Colorado,
LAMPSON, and SANDLIN changed their vote from ``nay'' to ``yea.''
{time} 1345
So the motion to recommit was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Bonilla). The question is on the passage
of the bill.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the noes appeared to have it.
Recorded Vote
Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. This will be a 5-minute vote.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 81,
noes 347, not voting 6, as follows:
[Roll No. 301]
AYES--81
Andrews
Ballenger
Barcia
Barrett (WI)
Barton
Bass
Bliley
Blumenauer
Blunt
Boyd
Brady
Campbell
Castle
Chambliss
Coburn
Combest
Condit
Davis (FL)
DeFazio
Deutsch
Doggett
Dooley
Doyle
Duncan
Ehlers
Fawell
Forbes
Gekas
Goode
Goodling
Graham
Gutknecht
Hall (TX)
Hamilton
Harman
Hefner
Hoekstra
Horn
Houghton
Inglis
John
Kind (WI)
Kingston
Klug
Kolbe
Largent
Livingston
Luther
McHale
McInnis
McIntyre
McKinney
Meehan
Minge
Morella
Neumann
Norwood
Peterson (MN)
Petri
Porter
Ramstad
Regula
Roemer
Rohrabacher
Royce
Sanchez
Sanford
Schaffer, Bob
Sensenbrenner
Sisisky
Smith (TX)
Stenholm
Tanner
Tauscher
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Turner
Upton
Visclosky
Wamp
[[Page H5622]]
NOES--347
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Aderholt
Allen
Archer
Armey
Bachus
Baesler
Baker
Baldacci
Barr
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Bateman
Becerra
Bentsen
Bereuter
Berman
Berry
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop
Blagojevich
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bonior
Bono
Borski
Boswell
Boucher
Brown (CA)
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Bryant
Bunning
Burr
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Calvert
Camp
Canady
Cannon
Capps
Cardin
Carson
Chabot
Chenoweth
Christensen
Clay
Clayton
Clement
Clyburn
Coble
Collins
Conyers
Cook
Cooksey
Costello
Cox
Coyne
Cramer
Crane
Crapo
Cubin
Cummings
Cunningham
Danner
Davis (IL)
Davis (VA)
Deal
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
DeLay
Dellums
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Dicks
Dingell
Dixon
Doolittle
Dreier
Dunn
Edwards
Ehrlich
Emerson
Engel
English
Ensign
Eshoo
Etheridge
Evans
Everett
Ewing
Farr
Fattah
Fazio
Filner
Flake
Foglietta
Foley
Ford
Fowler
Fox
Frank (MA)
Franks (NJ)
Frelinghuysen
Frost
Furse
Gallegly
Ganske
Gejdenson
Gephardt
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Goodlatte
Gordon
Goss
Granger
Green
Greenwood
Gutierrez
Hall (OH)
Hansen
Hastert
Hastings (FL)
Hastings (WA)
Hayworth
Hefley
Herger
Hill
Hilleary
Hilliard
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hobson
Holden
Hooley
Hostettler
Hoyer
Hulshof
Hunter
Hyde
Istook
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
Jenkins
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (WI)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnson, Sam
Jones
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kasich
Kelly
Kennedy (MA)
Kennedy (RI)
Kennelly
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kim
King (NY)
Kleczka
Klink
Knollenberg
Kucinich
LaFalce
LaHood
Lampson
Lantos
Latham
LaTourette
Lazio
Leach
Levin
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (GA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Lofgren
Lowey
Lucas
Maloney (CT)
Maloney (NY)
Manton
Manzullo
Markey
Martinez
Mascara
Matsui
McCarthy (MO)
McCarthy (NY)
McCollum
McCrery
McDade
McDermott
McGovern
McHugh
McIntosh
McKeon
McNulty
Meek
Menendez
Metcalf
Mica
Millender-McDonald
Miller (CA)
Miller (FL)
Mink
Moakley
Molinari
Mollohan
Moran (KS)
Moran (VA)
Murtha
Myrick
Nadler
Neal
Nethercutt
Ney
Northup
Nussle
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Owens
Oxley
Packard
Pappas
Parker
Pascrell
Pastor
Paul
Paxon
Payne
Pease
Pelosi
Peterson (PA)
Pickering
Pickett
Pitts
Pombo
Pomeroy
Portman
Poshard
Price (NC)
Pryce (OH)
Quinn
Radanovich
Rahall
Rangel
Redmond
Reyes
Riggs
Riley
Rivers
Rodriguez
Rogan
Rogers
Ros-Lehtinen
Rothman
Roukema
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Ryun
Sabo
Salmon
Sanders
Sandlin
Sawyer
Saxton
Scarborough
Schaefer, Dan
Schumer
Scott
Serrano
Sessions
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Sherman
Shimkus
Shuster
Skaggs
Skeen
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (OR)
Smith, Adam
Smith, Linda
Snowbarger
Snyder
Solomon
Souder
Spence
Spratt
Stabenow
Stearns
Stokes
Strickland
Stump
Stupak
Sununu
Talent
Thomas
Thompson
Thornberry
Thune
Thurman
Tiahrt
Tierney
Torres
Towns
Traficant
Velazquez
Vento
Walsh
Waters
Watkins
Watt (NC)
Watts (OK)
Waxman
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
Wexler
Weygand
White
Whitfield
Wicker
Wise
Wolf
Woolsey
Wynn
Yates
Young (FL)
NOT VOTING--6
Gonzalez
Hutchinson
Pallone
Schiff
Stark
Young (AK)
{time} 1354
Mrs. CHENOWETH, Mr. STUPAK, and Mr. CRAPO changed their vote from
``aye'' to ``no.''
So the bill was not passed.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
____________________