[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 102 (Thursday, July 17, 1997)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E1446]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                        DEPOT-LEVEL MAINTENANCE

                                 ______
                                 

                            HON. MAX SANDLIN

                                of texas

                    in the house of representatives

                        Thursday, July 17, 1997

  Mr. SANDLIN. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to introduce legislation that 
clarifies the definition of depot-level maintenance and repair as the 
definition applies to the Army. The definition of depot-level 
maintenance currently included in the Department of Defense 
authorization bill should include conversions and modifications and I 
ask your support for such a change.
  Section 333 of the Department of Defense authorization bill states:

       Depot level maintenance and repair means material 
     maintenance or repair requiring the overhaul, upgrading, or 
     rebuilding of parts, assemblies, or subassemblies, and the 
     testing and reclamation of equipment as necessary, regardless 
     of the source of funds for the maintenance or repair.

  I believe this definition is vague and unclear and could undermine 
current BRAC laws. Further, it could potentially be interpreted to 
change long-existing Army definitions, and devastate attempts to gain 
more workload at certain depots.
  I cite an example of why this definition is necessary. In 1995 Red 
River Army Depot in my district was realigned by the base realignment 
and closure process. The BRAC law stated: ``Move all maintenance 
missions except for that related to the Bradley Fighting Vehicle series 
to other depot maintenance activities including the private sector . . 
.'', thus leaving all maintenance of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle at 
Red River Army Depot.
  When I was elected to Congress, I sat down with the Army to discuss 
the situation at Red River. The Army told me that Red River was unable 
to perform conversions and modifications of the Bradley Fighting 
Vehicle because conversions and modifications are not part of depot 
maintenance. However, Army Regulation 750-2 of Army Materiel 
Maintenance Wholesale Operations defines depot maintenance as ``that 
maintenance performed on materiel requiring major overhaul or a 
complete rebuild of parts, assemblies, subassemblies, and end items, 
including the manufacture of parts, modifications and conversions, 
testing and reclamation, as required. Depot maintenance serves to 
support lower categories of maintenance by providing technical 
assistance and performing that maintenance beyond their responsibility. 
Depot maintenance provides stocks of serviceable equipment by using 
more extensive facilities or repair than are available in lower level 
maintenance activities.'' (Emphasis Added.)

  Clearly the law states that depot maintenance of Bradley Fighting 
Vehicles is to be performed at Red River Army Depot. Since the Army 
definition of depot maintenance includes modification and conversions, 
any modification and/or conversion of the Bradley should be performed 
at Red River Army Depot. Mr. Speaker, this is why we need this 
legislation to clearly state what the Army can and cannot do and so it 
can follow its own regulations.
  Depots are a vital part of our Nation's military and are essential to 
our military readiness. The Army currently has five maintenance depots, 
three of which are ground maintenance depots. More and more, each 
ground maintenance depot is becoming increasingly specialized.
  Mr. Speaker, we need to make sure these depots operate efficiently, 
and that in a time of need we have dependable sources of repair for our 
military might.
  It is clear that in the post-cold-war era our military readiness 
levels need to reflect the demise of the Warsaw Pact and other changes 
in the world. However, we need to fully assess the impact that closure 
and realignment decisions made to date have had on our current military 
readiness. To our knowledge, no report or complete assessment has been 
prepared on how base closures, which are currently being completed, 
have affected our military readiness. I believe that until such a 
report can be reviewed, it is unwise to recommend more base closures.
  The four previous rounds of the base realignment and closure [BRAC] 
process have resulted in the closing of 97 defense installations in the 
United States. We are still unable to fully assess the actual savings, 
if any, generated from those base closures. For this reason, we know 
that if there are any savings generated from further rounds of base 
closures, those savings will not be realized for many years to come. 
Further, it is also necessary to realize the amount of money spent to 
close military facilities. By the year 2000, we will have spent 
approximately $23 billion in cleanup and other costs associated with 
the closure of military installations.
  The Quadrennial Defense Review claimed that in order to preserve 
combat capability and readiness, the services must compete, outsource, 
or privatize military department infrastructure functions that are 
closely related to commercial enterprises. The Secretary of Defense 
recently stated that ``We need to deregulate defense just as we have 
deregulated many other American industries.'' However, our military is 
not just another American industry. The civilian and military employees 
who currently perform these functions are experienced, dedicated, and 
well-skilled individuals on whom our Nation can depend in time of war. 
The uncertainties we would face with an inexperienced, privatized work 
force, pressed into service on short notice, could be a tremendous 
detriment to our military readiness.

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