[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 100 (Tuesday, July 15, 1997)]
[House]
[Pages H5186-H5187]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




              PROBLEMS WITH THE QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of 
January 21, 1997, the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. Hefley] is 
recognized during morning hour debates for 5 minutes.
  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise this morning to continue the ongoing 
discussions in the House concerning the Quadrennial Defense Review. The 
QDR has emerged as a blueprint for the administration's defense 
program. The assumptions of the QDR, particularly as they affect 
budgets, are as critical as the policy choices contained in the review.
  One of the most often discussed recommendations contained in the QDR 
is the recommendation for two more rounds of base closures, but the QDR 
itself says very little about base infrastructure beyond that 
recommendation. The Congress still does not have a clear understanding 
how the Department came to the conclusion that it did.
  That is critically important, because DOD has made assumptions about 
future Defense budgets based on that recommendation. But those budget 
assumptions appear to be based on elementary projects of DOD's 
estimates of costs and savings of the current base closure effort, and 
those projections may turn out to be wrong.
  To date, the Congress has been skeptical of Secretary Cohen's rush to 
judgment on the need for more base closure rounds in the near term. The 
House version of the Defense authorization bill does not contain such 
authority. The other body adopted an amendment to its version of the 
Defense bill offered by Senator Dorgan that gets to the heart of the 
issue. The Senate bill asks for a comprehensive study and assessment of 
the true costs and actual savings, not estimates, of the four previous 
rounds of base closure which we will be implementing through 2001.
  The actions of both bodies have been misinterpreted. I, along with 
many other Members, voted in 1990 to establish the Commission process 
that governed the last three rounds. The Congress has overwhelmingly 
supported those base closure decisions as I have, even though some of 
the recommendations cause great unease and I think that perhaps we will 
regret some of the decisions made from it, but overall I think the 
process was a good process.
  We supported this because we thought it was best for the country. We 
have put aside our own parochial interests for the greater good. But 
now some have criticized Congress for not adopting blindly the 
Secretary's recommendation. Why have we not done so? Because those of 
us who have supported the base closure process believe now is not the 
time.
  Why do we believe that to be the case? Some commentators have chosen 
to focus solely on the President's politization of the process. 
Clearly, the McClellan and Kelly depot issue will

[[Page H5187]]

not go away and is a major factor, but it is not the only one, nor is 
it the most important.
  Let us review where we are now. Through four rounds of base closure 
that began a decade ago, we have slashed 21 percent of the U.S.-based 
plant replacement value of base structure. Ninety-seven major bases 
have been closed in the United States. We have cut our overseas basing 
structure by 43 percent, ceasing operations at over 960 facilities. The 
Army in Europe alone has closed the equivalent of 12 United States 
major maneuver bases.
  Taken together, we have gotten rid of 27 percent of the base 
structure at a very high price, but it had to be done. By 2001, the 
taxpayer will have spent an estimated $23 billion to close just the 
U.S.-based infrastructure closing or realigning under the BRAC.
  Will we save money? I do not doubt that measured over a 20-year 
period in terms of net present value that money will be saved. But 
there is a real question about how much. No one knows. Every savings 
figure is merely an estimate, and an incomplete one at that.
  I want to cite three examples of where these problems are. In its 
budget estimates to accompany the fiscal year 1996 budget request, DOD 
estimated that revenues from the sale and disposal of land from the 
first three rounds of BRAC would amount to $815.3 million. This year 
DOD's estimate is $277 million, a 66-percent reduction in just 2 years.
  DOD projects annual recurring savings after 2001 for all BRAC rounds 
of $5.6 billion annually. However, that figure does not take into 
account the expected ongoing environmental cleanup costs or the 
caretaker cost for property that cannot be disposed of at that point. 
Those costs are estimated conservatively, in my judgment, at $500 
million a year.
  Approximately 51 percent of the savings which DOD assumes will come 
from BRAC during the implementation are due to assumed savings in 
operation and maintenance costs. Much of those assumed savings are due 
to reductions in civilian personnel.
  What I am saying, Mr. Speaker, is that now is not the time. We need 
to do this in a more reasoned and careful manner.

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