[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 100 (Tuesday, July 15, 1997)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E1426]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                       TAJIKISTAN'S PEACE ACCORD

                                 ______
                                 

                       HON. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH

                             of new jersey

                    in the house of representatives

                         Tuesday, July 15, 1997

  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, after 5 long years, 
Tajikistan's civil war--the costliest conflict in the former Soviet 
Union, in terms of casualties--may be over. Negotiations underway since 
1994 under U.N. auspices have finally produced a peace accord and the 
opposing sides have crafted a power-sharing arrangement. Provisions are 
in place for over 20,000 refugees to return and elections are planned 
within 12 to 18 months.
  Tajik President Imomali Rakhmonov and Saidabdullo Nuri, leader of the 
United Tajik Opposition [UTO], signed the General Agreement on Peace 
and National Accord on June 27. Among the accord's key features is the 
26-member National Reconciliation Commission, composed of 13 government 
and 13 opposition representatives, and chaired by Nuri. Until elections 
are held, the opposition will control at least 30 percent of government 
portfolios. The opposition's fighters will be integrated into the 
government's force ministries, and 460 fighters will protect opposition 
leaders in Dushanbe. On July 10, the Reconciliation Commission came to 
terms on a general amnesty that will allow members of the UTO to return 
to Tajikistan.
  The general agreement was signed in the Kremlin, testifying to 
Russia's key mediating role. Moscow had backed Tajikistan's Government 
against the opposition--a melange of democratic, Islamic, and regional 
forces--since the war broke out in 1992, but has obviously rethought 
its priorities and acknowledged that the opposition cannot be defeated 
militarily, at acceptable cost. Moreover, the advance of the Taliban 
forces in Afghanistan, which Tajik opposition fighters had used as a 
staging ground for assaults against Russian and Tajik Government 
forces, has also convinced Moscow and, apparently, anti-Taliban, Shiite 
Iran, that Tajikistan must be stabilized in the face of the new threat 
from Sunni Islamic fundamentalism.
  As many analysis have pointed out, however, it is too soon for 
rejoicing. Though Moscow seems determined to end the conflict, there 
are several potential spoilers. Foremost among them is Abdumallik 
Abdullojanov, Tajikistan's former prime minister and chairman of the 
Party of National Revival. Abdullojanov represents the interests of 
Leninabad, the country's most populous and wealthy oblast, which had 
produced Tajikistan's rulers since the 1930's. By contrast, President 
Rakhmonov and his followers are from Kulyab oblast, whereas Nuri and 
most of the opposition are affiliated with the mountainous region of 
Karotegin. Yet Abdullojonov was not invited to participate in the peace 
talks or the Reconciliation Commission, and his followers have been 
given no positions in the coalition government. With no stake in the 
agreement and no incentive to promote its success, Abdullojonov has 
every reason to undermine its implementation, and can count on the 
backing of the population in northern Tajikistan.
  Abdullojonov also has the presumed support of Islam Karimov, 
President of Uzbekistan, which borders Leninabad oblast and is 
Abdullojonov's base of operations. Karimov did not authorize 
Uzbekistan's signature as guarantor of the Tajik peace agreement, 
indicating that Russia and Uzbekistan--though they share deep concerns 
over Taliban victories in Afghanistan--continue to compete for 
influence in Tajikistan, and that Tashkent will not play along unless 
its interests and those of its allies in northern Tajikistan are taken 
into account.
  If the government in Dushanbe does not see these dangers, the 
opposition does. On June 28, UTO first deputy leader Akbar Turajonzade 
told Interfax that Dushanbe's unwillingness to include representatives 
of other parties and movements, specifically mentioning Abdullojonov, 
was a mistake and could jeopardize prospects for peace.
  Apart from Abdullojonov, any number of well-armed military 
commanders, with strong local bases, could resume hostilities or simply 
block the establishment of a unified country with a recognized 
government exercising authority over its entire territory. And even if 
they could be brought over, the process of sharing government 
portfolios and dividing the economic pie among all the various 
movements and factions will require masterful diplomacy.
  Still, the peace accord and all its attendant problems are far 
preferable to the alternative Tajikistan's population has not known 
peace since the country became independent. The understanding between 
the government and the opposition may finally have laid the groundwork 
for the broader reconciliation that will be needed for enduring 
stability.
  Mr. Speaker, quite apart from the obvious humanitarian imperatives, 
it is in the United States interests that Tajikistan's peace accord 
succeed. War-torn Tajikistan lags behind most other New Independent 
States in building democratic institutions. We should encourage the 
reconciliation process and urge that the planned elections take place 
as scheduled and that they be as free and fair as possible. It would be 
especially useful for IFES, the Washington-based International 
Foundation for Election Systems, which has done such important work in 
helping local authorities organize elections all over the world, to be 
involved with Tajikistan's Central Election Commission. Hopefully, 
conditions will permit other United States NGO's to begin working with 
political parties, and gradually help put back on track the 
democratization in Tajikistan that was so tragically interrupted in 
1992.

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