[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 99 (Monday, July 14, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S7407-S7413]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




             DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 1998

  The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I will shortly offer an amendment to 
this bill. It is an amendment that many of us are working on. We worked 
on it last week for the Defense authorization bill. It deals with 
Bosnia and exactly what our mission is in Bosnia, and the possibility 
that we are looking at a change to that mission without congressional 
consultation.
  I want to step back and talk about U.S. foreign policy in general 
over the last 4 years since I have been a Member of the U.S. Senate.
  What concerns me is the lack of focus and the lack of stability in 
our foreign policy that, unfortunately, creates a vacuum that can be 
filled by either our allies or our adversaries. Since the last 4 years 
have seen many missions with U.S. troops both under the U.N. umbrella 
and the NATO umbrella, I think it is important for us to take a step 
back and look at what happens when there is a vacuum.
  As I have observed since President Clinton has been in office, it 
seems that someone is always wanting the United States to do more. 
Sometimes it is our allies asking us to send more aid, put more troops 
on the ground, go into police missions--missions to capture; not kill. 
If you look at the use of our troops over the last 4 years, we have, in 
fact, been drawn into conflicts sometimes not really even knowing why 
we were involved.
  Starting with Somalia. Somalia was a U.N. mission. Our mission was to 
feed starving people and starving children

[[Page S7408]]

in Somalia because we heard the reports coming back and saw the 
pictures of starving people. No one in the world could look at those 
pictures and not say we have to do something. So under the U.N. 
auspices, we did go to feed the starving people.
  But then there was a mission creep--from feeding starving people to 
capturing a warlord, Aideed. Because we had a mission creep that 
Congress was not prepared for, we lost 18 Army Rangers without even 
realizing that the U.S. mission had changed. What was the result? The 
result is that Aideed outlasted the United States. There was not much 
of a change in Somalia. Yet, we lost 18 Army Rangers.
  Then consider Haiti. Under the guise of installing a democratically 
elected President, United States forces in a U.N. mission invaded the 
island of Haiti. We spent $1 billion, American Defense dollars, dollars 
that we took from other Defense priorities, whether it was training or 
technology or new equipment.
  Today we are seeing the unraveling of the democratically elected 
President and that regime in Haiti--$1 billion later.
  Then we move to Bosnia. It seems that, since the day I walked onto 
the Senate floor in 1993, we have been trying to deal with the unrest, 
the war, and the atrocities in the former Yugoslavia. We started by 
trying to lift the arms embargo on one part of the population in the 
former Yugoslavia, because other elements of that population had arms. 
Some had gotten their arms even though there was an arms embargo. But 
the Muslim population received very few arms. Many of us in the Senate 
felt that if we could lift that arms embargo and let the Muslims have a 
fair fight, perhaps that war would have ended a lot sooner. But the 
President refused--refused--to provide the U.S. leadership needed to 
lift the U.N. arms embargo.
  Then we saw in 1995 a massacre of Muslim men and boys. We think as 
many as 10,000 died in Srebrenica and other places. It was clear that 
the U.N. mission could not do what it was supposed to do, which was to 
keep some sort of peace in Bosnia. We reached the Dayton peace accords 
and NATO entered Bosnia. The United States was pushed into putting U.S. 
troops on the ground. I believe they were pushed to do it because there 
was a vacuum of leadership and our allies said the only way that we 
could show our interest and support of Bosnia and peace is to have 
troops on the ground. Many of us felt that there were other things that 
we could do besides putting our troops on the ground that would have 
been helpful to peace in Bosnia--including putting our money into 
helping the Bosnian people build an infrastructure and economic base 
that would have led, I think, to a better peace settlement than we are 
seeing right now. We are seeing a bubbling up of the hostilities in 
Bosnia despite the fact that our troops are there. We are seeing the 
bubbling up of hostilities because there is still no economic base. It 
is that economic base, I think, that would provide hope for the future.

  But, instead, the President said we would put troops on the ground to 
keep the warring parties apart for 1 year--for 1 year. At the end of 
1995, the President said we would be there for 1 year--until the end of 
1996. As the end of that year approached, the President said we need to 
stay there--doing the same thing, not seeing much progress. He said it 
would be June 30, 1998 before we could withdraw. The Secretary of 
Defense, Bill Cohen, reiterated when he came into office in his Senate 
hearing that it would in fact be June 1998.
  Just last week in the Senate took up a resolution to confirm that 
June 30, 1998 will be the end. We did so so all participants can count 
on it and they can start making plans for it, so that there won't be a 
vacuum that anyone else could fill with mandates for the United States. 
But the President has now said that he thinks it would be wrong for the 
Senate to confirm June 30, 1998 as the withdrawal date.
  (Ms. COLLINS assumed the chair.)
  Madam President, I think this is the beginning of another muddled 
message. The President says we are going to be out June 30, 1998. His 
Secretary of Defense-designate this year said we are going to be out 
June 30, 1998. Congress proposed for us to start planning for that 
eventuality by saying we are going to set that limit, it will be in the 
law, the funding will be cut off. And the President says, no, don't do 
that. So he must be leaving himself an option, which is a message to 
both our allies and any adversaries. That leaves room once again for 
someone else to come in and establish American policy for us.
  Now, on top of all of this, we are hearing about a different mission 
in Bosnia. We hear our Secretary of State talking about capturing the 
war criminals, seeking the war criminals out.
  Once again, I think we need to go back and look at the parameters of 
the mission very clearly. We must learn from what happened in Somalia. 
When there is mission creep that Congress does not approve, it is in 
effect putting our troops into a combat role that Congress has not 
sanctioned. That is what we are beginning to see in Bosnia. It was 
clearly stated in the Dayton accords that we hoped that the war 
criminals, the indicted war criminals, would be apprehended and that it 
would be done by the three parties to the agreement: the Bosnian Serbs, 
the Bosnian Muslims, and the Croats.
  I want to read a series of statements that confirm what our mission 
is and what our mission isn't.
  On July 3 of this year, State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns 
stated that a Bosnia Serb television report that NATO peacekeepers had 
been ordered to arrest Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic on site was 
``absolutely and unequivocally false.'' In support of that position, 
the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, Gen. George Joulwan, reaffirmed 
on Monday, July 7, last week, that the principal responsibility for 
apprehending war criminals lies with the parties themselves, meaning 
the Bosnian parties--in accordance with the Dayton accords.
  On March 18 of this year, General Joulwan testified before the Senate 
Armed Services Committee that the military are not policemen.
  ``I think''--again quoting General Joulwan--``the proper 
responsibility rests on the parties, the Bosnian parties. That is what 
Dayton says. . . . If we are not careful, we will go down this slippery 
slope where the military will be put into hunting down war criminals. 
This is not within my mandate.''
  On July 9, last week, the prospective Supreme Allied Commander in 
Europe, Gen. Wesley Clark, during his confirmation hearing before the 
Senate Armed Services Committee, acknowledged his understanding of his 
predecessor's mandate and affirmed his intention to execute the policy 
in the same way as General Joulwan has.
  On November 17 of last year the Secretary of Defense stated, in 
response to a specific question regarding the apprehension of war 
criminals in Bosnia, that ``the mission is to provide a secure 
environment so that all of the other civil functions can go on. . . . 
It is not to perform apprehension functions.''
  On December 18 of last year, the Secretary of Defense reaffirmed that 
``the apprehension of war criminals was not an IFOR mission and it will 
not be an SFOR mission. Locating and arresting the criminals is a 
mission for a police force.''
  On March 3 of this year, the Secretary of Defense stated that the 
apprehension of war criminals was not a part of the mission. It is a 
police function. It is not a military-type mission.
  Madam President, a change in United States and NATO policy regarding 
alleged war criminals in Bosnia could expose United States and NATO 
troops to direct combat action and ultimately do what none of us want, 
and that is jeopardize the peacekeeping progress to date.
  United States and NATO forces have made progress in Bosnia. This 
could allow the situation to deteriorate to the conditions that existed 
before the NATO IFOR and SFOR missions were established.
  Madam President, we cannot let mission creep hurt what we have done 
so far. We have spent 6 billion American taxpayer dollars on this 
mission. We have our soldiers on the ground in Bosnia right now. We 
cannot walk away from this mission prematurely, but we need to set the 
parameters of this mission and reiterate them. And the parameters are 
that our troops' work will be done June 30, 1998, and the mission 
remains the same unless the President comes back to Congress to change 
it. And that is: if we run across

[[Page S7409]]

a war criminal, yes, we would apprehend that criminal. But when we say 
we are going to be part of a force that is going to go and seek out war 
criminals, war criminals that have armies still under their control, 
that is a very different mission. We are beginning to talk about a 
combat mission that we did not sign up for in the original IFOR and 
SFOR missions, which were very clear with Congress.
  I have seen General Joulwan time after time get out his book that is 
underlined and earmarked. It is his mission statement, and he has stuck 
to the mission. If we are going to change the mission, we need to know 
it, and we need to provide the extra alertness that would be required 
for changing the mission. Congress should be consulted if we are going 
to go out and seek war criminals. And I would say to the Serbs that we 
are not doing that now. We are not doing that. And when I read 
statements by Serbs that were passed out at the recent funeral of a war 
criminal, typed in broken English and appearing in Serb-held areas in 
northeast Bosnia promising a ``head for a head'' and warning that 
``Somalia was too gentle for U.S. troops,'' I am sending a message: 
There is no change in the mission as far as U.S. troops go.
  There should not be such a change without the full accord of 
Congress. Many of us in Congress did not want to use our troops in this 
way. All of us admire and respect our troops because they have done a 
wonderful job fulfilling their mission, but if we are going to change 
that mission, we must make that decision, and we must do it knowing 
what the risks are.
  Madam President, what we should not do is permit mission creep, 
something that inches forward without our specific authorization and 
consultation, but which would put our troops into a different 
situation, a combat situation, a high alert situation, without 
understanding the full consequences of doing that.
  So I am standing here today saying I hope all of the Senate will be 
able to agree on language which says that we want the war criminals at 
the Hague; these people who have been indicted, who have committed 
atrocities, should be brought to justice. But we cannot change the 
mission of American troops under NATO auspices without a full airing. 
We cannot put our troops in the position of being targets unless we go 
into a different state of high alert.
  So I hope that we will stand together on this to say that we want to 
be part of a plan that determines how those criminals will be brought 
to justice. But right now, in the Dayton accords, it is provided that 
the parties, the Bosnian Serbs, the Muslims, and the Croats, will go 
after war criminals, as they should. It should be an international 
police force, but it is not a military mission as George Joulwan, as 
General Clark, and as our Secretaries of Defense have said for the last 
2 years. And if we are going into a different kind of mission, we ask 
the President to come forward. Do not let this mission start creeping 
without our assent, without our consultation. It is the least we can do 
for the security of the United States, for the taxpayers of America, 
for our troops on the ground, and for the integrity of our word and our 
commitment.
  Thank you, Madam President. I yield the floor.
  Mr. INHOFE addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma is recognized.
  Mr. INHOFE. Madam President, I am not sure what else can be said 
concerning the dilemma we find ourselves in right now. I think the 
distinguished junior Senator from Texas has really said it all.
  It was just last week that we had our defense authorization bill up 
before this body. We talked at that time about the desirability of 
putting some type of amendment on to stop the funding for the Bosnia 
operation for any time after June 30, 1998. Of course, I think we 
decided that it wasn't going to work out that way because if that 
happened, it might jeopardize not just the bill but would probably have 
caused a filibuster, and we didn't want that. We wanted to keep it 
moving. We need to have our authorization bill. It is imperative to our 
Nation's defense that we have it.
  So I think against the better judgment of several people we agreed to 
not have that position in. But that is the way it is going to have to 
be. I don't know any other way we are going to be able to bring our 
troops back. Clearly, the President has us over a political barrel 
right now because any time our troops get out of there--I don't care if 
it is tomorrow, if it is June 30, 1998, or if it is 10 years from now--
the fighting will start again, and anyone with any common sense, with 
any knowledge of history, knows it has happened that way, and it is 
going to continue to happen that way. And so the question is do you do 
it sooner or later.
  Those of us who were concerned about mission creep back when they 
made the decision to send troops over to Bosnia back in December of 
1995, they were to be there for, of course, 1 year. They kept saying, 
``They will be home for Christmas December 1996.'' And all of us knew 
they would not be home for Christmas in December of 1996. It just 
didn't make any sense that that promise was made. So they went over 
there to provide safety for the corridors, to keep people from crossing 
over them, and supposedly that was going to take care of the problems 
that existed.
  Well, this is not the first time in history that this has happened. 
Here it is now. We have made a commitment of 2\1/2\ years instead of 12 
months. Now the President is trying to renege on that and go beyond to 
an undetermined period of time.
  I can remember in history when we sent our Marines into Nicaragua in 
1909, and that was supposed to be for a 6-month period in 1909 because 
there were some problems with the government down there and they felt 
our intervention would stabilize things, and we did have some national 
security interests at that time, not as great as they were in other 
parts of the world, but nevertheless we sent our troops in for that 
short period of time and they were still there 13 years later. In fact, 
they never really came back until 1933. That is 24 years.
  As to Haiti, the Senator from Texas was talking about the fact that 
we still have troops in Haiti. People forget about that. We did not 
have any mission over there in the first place that was strategic to 
any of our problems in this country and yet we sent troops over to 
Haiti to supposedly try to clean up their government and run it better 
than they can run it. And now we have the same problems over there as 
we had before and we still have troops over there. We sent Marines to 
Haiti in 1915 and the same problems existed at that time. They were 
going to help with some of the stability there in Haiti and they stayed 
there until 1934.
  So now we see that we are in the middle of a classic case of mission 
creep. We are enlarging the mission. We are exposing U.S. troops to a 
whole new set of risks, and it is all without the permission of the 
American people or the permission of the Senate, but they are going to 
do it.
  Let's review for a minute the timeline in Bosnia. The President and 
administration officials pledged on numerous occasions in 1995 and 1996 
that the United States military forces would be out of Bosnia by 1996 
in the hearings that we had in the Senate Armed Services Committee. The 
Secretaries of Defense and the Secretary of State, the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, John Shalikashvili, all of them said that the 
IFOR mission would be concluded in 1 year and that there were no plans 
to extend United States presence in Bosnia beyond a 1-year timeframe. 
And they kept repeating it.
  I can remember, since I serve on the Senate Armed Services Committee, 
a meeting we had October 17, 1995, Madam President, and that was when 
General Shalikashvili said, and I am going to quote his words, not my 
words--this is General Shalikashvili, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff. He said on October 17, 1995:

       From a military perspective, as I evaluated the tasks we 
     wished this force to accomplish, it was my judgment that it 
     in fact can be done in 12 months or less. Secondly, when tied 
     to the equipping and training issue, it was my judgment that 
     that, too, can be accomplished in less than a year. And so I 
     felt it was important that we, therefore, set a target of one 
     year and then bring the force back. In the absence of that, 
     you just find yourself staying there, and that's how very 
     often mission creep comes in. The force needs to be brought 
     home and they need to resume normal training and be ready for 
     other operations. And I just think one year--

[[Page S7410]]

     I saw no military justification for that force to stay longer 
     than one year, and that is why that was my recommendation.

  This is a guy who is supposed to be running the military, the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
  I was over in Bosnia several times, but the last time I talked to 
Gen. Monte Miggs up in that northeast sector and it is his job--he is 
doing a great job, by the way, of trying to carry on some type of 
training during the time that those troops are stationed over there. 
You have two big problems that exist when you have, when you are 
leaving troops in an area. One is in the case we are in right now where 
we have just decimated the military budget, our defense budget, we are 
spending all of this money. I can remember standing on this floor in 
November 1995 when the President had made the statement that the cost 
of the deployment to Bosnia would be somewhere between $1.5 billion and 
$2 billion.
  It is now going through $7.3 billion, and where does that money come 
from? It comes from readiness, it comes from modernization, it comes 
from force strength, and it comes from quality of life. That's the only 
four places it can come from.
  Now we have an optempo rate, where our troops are being asked to do 
things that human beings really can't do. Instead of being deployed for 
the normal 115 to 120 days a year, in some cases it is twice that. And 
we keep hearing stories from the field that it is even worse, because 
with the depleted budget we are now having to cannibalize perfectly 
good F-15 engines, that's F-100 engines, to get spare parts to keep the 
ones running that are in planes right now. Of course, that is very 
labor intensive. So from the field we hear these guys are working, some 
of them, 15 and 16 hours a day. They cannot keep that up for a period 
of time.
  But I think General Miggs up there, if there is ever anyone who can 
do it, up in the Brcko area, near the Posavina corridor, he is carrying 
on training. Of course, to carry on training and perform these 
humanitarian or peacekeeping or peacemaking missions, whatever they are 
supposed to be doing over there, it means longer and longer hours. So 
they are trying to do it. But there is not one general I have talked to 
who has not said that, if we should need our troops, if something 
should happen in North Korea at the same time something happened in 
Iran--not totally inconceivable--or Iraq or anyplace else, but if we 
were challenged in two regional fronts, we would have to take those 
people, withdraw them and retrain them, before we could send them into 
combat. So it's a real serious problem.
  In that same Senate Armed Services Committee meeting of October 17, 
1995, I might add, Secretary Bill Perry said:

       I cannot conceive of the circumstances which would motivate 
     me to come back and ask an extension of that time.

  This is an extension, he's talking about, beyond Christmas of 1996.

       . . . 12 months is sufficient to do the job we're 
     describing. And I believe there is a great value, a great 
     management value to putting a definite time scale on it and 
     sticking to that time period.

  Again, he said later, in December, this is 6 weeks later, he said:

       We believe the mission can be accomplished in 1 year, so we 
     have built our plan based on that timeline. This schedule is 
     realistic because the specific militarily tasks [which are 
     changing all the time, and that's the justification they are 
     making for leaving them over there] in the agreement can be 
     completed in the first 6 months, and thereafter IFOR's role 
     will be to maintain the climate of stability that will permit 
     civil work to go forward. We expect these civil functions 
     will be successfully initiated in 1 year. But, even if some 
     of them are not, we must not be drawn into a posture of 
     indefinite garrison.

  Madam President, we are in a posture of indefinite garrison.
  Look at this in yesterday's paper, ``Clinton keeps door open to 
extending U.S. role in Bosnia.''
  Here's the problem we have. I was disturbed we had to go beyond 12 
months. Now they say we will make it 2\1/2\ years and we will be out of 
there on June 30, 1998. I went over to the NATO meeting in Brussels and 
found we had Members of Congress, Members of the other body, who were 
walking around telling our NATO friends, whispering to them, ``Don't 
worry, we won't leave you. We'll be there.''
  There is plenty of time, adequate time now to make this as the 
policy, which is the accepted policy, that is we are getting out on 
June 30, 1998. Because there is a lot of time between now and then.
  I was watching the Senator from Texas and remembering what happened 
when we had a resolution of disapproval back in October 1995. Because 
we knew, once they went over there, it was going to be very difficult 
to bring them back. Sure enough, we lost that by four votes. It was 
interesting, because the main argument that was used by the other side 
was that our troops will be back in 12 months. So who can object to 12 
months?
  I heard Senator after Senator say to me, and say privately, ``Well, I 
was going to support the resolution of disapproval and not send troops 
over there, not agree to that, but after all, the President has 
promised it will be 12 months. He's promised it would not exceed on the 
outside $2 billion.''
  I made a speech on the floor at that time and stated it would be 
closer to $8 billion. And sure enough, we are creeping through right 
now $7.3 billion. Looking back, I remember what I stated on the floor. 
And I will repeat that now, because I think it is appropriate now, 18 
months later. This is quoting myself in the Congressional Record, 
December 13, 1995.

       My conviction that the administration's intention to put 
     troops in harm's way in Bosnia is a huge mistake rests on 
     three broad arguments. First and above all, the conflict in 
     Bosnia imposes no real threat to vital American interests. 
     Simply put there is nothing in Bosnia that Americans should 
     die for.
       Second, the Dayton talks have produced a false peace, that 
     is inherently unstable and politically doomed.

  Here I was talking about the fact we go to Dayton and we have all 
these factions in there, supposedly coming to a peace agreement, but 
who wasn't at Dayton? Karadzic was not in Dayton, that's the Bosnian 
Serbs. Sure, Milosevic was there. That's Serbia. But that wasn't where 
the problem was. Those individuals who were creating the problem were 
not there. The Bosnian Serbs were not represented. Not only were they 
not represented, but none of the rogue elements were represented. We 
still had the mujahidin, the Arkan Tigers, the Black Swans, and the 
rest of them, who are still over there right now.
  So you have a flawed meeting with a flawed attendance making an 
agreement that we cannot live with.
  Finally, quoting from my statement on the floor on December 13, 1995:

       The Implementation Force [that's IFOR] plan is self-
     contradictory, and hopelessly optimistic and will expose our 
     soldiers to unreasonable risk even as they diligently pursue 
     its unrealistic objectives.

  So, that is where we are today. I think, if you look and see what 
they agreed to and what was supposed to have happened in the first 12 
months in the Dayton accords, they talked about ``we were going to have 
the elections.'' They have not had the elections. They had flawed 
elections. They said, ``The refugees would all be able to go home 
before 12 months.'' Guess what, the refugees haven't gone home and it's 
18 months. We keep finding violations of arms agreements, in the 18 
months into the 1-year agreement, and we can't pull out. I am very 
thankful we have not suffered precious casualties at this time, but I 
tell you, we predicted on the floor if we continue this mission creep 
we may not be so fortunate in the future.
  I would conclude, Madam President, that we have a responsibility to 
be responsible. If this were a time when we didn't have the 
distinguished Senator from Alaska, the chairman of the Appropriations 
Committee, having a very difficult time coming up with the money to 
keep America strong enough to meet the minimum expectations of the 
American people, which we can't, that is to be able to defend America 
on two regional fronts--if that weren't the case, maybe we could afford 
to be sending troops around the world on humanitarian missions, on 
peacekeeping missions. But we can't afford to do that, Madam President.
  So I conclude by saying we need to make it very clear that we are 
going to be out of there, and give a date certain that is still 12 
months from now. There is still plenty of time for our allies to make 
time to make that happen. I have been agonizing with this concern.
  This is not a partisan thing, by the way, Madam President. Because 
when

[[Page S7411]]

we sent troops into Somalia, George Bush was President. That was in 
December. After he had been defeated but while he was still in office, 
we sent troops over there, if you'll remember, for a period of some 3 
months to 6 months. Then, once President Clinton got in, he kept 
extending it. So we sent resolutions and resolutions, ``We want to 
bring the troops back.'' Month after month, every month we sent 
resolutions, and the years started going by, and it was not until 18 of 
our rangers were brutally murdered and their naked corpses were dragged 
through the streets of Mogadishu before the American people got 
concerned enough to force the administration to bring the troops home 
from Somalia.
  Madam President, I don't want that to happen in Bosnia. I don't want 
our troops to be dragged through the streets of Sarajevo or Tuzla or 
Brcko or any of the rest of them.
  We have experienced mission creep. We are now in a situation where 
our troops are there for an indeterminate period of time. Now is the 
time to draw the line and say that June 30, 1998, is our time that our 
troops will be coming home. Are they going to be safe over there when 
that happens? No. If we brought them home tomorrow, there would still 
be fighting once our troops were out, or June 30, or 10 years from now.
  Madam President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I rise today as an original cosponsor of 
an amendment which expresses the sense of the Senate that: ``The 
Administration should consult closely and in a timely manner with the 
Congress on the NATO-led Stabilization Force's mission concerning the 
apprehension of indicted war criminals, including any changes in the 
mission which could affect American forces.''
  From the beginning of the NATO mission in Bosnia, particularly the 
ground element--a mission which I have consistently opposed--the 
administration has been clear that U.S. forces would be used primarily 
to implement the military aspects of the Dayton accords, and assist in 
limited civilian missions at the discretion of the local IFOR or SFOR 
commander.
  On the specific issue of apprehending war criminals, the 
administration has been unequivocal--NATO troops are not charged with 
hunting down war criminals. The specific, detailed mission statement is 
set forth in a classified document; therefore, I can only use as a 
resource statements made by administration officials on this issue. The 
following is a compilation of such statements:
  Secretary Cohen, before the House National Security Committee, March 
20, 1997, in response to a question from Congressman Lantos: ``Why 
aren't we apprehending war criminals? Well, that's not the mission of 
SFOR.''
  Ken Bacon, DOD Spokesman, July 3, 1997, in response to a question 
about whether or not the administration was considering expanding the 
authority of NATO troops to arrest war criminals:

       There's been no change in our procedures. And those 
     procedures are, first of all the Dayton accord makes it very 
     clear that the formerly warring factions are responsible for 
     turning in war criminals.
       And second, our job, because the collection and detention 
     of war criminals is an act of law enforcement for law 
     enforcement activities, our rules have been clear from the 
     beginning, which is that if we encounter war criminals in the 
     course of our patrols, we would detain them and turn them 
     over to authorized law enforcement agencies. There's been no 
     change in that rule.

  Sandy Berger, National Security Adviser, July 10, 1997:

       Under SFOR's mission they may apprehend indicted war 
     criminals encountered in the course of its duties and if the 
     tactical situation permits. This was such a situation 
     (British action on July 10) . . . SFOR concluded that they 
     could detain these individuals. NATO political authorities 
     agreed with that view. SFOR acted within its mission and 
     mandate.

  Background briefing by senior administration official, July 10, 1997.

       Rules of engagement and the authority of the SFOR forces 
     permit the commander in a particular situation when he 
     encounters or is encountering war criminals and believes that 
     he has a tactical capacity to apprehend in a way that is not 
     unduly risky to exercise that authority. That continues to be 
     the authority.
       The authority here is to apprehend war criminals who are 
     encountered by SFOR where the commander makes the tactical 
     decision that he can do so.

  From the above, it is clear that war criminals are to be apprehended 
only if IFOR or SFOR forces encountered these war criminals, and only 
if the local NATO commander determined that the tactical situation 
allowed his troops to safely apprehend the war criminals.
  Now that understanding seems to be changing. We hear press reports of 
the Secretary of State urging for a more proactive role for our troops 
in hunting down war criminals in Bosnia. We also hear that the 
Secretary of Defense is opposing this policy change. What is the 
accurate situation?
  Before it is too late, and the policy is changed, it is imperative 
for the Senate to express its judgment on this important issue.
  I strongly support the apprehension of the indicted war criminals so 
that they may be brought to justice.
  The policy of ``how''--working with all of the member nations of 
SFOR--must be carefully coordinated. The current policy, as enunciated 
above by administration officials, if it is to be changed, such change 
should beforehand be the subject of the most careful consultation with 
the Congress.
  In the case of Somalia, the Congress witnessed mission creep without 
taking any action to try to stop it. The results in that case were 
disastrous--18 dead, over 70 wounded.
  We should have learned from history that the military is not an 
appropriate force for tracking down and arresting individuals. There is 
no question as to their capability--but how would that detract from 
their primary mission? What are the personal risks?
  What will be the consequences of an expansion of the SFOR mission to 
include actively seeking out and apprehending indicted war criminals? 
While I share the hopes of all that the war criminals in Bosnia will be 
brought to justice, I question the wisdom of seeing the lives of United 
States or allied troops jeopardized in an effort to hunt and arrest 
these individuals. Both IFOR and now SFOR have been able to achieve a 
measure of success in Bosnia because they have been perceived as even-
handed. That will all change if we use our troops to aggressively 
pursue indicted war criminals. Rightly or wrongly, we will been seen as 
taking sides. Our troops will become targets, the success they have 
achieved thus far will be jeopardized.
  As I said earlier, I opposed the President's decision to send United 
States ground troops to Bosnia in December 1995. But that decision is 
behind us, and the American people have invested $7 billion into the 
operations in Bosnia. Precipitous action in this area could well put at 
risk that investment. As I stated last week, that investment could 
likewise be jeopardized by Congress forcing a specific withdrawal date. 
But these are separate issues.
  Our request of the administration is simple. Do not allow a 
significant change in the mission of our troops in Bosnia without first 
coming to the Congress.
  Mr. INOUYE. Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Allard). The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, last week, the Senate expressed in very 
clear terms its view that the United States' mission in Bosnia should 
be terminated by next June, which is the administration's stated 
deadline. This was not a position that was taken without public debate. 
In fact, the Senate debate regarding the Bosnia operation began last 
Thursday evening and continued well into Friday morning. A number of 
Senators were involved in the debate at various times during the 
consideration of the DOD bill. Quite frankly, Mr. President, as we well 
know, there were some Senators--including the Senator from Delaware 
[Mr. Biden] and the Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner]--who did express 
their disagreement with having a date certain for termination of U.S. 
ground troop deployment. Mr. President, they were clearly in the 
minority on this issue.
  The Senate took this action regarding an end date as part of one of 
the

[[Page S7412]]

most important pieces of defense related legislation--the Department of 
Defense authorization bill for fiscal year 1998. Mr. President, let me 
remind my colleagues what we did this past Friday. Indeed, one of the 
reasons that I pressed so hard to have a Bosnia-related provision added 
to that bill was because of the importance of having this debate on the 
DOD authorization itself.
  Now, today, we have begun consideration of the other key defense 
bill--the Department of Defense appropriations bill. As in the 
authorization bill, I do not think we can let the fact that we 
currently have 8,000 of our troops in Bosnia go unnoticed during a 
debate on the Department of Defense appropriations.
  Just 3 days ago, we passed an amendment to the defense authorization 
bill that clearly states the Senate's desire to have United States 
troops out of Bosnia no later than June 30, 1998. The resolution we 
passed was a modification of an amendment I had introduced that would 
have imposed a hard, statutory requirement that the administration 
stick to its announced pullout date of June 30, 1998. My original 
amendment was virtually identical to the one that passed the other 
body, the House, on a vote of 278-148 that literally cut off funding 
for the Bosnia mission after that June 30 date.
  The message of the action, Mr. President, in both the House and the 
Senate is crystal clear: It is the overwhelming desire of the Congress 
that the administration pull our brave men and women out of Bosnia by 
June 30, 1998.
  In light of these strong messages, Mr. President, I was somewhat 
disappointed in what I read in the papers over the weekend. Only 1 day 
after the Senate passed its resolution, President Clinton publicly 
stated what I am afraid the administration has been thinking all 
along--the possibility that the deployment of United States troops in 
Bosnia may well continue after the present mission expires. Let's not 
forget, this is already a major extension from the original date when 
it was supposed to terminate, which was approximately the end of 
December 1996.
  The President said, ``I believe the present operation will have run 
its course by then''--referring to the June deadline--``and we'll have 
to discuss what, if any, involvement the United States should have 
there.'' Meanwhile, the White House said that an international presence 
will be necessary in Bosnia for perhaps a considerable time past June 
1998.
  Now, Mr. President, I fear these statements send the wrong message. 
By making these remarks, the administration is hinting that the United 
States might be willing to sign on to a new mission once the mandate of 
the NATO-led stabilization force, or SFOR, has run out. Mr. President, 
I think it frighteningly opens the door for additional U.S. troop 
involvement after that time. Now, this is contrary to what Congress has 
said, that the U.S. troops should be on the way home next June, not 
starting a new mission. There should be no maybes about the continued 
involvement of U.S. ground troops past the clear deadline that has been 
set by the administration and endorsed by both Houses of Congress.

  Mr. President, in 1995, President Clinton asked Congress to approve 
the deployment of United States troops to Bosnia, with an 
understanding. The understanding was that our military personnel would 
remain there for just 1 year. Well, as we all know, after the 1 year 
the original implementation force was turned into a stabilization force 
and renamed from IFOR to SFOR. It just kept on going. And as a result, 
the United States has kept 8,000 of our troops in the region under the 
premise that SFOR was somehow a completely new mission. But it 
obviously is not.
  I also do not need to remind everyone, I hope, of the ballooning 
costs of the Bosnia mission. This is really quite startling to me. 
Despite original estimates in the $2 billion range, we are now 
committed to pay at least, Mr. President, $7.7 billion, and it is going 
up. When I first raised this issue this year on the supplemental bill, 
the figure I brought to the floor was $6.5 billion. Now it is already 
up to $7.7 billion a few short weeks later. Every time there is an 
assessment of the cost of this mission, the figure goes up another $1 
billion or $2 billion.
  After this weekend, I have a new fear that when the June deadline 
rolls around this mission will undergo another name change. Maybe the 
``stabilization'' force will become the ``coordination'' force, or 
CFOR. Maybe it will become the ``maintenance'' force, or MFOR. Whatever 
the new acronym is, Mr. President, I am afraid the results will be the 
same--our ground troops will be asked to remain in Bosnia past June 
under the pretense of a new mission.
  Now, I don't doubt for a minute, Mr. President, that United States 
goals in Bosnia are to maintain the peace and to help the three sides 
rebuild a united government. While our mission has succeeded in 
stopping the fighting, we are far behind in preparing for the day when 
Bosnians will once again have to rule themselves without the benefit of 
NATO troops. In a May study of the Bosnia mission, the GAO noted there 
has been little progress in creating a united police force, or on 
building a functioning parliament, or even setting up offices for a new 
Bosnian cabinet.
  Mr. President, the best way to ensure that something never gets done 
is to constantly extend the deadline. If a teacher were to give his or 
her students a term paper assignment and tell them, ``try to get it 
done by this year and, if that's not possible, maybe next year,'' you 
can bet that the students will not be rushing off to the library to get 
the work done. In a way, that is a little like what we are doing in 
Bosnia. We are saying, ``try to comply with the Dayton accords by June, 
but if you can't, we'll stick around anyway.'' It is no wonder the 
various parties in Bosnia are not making much headway in rebuilding 
their civilian institutions, given that NATO and the United States seem 
committed, it appears, to policing this country indefinitely.
  Similarly, I do not think that our European allies will take 
seriously their own responsibilities to the region unless they clearly 
understand American intentions. I think that's why the compromise 
resolution the Senate passed last week actually included language that 
the President should inform our partners in Europe in this exercise of 
the expression of this Congress--tell them that we are planning to 
leave by June 30, 1998. I think this is a very important part of the 
Senate's position on this issue.
  The administration, our friends in Europe, and the parties to this 
conflict must all understand that this Congress does consider the June 
deadline a firm one. That is not to say that at the end of next June 
there will be no more American involvement in the region. That is not 
my position. I don't think that is the position of most Senators. As 
the Senate resolution indicates, Congress would be open to considering 
a different kind of supporting role in Bosnia. This could include 
activities such as airlift, logistics, intelligence, or equipment, for 
example. As long as such activities do not include the use of ground 
forces, and as long as the Congress is appropriately consulted, I too 
am open to considering the United States having such a supportive role 
for our allies. That is not inconsistent with the notion of making sure 
ground troops come home.

  Mr. President, there are many who feel uncomfortable with Congress 
actually using its literal ``power of the purse'' to command a 
withdrawal of U.S. troops from a military deployment. During the debate 
last week, some Members who firmly support termination of the Bosnia 
deployment by the June target date did express concern about the 
mechanism--a hard funding cutoff--that I had originally proposed. 
However, I want to point out that the reason Members of Congress turn 
to these drastic remedies, the reason I proposed it in the first place, 
and the reason the House passed such a hard date overwhelmingly is 
precisely because not only the administration but also some leaders in 
Congress seem oblivious to the calls by other Members of Congress for 
ending the mission by the target date.
  Given the statements we heard this weekend, Mr. President, it is even 
more imperative than ever that the conferees employ the strongest 
possible language regarding the June 30 pullout date when we get to the 
final version of the Defense authorization bill. I originally believed 
that a hard mandate--nearly 1 year in advance of that date--would give 
the administration more than enough time to prepare for and to 
implement an orderly withdrawal of U.S. ground forces.

[[Page S7413]]

  Unlike the President's remarks, the message from the Congress has to 
leave no room for interpretation or ambiguity. We should not just say 
that our ground troops should be back home next year, if possible. I 
think we have to say, as we have done in both Houses--and we have to 
say this in the conference report--that our men and women should be out 
of Bosnia by June 30, 1998, period.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.


                           Amendment No. 846

  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask 
for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Alaska [Mr. Stevens], for himself and Mr. 
     Inouye, proposes an amendment numbered 846.
       At an appropriate place in the bill, insert:

     SEC.   . FINDINGS.

       The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, at the Madrid 
     summit, decided to admit three new members, the Czech 
     Republic, Poland and Hungary;
       The President, on behalf of the United States endorsed and 
     advocated the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty 
     Organization to include three additional members;
       The Senate will consider the ratification of instruments to 
     approve the admissions of new members to the North Atlantic 
     Treaty Organization;
       The United States has contributed more than $20,000,000,000 
     since 1952 for infrastructure and support of the Alliance;
       In appropriations Acts likely to be considered by the 
     Senate for fiscal year 1998, $449,000,000 has been requested 
     by the President for expenditures in direct support of United 
     States participation in the Alliance; and
       In appropriations Acts likely to be considered by the 
     Senate for fiscal year 1998, $9,983,300,000 has been 
     requested by the President in support of United States 
     military expenditures in North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
     countries.

     SEC.   .

       The Secretary of Defense shall identify and report to the 
     congressional defense committees not later than October 1, 
     1997; (1) the amounts necessary, by appropriation account, 
     for all anticipated costs to the U.S., for the admission of 
     the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary to the North Atlantic 
     Treaty Organization for the fiscal years 1998, 1999, 2000, 
     2001 and 2002, and; (2) any new commitments or obligations 
     entered into or assumed by the United States in association 
     with the admission of new members to the Alliance, to include 
     the deployment of United States military personnel, the 
     provision of defense articles or equipment, training 
     activities and the modification and construction of military 
     facilities.

  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I apologize to the reading clerk for not 
having it drafted properly to start with. But I do ask that these 
changes be made so that the amendment is as read by the reading clerk.
  It is an amendment that is a direction to the Department of Defense 
to provide the Congress with two specific reports.
  First, the amounts necessary, by appropriations account, for all 
anticipated costs to the United States for the admission of three new 
members to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and that report to 
cover the current budget cycle of fiscal year 1998 through 2002.
  Second, a report on any new commitments or obligations entered into 
or assumed by our Nation in association with the admission of these new 
members of the alliance, including--it is not limited to--but including 
deployment of U.S. personnel, the provisions of defense articles or 
equipment, training activities, and modification and construction of 
military facilities.
  I am one who has still strong reservations about the determination to 
add new members to NATO. I am not opposed to NATO. I have been a firm 
supporter of NATO. On the other hand, we are doing some studies now on 
the history of the expansion of NATO and how United States 
participation in deployment of forces there has just constantly 
increased.
  We, I think, need to know now what the obligation is that we have 
undertaken and really what will be the costs of this obligation in 
connection with the expansion of NATO. This really is, I think, a 
fairly restrictive list of things that we should have. But, clearly, we 
should have this information before we proceed with any consideration 
of ratification of any agreements that have been entered into by the 
United States in connection with this expansion of NATO.
  It is, I think, one of the strange coincidences of history that NATO 
was entered into--and I will present the documentation on this later--
with the firm assurance by the then Secretary of State Dean Atchison to 
the Senate that would be no obligation at all for the deployment of 
forces to Europe by virtue of the North Atlantic Treaty that was 
entered into by the United States at the very beginning of this 
organization, the NATO organization.
  I want to be right upfront about it, that this information may 
convince Members to go one way or the other concerning the matters that 
will be presented to us later. But I don't know of anyone who could 
object to asking for this information for the use of the Congress, and 
particularly for the use of those of us who have the duty to find and 
allocate the money to maintain our national defense forces to assure 
the capability to defend this country.
  I am pleased that my friend from Hawaii has cosponsored this 
amendment in that spirit. This is just seeking information. It will in 
no way inhibit the administration--either the Department of Defense or 
the President--in their current course. But I do, as I said, still 
maintain reservations about that course because of what I perceive to 
be the costs of that course and its impact on our future ability to 
maintain our own defense.
  Mr. INOUYE addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Hawaii.
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, as appropriators, I believe it is the only 
prudent process that we can follow to at least advise ourselves and our 
colleagues as to what can be reasonably and rationally anticipated if 
we are to take this important step.
  When NATO was originally organized, I doubt if Members of Congress 
had any inkling of what the costs would be to the taxpayers of the 
United States. Whether you are for it or against it, I think it would 
be well that we enter into this new phase and very important phase with 
our eyes open.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, it is not a small amount that is in the 
bill which is before us. As this amendment points out, there is almost 
$10 billion in the request of the President for U.S. military 
expenditures pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
obligations. I do believe that it is important for us to know to what 
extent that will be increased by virtue of the cost of action that is 
proposed due to the enlargement process as far as NATO is concerned.
  Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on this amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the 
amendment be set aside so that we may proceed with the program already 
outlined by the leadership.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________