[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 98 (Friday, July 11, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S7227-S7250]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




        NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998

  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Smith of Oregon). Under the previous 
order, the Senate will now resume consideration of S. 936, which the 
clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       A bill (S. 936) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 
     1998 for military activities of the Department of Defense, 
     for military construction, and for defense activities of the 
     Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for 
     such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other 
     purposes.

  The Senate resumed consideration of the bill.
  Pending:

       Coverdell (for Inhofe-Coverdell-Cleland) amendment No. 423, 
     to define depot-level maintenance and repair, to limit 
     contracting for depot-level maintenance and repair at 
     installations approved for closure or realignment in 1995, 
     and to modify authorities and requirements relating to the 
     performance of core logistics functions.
       Wellstone amendment No. 669, to provide funds for the 
     bioassay testing of veterans exposed to ionizing radiation 
     during military service.
       Wellstone modified amendment No. 666, to provide for the 
     transfer of funds for Federal Pell Grants.
       Murkowski modified amendment No. 753, to require the 
     Secretary of Defense to submit a report to Congress on the 
     options available to the Department of Defense for the 
     disposal of chemical weapons and agents.
       Kyl modified amendment No. 607, to impose a limitation on 
     the use of Cooperative Threat Reduction funds for destruction 
     of chemical weapons.
       Kyl modified amendment No. 605, to advise the President and 
     Congress regarding the safety, security, and reliability of 
     United States Nuclear weapons stockpile.
       Dodd amendment No. 762, to establish a plan to provide 
     appropriate health care to Persian Gulf veterans who suffer 
     from a Gulf War illness.
       Dodd amendment No. 763, to express the sense of the 
     Congress in gratitude to Governor Chris Patten for his 
     efforts to develop democracy in Hong Kong.
       Reid amendment No. 772, to authorize the Secretary of 
     Defense to make available $2,000,000 for the development and 
     deployment of counter-landmine technologies.
       Bingaman modified amendment No. 799, to increase the 
     funding for Navy and Air Force flying hours, and to offset 
     the increase by reducing the amount authorized to be 
     appropriated for the Space-Based Laser program in excess of 
     the amount requested by the President.
       Feingold amendment No. 759, to limit the use of funds for 
     deployment of ground forces

[[Page S7228]]

     of the Armed Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina after June 30, 
     1998, or a date fixed by statute, whichever is later.
       Levin modified amendment No. 802 (to amendment No. 759), to 
     express the sense of Congress regarding a follow-on force for 
     Bosnia and Herzegovina.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin is recognized to 
offer an amendment relative to Air Force jets on which there shall be 
30 minutes of debate.


                         Privilege Of The Floor

  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President. I ask unanimous consent that Susanne 
Martinez, Andy Kutler, and Linda Rotblatt of my staff be granted 
privileges of the floor during further consideration of S. 936.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. President.


                           amendment No. 677

  (Purpose: To require the Secretary of Defense to select one of the 
     three new tactical fighter aircraft programs to recommend for 
                              termination)

  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I now call up amendment No. 677, and ask 
unanimous consent that Senator Kohl, the senior Senator from Wisconsin, 
be added as an original cosponsor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. Feingold], for himself and 
     Mr. Kohl, proposes an amendment numbered 677.

  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further 
reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the end of subtitle E of title I, add the following:

     SEC. 144. NEW TACTICAL FIGHTER AIRCRAFT PROGRAMS.

       (a) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit 
     to Congress a report containing the Secretary's 
     recommendation on which one of the three new tactical fighter 
     aircraft programs should be terminated if only two of such 
     programs were to be funded. The report shall also contain an 
     analysis of how the two remaining new tactical fighter 
     aircraft programs (not including the tactical fighter 
     aircraft program recommended for termination), together with 
     the current tactical aircraft assets of the Armed Forces, 
     will provide the Armed Forces with an effective, affordable 
     tactical fighter force structure that is capable of meeting 
     projected threats well into the twenty-first century.
       (b) Covered Aircraft Programs.--The three new tactical 
     fighter aircraft programs referred to in subsection (a) are 
     as follows:
       (1) The F/A-18 E/F aircraft program.
       (2) The F-22 aircraft program.
       (3) The Joint Strike Fighter aircraft program.

  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I rise today to offer an amendment 
instructing the Pentagon to recommend the cancellation of one of the 
three aviation programs currently under development to modernize our 
tactical fighter force. Canceling one of these three programs would 
save American taxpayers tens of billions of dollars, and by all 
accounts still provide our Armed Forces with an effective yet 
affordable state-of-the-art tactical fighter fleet.
  This amendment which I am offering on behalf of myself and the senior 
Senator from Wisconsin, Senator Kohl, focuses on the Pentagon's current 
acquisition strategy for three new tactical fighter programs: The Air 
Force's F-22, the Navy's F/A-18E/F, and the multiservice joint strike 
fighter.
  DOD is currently planning on purchasing some 4,400 new fighters from 
these three programs at a total cost of at least $350 billion according 
to the Congressional Budget Office.
  Numerous experts, including the CBO and the General Accounting Office 
have concluded that given our current fiscal constraints and likely 
future spending parameters, the current acquisition strategy is just 
plain unrealistic and unwise and untenable.
  The recently released Quadrennial Defense Review, a collaborative 
effort by the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and 
the individual services to reassess our strategic blueprints for our 
Armed Forces, as well as to review our inventories and projected needs, 
has recommended sharp reductions in two of these three jet fighter 
programs already, the F/A-18E/F and the F-22.
  The QDR proposed recommendations are a promising step in the right 
direction. But the problem is that the QDR still clings to the 
assumption that somehow we can adequately control a program's cost by 
simply scaling it back, just having fewer of each of the three kinds of 
planes rather than taking the tough and more wise step of simply 
terminating one of them.
  Mr. President, to understand just how serious this budget shortfall 
will be, we have to take a look back for a minute and look at the 
entire defense procurement budget comprised of a number of weapons 
systems and technology programs. But it is currently dominated by these 
three separate fighter programs.
  First, the Navy's F/A-18E/F program.
  All though the current C/D model of this airplane performed 
extraordinarily well--very well in the gulf war--and has the capability 
of achieving most of the Navy's requirements with some retrofitting, 
the Pentagon is currently still asking for 1,000 of these expensive E/F 
airplanes, with a cumulative program cost of about $89 billion, 
according to the GAO.
  The second program is the Air Force's F-22, a stealthy fighter 
intended to provide air superiority but at an extraordinary cost. This 
aircraft, which one Navy official has referred to as gold-plated, will 
cost as much as $161 million per airplane making it the most expensive 
plane in our history. In all, the F-22 program, slated to provide 440 
airplanes to the Air Force, will cost at least $70 billion.
  The final one of the three fighters is truly still in its infancy. 
The joint strike fighter, expected to provide common, affordable 21st 
century strike aircraft for the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps, is 
actually still on the drawing boards with two major contractors dueling 
for what is expected to be at least--at least--Mr. President, a $219 
billion contract for close to 3,000 airplanes.
  Although the amendment I am offering today focuses on tactical 
fighters, I think to put this in context we should mention a few of the 
other programs on the Defense Department's wish list.
  We have focused on these because these programs will also have to 
draw on a limited procurement budget over the next few years. And it 
just seems impossible that all of these programs can go forward without 
some changes. In fact, it is likely that many of these nontactical 
fighter programs will receive reduced funding in the coming years as a 
result of the drain on our limited procurement dollars, particularly 
due to going forward with all three of these jet fighters.
  These programs include the $47 billion V-22 tilt-rotor aircraft being 
built primarily for the Marine Corps and Navy. There is the $25 billion 
Comanche reconnaissance and attack helicopter program for the Army. 
There is the Air Force's $18 billion request for 80 more C-17 cargo and 
transport airplanes.
  Mr. President, in addition to these new aviation programs, we must 
also factor into account the costs of the necessary replacement of 
other aging aircraft, such as the KC-135 refueller, the C-5A, the F-
117, and the Navy's EA-6B aircraft. These are all important air assets 
that must be replaced in the next few years, Mr. President.
  That, Mr. President, is just the portion of the procurement budget 
related to aviation spending. The Navy, for example, is looking to 
increase the procurement of their surface ships, starting with another 
aircraft carrier, CVN-77, and 17 of the DDG-51 Arleigh Burke 
destroyers, as well as four new attack submarines.
  In fiscal year 1999, the Navy would like to begin procurement of the 
new San Antonio-class amphibious landing ships for our Marine 
expeditionary forces.
  Unless, Mr. President, we take immediate action to avert this train 
wreck, with respect to tactical fighter spending, there simply will not 
be enough procurement dollars to fund all of these additional aviation 
and shipping programs.

[[Page S7229]]

  And a number of experts, Mr. President, in recent months, experts on 
military spending, have tried to warn the Department of Defense of this 
impending fiscal disaster.
  CBO, GAO, Members of Congress on both sides of the aisle--even high-
ranking Pentagon officials--have all forewarned the Defense Department 
that they will not receive the procurement funding level it has 
projected and will not be able to sustain these tactical fighter 
purchases at their planned acquisition levels.
  Here, for example, is what the GAO says:

       DOD's aircraft investment strategy is a business as usual 
     approach that is wasteful--adding billions of dollars to 
     defense acquisition costs and delaying delivery of weapon 
     systems to the operational forces.

  GAO goes on to say:

       We found the DOD's aircraft procurement plans will reach 
     unsustainable levels of the procurement budget if the 
     procurement and the total DOD budgets do not increase.
       The aircraft procurement plans, if implemented as planned, 
     will require drastic reprioritization of the procurement 
     budget that will require significantly reducing the amount 
     spent on other types of procurement (ships, tracked and 
     wheeled vehicles, missiles, etc.)

  Mr. President, I understand that many of my colleagues are either 
strong proponents or opponents of one or more of these individual 
fighter programs. That is why, Mr. President, my amendment is careful 
not to target any one specific program for termination. The language in 
this amendment merely states the obvious, that the Pentagon's 
procurement budget over the next several years will not be able to 
support three costly tactical fighter programs and that the Pentagon 
must start the process of making the tough decisions.
  Let me read exactly what my amendment does. It says:

       Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a 
     report containing the Secretary's recommendation on which one 
     of the three new tactical fighter programs should be 
     terminated if only two of such programs were to be funded.
       The report shall also contain an analysis of how the two 
     remaining new tactical fighter programs (not including the 
     tactical fighter aircraft program recommended for 
     termination), together with the current tactical aircraft 
     assets of the Armed Forces, will provide the Armed Forces 
     with an effective, affordable, tactical fighter force 
     structure that is capable of meeting projected threats well 
     into the 21st century.

  That's it, Mr. President. My amendment merely requires the Pentagon 
to send us a report within 60 days with a recommendation for canceling 
one of these programs. It also requires the Pentagon to provide an 
analysis of how our current tactical fighter assets, including the F-
15, the F-117, the F/A-18C/D and others might be utilized to continue 
to provide us with air superiority should one of the costly programs be 
canceled.
  My amendment does not single out any one program. That is the 
Pentagon's responsibility. It does not cancel funding for one single 
fighter aircraft. It merely calls for a recommendation. Once that 
recommendation is made, it will be up to Congress to determine if we 
are going to follow through on that recommendation. It does not lock in 
the Congress.
  That is what my amendment is about, Mr. President, making some tough 
decisions. We must have an acquisition strategy for tactical aviation 
that is affordable and tenable and consistent with the goal of Congress 
to achieve a Federal balanced budget in the coming years. My amendment 
is an attempt to force the Defense Department to understand the gravity 
of this situation. I hope we can get back to the path of fiscal 
responsibility in this area, as well, as we have sought so hard to do 
in so many other areas.
  I reserve the balance of my time, and I yield the floor.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I wonder if I could inquire of the Senator 
from Wisconsin if he has any additional speakers?
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, not that I know of.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. COATS. How much time remains?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin has 9 minutes and 
52 seconds.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, let me yield myself 4 minutes, and then 
advise me when that 4 minutes is up.
  First of all, I want to tell the Senator from Wisconsin that those of 
us on the Armed Services Committee understand and, in fact, have raised 
many of the same questions that he has raised. These are legitimate 
questions to raise in terms of where we are going with our tactical air 
for the future, what the cost is going to be, what the need is, 
assessment and so forth. In fact, as chairman of the Airland Forces 
Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee, we held two hearings 
wherein we brought experts from the Department of Defense and outside 
the Department of Defense to come in and answer some of the very 
questions--in fact, all of the very questions--that the Senator from 
Wisconsin proposes here this morning.
  Because we share that concern, we know that unless we can 
intelligently decide on how we budget for the future, if we concentrate 
too much effort in the tactical air modernization category, we will be 
shorting other categories, because it looks like we are going to, for 
some time in the future, have a pretty fixed cost in terms of what we 
are spending for defense.
  Many of the questions that were asked by the Senator from Wisconsin 
were posited to those who came before our committee, and we have had 
personal discussions with the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the 
Air Force, Secretary of the Navy, and others on this very question.
  As the Senator stated, the Department has just concluded a major 
study called the Quadrennial Defense Review, and as a result of that, 
the Secretary of Defense, former Senator Cohen, now Secretary Cohen, 
recommended very significant changes to the tactical air. He called for 
a significant reduction in the amount of F-22 buys, from 448 planes to 
339. Even more, for the F-18E/F, from 1,000 to 548--about a 50 percent 
reduction, and then a significant reduction and decrease of the joint 
strike fighter.

  Now, in addition to that, the Secretary acknowledged that a process 
that was initiated by Senator Lieberman and myself, with the support of 
Senator McCain and then-Senator Cohen and others, acknowledged that we 
are waiting for the review of the National Defense Panel, which is an 
outside group of experts which will give us a separate assessment from 
the Department of Defense in terms of this question and a number of 
other questions. It is a look into the future in terms of what we need, 
all throughout our defense posture and structure, but particularly in 
relationship to our tactical air needs.
  This report for the National Defense Panel will be forthcoming around 
December 15, and the committee awaits that with great anticipation. We 
are working hand in hand with the Secretary of Defense, with the 
Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs, with the National Defense 
Panel, through the committee efforts, to try to address the very 
questions that the Senator from Wisconsin raised.
  The reason why we object to this particular amendment at this 
particular time is that if we do a short-term study on the termination, 
recommending the termination of one of three programs, we place any one 
of those three in jeopardy. It may be that the National Defense Panel, 
the Secretary of Defense, the future analysis will conclude a different 
kind of a mix or moving forward with a different balance in order to 
achieve the cost savings.
  If we go forward and precipitously cancel one of those programs, we 
put one of our services in great jeopardy. If we cancel F-22 on a 
short-term analysis, we leave the Air Force naked in terms of providing 
for tactical air defenses for the future. If we cancel F/A-18E/F, we 
leave the Navy--who made a decision not to go forward immediately--we 
leave them, as we are retiring F-14's, without carrier capability with 
the F/A-18E/F. If we cancel joint strike fighters, we leave the Marine 
Corps totally without resources for the future because they are betting 
their whole future on JSF's.
  It would be an egregious mistake at this time to, within a 60-day 
period of time, require the Secretary to do something that they have 
spent months and months and months of analysis on, then requiring 
additional months of analysis to come up with that conclusion.
  I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from Missouri.

[[Page S7230]]

  Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I thank my distinguished friend from 
Indiana.
  I rise to express my opposition to the Feingold amendment. I 
understand, as the Senator from Indiana does, the need to deal with the 
fiscal problems the Department of Defense will face in coming years. We 
are all very much aware of those, and we know that choices have to be 
made. We know we have to operate within a budget.
  Mr. President, the Department of Defense has just completed its 
Quadrennial Defense Review. Not all of us like what the QDR had to say, 
but it was a strategy-based plan and decision for the future. This fall 
and early this winter, as the Senator from Indiana has just pointed 
out, the National Defense Panel will come out with another review of 
the Department's future. Just how many strategic essays does the 
sponsor of this amendment want? We can run around and order more 
studies conducted. Somehow, conducting studies makes thin soup. We can 
continue to put more of a paperwork burden on the Department of 
Defense, but that does not change the need for us to stay within the 
budget that has already been adopted by this Congress, to put us on a 
path to balance the budget by the year 2002, or sooner, I hope. We know 
those numbers. We know the maximum we can allot, and another study does 
not change the obligation of Congress to make tough choices based on 
what the Department of Defense has told us.
  The Armed Services Committee has held hearings. They have asked these 
questions. I say for my friends that the Defense Appropriations 
Subcommittee has also held hearings. We have also gone over all of 
these items and asked these questions. The sponsor and other Members 
are interested in where we stand and what the best thinking of the 
Department of Defense is today. I invite them to review the testimony 
that has been presented at those hearings and also to review the 
recommendations of the National Defense Panel.
  Technology moves on. We need to provide our military personnel with 
the finest equipment available in the present, as well as in the short- 
and long-term future. Technology is not cheap. But it does save lives. 
It protects our freedom; it protects our national security and 
international peace. These goals are worthy objectives. It is worth the 
cost. If some in this body do not believe it is worth the cost, I 
strongly disagree with them, and I will fight them on that.
  We are currently in the process of procuring the Navy's No. 1 
priority. It happens to be tactical aircraft for its carrier fleet. 
This is a fleet which the Armed Services Committee, and I predict the 
full Senate, will shortly show its support by advancing $345 million in 
this bill in order to bring the ship online and to do it faster and 
cheaper. This is a commitment to naval aviation. We need the carriers 
and the airplanes on the deck. Enough strategic studies. Let's get on 
with the program.

  I appreciate the time. I urge my colleagues to defeat this amendment.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, let me again remind the body that this 
does not require the termination of any one of the three jet fighters. 
It asks for a recommendation from the Department of Defense within 60 
days as to which of the three should be terminated, if that became 
fiscally necessary.
  Second, it is simply not the view of everyone who knows a lot about 
this subject that this would jeopardize our national security or the 
defense capability of our Armed Forces. Take a look at the GAO reports, 
the CBO reports, the analysis of a number of military experts--that is 
just not the case. I hope the folks who have urged me to look at the 
hearing testimony which I and my staff have looked at with regard to 
the merits of these airplanes, would give the same kind of attention to 
the analysis, fiscal analysis and other analysis of others who we often 
rely on to give us advice about the effectiveness and cost efficiency 
of various programs, including the GAO and the CBO, as well as military 
experts.
  Look, I don't think anyone thinks these are not good planes. These 
are great planes that are being proposed. I went down and spent part of 
a morning seeing the wonderful E/F planes, but what we see here is a 
credit card mentality that somehow we can just have it all. There is no 
real plan here to make sure that we don't end up trying to have all of 
these things and, as a result, not end up being able to truly pay for 
the ones we most need.
  One of the arguments that came out of the QDR that was cited by the 
Senator from Indiana is that there are ideas about bringing down the 
cost of each of these by reducing the number of E/F's, reducing the 
number of F-22's, and reducing the number of joint strike fighters. It 
is suggested significant savings can be achieved by reducing the size 
and scope of the fighter programs. I certainly do not question the 
motives of those who say that. But the idea we can maintain all three 
of these fighter programs is simply inconsistent with balancing the 
Federal budgets.
  Two months ago, the Senate Armed Services Committee received 
testimony from CBO with respect to proposals to merely reduce, as has 
been suggested by QDR, rather than cancel these tactical fighter 
programs. In that testimony, CBO explained how the Air Force had 
proposed last year to buy 124 F-22's over the 1998 to 2003 period. This 
year, the Air Force has revised that estimate and proposed purchasing 
just 70 F-22's during the 5-year period. That is a reduction in terms 
of numbers of over 40 percent of the number of airplanes. But despite 
buying 54 fewer airplanes and reducing the buy by over 40 percent, CBO 
noted this, and I think it is very significant, that the funding level 
for this buy remained almost the same, at about $20.4 billion now 
compared with $21.5 billion in last year's estimate. Why? Unit cost. If 
you don't build more airplanes up to a high level, then you don't get 
the benefit of the reduced cost. You end up paying almost the same for 
much fewer airplanes.

  CBO pointed out that is a savings of about $1.1 billion, despite 
buying 54 fewer planes. In other words, we reduced the F-22 buy by over 
42 fewer airplanes, but saved only about 5 percent of the funding.
  I ask my colleagues to consider the Pentagon's track record and the 
countless aviation programs that have promised so much in terms of cost 
savings and have delivered so little in terms of cost savings. In fact, 
the GAO estimates that the Pentagon's projections with respect to 
aircraft procurement typically have cost overruns of 20 to 40 percent.
  Clearly, that is not enough--and this may even exacerbate our budget 
problems--to simply propose reducing any one of these three planes 
without eliminating one.
  Time and time again, the Pentagon has promised an aviation program, 
promising large quantities of new aircraft at a given price, only to 
continually scale back the size of such program until we are receiving 
small quantities of aircraft but paying huge sums of money for those.
  The B-2 is a tremendous example. In 1986, the Reagan administration 
told us we were going to get 132 B-2's at a cost of $441 million per 
airplane. In 1990, the Bush administration revised this number and 
said, let's only have 75 B-2's, but at a cost of $864 million per 
airplane.
  Of course, by late 1996, we were on track to buy 20 B-2's at a cost 
of roughly $2.3 billion per copy. This isn't saving money. Over the 
course of a decade, Mr. President, we received less than one-sixth of 
the number of airplanes originally proposed, and we paid more than five 
times the original price quoted per airplane.
  Of the three tactical fighter programs identified in my amendment, 
the two programs currently under production, the F-22 and E/F, have 
already experienced this sort of program instability. In 1986, the Air 
Force originally proposed we buy 750 F-22's. That number was reduced to 
648 in 1991, 440 in 1996, and now, in 1997, the QDR proposes purchasing 
just 339 of these aircraft.
  Likewise, the Pentagon claims that the Navy and Marine Corps 
originally intended to purchase 1,300 Super Hornets. In 1992, with the 
Marine Corps dropout, this figure went to 1,000, and now the QDR is 
recommending this number be dropped to as low as 548 of these 
airplanes.
  Again, we are buying fewer and fewer of these airplanes and we are 
paying more and more for them. That is precisely, Mr. President, why 
merely reducing the quantities of the tactical fighters, just reducing 
the numbers, will not avert the fiscal train wreck

[[Page S7231]]

that is certain to occur if we continue to fund all three of these 
programs.
  That is why GAO has called this ``business as usual,'' and that is 
what it is. It completely shirks responsibility for how we are possibly 
going to afford all three of these programs 5 years from now.
  I hope my colleagues will not follow this road to fiscal 
irresponsibility and instead will support my amendment that simply 
says: Have the Pentagon tell us, within 60 days, which of these planes 
you can most do without, how they would go forward without one of these 
planes, and give us guidance on this so we can make the best decision 
here. Mr. President, we cannot afford these three fighters, and we have 
to make a decision at some point in the future about it.
  I reserve the remainder of my time.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I inquire how much time remains on each 
side.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin has 3 minutes 4 
seconds. The Senator from Indiana has 2 minutes.
  Mr. COATS. I ask the Senator from Wisconsin if he has any additional 
speakers. If so, we can let them go ahead and we can both wrap up.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I have no additional speakers.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, my understanding is that we have 2 minutes 
left.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, let me try to wrap up quickly in 2 minutes 
here for those Senators who are listening.
  The Senator from Wisconsin says that essentially makes the argument 
that a decision has to be made now regarding the future of tactical air 
purchases that will provide air defense security for the United States 
for 15 to 20 years in the future. He said we need a recommendation. He 
said we need a recommendation now as to what that decision ought to be. 
He says we are trying to have it all.
  Those arguments are based on the situation as it existed before the 
Quadrennial Defense Review. The QDR was reported and the Secretary of 
Defense, former Senator Cohen, certified that changes needed to be made 
along the lines of what the Senator was stating, except instead of 
saying ``cancel one,'' the Secretary said we need to dramatically 
reduce the amount. The threat isn't such that we need the same amount 
as we formerly had. That is going to save a very significant amount of 
money. But a balanced approach allows us to address the needs of Marine 
tactical air, Navy tactical air and Air Force tactical air.
  If you go forward and cancel one of those, one of those services is 
going to be left naked, without adequate tactical air. So the balanced 
approach that dramatically reduces the number of F-18's, the number of 
F-22's, and the joint strike fighter number, is the approach they want 
to take.
  Second, the final decision hasn't been made. The QDR report is 4 
years. The panel will look out into the future and give us more 
information on that decision. Secretary Cohen has only been there 6 
months; give him time to work the process. We are aware of this 
problem. As chairman of the Air-Land Committee, we have held hearings. 
We deny that we have put severe cost caps on the F-22. So we have 
already taken that action.
  So I urge our Members to support the efforts of the committee in 
recognizing the problem and going forward and addressing it, but not in 
the draconian way the Senator from Wisconsin advocated.
  Mr. FEINGOLD addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin is recognized.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I am just a little puzzled as to how the 
term ``draconian'' can be applied to my amendment. What does my 
amendment actually call for? The Defense Department, on this issue--or 
at least the advocates--seem so nervous about talking about this 
problem that we can't afford these three airplanes that they are 
referring to an amendment as ``draconian,'' which only asks the Defense 
Department to give us their opinion, tell us what they think. If you 
had to give up one of these three airplanes, which one would it be and 
how would you proceed?
  I would understand if this was a ridiculous question and why ask it 
of them. But it isn't. The GAO has said that the E/F is a good 
airplane, but it is not that much better than the C/D, and it is going 
to cost $17 billion more. There are others who are really questioning 
whether this is a good idea. How can it possibly be termed 
``draconian'' to simply ask the Defense Department to give us their 
opinion? It doesn't require a decision.
  If the crisis that the Senator from Indiana and I both agree may be 
coming has to be dealt with later, this is the kind of information that 
would be useful for us to have. We are not required to act on it. The 
Defense Department is not required to change their mind. How can this 
be described as draconian? What troubles me about that characterization 
is, what are we afraid of here as Members of Congress? Openly 
discussing the fact that there are some questions about whether we can 
afford this and whether we really need all three of these planes?
  This is really a business-as-usual attitude. The Defense Department 
will be better off and this country will be better off if it starts to 
join in the fiscal responsibility that all of us have been calling for. 
So I am very concerned that the Members of the Senate, who will vote on 
this soon, know that all this does is ask for a report within 60 days. 
It is asking for an advisory opinion from the Defense Department: If we 
had to cut one of these three planes, which one would it be? What 
possible harm would that be? I ask my colleagues to support this and 
help us solve what we all agree is an impending problem with regard to 
fiscal spending. How much time do I have?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There are 30 seconds.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Has all time expired except for that 30 seconds?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. I yield the remainder of my time and ask for the yeas 
and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.


                     Amendment No. 799, as Modified

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question now recurs on amendment No. 799. 
There are 15 minutes for debate, evenly divided.
  Who seeks time?
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from 
North Dakota.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I rise to support the amendment offered by 
the Senator from New Mexico, Senator Bingaman. My hope is that we will 
approve this amendment and save the $118 million that has been added to 
this bill for something called the space-based laser program. In 
supporting the Senator from New Mexico, I want to point out to my 
colleagues that the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization has reported 
to the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, ``There is no validated 
military requirement for space-based laser.''
  I will read that again because I think it is critically important. 
The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization has reported to the 
appropriations subcommittee, ``There is no validated military 
requirement for space-based laser.''
  Yet, $118 million is added to this authorization bill for the space-
based laser program. Last year, the Congressional Budget Office 
reported that the cost of deploying 20 space-based lasers, starting in 
the year 2006, would be $24.6 billion. According to Defense Week, 
however, the Pentagon's Program Analysis and Evaluation Office 
estimates the cost of the space-based laser at closer to $45 billion. 
Neither estimate includes the annual cost of replacing the space-based 
laser satellites. The Congressional Budget Office pegged those expenses 
at $1.6 billion per year.
  The question is, do we need it and can we afford it? That is a 
question we ought to ask about almost everything, I suppose. Do we need 
it and can we afford it? In answer to the first question--do we need it 
at this point?--it seems to me that the answer is no.
  The experts themselves tell us we don't need it, and the adding of 
$118 million continues the incessant desire by the Congress, over many, 
many years, to throw money at this program. And $100 billion has been 
spent on national missile defense in over four decades. The question 
is, what have we

[[Page S7232]]

gotten for the $100 billion? What would $100 billion have done invested 
in other areas of our country or spent for other purposes? Then, what 
have we gotten for our $100 billion invested in national missile 
defense?
  In North Dakota, we have the remnants of what was the free world's 
only antiballistic missile program. It was opened after the Nation 
spent billions and billions of dollars on it. Then we mothballed it 
within 30 days of its being declared operational.
  America's taxpayers have a right to question and wonder whether this 
is a wise use of their money? If I felt this program was a critical 
element of what is necessary for this country's defense, I would be 
here supporting it. But the Pentagon doesn't feel it is a critically 
important program, necessary for our country's defense. That is why 
they didn't ask for the $118 million. That is why the $118 million is 
now being added here in the authorization bill.
  The Senator from New Mexico asks that we take this $118 million out 
of this bill. I support the Senator from New Mexico on the question of, 
do we need it and can we afford it? The answer is no on both counts. It 
is not just an answer that I give; it is an answer that comes from 
military officials themselves who say there is no validated military 
requirement for the space-based laser.
  Mr. President, I hope that when we vote on this amendment, those who 
wish to save money, those who wish to stop spending money that we don't 
have on things we don't need will decide that we will approve the 
amendment offered by the Senator from New Mexico and cut the $118 
million for this program, which has been added to this program in this 
defense authorization bill.
  Mr. President, I thank the Senator from New Mexico for yielding me 
time, and I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from 
Oklahoma.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
  Mr. INHOFE. I thank the Senator for yielding.
  It would be awful difficult to try to express my beliefs on this in 2 
minutes. I would only say that this euphoria that we seem to enjoy 
around here that there is no threat is one that is of more concern to 
me than anything else we talk about.
  When you say, can we afford it, I often wonder can we afford not to 
do it. The whole argument that has been made on this space-based 
amendment by the distinguished Senator from New Mexico has been that 
right now there is nothing targeted at the United States. And I know 
the President has said in his State of the Union Message that there is 
nothing targeted at the United States for the first time in 
contemporary history when in fact we do not have any way of knowing 
that.
  I suggest you might remember the hearings on Anthony Lake when he was 
trying to become the Director of Central Intelligence. We made a very 
conclusive point that right now there is no way of telling. There is no 
verification. I would suggest you remember what Gen. John Shalikashvili 
said. He said there is no verification process. Then he went on to say, 
``But I can tell you we don't have missiles pointed at Russia.''
  That is really comforting, isn't it, to think it is just kind of a 
gentleman's agreement that you do not aim at us and we will not aim at 
you. But let us assume that we could verify today or at the beginning 
of this debate that there is nothing aimed at the United States. It can 
be retargeted in a matter of minutes.
  I would like to quote from Gen. Igor Sergeyev, the Commander in chief 
of the Russian Strategic Forces. He said, ``Missiles can be retargeted 
and launched from this war room mostly in a matter of minutes.''
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 2 minutes have expired.
  Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the amendment by 
the Senator from New Mexico to reduce funding for the space-based laser 
program. The space-based laser program is one of the most important 
technology development programs in the Department of Defense. It could 
provide for global boost phase defense against all types of ballistic 
missiles from short-range tactical missiles to long-range strategic 
missiles.
  It would be shortsighted for the United States to constantly abandon 
this development effort at a time when the long-range missile threat is 
growing. The space-based laser program is the only future oriented 
program remaining at the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization. With 
the exception of space-based laser, BMDO is focused almost exclusively 
on near-term development and deployment efforts.
  This is an unbalanced approach which mortgages our future for near-
term capability, and in my view we should have a more balanced 
approach, one which continues to invest in high payoff future systems 
while deploying near-term capability.
  Mr. President, the space-based laser program has been one of the best 
managed programs in the history of the Department of Defense. 
Unfortunately, the department has only requested $30 million for this 
important program in fiscal year 1998. The Armed Services Committee did 
the responsible thing by adding additional funds to ensure that this 
program continues to make technical progress. It would be highly 
irresponsible to cut this funding at this time.
  I strongly urge my colleagues to oppose the amendment by the Senator 
from New Mexico.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, how much time remains on 
our side?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 3 minutes 19 seconds.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I rise in strong 
opposition to the Bingaman amendment. It would cut funding that is 
necessary for the space-based laser program. This program is making 
tremendous technical progress. DOD acknowledges that additional funds 
are required for this purpose and is working to identify those 
additional funds in the outyears.
  This has been one of the best managed programs in the history of U.S. 
ballistic missile defense efforts. You cannot often say that, that the 
program is on budget, on time, reliable, and even under severe funding 
constraints it has continued to make remarkable technical progress. It 
offers the best hope for the future of providing highly effective 
global boost phase defense against ballistic missiles of all ranges.
  There was an independent review team appointed by the directer of 
BMDO to study the future of the SBL Program that has recommended that 
this program transition to the development of a space technology 
demonstrator for launch in the year 2005. And the funding contained in 
this bill supports the recommendation. It does not violate the ABM 
Treaty, for those who may be concerned. It keeps our options open to 
deploy this system.
  I get very concerned, Mr. President, when year after year--and this 
the seventh straight year--there has been opposition expressed on the 
floor in spite of the full support of the committee on this program. 
This is a tremendously important program, and I think my colleagues 
need to understand that there is an expansion of the number of 
countries possessing ballistic missiles, not only nuclear but chemical 
and biological. These warheads present a serious challenge to the 
security of the United States. They are all over the world--North 
Korea, Iran, Iraq, just to name a few--China. They threaten our troops 
and they threaten our cities, and to take away a technology that can 
protect those cities, protect those troops in the field is outrageous. 
It is outrageous. It is immoral. I do not understand the intensity of 
the effort to do this year after year after year.
  As the number of countries with these ballistic missiles continues to 
increase and as the range of those missiles increases, the expansion in 
the number of targets to defend will dramatically increase. With this 
technology, we are able to get these missiles in their boost phase and 
make the

[[Page S7233]]

debris from those missiles fall back on the aggressor or the firer of 
the missile.
  That is what this technology is all about. That is why it is so 
important, Mr. President. And to come down here year after year, time 
after time, and arbitrarily try to kill a program that has been on 
budget, on time, supported by the defense people and protecting our 
troops, protecting our cities is flat out irresponsible. There is 
absolutely no justification for it anywhere.
  I urge my colleagues to look very, very carefully at what they are 
doing here because if this vote were to prevail and this amendment were 
to be passed, it would do serious damage to our security and, frankly, 
put our cities at risk, our bases at risk and our troops at risk 
throughout the world.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, how much time remains?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 2 minutes remaining.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, first I would like unanimous consent to 
add Senator Moseley-Braun as a cosponsor of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, let me first just clarify what we are 
about here. The amendment that Senator Dorgan and Senator Moseley-Braun 
and I have offered is not an amendment to cut out the funding that the 
administration has requested in this area. It is to support the funding 
that the administration is requesting in this area. The administration 
in its budget said that it wanted $28.8 million in the space-based 
laser program this year, and that is exactly what we are proposing.
  Now, at the committee level and the subcommittee level an additional 
$118 million, or essentially five times as much funding, was added to 
the request of the administration. What we are trying to do is say let 
us go with what the Pentagon requested. That is not an unreasonable 
position.
  Last evening, Senator Lott spoke in opposition to our amendment, and 
he said clearly in his view the space-based laser was, and I think this 
is an exact quote, ``the national missile defense option of choice.''
  That is just flat wrong. The Pentagon has made it very clear that 
their option of choice is the ground-based interceptor which we are 
funding through the National Missile Defense Program in this budget. In 
fact, we are funding it at twice the level that the administration had 
earlier requested. Instead of the plan of spending $2.3 billion over 
the next 5 years, we are going to spend $4.6 billion on that.

  I support that, and our amendment does nothing to interfere with 
that. So the option of choice is the ground-based program which we have 
already agreed to go ahead and fund.
  The real question here is where is the money coming from? If we are 
going to do this space-based laser, where is the money coming from? We 
would think it totally irresponsible for the administration to come in 
with this kind of request in 1998 if they could not tell us what they 
were going to do in future years to follow on in building this so-
called demonstrator. But we think nothing of just adding it ourselves 
and saying, well, we will worry later about how we are going to fund 
this thing. So that is the issue.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has expired.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to support the 
amendment.
  I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment. 
The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Missouri [Ms. Mikulski] is 
necessarily absent.
  The result was announced--yeas 43, nays 56, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 171 Leg.]

                                YEAS--43

     Akaka
     Baucus
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Breaux
     Bryan
     Bumpers
     Byrd
     Chafee
     Cleland
     Conrad
     Daschle
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Glenn
     Graham
     Harkin
     Hollings
     Jeffords
     Johnson
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murray
     Reed
     Reid
     Robb
     Rockefeller
     Sarbanes
     Torricelli
     Wellstone
     Wyden

                                NAYS--56

     Abraham
     Allard
     Ashcroft
     Bennett
     Bond
     Brownback
     Burns
     Campbell
     Coats
     Cochran
     Collins
     Coverdell
     Craig
     D'Amato
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Domenici
     Enzi
     Faircloth
     Frist
     Gorton
     Gramm
     Grams
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Hatch
     Helms
     Hutchinson
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Inouye
     Kempthorne
     Kyl
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     McCain
     McConnell
     Murkowski
     Nickles
     Roberts
     Roth
     Santorum
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith (NH)
     Smith (OR)
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thurmond
     Warner

                             NOT VOTING--1

       
     Mikulski
       
  The amendment (No. 799), as modified, was rejected.
  (Ms. COLLINS assumed the chair.)
  Mr. THURMOND. Madam President, I move to reconsider the vote by which 
the amendment was rejected.
  Mr. LEVIN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 677

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question now is on agreeing to amendment 
No. 677 offered by Senator Feingold. The yeas and nays have been 
ordered. The clerk will call the roll.
  Mr. BYRD. Madam President, is there supposed to be an explanation of 
this amendment?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There was no time allowed for further debate 
on the amendment.
  Mr. BYRD. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that there be 4 
minutes equally divided for purposes of explanation.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered. The Senate will be in order.
  Who yields time?
  Mr. FEINGOLD addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin is recognized for 2 
minutes.
  The Senate will be in order.
  The Senator from Wisconsin.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Thank you, Madam President.
  This amendment asks that the Defense Department, within 60 days, 
issues a report to tell us which of the three planned jet fighters 
should be terminated because of the obvious problem that we don't have 
enough money in the procurement budget to have all three of these--the 
F-22 of the Air Force, the F-18E/F of the Navy, or the joint strike 
fighter that is being planned as a commonality plane for three branches 
of our armed services.
  The GAO, CBO, many military experts, and others agree that it is not 
possible for us to afford all three of these, and it is also not an 
answer, as the QDR suggests, to simply reduce each of the three, 
because the problem is that the unit cost of each plane is so high that 
at the lower number of planes that are produced, you don't get the 
savings. This is what happened with the B-2 bomber.
  We are facing a train wreck with regard to this, and we need some 
guidance from the Defense Department about which of the three should 
go, if that is what we have to do in order to continue to balance the 
budget.
  Thank you, Madam President.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. COATS addressed the Chair.
  The Senator from Indiana is recognized.
  Mr. COATS. Madam President, the Senator from Wisconsin has raised 
legitimate questions about the cost of future tactical air purchases. 
The Senate Armed Services Committee has raised these questions 
repeatedly with the Department of Defense, holding hearings, and 
received a great deal of testimony. The Secretary of Defense, former 
Senator Bill Cohen, has recommended a balanced approach by dramatically 
reducing the number of planes purchased for each of the three 
categories--F-18E/F, joint strike fighter, and the F-22.
  No final decision has been made. The committee has put severe cost 
constraints on engineering, manufacturing and development for the F-22. 
We are

[[Page S7234]]

working on this problem. We have a national defense panel that will 
report to us in December. To make a precipitous decision, or even a 
precipitous recommendation, of canceling one of those programs puts 
one, either the joint strike fighter, F-22, or F-18E/F, in jeopardy. It 
leaves the services in jeopardy. If you cancel one, you either leave 
the Navy, Marines, or Air Force naked without tactical air capability 
they need for the future.
  I don't think now is the time to take this approach. I think we will 
be making these decisions over the next several months, but we need to 
rely on the Secretary and others and the bipartisan recommendation of 
the Armed Services Committee before moving on this. So I recommend a 
vote against the Feingold amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has expired. The question now is on 
agreeing to amendment No. 677 offered by the Senator from Wisconsin 
[Mr. Feingold]. The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will 
call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Maryland [Ms. Mikulski] 
and the Senator from Louisiana [Ms. Landrieu] are necessarily absent.
  The result was announced--yeas 19, nays 79, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 172 Leg.]

                                YEAS--19

     Boxer
     Bryan
     Bumpers
     Byrd
     Durbin
     Feingold
     Grassley
     Harkin
     Johnson
     Kerrey
     Kohl
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Moseley-Braun
     Reid
     Rockefeller
     Torricelli
     Wellstone
     Wyden

                                NAYS--79

     Abraham
     Akaka
     Allard
     Ashcroft
     Baucus
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Breaux
     Brownback
     Burns
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Cleland
     Coats
     Cochran
     Collins
     Conrad
     Coverdell
     Craig
     D'Amato
     Daschle
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Enzi
     Faircloth
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Frist
     Glenn
     Gorton
     Graham
     Gramm
     Grams
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Hatch
     Helms
     Hollings
     Hutchinson
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Kempthorne
     Kennedy
     Kerry
     Kyl
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     McCain
     McConnell
     Moynihan
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nickles
     Reed
     Robb
     Roberts
     Roth
     Santorum
     Sarbanes
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith (NH)
     Smith (OR)
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thurmond
     Warner

                             NOT VOTING--2

     Landrieu
     Mikulski
       
  The amendment (No. 677) was rejected.
  Mr. THURMOND. Madam President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. DOMENICI. I move to lay it on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. DOMENICI. I ask unanimous consent the pending amendment be set 
aside.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                           Amendment No. 803

 (Purpose: To enable the County of Los Alamos, New Mexico to function 
without annual assistance payments under the Atomic Energy Communities 
   Act of 1955 through economic development with additional positive 
                 impact to the Pueblo of San Indefonso)

  Mr. DOMENICI. Madam President, I have an amendment that I will send 
to the desk that has been agreed to on both sides. Senator Bingaman is 
my cosponsor. It relates to the County of Los Alamos, NM.
  I send the unprinted amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate 
consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from New Mexico [Mr. Domenici], for himself, 
     and Mr. Bingaman proposes an amendment numbered 803.

  Mr. DOMENICI. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that reading 
of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

     SEC.   . FINAL SETTLEMENT OF DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY COMMUNITY 
                   ASSISTANCE PAYMENTS TO LOS ALAMOS COUNTY UNDER 
                   AUSPICES OF ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY ACT OF 
                   1955.

       (a) The Secretary of Energy on behalf of the federal 
     government shall convey without consideration fee title to 
     government-owned land under the administrative control of the 
     Department of Energy to the Incorporated County of Los 
     Alamos, Los Alamos, New Mexico, or its designee, and to the 
     Secretary of the Interior in trust for the Pueblo of San 
     Ildefonso for purposes of preservation, community self-
     sufficiency or economic diversification in accordance with 
     this section.
       (b) In order to carry out the requirement of subsection (a) 
     the Secretary shall--
       (1) no later than 3 months from the date of enactment of 
     this Act, submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a 
     report identifying parcels of land considered suitable for 
     conveyance, taking into account the need to provide lands--
       (A) which are not required to meet the national security 
     missions of the Department of Energy;
       (B) which are likely to be available for transfer within 
     ten years; and
       (C) which have been identified by the Department, the 
     County of Los Alamos, or the Pueblo of San Ildefonso, as 
     being able to meet the purposes stated in subsection (a),
       (2) no later than 12 months after the date of enactment of 
     this Act, submit to the appropriate Congressional committees 
     a report containing the results of a title search on all 
     parcels of land identified in paragraph (1), including an 
     analysis of any claims of former owners, or their heirs and 
     assigns, to such parcels. During this period, the Secretary 
     shall engage in concerted efforts to provide claimants with 
     every reasonable opportunity to legally substantiate their 
     claims. The Secretary shall only transfer land for which the 
     United States government holds clear title.
       (3) no later than 21 months from the date of enactment of 
     this Act, complete any review required by the National 
     Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321-4375) with 
     respect to anticipated environmental impact of the conveyance 
     of the parcels of land identified in the report to Congress; 
     and
       (4) no later than 3 months after the date, which is the 
     later of--
       (A) the date of completion of the review required by 
     paragraph (3); or
       (B) the date on which the County of Los Alamos and the 
     Pueblo of San Ildefonso submit to the Secretary a binding 
     agreement allocating the parcels of land identified in 
     paragraph (1) to which the government has clear title,

     submit to the appropriate Congressional committees a plan for 
     conveying the parcels of land in accordance with the 
     agreement between the County and the Pueblo and the findings 
     of the environmental review in paragraph (3).
       (c) The Secretary shall complete the conveyance of all 
     portions of the lands identified in the plan with all due 
     haste, and no later than 9 months, after the date of 
     submission of the plan under paragraph (b)(4).
       (d) If the Secretary finds that a parcel of land identified 
     in subsection (b) continues to be necessary for national 
     security purposes for a period of time less than ten years or 
     requires remediation of hazardous substances in accordance 
     with applicable laws that delays the parcel's conveyance 
     beyond the time limits provided in subsection (c), the 
     Secretary shall convey title of that parcel upon completion 
     of the remediation or after that parcel is no longer 
     necessary for national security purposes.
       (e) Following transfer of the land pursuant to subsection 
     (c), the Secretary shall make no further assistance payments 
     under section 91 or section 94 of the Atomic Energy Community 
     Act of 1955 (42 U.S.C. 2391; 2394) to county or city 
     governments in the vicinity of Los Alamos National 
     Laboratory.

  Mr. DOMENICI. Madam President, since the 1950's, the Department of 
Energy and its predecessors have made assistance payments to the county 
of Los Alamos, NM. Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1955, this was 
accomplished in recognition of the dependence of the community on the 
Atomic Energy Commission's, and later the DOE's, facilities. Their 
facilities, worth in the hundreds of millions of dollars, paid no taxes 
to this community. Now only Los Alamos County and schools receive any 
assistance, and all other communities are off assistance, many via 
buyouts.
  It is very difficult for Los Alamos to reach self-sufficiency and to 
continue into the next century as a viable community unless something 
is done about the fact that there is no longer any land within the city 
and county of Los Alamos that can be developed, for the excess land is 
all in the hands of the Department of Energy.
  Last year, we agreed to end assistance to Los Alamos County through 
an agreement that coupled a very moderate buyout amount with transfer 
of excess land to the city. The land considered for transfer now is 
under the control of the DOE and cannot be used by the city until 
ownership is transferred.
  This amendment will eventually return land to the county that can be 
used for normal county growth and to the Pueblo of San Ildefonso that 
has strong historic claims to portions of the land. The amendment also 
carefully prescribes a study of other claims for these lands that are 
now largely part of this county but still under the

[[Page S7235]]

control of the Department of Energy. The Secretary of Energy is 
chartered to conduct a record search of all legal claims and to use 
every reasonable effort to determine whether there are any claims to 
these pieces of property considered for transfer.
  It ends assistance payments to Los Alamos and provides for the future 
growth of Los Alamos by enabling opportunities for economic diversity. 
Ultimately, we believe this is in the best interests of the Federal 
Government and the many thousands of people that live in northern New 
Mexico. Without this amendment, we continue to have a land-locked city, 
without opportunity for economic development. And in that environment, 
there is also no room for housing projects, which leads to some of the 
highest housing costs in America. Without this amendment, assistance 
payments would have to continue. This amendment starts the forces of 
change that allow us to stop the assistance payments.
  In summary, Madam President, this amendment is critical to complete 
the mandate of the last Congress to stop assistance payments to the 
county of Los Alamos, NM, under the auspices of the Atomic Energy 
Community Act of 1955.
  The Atomic Energy Community Act of 1955 enabled assistance payments 
for communities impacted by the presence of major atomic energy 
facilities. These facilities were primarily located in remote areas, to 
address the security concerns accompanying their missions and none were 
more remote than the site at Los Alamos. Assistance payments to 
maintain community services were required in recognition of the nearly 
complete dependence of these cities on the then-AEC facilities that did 
not pay local taxes.
  Over the ensuing years, most of these communities moved to either 
attain economic self-sufficiency or were close enough to self-
sufficiency that they could accept various buyout provisions to enable 
their self-sufficiency. As they attained economic self-sufficiency, 
their assistance payments could stop. But, Los Alamos remained the 
exception, partly because it had virtually no land suitable for 
development for any commercial opportunities--virtually all usable land 
in the county was under the control of the Department of Energy.
  Last year, we developed an agreement to end the assistance payments 
to Los Alamos County. That agreement coupled a buyout payment of $22.6 
million that we appropriated last year along with provision of land to 
the county to enable commercial and residential development. It was 
essential to couple both the payment and the land together. Without the 
land with its potential for economic and housing development, a far 
larger payout amount would have been essential for the County to 
achieve self-sufficiency.

  This amendment directs the Department of Energy to evaluate the land 
under its control to determine what can be released without impacting 
the national security mission of the Laboratory. Now, some of that land 
will not be appropriate for economic or housing development, but does 
represent lands that were part of the San Ildefonso Pueblo at the time 
of the Manhattan Project. Many sacred sites of the San Ildefonso Pueblo 
are located on that property. During the Manhattan Project, those San 
Ildefonso lands became part of Los Alamos County, but no compensation 
was ever provided to San Ildefonso Pueblo. This current evaluation of 
DOE's land requirements provides an ideal opportunity to return to the 
Pueblo some of that land that they previously used.
  Our amendment recognizes that other parties have raised claims to 
some of these lands. Most of these claims result from homesteaded lands 
that were condemned when the Manhattan Project began, and compensation 
to the owners should have been provided at that time--but that must be 
carefully researched. The Department of Energy and the Corps of 
Engineers have been evaluating the legal basis for these claims over 
the past months, but this amendment asks that they go still further to 
provide every reasonable opportunity for these claimants to 
substantiate their claims. And the amendment precludes transfer of any 
land for which the U.S. Government does not hold clear title.
  This amendment then enables Congress to finish the agreement with Los 
Alamos County, by coupling land for commercial and residential 
development to the payout funds. It provides for return of lands to San 
Ildefonso Pueblo for which no compensation was provided. It further 
provides for a careful process to evaluate the legality of any 
outstanding claims on this land. And finally, through this amendment, 
Congress no longer will be asked to provide assistance payments to the 
county of Los Alamos.
  Madam President, I conclude by saying that there are many people in 
and around New Mexico that had previously owned lands in Los Alamos 
that were purchased during the Manhattan Project's location there.
  This amendment says, as to the land that may be conveyed, that if 
there are claimants, their claims will be evaluated and perhaps in some 
way resolved.
  I am delighted to have worked on that. I think it is very important 
to everybody in our State to know that will occur.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Madam President, I am pleased to be a co-sponsor of 
Senator Domenici's amendment to establish a framework for a final 
settlement of the assistance payments to the county of Los Alamos under 
the Atomic Energy Community Act of 1955. As Senator Domenici has 
pointed out, the Congress has already implemented the first part of a 
two-step process to end these payments and to provide the County with 
the ability to develop a commercial tax base--last year the Congress 
appropriated $22.6 million buyout payment for the county. This 
amendment implements the second part of the agreement, by transferring 
excess land from Los Alamos National Laboratory to the county for 
purposes of economic development. This development will mean jobs for 
northern New Mexicans and improved economic self-sufficiency for the 
County.
  In crafting the language being offered today, Senator Domenici and I 
have worked to address the concerns of a number of parties in New 
Mexico who have expressed interest in any land transfer involving the 
Los Alamos National Laboratory.
  The language will ensure that land needed for national security 
purposes will be retained by the Department.
  The language ensures that an environmental review of any transfer 
will take place, and that land in need of environmental remediation 
prior to transfer is cleaned up.
  The San Ildefonso Pueblo, which was originally supposed to receive 
lands that subsequently were withdrawn for the use of the Department of 
Energy, will participate in the process and have some of these lands 
returned, including sites that are sacred to the Pueblo.
  Finally, the language addresses the interests of the Homesteaders 
Association of the Los Alamos Plateau, which represents former owners 
and descendants of former owners of land that was condemned by the 
Federal Government for the Manhattan Project. The homesteaders are now 
researching their claims to the land that was condemned in the 1940's, 
and have asked for assistance from the Department of Energy in 
documenting their case. The language that we are considering today 
requires the Department of Energy to take several actions with respect 
to these claims.
  First, after the list of parcels of lands that are to be considered 
for transfer is drawn up, the Department is to submit a report to 
Congress with the result of a title search on those parcels.
  Second, the Department is also required to provide Congress with an 
analysis of any claims of former owners, or their heirs and assigns, to 
such parcels.
  Third, during the year after passage of this act, the Secretary shall 
engage in concerted efforts to provide claimants with every reasonable 
opportunity to legally substantiate their claims. The Department, in 
the past, has provided assistance to other groups and communities to 
enable them to fully exercise their rights to participate in 
departmental decisions affecting their vital interests. It is our 
intention that, within the bounds of reasonableness and 
appropriateness, the Department provide assistance to the homesteaders, 
as well.
  Finally, the language states, in two places, that the Department is 
only to transfer land to which the Government

[[Page S7236]]

has clear title. If a former owner has a valid legal claim to a parcel, 
this land transfer amendment provides the Department with no new 
authority to extinguish that claim. In such a case, the Department must 
report back to Congress on the claim and remove the affected parcel 
from consideration for transfer under this section, unless the 
Department and the former owner or the descendants of the former owner 
arrive at a mutually agreeable settlement of the claim.
  I believe that this amendment strikes the appropriate balance between 
the interests of Los Alamos County and the San Ildefonso Pueblo in 
having access to lands that are no longer needed by the Department and 
that are not in dispute, and the interests of the former owners of 
lands on the Los Alamos plateau in having their legal claims fairly 
examined and respected. I urge my colleagues to accept this amendment.
  Mr. THURMOND. Madam President, the amendment is cleared on this side.
  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, the amendment is supported on this side, 
as well. We support the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 803) was agreed to.
  Mr. THURMOND. I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. DOMENICI. I move to lay it on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                         Privilege of the Floor

  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent Michael 
Prendergast, a congressional fellow on Senator Graham's staff, be 
granted privileges of the floor during consideration of debate on this.


                           Amendment No. 764

  (Purpose: To establish the position of Senior Representative of the 
    National Guard Bureau as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff)

  Mr. STEVENS. Madam President, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Alaska [Mr. Stevens] for himself, Mr. 
     Wyden, Mr. Torricelli, Mr. Smith of Oregon, Mr. Shelby, Mr. 
     Sarbanes, Mr. Reid, Mr. Murkowski, Ms. Mikulski, Mr. Leahy, 
     Ms. Landrieu, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Jeffords, Mr. Inouye, Mr. 
     Hollings, Mr. Ford, Mrs. Feinstein, Mr. Enzi, Mr. Domenici, 
     Mr. DeWine, Mr. D'Amato, Mr Conrad, Mr. Cochran, Mr. Byrd, 
     Mr. Burns, Mr. Bumpers, Mr. Bryan, Mr. Breaux, Mr. Bond, Mr. 
     Bingaman, Mr. Akaka, Mr. Bennett, and Mr. Frist, proposes an 
     amendment numbered 764.

  Mr. STEVENS. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the end of title IX, add the following:

     SEC. 905. SENIOR REPRESENTATIVE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU.

       (a) Establishment.--(1) Chapter 1011 of title 10, United 
     States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

     ``Sec. 10509. Senior Representative of the National Guard 
       Bureau

       ``(a) Appointment.--There is a Senior Representative of the 
     National Guard Bureau who is appointed by the President, by 
     and with the advise and consent of the Senate. Subject to 
     subsection (b), the appointment shall be made from officers 
     of the Army National Guard of the United States or the Air 
     National Guard of the United States who--
       ``(1) are recommended for such appointment by their 
     respective Governors or, in the case of the District of 
     Columbia, the commanding general of the District of Columbia 
     National Guard; and
       ``(2) meet the same eligibility requirements that are set 
     forth for the Chief of the National Guard Bureau in 
     paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 10502(a) of this title.
       ``(b) Rotation of Office.--An officer of the Army National 
     Guard may be succeeded as Senior Representative of the 
     National Guard Bureau only by an officer of the Air National 
     Guard, and an officer of the Air National Guard may be 
     succeeded as Senior Representative of the National Guard 
     Bureau only by an officer of the Army National Guard. An 
     officer may not be reappointed to a consecutive term as 
     Senior Representative of the National Guard Bureau.
       ``(c) Term of Office.--An officer appointed as Senior 
     Representative of the National Guard Bureau serves at the 
     pleasure of the President for a term of four years. An 
     officer may not hold that office after becoming 64 years of 
     age. While holding the office, the Senior Representative of 
     the National Guard Bureau may not be removed from the reserve 
     active-status list, or from an active status, under any 
     provision of law that otherwise would require such removal 
     due to completion of a specified number of years of service 
     or a specified number of years of service in grade.
       ``(d) Grade.--The Senior Representative of the National 
     Guard Bureau shall be appointed to serve in the grade of 
     general.''.
       (2) The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter 
     is amended by adding at the end the following:

``10509. Senior Representative of the National Guard Bureau.''.

       (b) Member of Joint Chiefs of Staff.--Section 151(a) of 
     title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end 
     the following:
       ``(7) The Senior Representative of the National Guard 
     Bureau.''.
       ``(c) Adjustment of Responsibilities of Chief of the 
     National Guard Bureau.--(1) Section 10502 of title 10, United 
     States Code, is amended by inserting ```and to the Senior 
     Representative of the National Guard Bureau,'' after ``Chief 
     of Staff of the Air Force,''.
       (2) Section 10504(a) of such title is amended in the second 
     sentence by inserting ``, and in consultation with the Senior 
     Representative of the National Guard Bureau,'' after 
     ``Secretary of the Air Force''.
       (d) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this secitn 
     shall take effect on January 1, 1998.

  Mr. STEVENS. Madam President, today, I offer this amendment for 
myself and currently 46 Members of the Senate. This amendment will 
change the status of the Chief of the National Guard. Our amendment 
promotes the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to a 4-star general and 
will include that position as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
Now, the Joint Chiefs are the senior leadership within our military. 
This position for the Guard would rotate between the Army National 
Guard and the Air National Guard.
  I know this will become controversial with the members of the Armed 
Services Committee and members of the committee here in the Senate.
  Madam President, I ask unanimous consent Senators Gregg, Roberts, 
Campbell, McConnell, Faircloth, Boxer, Murray, Craig, Baucus, 
Hutchison, Daschle, Dorgan, Sessions, Lautenberg, and any other Senator 
who wishes to become sponsor, be listed as original cosponsors of this 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Brownback). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, the basis of this amendment is our belief 
that members of the National Guard are an essential part of our 
national security team. They are active participants now in the full 
spectrum of operations from the very smallest contingencies to the 
major actions we have been involved in. Theater wars, such as the 
Persian Gulf, no major military operation can be successful today 
without the National Guard.
  There are now 474,673 men and women in the National Guard. They are 
approximately 20 percent of our total Armed Forces and they represent 
participants from all 50 States and the 4 territories. These guardsmen 
truly embody our forefather's vision of the American citizen soldier. 
Guardsmen in uniform come in contact with the members of their 
community on a daily basis. As part of their community they attend 
their church, they serve on the PTA, they are actively involved in 
community and regional and State activities, they have civilian jobs in 
their communities. But they are citizen soldiers and they report for 
duty immediately.
  As a matter of fact, in my State, we now have an Air National Guard 
refueling unit that serves as the refueling unit for the whole Pacific 
theater. It is a National Guard unit. It is now fulfilling the complete 
functions of its predecessor, which was an active duty unit.
  Many Americans form their impressions about our people in military, 
particularly those in uniform, from their contact with members of the 
Guard. As we continue to downsize the active forces, I believe it is 
critical we maintain this strong communities-based military presence in 
every community. That citizen soldier is our link to the future, as far 
as support of military activities in this country, Mr. President.
  Mr. President, I have served now for many years on the Defense 
Appropriations Committee. One of my great privileges was to serve with 
Senator John Stennis who, at that time, was chairman of the Armed 
Services Committee and chairman of the Appropriations Committee. That 
can't happen

[[Page S7237]]

again under our changed rules in the Senate.
  But in those days, we talked very long and often about the National 
Guard and the way we might integrate the National Guard into the active 
forces so that they would get, during peacetime, the type of exposure 
they need to be very proficient and efficient members of our team when 
we are at war. We pioneered the concept of sending to Europe, to NATO, 
and to our forces in Europe, guardsmen who actively performed the roles 
of our military in that theater, even though they were National 
Guardsmen on temporary duty. That is a few years back now, but that 
proved to be very cost-effective, Mr. President. At a cost of about 25 
percent, we can maintain a person who is able and ready to perform 
military duties as a guardsman, compared to the active duty force. I am 
not saying they can ever replace them; that is not the idea. But the 
purpose of our amendment is to assure that there is recognition now of 
the role, on a constant basis, of the citizen soldier in the 
formulation of military policy in this Nation.
  The National Guard is not consulted now on a regular basis on major 
force structure decisions, or on matters concerning resource allocation 
and priorities. During the Quadrennial Defense Review, it is my 
judgment that the National Guard was not fully considered, as far as 
the deliberations concerning defense strategy, force readiness, and the 
allocation of funding. There were important decisions made concerning 
the future of the Guard within the military structure, without the 
Guard having any participant there.
  I think the Guard represents such a significant portion of our forces 
that the rank now held by the highest member in the National Guard, a 
three-star general, should become a four-star general, and that person 
representing, at times, the Army National Guard, and at other names the 
Air National Guard, rotating, as I said, should have a seat at the 
table where the decisions are made that vitally affect the future of 
the participants in the National Guard.
  Now, these Joint Chiefs--and I have a high regard for them --are the 
senior military advisers to the President, and they are the 
decisionmaking body of military strategy, as far as our system is 
concerned. Within the Department of Defense, they speak for those in 
uniform. But the National Guard, who constitutes 20 percent of our 
total military and one-fifth of the people who could be called into any 
crisis to come forward and participate in the defense of our Nation, 
are not represented at that table.
  It is my strong view that they should be part of that Joint Chiefs of 
Staff. The National Guard Bureau has no access to the chain of command 
directly to that staff, or to the Secretary of Defense, or to the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. I believe our amendment would correct 
that situation. And if it is not corrected, it could impair our future 
readiness and the survival of the Guard itself.
  Now, I want to state very clearly, I know that Secretary Cohen, who 
is not only a great Secretary, but he is a personal friend, and General 
Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, are not 
particularly pleased with this suggestion. Their counsel, I am sure, 
will come to the Congress with regard to this. But I remember that at 
the time we suggested that the Guard start performing regular duty 
functions, the Secretary and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs were opposed 
to that, too. Yet, when it came to the Persian Gulf, Mr. President, 
when we had to send our forces there to restrain the forces of Saddam 
Hussein, the call was answered by almost 75,000 National Guardsmen. 
Almost, as I understand it, about 25 percent of the thousands and 
thousands that were on active duty there were National Guardsmen.
  Now, it is high time, I believe, that the Guard forces who were 
called upon to serve our Nation have their interests fully considered 
on a day-to-day basis when the decisions are made that affect their 
future. That is what this amendment is all about.
  I believe this is an amendment that must become law. It will take 
some time to work it out. I am not saying this will happen overnight. 
But I do believe it is our role, as members of the Appropriations 
Committee, to raise this issue. A cost-effective military for this 
country in the 21st century requires the participation of the National 
Guard.
  We are constantly faced with decisions to reduce our force structure. 
The way to increase our force structure is to bring more citizen 
soldiers into the Department of Defense structure now. We will do that 
if they realize that we are going to emphasize their participation, we 
are going to emphasize their role, and we are going to do that by 
having a member of the Joint Chiefs be a representative of the National 
Guard of the United States. I consider this to be one of the major 
changes that must be made in the realignment of our forces and 
the command of our forces in this country. And I am hopeful that others 
will speak very forcefully on it. I might add, Mr. President, I see 
that the cochairmen of the National Guard Caucus are here. I am 
delighted that they support this proposal.

  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky is recognized.
  Mr. FORD. Mr. President, let me thank my good friend from Alaska. As 
he says, this will not be an easy decision, but he is not one that 
backs off when he thinks it is right. So, Mr. President, as cochairman 
of the Senate National Guard Caucus, I rise to ask my colleagues to 
support the amendment of the senior Senator from Alaska, elevating the 
National Guard Bureau to a four-star general and including that 
position as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
  Just a few weeks ago, I pointed out to my colleagues the Army's 
refusal to consult with the leadership of the National Guard Bureau or 
the leadership of the Army Guard during the consideration of the QDR. 
When asked about this oversight by the press, the Army spokesman 
responded, ``There is an Army Reserve colonel and a Guard colonel here 
in our offices. They get to weigh in on the issues.''
  You do not need extensive knowledge of military affairs to realize 
that a colonel does not pull much weight against a group of active duty 
Army generals protecting their turf. Mr. President, there is no excuse 
for the poor working relationship between the active Army and the Army 
National Guard. However, I believe the leadership of the active Army 
does not consider members of the Army National Guard as soldiers on 
equal footing. Instead, they treat the men and women of the Army 
National Guard with indifference. The active duty generals seem to 
forget that the men and women of the Army Guard have undergone the 
same--I repeat, the same--training as their counterparts. The situation 
is even more ridiculous when you consider that 50 percent of the entire 
Army National Guard are men and women coming off active duty with the 
Army.
  I also believe that, if this amendment becomes law, there would not 
be a constant need for offsite agreements between the Army and the 
National Guard. Just recently, I was briefed by the Army on the latest 
offsite meeting between the Army and the Guard--an off-site meeting 
that was held after it was brought to Secretary Cohen's attention by 
Senator Bond and I that the Guard had been left out of the QDR process. 
In that briefing, I was told the Army and the Guard had reached an 
agreement. But I pointed out to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, 
who briefed me, ``I have little faith in the outcome of such an 
agreement when the Army still hasn't lived up to the 1993 off-site 
agreement.'' Of course, that point may be moot, as I now have been 
informed that the Chief of Staff of the Army is unhappy with the 
agreement and, to date, has refused to sign off.
  So, Mr. President, this kind of runaround is exactly why we need 
Senator Stevens' amendment. The Army National Guard currently--I want 
my colleagues to listen to this--provides more than 55 percent of the 
ground combat forces, 45 percent of the combat support forces, 25 
percent of the Army's combat supply units, while receiving--guess 
what?--only 2 percent of the Department of Defense budget. Now, let me 
repeat that. The Army National Guard currently provides more than 55 
percent of the ground combat forces, 45 percent of the combat support 
forces, and 25 percent of the Army's combat supply units, while 
receiving only 2

[[Page S7238]]

percent of the Department of Defense budget.
  You will hear from some of our colleagues that the Army National 
Guard divisions have no fighting missions. They will be telling the 
truth, but they won't be telling all the truth. That is because the 
active duty Army leadership has simply refused to give the Guard a war 
fighting mission. They have refused to do so despite the fact that the 
active Army's attrition rate--get this--is 36 percent. About half of 
those are joining the National Guard. They have been trained. The 
attrition rate in the Army Guard is somewhere around 15 percent. The 
question my colleagues should be asking is, How many active duty Army 
divisions are at full strength versus the Army Guard divisions?
  So, Mr. President, this amendment will ensure that the National Guard 
and all its attendant forces will have a voice in the Department of 
Defense's senior decisionmaking process when it comes to defense 
strategy, force readiness, and allocation of resources. In the end, I 
hope that when my colleagues hear arguments like, ``there are two 
colonels here in our offices that weigh in on issues,'' they will 
remember that their simply being in the room isn't enough. You have to 
have a seat at the table and a voice that carries some weight. That is 
exactly what this amendment we have before us today does.
  So I hope my colleagues will support the amendment and help us pull 
up a chair for the National Guard Bureau and give them a voice that can 
be heard loud and clear at the Defense Department's decisionmaking 
table.
  I want to underscore one other thing. Already 47 Senators have 
cosponsored this amendment, and many more will come on board. I hope 
that we understand that the overwhelming sentiment of this body is to 
support Senator Stevens' amendment.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. BOND addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Missouri is recognized.
  Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I am very proud to join my cochair of the 
National Guard Caucus, the distinguished Senator from Kentucky, in 
support of a very long overdue and very important provision offered by 
the chairman of our Defense Appropriations Subcommittee and the full 
committee.
  I am pleased to be a cosponsor of this measure to elevate the Chief 
of the National Guard Bureau to a rank of four-star general and to give 
that general a seat at the table as a member of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff.
  As has already been pointed out, the National Guard has been 
increasingly called upon to perform overseas deployments and other 
operational tasks in its role as a national defense component. The 
National Guard is unique from all other services in that it has a 
State-oriented mission as well as a national mission. The National 
Guard maintains a force of over 350,000 soldiers and airmen and women, 
fully 20 percent of our total fighting force. It is a force greater, 
almost double that of another military component already represented on 
the JCS.
  The current administrative chain of command for the National Guard at 
the highest levels is confusing, to say the least. Component Air Force 
personnel of the National Guard, who are integrated into the Air Force 
structure in an enlightened and seamless way, fall under the umbrella 
of the Chief of the Guard Bureau, specifically to address the unique 
requirements faced by the National Guard personnel, but the Chief of 
the National Guard Bureau is responsible to the Chief of the Army.
  By placing the Chief of the Guard Bureau on the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, this convoluted chain of command will be rationalized. By 
placing the Chief of the Guard Bureau on the JCS, the unique 
characteristics of the Guard will receive their just due.
  As former Governors, my cochairman and I recognize as much as anyone 
can the truly vital State mission that the Guard provides. I have come 
to know and appreciate what the Guard must do in its civilian mission 
and its State militia role. This is a unique mission, unlike any of the 
missions of the other branches of the service, and for this reason as 
well it commends a seat at the table with the Joint Chiefs of Staff for 
the head of the Guard Bureau.
  My colleagues from Alaska and Kentucky have already pointed out how 
the Guard gets short shrift when major decisions are made. We have a 
couple of colonels in the room when the generals are making the 
decision. That does not carry a lot of weight. We have seen time and 
time again where agreements are reached, supposedly taking account of 
and recognizing the role the Guard plays, only to have the higher-ups, 
those people who have a membership on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
overturn or ignore those agreements.
  The President, who is advised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, gets, in 
my view, a biased view, and as a result the Office of the President 
traditionally has habitually disregarded the legitimate procurement 
needs of the Guard, and the recommendations that come to us from the 
President do not reflect what we in this body have continually 
recognized as the important role of the Guard. Rather than having us 
try to fight that battle every time, it makes sense, in my view, to 
have a four-star general as head of the Guard and have that person 
represented on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This will force the Defense 
Department to recognize the needs and the unique mission of the Guard 
in its budget requests and incorporate them into its financial plans as 
well as incorporating the Guard in its utilization plans. This action 
will go a long way to making sure that we have a fully integrated and 
effectively utilized civilian militia as we meet the changing needs 
with tight budgets for the future.
  As well, there are those of my colleagues who have had concerns about 
the politicization of National Guard requirements and resources. The 
administration has yet to recognize the legitimate procurement needs of 
the National Guard. Not once has one penny been requested for the 
National Guard's procurement requirements. The Department of Defense 
has relied upon the largess of the Congress to support it. So, to my 
colleagues who will use the argument in the coming days during 
discussions on the Defense authorization and appropriation bills, that 
``the Pentagon has not even asked for so many dollars,'' the Pentagon, 
doesn't do the asking, it is the President, and he has seen fit to 
disregard habitually, the legitimate procurement needs of the Guard. By 
having the Guard represented on the JCS, the Defense Department will be 
forced to recognize these needs in its budget and incorporate them into 
its financial plan. And this action will relieve a lot of that 
politicization we keep hearing about.
  This amendment will not increase the size of the National Guard, nor 
increase the administrative staffs. The rules and requirements met by 
the other Joint Chiefs will have to be met by the National Guard Chief.
  This is an amendment whose time has come. It is forward thinking, it 
recognizes the changing world situation and the subsequent change to 
our Nation's military force structure and requirements. It is an 
important step in the right direction of modernizing the military 
paradigms we have lived with through the cold war and goes a long way 
to addressing QDR concerns for the direction of our Nation's military 
force.
  I say again, I urge Members who have not yet cosponsored it--and 
there are only 53 left--to join us in cosponsoring this measure because 
this is an idea whose time has come.
  I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, the matter that is before us is of 
importance, and I know we all want to continue the discussion on our 
defense authorization bill, but there is another matter that is also 
under consideration as we are meeting here this morning, and that is 
the reconciliation, the proposal to bring together those elements of 
the House and Senate bills that will relate to the economy and relate 
to child health, education, Medicare, and other matters that really 
define where we are going as a country over the period of the next 5 
years. And as we are getting into that particular issue, I want to 
address one other item that is not unrelated to that and is related to 
the issues of fairness in our economy and fairness in our society. I 
will speak briefly to that and then introduce legislation and yield the 
floor.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, a point of order. Will the Senator yield 
for a point of order?

[[Page S7239]]

  Mr. KENNEDY. I yield for a point of order.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I have great respect for the Senator from 
Massachusetts. I would like to finish our amendment. It is my 
understanding that the rule established by the late Senator Pastore 
prevents introduction or speaking of nongermane matters during this 
period of consideration of this bill.
  I would like to finish this amendment. It is going to be accepted, I 
might say to the Senator from Massachusetts. I would like to finish the 
business. Will the Senator permit us to finish at this time so I would 
not have to make that point of order?
  Mr. KENNEDY. As I understand, the Pastore rule goes for a 2-hour 
period from the time we come in, which would be another 6 minutes, I 
guess. I am glad to accommodate if you think it is not going to go 
further. I would like to be able to speak. I will speak 5 minutes.
  Mr. STEVENS. I withdraw it.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Pastore rule will be in order until 12:04.
  Mr. STEVENS. I withdraw the point of order. The Senator is not going 
to take long.
  Mr. KENNEDY. I will ask to speak for 5 minutes, Mr. President.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. KENNEDY. I thank the Senator.
  (The remarks of Mr. Kennedy pertaining to the introduction of S. 1009 
are located in today's Record under ``Statements on Introduced Bills 
and Joint Resolutions.'')
  Mr. KENNEDY. I thank the Senator from Alaska.
  Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The able Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I am very concerned about this 
amendment. I realize that the amendment has nearly 50 cosponsors. I 
have been in the Senate long enough to know that any provision with 
that many cosponsors will pass. However, that does not make the 
amendment advisable or good government.
  While the amendment is very attractive from a political perspective, 
it is not good policy. The amendment would create a new position, the 
Senior Representative of the National Guard. The incumbent of this 
position would be a four-star general and would be a member of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
  The amendment does not eliminate the current three-star Chief of the 
National Guard Bureau nor does it shift any of the duties and 
responsibilities of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to the newly 
created Senior Representative of the National Guard. This is pure and 
simple an additional layer of bureaucracy. A new four-star position is 
created but the incumbent is not a commander. He has no directive 
authority over any forces. The National Guard is under the control of 
the Governors during peacetime and under the control of the war 
fighting CINC's during wartime. This new Senior Representative has no 
real function.
  This position was not created as the result of studies and analysis. 
There have not been any hearings to determine whether such a position 
will actually meet any need or to identify any military requirement for 
an additional general. This Senior Representative does not enhance the 
representation of the Reserve forces. He is a National Guardsman and 
would only concentrate on National Guard issues. I suspect creating 
such a position will do more to disrupt jointness than to enhance it.
  Currently in the statute, the Chief of the National Guard reports 
directly to the Secretary of Defense and serves as the principal 
adviser to the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force. The Chief of 
the National Guard Bureau is authorized to coordinate directly with the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.
  Giving the Senior Representative of the National Guard membership in 
the Joint Chiefs is contrary to the tenets of Goldwater-Nichols which 
we worked so hard to develop and enact in 1986. In Goldwater-Nichols we 
established the membership of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the Chairman 
and the four Service Chiefs. The Vice-Chairman was not made a member of 
the Joint Chiefs until 1992. This reflects the extensive study and 
analysis conducted by the JCS, the Department of Defense and the 
Congress before increasing the size of the Joint Chiefs. This Senior 
Representative position has not been vetted by anyone. I hope the 
Senator from Alaska would agree to let the Armed Services Committee 
hold hearings on this idea and determine whether and how to best meet 
the need the amendment is trying to address.
  In closing, Mr. President, I know this amendment will be adopted by 
the Senate. I want my colleagues to know that they are making national 
security policy by passing a politically appealing proposal. I prefer 
principle over politics.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a letter addressed to me 
by the Secretary of Defense, William Cohen, be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                         Secretary of Defense,

                                    Washington, DC, July 10, 1997.
     Hon. Strom Thurmond,
     Chairman, Armed Services Committee,
     U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: As the Senate continues consideration of 
     the FY 1998 National Defense Authorization Bill, I want to 
     express my strong opposition, which is shared by the Chairman 
     and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to legislation that would make 
     the Chief of the National Guard Bureau (NGB) a four star 
     general and a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
       The Army National Guard, the Air National Guard, and the 
     Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps Reserves are full 
     partners in the first line of defense of the United States of 
     America. Under the Total Force Policy, they are fully 
     represented in the deliberations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
     by their respective Service Chiefs. Moreover, the Total Force 
     Policy--which prescribes fully integrated active and reserve 
     forces--is also central to the National Military Strategy.
       Placing the Chief of the National Guard Bureau on the Joint 
     Chiefs of Staff would not accomplish the proposed 
     legislation's objective of fuller representation of the six 
     reserve components of the four Services. In addition, such a 
     step would run counter to the direction set for the Joint 
     Chiefs by the Goldwater-Nichols Act.
       The National Guard is a critical and highly valued part of 
     our national defense. I am committed to achieving even 
     greater unity among the various components of the Armed 
     Forces. I am concerned that creating this additional four 
     star position on the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be divisive 
     and counterproductive to the goal of greater unity.
       I will continue to examine the representation of the 
     various service components and the allocation of resources to 
     ensure equality and fairness in accordance with the needs of 
     our national defense. I strongly request your support to 
     maintain the existing JCS structure and the current 
     representation of the Reserve Components in the JCS by their 
     respective Service Chiefs.
           Sincerely,
                                                       Bill Cohen.

  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, we agree to accept the amendment on this 
side.
  Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I want to note my concerns with this 
amendment, which has close to 50 cosponsors. It would establish the 
position of Senior Representative of the National Guard Bureau and 
would add that position as the seventh member of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff.
  Mr. President, the composition of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is a very 
serious matter. The Joint Chiefs function as an advisory body to the 
Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council, and the President. 
Changes in the composition or functions of the Joint Chiefs should only 
be effected after long and careful consideration.
  Mr. President, of all the issues we considered during the committee 
process that led up to reporting the landmark Goldwater-Nichols bill to 
the Senate, one issue was more contentious than any other and took more 
committee time than all others. That issue was the establishment of the 
position of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The 
committee eventually decided to create that position by a one-vote 
margin. Moreover, although the committee decided to create the 
position, it decided not to make the Vice Chairman a member of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. As a matter of fact, the Vice Chairman was not 
made a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff until 1992, some 6 years 
after the position was created. In contrast, the Stevens amendment 
would add a new member to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Armed 
Services Committee has not held one hearing on the matter. I would also 
note that Secretary Cohen and General Shalikashvili oppose this 
amendment.

[[Page S7240]]

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the amendment? If 
not, the question is on agreeing to the amendment. Without objection, 
the amendment is agreed to.
  The amendment (No. 764) was agreed to.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. THURMOND. On behalf of Senator Dodd, I ask unanimous consent to 
add Senator Helms as a cosponsor to amendment No. 763.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that David Todd, 
of the staff of the current Presiding Officer, be granted access to the 
floor during consideration of this measure.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. STEVENS. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call 
be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, what is the business before the Senate?


                           Amendment No. 802

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending question is on amendment No 802 
offered by the Senator from Michigan and others.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I would like to speak in a generic sense to 
this issue and then briefly to the amendment, if the managers do not 
mind my doing that at this moment.
  Mr. President, we are going to have several amendments that call for 
cutting off of funds, that call for withdrawal of American forces from 
Bosnia by a date certain, and so on, amendments like the amendment No. 
759 of the Senator from Wisconsin and the substitute amendment No. 802 
of the Senator from Michigan. I understand this may be a work in 
progress here, since I know there are very bright people of all our 
staffs sitting down right now trying to figure out whether or not we 
can cobble together a reasonable compromise in this area. That is why I 
am not going to speak to the detail of any amendment, but I would like 
to speak to the issue because the issue does not change regardless of 
how the amendment is crafted.
  In reviewing the history of our policy in Bosnia, I feel like an odd 
variant of a worker on a decision tree who, instead of taking the best 
choice available to him, was forced to take the second best one in 
almost every instance where he had a choice to make. It's like that old 
joke, you know, from Yogi Berra, ``When you come to a fork in the road, 
take it.''

  Forks in the road that we have been presented with have usually 
involved two bad choices. For most of the duration of the conflict in 
the former Yugoslavia, over the last 4 years I have found myself taking 
a minority position and sometimes being a minority of one or two or 
three here in the Senate. As early as September 1992, on the floor of 
the Senate, I called for lifting of the immoral and illegal arms 
embargo against Bosnia. I also called for conducting airstrikes against 
the genocidal Serbian aggressors.
  I went to Bosnia during that period, came back, wrote a lengthy 
report, which was characterized as ``lift and strike,'' and engaged the 
President on that policy. We had significant debates here on the floor 
of the Senate about whether or not that policy was a sound one. I was 
told by very knowledgeable people on the floor of the Senate that, 
``Obviously, airstrikes didn't work,'' and, ``What was I talking 
about?'' and, ``The Serbs would just be more emboldened,'' all of which 
turned out to be dead wrong--dead, flat wrong. Three years and a 
quarter of a million dead later, we finally conducted airstrikes, which 
led to the Dayton accords and lifting of the arms embargo.
  What is done is done, Mr. President. After Dayton, we committed our 
troops to a multinational peace implementation force. But I remind my 
colleagues that had we followed the lift-and-strike policy when first 
advocated, we would not have needed to send American troops to Bosnia, 
either in IFOR or in SFOR. But now our forces are there.
  So, to review the bidding, my original preference was lift and 
strike. There were European forces on the ground. We would lift the 
embargo, use our air power to supplement those ground forces that were 
there, and therefore, there would be no need to have American forces 
there. But we ended up with a situation that was the next best, but 
still not good. We waited. We dillied around for 3 years and then 
finally conducted airstrikes. We finally got the Dayton accords. Since 
we were now part of the deal, we had to provide ground forces as well. 
So that was the second-best alternative. Going back to that decision 
tree I spoke of, we took a route over here that was better than not 
being on the tree, but it was not what it should have been in the first 
place.
  So I find myself in the strange position of having argued, initially, 
4 years ago, 5 years ago, that there was no need for American ground 
troops in Bosnia, to now being on the floor defending the presence of 
our ground troops there. But again I want to emphasize that we made the 
wrong decision at the outset. We finally made the right decision 3 
years later, but by that time we had fewer options once we made the 
right decision.
  Now our forces are there, and they have been the principal reason for 
the successes that have been achieved by SFOR. Although many of the 
provisions of the Dayton peace accords remain to be carried out, 
absolutely nothing would have been accomplished had it not been for the 
job that SFOR has done, and its predecessor, IFOR. These men and women 
from NATO member states and many non-NATO states, led by an American 
contingent, have successfully separated the warring factions, the 
Muslims, the Serbs, and the Croats, and have ended at least temporarily 
the blatant, planned genocide of the Muslims by the Serbs and the 
direct, immediate involvement of the country of Serbia, led by a war 
criminal named Milosevic. They have succeeded in putting a substantial 
amount of heavy weaponry in storage sites. And the carnage--though not 
the damage--in Bosnia has stopped.
  Yet much remains to be accomplished. There are still incidents of 
beatings and house burnings, which are inexcusable and must be halted. 
Most refugees are still not able to return to their homes. And if their 
homes lie in territory controlled by another of the three main 
religious groups, in almost every instance they have not been able to 
return. Most of the indicted war criminals remain at large.
  I have been very critical of the British conduct in Bosnia, but let 
me say publicly that I compliment them for doing yesterday what all of 
SFOR should be doing with indicted war criminals.
  These are people who engaged in genocide, and they should be taken to 
court, an international tribunal, which exists. If they resist, all 
force necessary should be used to apprehend them.
  Yesterday the British SFOR troops acted. One indicted Bosnian Serb 
war criminal was taken into custody. Another who resisted was shot and 
killed. So, hurrah for the British. I hope we are emboldened enough to 
act in the same way. So, again, most of the war criminals still remain 
at large, institutions of government, both at the national level and in 
the Muslim-Croat federation, need to be fleshed out and developed, 
notwithstanding the progress we have made.

  So now, once again I find myself in the minority. I think it was a 
mistake for the Clinton administration to have set a deadline of the 
end of June 1998 for the withdrawal of American ground forces from 
Bosnia, before we were sure that all the tasks enumerated in the Dayton 
accords will have been accomplished.
  Moreover, as I have repeatedly said over the last half year, I think 
our West European allies, particularly Great Britain and France, are 
making a serious mistake by not accepting our offer of United States 
air, sea, communications, and intelligence assets, plus an American 
ready reserve force, as they say, over the horizon, in Hungary

[[Page S7241]]

or Italy, if they would keep their ground forces in Bosnia when ours 
withdraw.
  I recently attended the NATO summit meeting in Madrid with President 
Clinton and my colleague, Bill Roth and several others. At that meeting 
I suggested exactly that course of action. I hope the administration 
will push our European allies very hard on that point.
  But, once again I find myself in the minority, suggesting that it was 
a bad idea to set a date of withdrawal once we had put troops on the 
ground. It would be even worse idea if we mandated that they leave or 
cut off funds. And it would be a still worse idea, if we do withdraw, 
if the Europeans withdraw. As I have stated repeatedly over the last 
half year, I think our European allies, particularly France and Great 
Britain, would be making a major mistake.
  Our allies talk ceaselessly in Brussels about a European security and 
defense identity and a European pillar within NATO, but when they get a 
chance to put their troops where their mouths are, they somehow change 
their tune.
  Now, once more, we face a Hobson's choice. I wish we had not set a 
date certain for withdrawal from Bosnia. I want the Europeans to play 
the military role to which they declare they aspire. But I do not want 
to give hope to the sordid opponents of Dayton, like Milosevic and 
Tudjman, who would like to carve up Bosnia after international troops 
leave. So, I am reluctantly forced, in Mr. Hobson's terms, to take the 
horse nearest the door; that is to give the Clinton administration the 
freedom of action to come up with a better plan within the next 12 
months.
  Could all the Bosnian horrors of ethnic cleansing, rape camps, and 
shelling of innocent civilians and children reemerge? You bet they 
could. In fact, if the international force withdraws before the tasks 
enumerated in Dayton have been accomplished, you can be sure they all 
will return--ethnic cleansing, rape camps, shelling of innocent women 
and children. By locking us into a specific withdrawal date without 
providing a viable alternative, we will guarantee that all we have 
accomplished in Bosnia will quickly fall apart and that what remains to 
be accomplished will never get off the drawing board. It will guarantee 
that a tinhorn dictator like Milosevic in Serbia, and an authoritarian 
thug like Tudjman in Croatia, will be able to proceed with their ill-
conceived plans to torpedo Dayton and do what they have intended all 
along--since 1992, I have been saying this--to carve up Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, with part going to Serbia and the rest to Croatia.
  We have accomplished a great deal in Bosnia and Herzegovina. We have 
made a commitment to the people of that tragic land and to our allies, 
and to other cooperating partners in SFOR. Largely, though, because of 
congressional pressure, it is not an open-ended commitment. Some of my 
colleagues suspect that the President will come back to us with a 
request for another extension of funding for our troop commitment to 
SFOR. Fine. If he does, we will have a thorough debate and then decide 
whether or not to support his request. But to say now, as is being 
contemplated by some, that we should cut off any funds in the future, 
to say that now we will dictate what the outcome will be a year from 
now, is the ultimate in stupidity, in my view. We are micromanaging. We 
are sending every wrong message we possibly can throughout Bosnia and 
the rest of Europe.
  What do we accomplish by doing that? Well, we accomplish, I guess, 
satisfying ourselves and telling people we are withdrawing troops. We 
have the authority to do that if the President does not withdraw troops 
by the end of June of next year. That is the operative date.
  So let's give the President an opportunity to jawbone with our 
European colleagues, to come up with a follow-on plan for what will 
occur after we withdraw our ground forces from Bosnia a year from now. 
But let's not do it now. Again, my friend from Michigan is trying very 
hard to come up with a proposal that basically says the same thing: 
look, Europeans, stay. We get out but we provide support.
  That is a reasonable approach. But, again, let's not, further on this 
decision tree, make another bad choice that leads us down the road 
further to less opportunity and fewer options for peace and security in 
Europe.
  As I said, I just had the great honor of being in Madrid, Spain, with 
the leaders of more than 16 European nations. I was playing what was 
very much a bit role, along for the ride, but there. I find it somewhat 
ironic that at the very moment some of us are supporting the 
enlargement of NATO to spread the zone of stability eastward within 
Europe so we do not end up in a circumstance like we did between World 
War I and World War II, when several smaller states unable to be part 
of the West were forced to seek their own bilateral military 
arrangements and their own attempts to provide their collective 
security--we, on the floor of the U.S. Senate, are contemplating voting 
to increase the instability in the most insecure part of Europe.
  To conclude, my hope is that we will not lock the President into a 
policy straitjacket while the situation remains so unstable. To those 
who have a philosophic disagreement with me that we should not be 
involved, that Bosnia is not so important, I say to them: you are not 
giving up any option, by opposing an attempt to determine the outcome a 
year before it is required, because there will be American forces there 
for the next year unless there is a foolhardy amendment that suggests 
we withdraw all American forces right now from SFOR.
  Mr. President, I thank my colleagues for their time, and I yield the 
floor.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Roberts). The Senator from Texas.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I rise to support what the 
distinguished Senator from Wisconsin is trying to do, because I think 
it is most important that the U.S. Senate speak at this very crucial 
time to say, let's set a mission, let's set a timetable, let's be very 
clear with our allies about what that is going to be and, Mr. 
President, let's keep our word. Let's keep our word when we say this is 
our mission, this is our role, this is our responsibility, we are going 
to be there for you and we are going to leave June 30, 1998.
  The chronology is very clear. We have been trying to help the people 
of the former Yugoslavia for years. Many of us believed that they had 
the right to have a fair fight, but they didn't have a fair fight 
because part of that country was held to an arms embargo that did not 
allow them to fight for their lives, their families, their land and 
their sovereignty. We put amendment upon amendment on the floor to give 
those people a chance to have a fair fight: Lift the arms embargo on 
the Muslims, let them have a fair fight. But we could never adopt 
that--actually, we did adopt it, but we could never get the attention 
of the President.
  In 1995, we saw the horror of horrors, the massacre at Srebrenica 2 
years ago where we believe, and are not even sure yet how many, but we 
believe as many as 10,000 Bosnians were systematically murdered.
  At the end of 1995, we sent in troops to keep the warring parties 
apart and try to have a peace which was put together at Dayton. We said 
that we would be there for a year at the end of 1995. At the end of 
1996, the President said that it would be June 1998, and the Secretary 
of Defense was very clear that we would set the mission and we would 
set the timetable.
  What the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin is now trying to do is 
say, once again, we expect that timetable to be fair warning to 
everyone of what our intentions are. I think it is very necessary for 
the Senate to speak on this, Mr. President, because we are seeing an 
alarming mission creep happening in that country as we speak.
  I think our allies in NATO have every right to go forward with the 
missions which they have laid out. The mission of the United States has 
been made very clear, that if a war criminal is there in front of us, 
of course, we would capture that person. But we committed, and it has 
been said as late as this week by both General Joulwan and Wes Clark, 
who is the incoming head of NATO, that our mission would not be to go 
out and capture the war criminals, not because we don't think they 
should be captured--of course they should--and the responsibility

[[Page S7242]]

under Dayton for that is with the parties, it is with the Bosnian 
Government. I think we should do everything we can to help provide a 
framework for the capturing of these people, but American troops should 
not be part of that kind of effort, because we are the targets. We are 
the superpower. I want us to be helpful, to bring peace to Bosnia, and 
I want those people who committed those atrocities to be brought to 
justice. It is unthinkable that within the last 2 years we would have 
seen the kind of atrocities that were perpetrated by those indicted at 
The Hague who were representing the Bosnian Serbs. So I want those 
people to be captured. I think it is important that they be brought to 
justice.
  But, Mr. President, if we are going to be part of any such operation, 
it is incumbent on this administration to come back to Congress and 
change the mission rather than having a mission creep, such as we saw 
in Somalia where we were not aware that we had changed the mission from 
feeding starving children to capturing a warlord, and it cost us 18 
Rangers, because we are different. Our people who came back from 
Somalia said that when our troops would go with others down the streets 
of Somalia, the people would not be hostile to the Turkish troops, they 
would not be hostile to other troops, but when the Americans came 
forward, the hostilities would erupt.
  We are a major superpower in the world. We are the only superpower 
probably that has a history of not being aggressive toward trying to 
take over other governments. We want to be a beacon for what is good in 
the world. So I think it is important that we are helpful to our allies 
without being in every firefight. I hope that we can set a standard and 
a mission that will uphold those principles, that we are the beacon of 
the world for what is good. I hope we can come to a bipartisan 
agreement that will assure that our mission is clear. That is why I 
hope that we can work with the Senator from Wisconsin, Senator 
Feingold, in his mission to be very clear in speaking as a United 
States Senate that we are going to keep our word in Bosnia, that we 
want to help the people there, we want to help them build their 
infrastructure, we want them to have new factories, we want them to 
have a peace that is based on economic security. I think the money that 
we are spending there is very important and perhaps if we are clear in 
our mission and our timetable, we will be able to show that economic 
stability will produce a lasting peace, perhaps better than just 
keeping warring parties apart.

  I think we have to be very careful as we move forward. I think we 
have to be clear in our mission, and we have to keep our word. We have 
to do what we say we are going to do, and our mission has been 
reiterated by our Department of Defense and our military leaders. I 
don't want the Senate to go forward without speaking on this issue. I 
hope that we can work with Senator Feingold, Senator Warner, Senator 
McCain, Senator Levin, Senator Thurmond, Senator Inhofe, and myself to 
make sure that our mission is clear and our timetable is set.
  Senator Lott, our majority leader, has been very clear with all of 
our allies and with us and to the press that the June 30, 1998, 
timetable is real, and if we don't speak forcefully, then by inches, we 
could change a mission that would be dangerous to our troops and, most 
important, dangerous to the steps we have taken in the Dayton peace 
accords, because if we have a flareup because of a change in mission, 
it could result in tearing down everything we have done so far in that 
country. It could decimate the Dayton peace accords if we allow a 
mission creep to go forward, a timetable to get fuzzy that we have not 
approved and have been clear that is what the United States commitment 
is.
  I hope that we will come to terms on Senator Feingold's amendment. I 
hope that we will come to terms on the mission that are very clear with 
regard to war criminals and what our role will be, such as the 
amendment that Senator Warner and I and others are working on with the 
help from Senator Lott and Senator McCain, Senator Inhofe.
  It is very clear that when a superpower speaks, our allies, as well 
as our adversaries, should be able to count on our word being good. Our 
word on when we will leave Bosnia should be good. It is June 30, 1998. 
The President has said so; the Secretary of Defense has said so.
  So let's make sure we support that and we do everything to prepare 
that country for peace. Ratcheting up the hostilities is a perilous 
course. I hope this Senate will speak for America so that we can remain 
the beacon of the superpower that does not have a personal interest but 
wants the world to do what is right. That is our mission, and I hope 
the Senate will speak.
  Thank you, Mr. President.
  Several Senators addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I agree wholeheartedly with the 
distinguished junior Senator from Texas. I would like, for a moment, to 
put this in historic perspective, because it was Senator Hutchison and 
I who had a resolution of disapproval in November 1995. We lost that by 
four votes. I remember so well why we lost that by four votes. We lost 
it because there were several Members who said, ``Well, the President 
and the Secretary of Defense have promised that we are going to be out 
of Bosnia in 12 months, that will be Christmas of 1996.'' So a few of 
them said, ``I guess that it's all right to go over if we can 
accomplish whatever mission we thought we were going to accomplish by 
that time.''
  In preparation for that, I went over to Bosnia in the northeast 
sector. I can remember so well going into the Tuzla area when no 
Americans were up there, no Americans had been up there, and those who 
would go ahead to see what we were getting into had not been there yet. 
I talked with General Haukland from Norway who was in charge of the 
northeast sector for the United Nations in Bosnia. That was the area we 
were assuming responsibility for.
  When I told them we were going to be out in 12 months, they all 
started laughing. They said we were not going to be out in 12 months. 
He said, ``You must mean 12 years.'' That is the situation we are in 
now. It is like putting your hand in water and leaving it in there for 
12 months, taking it out and nothing has changed, it is the same as it 
was.
  We have made that commitment. We went in there and didn't come out as 
we promised. This was not just a projection by saying by December 1996, 
things should be done and we should be out. It wasn't that at all. The 
President said we will be out. In fact, I have statements from our 
Senate Armed Services Committee where the Secretary of Defense said it 
is an absolute. General Shalikashvili said it was an absolute, we will 
be out of Bosnia by Christmas 1996. Now we are debating about whether 
to be out, not in 12 months, but 2\1/2\ years after this thing started.

  The one thing that the distinguished Senator from Delaware did not 
mention is, what are our national security interests that we are there 
for? It would be nice, it would be wonderful, and it would be 
compassionate of us if we had the money and the resources to go around 
the world and go to Ethiopia and go to all these places where they 
would like to have our help, but we do not have those resources.
  Now, the problem we have is this. We have a political problem--I 
recognize that--that anyone who is opposed to getting out on June 30, 
1998, is going to say, ``If we pull out, they're going to start 
fighting again.'' You know what? They are right. But the same argument 
could be used, Mr. President, if it is 10 years from now. So how long 
is this commitment going to go on?
  You know what they said in November 1995? They said the cost is going 
to be between $1.5 billion and $2 billion. Now it is passing through 
$6.5 billion. Where is the money going to come from? The money is going 
to come from the defense budget, a defense budget that right now, while 
our distinguished chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee has 
put together a very good authorization bill that we have to pass, it is 
still inadequate, still does not adequately arm America for the threats 
that face us out there.
  People who say the cold war is over and there is no threat anymore, I 
can assure you the threat is much greater

[[Page S7243]]

than it was then during the cold war when we could identify who the 
enemy was and our intelligence knew something about that enemy.
  So here we are now making a commitment. And how long is it going to 
take? I can tell you right now, if we do not adhere to the June 30, 
1998 deadline, we are not going to get out until something very bad 
happens. I suspect that we would still be in Somalia today if it were 
not for the fact that 18 of our Rangers were brutally murdered and 
their nude corpses dragged through the streets in Mogadishu. I do not 
want that to happen anywhere in the streets of Bosnia.

  So it was not long ago I was in Brussels. I found there were many 
Members of Congress that were going around whispering to our NATO 
allies, ``Don't worry about it. We won't leave at that time.'' That is 
the most dangerous thing we could do at this time. We need to draw that 
line and say we are going to be out by that time.
  We made a mistake. We should have been out by December 1996, as we 
promised, as the President promised, as the Secretary of Defense 
promised, as we promised the American people. We have to keep the 
promise this time and make it June 30. What we do in terms of a 
commitment for June 30, 1998, right now I am not real sure. But I can 
tell you right now, with every fiber of my being I will fight to make 
sure that our troops are home after June 30 of 1998.
  Mr. WYDEN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon is recognized.


                     Investigating Military Crashes

  Mr. WYDEN. I ask unanimous consent to speak for 15 minutes on an 
amendment that I offer today with my colleague, Senator Gordon Smith, 
dealing with the tragic crash last November of a C-130 Oregon Air Force 
Reserve plane.
  It is our understanding that the amendment has been cleared with the 
managers on both sides of the aisle and will be included in a package 
that will be offered later today.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. WYDEN. Mr. President, and colleagues, last November our Nation 
was shocked by the terrible news that an Air Force Reserve C-130 had 
crashed off the California coast, killing 10 Oregon reservists. All of 
the people of our State grieved and rallied to the support of the 
surviving family members, providing what comfort could be offered at a 
time of tragedy.
  Mr. President, when these tragedies occur, the first question must 
be: What can be done for the families of the victims, and how can it be 
possible to make sure that these tragedies do not happen in the future 
to the sons and daughters of other Americans?
  What we found in our situation is that the Air Force, when they 
stepped in, was able to offer only limited assistance to the families. 
The families had extreme difficulty in learning even the most basic 
facts about the crash and about the subsequent investigation.
  How would you feel if anxiously awaiting the news you were to first 
learn important details from television news stories? This is what 
happened in our home State of Oregon. And it is completely 
unacceptable.
  What our amendment does, Mr. President, is really two things.
  It directs the Federal Government to look into the question of using 
a different notification process for informing the families in these 
tragedies.
  As a member of the aviation committee here in the Senate, I have seen 
that there have been improvements in terms of dealing with these 
tragedies on the civilian side. And I believe it is time to bring more 
accountability, more compassion, and more openness in terms of how the 
families are notified in the instance of tragedies such as the C-130 
that took the lives of our constituents.
  So the first part of our amendment directs the Federal Government to 
looking into using the process used on the civilian side with respect 
to these crashes such as we had in Oregon.
  The second part of our amendment directs the Federal Government to 
look into the way investigations of these accidents are followed up on.
  Right now, there is a dual-track system. There is one top secret 
investigation of a crash that cannot be seen. There is another separate 
investigation for public dissemination. And I am of the view that given 
what has come to light about the C-130 in the last few weeks, that this 
dual-track investigation, this dual-track process is eroding public 
confidence in our system of handling these inquiries.
  I believe that it is time to look at this in a comprehensive way, to 
lift the cloak of secrecy with respect to these investigations, unless 
it involves national security.
  Under the second part of the amendment that Senator Smith and I offer 
together here today, there would be an effort to look into ending the 
dual-track system. Right now, the dual-track system, given all that has 
come to light about similar problems in the last few weeks, in my view 
erodes public confidence, and it is time for the Federal Government to 
look at a different kind of system and, in my view, lift the cloak of 
secrecy unless an investigation does involve national security.
  Mr. President, I want to thank the managers of the legislation, 
particularly the chairman of the committee, Senator Thurmond, and the 
ranking Democrat, Senator Levin. They have been extremely helpful to 
Senator Smith and I in going forward on this matter. The people of our 
State are grieving about this, and they want answers. We thank them.
  I yield the remainder of my time to Senator Smith, who has been 
working with me on this. We have pursued this every step of the way on 
a bipartisan basis. I yield to my colleague.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon is recognized.
  Mr. SMITH of Oregon. Thank you, Mr. President.
  I thank Senator Wyden for his remarks and diligence on this issue.
  Mr. President, on November 27, 1996, as Senator Wyden has related, a 
Portland-based HC-130 airplane of the 304th Rescue Squadron, with the 
call sign of ``King 56,'' crashed off the coast of California, killing 
10 of 11 people on board.
  I read the account of this tragedy, as related by the sole survivor 
of this accident, T. Sgt. Robert Vogel, and I was both moved and proud 
knowing that under extreme stress and knowing of their peril, this 
Oregon-based crew performed exactly as trained, and followed procedures 
and worked together until the very end.
  Almost 8 months has passed since this accident, and still the 
Department of Defense officials are unsure of the cause of the 
accident. Never learning the cause of this accident and the risk of 
having a similar accident occurring to another C-130 crew is simply 
unacceptable to Senator Wyden and myself. That is why we have asked 
experts from the National Transportation Safety Board to perform an 
additional review of the accident investigation and the accident 
procedures conducted by the Air Force. This review is still in 
progress.
  Although the cause of the accident is unknown, what we have learned 
is that there were very unfortunate shortcomings in the way the 
Department of Defense dealt with the families of the ``King 56'' crash 
victims.
  The shortcomings relate both to the way the Department manages 
accident investigations and the way the Department performs casualty 
notifications. That is what this amendment by Senator Wyden and myself 
has intended to address. We are simply asking the Department to 
evaluate its procedures against models used by the Federal Aviation 
Administration and to report to Congress whether these procedures would 
be beneficial and should be adopted also for military use.
  I thank Senator Wyden again for our work together in trying to 
correct the shortcomings in the Department of Defense accident process 
and to do a better job assisting the families generally, but 
specifically those families associated with ``King 56.''
  I urge the Air Force to continue to question this accident so that 
none of us in any State has to experience a similar tragedy as Oregon 
has. Our volunteer men and women in the Armed Services deserve no less.

  Thank you, Mr. President.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who seeks time?
  Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized.
  Mr. LEVIN. While the two Senators from Oregon are on the floor, let 
me

[[Page S7244]]

commend them for their amendment and for their sensitivity to families 
that have to face tragedy which is reflected in this amendment. 
Senators Wyden and Smith are to be strongly commended and, I hope, 
supported in this amendment. I think we are doing everything we can to 
try to clear that amendment and see that it is, in fact, adopted, as it 
deservedly should be.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the present 
amendment be temporarily laid aside.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                           Amendment No. 804

   (Purpose: To cap the cost of the F-22 fighter production program)

  Mr. BUMPERS. I send an amendment to the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Bumpers] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 804.

  Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the end of line 21 on page 32, insert the following new 
     subsection:
       (  ) Limitation on Total Cost of Production.--The total 
     amount obligated or expended for the F-22 production program 
     may not exceed $43,000,000,000.

  Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, this is an amendment that Senator Coats 
and I have been talking to other Senators about. I think it is agreed 
to by both sides now.
  It simply says, regarding the F-22 fighter plane, the day before 
yesterday the Air Force said they would build the F-22 fighter, 339 
planes, for $43 billion. We have spent so far a little over $18 billion 
in research and development of that plane.
  Senator Coats, in the Armed Services Committee, got a provision put 
in that $18 billion--they have not spent that much yet but that is what 
is anticipated to be spent on research and development. Senator Coats 
put an amendment in the bill to make that a cap, $18 billion. This 
amendment would put a $43 billion cap on the production of 339 
airplanes.
  As I say, that simply says exactly what the Air Force says it would 
take to do it. I think it is a very healthy amendment. I think it is 
one that serves the taxpayers well, will serve us well and the 
contractors well. It is a commitment they are making and we are simply 
codifying that in this bill.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, as the Senator from Arkansas has mentioned, 
we have been discussing this not only with each other but with other 
Members who have an interest in this particular subject. We think it 
makes a lot of sense on our side.
  The Air Force has specified in testimony before us and in a public 
statement that they believe, with the adjustments that Senator Cohen 
has made and the QDR has made in terms of the total number of planes to 
be built, they can meet the cost projection. It makes a great deal of 
sense, I think, for the Congress to say we encourage you very, very 
strongly--in fact, we will put language in to give that encouragement--
to meet that cost.
  If we are going to have a viable tactical modernization program in 
the future, given the realities of the budget that we have to deal with 
our entire defense structure, we have to set realistic cost caps on how 
much we will spend. If we don't do that, we will run into problems that 
we have run into before, as in B-2 and other modernization programs, 
and we jeopardize the entire tactical air modernization program as well 
as funding for other aspects of our national security.
  I think this makes perfect sense because we have something here that 
simply ratifies what the Air Force has said they can already do. They 
have assessed this. They said they can do it. They are working with a 
contractor to work out an agreement to do this. We are saying, ``Amen. 
This is what you need to do and we will urge you and support you in 
this effort.''
  I commend the Senator from Arkansas for his amendment. We have worked 
together, and I believe there is agreement across the aisle that we 
ought to go forward with this. I think we should do just that.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 804) was agreed to.
  Mr. COATS. I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. BUMPERS. I move to lay that on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the distinguished chairman, Mr. Thurmond, 
and I, and the distinguished ranking member, together with others, have 
been working to resolve a draft that I hope will be an amendment in the 
second degree to the underlying amendment by the distinguished Senator 
from Wisconsin, which, as I understand it, from the distinguished 
ranking member, is now acceptable in form and, therefore, I will 
entertain the remarks of the distinguished ranking member.
  Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized.


                 Amendment No. 802, As Modified Further

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I send a modification of my second-degree 
amendment to the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has a right to modify the 
amendment, and the amendment is so modified.
  The amendment (No. 802), as modified further, is as follows:

     SEC.   . SENSE OF THE SENATE REGARDING A FOLLOW-ON FORCE FOR 
                   BOSNIA

       The Senate finds the following:
       (1) U.S. military forces were deployed to Bosnia as members 
     of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
     Implementation Forces (IFOR) to implement the military 
     aspects of the Dayton Agreement.
       (2) The military aspects of the Dayton Agreement were being 
     successfully implemented.
       (3) Following the recommendation of the Secretary General 
     of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on December 11, 
     1996, to extend the presence of NATO forces in Bosnia until 
     June 1998 so that progress could be achieved in implementing 
     the civil aspects of the Dayton Agreement, the President 
     announced his decision to extend the presence of United Stats 
     forces in Bosnia to participate in the NATO Stabilization 
     Force (SFOR) until June 1998.
       (4) The cost of U.S. participation in operations in Bosnia 
     from 1992 through June 1998 is estimated to exceed $7 
     billion.
       (5) The President and the Secretary of Defense have stated 
     that United States forces are to be withdrawn from Bosnia by 
     June 1998.
       It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) United States ground combat forces should not 
     participate in a follow-on force in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
     after June 1998;
       (2) the European Security and Defense Identity, which, as 
     facilitated by the Combined Joint Task Forces concept, 
     enables the Western European Union, with the consent of the 
     North Atlantic Alliance, to assume political control and 
     strategic direction of NATO assets made available by the 
     Alliance, is an ideal instrument for a follow-on force for 
     Bosnia and Herzegovina;
       (3) if the European Security and Defense Identity is not 
     sufficiently developed or is otherwise deemed inappropriate 
     for such a mission, a NATO-led force without the 
     participation of United States ground combat forces in 
     Bosnia, may be suitable for a follow-on force for Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina;
       (4) the United States may decide to appropriately provide 
     support to a Western European Union-led or NATO-led follow-on 
     force, including command and control, intelligence, 
     logistics, and, if necessary, a ready reserve force in the 
     region
       (5) the President should inform our European NATO allies of 
     this expression of the sense of Congress and should strongly 
     urge them to undertake preparations for a Western European 
     Union-led or NATO-led force as a follow-on force to the NATO-
     led Stabilization Force if needed to maintain peace and 
     stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina; and
       (6) The President should consult with the Congress with 
     respect to any support to be

[[Page S7245]]

     provided to a Western European Union-led, or NATO-led follow-
     on force in Bosnia after June 1998.

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, this amendment is offered on behalf of 
myself, Senators Reed, McCain, Thurmond, Byrd, and Inhofe.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate?
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President----
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if I might interject, perhaps it could be 
voted on and then the Senator can make his remarks.
  Mr. LEVIN. I would be happy to have the amendment adopted first.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate?
  The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from 
Michigan.
  The amendment (No. 802), as modified further, was agreed to.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. WARNER. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, this amendment has the same language as the 
original second-degree amendment in almost all respects but a few 
relatively minor ones. It is a sense-of-the-Congress resolution. It is 
not a funding cutoff. It is a sense-of-the-Congress resolution that our 
ground forces should be out of Bosnia in June 1998. It has the same 
language as last night relative to the possible support for a European 
follow-on force, either through the European Security and Defense 
Identity, which is part of NATO, or in some other kind of a NATO-led 
force, but without the participation of the U.S. ground combat forces.
  It adds a provision at the end that the President should consult with 
the Congress with respect to any support to be provided to such a 
Western European Union-led or NATO-led follow-on force in Bosnia after 
June 1998. And then there are some findings in front that are factual 
findings before the sense-of-the-Congress language that is the heart of 
last night's and this second-degree amendment.
  Mr. President, very briefly, we should send a message that our troops 
on the ground in Bosnia will be out by next June. That is the policy of 
the administration. We should support that mission description. We 
should do so in a way that will not undermine the goals of Dayton, or 
undermine the flexibility of our commanders in the field. The funding 
cutoff was too rigid, too inflexible, and too far in advance. So this 
approach was adopted.
  General Shalikashvili and Secretary Cohen sent us a letter on July 9 
that, in two sentences, reflects the spirit and heart of my second-
degree amendment.
  Part of that letter reads as follows: ``We remain committed to a June 
1998 withdrawal date.'' That is Secretary Cohen and General 
Shalikashvili speaking. The next line also is reflected in this sense-
of-the-Congress resolution: ``However, we strongly oppose a statutorily 
mandated withdrawal of the United States forces from the NATO-led 
Stabilization Force by that date or, indeed, any specific date.'' It 
points out that, our forces must be able to proceed with a minimum risk 
to U.S. personnel: legislating their redeployment schedule would 
completely change the dynamic on the ground and could undercut troop 
safety.
  I ask unanimous consent that the entire letter from General 
Shalikashvili and Secretary Cohen be printed into the Record at this 
time.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                                     July 9, 1997.
     Hon. Thomas Daschle,
     Minority Leader, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Daschle: Eighteen months ago the bloodiest 
     conflict Europe had seen since World War II raged in Bosnia. 
     With United States leadership, the Parties to that conflict 
     agreed in December 1995 to cease hostilities. Today, NATO is 
     helping to maintain this U.S.-brokered peace, a peace that 
     provides a secure environment for political reconciliation 
     and economic reconstruction. The four-year long cycle of 
     violence has been broken, the warring factions have been 
     separated and an enforceable boundary between them has been 
     established. These successes have reinvigorated the NATO 
     Alliance and have reestablished America's leadership.
       Notwithstanding these successes, legislation setting a 
     fixed date for withdrawal of U.S. forces is expected to be 
     considered by the Senate. We urge the Senate to reject this 
     legislation and we request your support. We remain committed 
     to a June 1998 withdrawal date. However, we strongly oppose a 
     statutorily mandated withdrawal of the United States forces 
     from the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) by that date or, 
     indeed, any specific date. A fixed withdrawal date will 
     constrict U.S. commander's flexibility, encourage our 
     opponents and undermine the important psychological advantage 
     U.S. troops enjoy. Our forces must be able to proceed with a 
     minimum of risk to U.S. personnel; legislating their 
     redeployment schedule would completely change the dynamic on 
     the ground and could undercut troop safety. Finally, 
     legislative action of this nature on a matter of European 
     security could very well undermine the cohesion of the NATO 
     Alliance.
       We are committed to full consultation with the Congress on 
     our deployment in Bosnia. We urge the Senate to reject 
     attempts to legislate any mandatory date for withdrawal from 
     Bosnia.
           Sincerely,
     John M. Shalikashvili,
       Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
     William S. Cohen,
       Secretary of Defense.

  Mr. LEVIN. Finally, Mr. President, I want to thank Senator Feingold, 
whose initiative it was that put us on the path to making a statement 
to sending a message about congressional intent, which this amendment 
reflects. Even though there is no funding cutoff, as I believe there 
should not be, there should be a strong statement as to what 
congressional intent is at this time and under these circumstances. And 
this second-degree amendment that I offered last night, and have 
slightly modified again, which has now been adopted, is a bipartisan 
amendment; it always has been.
  Senator McCain has been active in this. Senator Reed from Rhode 
Island, my first cosponsor, has been a very, very strong active person 
in the debate of this issue. I want to also express my particular 
gratitude to Senator Reed of Rhode Island for his constant involvement 
and participation and help in drafting this language.
  With that, I thank Senator Warner, as always, for his work in trying 
to bring people together. My good chairman, Senator Thurmond, as 
always, is helpful in trying to resolve these issues. And the two 
leaders have been very active as well.
  With that, I yield the floor.
  Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia is recognized.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank my distinguished colleague for his 
remarks.
  I was simply acting on behalf of the distinguished chairman in 
putting this matter together and reconciling the differences. But I 
wish the Record to reflect that the Senator from Virginia, on the voice 
vote, voted in the negative.
  Mr. President, I have consistently opposed the deployment of United 
States ground troops to Bosnia. In December 1995, prior to the initial 
deployment of U.S. ground troops, I voted against the deployment on 
three separate occasions. I have stated repeatedly that, in my view, 
there is no vital United States national security interest at stake in 
Bosnia that justifies putting United States ground troops in harm's 
way.
  Having said that, I do not believe that the Bosnia amendments that we 
are voting on this afternoon are the right way to send the message to 
the administration that we do not support its Bosnia policy.
  As a general matter, I do not believe it is a good idea to set 
deadlines for a military operation. I have criticized the 
administration for setting Bosnia deadlines, and I do not believe the 
Congress should now validate that approach.
  I also feel very strongly that it is the President's constitutional 
right and duty to decide when U.S. troops should be deployed on a 
military operation, and when those troops should be withdrawn.
  Although I do not support the President's Bosnia policy, and I remain 
of the opinion that that part of the world is not in the United States 
vital national interest, we have made a $7 billion dollar investment in 
Bosnia. A precipitous withdrawal could jeopardize that investment.
  Mr. President, last evening I had the opportunity to engage in a 
colloquy with the Senator from Michigan on this issue. I wanted to take 
this opportunity this afternoon to further explain the reasons for my 
votes on these Bosnia amendments.

[[Page S7246]]

  I urge other Senators who are anxious to speak, if we could be brief. 
I believe I am authorized to say on behalf of the distinguished 
chairman of the committee and the majority leader, indeed, the ranking 
member, that we are very close to final passage. It is our hope and 
expectation with the resolution of one matter, which the leadership of 
the Senate is now addressing, that we might be able to proceed to final 
passage within maybe 30 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who seeks time?
  The Senator from Rhode Island is recognized.
  Mr. REED. Mr. President, very briefly, I commend the Senator from 
Michigan and the Senator from Virginia and my colleagues who have 
proposed the second-degree amendment. I also commend the Senator from 
Wisconsin, Senator Feingold, for focusing our attention on this very 
critical issue.
  The danger for an immediate cutoff of funds, I think, is threefold.
  First, essentially demoralizing our troops. It would be very 
difficult for them to understand that we have cut off funds now for an 
operation that is extending into June 1998. In effect, it would be like 
the difference between knowing that your lease expires in June 1998 and 
getting the eviction notice. Cutting off of funds is very close to 
being evicted. I don't think our troops will understand that.
  Second, it would paralyze our efforts to construct a follow-on force 
by our European allies, a force that would not contain American troops 
but a force that would be necessary to maintain the peace in Bosnia. If 
we were to announce today a cutoff of funds, I believe we would have no 
chance to construct this follow-on force by our European allies.
  Finally, I think we embolden those force elements who are resisting 
within Bosnia. This would be the message, that we are leaving, 
categorically, that there will be nothing to replace it, and that idea 
can only lead to further violence.
  So I believe the best approach is the one that has been adopted in 
the second-degree amendment. And that is to, once again, reiterate our 
strong commitment to a withdrawal date by June 1998, but to give the 
time--and also to give the impetus--to develop a follow-on force, a 
non-American follow-on force, and support that force, and to continue 
to build on the structure of peace that is emerging today and that we 
hope will continue in the former Yugoslavia.
  I commend again all of my colleagues who are working on this effort.
  I yield my time.
  Mr. FEINGOLD addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin is recognized.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, thank you.
  Mr. President, I am very pleased that the proponents of the modified 
Bosnia amendment have managed to work out a compromise, and I think, in 
fact, the changes that were made on the modification strengthened the 
second-degree amendment, made it stronger and tough, which, I think, is 
very appropriate here.
  While my original amendment would have prohibited the use of funds 
for the deployment of ground troops in Bosnia, I was willing to accept 
the sense-of-the-Congress language because I think it is vitally 
important that the Congress send a signal about our views on this 
mission during consideration of this bill, the Department of Defense 
authorization bill.
  I introduced this amendment in the first place because I felt it was 
critical that we debate this issue at this time. Frankly, I think it 
would have been somewhat irresponsible not to have any debate about the 
Bosnian involvement in the context of the Department of Defense 
authorization bill.
  As I indicate by my underlying amendment, I would greatly prefer a 
hard statutory requirement that the administration stick to its stated 
end date of June 30, 1998. That is, in fact, what the other body did. 
That is what the House has already done. The House voted 278 to 148 to 
limit the use of funds after that date. The House version and the 
modification to my amendment speak to the same goal. The Congress wants 
to see this mission end. Our main differences lay in the mechanism to 
achieve that goal. But when these two versions get to conference later 
this year, the conferees will have to resolve these differences.
  Mr. President, it is my hope that the conference will include the 
strongest possible language with regard to this issue. We have taken an 
important step today toward terminating the Bosnian mission and 
bringing home our men and women.
  I am delighted to have the support from so many Members on both sides 
of the aisle for my efforts in this area. I want to especially thank 
the Senators from Michigan and Rhode Island for their work, and the 
strong and consistent support of the Senator from Texas, Senator 
Hutchison, who has been working with me on this important matter all 
along.
  Thank you, Mr. President.
  I yield the floor.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas is recognized.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I want to commend the Senator from 
Wisconsin for his courage in pursuing this matter. I want to thank the 
Senators from Michigan, from Arizona, from South Carolina, from Rhode 
Island, and from Oklahoma who are working on this to make sure that we 
have something that everyone can support. I think it is a very strong 
message to the administration that sets out the concerns of the Senate. 
I think with what the House did on this issue, it is going to be very 
clear that Congress expects a June 30 exit date for the United States. 
I think, certainly, if something occurs, that we should be able to 
discuss after that time, but I think if we plan from today, we are 
giving plenty of notice to everyone what our intentions are.
  I think the most important issue that we must address in the next 
year is the issue that was promised to Senator Dole and Senator McCain 
by the President. That is that there would be arming and training of 
the police force, of the Bosnians, so that they would be able to have a 
sense of order in their country when the NATO forces would withdraw. I 
am concerned that that training and arming is not taking place, and 
that we may come upon the June 30 deadline for our exit and they won't 
be fully supplied with policemen and with the armed services that will 
be able to keep the peace. We have a year to correct that. I hope that 
the administration will make sure that our word is kept, that we would 
have a good solid police force that would be able to keep the peace in 
Bosnia after June 30, 1998.
  But I think the sense of the Senate provides for other options, other 
alternatives, as we have stated in the sense of the Senate, that if, in 
fact, it is not finally a peaceful situation, that the United States 
could leave and perhaps a NATO force without the United States could 
stay. And we are going to be there in a support role. We have always 
been there in a support role for peacekeeping.
  But I think we must keep our word. The Senate has spoken. The House 
has spoken, and now is the time for the administration to hear the 
message and get along with the business of getting an exit strategy, 
putting these people in control of their government, giving them the 
training that they need to be able to sustain that peace themselves.
  I appreciate very much the very bipartisan support for this sense of 
the Senate. I hope that the administration will hear our words and 
begin the strategy for the June 1998 exit of U.S. troops.
  Thank you, Mr. President.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, one of the most difficult and intractable 
problems facing the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization [NATO] is the civil war in the Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. In recent years, we have witnessed mass murder and 
genocide on a scale not seen in Europe since the Holocaust. We have 
also been concerned that this conflict could spill over into 
neighboring countries, which would force NATO to intervene under much 
worse circumstances.
  The U.S. provided the crucial leadership to negotiate the Dayton 
peace accords, which called for NATO forces to separate the warring 
factions, and for democratic elections to be held, as a basis for a 
permanent peace in Bosnia. As a result of our efforts, fighting has 
ended, and the first tentative steps towards peace have been taken.

[[Page S7247]]

  We have just started down this path to peace, however, after more 
than five years of war. Our early efforts have not erased the memories 
of concentration camps and mass murder. Building democratic 
institutions in such an environment is fraught with road blocks. It is 
easy for the foes of peace to beat the drum beat of war, and plunge 
Bosnia back into a renewed cycle of fighting and genocide.
  The United States has clearly stated our intention to withdraw in 
June of 1998. The Administration is fully aware that a long-term and 
open-minded commitment will not be supported by Congress.
  Nonetheless, if the amendment offered by Senator Feingold were 
adopted by the Senate, it would send a loud and unmistakable signal to 
the worst elements of the Bosnian factions to begin to prepare for war. 
Senator Feingold's amendment would terminate funding for U.S. 
participation in Bosnia on June 30, 1998, with no discussion of what 
would follow in the vacuum left after our withdrawal. Indeed, a Senate 
vote in favor of Senator Feingold's amendment would make it more 
difficult for the best elements in Bosnia--those who legitimately 
desire to work for peace--to continue to advance their efforts. The 
pressures to prepare for war will likely overtake and silence any 
factions which wish to work for a peaceful resolution of the conflict. 
At the present time, the various factions have eleven more months to 
hold elections and prepare for the gradual end of the direct 
involvement of NATO troops. These efforts will, for all intents and 
purposes, rapidly come to an end if the Senate openly votes to 
completely get out of Bosnia on June 30, 1998.
  The second degree amendment offered by Senator Levin, of which I am a 
cosponsor, recognizes that it is likely that a NATO follow-on force 
will have to remain in Bosnia after June 1998, while stating that U.S. 
ground combat forces should not participate in such a force. This 
involves the replacement of U.S. ground combat forces with those of our 
European partners in NATO. The Administration should exercise very 
strenuous efforts to convince our allies to take up the ground combat 
role by next June. It calls upon the President to urge our European 
allies to step up to the plate, and undertake preparations for a 
Western European Union-led or NATO-led force, to assume responsibility 
for the ground situation in Bosnia after June 1998. The second degree 
amendments supports a U.S. provision of needed American command and 
control, intelligence, and logistics support for such a follow-on NATO 
operation. This will allow NATO to continue to build democratic 
institutions within Bosnia to continue, and hopefully prevent an 
arbitrary return to bloodshed and war. It is a wiser course and one 
which provides a logical conclusion to U.S. efforts in the region.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I appreciate the concerns of my 
colleagues on this issue. I think we all agree that there are few more 
important foreign policy issues facing the United States then ensuring 
that the Bosnian peace process succeeds.
  I am pleased with the effort has been made by Senators on both sides 
of this issue to see that we did not need to vote on a cut-off of funds 
for our ground forces in Bosnia.
  However, it is precisely because I want to see the peace process 
succeed that I feel that I must nevertheless voice my concerns about 
this amendment.
  It is my belief that our presence in Bosnia must be one without any 
preconditions as to time. We must stay long enough to make sure that 
the job we started gets done, and gets done right.
  Any effort to set a date to cut off funds, as Senator Feingold 
proposed in his amendment, or which suggests a firm date for the 
withdrawal of all U.S. ground combat troops, as Senator Levin's second 
degree amendment to Senator Feingold's amendment does, telegraphs U.S. 
policy to those who would oppose us, and to those who oppose the 
implementation of the Dayton Accords.
  I do not think that there is a single Member of this Chamber that 
does not wish that 1 year had been sufficient time for the Dayton 
Accords to be implemented, and that U.S. troops were not still needed 
in the Balkans.
  But the simple fact of the matter is that there are aspects of the 
Dayton Accords which have not yet been fully implemented--aspects which 
require a little more time if they are going to have a chance to take 
root.
  Earlier this year voter registration began for the municipal 
elections scheduled for Bosnia this September. True, I wish that 
conditions existed to hold these elections last year when they were 
originally planned. But those conditions did not exist then; they do 
now.
  What sort of signal will we send to those who support peace and 
democracy in Bosnia if, even as they are preparing for municipal 
elections, we are telling them that the troops who safeguard the peace 
process and democracy are on the way out?
  Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic and his Party of Democratic 
Action have formed a coalition with a number of opposition parties to 
seek broad-minded support in the municipal elections. This amendment 
will cut his legs out from under him, and give strength to those who 
would like to see Bosnia destroyed.
  This fall Serbia will hold a presidential election. It will be a 
difficult campaign for Milosevic's opponents, but not an impossible 
one. That Milosevic's grip on power might be lessened would have been 
inconceivable a year ago. It is not inconceivable now.
  But setting a date for cutting off funds for U.S. forces or for the 
withdrawal of all U.S. ground combat troops without giving the 
President flexibility will all but guarantee Milosevic's re-election.
  I do not believe that supporters of this amendment intend it as a 
boost to Milosevic's campaign, but that is exactly what it will do.
  Right now in the Republika Srpska there is a power struggle going on 
between President Plavsic and pro-Karadzic hardliners based in Pale.
  How this struggle will play out, and whether the more moderate 
supporters of President Plavsic can retain control, or whether the pro-
Karadzic forces will seize control of the Republic Srpska has profound 
implications for the future of peace and stability in the Balkans.
  The pro-Karadzic forces, the Pale hardliners, the war criminals, have 
adopted a wait it out strategy. They think that the United States will 
be withdrawing next year without any follow-on force to SFOR. If they 
just bide their time, they believe, come next summer they will be able 
to overturn Dayton and destroy any hope for Bosnia.
  This amendment will tell them that they have won.
  I do not think that giving support to the Pale hardliners is the 
intent of the supporters of this amendment, but that is exactly what 
this amendment does.
  It will tell them that they are right; all they have to do is wait, 
and that the United States will leave without fully implementing 
Dayton, without following through on our commitment to create a secure 
and stable Bosnia.
  After we have done so much we cannot abandon Bosnia now.
  It is true there are still unsettled issues with refugees, with 
reconstruction, and with indicted war criminals in the 
former Yugoslavia. And again, I would not argue that we did not want or 
hope that these matters would have been taken care of by now.

  But having said that, setting a date for a troop pullout will not 
help us to resettle refugees, to speed economic reconstruction, or to 
apprehend indicted war criminals.
  Instead, it will send a message to refugees that they cannot hope to 
be safely resettled; to those trying to rebuild their businesses that 
they should not bother; and to war criminals that they only have to 
remain in hiding a little bit longer, and then they will be free to 
commit their ghastly crimes once again.
  The continued presence of U.S. forces is critical in keeping the 
peace process on track. And the fact of the matter is that the United 
States-led peacekeeping force is the glue that holds peace process in 
the former Yugoslavia together.
  Those who suggest we set a date certain for a troop pullout argue 
that we have already spent a lot of money pursuing peace in the 
Balkans, and that to continue to stay will cost us even more.
  But to set a date to pull out now will all but guarantee that the 
peace process will break down, and that all that

[[Page S7248]]

we have invested in Bosnia in the past year and a half will be wasted.
  Establishing a date certain for a United States pullout will set in 
motion a clock whereby the forces of nationalism and ethnic hatred in 
the former Yugoslavia will begin to plan for renewed war.
  And, if war breaks out again in the Balkans and spreads elsewhere in 
the region, it will be far more costly for the U.S. to have to 
intervene once again than if we retain the flexibility to maintain our 
presence.
  Those who suggest we need to set a date for a United States pullout 
from Bosnia also argue that without this clear end-date there is danger 
of mission creep, and of Bosnia becoming a quagmire.
  Just the opposite. Anyone who has paid attention to what has happened 
with the NATO peacekeeping force in Bosnia for the past year and a half 
can only come to one conclusion: SFOR has a clear mandate. There has 
been no mission creep and there is not going to be any mission creep.
  In fact, concern for the safety of our troops would dictate that we 
allow the military to continue with planning based on their current 
mission and deployment, and to pull out on a schedule dictated by the 
military facts on the ground without having the Senate dangerously 
compromise their position by telegraphing our plans and intentions.
  In addition, this abrupt U.S. departure will almost certainly doom 
any effort to create some follow-on force or mechanism to insure the 
peace process continues. Again, I wish it were not the case. I wish 
that our European allies would act in a more decisive way without 
United States having to take the lead--but we are dealing with reality 
here.
  I fully support the spirit of Senator Levin's amendment: I too 
believe that Europe should take greater responsibility for Europe, and 
that a SFOR follow-on force led by Europe in the context of the 
European Security and Defense Identity should be the next phase of 
peacekeeping in Bosnia.
  But if the United States precipitously pulls out of Bosnia our 
European NATO allies may be unable to lead a follow-on force. What if 
United States ground combat troops are required in Bosnia until August 
1, 1998, or even December 1, 1998, to effect a smooth, safe, 
transition?
  Indeed, under the dynamic set in motion by this amendment, if Europe 
wanted to lead such a follow-on mission in Bosnia with United States 
support it would be reasonable of them to question whether or not we 
would be there to support them.
  Do we really want to set a precedent here of giving our friends and 
allies reason to question whether the United States will be there to 
support them when they need our assistance? To send that sort of 
message would have tremendous implications--and none of them good--for 
U.S. interests throughout the globe.
  It is my hope, and I think that of many of my colleagues, that a 
European-led follow-on force to SFOR will take the lead in maintaining 
the peace in Bosnia come next June. But that follow-on force may 
require some United States military support and assistance, on the 
ground, in Bosnia.
  This amendment, by preventing the United States from supporting our 
European allies, will destroy any chance that such a European-led force 
could come into being.
  Both the President and the Secretary of Defense have suggested that 
United States forces will be able to pull out of Bosnia by June 30, 
1998. There is no reason to doubt their word or intention.
  But, as my colleagues surely know, the unexpected may occur. There 
may be good reason to keep some or even a substantial United States 
force in Bosnia past next June. Or, there may be reason to pull our 
forces out sooner. The bottom line here is that we cannot and should 
not put our military in a disadvantageous position by setting a date 
certain for a pull out.
  It is my belief that if we continue to work the peace process, and 
give the President the discretion that, as Commander in Chief, he 
deserves, by the time United States forces prepare to leave Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the peace process will have been given sufficient time to 
develop deep, sustainable, roots.
  To adopt this amendment will risk killing the peace process and all 
but condemns Bosnia to further bloodshed.
  Again, I would like to extend my appreciation to my colleagues on all 
sides of this issue who have worked hard to find a compromise. 
Nevertheless, I feel that I must I oppose this amendment and would urge 
my colleagues to oppose it as well.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I would like to state for the record that 
although I voted for the Levin substitute amendment, I did so as one of 
the second choices that I described in my statement earlier today.
  The Levin substitute amendment, in my opinion, was an improvement 
over the Feingold amendment in that rather than cutting off funds for 
United States ground forces in Bosnia after June 30, 1998, it puts our 
NATO European Allies on notice that we expect them to provide the post-
SFOR ground forces, while we provide command and control, intelligence, 
logistics, and if necessary a ready reserve force in the region.
  My first choice, as I said earlier, would have been to give President 
Clinton freedom of movement for the next 12 months to carry out the 
unfulfilled portions of the Dayton accords and to negotiate appropriate 
international security arrangements for Bosnia and Herzegovina after 
June 30, 1998.
  I thank the Chair and yield the floor.


                     Amendment No. 759, As Amended

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair would observe that amendment 759, as 
amended, has not been agreed to.
  Is there objection to the amendment? Hearing none, the amendment is 
agreed to.
  The amendment (No. 759), as amended, was agreed to.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the 
amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who seeks time?
  Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, what is the pending amendment, if I could 
ask?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending amendment is the Reed amendment 
No. 772.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to set aside the 
pending amendment temporarily.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Hearing none, it is so 
ordered.


                           Amendment No. 805

(Purpose: To achieve savings in the cost of the CVN-77 nuclear aircraft 
                            carrier program)

  Mr. LEVIN. I send an amendment to the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The bill clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Michigan [Mr. Levin] proposes an amendment 
     numbered 805.

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the end of section 122, add the following:
       (c) Limitation of Costs.--(1) The Secretary of the Navy 
     shall structure the procurement of CVN-77 nuclear aircraft 
     carrier and manage the program so that the CVN-77 may be 
     acquired for an amount not to exceed $4,600,000,000.
       (2) The Secretary of the Navy may adjust the amount set 
     forth in paragraph (1) for the program by the following 
     amounts:
       (A) The mounts of outfitting costs and post-delivery costs 
     incurred for the program.
       (B) The amounts of increases or decrease in costs 
     attributtal to economic inflation after September 30, 1997.
       (C) The amounts of increases or decreases in costs 
     attributable to compliance with changes in Federal, State, or 
     local laws enacted after September 30, 1997.
       (D) The amounts of increases or decreases in costs of the 
     program that are attributable to new technology built into 
     the CVN-77 aircraft carrier, as compared to the technology 
     built into the baseline design of the CVN-76 aircraft 
     carrier.
       (E) The amounts of increases or decreases in costs 
     resulting from changes the Secretary proposes in the funding 
     plan of the Smart Buy proposal on which the projected savings 
     are based.
       (3) The Secretary of the Navy shall submit to the 
     congressional defense committees annually, at the same time 
     as the submission of the budget under section 105(a) of title 
     31,

[[Page S7249]]

     United States Code, any changes in the amount set forth in 
     paragraph (1) that he has determined to be associated with 
     costs referred to in paragraph (2).

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, my amendment would establish a cost cap on 
the cost of the next nuclear aircraft carrier, and ensure that we 
achieve the savings that we expect from beginning to fund the ship next 
year, which is a number of years earlier than planned.
  Mr. President, the committee bill authorizes $345 million in fiscal 
year 1998 to begin incrementally funding construction of the next 
Nimitz class nuclear aircraft carrier, CVN-77, based on claims of cost 
savings by the shipbuilder. The Committee did not adopt safeguards to 
ensure that the taxpayers actually receive the savings on which this 
unusual action is based. Those are the safeguards which are contained 
in this amendment.
  Let me just review the bidding. The Navy budget projects a total cost 
of $5.2 billion for CVN-77, funded normally--that is, with advance 
procurement of $695 million in fiscal year 2000 and the remaining $4.5 
billion of full funding in fiscal year 2002.
  The shipbuilder--Newport News Shipbuilding--has come forward with a 
proposal to save $600 million by having the Government provide funding 
for CVN-77 earlier than the Navy budget proposes it. This claim has 
been repeated over the last 2 months in a highly visible media 
campaign.
  The shipbuilder claims that we could buy the CVN-77 under their 
alternative for $4.6 billion--a savings of $600 million --if we provide 
incremental funding over the next 5 years, starting with $345 million 
in fiscal year 1998.
  I have been very skeptical in the past of providing phased or 
incremental funding for defense programs. The normal method of funding 
major defense procurement programs is to provide full funding in one 
lump sum in the year in which the program is started, with the 
exception of certain limited long-lead items which are funded through 
advance procurement. As a general rule, incrementally funding major 
weapons programs reduces visibility over total program costs, and can 
lead to a ``buy in'' situation in which it becomes more difficult to 
control total program costs and future cost growth.
  Mr. President, I believe that we should try to achieve savings in 
Defense modernization wherever we can, particularly savings of the 
magnitude of $600 million. Meeting our modernization goals for the 
military services over the next 10 years within a stable defense budget 
is going to be a significant challenge. We need to look for innovative 
ways to save money, and this approach to funding the CVN-77 looks like 
something we should do if--and this is the critical if--we really save 
money. At the same time, I feel strongly that we must protect the 
interests of the taxpayer, if we are to take full advantage of the 
opportunity for savings.
  It will disadvantage the tax payer if we incrementally fund CVN-77 
without the assurances that the reason for doing it--saving dollars--is 
in fact achieved.
  That's why we should adopt this amendment putting a ceiling on the 
total cost of this ship that is in line with what the shipbuilder 
promised.
  If we don't, we will be in a terrible bargaining position.
  The amendment puts a limit on the total cost of the next carrier, 
using the cost cap language that was developed for the Seawolf 
submarine as a model. The amendment: establishes a cost cap of $4.6 
billion for CVN-77, $600 million below the Navy's budget estimate fully 
funding this ship in the usual manner; it excludes outfitting and post 
delivery costs; and it adjusts the cost cap automatically to reflect 
changes in inflation or costs attributable to compliance with changes 
in Federal, State, or local laws.
  This amendment adds three important additional provisions:
  It includes a proviso that allows the Navy to change the cost cap for 
the ship based on changes in costs that are incurred by inserting new 
technology--compared to the previous carrier, CVN-76.
  It includes a proviso that allows the Navy to change the cost cap for 
the ship if the funding is changed in later fiscal years from the plan 
on which the shipbuilder based his proposed savings.
  And it includes an annual reporting requirement on changes in the end 
cost of the CVN-77, so there will be visibility into the technology 
improvement program that will allow the Navy to demonstrate how 
technology insertion is causing any substantive changes in the end cost 
of the ship.
  My bottom line is that, despite my overall concerns about incremental 
or phased funding, I am willing to support this funding approach for 
the next aircraft carrier, because I believe we can achieve the savings 
under the phased funding approach. We must, however, have a vehicle to 
guarantee that the Government will achieve the promised savings, which 
is the driving argument for phased funding.
  Mr. President, this amendment will help guarantee those savings, 
while providing room to adjust the price of CVN-77 for the legitimate 
factors indicated.
  I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the Chief of Naval Operations has 
described the smart buy proposal as a proposal which has great merit. 
Both the Navy and the Rand Corp. have verified that the savings claimed 
by the contractor under this plan can indeed be achieved.
  However, these savings will not be achieved unless the funding 
profile outlined in the smart buy proposal is carried out, as follows: 
fiscal year 1998, $345 million; fiscal year 1999, $170 million; fiscal 
year 2000, $875 million; fiscal year 2001, $135 million; and fiscal 
year 192002, $3,075 million. Therefore, the Levin amendment before us 
is based on the strong expectation that the administration will provide 
funding in its annual budget submissions to fully fund CVN-77 in 
accordance with the smart buy proposal, and that the Congress will 
support those budget submissions with annual appropriations.
  Without a firm commitment to this program by the Navy--as evidenced 
by including funding for this program in the SCN account for each year 
from fiscal year 1999 to 2002--the $600 million in savings to the 
American taxpayer could well be lost. We expect the Navy to follow 
through on its commitment and to achieve the savings it has represented 
to be possible.
  Likewise, I know my colleague agrees with me that the savings cannot 
be achieved if the Congress does not authorize and appropriate the 
amounts set forth in the smart buy proposal. Although the amendment 
before us contains a mechanism to deal with the failure of the Navy to 
provide the appropriate funding, there is nothing to address problems 
caused if a future Congress fails to provide adequate funding for this 
program. If at some point the Congress does not provide the necessary 
funding, we will have to revisit the limitation contained in this 
amendment and adjust it accordingly. Does the Senator agree that this 
is the course we will follow?
  Mr. LEVIN. I agree with the Senator from Virginia. The $600 million 
savings that we all expect to achieve are based upon the funding 
profile set forth in the smart buy proposal. I will work with the 
Senator from Virginia to ensure that we maintain that funding profile 
and achieve these savings, and I expect the Navy to do the same.
  If for any reason the Navy fails to include the funding profile in 
its budget request, the amendment that we are offering provides a 
specific remedy: the funding limitation would remain in place, but 
would be adjusted to address the impact of the changed funding profile. 
Paragraph (2)(E) of the amendment specifies that the limitation will be 
revised to reflect any adjustments needed to accommodate a change in 
funding. Would the Senator from Virginia agree that this is the effect 
of this amendment?
  Mr. WARNER. I am in complete agreement with the Senator from 
Michigan.
  Mr. President, this is a matter on which my distinguished colleague 
and I have worked for some time. I do not feel that it is necessary to 
place these financial constraints, because this contract, unlike 
others, has built-in checks and balances. Nevertheless, we have 
reconciled our differences, and to that extent I will go ahead and 
accept his amendment.
  I urge adoption of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the amendment? The 
question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Michigan.

[[Page S7250]]

  The amendment (No. 805) was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the 
amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. LEVIN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, we are working--the chairman, the ranking 
member, and others. I anticipate momentarily a statement from two other 
Senators that could well be the last items other than the adoption of a 
series of agreed-upon amendments. Pending that, I suggest the absence 
of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Hagel). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, at this time the distinguished Senator 
from Massachusetts, together with Senator Smith of New Hampshire, will 
address the Senate on another matter.
  Mr. KERRY addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, what is the order at this point?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator needs consent to call up his 
amendment.


                     Amendment No. 680, as modified

  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent I be permitted to 
call up amendment No. 680.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be permitted 
to modify the amendment at this time, and I send such a modification to 
the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has that right. The amendment will 
be so modified.
  The clerk will report the amendment.
  The bill clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. Kerry] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 680, as modified.

  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment (No. 680), as modified, is as follows:

       Beginning on page 336, line 20, strike all after ``SEC. 
     1067.'' through ``(50 U.S.C. 401a).'' on line 3 of page 338 
     and insert in lieu thereof the following:

     POW/MIA INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

       (a) The Director of Central Intelligence in consultation 
     with the Secretary of Defense, shall provide analytical 
     support on POW/MIA matters to all Departments and agencies of 
     the Federal Government involved in such matters. The 
     Secretary of Defense shall ensure that all intelligence 
     regarding POW/MIA matters is taken into full account in the 
     analysis of POW/MIA cases by DPMO.

  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, this is a modification mutually arrived at 
together with Senator Smith of New Hampshire and Senator McCain in an 
effort to try to improve the intelligence-gathering process with 
respect to POW/MIA matters, and I thank Senator Smith of New Hampshire 
for his cooperation and Senator McCain. I think we have strengthened 
the ability of the process to guarantee that intelligence is going to 
be properly and fully vetted in the process but at the same time be 
able to continue the cooperative effort that we have achieved over 
these last years in that process.
  I think the compromise we have arrived at is a thoughtful one and an 
appropriate one with respect to the best intelligence gathering and 
control. So I think we have served the process well. I yield the floor.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I appreciate the help of 
the Senator from Massachusetts on this matter. We have reached 
agreement. The intent here is to see to it that those who are 
collecting intelligence on POW/MIA matters both now and in the future 
would have the opportunity to vet that through the intelligence 
community, and we have accomplished that with the compromise language, 
and we accept that language on this side.
  Mr. McCAIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, we had here a problem between the 
Intelligence Committee and the Armed Services Committee. It was 
resolved through intense negotiations in the last few minutes. I thank 
Senator Smith of New Hampshire, who we all know is the leader on this 
issue. His commitment to getting a full resolution not only in the past 
but in the case of conflicts in the future is well known. I thank 
Senator Kerry for his willingness, obviously, to move forward and 
comprise.
  Again, I thank Senator Smith of New Hampshire because I believe that 
this achieves the goal that he sought and at the same time allows us to 
come to an agreement here without further acrimony or dissent on this 
issue.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate? The Senator from 
Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I wish to compliment the distinguished 
Senator from Arizona, Senator Smith of New Hampshire, and Senator Kerry 
and urge we proceed to finish this off.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. I do not think there is any further debate. We are ready 
to proceed to a vote.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 680), as modified, was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. KERRY. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

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