[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 98 (Friday, July 11, 1997)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E1410-E1411]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


                   AMERICA'S VETERANS URGE RESTRAINT

                                 ______
                                 

                            HON. LANE EVANS

                              of illinois

                    in the house of representatives

                         Friday, July 11, 1997

  Mr. EVANS. Mr. Speaker, the Veterans' Affairs Committee held a 
hearing this week on S. 923 and H.R. 2040, measures which would deny 
certain veterans' benefits to veterans convicted of certain capital 
crimes. Seven of the major veterans' service organizations testified as 
one voice, and I urge my colleagues to review their excellent statement 
which thoughtfully examines a very difficult and complex issue. Their 
testimony follows:

   Statement of Rick Surratt, Disabled American Veterans Before the 
              Committee on Veterans' Affairs, July 9, 1997

       I am pleased to present the collective views of the 
     American Legion, AMVETS, the Blinded Veterans Association 
     (BVA), the Disabled American Veterans (DAV), the Jewish War 
     Veterans of the USA, the Paralyzed Veterans of America (PVA), 
     the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States (VFW), and 
     the Vietnam Veterans of America (VVA) on two bills to amend 
     the law pertaining to benefits eligibility in the case of 
     veterans committing capital crimes. The national veterans 
     organizations comprising this group, which for the sake of 
     convenience I will refer to as the ``veterans group,'' have 
     come together to speak as one, united voice because of the 
     views and concerns they hold in common on the subject matter 
     of these bills.
       The veterans group appreciates your invitation to explain 
     its position on whether and to what extent the commission of 
     capital offenses by veterans should affect their, or their 
     dependents,' benefit eligibility status. Without question, 
     this raises a serious public policy question for our Nation's 
     citizens. It is also certainly appropriate that the millions 
     of veterans the group represents have a voice on this issue 
     because, after all, these veterans are some of America's most 
     patriotic and civic-mined citizens, and these matters, of 
     course, also involve highly valued and honored rights 
     veterans earned by virtue of their reviewed service to the 
     Nation. On the other hand, because veterans are among our 
     most responsible citizens, they must not and will not view 
     their interests as veterans as separate from or in conflict 
     with the greater interests of the Nation as a whole. However, 
     as appropriate with many such difficult issues, they counsel 
     a balancing between the immediate human desire for and the 
     attractiveness of societal retribution for crimes and the 
     countervailing rational concerns about the maintenance of 
     stable measured, and equitable principles of law--and thus 
     the best interests of our society as a whole--over the long-
     term. It is that sense of prudence and equity that guides the 
     veterans group in their position of these bills.
       The veterans group has no quarrel with a view that veterans 
     are without privilege to disobey society's rules, and that, 
     absent special circumstances, the consequences for crimes 
     should be the same for veterans and nonveterans. fairness 
     dictates that veterans be treated the same as other citizens 
     on matters unrelated to their status as veterans per se, 
     however. Thus, the veteran should not suffer greater or 
     harsher penalties merely because he or she is a veteran than 
     a similarly situated nonveteran. To impose greater punishment 
     on the veteran goes beyond punishment on account of a 
     crime to punishment on account of being a veteran. That is 
     not to argue that we should continue to hold veterans who 
     commit crimes in the same high esteem that we do veterans 
     who conduct themselves properly. Thus, we do not have to 
     bestow the same honors upon veterans who bring dishonor to 
     themselves as we would upon veterans who continue to 
     conduct themselves in an upright manner during their 
     civilian lives following completion of military service.
       Of concern to the veterans group here, however, is the 
     treatment to be accorded veteran status once earned through 
     satisfactory fulfillment of service to the Nation. Veteran 
     status is a legal status which, as a practical matter, is 
     realized through the special rights created for veterans to 
     enjoy as a restitution for the sacrifices of military 
     service. Almost without exception, this status, once accrued, 
     is considered indefeasible. It is conferred by the completion 
     and honorable character of the recipient's military service 
     and is not conditioned upon subsequent conduct in civilian 
     life. Logically, that is as it should be. Just as a former 
     servicemember without honorable service should not be awarded 
     veterans' rights on the basis of post-service 
     accomplishments, no matter how commendable, conversely, 
     veteran status should not be exposed to rescission as a 
     result of civilian conduct following, or for other reasons 
     unrelated to, the performance of military service. Veterans 
     should be secure in the knowledge that their veteran status 
     is vested and will not be held hostage to irrelevant, post-
     service factors. If veterans' rights are intended to 
     remunerate for disabilities incurred, opportunities lost, 
     extraordinary rigors suffered, or contributions made in 
     connection with and during the time of military service, such 
     rights should, like wages earned, not be withheld or recalled 
     because of subsequent performance or unconnected actions or 
     events, even when such actions or events are of a character 
     that evoke very negative public sentiments. The special value 
     of service to one's country and the integrity of veteran 
     status would be defeated by departure from that tradition. 
     Fidelity to this principle admits exceptions for only the 
     most highly exceptional circumstances.
       Currently, the law provides for forfeiture of veterans' 
     rights only under circumstances of crimes against the 
     government which jeopardize or seriously threaten our 
     national security. Section 6104 of title 38, United States 
     Code, provides that veterans shown to be guilty of mutiny, 
     treason, or sabotage forfeit all future VA benefits, and 
     section 6105 of title 38 similarly provides that veterans 
     convicted of a variety of subversive activities forfeit VA 
     benefits, including eligibility for burial in a national 
     cemetery. These circumstances justify nullification of 
     veterans' entitlements because individuals should not receive 
     support from a government they actively seek to destroy.
       This Committee now has before it S. 923 which the Senate 
     passed recently. This bill would essentially void the veteran 
     status of any veteran convicted of a Federal capital offense. 
     Forfeiture would result from the commission of any Federal 
     offense punishable by death (regardless of whether the death 
     penalty was deemed warranted or actually imposed). Obviously, 
     that would go well beyond the nature of the offenses which 
     are now deemed to justify voidance of veteran status. While 
     the veterans of this Nation understand and, indeed, share in 
     the public indignation at such detestable acts, they believe 
     that persons committing such crimes should be punished as 
     criminals, not veterans. As noted previously, when the laws 
     impose the criminal penalty and also void veteran status, 
     they punish veterans both for the crime and because they 
     are veterans. Unquestionably, persons committing capital 
     offenses, as well as many lesser but also repulsive or 
     unsavory crimes such as child molestation or even drunken 
     driving, are justifiably not viewed very sympathetically 
     by the public, but emotions should not obscure or overcome 
     the more judicious considerations appropriate in these 
     matters. An integral part of our national values and the 
     qualities that set us apart from other nations is our 
     refusal to compromise justice and fairness even for the 
     most reprehensible within our society.
       Therefore, in addition to opposing S. 923 because it 
     operates to impose greater punishment on veterans merely 
     because they are veterans, the veterans group also opposes it

[[Page E1411]]

     as a matter of principle inasmuch as it diminishes the 
     intrinsic value of veteran status. This would be but one step 
     in undermining the fortification of veteran status against 
     the capricious overreactions of those who would revoke it in 
     the name of any popular cause or crusade or would find it a 
     convenient target against which they could direct their 
     frustration. If enacted into law, this will make veterans 
     more vulnerable to oblique attacks or indirect punishment for 
     unrelated matters. Again, once veteran status is earned, it 
     should be a protected and an irrevocable right, not to be 
     taken away because of subsequent unrelated events, except for 
     serious crimes against the nation. Preservation of the high 
     esteem of veteran status promotes patriotic ideals and 
     national unity, and is in the best interest of the Nation as 
     a whole.
       H.R. 2040, introduced by Committee Chairman Stump on behalf 
     of himself, Mr. Evans, Mr. Skelton, Mr. Bachus, Mr. Everett, 
     Mr. Filner, Mr. Quinn, Mr. Clyburn, and Mr. Stearns, would 
     preclude burial in a federally funded cemetery for persons 
     guilty of first-degree murder of certain Federal officials 
     and law enforcement personnel in conjunction with the 
     commission of certain other Federal crimes. This bill does 
     not have the objectionable effects of S. 923.
       H.R. 2040 would impose this bar by amending section 2402 of 
     title 38, United States Code, to exclude from eligibility for 
     burial in federally funded cemeteries those who have been 
     convicted of, or are shown to have committed, the crimes 
     specified. In addition to first-degree murder of Federal 
     officers or employees as provided in section 1114 of title 
     18, United States Code, the persons excluded must have 
     committed one of the following crimes: damage or destruction 
     or attempted damage or destruction by fire or an explosive of 
     Federal property, as provided under section 844(f) of title 
     18, United States Code; use of a weapon of mass destruction, 
     as prohibited under section 2332a of title 18, United States 
     Code; acts of terrorism, as prohibited under section 2332b of 
     title 18, United States Code; use of chemical weapons, as 
     prohibited under section 2332c of title 18, United States 
     Code; providing material support to terrorists within the 
     United States, as prohibited under section 2339A of title 18, 
     United States Code; or providing material support or 
     resources to foreign terrorists, as prohibited under section 
     2339B of title 18, United States Code. Such persons would be 
     ineligible for burial in Arlington National Cemetery, any 
     cemetery of the National Cemetery System, or any state 
     cemetery for which a grant has been approved or provided 
     under section 2408 of title 18, United States Code. This 
     prohibition would apply to applications for burial or 
     interment made on or after the date of enactment of the 
     legislation.
       While we do not wish to understate the gravity of capital 
     offenses, the disqualifying crimes are of a character and 
     magnitude to be distinguishable from the other numerous 
     capital offenses generally. Moreover, the question of who 
     should be permitted to be buried in our national cemeteries 
     is different from the question of who should have rights as 
     veterans generally. There are valid reasons to prevent 
     persons committing these crimes from being buried in the 
     places of honor set aside for our Nation's most gallant and 
     beloved sons and daughters. First, such persons are 
     themselves unworthy of the honor of burial in these hallowed 
     shrines. Second, to permit persons of such depravity to be 
     buried in the midst of those who fully deserve the honor and 
     tribute, belittles that honor, mocks that tribute, and 
     defeats the special purpose of these places of dignity and 
     sanctity. The national and other federally funded veterans 
     cemeteries serve as a lasting testimonial to this Nation's 
     gratitude for the sacrifices of its veterans. Being an 
     enduring symbol of the special honor our Nation reserves for 
     its veterans to memorialize their bravery, patriotic deeds, 
     and glory, the renown of these sanctuaries resides in the 
     character of those buried there. It is therefore unfair to 
     our other noble veterans to permit persons who have acted so 
     dishonorably through the commission of such heinous crimes to 
     be buried alongside of them.
       H.R. 2040 appropriately responds to concerns that our 
     veterans' cemeteries not be degraded by interment of persons 
     who wear a badge of infamy. The class of persons barred by 
     H.R. 2040 is very carefully tailored to exclude from 
     eligibility those who commit the type of crimes warranting 
     such action, and this bill does not include more reactive 
     provisions and sweeping forfeiture that has inappropriate 
     implications and disturbs the integrity of veterans status 
     itself.
       The veterans group does have some questions of a purely 
     technical nature about H.R. 2040, however. To bar those who 
     have not been convicted by a court due to unavailability for 
     trial but who are nonetheless shown to have committed 
     disqualifying crimes, H.R. 2040 provides for an 
     administrative determination of ineligibility. Subparagraph 
     (B) of the new subsection (b) excludes burial eligibility for 
     ``a person shown to the appropriate Secretary by clear and 
     convincing evidence, after an opportunity for a hearing in 
     such manner as such Secretary may prescribe, to have 
     committed a crime described in both clauses (i) and (ii) of 
     subparagraph (A) but has not been convicted of such crimes by 
     reason of such person not being available for trial due to 
     death, flight to avoid prosecution, or determination of 
     insanity.''
       Although it presents no serious concern, the practical 
     effect of subparagraph (B) in the case of unavailability for 
     trial due to death or flight to avoid prosecution is 
     questionable. If the person has not been tried due to death, 
     he or she would either already be interred or inurned in a 
     nongovernment cemetery or mausoleum, would already be 
     interred or inurned in a federally funded cemetery covered by 
     this bill, or might be in a mortuary. In the first instance, 
     the question of interment in a veterans' cemetery would seem 
     an unlikely one. In the second instance, if the person's 
     crimes were not learned until after burial in a veterans' 
     cemetery, for example, would disqualification under this 
     section require disinterment, and if so, who would bear the 
     costs of such disinterment? In the third instance, where 
     the person was killed at the time of the crime and the 
     body is awaiting burial, for example, the requirement of 
     an administrative hearing might effectively bar burial 
     regardless of the proper disposition of the issue if the 
     bureaucracy moves at its usual speed. It is also unclear 
     how the issue of eligibility would arise if the person is 
     a live fugitive, unless this provision is to be 
     interpreted as requiring a preemptive administrative 
     determination, which would seem unnecessary given the 
     possible eventualities that there may never be a request 
     for burial of such person in a federally funded cemetery; 
     that the person will be apprehended and tried, making this 
     subparagraph inapplicable; or that the issue will arise 
     upon the person's death, which of course then returns us 
     to the questions about implementation in the case of a 
     deceased person. (Recognizing that, in their proceedings, 
     administrative tribunals do not apply the standard of 
     proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The American Legion is 
     nonetheless also concerned that the presumption of 
     innocence is rebutted by less conclusive proof in the 
     administrative proceedings under subparagraph (B) than in 
     criminal trials.)
       As written, subparagraph (B) applies to those who have not 
     been ``convicted'' because of ``not being available for 
     trial.'' Thus, it would not, and should not, apply to persons 
     tried and found not guilty by reason of insanity. For simple 
     clarity and to ensure this causes no hesitation or 
     possibility of misinterpretation by administrative personnel, 
     the veterans group suggests that ``determination of 
     incompetence to stand trial'' or language of similar import 
     might be more appropriate.
       It appears that there would be a right of appeal on any 
     adverse determination with respect to burial in a national 
     cemetery under section 2402. Under section 7104 of title 38, 
     United States Code, the Board of Veterans' Appeals has 
     jurisdiction to review any decision of the Secretary of 
     Veterans Affairs on the provision of benefits in accordance 
     with the Secretary's authority under section 511 of title 38. 
     H.R. 2040 appears to leave unanswered the collateral question 
     of the right of and process for administrative or judicial 
     appeal from adverse determinations of the Secretary of the 
     Army regarding Arlington National Cemetery, however. The 
     Committee may wish to amend H.R. 2040 to resolve this 
     question.
       Other than these minor technical matters, H.R. 2040 appears 
     to be carefully crafted to accomplish its goal of maintaining 
     the stature of our veterans' cemeteries. The veterans group 
     is especially appreciative of the sponsors' careful, wise, 
     and thoughtful approach to this sensitive issue and urges 
     this Committee to take the same approach and favor this bill 
     over S. 923. The veterans group is also especially grateful 
     for the Chairman's leadership on this matter and the advice 
     he has given sponsors of other related bills.

     

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