Congressional Record, Volume 143 Issue 97 (Thursday, July 10, 1997)

[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 97 (Thursday, July 10, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S7131-S7145]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now
resume consideration of S. 936, which the clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (S. 936) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year
1998 for military activities of the Department of Defense,
for military construction, and for defense activities of the
Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for
such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other
purposes.

The Senate resumed consideration of the bill.

Pending:

Cochran/Durbin amendment No. 420, to require a license to
export computers with composite theoretical performance equal
to or greater than 2,000 million theoretical operations per
second.
Grams amendment No. 422 (to amendment No. 420), to require
the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct a
study on the availability and potential risks relating to the
sale of certain computers.
Coverdell (for Inhofe/Coverdell/Cleland) amendment No. 423,
to define depot-level maintenance and repair, to limit
contracting for depot-level maintenance and repair at
installations approved for closure or realignment in 1995,
and to modify authorities and requirements relating to the
performance of core logistics functions.
Wellstone amendment No. 669, to provide funds for the
bioassay testing of veterans exposed to ionizing radiation
during military service.
Wellstone modified amendment No. 668, to require the
Secretary of Defense to transfer $400,000,000 to the
Secretary of Veterans Affairs to provide funds for veterans'
health care and other purposes.
Wellstone modified amendment No. 666, to provide for the
transfer of funds for Federal Pell Grants.
Murkowski modified amendment No. 753, to require the
Secretary of Defense to submit a report to Congress on the
options available to the Department of Defense for the
disposal of chemical weapons and agents.
Kyl modified amendment No. 607, to impose a limitation on
the use of Cooperative Threat Reduction funds for destruction
of chemical weapons.
Kyl amendment No. 605, to advise the President and Congress
regarding the safety, security, and reliability of United
States Nuclear weapons stockpile.
Dodd amendment No. 762, to establish a plan to provide
appropriate health care to

[[Page S7132]]

Persian Gulf veterans who suffer from a Gulf War illness.
Dodd amendment No. 763, to express the sense of the
Congress in gratitude to Governor Chris Patten for his
efforts to develop democracy in Hong Kong.
Reid amendment No. 772, to authorize the Secretary of
Defense to make available $2,000,000 for the development and
deployment of counter-landmine technologies.
Levin amendment No. 778, to revise the requirements for
procurement of products of Federal Prison Industries to meet
needs of Federal agencies.
Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The able Senator from South Carolina is
recognized.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I just want to tell the Senators that we
are going to finish this bill this week. If they want their amendments
adopted, they better come in and have them considered and debated and
acted on. We do not want any further delays. And we want to get time
agreements, too. No use to spend hours and hours on one amendment. We
ought to get a very limited time on each amendment so we can finish
this bill. That is very important. I want Senators to know that we
expect to proceed along that line.

Amendment No. 422

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will now resume consideration of
Grams amendment No. 422 on which there shall be 90 minutes for debate
equally divided.
Who yields time?
Mr. COCHRAN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.
Mr. COCHRAN. Who controls time under the order?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi controls 45
minutes and the Senator from Minnesota controls 45 minutes.
Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, to refresh the memory of Senators about
this amendment that is now the pending business, at an early stage in
the consideration of this authorization bill I offered an amendment for
myself and on behalf of the distinguished Senator from Illinois [Mr.
Durbin] to modify the administration's existing policy relating to the
export by U.S. companies of supercomputers in the global marketplace.
The reason this amendment was considered important for the
consideration of the Senate on this bill is that it, first of all,
involves exporting technology that no other country in the world has.
Unlike many of our arms sales, defense equipment or technology sales
around the world, whether to friendly allies or those who may not be so
friendly, computer technology has evolved here in the United States to
the point that we have the corner on the market. No one can compete
with us in many areas of supercomputer technology. The Japanese have
developed an impressive capacity in this area as well.
But one thing has come to our attention in the subcommittee that I
chair on Governmental Affairs, the Subcommittee on International
Security, Proliferation and Federal Services. We have had a series of
hearings that began the first month of this year. We have had at least
one hearing every month. And we have explored one aspect of weapons
proliferation.
It was at a hearing that we had recently on the exporting of
technology that we learned that the United States was a proliferator of
weapons technology that was threatening the security of the United
States, and putting at risk United States servicemen, servicewomen,
other interests, and other assets and interests throughout the world,
because we were giving countries like Russia and China and others the
capacity to improve the lethality, the accuracy, and the capabilities
of nuclear weapons systems through the exporting of technology that
they were using to simulate tests, which they would not otherwise be
able to do, and to upgrade the quality and accuracy of their missile
delivery systems and weapons systems.
This does not make good sense. Japan's export control policy is more
restrictive than our policy. The President came into office after a
campaign which involved a lot of discussion about changes in the world
security situation. We all rejoiced in the past two administrations
when so much progress was made in terms of reducing the threat to the
security of the United States because of the changes going on in the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
The fact is, that we were able to relax somewhat when those weapons
systems were no longer targeted at us. But the fact remains that there
is a tremendous potential threat, not only in Russia but some of the
other states of the former Soviet Union for the development at some
future date of an attitude that may put our security relationship at
greater risk than it is today. And so we do have an interest in
refraining from doing those things ourselves that end up unwittingly or
carelessly investing in others the capability to develop modern, more
lethal, and more dangerous weapons systems that could threaten our
security interests.

One other aspect of this is that part of our hearings have been
involving the sale of weapons systems by countries like Russia and
China. We had a whole series of witnesses come before our committee
talking about this as a problem now, selling missiles, for example, to
Iran, selling nuclear weapons technology to countries like India and
Pakistan and others.
But we see emerging around the world a new capacity on the part of
many of these countries that we do not trust at all to have those kinds
of systems that can inflict great damage, destroy assets that we have,
and people, troops that we have in the Middle East or in South Korea,
sailors who are on ships around the world who are now vulnerable to
cruise missiles in the Mediterranean that we never had to worry about
before because of this proliferation of missiles and technologies and
weapons systems.
So that is the big issue here. So that is why we have suggested that
the administration's new policy--when they came into office they said
we are going to open up and take the controls off of our exports so we
can take advantage of the new security situation around the world, let
our businesses enjoy a more relaxed atmosphere. That is all fine. But
what we have learned in the last 18 months of this new policy--it was
put into place in October 1995--the new policy has resulted in
supercomputers coming into the possession of the Chinese Academy of
Sciences which has a component that is involved in the modernization of
the Chinese nuclear weapons program and systems. They now have seven
supercomputers that came from the United States that they are using,
they potentially are using, to develop a more modern weapons capability
in nuclear weapons.
The Russian chief of atomic energy boasted recently that his
operation, the group of people he has under his control in his
laboratories--Chelyabinsk 20 and Arzamas 16--these are locations where
they do work on nuclear weapons systems in Russia that they now have a
supercomputer capability previously unknown, compliments of the United
States.
This is a sad state of affairs because of a policy that is much more
relaxed now. And I want to describe the details of it. That is why we
have these 90 minutes reserved here so Senators will understand how
serious a threat this is and what it means in practical terms.
We have seen the administration develop this new policy that
identifies countries in categories. They call it a four-tier system.
Tier 1 countries are our best friends, NATO Allies. There are no
restrictions. Tier 2 are those countries where it is more lenient
still. Tier 3 and Tier 4. Tier 4, there is a complete embargo on the
exporting of computer technology of all capability. You cannot sell
computers under our new system to these Tier 4 countries. They are
Iran, Libya, North Korea, Cuba, a couple of others.
Tier 3 are those countries where, depending upon the capability of
the computer, there are restrictions. There are no restrictions for the
PCs, the personal computers, no restrictions. But when you get up into
these high-end computer systems there are restrictions, you have to get
an export license from the Department of Commerce. And the way you
decide whether you need a license or not is to decide if the end use of
the computer is going to be for a military purpose or a civilian
purpose or if the user is a military entity or a civilian entity.

[[Page S7133]]

The problem with the administration's policy is the Commerce
Department does not tell our exporters whether the end use or the user
is military or civilian. They leave it up to our exporter to find that
out for themselves. That is the problem. That is what this amendment is
about. We are trying to change one part of this policy to require the
Federal Government to approve the sale--in the case of these countries
in Tier 3, China, Russia, and a number of others--where the potential
for use of this technology for military purposes has become so apparent
and real.
Now, I am not suggesting that our computer companies are carelessly
and negligently and wholesale selling these high-end computers, these
advanced computers, without careful analysis of who their customers
are. Some of them are making a very conscientious effort to ensure
that. But what they cannot do and they do not have the capacity to
decide, that in the reality of this new situation there are front
companies being developed--in the case of China, for example, in Hong
Kong and maybe other places, as well, and I cannot discuss all of this
because some of it is classified--but there are companies that have
been established, whether by governments or government-related
industries, who are able now to purchase U.S. computers because they
are a civilian company, and then turn around and sell it to a company
that is affiliated with one of these governments. That is what has
happened, apparently.
So do we want to continue to leave to the capabilities of a computer
exporter the responsibility of making these determinations, by
understanding what is a front company and what is not? They do not have
the resource to do that. Our intelligence community, however, and the
resources of our Federal Government are much more nearly able to make
this kind of determination.
Under Secretary Reinsch at Commerce talked about this policy at
hearings in our committee, and you could tell that Commerce realized
that changes had to be made in the way they were monitoring and
supervising and implementing this new policy. After our hearing, they
started making changes. They started putting out a list, for example,
of entities around the world that they think are suspicious enough or
they have evidence enough so they can say you cannot tell this entity
or that entity in these Tier 3 countries because we know that puts at
risk the potential use of this technology for nuclear weapons purpose
or other weapons of mass destruction purpose. So they are making some
changes. The fact is they left a lot of things off the list, they left
a lot of entities off the list that we know in the past have purchased
or wound up having these technologies.
So it creates a situation where a change needs to be made right now.
This is the change that we think is best. We are pleased to have the
cosponsorship on this amendment of distinguished leaders in the area of
proliferation here in the Senate. Senator Thurmond, who is chairman of
the Armed Services Committee, supports our amendment. Senator Warner
supports our amendment. Senator Glenn, who has previously served as
chairman of this proliferation subcommittee and chairman of the full
Committee on Governmental Affairs, and been a leader in this effort his
entire career in the Senate, and he announced yesterday--and put a
statement in the Record, which we invite Senators to look at--that he
is supporting this amendment. Senator Durbin of Illinois was in the
hearing and has taken an active role in trying to understand and deal
with this emerging problem. It has emerged full-blown into one of the
most serious threats to our Nation's security, and it has been done
because of the way this policy has played out and the way the problem
has increased. So we think that Senators ought to look carefully at
this.
Let me just say this chart tries to explain how a small area of the
computer industry and the hardware that are involved are affected by
this amendment. The diagonal lines here that say Chelyabinsk-70 and
Arzamas-16 are nuclear weapon labs in the Soviet Union, and the Chinese
Academy of Sciences that we know wound up with United States computers
that can be used now throughout China for the purpose of developing new
modern weapons of mass destruction. This represents numbers of total
computers, 6.34 percent of the total U.S. computer export markets
affected, and targeted only those computers going to those Tier 3
countries with lethality or capability of 2,000 MTOPS to 7,000 MTOPS.
These are millions of theoretical operations per second. That is how
you measure the capability or speed of computation of computers. That
is the way the Commerce Department has broken this down and divided up
these up so that they reflect the capabilities of these computers. A PC
has a capability of 250 MTOPS. We are talking about advanced computers,
very expensive, and, of course, the computer industry is competing with
each other to make these sales.
This is another point: If you were running a big computer company--
IBM, Cray computer, whatever the names are--you do not want to have to
go to the Secretary of Commerce and tell them you are thinking about
making a sale or you have a customer on your screen that you think you
can sell a big, heavy-duty, new, modern, expensive computer to, you do
not want to tell anybody about it. If you are a salesman, you do not
want that word out on the street. You do not want somebody at Commerce
looking into it and asking a bunch of questions of you. You would like
to go in and make the sale. If the customer is ready to buy your
computer, you want to go in, sign the deal, and make the sale. Of
course, you have a responsibility under the new policy to satisfy
yourself about who the end user is, what the end-use purpose is, and so
you hurry to get that done. No matter how conscientious you are, you
might not do as good a job with that, particularly if you have a
competitor who is trying to make the same sale.

So we are in a situation where the competition of the U.S. market and
economic system is working against our interests in protecting our
national security and maybe taking a little bit more time and
understanding what the potential is for this sale in terms of coming
back at us in a new, advanced missile that has capabilities never
before possible because of U.S. computer manufacturers selling in these
markets to the countries that have the money to buy them. You are
talking about the big countries. I am particularly concerned about
Russia and China, specifically. We are developing, we hope, better
relationships with both countries. We are working to improve our
relationships around the world, make this a more stable, safer,
peaceful world. That effort has to continue.
What we are doing today, in calling it to the attention of the Senate
today, is not at all designed to sour or make that process more
difficult, but we have to recognize that this is still a dangerous
relationship in many respects. These are the countries that have the
greatest capability in the world today, and past attitudes among some
in those countries that do not have our interests at heart, do not have
our security uppermost in their mind, who may be capable of diverting
some of these technologies for uses such as the development of new
generations of weapons of mass destruction which not only they but some
of their friends end up with in the due course of business.
I have gotten calls and we have had visits from some in the computer
industry saying this amendment is not necessary; it is not necessary to
put this in the law. Why don't we just change the policy? Well, we
can't change the policy. We are the Congress. The executive branch
makes policies. They issue regulations.
One of the Senators asked me in a formal colloquy yesterday why we
needed to put this in a bill. Well, it is the only way that Congress
has available to it to participate in the policymaking process in
helping to do our part to ensure that our Nation's security is
protected. We cannot issue a regulation, we cannot modify a policy
other than doing it the way we are doing it right now.
Now, the Senator from Minnesota, who is my good friend, has an
alternative. He wants to do things other than change the policy. He
wants to ask GAO to investigate it. We are already having GAO
investigate this and gather more information. We are continuing to
discuss with GAO other areas where we might get information

[[Page S7134]]

that will be more helpful to the Congress in understanding what our
options are. He suggests that Commerce ought to publish a list of
prohibited purchasers. That list is good for as long as the ink is
drying, but no further. What if a change occurs and they have not
gotten a new list out with modifications, and you see nobody is on the
list with the name of a company that you have been contacted by and you
make the sale or you try to make the sale, and you decide this is a
civilian company. There was nobody in uniform who came to see you, so
your assumption is that it is a civilian. Well, the names change, these
identities change, the purposes of companies change, the contacts and
relationships of companies, particularly in this part of the world we
are talking about, can change.

So you are going to invite them to start changing things. If they see
they are on the list, they will probably dissolve their corporation if
their purpose was to be a front for the People's Liberation Army, and
some of these companies are. How is an innocent U.S. exporter to know?
You cannot have all these agents and assets to detect this kind of
thing on the payroll of the company. But the U.S. Government has
resources, and they have a better opportunity to make these
determinations.
What we are simply saying is--not as the Senator from Minnesota wants
us to do, which is nothing. His amendment just absolutely guts the
effort to change the policy. It says there will be no change in policy
as we are suggesting here. There will be no change. We will leave it up
to the Commerce Department to improve its policy by making a list, and
we will ask the GAO to look into this more. That is not good enough. I
am hoping the Senate will vote down the Grams amendment and support the
Cochran-Durbin amendment.
The cosponsors, I hope Senators will consider, who are on this bill
right now, and I do not have a last count, but we are well into the
double digits. Around 20 Senators have cosponsored this amendment. It
is a strong statement of support for change that is needed now to
protect our Nation's security. If we fool around and argue about this
and are mealymouthed and don't want to hurt anybody's feelings or scare
any of the computer companies, they don't want to get Congress to agree
on any sale and they want to use their best efforts--I am not
suggesting they don't, but they don't have the capacity, they don't
have the expertise, they don't have the reach, the broad reach of the
U.S. Government and its intelligence community to make these
determinations.
So for these few computers with MTOPS between 2,000 and 7,000, for
these few countries in tier 3, we are suggesting that any sale has to
be first approved by the Commerce Department to ensure that the end use
is civilian and that the end user is civilian and not military. That is
all this is. Every other computer sale and administration policy can
continue without any new restraint whatever.
I am hopeful the Senate will review this situation carefully, Mr.
President.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GRAMS. Mr. President, I rise to continue the debate this morning
on the Grams-Boxer amendment to the Cochran-Durbin amendment. I urge my
colleagues today to support what I believe is a very reasonable
compromise to a very controversial issue.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senators D'Amato, Bond,
Gregg, and Feinstein be added as cosponsors to this amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. GRAMS. Mr. President, I understand that there is a lot of concern
in this body about United States computer sales being diverted for
military use to either China or Russia. None of us wants that to occur.
But we have to consider whether the Cochran amendment solves the
problem. I believe that it does not.
The Cochran amendment would require export licenses for all midlevel
computers. Now, these are not supercomputers, these are not high-end
computers. You are going to hear that term, but they are not
supercomputers. These are midlevel computers, and they are shipped to
China, Russia, Israel, and 47 other countries. We talk about the Third
Tier countries. They involve 51 nations, like Russia, China, India,
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Romania, and the Baltic States. Some of
our future NATO Allies could also be involved. Mr. President, export
licenses do not solve end-user problems. These are diversions that
would not have been caught during the export license procedure. Export
licenses do require end-user certification, but if the end user chooses
to ignore the agreement, or if the computer is stolen, that possibility
will not be evident in the licensing process. In my judgment, the
current system works.
Just yesterday, Secretary of Defense Bill Cohen sent us a letter
opposing the Cochran amendment. He said the current law and system can
deal with unauthorized exports and diversions. This is from the
department that has been very conservative on all export decontrol
matters. Secretary Cohen further states that we should focus our
controls on technology that can make a national security difference,
not that which is widely available around the world and is obsolete.
Yes, Mr. President, there have been three diversions, but that was
out of 1,400 sales. But, no, this is not the right way to address those
problems. The right way is to force the administration to publish as
many military end users as possible and then to work with the industry
to identify all military end users. We have been able to identify
diversions through our capable intelligence sources. Mr. President,
there is no evidence that there are dozens of computers out there used
by military end users. It is just not there.
Further, I don't believe that the industry irresponsibly ignores
available information about military end users. They have too much at
stake. A company which violates export control laws takes a very big
risk. The penalties are prohibition of all exports for 20 years or
more, 10 years in prison, and up to a $5,000 fine for each violation.
This doesn't include the blemish that would remain on the company's
reputation or the great difficulty that company would have in the
future seeking an export license. No company, Mr. President, can afford
that risk.
What we would be doing here this morning is handing this midlevel
computer business over to the Japanese and other allies. Now, again, I
want to emphasize that these are midlevel computers, they are not
supercomputers. Next year, they will be the kind of systems that we
will be able to have in our offices here in the Senate, or what you
could find in a small company or in a doctor's office. These are not
the computers that are sought after for nuclear weapons production or
design. Again, we are looking at midlevel computers, between 2,000 and
7,000 MTOPS, which are widely available around the world.
Supercomputers, which are sought after for weapons design, start at
the 20,000 MTOPS level and go all the way up to 650,000 this year, and
they will go beyond the 1 million MTOPS level next year. By the way,
China already produces a computer at 13,000 MTOPS. No other country
considers these computers to be anything but generally available and
will step in to take over the business that the Cochran amendment will
hand to them. The question is, is that what we want?
Also, anyone can purchase upgrades, by the way, to raise a PC, a
current PC, above the 2,000 MTOPS level. We can't control the box. We
can't control the chips around the world that can be put in it. We
can't control the upgrades. There is no way to control these low-level
PC's under the 2,000 MTOPS threshold, again, since they are available
in nearly every country in the world.
Further, the chips that make up these computers are also available
and produced around the world. They were decontrolled during the Bush
administration. Our chip producers have markets throughout the world,
and they need to maintain them to remain competitive. Chip producers
cannot control who receives their end product.
Also, how do you prohibit a foreign national from using a computer
even above the 7,000 level here in the United States and taking the
results back, or faxing it back?
Our friend Jack Kemp has written to us also this week stating that
the Cochran amendment would ``establish a policy that is destined to
fail and

[[Page S7135]]

would hurt American computer manufacturers without protecting our
national security. The American high-technology sector is critical to
the future of this country and must be protected from overly intrusive
Government restrictions.''
I wish there was something we could do to effectively control some of
these exports, but it is just not possible at these lower levels. We
cannot convince our allies to reverse 2 years of their own decontrol.
In fact, Europe has tabled a decontrol proposal at 10,000 MTOPS, which
proves that they have no intention of even respecting our 7,000 level.
We cannot pull all the PC's and upgrades off the retail shelves, and we
cannot close our borders to prevent all foreign nationals from entering
this country and using our computers.

We must concentrate our resources on keeping computers above the
7,000 level from reaching military end users; that's for sure. But I
fear that an increased license burden in the administration would steer
resources away from efforts to locate diversions and investigate them.
Now, Mr. President, in an earlier statement, I also countered a claim
that an export license requirement would not slow down these computer
sales. I have heard that someone made the comment that an export
license would take 10 days. Well, anyone who knows how the licensing
process works knows that it can take many, many months to obtain one.
This will only earn our industry a reputation as an unreliable
supplier, and it will cost us sales and it will cost us many, many U.S.
jobs. The administration admits that a computer license application
averages 107 days to reach a decision. I have seen it take far longer.
Even 107 days, by the way, is enough to convince the end user to go out
and seek a buyer in another country.
Since so many of the Tier 3 countries are emerging markets, we need
to be in there early to maintain a foothold for future sales. When we
hear about the 6.3 percent of sales to Tier 3 countries, that is
misleading. It is in an area where the market is expanding rapidly. If
we leave our companies out of those markets, they will not be there to
compete in the future. They will not be there to provide sales and jobs
for the United States.
Another argument I have heard is that there is no foreign
availability over 3,500 MTOPS. Well, last year, NEC of Japan tried to
sell a supercomputer to the United States Government at a level between
30,000 and 50,000 MTOPS. They match our speeds all the way to the top.
Mr. President, I believe that all of us are proud of our computer
industry, that our industry remains the state of the art in so many
areas, particularly in the levels above 7,000. We have made progress to
facilitate exports without compromising our national security, progress
which began back in the Reagan and Bush administrations, but here is an
effort today to reverse all of that progress.
Our industry has to survive on exports, and it has to pursue
commercial business with these 50 countries to remain competitive. All
computer sales over the 7,000 MTOPS level do require license now. We
have not sold any computers above that level. And, again, the 7,000
MTOPS are not supercomputers--they are not--they are midlevel
computers. We have not sold any computers above that level to Tier 3
countries; nor do our allies, to my knowledge. However, we should not
restrict the sales of these midlevel and, again, generally available
computers to commercial end users. We should simply maintain the
current licensing requirement for the questionable end users. I firmly
believe that there will be improved cooperation between the Government
and industry on end-user information, particularly those for Russia and
China.
Now, I also commend the Commerce Department for starting to publish
information on end users and to examine all sales that are made to the
Tier 3 countries within these computer speeds.
The Grams-Boxer amendment requests the GAO to determine whether these
sales affect our national security. That is very important. It will
look into the issue of foreign availability. It will also require the
publication of a military end-user list, and it requires Commerce to
improve its assistance to the industry on identifying those military
end users.
There will be some that vote today solely to express their
dissatisfaction with China's alleged military sales to our adversaries.
Let me remind you once again that there is no evidence that U.S.
computers were involved in any of those cases. I also urge you to look
at the merits of this issue. Pure and simple, the Cochran amendment
would hand the sales of midlevel computers over to the Japanese and the
Europeans at the expense of an industry that we have sought to protect
and to promote and an industry that we are proud of.
As chairman of the International Finance Subcommittee of Banking, the
committee that has jurisdiction over this issue, I strongly, this
morning, urge my colleagues to vote for my substitute and let us
continue this debate in the normal manner, through committee
consideration. At the same time, the administration should step up its
efforts to express to the Chinese and the Russians our grave concerns
regarding efforts to divert commercial sales to military end users
without knowledge of the United States seller.
Mr. President, I appreciate the efforts of my colleague from
Mississippi to address these diversions. I want to work with him in my
role as chairman of the subcommittee of jurisdiction to ensure that the
current system does work or on how we can improve it once we have
better information regarding the extent of the problem.

I urge the support of my colleagues for the Grams-Boxer substitute as
a compromise to this very, very controversial issue. Thank you very
much.
Mr. DURBIN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I am a cosponsor with the Senator from
Mississippi, and he has allotted the remaining time to me for this
debate.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois is recognized.
Mr. DURBIN. Thank you, Mr. President. There is a quotation attributed
to Vladimir Lenin. I am not sure he said it, but it has been repeated
often enough that it is possible he did. It is illustrative of the
challenge we face in this debate. It is reported that Lenin said: ``A
capitalist will sell you the rope that you use to hang him.''
The suggestion from this founder of communism was that countries like
the United States with a passion for capitalism and sales will
occasionally get too overheated and end up selling the very product
that can be used against him. Lenin's quotation goes back almost 80
years; yet, it is apropos of the debate today in 1997. We are talking
about the sale of a supercomputer to a country that can use it against
us. How should we take care to prevent that from happening? What
safeguards should we establish?
You have read in the newspapers over the last few years the sad
commentary of people entrusted at the highest levels of Government in
the United States with classified and secret information, with access
to technology, who have literally betrayed the United States and have
sold that information to one of our adversaries. Ultimately, many of
them have been caught and prosecuted and have served time, as they
should, for betraying their Nation and giving away something very
critical to the defense of this country to one of our adversaries.
At the basis of this debate is this same question: Are we giving
away, through sales, a precious resource that can be used against us?
Are we handing over a capability to a country that may not have the
same interest or the best interest of the United States at heart?
That is why Senator Cochran and I have offered this amendment. Let me
say at the outset for those who are critical of the amendment, we are
not saying that the United States cannot make sales of these
supercomputers to any country, Tier 1, 2, or 3; but we are saying, if
you are going to sell these supercomputers to one group of countries
that we want to take care do not misuse them, then please come to the
Government, come to the Department of Commerce and make certain that
the party buying the computer in that country, whether it is China,
Russia, or another Tier 3 country, is an end user or party that will
use it for peaceful purposes.

[[Page S7136]]

Is that some outrageous suggestion--that before we sell this great
capability, this supercomputer capability, to some entity in China or
Russia that we take care not to sell it to the wrong person? I think
most Americans would say, ``Why would we have a Government, if you
aren't going to do something that basic to protect us?'' Is there
reason to be concerned about this?
Think about what we are selling. One supercomputer that was sold to
Russia increased their computer capability 10 times. We took our
genius, our technology, put it up for sale, and they bought it. And
with that purchase they not only bought the technology, they bought a
new capability--I am sorry to report capability which can be used for
negative reasons, for reasons inconsistent with American policy, and as
easily for peaceful reasons.
Some have said, ``Don't do the Cochran-Durbin amendment. It just
involves too many sales. It would restrict too many supercomputer
sales.''
Senator Cochran made this point. When you look at the sales to Tier 3
countries, which are the only countries affected by this amendment,
there were 91 sales in the 15 months of new trade policy by the Clinton
administration; 6.3 percent of the computers in question are at issue
here. Is that too much to ask? That when we start to sell 6.3 percent
of our computer sales to certain countries, we say, ``Pause. Hold back.
Let's review and make sure that the entity buying them in the other
country is a peaceful entity, that in fact it won't be used against the
United States.''
We have sold 47 supercomputers to China, another 20 to Hong Kong, and
many to Russia as well. What have we learned about these sales?
I am sorry to report that four silicon graphic machines that were
sold to Russia are now being used at Russia's nuclear weapons labs; one
silicon graphics machine in the Chinese Academy of Sciences, which on
its face sounds harmless but it is a key part of China's nuclear
weapons complex; one Sun Microsystems machine we sold, we learned last
week, is now running in a Chinese military facility after being
diverted from Hong Kong.
What Senator Cochran and I are saying is, is it worth our effort and
time to take care not to let these computers fall into the wrong hands?
But, if you listen to the voices of business and the supercomputer
industry, you would think that our suggestion was to stop sales of
supercomputers. But it is not. In fact, it wouldn't affect 93 percent
of the sales already, and for the other 6.3 percent all we are asking
is for time for review.
We received a letter in opposition to our amendment from the
Secretary of Commerce, a man whom I admire very much. But I would have
to say to the Department of Commerce and to the Department of Defense
that it is not unreasonable for us to ask you to set up a mechanism to
make sure these computers don't end up in the wrong hands.
I have received a publication from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Not
surprisingly they don't want any restrictions on this trade. They want
U.S. companies to be able to sell whenever and to whomever they choose,
and they don't want the restriction of the Cochran-Durbin amendment.
But I would say to my colleagues that it is a little disingenuous for
them to argue that if we do not allow the sale of supercomputers which
can be misused against the United States that we endanger American
jobs. There is something larger at stake than American jobs. What is at
stake here is American security. I would think that every worker in the
computer industry or outside would want to make certain that, No. 1, we
provide for the common defense. If I recall, that is part of a document
that all of us consider to be illustrative of the goals of America.
Let's address this issue about whether or not the Cochran-Durbin
amendment in going after the 2,000 MTOPS model is talking about a
garden variety of PC's which people can pick up at the corner computer
store and are today available in Senate offices. As one of my
colleagues said, it is a common thing that shouldn't be restricted.
From what we are told 10,000 MTOPS is not common to them. The computers
that are being sold right now are at a level of 200 MTOPS or 250 MTOPS.
And even assuming that this industry, which is burgeoning and
increasing its capability dramatically, should continue to increase the
capability of these computers, Senator Cochran and I estimate that it
will be more than 4 years before they all reach the end of the MTOPS
stage. At least until that time shouldn't we take care, be cautious,
and be concerned about the danger of selling this capability? I think
we should. I think it is a serious mistake for us to assume that if we
do not sell these computers to our potential enemies some other country
will.
When we asked the Department of Commerce and the Department of
Defense this question they said, ``Well, the only country likely to
step in, if the United States doesn't sell the computers, is Japan.''
Incidentally, Japan has more restrictive export controls than the
United States. So I wonder if we are really thinking very seriously
about the potential ramifications.
It is very shortsighted to celebrate the sale of a computer to a
country overseas, to celebrate the jobs that are created, and to ignore
the reality that that computer may give a potential enemy capability--
capability to manufacture, capability to test through computers nuclear
weaponry, chemical weaponry, and biological weaponry. All of these
things I think should be of great concern to all of us.
With all due respect to my colleague, the Senator from Minnesota, I
would say that his amendment does little to address the core problem
here. To call for a study? Well, we have been at this for 15 months. If
you want to know what has happened, we can give you the statistics. We
can tell you what has occurred in terms of the sales actually made to
China, to Russia, and through Hong Kong back to China. We know things
have happened that we never wanted to happen. The idea that we can
somehow evaluate this and then let those know who are interested really
strikes me as a very weak approach.
Let me just say that the bottom line is that I know industry is in
the business of selling. I think our Government and the Senate should
be in the interest of not only encouraging sales but encouraging
responsible sales.
When Senator Cochran and I come forward and say that for 6.3 percent
of computers we want to make certain there is a review, that the end
users cannot use that technology against us, I think that is a
reasonable request.
I sat through the hearing. I wish some of my colleagues who oppose
this amendment could have sat through it as well. I think they would
have come away with the same impression that I did. The current liberal
trade policy of supercomputers is going to create a situation which
could one day come back and haunt America. We are giving to those in
China, Russia, and other countries capabilities which we have worked
hard to create and capabilities which unfortunately they may misuse.
We spend so much time in this body discussing the proliferation of
weapons. We watch every move that the People's Republic of China makes
for fear that they are proliferating these weapons around the world. We
have classified and unclassified briefings on the subject. And when it
comes to the sale of hardware and technology, we step aside and say it
is another story. It is not. It is the same story. It is the same
concern, and should be expressed as such.
I hope my colleagues will take a hard look at this. It is not often
that I break with the Clinton administration on foreign policy. But I
think Senator Cochran is right. I think this policy should be subject
to thorough review, and I think his amendment, which I am happy to
cosponsor, is a step in the direction to make sure that we don't turn
loose to the world supercomputer technology and one day come to regret
it.
I reserve the remainder of my time.
Mr. GRAMS addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. GRAMS. I yield time to my colleague from California who is also a
cosponsor of the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California.
Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, thank you, very much.
Mr. President, will you tell me when I have used 10 minutes? Then I
will wrap it up because I know the Senator from Missouri is waiting. We
are very proud that he is here to speak in behalf

[[Page S7137]]

of the Grams-Boxer amendment. I am also proud to say that Senator
Daschle, the Democratic leader has endorsed the Grams-Boxer amendment.
Mr. President, my colleague from Illinois started off his argument by
quoting Lenin. He said Lenin said that ``The capitalist will sell you
the rope that you need to hang him.'' I never agreed with Lenin, and I
don't agree now.
But, in addition, I really do believe that the Cochran amendment, as
drafted, amounts to us hanging ourselves. What do I mean by this? I do
not believe the Cochran amendment does anything to protect our national
security. Rather, it harms it, I believe, a very substantial way, our
international competitiveness in an industry that is leading America
into prosperous times.
This is a view that is shared by Defense Secretary William Cohen, by
Commerce Secretary William Daley, and our National Security Adviser,
Sandy Berger. This bipartisan team has told us very directly that the
Cochran amendment is harmful. I truly hope our colleagues will take a
deep breath, step back and review these letters.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that letters from the
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Commerce, and the National
Security Adviser be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

The Secretary of Defense,

Washington, DC, July 9, 1997.
Hon. Trent Lott,
Majority Leader, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Majority Leader. I am writing to express my
opposition to the Cochran-Durbin and Spence-Dellums
amendments to the Fiscal Year 1998 Defense Authorization Act
regarding supercomputer export controls.
While I understand the concerns that motivated these
amendments, I believe they are unnecessary and would
undermine the flexibility that we need to adapt to changing
security requirements and technology trends. I am a strong
advocate for effective export controls. To be most effective,
we must focus our limited export control resources on the
export of goods and technologies that can make a significant
difference for national security and nonproliferation
reasons. Therefore, in order to best serve our security
interests, we need to maintain a system that allows us to
adjust our controls when technology advances and when
technology becomes widely available. Putting specific control
levels into statute is not an appropriate means to meet these
often fast-changing challenges.
We have a system and adequate authority under current law
that can deal appropriately with unauthorized exports and
diversions. In this regard, the Administration is
aggressively and intensively addressing recently reported
unauthorized computer shipments to Russia and China, using
the full range of law enforcement and diplomatic tools
available.
We remain committed to working with Congress to address
these important matters in a manner that maintains the
flexibility we need to preserve our security interests.
Sincerely,
Bill Cohen.
____

The White House,

Washington,
Hon. Trent Lott,
The Senate,
Washington, D.C.
Dear Trent: I want to convey the Administration's strong
opposition to Cochran-Durbin and Spence-Dellums floor
amendments to the FY 1998 Defense Authorization Act
concerning export licensing requirements for high performance
computers.
First, we believe it is a mistake to set these export
control limits in concrete by mandating them in statute,
particularly in view of the rapid growth in computing power
available worldwide. The amendment drastically undercuts our
flexibility to adjust controls to keep pace with
technological change--an extraordinarily rapid pace in the
highly competitive area of computers--and with our ongoing
evaluations of evolving security requirements.
Second, there is no need to legislate a revision to this
policy. There are adequate administrative and enforcement
means under current law to address problems that arise with
U.S. computer exports. For example, with regard to the
reported unauthorized computer shipments to Russia, both the
Departments of Commerce and Justice are intensively
investigating the shipments, and we are actively addressing
the issue through diplomatic means. We also are issuing
additional administrative guidance to U.S. exporters
regarding impermissible end-users of proliferation concern.
The Department of Commerce is reviewing all computer exports
above 2,000 MTOPS (Millions of Theoretical Operations per
Second) made since January 1996, including those countries in
Tier Three such as China, India, and Israel. If problems are
identified with any of these shipments, we have the legal and
administrative means to address them and I can assure you we
will use that authority.
The Administration remains willing to work with the
appropriate committees of the Congress to address concerns
regarding export controls.
Sincerely,

Samuel R. Berger,

Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs.
____

The Secretary of Commerce,

Washington, DC, July 8, 1997.
Hon. Trent Lott,
Majority Leader, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Lott: I am writing to urge you to oppose the
amendment to the Defense Authorization Act for 1998 authored
by Senator Cochran concerning exports of high performance
computers and support instead the alternative proposed by
Senator Grams, which would provide an objective assessment of
the effect of computer sales on our national security. The
Administration opposes the Cochran amendment because it
reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the role of
computer technology in the global marketplace and will
seriously hurt the competitiveness of the computer industry
without enhancing our national security.
The Cochran amendment seeks to roll back the President's
decision in 1995 to permit the export of computers with a
performance capability of 2,000 to 7,000 Million Theoretical
Operators Per Second (MTOPS) to civilian end users in 50
countries, including China, Russia, India, Israel, and
Pakistan, without advance approval from the government. The
amendment would require individual government approval for
each such export. (The President's policy currently requires
individual approval for all exports of computers with a
performance capability above 7,000 MTOPS to all end-users in
those countries, as well as for all exports or re-exports
with a CTP greater than 2,000 MTOPS to military and
proliferation end-users in Computer Tier 3 countries as
defined in part 744 of the Export Administration
Regulations.)
The President's decision was based on an extensive
government review of advancements in computer technology and
of our national security requirements that concluded (1) that
computers with capabilities in this range would become widely
available between 1995 and mid-1997, and (2) that critical
defense applications that justified export controls were
clustered at levels above 7,000 MTOPS. Information we have
acquired since the decision supports those conclusions and
suggests that, if anything, its forecast of foreign
availability of these computers was conservative. The
amendment would lock us into an export control policy that is
already outdated and which could only be changed by
legislation.
The Cochran amendment's proposed control levels are
outdated because of the rapid pace of development of computer
technology and the widespread availability of the
semiconductors that run these machines. In late 1995, single
processors with a performance capability between 400 and 600
MTOPS were available, while today such processors are
commercially available at over 1000 MTOPS. At the beginning
of the Clinton Administration, machines performing at over
195 MTOPS were defined as ``supercomputers.'' Today, many
desktop PCs exceed that level. These computers are not
controlled for export and are manufactured in many countries
throughout the world. It is relatively simple to upgrade
existing machines to higher levels by adding processors. In
addition, connecting lower level PCs that are not controlled
for export--known as ``distributed parallel processing''--can
permit them to function with the capability of a single
larger machine.
Attempting to stop the spread of computers to selected
countries at the Cochran amendment levels would be
exceptionally difficult and not the best use of our
nonproliferation resources. We can control proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction more effectively by concentrating
our resources on ``choke point'' goods and technologies--
those items without which a weapon cannot be built or
delivered. Those items, by virtue of their specialized use,
often have a limited number of producers and can be
effectively controlled through multilateral agreements. Such
items also can be controlled through unilateral action if
necessary.
At the same time, I want to make clear that the Department
of Commerce takes violations of our export control law and
regulations very seriously and is prosecuting them
aggressively. We have sufficient authority in current law to
do that and are also taking a number of steps to help
industry better meet its responsibilities. The Bureau of
Export Administration (BXA) is reviewing all computer exports
in the 2,000-7,000 MTOPS category; where there are concerns,
BXA has initiated investigations; where investigations show
that a U.S. law may have been broken, BXA has promptly
referred the matter to a U.S. Attorney's office for
prosecution; BXA has published the names of organizations and
other entities involved in activities of proliferation
concern (such as nuclear proliferation) to whom dual use
exports will require a license; and BXA is re-doubling
efforts to educate companies on their obligations to know
their customers.
I hope you will vote against the Cochran amendment and for
the Grams substitute. If you have questions about the
technology or

[[Page S7138]]

our policy, I would be delighted to arrange a briefing for
you.
Sincerely,
William M. Daley.

Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, let me share with my colleagues part of
the letter the Secretary of Defense has written in opposition to the
Cochran-Durbin amendment and the Spence-Dellums amendment. Secretary
Cohen says, ``I believe they are unnecessary and would undermine the
flexibility that we need to adapt to the changing security requirements
and technology trends.'' He goes on to say, ``We have a system and
adequate authority under current law that can deal appropriately with
unauthorized exports and diversions.''
The Secretary of Commerce is very strong on this point. He says the
Cochran amendment's proposed control levels are outdated because of the
rapid pace of development of computer technology, and the widespread
availability of the semiconductors required to run those machines.
From the National Security Adviser, Samuel Berger, we hear this. ``We
[referring to the Administration] believe it is a mistake to set these
export control limits in concrete by mandating amendment of statutes,
particularly in view of the rapid growth in computing power available
worldwide.''
He continues, ``[the Cochran amendment] drastically undercuts our
flexibility to adjust controls to keep pace with technological change *
* *.''
I think what we see here in this debate is the bipartisan effort here
to ask our colleagues in the Senate to really look at the Cochran
amendment and to realize that it will really simply hurt us.
It reminds me of someone who wakes up in the morning feeling great,
everything is going well, and then they just knock themselves in the
face, knock themselves out. For what reason? There is absolutely no
reason.
There is no reason to put these controls back on these midlevel
computers. The current policy that is in place did not occur in a
vacuum. The decision to decontrol was based on the collective wisdom
and judgment of the Department of Commerce, the Department of Defense,
the State Department, intelligence agencies, and the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency. And the decision to decontrol the chips, that run
the computers, was made by the Bush administration. Why were those
decisions made? They were made because computers in the 2,000 through
7,000 MTOPS ranges are mid-level computers that are widely available.
They are not supercomputers.
Let me repeat this because I know there is a lot of confusion on this
issue. Computers in the 2,000 MTOPS through 7,000 MTOPS range are not
supercomputers. In fact, many computer servers will top the 2,000 MTOPS
threshold next year.
A server is the central computer in an office, and it holds
information which all of the other computers in the office can access.
It is expected that next year a number of law firms, distribution
centers, dentist's offices, doctor's offices, car dealers, police
departments, and even congressional offices will be using servers at
the 2,000 MTOPS level. Yet, if the Cochran-Durbin amendment were
adopted, we would reimpose export controls on computers that we may be
using right here in the Senate next year.
Technology is advancing, as Secretary Cohen noted. It is being
developed and is moving forward at a very rapid pace, not only in this
country, but in other countries as well. We cannot stop it, nor can we
slow it down.
So it seems to me, Mr. President, our export policy should move
forward, to keep pace with technology rather than move backward. By
reimposing export controls on midlevel computers, as called for in the
Cochran amendment, we would in fact, however, be moving backward.
Moving backward, Mr. President, without a clear national security
rationale for so doing. That is not coming from Senator Boxer or
Senator Grams or Senator Bond. It is coming from Secretary of Defense
William Cohen. It is coming from Samuel Berger, the National Security
Adviser.
Our goal as policymakers should be to establish export policies which
are efficient, effective and competitive while also ensuring that our
national security objectives are maintained. Current law achieves that
objective.
Does this mean we should allow companies to sell any computer at any
level to any country notwithstanding our national security interests?
Of course not. Our national security interests are paramount. They are
paramount. Our export policies absolutely must ensure that our foreign
policy and security objectives, particularly as they relate to
nonproliferation and counterterrorism, are maintained.
The Cochran-Durbin amendment, however, restricts our export
competitiveness without furthering our national security objectives.
Let me explain why the Cochran-Durbin amendment will not further our
national security objectives.
First, the independent study conducted in 1995 concluded that exports
of computers in the 2,000 to 7,000 range, destined for civilian use,
posed no national security risk. The Cochran amendment, however, would
severely restrict the sale of these computers to foreign commercial
users because, as my colleague Senator Grams has so clearly stated, it
takes an average of 107 days for the appropriate agencies--Commerce,
Defense, State, and others--to issue export licenses on these mid-level
computers. to buy a midlevel computer if you were a person who went
into the store in, let us say, a city in Israel; that is one of the
Tier 3 countries that would be impacted here.
Let me pose a question, and I think anyone can answer it. If you were
a businessman in, let us say, Israel, that is one of the Tier 3
countries that would be impacted under the Cochran amendment, and
wanted to purchase a computer from a United States manufacturer, but
you were told that the United States manufacturer from whom you wanted
to purchase the computer would have to wait an average of 107 days to
get an export license to ship the computer, would you purchase that
computer from the United States manufacturer, or would you opt to
purchase a similar computer from a Japanese manufacturer? Clearly, the
answer is that you would purchase from the Japanese manufacturer and
not the American manufacturer.
Now, if there was any national security reason for this, I would be
standing here arguing for it. But I do not see what national security
objective is furthered when an Israeli dentist cannot go buy a computer
for his office. I frankly do not see it. Second, we also know that
sophisticated advanced nuclear weaponry design is not conducted on
midlevel computers in the 2,000 through 7,000 range. And again, as my
colleague Senator Grams, has clearly stated, the computers are just
boxes. It is the chip inside the computer which makes the difference,
and those chips were decontrolled under the Bush administration.
Third, and I alluded to this earlier, we know the Japanese make these
computers. We also know companies in France, Taiwan, the United
Kingdom, and Germany all manufacture computers in the 2,000 through
7,000 MTOPS range.
And how about this? China is producing computers at the 13,000 MTOPS
level, far above the level which the Cochran amendment seeks to
control.
So what are we doing here? We are hurting one of the most robust and
important industries in our country, and there is no reason to do it.
We cannot control the uncontrollable. If we were the only ones in the
world that made these computers, this debate would be worth having, but
we are not.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair will inform the Senator from
California that she has now consumed 10 minutes.
Mrs. BOXER. I thank the Chair. Will you tell me when I have used 3
more minutes and then I will yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California.
Mrs. BOXER. So we cannot turn back the hands of time. All of those
countries make these computers already. We are hurting ourselves for no
rational purpose.
Finally, in analyzing this issue, I think it is also important to
consider whether we as Senators have the expertise to determine what
makes a supercomputer. I really believe we do not have that expertise
among us. The Secretary of Defense has all of that expertise at his
disposal. The National Security Adviser has all of that expertise at
his disposal. The Secretary of Commerce has all of that expertise at
his

[[Page S7139]]

disposal. And each opposes the Cochran amendment. So I do not think
that any of us, individually or collectively, possess the knowledge to
make that kind of determination. I think the fact that we have Senators
referring to a 2,000 MTOPS computer as supercomputer evidences that
fact. We know that 2,000 MTOP computers are not supercomputers because
the experts have concluded otherwise.
So I hope that my colleagues will join the Democratic leader and will
join us and vote for the Grams-Boxer amendment. I think we should study
this issue further and defer to the Secretary of Defense and to the
intelligence agencies. I think that would set us on the appropriate
course.
I thank my colleague for his generosity, and I yield back to him.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. GRAMS addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota.
Mr. GRAMS. Mr. President, I thank my colleague from California for
that excellent statement, and I appreciate her support on this
amendment as well.
Mr. President, I would like to now yield time to the Senator from
Missouri [Mr. Bond] for whatever time he may consume.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Missouri.
Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished manager of the
amendment.
As a former chairman of the Banking Subcommittee on International
Finance, it is a pleasure to rise in support of the amendment offered
by the current chair of that subcommittee and the current ranking
member. We spent a lot of time in the International Finance
Subcommittee trying to figure out what export controls work and what
controls do not work.

Let me tell you something, Mr. President. The one thing that we have
learned is we do not spend enough time in dealing with the truly
cutting-edge technology, the major supercomputers that need to be
controlled. And why? Because we spend too much time on things that are
readily available in Radio Shack in the United States or similar stores
throughout the world. Why are we wasting our time trying to control
something that any attache from an Embassy can walk into a store here
in the United States and pick up and send home or can be found in a
store in almost any major city in the world.
Two years ago, the Clinton administration put to an end the
requirement that a U.S. exporter of computer technology attain a
Commerce Department license prior to selling computer equipment with a
capacity greater than 2,000 MTOPS to any Third Tier nation--2,000. We
need to keep these numbers in mind and, unfortunately, there are a lot
of numbers going to be thrown around. We are talking about the range of
2,000 to 7,000.
Now, the administration arrived at this decision at the conclusion of
a detailed study by a professor at Stanford University conducted in
association with the Department of Defense and the Department of
Commerce. These parties concluded that the marginal benefit to national
security cannot justify requiring U.S. exporters of technology at this
level to be licensed for sale to nonmilitary users. Acting on the
conclusions of this very credible source and with the concurrence of
the Defense and Commerce Departments, the administration rolled back
the regulatory requirement that the first-degree amendment of the
distinguished Senators from Mississippi and Illinois would seek to
reimpose. In spite of my great respect for my esteemed colleagues from
Mississippi and Illinois, let me say that rolling back the decontrols
is unwise and misdirected policy, and I hope that our colleagues will
join us in supporting the second-degree amendment.
The policy of the legislative change in the first-degree amendment
quite simply cannot be policed, it cannot be enforced, it is
ineffective, and it does little to contribute to our national security.
I might add, ``harsh letter to follow.'' I think if you would take
those four points--it cannot be policed, it cannot be enforced, it is
ineffective, and does not contribute to our national security--it does
harm our economic competitiveness. It does take away jobs from
Americans.
The question here is about computer technology, but it is also about
computer chips. Dozens of computer chips with a typical capacity of 650
MTOPS are available commercially all over the world--650 MTOPS. I
happened to stop by the candy desk, and I picked up four pieces of
candy. Each one of these could hold a computer chip wrapped in a couple
of layers of protective shipping material. Four 650 MTOPS chips would
give you the capacity of 2,600 MTOPS--600 MTOPS above the level. If
these were four computer chips, that would give you more computing
power than the minimum amount to be licensed in sales under this first-
degree amendment. I am told that anyone with the know-how, basic
electronic know-how, can fashion these chips together in a computer
with capacity that is far greater than that which would be regulated
under this amendment.
I cite this example to show that it is nearly impossible to prevent
the transport of certain technology particularly when it can be carried
out of the country in somebody's pocket. It is simply fruitless to
attempt to control technology at this level through export control
measures.

Now, the proponents and my friend from Illinois have talked about
sales of supercomputers to our adversaries. If that is what we were
talking about, if we were talking truly about supercomputers, I would
be on their side because I do not think we ought to be selling
supercomputers. Supercomputers that do military work these days are
20,000 MTOPS to 650,000 MTOPS. They are talking about computers 10
times, 10 times the range that would be covered by this regulation.
Now, the Senator from Illinois said that the servers we have in our
offices are about 200 to 250 MTOPS. I just checked with the computer
center, and the Pentium server that we have in our office to do such
sophisticated things as handle the mail and try to get the split
infinitives out of the letters my staff prepares for me and handle
memoranda and keep the books in our office is a 1,500 MTOPS computer.
That server is 1,500, just under the level that would be regulated. And
we do the high-technology stuff like keep the mail and send e-mail
messages. I have even learned how to use it. That is how simple it is.
With little benefit to national security, the first-degree
amendment's proponents are preparing to deliver a serious blow to the
American computer industry. With very little to show for it, the
advocates of this amendment are advocating the subjection of the entire
computer industry to a cumbersome bureaucratic process and a
significant regulatory burden. Our competitors certainly will not be
joining us in this effort. To the contrary. When they have concluded
their celebration and breaking open the champagne bottles to celebrate
their capture of this market, they will use this opportunity to leave
our manufacturers in the dust. While perhaps our most dynamic industry
is forced to comply with added regulatory obstacles, our competitors
will be selling to our country's former customers.
This amendment, Mr. President, is a blow because it is not regulating
the sale of supercomputers. The technology we fear will be employed to
upgrade weapons systems. The amendment actually regulates the sale of
technology on the level of an office server or an office workstation, a
tremendous market for our manufacturers. In a short period of time,
this amendment will be regulating personal computers and we will be
doing it by legislation that will have to be changed. You know how
quickly we change things around here. Not that quickly.
Many levels of technology far below that which pose national security
risks will be subjected to this policy. Leadership in the computer
industry is incredibly important to the prosperity of this country. We
cannot afford to foreclose those markets. The disadvantage to our
producers on the world market cannot be understated. The potential loss
of U.S. jobs cannot be underestimated. And the risk to our leadership
in the industry should not be jeopardized in this manner.
I do not take lightly the reports of technology being diverted to
unauthorized military users. This is a serious matter that requires our
attention. That is why it is important to study

[[Page S7140]]

the 1995 decontrol and evaluate its effectiveness. I believe that we
will find that it was unlikely that these transfers could have been
prevented and that they are an inevitable byproduct of the world
market. But, should it be concluded that decontrol is a threat,
corrective measures can and should be taken in a prompt fashion. They
can be taken administratively. However, to backtrack today with a
legislative enactment would be a mistaken rush to judgment and risks
placing our companies at a significant competitive disadvantage.

It has already been pointed out, and I believe the Senator from
California has offered into the Record the opposition of the Department
of Commerce, the Department of Defense, the administration, and several
of my colleagues. I note just one provision in the letter from our
former colleague, the former Senator from Maine now the Secretary of
Defense, Bill Cohen. He says in that letter:

I am a strong advocate for effective export controls. To be
most effective, we must focus our limited export control
resources on the export of goods and technologies that can
make a significant difference for national security and
nonproliferation reasons.

Mr. President, that is the gist of this whole thing. We should not be
focusing our efforts on things that are readily available commercially.
I agree with the Secretary of Defense that we ought to concentrate our
efforts on the true supercomputers and make sure that those, not office
workstations, are kept out of the hands of potential adversaries.
We need to be selling to countries like Israel workstations and
office things, personal computers, that would, if the first-degree
amendment were adopted, be subject to a lengthy licensing process.
Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to support the second-degree
amendment of the chairman of the subcommittee, my friend from
Minnesota. I thank the Chair and I yield the floor.
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President I rise today in opposition to the
Cochran/Durbin amendment to the Defense Authorization bill. The
amendment would bar the sale of many types of computers, denying export
opportunities for American firms, shifting high-technology sales to
international competitors and flooding the Commerce Department with
export applications for routine computer sales.
Rather than impose new restrictions, the Senate should adopt a
substitute amendment, offered by Senator Rod Grams of Minnesota and my
California colleague Barbara Boxer. The Grams/Boxer substitute would:
Require the Commerce Department to improve its licensing process and
provide more information to exporters, assisting exporters to identify
suspicious potential purchasers and avoid questionable sales.
Require the General Accounting Office to study the impact of proposed
export restrictions and the impact of foreign availability of computers
on U.S. exports.
Rather than restrict a broad range of computer exports, the Grams/
Boxer substitute amendment will help the administration and exporters
distinguish between the potentially damaging sales that place us at
risk and the routine computer sales.

Export Controls Must Apply to the Right Computers

Since the 1940's, the United States has controlled the export of
dual-use technology, advanced technology which has both defense and
nondefense applications. These restrictions are appropriate, because we
all want to keep critical military technology out of the hands of
potentially hostile militaries.
However, technology advances rapidly. What was called a supercomputer
only a few years ago, represents only routine computing power today. We
cannot lock up U.S. exports and deny the administration the necessary
flexibility to respond to evolving technology and worldwide
competition.
In 1993, the administration conducted a thorough review, involving
the Departments of State, Defense, and Commerce, intelligence agencies
and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The resulting U.S. policy
permits the export of computers capable of 2,000 to 7,000 million
theoretical operations per second [MTOPS] for Tier 3 countries. Among
the more than 50 tier 3 countries are the countries of the former
Soviet Union, Israel, Saudi Arabia, India, and China.
Export restrictions must be based on an objective review of a
computer's computing power and the computing needs of the potential
computer application. As Defense Secretary Cohen stated, ``we need to
maintain a system that allows us to adjust our controls when technology
advances and when technology becomes widely available. Putting specific
control levels into state is not an appropriate means to meet these
often fast-changing challenges.''

the cochran/durbin amendment is overbroad

The Cochran/Durbin amendment would prohibit the export of computer of
2,000 to 7,000 MTOPS from being exported to any Tier 3 country without
an export license. The amendment is overbroad and will deny sales for
U.S. companies and undermine our long-term national security needs.
The amendment will restrict the sale and export of ordinary work
stations and computers, not just supercomputers. Many low-level work
stations currently exceed the 2,000 MTOPS level, and are found in
offices, ranging from law firms to auto dealerships, across the
country. By 1998, personal computers will exceed the 2,000 MTOPS level
and would be subject to the amendment's licensing requirement. At a
time when many have urged the complete abolition of the Commerce
Department, the Cochran amendment will trigger a flood of export
applications for new categories of common computers.

The Restrictions Will Not Increase National Security

The proposed amendment will not enhance U.S. national security. In
1995, the administration's review concluded computers of 2,000 to 7,000
MTOPS were widely available throughout the world and no longer
considered to be a critical choke point for technologies used in the
design, testing, or production of weapons of mass destruction.
However, if U.S. firms are denied the sales, manufacturers in other
countries are prepared to fill the void. Computers in the 2,000 to
7,000 MTOPS range are manufactured in Japan, as well as 4 European
companies. China reportedly produces a 13,000 MTOPS computer, while
Russia and India also already produce computers more powerful than
those the amendment would seek to control. The proposed restrictions
will not keep technology out of the hands of countries posing national
security concerns. The proposed restriction will be ineffective,
denying many legitimate transactions for valid purposes, while allowing
military testing proceeds through other means.

Exporters Need More Information

Under current law, the manufacturers of computers are caught because
the Commerce Department cannot release the name or circumstances when
an export license application is rejected. The notice of the rejection
of a license is only provided to the individual exporting applicant.
As a result, when a U.S. exporter's application is rejected, the
suspicious purchaser is encouraged to pursue alternative sellers and
provide false information to support the sale. If potential U.S.
exporter could receive more information, potential sales to suspicious
purchasers could be detected earlier.

Conclusion

I urge my colleagues to reject the Cochran amendment. The amendment
will impose unnecessary restrictions on routine computer exports and
undermine our national security in the long-run by shifting more sales
to international competitors, many with weak or no export control laws
at all.
Rather than impose new restrictions, the administration should
provide more information to potential exporters to assist in the
identification of suspicious potential purchasers.
The Grams/Boxer substitute will offer the appropriate incentives,
while providing the administration with the authority to distinguish
between sales that jeopardize national security and those that do not.
While the administration needs flexibility to focus attention and
resources on priority export applications, the Cochran amendment will
divert attention and resources away from high-priority areas, truly
placing our national security at risk. The Cochran amendment should be
rejected.

[[Page S7141]]

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the Grams
second-degree amendment. Today, America leads the world in the
development and production of high performance computers and our
commercial interests in promoting exports of these machines is strong.
To restrict the export of computers at the level set by the Cochran
amendment would unnecessarily hurt our companies without promoting our
national security.
I, like all other Senators, am concerned about how the export of
advanced technology affects our national security. Recent press stories
have made it all too clear that potential adversaries wish to acquire
American technology to assist their military efforts. In addressing
this issue, however, policymakers must strike a balance between the
interests of American companies and what is required to ensure our
national security. This is never an easy task and is made more
difficult with the rapid ace of development in the computer industry.
We need to be diligent in our efforts to try and match our policies to
what is occurring in that industry.
Supercomputers are integral to the development of advanced weapons
development. Therefore, our policy which restricts the export of the
most powerful computers is necessary and warranted. However, the
performance level of the computers that the Cochran amendment seeks to
control does not reach the extreme speeds of true supercomputers. The
Cochran amendment imposes controls on computers operating at 2,000 to
7,000 million theoretical operations per second [MTOPS].
Today, a computer that operates at 2,000 MTOPS is considered a mid-
level workstation. The next generation of chips may allow Senators to
have machines capable of that speed on their own desks by the end of
next year. High performance computers start at 10,000 MTOPS and go up
to 1,000,000 MTOPS. Supercomputers are machines that operate above
20,000 MTOPS and require validated export licenses under the current
policy.
In 1995, an extensive Government review of computer technology
determined that critical defense applications required machines that
operated above the 7,000 MTOPS level. Further, it was determined that
machines that operate below the 7,000 MTOPS level would soon become
widely available from foreign suppliers. The administration then
proposed its current policy, which has strong restrictions on the sale
of computers that operate above the 7,000 MTOPS and lesser restrictions
on machines that operate below that level. This decision was reviewed
and approved by the Defense Department, the State Department, ACDA, and
the intelligence agencies. Information gathered by our intelligence
community since that decision was made support keeping the export
policy in its current form.
Today, companies in Germany, Italy, France, India, Japan, and Poland
are selling computers that operate in the 2,000 to 7,000 MTOPS level.
And the performance level of the computers foreign companies produce
continues to grow. Even if availability of these machines were a
legitimate risk to national security, which it is not, restrictions on
American companies seeking to export computers in this range would have
little or no effect on the ability of foreign militaries to acquire
this technology.
Further, simply placing license requirements on the sale of these
computers would place American companies at an unfair disadvantage. We
all know that sales of technology or any commodity depend on the speed
of delivery. Foreign customers will not wait a week for an American
company to receive a license if another vendor can deliver the same
quality machine tomorrow.
Critics of the current policy believe its implementation has allowed
computers to be diverted to illegitimate end users. The Commerce
Department has not informed companies what foreign customers should or
should not receive this type of computers and places the burden on the
companies to acquire this information. However, how well a policy is
implemented does not necessarily reflect on the prudence of the policy.
If there have been problems in how our current export policy is
implemented, recent changes made by the administration and measures
imposed by the Grams amendment should help fix them.
I agree with Senator Grams that we should continue to evaluate our
computer export policy and how foreign availability affects U.S.
exports. We should also make it easier for companies to know which
foreign companies, militaries, and nuclear end users should not receive
our technology. I believe the current policy has been set at a level
which both promotes American commercial interests and helps protect our
national security. I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting the
Grams amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Several Senators addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.
Mr. COCHRAN. How much time remains on both sides, Mr. President?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair will advise the Senator from
Mississippi that 8 minutes 53 seconds remain under his control of time,
and 9 minutes 42 seconds remain under the control of the time of the
Senator from Minnesota.
Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, does the distinguished Senator from South
Carolina wish time on the amendment?
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Cochran, I ask
unanimous consent that the Senator from Maine, Susan Collins, be added
as a cosponsor of the Cochran amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from Mississippi.
Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.
Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished chairman of the
Armed Services Committee for his contribution to the understanding of
this issue and for his cosponsorship personally of the amendment and
his announcement that the distinguished Senator from Maine, Senator
Collins, is now a cosponsor of the amendment. This indicates that we
have a broad base of cosponsors for the Cochran amendment, which means,
if you are for the Cochran amendment, you would vote against the Grams
and Boxer substitute for the Cochran amendment, because their amendment
undermines the effort to impose a change in the current policy to
require simply that our Department of Commerce approve sales of
computer technology and computers by U.S. firms to overseas customers
that have a computing capability of between 2,000 MTOPS and 7,000
MTOPS, if they are certain kinds of countries called Tier 3 countries,
to ensure that they are not military users or that the computers will
not be put to a military use.
The problem with the current policy is that the Department of
Commerce is leaving it up to the U.S. exporters to make this
determination now. Some have gotten into trouble because some, like
Silicon Graphics in California, are now under a grand jury
investigation because of sales made to questionable users in violation
of the current policy. The question is whether they knew or should have
known that the end use was going to be military or the end user was
going to be military; whether they exercised that degree of diligence
required by the current policy.
Do we want to continue that kind of policy that puts at risk all of
our computer companies when engaged in these international sales? I say
no. It is time to put the onus, not on the computer company trying to
make a sale abroad, but on the Department of Commerce, which has the
responsibility of administering its own policies. But they are shifting
their burden to the exporter, away from the Government, and this is
causing difficulty. It has resulted in seven very sophisticated, high-
end supercomputers being used now by the Chinese Academy of Sciences,
an arm of which is involved in the modernization of the Chinese nuclear
weapon program and capabilities. In Russia, the chairman of the
equivalent to the Atomic Energy Commission there, boasted that they now
have a supercomputer with a potential previously unknown, because of
U.S. technology exports to Russia. That is the entity that modernizes
and maintains the nuclear weapons of Russia.
What we are unwittingly doing by carrying forward and going forward
with this policy with no change, which is what the Grams amendment
basically suggests, it says make a list, tell

[[Page S7142]]

everybody who they should not sell to--you cannot do that. You cannot
possibly make a list and put down all the fronts for the People's
Liberation Army or others who might be involved in either developing
new weapons of mass destruction or exporting the technology for these
weapons: North Korea, Iran, other countries and nation-states that we
know now are developing more and more sophisticated and lethal weapons
of mass destruction capability, with delivery systems. We know that is
going on.
Here we are providing the technology to do simulations that they
cannot do now without our technology. They cannot buy this. They cannot
buy this from any other country except the United States. And we are
leaving it up to U.S. exporters, saying our policy depends upon the
good intentions and the capabilities of our U.S. civilian companies to
determine these end uses and end users, who they are, what they are
going to do with the technology, whether or not they are going to
transship it to some other entity.
There are facts on the record, as a result of hearings held in our
subcommittee that has been looking at proliferation issues all year,
that are overwhelming and completely persuasive on this point. This
policy ought to be changed. The only way Congress can influence change
is by adopting a change, by doing so in this amendment. We cannot issue
a regulation. We cannot make an administrative policy change here in
the Senate. We can ask them to do it. We have already done that and it
has not resulted in the change that is necessary. It is simply if you
were a suspicious end user, we want the Department of Commerce to
certify that it is OK to make that sale.

The Senator from California correctly discusses whether or not some
of our closest allies are going to be adversely affected by this
amendment. Israel has been purchasing computer technology under
existing policy with licenses from the Department of Commerce. That is
going to continue. That is not going to change. There is not going to
be any slowdown in the process if someone is a trusted ally or friend.
We don't even require licenses for our NATO allies. They are Tier 1
countries. But the Tier 3 countries--that includes China, Russia, and a
lot of other countries--do have to have the approval of the Department
of Commerce under our amendment if the computer capability is within a
certain range.
These are not PC's. The Senator from Missouri, and my dear friend,
suggests that this is like the PC's on our desk, at our workstations in
our offices. He is talking about the Pentium server, that is the
network, the hardware for the entire network. I know he did not mean to
misrepresent it, but you have to understand what he's talking about. He
has acted like an attache walks into Radio Shack and buys one of these
computers that has an MTOPS speed and capability that would be
described in this amendment. That is not true. You cannot do that.
First of all, an attache could not afford it. These are expensive.
The fact is, we are talking about only 6.34 percent of the total
supercomputer sales that would be affected by this amendment. Mr.
President, 95 percent of all of the sales have been approved within 30
days that do require licenses. The Senator from Minnesota said it is
over 100 days you had to wait to get approval. That is not borne out by
the facts, by the testimony before our subcommittee by the people at
the Department of Commerce.
So I am hopeful that Senators will think carefully about what we are
trying to do. I know the computer companies are putting a lot of
pressure on, sending everybody messages and phone calls and the rest. I
would not want to have to go through another process. But we are
talking about only such a small part of the market, a small part of
those manufactured workstations and other large pieces of hardware that
have the potential to be used to upgrade lethal weapons systems and
missile systems to make them more accurate, to make them more lethal,
to make them competitive with the U.S. arsenal that is designed to
protect us. And we are going to put at risk our own system of national
defense? We can't do that.
Mr. President, I urge Senators to vote against the Grams-Boxer
amendment and then vote for the Cochran-Durbin amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? The Senator from Minnesota.
Mr. GRAMS. Mr. President, I inquire how much time is remaining?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota has 9 minutes 42
seconds remaining, the Senator from Mississippi has 25 seconds.
Mr. GRAMS. Mr. President, I want to make one brief comment before I
ask to yield time to my colleague from New York.
I want to say our friend and colleague from Mississippi has a well-
intended amendment, but it is aimed at the wrong level. These are not
supercomputers, as they continue to try to say. These are midlevel
computers. If you are talking supercomputer, a low-end supercomputer
starts at 20,000 MTOPS and goes now to 650,000, and next year it will
be over a million; so these are not supercomputers.
Mr. President, I now would like to yield up to 7 minutes to my friend
from New York.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York is recognized to
speak for up to 7 minutes.
Mr. D'AMATO. Mr. President, let me first say there are very few
colleagues for whom I have greater respect and who are more
knowledgeable in the areas of national security than the distinguished
senior Senator from Mississippi, Senator Cochran. Indeed, he raises a
very valid and natural concern that we have with respect to nuclear
proliferation and the ability to enhance systems by way of the
computer, the supercomputer in particular, and the need for proper
balance in terms of export controls. That has been something which the
Banking Committee has had jurisdiction over and has grappled with over
the years. So, while I am sympathetic to the concerns that are raised,
I just have to think that the issues of computer sales to foreign
countries, as Senator Cochran has made clear to the Senate, is one that
is so important that it really deserves much more analysis and much
more debate than can be allowed for this floor amendment.
Indeed, as the chairman of the Banking Committee's International
Finance Subcommittee, I believe that Senator Grams has offered an
amendment that is worthy of our support, because what it would do, it
would allow the entire Senate to ascertain, by way of the kind of
comprehensive analysis that we need by the General Accounting Office as
it relates to what security needs may be open at the present time, what
concerns are related to the sales of the high MTOPS computers to Tier 3
countries and what impact they may or may not have on this legislation
that has been proposed.
I think Senator Grams' amendment is the proper way to proceed, to
give us an opportunity, not to just dive in after 45 minutes or 1
hour's worth of debate. We need the careful scrutiny, the careful
study, to ascertain is there an availability of these computers to such
an extent that this really becomes a meaningless impediment to our own
trade? Will there be other countries in Europe and other areas that
will rush to fill the vacuum? That is what I have been told. That may
not be correct, but let's ascertain, let's find out. That is what
Senator Grams' second-degree amendment would accomplish.
It seems to me that makes sense. It would require the Commerce
Committee to publish a list of questionable military and nuclear end
users, with certain exceptions when sources and methods would be
jeopardized. That is what we have to know.
Let me depart just for a moment, if I might. If we want to do
something as it relates to nuclear proliferation, let's say to some of
those countries who are looking to get most-favored-nation trading
status, or continue it, that you cannot be exporting--when we know they
are exporting--the kind of missile systems and delivery systems which
China is today exporting.
That becomes something of a controversy. Let's find out how many of
my colleagues are going to be willing to stand up to the business
interests who look the other way and don't look at our national
security interests or don't look at the abuse of human rights and the
crackdown on religious freedoms that take place now or the forced
sterilization of people. That is

[[Page S7143]]

what is going on in China. They present, Mr. President, a very real and
clear and present danger to the security of the world and to world
peace by exporting to Iran and to other countries delivery systems and
all kinds of enhancement of weapons systems which will endanger world
peace.
If we really want to do something, let's take that up, but to simply
come forward at this point in time without the proper kind of
analysis--again, Senator Grams should be commended because his second-
degree amendment would say, ``OK, let's make a detailed analysis,'' and
not come down on the floor and raise this. I think this is what we have
to do.
So not only on a jurisdictional basis would I have problems
supporting the Cochran amendment, but basically on the basis of fact. I
don't think we should just raise jurisdiction and say, ``That's within
my committee, and, therefore, I want it to come through my committee.''
I sometimes get upset about that. If it is good legislation, so what if
it didn't come through the committee process properly, particularly
when we are talking about matters of national security. So I don't just
raise that, but it does need the kind of careful thought, careful
analysis that Senator Grams' amendment calls for.
For that reason, I hope that we support overwhelmingly this cautious
approach to making analysis of whether or not the export of the MTOPS
to Tier 3 countries should go through another process with Government
bureaucrats analyzing and never coming to a decision. I think that
would be a mistake.

Again, let's take a look at China: $50 billion surplus in trade, and
yet she does what she wants, and she claims she wants friendship with
us. I think on the altar of the almighty dollar, we just continue
business as usual. I am more concerned about saying to them, ``You
can't be our friend on one hand, you can't be enjoying a $50 billion
trade surplus with us and then have a half a billion dollar industry
that your generals are running,'' and we say, ``Oh, no, don't rock the
boat.''
Do we really want to stop nuclear proliferation? Do we want to stop
the export of deadly weapons systems? Let's do it when we have some
clout, and we do have some clout. But I am afraid we will succumb to
those who say, ``Oh, we can't do this, we'll lose a lot of jobs here in
this country if we stand up to that kind of activity.''
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. GRAMS addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Burns). The Senator from Minnesota.
Mr. GRAMS. Mr. President, I yield another minute to my colleague from
California and coauthor of this amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California is recognized.
Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, I want to say to my colleague, it has been
a pleasure working with him and his staff. I think that what we are
offering here is a very wise alternative to an unwise policy. I am
looking at the Tier 3 countries, and my colleague from Mississippi said
there is no difference in what will happen to Israel under this
amendment than under current law. It isn't true. Tier 3 includes
Israel, Romania, who wants to join NATO, Latvia, and other countries.
If a business wanted to buy a computer that fell in the 2,000 to 7,000
MTOPS range, which we have already established is mid-level computer,
and we are going to have them right here in the Congress next year,
then that business would have to wait an average of 107 days.
Mr. President, this Cochran amendment is kind of a ``Back to the
Future'' amendment. It might have some application if it was offered
many years ago, but it doesn't have any application now. I think the
Grams-Boxer amendment, which has so much support from Secretary Cohen,
from Sandy Berger, from Secretary Daley, from so many Senators on both
sides of the aisle, I think that is the appropriate course to take. I
really hope that our colleagues have listened, and I hope that the
Grams-Boxer amendment prevails. I yield back to my colleague.
Mr. GRAMS. Mr. President, how much time is remaining?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota has 55 seconds, and
the Senator from Mississippi has 25 seconds.
Mr. GRAMS. Mr. President, in wrapping up the debate this morning, I
want to, again, say that I believe the controls we have in place are
working. We are taking a step backward if we approve the Cochran-Durbin
amendment. The rest of the world is moving forward very fast. Anybody
who has bought a computer in the last 2 years knows that technology has
already passed them, and they have to look at a new system. But between
the 2,000 and the 7,000 MTOPS level, computers are going to become so
commonplace that any commercial industry or any office in this country
will be able to buy them next year. These are well intended controls
but, again, as I say, placed on the wrong levels. These are not
supercomputers. These are not computers that countries would be looking
for military end use. These are computers that are more for business
and office use. I believe that putting any kind of restrictions or
recontrolling these would be a step backward in our efforts to provide
jobs and assistance.

Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time.
Mr. COCHRAN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.
Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, at the outset of the debate, I made a
speech that lasted about 20 minutes. It is in the Record, so I am not
going to make it again. I will try to make it in 25 seconds.
We are limiting export controls in a very small area of lethal
computer technology. Please vote against the Grams-Boxer weakening
amendment and support the Cochran-Durbin-Thurmond-Glenn amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has expired. The question is on
agreeing to the second-degree amendment No. 422. The yeas and nays have
been ordered. The clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk called the roll.
Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Maryland [Ms. Mikulski] is
necessarily absent.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber
desiring to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 72, nays 27, as follows:

Rollcall Vote No. 166 Leg.]

YEAS--72

Akaka
Allard
Ashcroft
Baucus
Bennett
Biden
Bingaman
Bond
Boxer
Breaux
Brownback
Bryan
Bumpers
Byrd
Campbell
Chafee
Cleland
Conrad
Craig
D'Amato
Daschle
Domenici
Dorgan
Enzi
Faircloth
Feinstein
Frist
Gorton
Graham
Gramm
Grams
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Harkin
Hatch
Helms
Hollings
Hutchison
Jeffords
Johnson
Kempthorne
Kennedy
Kerrey
Kerry
Kohl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
McCain
McConnell
Moseley-Braun
Moynihan
Murkowski
Murray
Nickles
Reed
Reid
Robb
Rockefeller
Roth
Santorum
Sarbanes
Shelby
Smith (OR)
Thomas
Torricelli
Warner
Wellstone
Wyden

NAYS--27

Abraham
Burns
Coats
Cochran
Collins
Coverdell
DeWine
Dodd
Durbin
Feingold
Ford
Glenn
Hutchinson
Inhofe
Inouye
Kyl
Lott
Lugar
Mack
Roberts
Sessions
Smith (NH)
Snowe
Specter
Stevens
Thompson
Thurmond

NOT VOTING--1

Mikulski

The amendment (No. 422) was agreed to.
Mr. THURMOND. I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. FORD. I move to lay it on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Amendment No. 420, As Amended

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to Cochran
amendment numbered 420, as amended.
The amendment (No. 420), as amended, was agreed to.
Mr. COCHRAN. I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. THURMOND. I move to lay it on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at 1:15
p.m. Senator Murray be recognized and that debate on the Murray
amendment No. 593 be limited to 45 minutes, to be equally divided in
the usual form, and following the conclusion or yielding back of time,
the Senate proceed to

[[Page S7144]]

vote on or in relation to the Murray amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. THURMOND. I further ask unanimous consent that no amendments be
in order to the Murray amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to proceed as in
morning business for 10 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I thank the Chair.
(The remarks of Mr. Roberts pertaining to the introduction of S. 1000
are located in today's Record under ``Statements on Introduced Bills
and Joint Resolutions.'')

Amendment No. 668

Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I call up amendment 668.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has that right. The amendment
numbered 668 is now the pending question.
Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I offer this amendment on behalf of
myself and Senator Harkin.
Mr. President, let me begin by asking unanimous consent that letters
from the Disabled American Veterans, the Paralyzed Veterans of America,
and the Vietnam Veterans of America be printed in the Record in support
of this amendment.
There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

Disabled American Veterans,

Washington, DC, July 9, 1997.
Hon. Paul David Wellstone,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Wellstone: On behalf of the more than one
million members of the Disabled American veterans (DAV), I
express our strong support for your efforts to provide
funding to enable Brookhaven National Laboratory to conduct
internal dose reconstruction of veterans exposed to ionizing
radiation (atomic veterans) and to transfer some $400 million
to the Department of veterans Affairs (VA) budget for health
care.
The DAV believes that $16.959 billion is inadequate--by at
least $600 million--to enable VA to provide quality and
timely health care to veterans. Your amendment would greatly
enhance VA's ability to provide adequate health care to our
Nation's sick and disable veterans.
Additionally, according to the VA, very few atomic veterans
or their survivors have been successful in establishing that
the veteran's disability, recognized as a ``radiogenic
disease,'' is the result of the veteran's exposure to
ionizing radiation in service. The main reason for the high
failure rate is due to the current, inadequate and inaccurate
method of reconstructing dose estimates which routinely
indicate minimal radiation exposure.
Senator Wellstone, your amendment would ensure that
America's atomic veterans will have available to them Fission
Tracking Analysis, a more accurate method of dose
reconstruction. Surely, fairness and equity in the
adjudication of atomic veterans' claims is the very least
that our Nation owes to these brave veterans who were used to
advance our country's knowledge of the effects of ionizing
radiation, unbeknownst to them.
Again, you have the full support of the more than one
million members of the DAV in your efforts to ensure that the
VA has adequate funding to care for America's sick and
disabled veterans and to ensure that atomic veterans are
provided with accurate internal dose reconstruction to
support their claims.
Sincerely,
David W. Gorman,
Executive Director.
____

Paralyzed Veterans of America,

Washington, DC, July 9, 1997.
Hon. Paul David Wellstone,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Wellstone: On behalf of the members of
Paralyzed Veterans of America, please accept our full support
for your efforts to increase needed funding for health care
benefits and services provided by the Department of Veterans
Affairs (VA).
As you well know, the proposed FY 1998 VA budget calls for
unprecedented reductions in current and proposed
appropriations for the health care system. The actual
appropriation request freezes VA discretionary funding at a
level far below current levels. The only relief given to VA
over that period of time comes from a very uncertain plan
allowing VA to keep fees and reimbursements from private
insurance companies to help cover increasing health care
costs. Even with this budget gimmick, VA hospitals will
remain seriously under funded next year and in future years
under the proposal.
Again, we appreciate your efforts to correct this serious
funding shortfall, and urge all members of the Senate to
support your amendment.
Sincerely yours,
Gordon H. Mansfield,
Executive Director.
____

Vietnam Veterans of America, Inc.,

Washington, DC, July 9, 1997.
Hon. Paul Wellstone,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Wellstone: On behalf of Vietnam Veterans of
America (VVA), I want to thank you for your efforts to secure
additional funding for veterans medical care. VVA is pleased
to support your amendment to the DOD Authorization bill which
would transfer $400 million to VA medical care.
As you know, the veterans community remains very concerned
about the impacts of discretionary spending cuts on VA
medical care and benefits processing. Both programs are in a
state of major transition, implementing significant reforms
and procedural improvements which will--in time--create
enhanced efficiencies. The Senate and House budget
reconciliation bills, as well as the appropriation bill
moving through the House right now and soon to be considered
in the Senate, are placing veterans health care in jeopardy
by depending upon VA's ability to collect insurance monies
for over $600 million over VA's FY 1998 health care budget.
This is a very tenuous plan, as the program is untested and
the targeted amount seems overly optimistic.
As it currently stands, VA's FY 1998 budget offers the
veterans community no guarantee that the national commitment
to provide care to our disabled and low-income veterans will
be honored. Again, VVA appreciates your strong advocacy for
veterans programs and urges the Senate to adopt your
amendment. Veterans benefits, after all, are an ongoing cost
of our national defense.
Sincerely,
George C. Duggins,
National President.

Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, these letters are extremely important.
They are from three very fine veterans organizations: The DAV, the PVA,
and the Vietnam Veterans of America. The reason they are concerned,
and, for that matter, all of the veterans community is concerned, is
that in the budget resolution what we ended up putting into effect was
a cut in veterans health care benefits.
Mr. President, the portion of those cuts that directly affect
veterans health care is $400 million. What this amendment does is
simply authorize the Secretary of Defense the ability to be able to
transfer this $400 million into the veterans health care.
Mr. President, let me just say to colleagues that this is a huge
issue. I am positive that if my colleagues, Democrats and Republicans
alike, get a chance to talk with the veterans organizations and
veterans communities in their States, they will find out that people
are really indignant about this because it was never clear--I don't
think it was clear to any of us--that, in fact, we were voting for
actual cuts, actual cuts in veterans health care.
What this amendment does, it says, look, we have $2.6 billion in the
Pentagon budget more than the Pentagon asked for; we can at least take
a portion of this. And please remember, all this amendment does is give
the Secretary of Defense the discretion or the authority to be able to
transfer it. It is not a mandate. It seems very appropriate.
Mr. President, it seems like this amendment that Senator Harkin and I
have introduced is eminently reasonable because if you think about it,
one of the huge concerns in the Veterans' Committee is very much linked
to national defense. We are talking about men and women who have served
our country. As we look at veterans health care and we project to the
future, we want to make sure we do not end up sacrificing the quality
of care for veterans.
I know what I hear back in the State of Minnesota, first and
foremost, we have now an increasing number of gulf war veterans who are
in need of help. This is yet an additional challenge for the VA. This
is an additional challenge for our country to get the care to these
people.

Mr. President, this amendment, again, just authorizes the Secretary
of Defense to make this transfer of funding. These veterans were all
about serving our country in defense of our country. If there ever was
an opportunity to restore this funding for veterans health care, it is
now. This Congress, whether it is this afternoon, or whether it is next
week, or whether it is next month, is going to have to restore this
funding. I don't think there was one Senator that was clear, when we
passed this budget resolution, that we were actually directing $400
million of cuts in veterans health care.
I will just tell you that more and more and more of the gulf war
veterans are going to be stepping forward in

[[Page S7145]]

your States, in our States, and they are going to be saying: We don't
know what happened to us, but we do know that before we went and
served, we could run 2 miles and we felt good, and now we can't walk a
half mile, and we don't know what happened to us.
Over and over again, we are seeing report after report that makes it
crystal clear that the gulf war veterans have every reason in the world
to be indignant about not getting information that they need to get
from our Government and, more important, about their need to receive
some care. So what in the world are we doing cutting $400 million in
the veterans health care budget?
In addition, Mr. President, let me simply point out that above and
beyond the gulf war veterans, we have a situation where our veterans
population is aging. More and more of our veterans are living to be 65
years of age and over. More and more of our veterans are living to be
85 years of age and over. And this is an additional strain.
So, Mr. President, I want to point out that, at the very time that
veterans are showing up at VA hospitals in greater numbers, with
increasing health care costs generally and prospects for greater
medical costs specifically, at the very time that we have that going
on, we have a cut in this budget resolution.
So, what we are saying in this amendment--and I will defer to my
colleague from Iowa in a moment--we are saying, look, we have an excess
$2.6 billion. It is more than the Pentagon asked for. We have a cut in
veterans health care in the budget resolution to the tune of $400
million. It is clear it is going to have very negative consequences for
veterans. The veterans community in our Nation--I have just three
letters, from the PVA, DAV, and Vietnam veterans, and they are saying:
You can't do that. What about those of us who are struggling with
posttraumatic stress syndrome? What about the Persian Gulf veterans?
More and more are asking: What happened to us? More and more of those
veterans are asking for adequate care. What about the ever-increasing
aging population among veterans at the very time there is going to be
more of a strain? At the very time that we have more of a challenge,
you have cut $400 million.
This is an opportunity to come through for the veterans community. I
hope it will happen today. I hope we get a very strong vote today. I
say this to all my colleagues. One way or another, we are going to have
to restore this funding. This amendment, if you just think about the
wording, just provides the Secretary of Defense with the authorization
to transfer some of this funding to VA health care--$400 million--and
it makes eminently good sense because, after all, these veterans who
come and seek health care within our VA health care system were the
very men and women who served our country in defense of our country.

Mr. President, how much time do we have left?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is no time agreement.
Mr. GREGG addressed the Chair.
Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President----
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator yield the floor?
Mr. WELLSTONE. Are we now debating this amendment?
Mr. GREGG. Mr. President, if the Senator from Minnesota will yield
for a question, I simply have about 3 minutes I would like to talk, and
it has nothing to do with this amendment.
Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I would rather not yield the floor at
the moment. But if my colleague wants to speak--do we have other
Senators on the floor who want to speak on this amendment? My colleague
from Iowa wants to speak on the amendment. If Senators want to cover
other topics for a short period of time, I would be more than willing
to defer to them. We want to try to make our case here before the vote.
Can I ask my colleagues whether they are interested in debating this
amendment?
Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, I want to speak about 10 minutes on the
Levin amendment. I would certainly be willing to allow the Senator to
maintain his right to the floor, but this is unusual procedure. The
Senator doesn't have a right to control the floor. He has a right to
speak, but he doesn't have a right to control the flow of debate for
others. I am willing to accommodate him, but this is an unusual
procedure. Being the accommodating person that I am, I am willing to do
it. At some point, we might have to ask if the Senator is through
speaking and let somebody else speak.
Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, my amendment is pending now, I say to
my colleague from Texas. The Levin amendment is not pending. I have not
yielded the floor yet, but I would be more than willing----
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair advises the Senator from Minnesota
that he can yield to his friend from Iowa for a question.
Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I suggest that we follow the normal rules.
If the Senator wants to speak, we can go back and forth. That would be
fine with this Senator.
Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the
Senator from New Hampshire be allowed to speak and the Senator from
Texas for 10 minutes and then that be followed by the Senator from
Iowa.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from New Hampshire is recognized.

____________________