[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 97 (Thursday, July 10, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S7131-S7145]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




        NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now 
resume consideration of S. 936, which the clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       A bill (S. 936) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 
     1998 for military activities of the Department of Defense, 
     for military construction, and for defense activities of the 
     Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for 
     such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other 
     purposes.

  The Senate resumed consideration of the bill.

  Pending:

       Cochran/Durbin amendment No. 420, to require a license to 
     export computers with composite theoretical performance equal 
     to or greater than 2,000 million theoretical operations per 
     second.
       Grams amendment No. 422 (to amendment No. 420), to require 
     the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct a 
     study on the availability and potential risks relating to the 
     sale of certain computers.
       Coverdell (for Inhofe/Coverdell/Cleland) amendment No. 423, 
     to define depot-level maintenance and repair, to limit 
     contracting for depot-level maintenance and repair at 
     installations approved for closure or realignment in 1995, 
     and to modify authorities and requirements relating to the 
     performance of core logistics functions.
       Wellstone amendment No. 669, to provide funds for the 
     bioassay testing of veterans exposed to ionizing radiation 
     during military service.
       Wellstone modified amendment No. 668, to require the 
     Secretary of Defense to transfer $400,000,000 to the 
     Secretary of Veterans Affairs to provide funds for veterans' 
     health care and other purposes.
       Wellstone modified amendment No. 666, to provide for the 
     transfer of funds for Federal Pell Grants.
       Murkowski modified amendment No. 753, to require the 
     Secretary of Defense to submit a report to Congress on the 
     options available to the Department of Defense for the 
     disposal of chemical weapons and agents.
       Kyl modified amendment No. 607, to impose a limitation on 
     the use of Cooperative Threat Reduction funds for destruction 
     of chemical weapons.
       Kyl amendment No. 605, to advise the President and Congress 
     regarding the safety, security, and reliability of United 
     States Nuclear weapons stockpile.
       Dodd amendment No. 762, to establish a plan to provide 
     appropriate health care to

[[Page S7132]]

     Persian Gulf veterans who suffer from a Gulf War illness.
       Dodd amendment No. 763, to express the sense of the 
     Congress in gratitude to Governor Chris Patten for his 
     efforts to develop democracy in Hong Kong.
       Reid amendment No. 772, to authorize the Secretary of 
     Defense to make available $2,000,000 for the development and 
     deployment of counter-landmine technologies.
       Levin amendment No. 778, to revise the requirements for 
     procurement of products of Federal Prison Industries to meet 
     needs of Federal agencies.
  Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The able Senator from South Carolina is 
recognized.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I just want to tell the Senators that we 
are going to finish this bill this week. If they want their amendments 
adopted, they better come in and have them considered and debated and 
acted on. We do not want any further delays. And we want to get time 
agreements, too. No use to spend hours and hours on one amendment. We 
ought to get a very limited time on each amendment so we can finish 
this bill. That is very important. I want Senators to know that we 
expect to proceed along that line.


                           Amendment No. 422

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will now resume consideration of 
Grams amendment No. 422 on which there shall be 90 minutes for debate 
equally divided.
  Who yields time?
  Mr. COCHRAN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.
  Mr. COCHRAN. Who controls time under the order?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi controls 45 
minutes and the Senator from Minnesota controls 45 minutes.
  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, to refresh the memory of Senators about 
this amendment that is now the pending business, at an early stage in 
the consideration of this authorization bill I offered an amendment for 
myself and on behalf of the distinguished Senator from Illinois [Mr. 
Durbin] to modify the administration's existing policy relating to the 
export by U.S. companies of supercomputers in the global marketplace.
  The reason this amendment was considered important for the 
consideration of the Senate on this bill is that it, first of all, 
involves exporting technology that no other country in the world has. 
Unlike many of our arms sales, defense equipment or technology sales 
around the world, whether to friendly allies or those who may not be so 
friendly, computer technology has evolved here in the United States to 
the point that we have the corner on the market. No one can compete 
with us in many areas of supercomputer technology. The Japanese have 
developed an impressive capacity in this area as well.
  But one thing has come to our attention in the subcommittee that I 
chair on Governmental Affairs, the Subcommittee on International 
Security, Proliferation and Federal Services. We have had a series of 
hearings that began the first month of this year. We have had at least 
one hearing every month. And we have explored one aspect of weapons 
proliferation.
  It was at a hearing that we had recently on the exporting of 
technology that we learned that the United States was a proliferator of 
weapons technology that was threatening the security of the United 
States, and putting at risk United States servicemen, servicewomen, 
other interests, and other assets and interests throughout the world, 
because we were giving countries like Russia and China and others the 
capacity to improve the lethality, the accuracy, and the capabilities 
of nuclear weapons systems through the exporting of technology that 
they were using to simulate tests, which they would not otherwise be 
able to do, and to upgrade the quality and accuracy of their missile 
delivery systems and weapons systems.
  This does not make good sense. Japan's export control policy is more 
restrictive than our policy. The President came into office after a 
campaign which involved a lot of discussion about changes in the world 
security situation. We all rejoiced in the past two administrations 
when so much progress was made in terms of reducing the threat to the 
security of the United States because of the changes going on in the 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
  The fact is, that we were able to relax somewhat when those weapons 
systems were no longer targeted at us. But the fact remains that there 
is a tremendous potential threat, not only in Russia but some of the 
other states of the former Soviet Union for the development at some 
future date of an attitude that may put our security relationship at 
greater risk than it is today. And so we do have an interest in 
refraining from doing those things ourselves that end up unwittingly or 
carelessly investing in others the capability to develop modern, more 
lethal, and more dangerous weapons systems that could threaten our 
security interests.

  One other aspect of this is that part of our hearings have been 
involving the sale of weapons systems by countries like Russia and 
China. We had a whole series of witnesses come before our committee 
talking about this as a problem now, selling missiles, for example, to 
Iran, selling nuclear weapons technology to countries like India and 
Pakistan and others.
  But we see emerging around the world a new capacity on the part of 
many of these countries that we do not trust at all to have those kinds 
of systems that can inflict great damage, destroy assets that we have, 
and people, troops that we have in the Middle East or in South Korea, 
sailors who are on ships around the world who are now vulnerable to 
cruise missiles in the Mediterranean that we never had to worry about 
before because of this proliferation of missiles and technologies and 
weapons systems.
  So that is the big issue here. So that is why we have suggested that 
the administration's new policy--when they came into office they said 
we are going to open up and take the controls off of our exports so we 
can take advantage of the new security situation around the world, let 
our businesses enjoy a more relaxed atmosphere. That is all fine. But 
what we have learned in the last 18 months of this new policy--it was 
put into place in October 1995--the new policy has resulted in 
supercomputers coming into the possession of the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences which has a component that is involved in the modernization of 
the Chinese nuclear weapons program and systems. They now have seven 
supercomputers that came from the United States that they are using, 
they potentially are using, to develop a more modern weapons capability 
in nuclear weapons.
  The Russian chief of atomic energy boasted recently that his 
operation, the group of people he has under his control in his 
laboratories--Chelyabinsk 20 and Arzamas 16--these are locations where 
they do work on nuclear weapons systems in Russia that they now have a 
supercomputer capability previously unknown, compliments of the United 
States.
  This is a sad state of affairs because of a policy that is much more 
relaxed now. And I want to describe the details of it. That is why we 
have these 90 minutes reserved here so Senators will understand how 
serious a threat this is and what it means in practical terms.
  We have seen the administration develop this new policy that 
identifies countries in categories. They call it a four-tier system.
  Tier 1 countries are our best friends, NATO Allies. There are no 
restrictions. Tier 2 are those countries where it is more lenient 
still. Tier 3 and Tier 4. Tier 4, there is a complete embargo on the 
exporting of computer technology of all capability. You cannot sell 
computers under our new system to these Tier 4 countries. They are 
Iran, Libya, North Korea, Cuba, a couple of others.
  Tier 3 are those countries where, depending upon the capability of 
the computer, there are restrictions. There are no restrictions for the 
PCs, the personal computers, no restrictions. But when you get up into 
these high-end computer systems there are restrictions, you have to get 
an export license from the Department of Commerce. And the way you 
decide whether you need a license or not is to decide if the end use of 
the computer is going to be for a military purpose or a civilian 
purpose or if the user is a military entity or a civilian entity.

[[Page S7133]]

  The problem with the administration's policy is the Commerce 
Department does not tell our exporters whether the end use or the user 
is military or civilian. They leave it up to our exporter to find that 
out for themselves. That is the problem. That is what this amendment is 
about. We are trying to change one part of this policy to require the 
Federal Government to approve the sale--in the case of these countries 
in Tier 3, China, Russia, and a number of others--where the potential 
for use of this technology for military purposes has become so apparent 
and real.
  Now, I am not suggesting that our computer companies are carelessly 
and negligently and wholesale selling these high-end computers, these 
advanced computers, without careful analysis of who their customers 
are. Some of them are making a very conscientious effort to ensure 
that. But what they cannot do and they do not have the capacity to 
decide, that in the reality of this new situation there are front 
companies being developed--in the case of China, for example, in Hong 
Kong and maybe other places, as well, and I cannot discuss all of this 
because some of it is classified--but there are companies that have 
been established, whether by governments or government-related 
industries, who are able now to purchase U.S. computers because they 
are a civilian company, and then turn around and sell it to a company 
that is affiliated with one of these governments. That is what has 
happened, apparently.
  So do we want to continue to leave to the capabilities of a computer 
exporter the responsibility of making these determinations, by 
understanding what is a front company and what is not? They do not have 
the resource to do that. Our intelligence community, however, and the 
resources of our Federal Government are much more nearly able to make 
this kind of determination.
  Under Secretary Reinsch at Commerce talked about this policy at 
hearings in our committee, and you could tell that Commerce realized 
that changes had to be made in the way they were monitoring and 
supervising and implementing this new policy. After our hearing, they 
started making changes. They started putting out a list, for example, 
of entities around the world that they think are suspicious enough or 
they have evidence enough so they can say you cannot tell this entity 
or that entity in these Tier 3 countries because we know that puts at 
risk the potential use of this technology for nuclear weapons purpose 
or other weapons of mass destruction purpose. So they are making some 
changes. The fact is they left a lot of things off the list, they left 
a lot of entities off the list that we know in the past have purchased 
or wound up having these technologies.
  So it creates a situation where a change needs to be made right now. 
This is the change that we think is best. We are pleased to have the 
cosponsorship on this amendment of distinguished leaders in the area of 
proliferation here in the Senate. Senator Thurmond, who is chairman of 
the Armed Services Committee, supports our amendment. Senator Warner 
supports our amendment. Senator Glenn, who has previously served as 
chairman of this proliferation subcommittee and chairman of the full 
Committee on Governmental Affairs, and been a leader in this effort his 
entire career in the Senate, and he announced yesterday--and put a 
statement in the Record, which we invite Senators to look at--that he 
is supporting this amendment. Senator Durbin of Illinois was in the 
hearing and has taken an active role in trying to understand and deal 
with this emerging problem. It has emerged full-blown into one of the 
most serious threats to our Nation's security, and it has been done 
because of the way this policy has played out and the way the problem 
has increased. So we think that Senators ought to look carefully at 
this.
  Let me just say this chart tries to explain how a small area of the 
computer industry and the hardware that are involved are affected by 
this amendment. The diagonal lines here that say Chelyabinsk-70 and 
Arzamas-16 are nuclear weapon labs in the Soviet Union, and the Chinese 
Academy of Sciences that we know wound up with United States computers 
that can be used now throughout China for the purpose of developing new 
modern weapons of mass destruction. This represents numbers of total 
computers, 6.34 percent of the total U.S. computer export markets 
affected, and targeted only those computers going to those Tier 3 
countries with lethality or capability of 2,000 MTOPS to 7,000 MTOPS. 
These are millions of theoretical operations per second. That is how 
you measure the capability or speed of computation of computers. That 
is the way the Commerce Department has broken this down and divided up 
these up so that they reflect the capabilities of these computers. A PC 
has a capability of 250 MTOPS. We are talking about advanced computers, 
very expensive, and, of course, the computer industry is competing with 
each other to make these sales.
  This is another point: If you were running a big computer company--
IBM, Cray computer, whatever the names are--you do not want to have to 
go to the Secretary of Commerce and tell them you are thinking about 
making a sale or you have a customer on your screen that you think you 
can sell a big, heavy-duty, new, modern, expensive computer to, you do 
not want to tell anybody about it. If you are a salesman, you do not 
want that word out on the street. You do not want somebody at Commerce 
looking into it and asking a bunch of questions of you. You would like 
to go in and make the sale. If the customer is ready to buy your 
computer, you want to go in, sign the deal, and make the sale. Of 
course, you have a responsibility under the new policy to satisfy 
yourself about who the end user is, what the end-use purpose is, and so 
you hurry to get that done. No matter how conscientious you are, you 
might not do as good a job with that, particularly if you have a 
competitor who is trying to make the same sale.

  So we are in a situation where the competition of the U.S. market and 
economic system is working against our interests in protecting our 
national security and maybe taking a little bit more time and 
understanding what the potential is for this sale in terms of coming 
back at us in a new, advanced missile that has capabilities never 
before possible because of U.S. computer manufacturers selling in these 
markets to the countries that have the money to buy them. You are 
talking about the big countries. I am particularly concerned about 
Russia and China, specifically. We are developing, we hope, better 
relationships with both countries. We are working to improve our 
relationships around the world, make this a more stable, safer, 
peaceful world. That effort has to continue.
  What we are doing today, in calling it to the attention of the Senate 
today, is not at all designed to sour or make that process more 
difficult, but we have to recognize that this is still a dangerous 
relationship in many respects. These are the countries that have the 
greatest capability in the world today, and past attitudes among some 
in those countries that do not have our interests at heart, do not have 
our security uppermost in their mind, who may be capable of diverting 
some of these technologies for uses such as the development of new 
generations of weapons of mass destruction which not only they but some 
of their friends end up with in the due course of business.
  I have gotten calls and we have had visits from some in the computer 
industry saying this amendment is not necessary; it is not necessary to 
put this in the law. Why don't we just change the policy? Well, we 
can't change the policy. We are the Congress. The executive branch 
makes policies. They issue regulations.
  One of the Senators asked me in a formal colloquy yesterday why we 
needed to put this in a bill. Well, it is the only way that Congress 
has available to it to participate in the policymaking process in 
helping to do our part to ensure that our Nation's security is 
protected. We cannot issue a regulation, we cannot modify a policy 
other than doing it the way we are doing it right now.
  Now, the Senator from Minnesota, who is my good friend, has an 
alternative. He wants to do things other than change the policy. He 
wants to ask GAO to investigate it. We are already having GAO 
investigate this and gather more information. We are continuing to 
discuss with GAO other areas where we might get information

[[Page S7134]]

that will be more helpful to the Congress in understanding what our 
options are. He suggests that Commerce ought to publish a list of 
prohibited purchasers. That list is good for as long as the ink is 
drying, but no further. What if a change occurs and they have not 
gotten a new list out with modifications, and you see nobody is on the 
list with the name of a company that you have been contacted by and you 
make the sale or you try to make the sale, and you decide this is a 
civilian company. There was nobody in uniform who came to see you, so 
your assumption is that it is a civilian. Well, the names change, these 
identities change, the purposes of companies change, the contacts and 
relationships of companies, particularly in this part of the world we 
are talking about, can change.

  So you are going to invite them to start changing things. If they see 
they are on the list, they will probably dissolve their corporation if 
their purpose was to be a front for the People's Liberation Army, and 
some of these companies are. How is an innocent U.S. exporter to know? 
You cannot have all these agents and assets to detect this kind of 
thing on the payroll of the company. But the U.S. Government has 
resources, and they have a better opportunity to make these 
determinations.
  What we are simply saying is--not as the Senator from Minnesota wants 
us to do, which is nothing. His amendment just absolutely guts the 
effort to change the policy. It says there will be no change in policy 
as we are suggesting here. There will be no change. We will leave it up 
to the Commerce Department to improve its policy by making a list, and 
we will ask the GAO to look into this more. That is not good enough. I 
am hoping the Senate will vote down the Grams amendment and support the 
Cochran-Durbin amendment.
  The cosponsors, I hope Senators will consider, who are on this bill 
right now, and I do not have a last count, but we are well into the 
double digits. Around 20 Senators have cosponsored this amendment. It 
is a strong statement of support for change that is needed now to 
protect our Nation's security. If we fool around and argue about this 
and are mealymouthed and don't want to hurt anybody's feelings or scare 
any of the computer companies, they don't want to get Congress to agree 
on any sale and they want to use their best efforts--I am not 
suggesting they don't, but they don't have the capacity, they don't 
have the expertise, they don't have the reach, the broad reach of the 
U.S. Government and its intelligence community to make these 
determinations.
  So for these few computers with MTOPS between 2,000 and 7,000, for 
these few countries in tier 3, we are suggesting that any sale has to 
be first approved by the Commerce Department to ensure that the end use 
is civilian and that the end user is civilian and not military. That is 
all this is. Every other computer sale and administration policy can 
continue without any new restraint whatever.
  I am hopeful the Senate will review this situation carefully, Mr. 
President.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GRAMS. Mr. President, I rise to continue the debate this morning 
on the Grams-Boxer amendment to the Cochran-Durbin amendment. I urge my 
colleagues today to support what I believe is a very reasonable 
compromise to a very controversial issue.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senators D'Amato, Bond, 
Gregg, and Feinstein be added as cosponsors to this amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. GRAMS. Mr. President, I understand that there is a lot of concern 
in this body about United States computer sales being diverted for 
military use to either China or Russia. None of us wants that to occur. 
But we have to consider whether the Cochran amendment solves the 
problem. I believe that it does not.
  The Cochran amendment would require export licenses for all midlevel 
computers. Now, these are not supercomputers, these are not high-end 
computers. You are going to hear that term, but they are not 
supercomputers. These are midlevel computers, and they are shipped to 
China, Russia, Israel, and 47 other countries. We talk about the Third 
Tier countries. They involve 51 nations, like Russia, China, India, 
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Romania, and the Baltic States. Some of 
our future NATO Allies could also be involved. Mr. President, export 
licenses do not solve end-user problems. These are diversions that 
would not have been caught during the export license procedure. Export 
licenses do require end-user certification, but if the end user chooses 
to ignore the agreement, or if the computer is stolen, that possibility 
will not be evident in the licensing process. In my judgment, the 
current system works.
  Just yesterday, Secretary of Defense Bill Cohen sent us a letter 
opposing the Cochran amendment. He said the current law and system can 
deal with unauthorized exports and diversions. This is from the 
department that has been very conservative on all export decontrol 
matters. Secretary Cohen further states that we should focus our 
controls on technology that can make a national security difference, 
not that which is widely available around the world and is obsolete.
  Yes, Mr. President, there have been three diversions, but that was 
out of 1,400 sales. But, no, this is not the right way to address those 
problems. The right way is to force the administration to publish as 
many military end users as possible and then to work with the industry 
to identify all military end users. We have been able to identify 
diversions through our capable intelligence sources. Mr. President, 
there is no evidence that there are dozens of computers out there used 
by military end users. It is just not there.
  Further, I don't believe that the industry irresponsibly ignores 
available information about military end users. They have too much at 
stake. A company which violates export control laws takes a very big 
risk. The penalties are prohibition of all exports for 20 years or 
more, 10 years in prison, and up to a $5,000 fine for each violation. 
This doesn't include the blemish that would remain on the company's 
reputation or the great difficulty that company would have in the 
future seeking an export license. No company, Mr. President, can afford 
that risk.
  What we would be doing here this morning is handing this midlevel 
computer business over to the Japanese and other allies. Now, again, I 
want to emphasize that these are midlevel computers, they are not 
supercomputers. Next year, they will be the kind of systems that we 
will be able to have in our offices here in the Senate, or what you 
could find in a small company or in a doctor's office. These are not 
the computers that are sought after for nuclear weapons production or 
design. Again, we are looking at midlevel computers, between 2,000 and 
7,000 MTOPS, which are widely available around the world.
  Supercomputers, which are sought after for weapons design, start at 
the 20,000 MTOPS level and go all the way up to 650,000 this year, and 
they will go beyond the 1 million MTOPS level next year. By the way, 
China already produces a computer at 13,000 MTOPS. No other country 
considers these computers to be anything but generally available and 
will step in to take over the business that the Cochran amendment will 
hand to them. The question is, is that what we want?
  Also, anyone can purchase upgrades, by the way, to raise a PC, a 
current PC, above the 2,000 MTOPS level. We can't control the box. We 
can't control the chips around the world that can be put in it. We 
can't control the upgrades. There is no way to control these low-level 
PC's under the 2,000 MTOPS threshold, again, since they are available 
in nearly every country in the world.
  Further, the chips that make up these computers are also available 
and produced around the world. They were decontrolled during the Bush 
administration. Our chip producers have markets throughout the world, 
and they need to maintain them to remain competitive. Chip producers 
cannot control who receives their end product.
  Also, how do you prohibit a foreign national from using a computer 
even above the 7,000 level here in the United States and taking the 
results back, or faxing it back?
  Our friend Jack Kemp has written to us also this week stating that 
the Cochran amendment would ``establish a policy that is destined to 
fail and

[[Page S7135]]

would hurt American computer manufacturers without protecting our 
national security. The American high-technology sector is critical to 
the future of this country and must be protected from overly intrusive 
Government restrictions.''
  I wish there was something we could do to effectively control some of 
these exports, but it is just not possible at these lower levels. We 
cannot convince our allies to reverse 2 years of their own decontrol. 
In fact, Europe has tabled a decontrol proposal at 10,000 MTOPS, which 
proves that they have no intention of even respecting our 7,000 level. 
We cannot pull all the PC's and upgrades off the retail shelves, and we 
cannot close our borders to prevent all foreign nationals from entering 
this country and using our computers.

  We must concentrate our resources on keeping computers above the 
7,000 level from reaching military end users; that's for sure. But I 
fear that an increased license burden in the administration would steer 
resources away from efforts to locate diversions and investigate them.
  Now, Mr. President, in an earlier statement, I also countered a claim 
that an export license requirement would not slow down these computer 
sales. I have heard that someone made the comment that an export 
license would take 10 days. Well, anyone who knows how the licensing 
process works knows that it can take many, many months to obtain one. 
This will only earn our industry a reputation as an unreliable 
supplier, and it will cost us sales and it will cost us many, many U.S. 
jobs. The administration admits that a computer license application 
averages 107 days to reach a decision. I have seen it take far longer. 
Even 107 days, by the way, is enough to convince the end user to go out 
and seek a buyer in another country.
  Since so many of the Tier 3 countries are emerging markets, we need 
to be in there early to maintain a foothold for future sales. When we 
hear about the 6.3 percent of sales to Tier 3 countries, that is 
misleading. It is in an area where the market is expanding rapidly. If 
we leave our companies out of those markets, they will not be there to 
compete in the future. They will not be there to provide sales and jobs 
for the United States.
  Another argument I have heard is that there is no foreign 
availability over 3,500 MTOPS. Well, last year, NEC of Japan tried to 
sell a supercomputer to the United States Government at a level between 
30,000 and 50,000 MTOPS. They match our speeds all the way to the top.
  Mr. President, I believe that all of us are proud of our computer 
industry, that our industry remains the state of the art in so many 
areas, particularly in the levels above 7,000. We have made progress to 
facilitate exports without compromising our national security, progress 
which began back in the Reagan and Bush administrations, but here is an 
effort today to reverse all of that progress.
  Our industry has to survive on exports, and it has to pursue 
commercial business with these 50 countries to remain competitive. All 
computer sales over the 7,000 MTOPS level do require license now. We 
have not sold any computers above that level. And, again, the 7,000 
MTOPS are not supercomputers--they are not--they are midlevel 
computers. We have not sold any computers above that level to Tier 3 
countries; nor do our allies, to my knowledge. However, we should not 
restrict the sales of these midlevel and, again, generally available 
computers to commercial end users. We should simply maintain the 
current licensing requirement for the questionable end users. I firmly 
believe that there will be improved cooperation between the Government 
and industry on end-user information, particularly those for Russia and 
China.
  Now, I also commend the Commerce Department for starting to publish 
information on end users and to examine all sales that are made to the 
Tier 3 countries within these computer speeds.
  The Grams-Boxer amendment requests the GAO to determine whether these 
sales affect our national security. That is very important. It will 
look into the issue of foreign availability. It will also require the 
publication of a military end-user list, and it requires Commerce to 
improve its assistance to the industry on identifying those military 
end users.
  There will be some that vote today solely to express their 
dissatisfaction with China's alleged military sales to our adversaries. 
Let me remind you once again that there is no evidence that U.S. 
computers were involved in any of those cases. I also urge you to look 
at the merits of this issue. Pure and simple, the Cochran amendment 
would hand the sales of midlevel computers over to the Japanese and the 
Europeans at the expense of an industry that we have sought to protect 
and to promote and an industry that we are proud of.
  As chairman of the International Finance Subcommittee of Banking, the 
committee that has jurisdiction over this issue, I strongly, this 
morning, urge my colleagues to vote for my substitute and let us 
continue this debate in the normal manner, through committee 
consideration. At the same time, the administration should step up its 
efforts to express to the Chinese and the Russians our grave concerns 
regarding efforts to divert commercial sales to military end users 
without knowledge of the United States seller.
  Mr. President, I appreciate the efforts of my colleague from 
Mississippi to address these diversions. I want to work with him in my 
role as chairman of the subcommittee of jurisdiction to ensure that the 
current system does work or on how we can improve it once we have 
better information regarding the extent of the problem.

  I urge the support of my colleagues for the Grams-Boxer substitute as 
a compromise to this very, very controversial issue. Thank you very 
much.
  Mr. DURBIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I am a cosponsor with the Senator from 
Mississippi, and he has allotted the remaining time to me for this 
debate.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois is recognized.
  Mr. DURBIN. Thank you, Mr. President. There is a quotation attributed 
to Vladimir Lenin. I am not sure he said it, but it has been repeated 
often enough that it is possible he did. It is illustrative of the 
challenge we face in this debate. It is reported that Lenin said: ``A 
capitalist will sell you the rope that you use to hang him.''
  The suggestion from this founder of communism was that countries like 
the United States with a passion for capitalism and sales will 
occasionally get too overheated and end up selling the very product 
that can be used against him. Lenin's quotation goes back almost 80 
years; yet, it is apropos of the debate today in 1997. We are talking 
about the sale of a supercomputer to a country that can use it against 
us. How should we take care to prevent that from happening? What 
safeguards should we establish?
  You have read in the newspapers over the last few years the sad 
commentary of people entrusted at the highest levels of Government in 
the United States with classified and secret information, with access 
to technology, who have literally betrayed the United States and have 
sold that information to one of our adversaries. Ultimately, many of 
them have been caught and prosecuted and have served time, as they 
should, for betraying their Nation and giving away something very 
critical to the defense of this country to one of our adversaries.
  At the basis of this debate is this same question: Are we giving 
away, through sales, a precious resource that can be used against us? 
Are we handing over a capability to a country that may not have the 
same interest or the best interest of the United States at heart?
  That is why Senator Cochran and I have offered this amendment. Let me 
say at the outset for those who are critical of the amendment, we are 
not saying that the United States cannot make sales of these 
supercomputers to any country, Tier 1, 2, or 3; but we are saying, if 
you are going to sell these supercomputers to one group of countries 
that we want to take care do not misuse them, then please come to the 
Government, come to the Department of Commerce and make certain that 
the party buying the computer in that country, whether it is China, 
Russia, or another Tier 3 country, is an end user or party that will 
use it for peaceful purposes.

[[Page S7136]]

  Is that some outrageous suggestion--that before we sell this great 
capability, this supercomputer capability, to some entity in China or 
Russia that we take care not to sell it to the wrong person? I think 
most Americans would say, ``Why would we have a Government, if you 
aren't going to do something that basic to protect us?'' Is there 
reason to be concerned about this?
  Think about what we are selling. One supercomputer that was sold to 
Russia increased their computer capability 10 times. We took our 
genius, our technology, put it up for sale, and they bought it. And 
with that purchase they not only bought the technology, they bought a 
new capability--I am sorry to report capability which can be used for 
negative reasons, for reasons inconsistent with American policy, and as 
easily for peaceful reasons.
  Some have said, ``Don't do the Cochran-Durbin amendment. It just 
involves too many sales. It would restrict too many supercomputer 
sales.''
  Senator Cochran made this point. When you look at the sales to Tier 3 
countries, which are the only countries affected by this amendment, 
there were 91 sales in the 15 months of new trade policy by the Clinton 
administration; 6.3 percent of the computers in question are at issue 
here. Is that too much to ask? That when we start to sell 6.3 percent 
of our computer sales to certain countries, we say, ``Pause. Hold back. 
Let's review and make sure that the entity buying them in the other 
country is a peaceful entity, that in fact it won't be used against the 
United States.''
  We have sold 47 supercomputers to China, another 20 to Hong Kong, and 
many to Russia as well. What have we learned about these sales?
  I am sorry to report that four silicon graphic machines that were 
sold to Russia are now being used at Russia's nuclear weapons labs; one 
silicon graphics machine in the Chinese Academy of Sciences, which on 
its face sounds harmless but it is a key part of China's nuclear 
weapons complex; one Sun Microsystems machine we sold, we learned last 
week, is now running in a Chinese military facility after being 
diverted from Hong Kong.
  What Senator Cochran and I are saying is, is it worth our effort and 
time to take care not to let these computers fall into the wrong hands? 
But, if you listen to the voices of business and the supercomputer 
industry, you would think that our suggestion was to stop sales of 
supercomputers. But it is not. In fact, it wouldn't affect 93 percent 
of the sales already, and for the other 6.3 percent all we are asking 
is for time for review.
  We received a letter in opposition to our amendment from the 
Secretary of Commerce, a man whom I admire very much. But I would have 
to say to the Department of Commerce and to the Department of Defense 
that it is not unreasonable for us to ask you to set up a mechanism to 
make sure these computers don't end up in the wrong hands.
  I have received a publication from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Not 
surprisingly they don't want any restrictions on this trade. They want 
U.S. companies to be able to sell whenever and to whomever they choose, 
and they don't want the restriction of the Cochran-Durbin amendment. 
But I would say to my colleagues that it is a little disingenuous for 
them to argue that if we do not allow the sale of supercomputers which 
can be misused against the United States that we endanger American 
jobs. There is something larger at stake than American jobs. What is at 
stake here is American security. I would think that every worker in the 
computer industry or outside would want to make certain that, No. 1, we 
provide for the common defense. If I recall, that is part of a document 
that all of us consider to be illustrative of the goals of America.
  Let's address this issue about whether or not the Cochran-Durbin 
amendment in going after the 2,000 MTOPS model is talking about a 
garden variety of PC's which people can pick up at the corner computer 
store and are today available in Senate offices. As one of my 
colleagues said, it is a common thing that shouldn't be restricted. 
From what we are told 10,000 MTOPS is not common to them. The computers 
that are being sold right now are at a level of 200 MTOPS or 250 MTOPS. 
And even assuming that this industry, which is burgeoning and 
increasing its capability dramatically, should continue to increase the 
capability of these computers, Senator Cochran and I estimate that it 
will be more than 4 years before they all reach the end of the MTOPS 
stage. At least until that time shouldn't we take care, be cautious, 
and be concerned about the danger of selling this capability? I think 
we should. I think it is a serious mistake for us to assume that if we 
do not sell these computers to our potential enemies some other country 
will.
  When we asked the Department of Commerce and the Department of 
Defense this question they said, ``Well, the only country likely to 
step in, if the United States doesn't sell the computers, is Japan.'' 
Incidentally, Japan has more restrictive export controls than the 
United States. So I wonder if we are really thinking very seriously 
about the potential ramifications.
  It is very shortsighted to celebrate the sale of a computer to a 
country overseas, to celebrate the jobs that are created, and to ignore 
the reality that that computer may give a potential enemy capability--
capability to manufacture, capability to test through computers nuclear 
weaponry, chemical weaponry, and biological weaponry. All of these 
things I think should be of great concern to all of us.
  With all due respect to my colleague, the Senator from Minnesota, I 
would say that his amendment does little to address the core problem 
here. To call for a study? Well, we have been at this for 15 months. If 
you want to know what has happened, we can give you the statistics. We 
can tell you what has occurred in terms of the sales actually made to 
China, to Russia, and through Hong Kong back to China. We know things 
have happened that we never wanted to happen. The idea that we can 
somehow evaluate this and then let those know who are interested really 
strikes me as a very weak approach.
  Let me just say that the bottom line is that I know industry is in 
the business of selling. I think our Government and the Senate should 
be in the interest of not only encouraging sales but encouraging 
responsible sales.
  When Senator Cochran and I come forward and say that for 6.3 percent 
of computers we want to make certain there is a review, that the end 
users cannot use that technology against us, I think that is a 
reasonable request.
  I sat through the hearing. I wish some of my colleagues who oppose 
this amendment could have sat through it as well. I think they would 
have come away with the same impression that I did. The current liberal 
trade policy of supercomputers is going to create a situation which 
could one day come back and haunt America. We are giving to those in 
China, Russia, and other countries capabilities which we have worked 
hard to create and capabilities which unfortunately they may misuse.
  We spend so much time in this body discussing the proliferation of 
weapons. We watch every move that the People's Republic of China makes 
for fear that they are proliferating these weapons around the world. We 
have classified and unclassified briefings on the subject. And when it 
comes to the sale of hardware and technology, we step aside and say it 
is another story. It is not. It is the same story. It is the same 
concern, and should be expressed as such.
  I hope my colleagues will take a hard look at this. It is not often 
that I break with the Clinton administration on foreign policy. But I 
think Senator Cochran is right. I think this policy should be subject 
to thorough review, and I think his amendment, which I am happy to 
cosponsor, is a step in the direction to make sure that we don't turn 
loose to the world supercomputer technology and one day come to regret 
it.
  I reserve the remainder of my time.
  Mr. GRAMS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. GRAMS. I yield time to my colleague from California who is also a 
cosponsor of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California.
  Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, thank you, very much.
  Mr. President, will you tell me when I have used 10 minutes? Then I 
will wrap it up because I know the Senator from Missouri is waiting. We 
are very proud that he is here to speak in behalf

[[Page S7137]]

of the Grams-Boxer amendment. I am also proud to say that Senator 
Daschle, the Democratic leader has endorsed the Grams-Boxer amendment.
  Mr. President, my colleague from Illinois started off his argument by 
quoting Lenin. He said Lenin said that ``The capitalist will sell you 
the rope that you need to hang him.'' I never agreed with Lenin, and I 
don't agree now.
  But, in addition, I really do believe that the Cochran amendment, as 
drafted, amounts to us hanging ourselves. What do I mean by this? I do 
not believe the Cochran amendment does anything to protect our national 
security. Rather, it harms it, I believe, a very substantial way, our 
international competitiveness in an industry that is leading America 
into prosperous times.
  This is a view that is shared by Defense Secretary William Cohen, by 
Commerce Secretary William Daley, and our National Security Adviser, 
Sandy Berger. This bipartisan team has told us very directly that the 
Cochran amendment is harmful. I truly hope our colleagues will take a 
deep breath, step back and review these letters.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that letters from the 
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Commerce, and the National 
Security Adviser be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                     The Secretary of Defense,

                                     Washington, DC, July 9, 1997.
     Hon. Trent Lott,
     Majority Leader, U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Majority Leader. I am writing to express my 
     opposition to the Cochran-Durbin and Spence-Dellums 
     amendments to the Fiscal Year 1998 Defense Authorization Act 
     regarding supercomputer export controls.
       While I understand the concerns that motivated these 
     amendments, I believe they are unnecessary and would 
     undermine the flexibility that we need to adapt to changing 
     security requirements and technology trends. I am a strong 
     advocate for effective export controls. To be most effective, 
     we must focus our limited export control resources on the 
     export of goods and technologies that can make a significant 
     difference for national security and nonproliferation 
     reasons. Therefore, in order to best serve our security 
     interests, we need to maintain a system that allows us to 
     adjust our controls when technology advances and when 
     technology becomes widely available. Putting specific control 
     levels into statute is not an appropriate means to meet these 
     often fast-changing challenges.
       We have a system and adequate authority under current law 
     that can deal appropriately with unauthorized exports and 
     diversions. In this regard, the Administration is 
     aggressively and intensively addressing recently reported 
     unauthorized computer shipments to Russia and China, using 
     the full range of law enforcement and diplomatic tools 
     available.
       We remain committed to working with Congress to address 
     these important matters in a manner that maintains the 
     flexibility we need to preserve our security interests.
           Sincerely,
     Bill Cohen.
                                                                    ____



                                              The White House,

                                                       Washington,
     Hon. Trent Lott,
     The Senate,
     Washington, D.C.
       Dear Trent: I want to convey the Administration's strong 
     opposition to Cochran-Durbin and Spence-Dellums floor 
     amendments to the FY 1998 Defense Authorization Act 
     concerning export licensing requirements for high performance 
     computers.
       First, we believe it is a mistake to set these export 
     control limits in concrete by mandating them in statute, 
     particularly in view of the rapid growth in computing power 
     available worldwide. The amendment drastically undercuts our 
     flexibility to adjust controls to keep pace with 
     technological change--an extraordinarily rapid pace in the 
     highly competitive area of computers--and with our ongoing 
     evaluations of evolving security requirements.
       Second, there is no need to legislate a revision to this 
     policy. There are adequate administrative and enforcement 
     means under current law to address problems that arise with 
     U.S. computer exports. For example, with regard to the 
     reported unauthorized computer shipments to Russia, both the 
     Departments of Commerce and Justice are intensively 
     investigating the shipments, and we are actively addressing 
     the issue through diplomatic means. We also are issuing 
     additional administrative guidance to U.S. exporters 
     regarding impermissible end-users of proliferation concern. 
     The Department of Commerce is reviewing all computer exports 
     above 2,000 MTOPS (Millions of Theoretical Operations per 
     Second) made since January 1996, including those countries in 
     Tier Three such as China, India, and Israel. If problems are 
     identified with any of these shipments, we have the legal and 
     administrative means to address them and I can assure you we 
     will use that authority.
       The Administration remains willing to work with the 
     appropriate committees of the Congress to address concerns 
     regarding export controls.
           Sincerely,

                                             Samuel R. Berger,

                                    Assistant to the President for
     National Security Affairs.
                                                                    ____



                                    The Secretary of Commerce,

                                     Washington, DC, July 8, 1997.
     Hon. Trent Lott,
     Majority Leader, U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Lott: I am writing to urge you to oppose the 
     amendment to the Defense Authorization Act for 1998 authored 
     by Senator Cochran concerning exports of high performance 
     computers and support instead the alternative proposed by 
     Senator Grams, which would provide an objective assessment of 
     the effect of computer sales on our national security. The 
     Administration opposes the Cochran amendment because it 
     reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the role of 
     computer technology in the global marketplace and will 
     seriously hurt the competitiveness of the computer industry 
     without enhancing our national security.
       The Cochran amendment seeks to roll back the President's 
     decision in 1995 to permit the export of computers with a 
     performance capability of 2,000 to 7,000 Million Theoretical 
     Operators Per Second (MTOPS) to civilian end users in 50 
     countries, including China, Russia, India, Israel, and 
     Pakistan, without advance approval from the government. The 
     amendment would require individual government approval for 
     each such export. (The President's policy currently requires 
     individual approval for all exports of computers with a 
     performance capability above 7,000 MTOPS to all end-users in 
     those countries, as well as for all exports or re-exports 
     with a CTP greater than 2,000 MTOPS to military and 
     proliferation end-users in Computer Tier 3 countries as 
     defined in part 744 of the Export Administration 
     Regulations.)
       The President's decision was based on an extensive 
     government review of advancements in computer technology and 
     of our national security requirements that concluded (1) that 
     computers with capabilities in this range would become widely 
     available between 1995 and mid-1997, and (2) that critical 
     defense applications that justified export controls were 
     clustered at levels above 7,000 MTOPS. Information we have 
     acquired since the decision supports those conclusions and 
     suggests that, if anything, its forecast of foreign 
     availability of these computers was conservative. The 
     amendment would lock us into an export control policy that is 
     already outdated and which could only be changed by 
     legislation.
       The Cochran amendment's proposed control levels are 
     outdated because of the rapid pace of development of computer 
     technology and the widespread availability of the 
     semiconductors that run these machines. In late 1995, single 
     processors with a performance capability between 400 and 600 
     MTOPS were available, while today such processors are 
     commercially available at over 1000 MTOPS. At the beginning 
     of the Clinton Administration, machines performing at over 
     195 MTOPS were defined as ``supercomputers.'' Today, many 
     desktop PCs exceed that level. These computers are not 
     controlled for export and are manufactured in many countries 
     throughout the world. It is relatively simple to upgrade 
     existing machines to higher levels by adding processors. In 
     addition, connecting lower level PCs that are not controlled 
     for export--known as ``distributed parallel processing''--can 
     permit them to function with the capability of a single 
     larger machine.
       Attempting to stop the spread of computers to selected 
     countries at the Cochran amendment levels would be 
     exceptionally difficult and not the best use of our 
     nonproliferation resources. We can control proliferation of 
     weapons of mass destruction more effectively by concentrating 
     our resources on ``choke point'' goods and technologies--
     those items without which a weapon cannot be built or 
     delivered. Those items, by virtue of their specialized use, 
     often have a limited number of producers and can be 
     effectively controlled through multilateral agreements. Such 
     items also can be controlled through unilateral action if 
     necessary.
       At the same time, I want to make clear that the Department 
     of Commerce takes violations of our export control law and 
     regulations very seriously and is prosecuting them 
     aggressively. We have sufficient authority in current law to 
     do that and are also taking a number of steps to help 
     industry better meet its responsibilities. The Bureau of 
     Export Administration (BXA) is reviewing all computer exports 
     in the 2,000-7,000 MTOPS category; where there are concerns, 
     BXA has initiated investigations; where investigations show 
     that a U.S. law may have been broken, BXA has promptly 
     referred the matter to a U.S. Attorney's office for 
     prosecution; BXA has published the names of organizations and 
     other entities involved in activities of proliferation 
     concern (such as nuclear proliferation) to whom dual use 
     exports will require a license; and BXA is re-doubling 
     efforts to educate companies on their obligations to know 
     their customers.
       I hope you will vote against the Cochran amendment and for 
     the Grams substitute. If you have questions about the 
     technology or

[[Page S7138]]

     our policy, I would be delighted to arrange a briefing for 
     you.
           Sincerely,
                                                 William M. Daley.

  Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, let me share with my colleagues part of 
the letter the Secretary of Defense has written in opposition to the 
Cochran-Durbin amendment and the Spence-Dellums amendment. Secretary 
Cohen says, ``I believe they are unnecessary and would undermine the 
flexibility that we need to adapt to the changing security requirements 
and technology trends.'' He goes on to say, ``We have a system and 
adequate authority under current law that can deal appropriately with 
unauthorized exports and diversions.''
  The Secretary of Commerce is very strong on this point. He says the 
Cochran amendment's proposed control levels are outdated because of the 
rapid pace of development of computer technology, and the widespread 
availability of the semiconductors required to run those machines.
  From the National Security Adviser, Samuel Berger, we hear this. ``We 
[referring to the Administration] believe it is a mistake to set these 
export control limits in concrete by mandating amendment of statutes, 
particularly in view of the rapid growth in computing power available 
worldwide.''
  He continues, ``[the Cochran amendment] drastically undercuts our 
flexibility to adjust controls to keep pace with technological change * 
* *.''
  I think what we see here in this debate is the bipartisan effort here 
to ask our colleagues in the Senate to really look at the Cochran 
amendment and to realize that it will really simply hurt us.
  It reminds me of someone who wakes up in the morning feeling great, 
everything is going well, and then they just knock themselves in the 
face, knock themselves out. For what reason? There is absolutely no 
reason.
  There is no reason to put these controls back on these midlevel 
computers. The current policy that is in place did not occur in a 
vacuum. The decision to decontrol was based on the collective wisdom 
and judgment of the Department of Commerce, the Department of Defense, 
the State Department, intelligence agencies, and the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency. And the decision to decontrol the chips, that run 
the computers, was made by the Bush administration. Why were those 
decisions made? They were made because computers in the 2,000 through 
7,000 MTOPS ranges are mid-level computers that are widely available. 
They are not supercomputers.
  Let me repeat this because I know there is a lot of confusion on this 
issue. Computers in the 2,000 MTOPS through 7,000 MTOPS range are not 
supercomputers. In fact, many computer servers will top the 2,000 MTOPS 
threshold next year.
  A server is the central computer in an office, and it holds 
information which all of the other computers in the office can access. 
It is expected that next year a number of law firms, distribution 
centers, dentist's offices, doctor's offices, car dealers, police 
departments, and even congressional offices will be using servers at 
the 2,000 MTOPS level. Yet, if the Cochran-Durbin amendment were 
adopted, we would reimpose export controls on computers that we may be 
using right here in the Senate next year.
  Technology is advancing, as Secretary Cohen noted. It is being 
developed and is moving forward at a very rapid pace, not only in this 
country, but in other countries as well. We cannot stop it, nor can we 
slow it down.
  So it seems to me, Mr. President, our export policy should move 
forward, to keep pace with technology rather than move backward. By 
reimposing export controls on midlevel computers, as called for in the 
Cochran amendment, we would in fact, however, be moving backward. 
Moving backward, Mr. President, without a clear national security 
rationale for so doing. That is not coming from Senator Boxer or 
Senator Grams or Senator Bond. It is coming from Secretary of Defense 
William Cohen. It is coming from Samuel Berger, the National Security 
Adviser.
  Our goal as policymakers should be to establish export policies which 
are efficient, effective and competitive while also ensuring that our 
national security objectives are maintained. Current law achieves that 
objective.
  Does this mean we should allow companies to sell any computer at any 
level to any country notwithstanding our national security interests? 
Of course not. Our national security interests are paramount. They are 
paramount. Our export policies absolutely must ensure that our foreign 
policy and security objectives, particularly as they relate to 
nonproliferation and counterterrorism, are maintained.
  The Cochran-Durbin amendment, however, restricts our export 
competitiveness without furthering our national security objectives. 
Let me explain why the Cochran-Durbin amendment will not further our 
national security objectives.
  First, the independent study conducted in 1995 concluded that exports 
of computers in the 2,000 to 7,000 range, destined for civilian use, 
posed no national security risk. The Cochran amendment, however, would 
severely restrict the sale of these computers to foreign commercial 
users because, as my colleague Senator Grams has so clearly stated, it 
takes an average of 107 days for the appropriate agencies--Commerce, 
Defense, State, and others--to issue export licenses on these mid-level 
computers. to buy a midlevel computer if you were a person who went 
into the store in, let us say, a city in Israel; that is one of the 
Tier 3 countries that would be impacted here.
  Let me pose a question, and I think anyone can answer it. If you were 
a businessman in, let us say, Israel, that is one of the Tier 3 
countries that would be impacted under the Cochran amendment, and 
wanted to purchase a computer from a United States manufacturer, but 
you were told that the United States manufacturer from whom you wanted 
to purchase the computer would have to wait an average of 107 days to 
get an export license to ship the computer, would you purchase that 
computer from the United States manufacturer, or would you opt to 
purchase a similar computer from a Japanese manufacturer? Clearly, the 
answer is that you would purchase from the Japanese manufacturer and 
not the American manufacturer.
  Now, if there was any national security reason for this, I would be 
standing here arguing for it. But I do not see what national security 
objective is furthered when an Israeli dentist cannot go buy a computer 
for his office. I frankly do not see it. Second, we also know that 
sophisticated advanced nuclear weaponry design is not conducted on 
midlevel computers in the 2,000 through 7,000 range. And again, as my 
colleague Senator Grams, has clearly stated, the computers are just 
boxes. It is the chip inside the computer which makes the difference, 
and those chips were decontrolled under the Bush administration.
  Third, and I alluded to this earlier, we know the Japanese make these 
computers. We also know companies in France, Taiwan, the United 
Kingdom, and Germany all manufacture computers in the 2,000 through 
7,000 MTOPS range.
  And how about this? China is producing computers at the 13,000 MTOPS 
level, far above the level which the Cochran amendment seeks to 
control.
  So what are we doing here? We are hurting one of the most robust and 
important industries in our country, and there is no reason to do it. 
We cannot control the uncontrollable. If we were the only ones in the 
world that made these computers, this debate would be worth having, but 
we are not.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair will inform the Senator from 
California that she has now consumed 10 minutes.
  Mrs. BOXER. I thank the Chair. Will you tell me when I have used 3 
more minutes and then I will yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California.
  Mrs. BOXER. So we cannot turn back the hands of time. All of those 
countries make these computers already. We are hurting ourselves for no 
rational purpose.
  Finally, in analyzing this issue, I think it is also important to 
consider whether we as Senators have the expertise to determine what 
makes a supercomputer. I really believe we do not have that expertise 
among us. The Secretary of Defense has all of that expertise at his 
disposal. The National Security Adviser has all of that expertise at 
his disposal. The Secretary of Commerce has all of that expertise at 
his

[[Page S7139]]

disposal. And each opposes the Cochran amendment. So I do not think 
that any of us, individually or collectively, possess the knowledge to 
make that kind of determination. I think the fact that we have Senators 
referring to a 2,000 MTOPS computer as supercomputer evidences that 
fact. We know that 2,000 MTOP computers are not supercomputers because 
the experts have concluded otherwise.
  So I hope that my colleagues will join the Democratic leader and will 
join us and vote for the Grams-Boxer amendment. I think we should study 
this issue further and defer to the Secretary of Defense and to the 
intelligence agencies. I think that would set us on the appropriate 
course.
  I thank my colleague for his generosity, and I yield back to him.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. GRAMS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota.
  Mr. GRAMS. Mr. President, I thank my colleague from California for 
that excellent statement, and I appreciate her support on this 
amendment as well.
  Mr. President, I would like to now yield time to the Senator from 
Missouri [Mr. Bond] for whatever time he may consume.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Missouri.
  Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished manager of the 
amendment.
  As a former chairman of the Banking Subcommittee on International 
Finance, it is a pleasure to rise in support of the amendment offered 
by the current chair of that subcommittee and the current ranking 
member. We spent a lot of time in the International Finance 
Subcommittee trying to figure out what export controls work and what 
controls do not work.

  Let me tell you something, Mr. President. The one thing that we have 
learned is we do not spend enough time in dealing with the truly 
cutting-edge technology, the major supercomputers that need to be 
controlled. And why? Because we spend too much time on things that are 
readily available in Radio Shack in the United States or similar stores 
throughout the world. Why are we wasting our time trying to control 
something that any attache from an Embassy can walk into a store here 
in the United States and pick up and send home or can be found in a 
store in almost any major city in the world.
  Two years ago, the Clinton administration put to an end the 
requirement that a U.S. exporter of computer technology attain a 
Commerce Department license prior to selling computer equipment with a 
capacity greater than 2,000 MTOPS to any Third Tier nation--2,000. We 
need to keep these numbers in mind and, unfortunately, there are a lot 
of numbers going to be thrown around. We are talking about the range of 
2,000 to 7,000.
  Now, the administration arrived at this decision at the conclusion of 
a detailed study by a professor at Stanford University conducted in 
association with the Department of Defense and the Department of 
Commerce. These parties concluded that the marginal benefit to national 
security cannot justify requiring U.S. exporters of technology at this 
level to be licensed for sale to nonmilitary users. Acting on the 
conclusions of this very credible source and with the concurrence of 
the Defense and Commerce Departments, the administration rolled back 
the regulatory requirement that the first-degree amendment of the 
distinguished Senators from Mississippi and Illinois would seek to 
reimpose. In spite of my great respect for my esteemed colleagues from 
Mississippi and Illinois, let me say that rolling back the decontrols 
is unwise and misdirected policy, and I hope that our colleagues will 
join us in supporting the second-degree amendment.
  The policy of the legislative change in the first-degree amendment 
quite simply cannot be policed, it cannot be enforced, it is 
ineffective, and it does little to contribute to our national security. 
I might add, ``harsh letter to follow.'' I think if you would take 
those four points--it cannot be policed, it cannot be enforced, it is 
ineffective, and does not contribute to our national security--it does 
harm our economic competitiveness. It does take away jobs from 
Americans.
  The question here is about computer technology, but it is also about 
computer chips. Dozens of computer chips with a typical capacity of 650 
MTOPS are available commercially all over the world--650 MTOPS. I 
happened to stop by the candy desk, and I picked up four pieces of 
candy. Each one of these could hold a computer chip wrapped in a couple 
of layers of protective shipping material. Four 650 MTOPS chips would 
give you the capacity of 2,600 MTOPS--600 MTOPS above the level. If 
these were four computer chips, that would give you more computing 
power than the minimum amount to be licensed in sales under this first-
degree amendment. I am told that anyone with the know-how, basic 
electronic know-how, can fashion these chips together in a computer 
with capacity that is far greater than that which would be regulated 
under this amendment.
  I cite this example to show that it is nearly impossible to prevent 
the transport of certain technology particularly when it can be carried 
out of the country in somebody's pocket. It is simply fruitless to 
attempt to control technology at this level through export control 
measures.

  Now, the proponents and my friend from Illinois have talked about 
sales of supercomputers to our adversaries. If that is what we were 
talking about, if we were talking truly about supercomputers, I would 
be on their side because I do not think we ought to be selling 
supercomputers. Supercomputers that do military work these days are 
20,000 MTOPS to 650,000 MTOPS. They are talking about computers 10 
times, 10 times the range that would be covered by this regulation.
  Now, the Senator from Illinois said that the servers we have in our 
offices are about 200 to 250 MTOPS. I just checked with the computer 
center, and the Pentium server that we have in our office to do such 
sophisticated things as handle the mail and try to get the split 
infinitives out of the letters my staff prepares for me and handle 
memoranda and keep the books in our office is a 1,500 MTOPS computer. 
That server is 1,500, just under the level that would be regulated. And 
we do the high-technology stuff like keep the mail and send e-mail 
messages. I have even learned how to use it. That is how simple it is.
  With little benefit to national security, the first-degree 
amendment's proponents are preparing to deliver a serious blow to the 
American computer industry. With very little to show for it, the 
advocates of this amendment are advocating the subjection of the entire 
computer industry to a cumbersome bureaucratic process and a 
significant regulatory burden. Our competitors certainly will not be 
joining us in this effort. To the contrary. When they have concluded 
their celebration and breaking open the champagne bottles to celebrate 
their capture of this market, they will use this opportunity to leave 
our manufacturers in the dust. While perhaps our most dynamic industry 
is forced to comply with added regulatory obstacles, our competitors 
will be selling to our country's former customers.
  This amendment, Mr. President, is a blow because it is not regulating 
the sale of supercomputers. The technology we fear will be employed to 
upgrade weapons systems. The amendment actually regulates the sale of 
technology on the level of an office server or an office workstation, a 
tremendous market for our manufacturers. In a short period of time, 
this amendment will be regulating personal computers and we will be 
doing it by legislation that will have to be changed. You know how 
quickly we change things around here. Not that quickly.
  Many levels of technology far below that which pose national security 
risks will be subjected to this policy. Leadership in the computer 
industry is incredibly important to the prosperity of this country. We 
cannot afford to foreclose those markets. The disadvantage to our 
producers on the world market cannot be understated. The potential loss 
of U.S. jobs cannot be underestimated. And the risk to our leadership 
in the industry should not be jeopardized in this manner.
  I do not take lightly the reports of technology being diverted to 
unauthorized military users. This is a serious matter that requires our 
attention. That is why it is important to study

[[Page S7140]]

the 1995 decontrol and evaluate its effectiveness. I believe that we 
will find that it was unlikely that these transfers could have been 
prevented and that they are an inevitable byproduct of the world 
market. But, should it be concluded that decontrol is a threat, 
corrective measures can and should be taken in a prompt fashion. They 
can be taken administratively. However, to backtrack today with a 
legislative enactment would be a mistaken rush to judgment and risks 
placing our companies at a significant competitive disadvantage.

  It has already been pointed out, and I believe the Senator from 
California has offered into the Record the opposition of the Department 
of Commerce, the Department of Defense, the administration, and several 
of my colleagues. I note just one provision in the letter from our 
former colleague, the former Senator from Maine now the Secretary of 
Defense, Bill Cohen. He says in that letter:

       I am a strong advocate for effective export controls. To be 
     most effective, we must focus our limited export control 
     resources on the export of goods and technologies that can 
     make a significant difference for national security and 
     nonproliferation reasons.

  Mr. President, that is the gist of this whole thing. We should not be 
focusing our efforts on things that are readily available commercially. 
I agree with the Secretary of Defense that we ought to concentrate our 
efforts on the true supercomputers and make sure that those, not office 
workstations, are kept out of the hands of potential adversaries.
  We need to be selling to countries like Israel workstations and 
office things, personal computers, that would, if the first-degree 
amendment were adopted, be subject to a lengthy licensing process.
  Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to support the second-degree 
amendment of the chairman of the subcommittee, my friend from 
Minnesota. I thank the Chair and I yield the floor.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President I rise today in opposition to the 
Cochran/Durbin amendment to the Defense Authorization bill. The 
amendment would bar the sale of many types of computers, denying export 
opportunities for American firms, shifting high-technology sales to 
international competitors and flooding the Commerce Department with 
export applications for routine computer sales.
  Rather than impose new restrictions, the Senate should adopt a 
substitute amendment, offered by Senator Rod Grams of Minnesota and my 
California colleague Barbara Boxer. The Grams/Boxer substitute would:
  Require the Commerce Department to improve its licensing process and 
provide more information to exporters, assisting exporters to identify 
suspicious potential purchasers and avoid questionable sales.
  Require the General Accounting Office to study the impact of proposed 
export restrictions and the impact of foreign availability of computers 
on U.S. exports.
  Rather than restrict a broad range of computer exports, the Grams/
Boxer substitute amendment will help the administration and exporters 
distinguish between the potentially damaging sales that place us at 
risk and the routine computer sales.


           Export Controls Must Apply to the Right Computers

  Since the 1940's, the United States has controlled the export of 
dual-use technology, advanced technology which has both defense and 
nondefense applications. These restrictions are appropriate, because we 
all want to keep critical military technology out of the hands of 
potentially hostile militaries.
  However, technology advances rapidly. What was called a supercomputer 
only a few years ago, represents only routine computing power today. We 
cannot lock up U.S. exports and deny the administration the necessary 
flexibility to respond to evolving technology and worldwide 
competition.
  In 1993, the administration conducted a thorough review, involving 
the Departments of State, Defense, and Commerce, intelligence agencies 
and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The resulting U.S. policy 
permits the export of computers capable of 2,000 to 7,000 million 
theoretical operations per second [MTOPS] for Tier 3 countries. Among 
the more than 50 tier 3 countries are the countries of the former 
Soviet Union, Israel, Saudi Arabia, India, and China.
  Export restrictions must be based on an objective review of a 
computer's computing power and the computing needs of the potential 
computer application. As Defense Secretary Cohen stated, ``we need to 
maintain a system that allows us to adjust our controls when technology 
advances and when technology becomes widely available. Putting specific 
control levels into state is not an appropriate means to meet these 
often fast-changing challenges.''


               the cochran/durbin amendment is overbroad

  The Cochran/Durbin amendment would prohibit the export of computer of 
2,000 to 7,000 MTOPS from being exported to any Tier 3 country without 
an export license. The amendment is overbroad and will deny sales for 
U.S. companies and undermine our long-term national security needs.
  The amendment will restrict the sale and export of ordinary work 
stations and computers, not just supercomputers. Many low-level work 
stations currently exceed the 2,000 MTOPS level, and are found in 
offices, ranging from law firms to auto dealerships, across the 
country. By 1998, personal computers will exceed the 2,000 MTOPS level 
and would be subject to the amendment's licensing requirement. At a 
time when many have urged the complete abolition of the Commerce 
Department, the Cochran amendment will trigger a flood of export 
applications for new categories of common computers.


          The Restrictions Will Not Increase National Security

  The proposed amendment will not enhance U.S. national security. In 
1995, the administration's review concluded computers of 2,000 to 7,000 
MTOPS were widely available throughout the world and no longer 
considered to be a critical choke point for technologies used in the 
design, testing, or production of weapons of mass destruction.
  However, if U.S. firms are denied the sales, manufacturers in other 
countries are prepared to fill the void. Computers in the 2,000 to 
7,000 MTOPS range are manufactured in Japan, as well as 4 European 
companies. China reportedly produces a 13,000 MTOPS computer, while 
Russia and India also already produce computers more powerful than 
those the amendment would seek to control. The proposed restrictions 
will not keep technology out of the hands of countries posing national 
security concerns. The proposed restriction will be ineffective, 
denying many legitimate transactions for valid purposes, while allowing 
military testing proceeds through other means.


                    Exporters Need More Information

  Under current law, the manufacturers of computers are caught because 
the Commerce Department cannot release the name or circumstances when 
an export license application is rejected. The notice of the rejection 
of a license is only provided to the individual exporting applicant.
  As a result, when a U.S. exporter's application is rejected, the 
suspicious purchaser is encouraged to pursue alternative sellers and 
provide false information to support the sale. If potential U.S. 
exporter could receive more information, potential sales to suspicious 
purchasers could be detected earlier.


                               Conclusion

  I urge my colleagues to reject the Cochran amendment. The amendment 
will impose unnecessary restrictions on routine computer exports and 
undermine our national security in the long-run by shifting more sales 
to international competitors, many with weak or no export control laws 
at all.
  Rather than impose new restrictions, the administration should 
provide more information to potential exporters to assist in the 
identification of suspicious potential purchasers.
  The Grams/Boxer substitute will offer the appropriate incentives, 
while providing the administration with the authority to distinguish 
between sales that jeopardize national security and those that do not. 
While the administration needs flexibility to focus attention and 
resources on priority export applications, the Cochran amendment will 
divert attention and resources away from high-priority areas, truly 
placing our national security at risk. The Cochran amendment should be 
rejected.

[[Page S7141]]

  Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the Grams 
second-degree amendment. Today, America leads the world in the 
development and production of high performance computers and our 
commercial interests in promoting exports of these machines is strong. 
To restrict the export of computers at the level set by the Cochran 
amendment would unnecessarily hurt our companies without promoting our 
national security.
  I, like all other Senators, am concerned about how the export of 
advanced technology affects our national security. Recent press stories 
have made it all too clear that potential adversaries wish to acquire 
American technology to assist their military efforts. In addressing 
this issue, however, policymakers must strike a balance between the 
interests of American companies and what is required to ensure our 
national security. This is never an easy task and is made more 
difficult with the rapid ace of development in the computer industry. 
We need to be diligent in our efforts to try and match our policies to 
what is occurring in that industry.
  Supercomputers are integral to the development of advanced weapons 
development. Therefore, our policy which restricts the export of the 
most powerful computers is necessary and warranted. However, the 
performance level of the computers that the Cochran amendment seeks to 
control does not reach the extreme speeds of true supercomputers. The 
Cochran amendment imposes controls on computers operating at 2,000 to 
7,000 million theoretical operations per second [MTOPS].
  Today, a computer that operates at 2,000 MTOPS is considered a mid-
level workstation. The next generation of chips may allow Senators to 
have machines capable of that speed on their own desks by the end of 
next year. High performance computers start at 10,000 MTOPS and go up 
to 1,000,000 MTOPS. Supercomputers are machines that operate above 
20,000 MTOPS and require validated export licenses under the current 
policy.
  In 1995, an extensive Government review of computer technology 
determined that critical defense applications required machines that 
operated above the 7,000 MTOPS level. Further, it was determined that 
machines that operate below the 7,000 MTOPS level would soon become 
widely available from foreign suppliers. The administration then 
proposed its current policy, which has strong restrictions on the sale 
of computers that operate above the 7,000 MTOPS and lesser restrictions 
on machines that operate below that level. This decision was reviewed 
and approved by the Defense Department, the State Department, ACDA, and 
the intelligence agencies. Information gathered by our intelligence 
community since that decision was made support keeping the export 
policy in its current form.
  Today, companies in Germany, Italy, France, India, Japan, and Poland 
are selling computers that operate in the 2,000 to 7,000 MTOPS level. 
And the performance level of the computers foreign companies produce 
continues to grow. Even if availability of these machines were a 
legitimate risk to national security, which it is not, restrictions on 
American companies seeking to export computers in this range would have 
little or no effect on the ability of foreign militaries to acquire 
this technology.
  Further, simply placing license requirements on the sale of these 
computers would place American companies at an unfair disadvantage. We 
all know that sales of technology or any commodity depend on the speed 
of delivery. Foreign customers will not wait a week for an American 
company to receive a license if another vendor can deliver the same 
quality machine tomorrow.
  Critics of the current policy believe its implementation has allowed 
computers to be diverted to illegitimate end users. The Commerce 
Department has not informed companies what foreign customers should or 
should not receive this type of computers and places the burden on the 
companies to acquire this information. However, how well a policy is 
implemented does not necessarily reflect on the prudence of the policy. 
If there have been problems in how our current export policy is 
implemented, recent changes made by the administration and measures 
imposed by the Grams amendment should help fix them.
  I agree with Senator Grams that we should continue to evaluate our 
computer export policy and how foreign availability affects U.S. 
exports. We should also make it easier for companies to know which 
foreign companies, militaries, and nuclear end users should not receive 
our technology. I believe the current policy has been set at a level 
which both promotes American commercial interests and helps protect our 
national security. I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting the 
Grams amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Several Senators addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.
  Mr. COCHRAN. How much time remains on both sides, Mr. President?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair will advise the Senator from 
Mississippi that 8 minutes 53 seconds remain under his control of time, 
and 9 minutes 42 seconds remain under the control of the time of the 
Senator from Minnesota.
  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, does the distinguished Senator from South 
Carolina wish time on the amendment?
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Cochran, I ask 
unanimous consent that the Senator from Maine, Susan Collins, be added 
as a cosponsor of the Cochran amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Mississippi.
  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.
  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished chairman of the 
Armed Services Committee for his contribution to the understanding of 
this issue and for his cosponsorship personally of the amendment and 
his announcement that the distinguished Senator from Maine, Senator 
Collins, is now a cosponsor of the amendment. This indicates that we 
have a broad base of cosponsors for the Cochran amendment, which means, 
if you are for the Cochran amendment, you would vote against the Grams 
and Boxer substitute for the Cochran amendment, because their amendment 
undermines the effort to impose a change in the current policy to 
require simply that our Department of Commerce approve sales of 
computer technology and computers by U.S. firms to overseas customers 
that have a computing capability of between 2,000 MTOPS and 7,000 
MTOPS, if they are certain kinds of countries called Tier 3 countries, 
to ensure that they are not military users or that the computers will 
not be put to a military use.
  The problem with the current policy is that the Department of 
Commerce is leaving it up to the U.S. exporters to make this 
determination now. Some have gotten into trouble because some, like 
Silicon Graphics in California, are now under a grand jury 
investigation because of sales made to questionable users in violation 
of the current policy. The question is whether they knew or should have 
known that the end use was going to be military or the end user was 
going to be military; whether they exercised that degree of diligence 
required by the current policy.
  Do we want to continue that kind of policy that puts at risk all of 
our computer companies when engaged in these international sales? I say 
no. It is time to put the onus, not on the computer company trying to 
make a sale abroad, but on the Department of Commerce, which has the 
responsibility of administering its own policies. But they are shifting 
their burden to the exporter, away from the Government, and this is 
causing difficulty. It has resulted in seven very sophisticated, high-
end supercomputers being used now by the Chinese Academy of Sciences, 
an arm of which is involved in the modernization of the Chinese nuclear 
weapon program and capabilities. In Russia, the chairman of the 
equivalent to the Atomic Energy Commission there, boasted that they now 
have a supercomputer with a potential previously unknown, because of 
U.S. technology exports to Russia. That is the entity that modernizes 
and maintains the nuclear weapons of Russia.
  What we are unwittingly doing by carrying forward and going forward 
with this policy with no change, which is what the Grams amendment 
basically suggests, it says make a list, tell

[[Page S7142]]

everybody who they should not sell to--you cannot do that. You cannot 
possibly make a list and put down all the fronts for the People's 
Liberation Army or others who might be involved in either developing 
new weapons of mass destruction or exporting the technology for these 
weapons: North Korea, Iran, other countries and nation-states that we 
know now are developing more and more sophisticated and lethal weapons 
of mass destruction capability, with delivery systems. We know that is 
going on.
  Here we are providing the technology to do simulations that they 
cannot do now without our technology. They cannot buy this. They cannot 
buy this from any other country except the United States. And we are 
leaving it up to U.S. exporters, saying our policy depends upon the 
good intentions and the capabilities of our U.S. civilian companies to 
determine these end uses and end users, who they are, what they are 
going to do with the technology, whether or not they are going to 
transship it to some other entity.
  There are facts on the record, as a result of hearings held in our 
subcommittee that has been looking at proliferation issues all year, 
that are overwhelming and completely persuasive on this point. This 
policy ought to be changed. The only way Congress can influence change 
is by adopting a change, by doing so in this amendment. We cannot issue 
a regulation. We cannot make an administrative policy change here in 
the Senate. We can ask them to do it. We have already done that and it 
has not resulted in the change that is necessary. It is simply if you 
were a suspicious end user, we want the Department of Commerce to 
certify that it is OK to make that sale.

  The Senator from California correctly discusses whether or not some 
of our closest allies are going to be adversely affected by this 
amendment. Israel has been purchasing computer technology under 
existing policy with licenses from the Department of Commerce. That is 
going to continue. That is not going to change. There is not going to 
be any slowdown in the process if someone is a trusted ally or friend. 
We don't even require licenses for our NATO allies. They are Tier 1 
countries. But the Tier 3 countries--that includes China, Russia, and a 
lot of other countries--do have to have the approval of the Department 
of Commerce under our amendment if the computer capability is within a 
certain range.
  These are not PC's. The Senator from Missouri, and my dear friend, 
suggests that this is like the PC's on our desk, at our workstations in 
our offices. He is talking about the Pentium server, that is the 
network, the hardware for the entire network. I know he did not mean to 
misrepresent it, but you have to understand what he's talking about. He 
has acted like an attache walks into Radio Shack and buys one of these 
computers that has an MTOPS speed and capability that would be 
described in this amendment. That is not true. You cannot do that.
  First of all, an attache could not afford it. These are expensive. 
The fact is, we are talking about only 6.34 percent of the total 
supercomputer sales that would be affected by this amendment. Mr. 
President, 95 percent of all of the sales have been approved within 30 
days that do require licenses. The Senator from Minnesota said it is 
over 100 days you had to wait to get approval. That is not borne out by 
the facts, by the testimony before our subcommittee by the people at 
the Department of Commerce.
  So I am hopeful that Senators will think carefully about what we are 
trying to do. I know the computer companies are putting a lot of 
pressure on, sending everybody messages and phone calls and the rest. I 
would not want to have to go through another process. But we are 
talking about only such a small part of the market, a small part of 
those manufactured workstations and other large pieces of hardware that 
have the potential to be used to upgrade lethal weapons systems and 
missile systems to make them more accurate, to make them more lethal, 
to make them competitive with the U.S. arsenal that is designed to 
protect us. And we are going to put at risk our own system of national 
defense? We can't do that.
  Mr. President, I urge Senators to vote against the Grams-Boxer 
amendment and then vote for the Cochran-Durbin amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? The Senator from Minnesota.
  Mr. GRAMS. Mr. President, I inquire how much time is remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota has 9 minutes 42 
seconds remaining, the Senator from Mississippi has 25 seconds.
  Mr. GRAMS. Mr. President, I want to make one brief comment before I 
ask to yield time to my colleague from New York.
  I want to say our friend and colleague from Mississippi has a well-
intended amendment, but it is aimed at the wrong level. These are not 
supercomputers, as they continue to try to say. These are midlevel 
computers. If you are talking supercomputer, a low-end supercomputer 
starts at 20,000 MTOPS and goes now to 650,000, and next year it will 
be over a million; so these are not supercomputers.
  Mr. President, I now would like to yield up to 7 minutes to my friend 
from New York.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York is recognized to 
speak for up to 7 minutes.
  Mr. D'AMATO. Mr. President, let me first say there are very few 
colleagues for whom I have greater respect and who are more 
knowledgeable in the areas of national security than the distinguished 
senior Senator from Mississippi, Senator Cochran. Indeed, he raises a 
very valid and natural concern that we have with respect to nuclear 
proliferation and the ability to enhance systems by way of the 
computer, the supercomputer in particular, and the need for proper 
balance in terms of export controls. That has been something which the 
Banking Committee has had jurisdiction over and has grappled with over 
the years. So, while I am sympathetic to the concerns that are raised, 
I just have to think that the issues of computer sales to foreign 
countries, as Senator Cochran has made clear to the Senate, is one that 
is so important that it really deserves much more analysis and much 
more debate than can be allowed for this floor amendment.
  Indeed, as the chairman of the Banking Committee's International 
Finance Subcommittee, I believe that Senator Grams has offered an 
amendment that is worthy of our support, because what it would do, it 
would allow the entire Senate to ascertain, by way of the kind of 
comprehensive analysis that we need by the General Accounting Office as 
it relates to what security needs may be open at the present time, what 
concerns are related to the sales of the high MTOPS computers to Tier 3 
countries and what impact they may or may not have on this legislation 
that has been proposed.
  I think Senator Grams' amendment is the proper way to proceed, to 
give us an opportunity, not to just dive in after 45 minutes or 1 
hour's worth of debate. We need the careful scrutiny, the careful 
study, to ascertain is there an availability of these computers to such 
an extent that this really becomes a meaningless impediment to our own 
trade? Will there be other countries in Europe and other areas that 
will rush to fill the vacuum? That is what I have been told. That may 
not be correct, but let's ascertain, let's find out. That is what 
Senator Grams' second-degree amendment would accomplish.
  It seems to me that makes sense. It would require the Commerce 
Committee to publish a list of questionable military and nuclear end 
users, with certain exceptions when sources and methods would be 
jeopardized. That is what we have to know.
  Let me depart just for a moment, if I might. If we want to do 
something as it relates to nuclear proliferation, let's say to some of 
those countries who are looking to get most-favored-nation trading 
status, or continue it, that you cannot be exporting--when we know they 
are exporting--the kind of missile systems and delivery systems which 
China is today exporting.
  That becomes something of a controversy. Let's find out how many of 
my colleagues are going to be willing to stand up to the business 
interests who look the other way and don't look at our national 
security interests or don't look at the abuse of human rights and the 
crackdown on religious freedoms that take place now or the forced 
sterilization of people. That is

[[Page S7143]]

what is going on in China. They present, Mr. President, a very real and 
clear and present danger to the security of the world and to world 
peace by exporting to Iran and to other countries delivery systems and 
all kinds of enhancement of weapons systems which will endanger world 
peace.
  If we really want to do something, let's take that up, but to simply 
come forward at this point in time without the proper kind of 
analysis--again, Senator Grams should be commended because his second-
degree amendment would say, ``OK, let's make a detailed analysis,'' and 
not come down on the floor and raise this. I think this is what we have 
to do.
  So not only on a jurisdictional basis would I have problems 
supporting the Cochran amendment, but basically on the basis of fact. I 
don't think we should just raise jurisdiction and say, ``That's within 
my committee, and, therefore, I want it to come through my committee.'' 
I sometimes get upset about that. If it is good legislation, so what if 
it didn't come through the committee process properly, particularly 
when we are talking about matters of national security. So I don't just 
raise that, but it does need the kind of careful thought, careful 
analysis that Senator Grams' amendment calls for.
  For that reason, I hope that we support overwhelmingly this cautious 
approach to making analysis of whether or not the export of the MTOPS 
to Tier 3 countries should go through another process with Government 
bureaucrats analyzing and never coming to a decision. I think that 
would be a mistake.

  Again, let's take a look at China: $50 billion surplus in trade, and 
yet she does what she wants, and she claims she wants friendship with 
us. I think on the altar of the almighty dollar, we just continue 
business as usual. I am more concerned about saying to them, ``You 
can't be our friend on one hand, you can't be enjoying a $50 billion 
trade surplus with us and then have a half a billion dollar industry 
that your generals are running,'' and we say, ``Oh, no, don't rock the 
boat.''
  Do we really want to stop nuclear proliferation? Do we want to stop 
the export of deadly weapons systems? Let's do it when we have some 
clout, and we do have some clout. But I am afraid we will succumb to 
those who say, ``Oh, we can't do this, we'll lose a lot of jobs here in 
this country if we stand up to that kind of activity.''
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. GRAMS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Burns). The Senator from Minnesota.
  Mr. GRAMS. Mr. President, I yield another minute to my colleague from 
California and coauthor of this amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California is recognized.
  Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, I want to say to my colleague, it has been 
a pleasure working with him and his staff. I think that what we are 
offering here is a very wise alternative to an unwise policy. I am 
looking at the Tier 3 countries, and my colleague from Mississippi said 
there is no difference in what will happen to Israel under this 
amendment than under current law. It isn't true. Tier 3 includes 
Israel, Romania, who wants to join NATO, Latvia, and other countries. 
If a business wanted to buy a computer that fell in the 2,000 to 7,000 
MTOPS range, which we have already established is mid-level computer, 
and we are going to have them right here in the Congress next year, 
then that business would have to wait an average of 107 days.
  Mr. President, this Cochran amendment is kind of a ``Back to the 
Future'' amendment. It might have some application if it was offered 
many years ago, but it doesn't have any application now. I think the 
Grams-Boxer amendment, which has so much support from Secretary Cohen, 
from Sandy Berger, from Secretary Daley, from so many Senators on both 
sides of the aisle, I think that is the appropriate course to take. I 
really hope that our colleagues have listened, and I hope that the 
Grams-Boxer amendment prevails. I yield back to my colleague.
  Mr. GRAMS. Mr. President, how much time is remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota has 55 seconds, and 
the Senator from Mississippi has 25 seconds.
  Mr. GRAMS. Mr. President, in wrapping up the debate this morning, I 
want to, again, say that I believe the controls we have in place are 
working. We are taking a step backward if we approve the Cochran-Durbin 
amendment. The rest of the world is moving forward very fast. Anybody 
who has bought a computer in the last 2 years knows that technology has 
already passed them, and they have to look at a new system. But between 
the 2,000 and the 7,000 MTOPS level, computers are going to become so 
commonplace that any commercial industry or any office in this country 
will be able to buy them next year. These are well intended controls 
but, again, as I say, placed on the wrong levels. These are not 
supercomputers. These are not computers that countries would be looking 
for military end use. These are computers that are more for business 
and office use. I believe that putting any kind of restrictions or 
recontrolling these would be a step backward in our efforts to provide 
jobs and assistance.

  Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time.
  Mr. COCHRAN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.
  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, at the outset of the debate, I made a 
speech that lasted about 20 minutes. It is in the Record, so I am not 
going to make it again. I will try to make it in 25 seconds.
  We are limiting export controls in a very small area of lethal 
computer technology. Please vote against the Grams-Boxer weakening 
amendment and support the Cochran-Durbin-Thurmond-Glenn amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has expired. The question is on 
agreeing to the second-degree amendment No. 422. The yeas and nays have 
been ordered. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk called the roll.
  Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Maryland [Ms. Mikulski] is 
necessarily absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 72, nays 27, as follows:

                      Rollcall Vote No. 166 Leg.]

                                YEAS--72

     Akaka
     Allard
     Ashcroft
     Baucus
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Boxer
     Breaux
     Brownback
     Bryan
     Bumpers
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Cleland
     Conrad
     Craig
     D'Amato
     Daschle
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Enzi
     Faircloth
     Feinstein
     Frist
     Gorton
     Graham
     Gramm
     Grams
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Helms
     Hollings
     Hutchison
     Jeffords
     Johnson
     Kempthorne
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     McCain
     McConnell
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nickles
     Reed
     Reid
     Robb
     Rockefeller
     Roth
     Santorum
     Sarbanes
     Shelby
     Smith (OR)
     Thomas
     Torricelli
     Warner
     Wellstone
     Wyden

                                NAYS--27

     Abraham
     Burns
     Coats
     Cochran
     Collins
     Coverdell
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Durbin
     Feingold
     Ford
     Glenn
     Hutchinson
     Inhofe
     Inouye
     Kyl
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     Roberts
     Sessions
     Smith (NH)
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thompson
     Thurmond

                             NOT VOTING--1

       
     Mikulski
       
  The amendment (No. 422) was agreed to.
  Mr. THURMOND. I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. FORD. I move to lay it on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                     Amendment No. 420, As Amended

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to Cochran 
amendment numbered 420, as amended.
  The amendment (No. 420), as amended, was agreed to.
  Mr. COCHRAN. I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. THURMOND. I move to lay it on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at 1:15 
p.m. Senator Murray be recognized and that debate on the Murray 
amendment No. 593 be limited to 45 minutes, to be equally divided in 
the usual form, and following the conclusion or yielding back of time, 
the Senate proceed to

[[Page S7144]]

vote on or in relation to the Murray amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. THURMOND. I further ask unanimous consent that no amendments be 
in order to the Murray amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to proceed as in 
morning business for 10 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I thank the Chair.
  (The remarks of Mr. Roberts pertaining to the introduction of S. 1000 
are located in today's Record under ``Statements on Introduced Bills 
and Joint Resolutions.'')


                           Amendment No. 668

  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I call up amendment 668.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has that right. The amendment 
numbered 668 is now the pending question.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I offer this amendment on behalf of 
myself and Senator Harkin.
  Mr. President, let me begin by asking unanimous consent that letters 
from the Disabled American Veterans, the Paralyzed Veterans of America, 
and the Vietnam Veterans of America be printed in the Record in support 
of this amendment.
  There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                   Disabled American Veterans,

                                     Washington, DC, July 9, 1997.
     Hon. Paul David Wellstone,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Wellstone: On behalf of the more than one 
     million members of the Disabled American veterans (DAV), I 
     express our strong support for your efforts to provide 
     funding to enable Brookhaven National Laboratory to conduct 
     internal dose reconstruction of veterans exposed to ionizing 
     radiation (atomic veterans) and to transfer some $400 million 
     to the Department of veterans Affairs (VA) budget for health 
     care.
       The DAV believes that $16.959 billion is inadequate--by at 
     least $600 million--to enable VA to provide quality and 
     timely health care to veterans. Your amendment would greatly 
     enhance VA's ability to provide adequate health care to our 
     Nation's sick and disable veterans.
       Additionally, according to the VA, very few atomic veterans 
     or their survivors have been successful in establishing that 
     the veteran's disability, recognized as a ``radiogenic 
     disease,'' is the result of the veteran's exposure to 
     ionizing radiation in service. The main reason for the high 
     failure rate is due to the current, inadequate and inaccurate 
     method of reconstructing dose estimates which routinely 
     indicate minimal radiation exposure.
       Senator Wellstone, your amendment would ensure that 
     America's atomic veterans will have available to them Fission 
     Tracking Analysis, a more accurate method of dose 
     reconstruction. Surely, fairness and equity in the 
     adjudication of atomic veterans' claims is the very least 
     that our Nation owes to these brave veterans who were used to 
     advance our country's knowledge of the effects of ionizing 
     radiation, unbeknownst to them.
       Again, you have the full support of the more than one 
     million members of the DAV in your efforts to ensure that the 
     VA has adequate funding to care for America's sick and 
     disabled veterans and to ensure that atomic veterans are 
     provided with accurate internal dose reconstruction to 
     support their claims.
           Sincerely,
                                                  David W. Gorman,
     Executive Director.
                                                                    ____



                                Paralyzed Veterans of America,

                                     Washington, DC, July 9, 1997.
     Hon. Paul David Wellstone,
     U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Wellstone: On behalf of the members of 
     Paralyzed Veterans of America, please accept our full support 
     for your efforts to increase needed funding for health care 
     benefits and services provided by the Department of Veterans 
     Affairs (VA).
       As you well know, the proposed FY 1998 VA budget calls for 
     unprecedented reductions in current and proposed 
     appropriations for the health care system. The actual 
     appropriation request freezes VA discretionary funding at a 
     level far below current levels. The only relief given to VA 
     over that period of time comes from a very uncertain plan 
     allowing VA to keep fees and reimbursements from private 
     insurance companies to help cover increasing health care 
     costs. Even with this budget gimmick, VA hospitals will 
     remain seriously under funded next year and in future years 
     under the proposal.
       Again, we appreciate your efforts to correct this serious 
     funding shortfall, and urge all members of the Senate to 
     support your amendment.
           Sincerely yours,
                                              Gordon H. Mansfield,
     Executive Director.
                                                                    ____



                            Vietnam Veterans of America, Inc.,

                                     Washington, DC, July 9, 1997.
     Hon. Paul Wellstone,
     U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Wellstone: On behalf of Vietnam Veterans of 
     America (VVA), I want to thank you for your efforts to secure 
     additional funding for veterans medical care. VVA is pleased 
     to support your amendment to the DOD Authorization bill which 
     would transfer $400 million to VA medical care.
       As you know, the veterans community remains very concerned 
     about the impacts of discretionary spending cuts on VA 
     medical care and benefits processing. Both programs are in a 
     state of major transition, implementing significant reforms 
     and procedural improvements which will--in time--create 
     enhanced efficiencies. The Senate and House budget 
     reconciliation bills, as well as the appropriation bill 
     moving through the House right now and soon to be considered 
     in the Senate, are placing veterans health care in jeopardy 
     by depending upon VA's ability to collect insurance monies 
     for over $600 million over VA's FY 1998 health care budget. 
     This is a very tenuous plan, as the program is untested and 
     the targeted amount seems overly optimistic.
       As it currently stands, VA's FY 1998 budget offers the 
     veterans community no guarantee that the national commitment 
     to provide care to our disabled and low-income veterans will 
     be honored. Again, VVA appreciates your strong advocacy for 
     veterans programs and urges the Senate to adopt your 
     amendment. Veterans benefits, after all, are an ongoing cost 
     of our national defense.
           Sincerely,
                                                George C. Duggins,
                                               National President.

  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, these letters are extremely important. 
They are from three very fine veterans organizations: The DAV, the PVA, 
and the Vietnam Veterans of America. The reason they are concerned, 
and, for that matter, all of the veterans community is concerned, is 
that in the budget resolution what we ended up putting into effect was 
a cut in veterans health care benefits.
  Mr. President, the portion of those cuts that directly affect 
veterans health care is $400 million. What this amendment does is 
simply authorize the Secretary of Defense the ability to be able to 
transfer this $400 million into the veterans health care.
  Mr. President, let me just say to colleagues that this is a huge 
issue. I am positive that if my colleagues, Democrats and Republicans 
alike, get a chance to talk with the veterans organizations and 
veterans communities in their States, they will find out that people 
are really indignant about this because it was never clear--I don't 
think it was clear to any of us--that, in fact, we were voting for 
actual cuts, actual cuts in veterans health care.
  What this amendment does, it says, look, we have $2.6 billion in the 
Pentagon budget more than the Pentagon asked for; we can at least take 
a portion of this. And please remember, all this amendment does is give 
the Secretary of Defense the discretion or the authority to be able to 
transfer it. It is not a mandate. It seems very appropriate.
  Mr. President, it seems like this amendment that Senator Harkin and I 
have introduced is eminently reasonable because if you think about it, 
one of the huge concerns in the Veterans' Committee is very much linked 
to national defense. We are talking about men and women who have served 
our country. As we look at veterans health care and we project to the 
future, we want to make sure we do not end up sacrificing the quality 
of care for veterans.
  I know what I hear back in the State of Minnesota, first and 
foremost, we have now an increasing number of gulf war veterans who are 
in need of help. This is yet an additional challenge for the VA. This 
is an additional challenge for our country to get the care to these 
people.

  Mr. President, this amendment, again, just authorizes the Secretary 
of Defense to make this transfer of funding. These veterans were all 
about serving our country in defense of our country. If there ever was 
an opportunity to restore this funding for veterans health care, it is 
now. This Congress, whether it is this afternoon, or whether it is next 
week, or whether it is next month, is going to have to restore this 
funding. I don't think there was one Senator that was clear, when we 
passed this budget resolution, that we were actually directing $400 
million of cuts in veterans health care.
  I will just tell you that more and more and more of the gulf war 
veterans are going to be stepping forward in

[[Page S7145]]

your States, in our States, and they are going to be saying: We don't 
know what happened to us, but we do know that before we went and 
served, we could run 2 miles and we felt good, and now we can't walk a 
half mile, and we don't know what happened to us.
  Over and over again, we are seeing report after report that makes it 
crystal clear that the gulf war veterans have every reason in the world 
to be indignant about not getting information that they need to get 
from our Government and, more important, about their need to receive 
some care. So what in the world are we doing cutting $400 million in 
the veterans health care budget?
  In addition, Mr. President, let me simply point out that above and 
beyond the gulf war veterans, we have a situation where our veterans 
population is aging. More and more of our veterans are living to be 65 
years of age and over. More and more of our veterans are living to be 
85 years of age and over. And this is an additional strain.
  So, Mr. President, I want to point out that, at the very time that 
veterans are showing up at VA hospitals in greater numbers, with 
increasing health care costs generally and prospects for greater 
medical costs specifically, at the very time that we have that going 
on, we have a cut in this budget resolution.
  So, what we are saying in this amendment--and I will defer to my 
colleague from Iowa in a moment--we are saying, look, we have an excess 
$2.6 billion. It is more than the Pentagon asked for. We have a cut in 
veterans health care in the budget resolution to the tune of $400 
million. It is clear it is going to have very negative consequences for 
veterans. The veterans community in our Nation--I have just three 
letters, from the PVA, DAV, and Vietnam veterans, and they are saying: 
You can't do that. What about those of us who are struggling with 
posttraumatic stress syndrome? What about the Persian Gulf veterans? 
More and more are asking: What happened to us? More and more of those 
veterans are asking for adequate care. What about the ever-increasing 
aging population among veterans at the very time there is going to be 
more of a strain? At the very time that we have more of a challenge, 
you have cut $400 million.
  This is an opportunity to come through for the veterans community. I 
hope it will happen today. I hope we get a very strong vote today. I 
say this to all my colleagues. One way or another, we are going to have 
to restore this funding. This amendment, if you just think about the 
wording, just provides the Secretary of Defense with the authorization 
to transfer some of this funding to VA health care--$400 million--and 
it makes eminently good sense because, after all, these veterans who 
come and seek health care within our VA health care system were the 
very men and women who served our country in defense of our country.

  Mr. President, how much time do we have left?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is no time agreement.
  Mr. GREGG addressed the Chair.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President----
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator yield the floor?
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Are we now debating this amendment?
  Mr. GREGG. Mr. President, if the Senator from Minnesota will yield 
for a question, I simply have about 3 minutes I would like to talk, and 
it has nothing to do with this amendment.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I would rather not yield the floor at 
the moment. But if my colleague wants to speak--do we have other 
Senators on the floor who want to speak on this amendment? My colleague 
from Iowa wants to speak on the amendment. If Senators want to cover 
other topics for a short period of time, I would be more than willing 
to defer to them. We want to try to make our case here before the vote. 
Can I ask my colleagues whether they are interested in debating this 
amendment?
  Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, I want to speak about 10 minutes on the 
Levin amendment. I would certainly be willing to allow the Senator to 
maintain his right to the floor, but this is unusual procedure. The 
Senator doesn't have a right to control the floor. He has a right to 
speak, but he doesn't have a right to control the flow of debate for 
others. I am willing to accommodate him, but this is an unusual 
procedure. Being the accommodating person that I am, I am willing to do 
it. At some point, we might have to ask if the Senator is through 
speaking and let somebody else speak.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, my amendment is pending now, I say to 
my colleague from Texas. The Levin amendment is not pending. I have not 
yielded the floor yet, but I would be more than willing----
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair advises the Senator from Minnesota 
that he can yield to his friend from Iowa for a question.
  Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I suggest that we follow the normal rules. 
If the Senator wants to speak, we can go back and forth. That would be 
fine with this Senator.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the 
Senator from New Hampshire be allowed to speak and the Senator from 
Texas for 10 minutes and then that be followed by the Senator from 
Iowa.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from New Hampshire is recognized.

                          ____________________