[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 96 (Wednesday, July 9, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S7052-S7091]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




     CHINESE MILITARY EXPANSION AND UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY

  Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, no one did more to bring peace and 
prosperity in our time than our 40th President, Ronald Reagan. 
President Reagan's economic and foreign policies gave us the longest 
peacetime expansion in our history and, indeed, did fulfill an ambition 
of this country to make the world safe again for democracy. But more 
than that, Ronald Reagan called us to our highest and best; we never 
spoke with more certainty or sat taller in the saddle than when Ronald 
Reagan was riding point.
  In his second inaugural address, Reagan spoke of the danger of 
simple-minded appeasement, of accommodating countries at their lowest 
and least. ``History,'' said President Reagan, ``teaches us that wars 
begin when governments believe the price of aggression is cheap.'' 
Having seen the death and destruction of five wars in his lifetime, 
President Reagan's was a lesson learned at some expense. It was a 
lesson which he refused to repeat. And from his experience was borne 
the policy of peace through strength--a strategy that recognized that 
wishful thinking about our adversaries is a betrayal of our past and a 
squandering of our freedom.
  But today, the administration seems to have forgotten this costly 
lesson. It seems driven not by foreign policy so much as by foreign 
politics, willing to pursue that which sounds historic rather than 
adopting policies that are historically sound.
  Nowhere is this administration's failed thinking more apparent than 
in United States policy toward China. As I noted on the floor 2 weeks 
ago, Beijing has embarked on a military buildup that may soon threaten 
security interests in Asia, including our own. China already has the 
world's largest military at 2.9 million and is taking steps to enhance 
its force projection capabilities, including the acquisition of a blue 
water navy and a 21st century air force.
  China is not an enemy of the United States. I sincerely hope that 
Washington and Beijing can develop a forthright and an enduring 
relationship. For such a relationship to develop, however, security 
issues must be addressed and fundamental questions about those issues 
must be answered.
  What does it mean when China engages in a dramatic military buildup 
aimed at achieving superpower status? What does it mean when China 
proliferates technology for weapons of mass destruction and signs a 
$4.5 billion arms deal with the terrorist State of Iran? What does it 
mean when China fires missiles in the Taiwan Strait and seizes small 
islands in the South China Sea? For this belligerence suggests a China 
bent on regional domination.
  While China's official military budget is roughly $8 billion, Beijing 
effectively conceals military spending through off-budget funding and 
revenue. Reliable estimates place China's military spending from 4 to 
10 times the official budget. Russia alone, has made over $7 billion in 
arm sales to China since 1990, and hundreds, perhaps thousands, of 
underemployed Russian nuclear engineers have been hired by China in the 
last several years.
  Mr. President, the People's Liberation Army of China, has 20,000 
companies, business enterprises, that funnel revenue into the 
military's coffers. These PLA companies are not the kind of competitors 
we want to welcome to the American market. Companies with ties to the 
PLA benefit from their special relationship with Beijing and have been 
involved in criminal activities ranging from smuggling assault weapons 
onto the streets of San Francisco to stealing defense-related 
technology.
  So what, then, has this explosion in military spending wrought? 
First, a missile program that will soon give China the capacity to 
build hundreds of highly accurate ballistic missiles. Second, short- to 
medium-range ballistic

[[Page S7053]]

missiles that will provide Beijing with versatile nonnuclear weapons to 
target U.S. military personnel in a variety of contingencies if they so 
desire.
  And, as if this were not enough, China is modernizing its long-range 
nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles with mobile ICBM systems 
and advance reentry technology. Due to the potential of secret 
underground construction which is said to be available in China, China 
could have as many as 130 of such missiles with a range of 8,000 miles. 
China's missile modernization program is accompanied by the buildup of 
China's Air Force.
  By 2010, China could have over 100 SU-27 and SU-30 aircraft. The SU-
27 is comparable to, and may be more advanced in some areas than, the 
U.S. F-15C Eagle. Russia has been the primary provider of these 
aircraft and has signed a $2.2 billion coproduction agreement with 
China to help Beijing develop the domestic capacity to produce these 
planes.
  China's ultimate goal is to acquire an all-weather Air Force within 5 
years. Attack aircraft, precision-guided munitions, airborne early 
warning and control systems [AWACS], and large transport aircraft are 
all items on Beijing's wish list. With the help of Russian arms 
suppliers, China is putting the pieces of this lethal puzzle in place.
  Beijing is also working to develop a blue water navy. Their ambitions 
are perhaps summed up best by the words of Admiral Liu Huaqing. ``The 
Chinese Navy,'' said Admiral Liu, ``should exert effective control of 
the seas within the first island chain. Offshore should not be 
interpreted as coastal as we used to know it. Offshore is a concept 
relative to the high seas. It means the vast sea waters within the 
second island chain.''
  Mr. President, it just so happens that the first island chain China 
seeks to control encompasses Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and some 
of the most critical shipping lanes in the world. The South China Sea 
alone accommodates 25 percent of the world's maritime trade and 75 
percent of Japan's oil shipments.
  To achieve Admiral Liu's objective, Beijing has purchased Kilo-class 
submarines and Sovremenny-class missile destroyers from Russia. In 
addition, the United States Office of Naval Intelligence [ONI] cites a 
National People's Congress report that China is seeking to build two 
48,000-ton aircraft carriers, each with 40 combat aircraft, by the year 
2005.
  China's arms buildup would be less disturbing if Beijing were acting 
to resist aggression by an enemy power. But China faces no grave 
security threats, leaving us with troubling conclusions about Beijing's 
real intent. China has historically demonstrated a willingness to 
settle territorial disputes with force, and greater capacity can only 
increase the likelihood of belligerence in the future.
  Since WWII, a catalog of China's regional conflicts covers almost her 
entire periphery. China has invaded Tibet and Vietnam, entered the 
Korean war, ousted Vietnamese forces from several islands in the South 
China Sea, fought India twice and Russia once over boundary disputes, 
and--not to forget the most consistent aspect of China's military 
adventurism--threatened Taiwan with military exercises and outright 
invasion of Taiwanese islands close to China's shore.
  China currently has territorial disputes with India, Russia, Japan, 
Vietnam, and has vied with the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, Brunei, 
and Malaysia for control of the resource-rich and strategically 
important South China Sea. To defend its claim, Beijing has already 
constructed five naval installations in the Paracel Islands and seven 
installations in the Spratly Island group.
  And what has been the Clinton administration's response to the rising 
Chinese military threat? Appeasement at every turn. China proliferates 
missile, nuclear, and chemical weapons technology to rogue regimes like 
Iran; in fact, China is identified by the CIA as the world's worst 
proliferator of weapons of mass destruction. And yet, the 
administration refuses to impose consistently sanctions authorized by 
U.S. law.
  The China Ocean Shipping Co., better known as COSCO, is implicated in 
weapons smuggling to the United States and missile transfers to 
Pakistan, and the President personally assists the city of Long Beach, 
CA, in leasing the local United States naval harbor to COSCO.
  The China National Nuclear Corp. orchestrates most of the nuclear 
technology transfers to Pakistan and Iran, and the administration 
responds by approving Export-Import Bank loans to help this Chinese 
company complete a nuclear reactor in China.
  These examples reveal an underlying laxity also clearly seen in 
President Clinton's dismantling of export controls for sensitive 
technology. President Reagan's formation of the Combat Command [COCOM] 
helped enforce an international embargo of sensitive technology exports 
to the Soviet Union and effectively expanded America's technological 
lead. Unfortunately, having confused short-term profits with long-term 
security, this administration has undermined our export control 
framework.
  For example, advanced U.S. aircraft engines have historically been a 
protected item on the munitions list of goods and services. Sales of 
Munitions List items are illegal to any country without formal approval 
from the State Department. In addition, sales of Munitions List items 
to China were prohibited after the Tiananmen Square crackdown and could 
only be permitted with a Presidential waiver.
  Instead of openly issuing a waiver for the sale of aircraft engines 
to China, the Clinton administration quietly took airplane engines off 
the Munitions List and shifted their control from the Department of 
State to the Department of Commerce. Licenses for the sale of aircraft 
engines were quickly issued by then-Secretary Brown, and they continue 
to this day.
  In addition to aircraft technology, export controls for 
supercomputers have also been relaxed. As Senator Cochran has argued so 
compellingly on the floor this week, supercomputers are not extra large 
versions of a Macintosh or an IBM, but advanced machines that can 
simulate warfare contingencies and model sophisticated weapons.
  The Bush administration defined supercomputers as machines that could 
perform 195 MTOPS--million theoretical operations per second. The 
Clinton administration relaxed export controls by changing this 
definition to 2,000 MTOPS, a tenfold increase in the capability of 
noncontrolled supercomputers within 2 years. Shortly thereafter, the 
Clinton administration raised the threshold to 7,000 MTOPS for export 
of supercomputers for civilian use.
  In the euphoria of the post-cold war world, the Clinton 
administration seems to have forgotten that civilian and military 
distinctions have little use in a Communist State like China where 
Government control of industry ensures that civilian technology is 
applied to military ends and where thousands of so-called businesses 
are literally owned by the military.
  Again, as Senator Cochran has noted, United States companies have 
used these relaxed regulations to sell 47 supercomputers to China. 
Dozens more have been indirectly shipped to China via Europe, the 
Persian Gulf, and East Asia. The Clinton administration cannot account 
for where many of these computers are located or how they are being 
used.

  As Stephen Bryan, former Deputy Undersecretary of Defense, writes:

       Thanks to * * * the Clinton administration, the Chinese can 
     now conduct tests of nuclear weapons, conventional 
     explosives, and chemical and biological weapons by simulating 
     them on supercomputers. Not only can they now make better 
     weapons of mass destruction, but they can do a lot of the 
     work secretly, thus threatening us with an additional element 
     of surprise.

  For too long we have heard the argument that if the United States 
does not sell technology to Beijing, China will simply acquire the 
products from other sources. This contention is as familiar as it is 
flawed. United States military and dual-use technology is often a 
generation ahead of its Russian and European counterparts. How can the 
United States call on other nations to stop transferring dangerous 
technology when America is giving China some of the most advanced 
technology in the world?
  A final thought. This week the Government Affairs Committee began 
investigating an ominous and startling facet of our national security--
the security of this Nation's democratic elections. Every American has 
an interest

[[Page S7054]]

in investigating the alleged plot of the Beijing government to 
influence the election of our President and Members of this Congress. 
Trying to corrupt American elections is shocking, outrageous, and 
wrong. And, if true, it must be dealt with in a forthright and forceful 
fashion.
  In the end, it all comes down to leadership. That is what Ronald 
Reagan gave us throughout the 1980's, and that is what this country is 
looking for now. Leaders are willing to call this Nation--and nations 
around the world--to their highest and best, not accommodate them at 
their lowest and least.
  Continued appeasement can only lead to further belligerence from 
Beijing. We must not let China slam shut the gate of freedom. We must 
show the quiet courage and common sense that have marked our foreign 
policy since America's first days.
  It is time for America to place restrictions on high-technology 
exports to Beijing by supporting the Cochran-Durbin amendment; time to 
impose consistently sanctions on China for proliferating weapons of 
mass destruction; time to restrict United States market access to PLA-
front companies; and time to let Beijing know that American security 
interests in East Asia will not be compromised. So, that 1 day, the 
long tug of memory might look favorably upon us as we look approvingly 
on those who fought for freedom in decades passed.
  Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                     Amendment No. 670, As Modified

  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I call up amendment 670.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The bill clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Minnesota [Mr. Wellstone] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 670, as modified.

  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, just as a courtesy to my colleagues, 
let me say that I am not offering a new amendment. This is an amendment 
that I introduced yesterday morning. I wanted to take advantage of this 
time to speak about this amendment.
  This amendment would authorize the Secretary of Defense to transfer 
$5 million out of the $265 billion Pentagon budget--some $2.6 billion 
more than the President himself asked for--to the Secretary of 
Agriculture, to be used for outreach and startup grants for the school 
breakfast program.
  Mr. President, this amendment involves a very small amount of money. 
While it involves a small amount of money--at least given the kind of 
money we are dealing with here--it actually speaks to a very large 
question. I think the question has to do with what our priorities are.
  I think it is a distorted priority to provide the Pentagon with $2.6 
billion more than it originally asked for. For the third year in a 
row--these are one of the few times I can remember in my adult life 
that the Congress actually wants to provide the Pentagon with more 
money than the Pentagon has actually asked for. At the same time, when 
it comes to some really vitally important programs that dramatically 
affect children's lives, we don't make the investment.
  By way of background: In the welfare bill that passed last Congress, 
$5 million was eliminated from a critically important program, which 
was a program that on the one hand provided States and school districts 
with the information they needed--call it an outreach program--about 
how they could set up a breakfast program, and on the other hand, it 
provided some badly needed funding for some of the poorer school 
districts to actually, for example, purchase refrigerators in order to 
have milk.
  It is difficult to understand how this could have been cut, 
especially given the heralded success of the school breakfast program. 
Some things I guess we do not know enough about, but we do know that a 
nutritious breakfast really is important in enabling a child to learn. 
We also know that if a child is not able to learn, as I said yesterday, 
when he or she becomes an adult they may very well not be able to earn. 
This is a small amount of money that makes a huge difference.
  So this amendment says that out of a $265 billion Pentagon budget, 
some $2.6 billion more than the Pentagon asked for, can't we authorize 
the Secretary of Defense to be able to transfer $5 million--$5 
million--for school breakfasts? For what I would call catalyst money 
that gets necessary information out to the States and school districts 
and some needed assistance by way of refrigerators and resources to 
enable them to expand the school breakfast program.
  Mr. President, I want to point out by way of context that there are 
still some 27,000 schools that do not have school breakfast programs 
available. There are some 8 million vulnerable, low-income children, 
therefore, who are not able to participate. Too many of those children 
go to school without having had a nutritious breakfast.
  This may seem abstract to many of us in the Senate, but it is a very 
concrete and a very important issue.
  This amendment has the support of FRAC, the Food Research Action 
Center, which has a longstanding history of working on childhood hunger 
and nutrition issues. It has the support of the Elementary School 
Principals Association, the American School Food Services, and Bread 
for the World.

  Mr. President, I might point out that these organizations have a 
tremendous amount of credibility for all of us who care about hunger 
and malnutrition. These are organizations that have been down in the 
trenches for years working on these issues. I don't think anybody can 
quarrel with the values and ethics of Bread for the World and the work 
that they have done, much of it very rooted in the religious community, 
and the American School Food Services. These are food service workers. 
These are the people who know what it means when they can't provide a 
nutritious breakfast to low-income students.
  This is a special endorsement for me because my mother was a food 
service worker.
  What the Elementary School Principals Association is saying by 
endorsing this amendment is simply this: If a child hasn't had a 
nutritious breakfast, how is that child going to be able to learn?
  Mr. President, let me talk a little bit about the extent of hunger 
and the scope of the problem. This is from the Food Research Action 
Committee.
  Approximately 4 million American children under the age of 12 go 
hungry, and approximately 9.6 million are in risk of hunger. According 
to estimates based on the results of the most comprehensive study ever 
done on childhood hunger in the United States--this was the community 
childhood hunger education project--based on the results of over 5,000 
surveys of families with incomes below 185 percent of poverty, applied 
to the best available national data, FRAC estimates that of the 
approximately 13.6 million children under age 12 in the United States, 
29 percent live in families that must cope with hunger or the risk of 
hunger during some part of one or more months in the previous year.
  Let me just raise a question with colleagues before we have this 
vote. I just think that this goes to the heart of what we are about. 
This goes to the heart of priorities.
  I, as a Senator from Minnesota, tire of the symbolic politics. We 
have had the conferences on early childhood development. The books and 
the reports, the magazines, the TV documentaries have come out.
  We know--let me repeat this--we know that in order for children to do 
well, it is important that they have a nutritious breakfast. We know 
that when children are hungry, they don't do well in school. We know, 
as parents and grandparents, that we want to make sure that our 
children and our grandchildren start school after having a nutritious 
breakfast. And we also know, based on clear evidence, that sometimes we 
don't know what we don't want to know--that there is a significant 
amount of children who still go to bed hungry or still wake up in the 
morning hungry and go to school hungry.
  Why can't the U.S. Senate make this small investment in this program 
which was so important in enabling States and school districts to 
expand the school breakfast program?

[[Page S7055]]

  Mr. President, I am going to bring this amendment to the floor of the 
Senate over and over and over again starting with this defense 
authorization bill.
  Let me just read. I am assuming that my colleagues are interested in 
this information, and I am assuming that we want to address the 
problem. Let me just talk a little bit about this relationship between 
hunger and nutrition and learning.
       Undernutrition increases the risk of illness and its 
     severity.
       Undernutrition has a negative effect on a child's ability 
     to learn . . .
       Iron deficiency anemia is a specific kind of undernutrition 
     and is one of the most prevalent undernutritional problems in 
     the United States especially among children. Even mild cases 
     lead to shortened attention span, irritability, fatigue and 
     decreased ability to concentrate . . .
       Hunger leads to nervousness, irritability, disinterest in 
     the learning situation, and an inability to concentrate . . .
       Hunger . . . disrupt(s) the learning process--one 
     developmental step is lost, and it is difficult to move on to 
     the next one.
       A United States Department of Agriculture study of the 
     lunch and breakfast programs demonstrated that these programs 
     make nutritional improvements in children's diets.

  I could go on and on, but--I see my colleague from Arizona in the 
Chamber--I will try to summarize. Let me just make it clear that the 
data is out there. And over and over again, in report after report 
after report, we see clearly that malnourished children are not going 
to do well in school, and we know that 8 million low-income children 
are not able to participate because there is no School Breakfast 
Program.
  We had a $5 million USDA outreach program that enabled school 
districts to get started, provided them with badly needed information, 
provided them with refrigerators if they needed that, and we eliminated 
it. And at the same time we have a Pentagon budget that is $2.6 billion 
more than the Pentagon asked.
  We all say we care about children. We are all referring to these 
studies that say children have to do well in school, we are talking 
about the importance of good nutrition, and here we have an opportunity 
to make a difference.
  So, Mr. President, I want to over and over again come to the floor 
with amendments that speak to this question. One more time, just in 
terms of looking at the endorsements for this amendment, we have 
endorsements from FRAC, which is Food Research and Action Center--FRAC 
has been as involved in children's nutritional issues as any 
organization I know--the Elementary School Principals Association--they 
are saying to us, colleagues, at least make sure that children are able 
to have a nutritious breakfast. I think the elementary school 
principals know something about learning and something about children 
at this young age--American School Food Services and Bread for the 
World.
  I hope we will have strong support for this amendment.
  I point out by way of conclusion that if you look at participation in 
the School Breakfast Program from 1976 to 1996 --and remember, once 
upon a time, I say to my colleagues, we used to think this program was 
only for rural areas, for students with long bus rides, students who 
were not going to be able to eat at home. Now what we find is the 
reality that in many of these families there are split shifts, 
different shifts, both parents working, and all too often these kids in 
urban areas and suburbs come to school and they really have not had a 
nutritious breakfast.
  We saw a good increase in participation in the School Breakfast 
Program from 1976 to 1996, but now what has happened as a result of 
eliminating this small $5 million outreach program is there is 
tremendous concern from USDA all the way to the different child 
advocacy organizations that the participation is going to begin to 
decline.
  So here is an opportunity, colleagues, to invest a small amount of 
money in the basic idea that each child ought to have the same 
opportunity to reach his or her full potential. This is an opportunity 
for all of us to come through for these vulnerable children, 
understanding full well--and I know my colleague from Arizona is out 
here, but I say to him and this really is my conclusion--understanding 
full well that, indeed, there is a linkage to reform and to the work 
that he and others are doing on trying to get the money out of 
politics. There are a number of us who are absolutely convinced we have 
to act on this agenda. That is to say these children and these families 
are not the heavy hitters; they are not the big players; they are not 
the givers; they do not have the big lobbyists; they all too often are 
faceless and voiceless, and that it is profoundly wrong. I hope to get 
100 votes for this amendment.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. McCAIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Santorum). The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Before I call up my amendment, I wish to respond to my 
friend from Minnesota for just a moment on his amendment. I preface my 
remarks by saying I know of no more passionate or compassionate Member 
of this body than the Senator from Minnesota, nor do I believe that 
there is anyone in this body who articulates as well as he the plight 
of those who, as he pointed out, may be underrepresented here in this 
body in our deliberations. I have grown and developed over the years a 
great respect and even affection for the Senator from Minnesota because 
of my admiration for his incredible commitment to serving those who may 
not always have a voice.
  But I say to the Senator from Minnesota that this amendment, like 
many others, is what I call the Willie Sutton syndrome. When the famous 
bank robber was once asked why he robbed banks, he said, ``Because 
that's where the money is.'' And time after time I see amendments that 
are worthwhile and at times, as the Senator from Minnesota just 
articulated, compelling, but they come out of funds that are earmarked 
for national defense. In my view, that is not an appropriate way to 
spend defense money.
  I would also quickly point out that this is not the first time it has 
happened. There are literally billions of dollars now that we spend out 
of defense appropriations and authorization that have absolutely 
nothing to do with defending this Nation's vital national security 
interests, again because of the Willie Sutton syndrome. Although I 
admire and appreciate the amendment of the Senator from Minnesota, I 
would oppose it, not because of its urgency but because of its 
inappropriate placement on a defense appropriations bill. And I would 
also like to work with the Senator from Minnesota when the Labor-HHS 
appropriations bill comes to the floor to see if we cannot provide that 
funding, which the Senator from Minnesota appropriately points out is 
not a great deal of money given the large amounts of money we deal with 
and also considering the importance and urgency of the issue.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent----
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Will the Senator yield at this moment.
  Mr. McCAIN. I would be glad to yield to the Senator from Minnesota 
for a comment.
  I ask unanimous consent to yield to the Senator from Minnesota for 5 
minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. I thank my colleague. The respect is mutual.
  I just wanted to say--it was going to be a question, but I can just 
make a comment instead--as a matter of history, the School Lunch 
Program was created by the Congress 50 years ago, and I quote, ``As a 
measure of national security to safeguard the health and well-being of 
the Nation's children.'' It was a direct response to the fact that many 
of the young men who were drafted in World War II were rejected due to 
conditions arising from nutritional deficiencies. So there is, in fact, 
a direct linkage to national defense.
  It is, in fact, very much a national security issue to make sure that 
children have full nutrition and that we do not end up with men and 
women later on who have not been able to learn, not been able to earn 
and may, in fact, not even be healthy enough to qualify to serve our 
Nation.
  So it is an interesting history, and I just wanted my colleague to 
know that this program is very much connected to national security.
  My second point is I too look forward to working with my colleague in 
the future. But I hope to win on this amendment now. This is simply a 
matter of saying, look, we have a budget

[[Page S7056]]

that is $2.6 billion over what the Pentagon asked. There have been 
plenty of studies which have pointed out excesses in the defense 
budget. Can we not at least authorize the Secretary of Defense to 
transfer this $5 million.
  And then, finally, I say to all my colleagues that I think there is 
going to come a point in time where people cannot--and I know the 
Senator from Arizona is not trying to do this--but people cannot say, 
well, we shouldn't vote for this now; we can't vote for this now; we 
won't vote for this now; there will be a more appropriate place; there 
will be a more appropriate time. And I find that when it comes to all 
these issues that have to do with how can we refurbish and renew and 
restore our national vow of equal opportunity for every child, the vote 
always gets put off. It always gets put in parenthesis. So I absolutely 
take what my friend from Arizona said in good faith. I look forward to 
working with him. But I do think that on this bill, on this amendment, 
this is the time to vote for such a small step for a good many very 
vulnerable children in our country.
  I thank my colleague for his graciousness.


                           Amendment No. 705

      (Purpose: To authorize base closure rounds in 1999 and 2001)

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to lay aside the 
pending amendments and ask that the clerk call up amendment No. 705.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk 
will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Arizona [Mr. McCain], for himself, Mr. 
     Levin, Mr. Coats, and Mr. Robb, proposes an amendment 
     numbered 705.

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (The text of the amendment is printed in today's Record under 
``Amendments Submitted.'')
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, this amendment would authorize two 
additional base closure rounds in 1999 and the year 2001 consistent 
with the recommendations in the Quadrennial Defense Review, known as 
the QDR. The amendment authorizes a process which is identical to the 
process established in 1990 for the last three BRAC rounds. The 
amendment also contains language which addresses the politicization in 
the last BRAC process which permitted the President to implement 
privatization in place at Kelly and McClellan Air Force Bases.
  I might point out that I am working with the Senator from Texas [Mr 
Gramm], in trying to frame language to modify the amendment at the 
appropriate time which would allow the Secretary of Defense to 
privatize where it can be proven to be of benefit to the taxpayer. We 
are still working on that legislation.
  Mr. President, we need to authorize additional base closure rounds to 
correct a current imbalance in force structure and 
infrastructure. After four base closing rounds, only 21 percent of the 
military installations in the continental United States have been 
reduced. Our force structure, however, will have been reduced by over 
36 percent by the time that quarterly defense review recommendations 
are complete. Obviously, retaining excess base infrastructure is 
unnecessary with a smaller military force and wastes scarce defense 
resources that are essential to future military modernization.

  I think it is important to frame the debate about this amendment in 
the terms of the realistic approach we have to take to future defense 
budgets. I do not believe there is any of us here, barring a national 
security emergency, who believes we are going to see increases in 
defense spending, certainly not increases in defense spending which 
would justify the size of our infrastructure as it exists today. It 
just is not possible, in a period, in real terms, of declining defense 
budgets, to maintain this infrastructure and, at the same time, 
modernize our force and provide the men and women in the military with 
the necessary tools to fight and to win any future conflict with a 
minimization of casualties.
  I am very confident that the United States has emerged at the end of 
the cold war as the world's No. 1 superpower. I don't think there is 
any doubt about that. But I also think it is important to point out 
that we are seeing problems within the military that some of us, with 
the benefit of experience and old age, recognize as having happened 
before. We are now seeing a failure to meet our recruitment goals for 
our All Volunteer Force. We are now seeing a derogation of our 
readiness capabilities in parts of the military establishment. We 
clearly are not modernizing the force in a way that will give us the 
ability to maintain our technological edge, which has made us the 
world's No. 1 superpower and won the magnificent victory of the Persian 
Gulf war.
  So, if you accept the premise that there will be at best a leveling 
of defense spending, and certainly realistically speaking a decline, at 
least in terms of inflation if not worse, then there really is no 
argument against closing more bases. I have heard some very interesting 
arguments and we will hear on the floor some interesting arguments 
against base closure. One that has some legitimacy is that, either in 
reality or by perception, the last base closing round was politicized 
by the President of the United States by privatizing in place two major 
bases, both of them with very large electoral votes. I wish that had 
not happened. It has caused an enormous amount of acrimony and division 
within this body, within America, within the Senate Armed Services 
Committee. And this particular reauthorization of further BRAC rounds 
will not allow a privatization in place to take place. So it will be 
well, I am sure, by some, to lament the politicization of the process 
as took place--or the perception that it took place, depending on which 
side you are on in the argument--of the last BRAC process.
  But it does not change the reality. It does not change the reality 
that we have a significant imbalance between operating forces and 
infrastructure. In other words, we don't need the number of bases that 
we have in our defense establishment in order to match up to the 
fighting forces that we must maintain. If we maintain that base 
structure, it will siphon more and more funds unnecessarily into a base 
structure and away from the much needed funding, such as pay raises, 
such as operations and maintenance, such as training funds, such as 
modernization of force, such as recruitment, such as, for example, 
addressing the problem we are seeing right now in aviation in the 
military, an exodus of pilots from the military to go with the 
airlines. One of the reasons is pilots are putting pen to paper and 
figuring out that after a short period of time financially they will be 
better off as airline pilots than as military pilots.
  If you couple that with ever-increasing deployments and separation 
from family and home, this is causing a hemorrhaging from our most 
highly skilled and highly trained branches of our military.
  Another argument you are going to hear is that we are spending too 
much money on other functions, such as peacekeeping. All of us regret 
that we have had to spend--I believe the estimates are now up to 
somewhere around $7.5 billion or $8 billion on peacekeeping in Bosnia. 
I regret that, too. I hope that by next June 30 the United States will 
not only be out of Bosnia militarily but also financially. I will bend 
every effort that I can, short of jeopardizing the lives of those young 
men and women and short of provoking another conflict in the region 
which may cost the United States more in the long run, but I will do 
everything in my power to see that we stop spending that money on 
peacekeeping.
  But what in the world is the connection between the money we are 
spending on peacekeeping and the base infrastructure? What is the 
point? There is none, because whether we had a large or small 
establishment, we would still be spending too much money on 
peacekeeping.
  So, I respect the arguments that will come in opposition to this 
amendment. Those are the two primary arguments. But I fail to see the 
relation between those arguments and what we have to do in the national 
interest.

  One of the interesting things that has happened since the end of the 
cold war is that we see very little, if any, interest in national 
security issues and national defense on the part of the American 
public. I think in some ways that

[[Page S7057]]

is good news, because the American people feel content. They do not see 
a threat to our security out on the horizon. And, although that 
sentiment does not prevail when Americans are killed in places like 
Somalia and others, generally speaking there is no urgent feeling on 
the part of the American people that we need to spend, not only not 
more, but even as much as we are spending on national defense.
  It is also true, however, that we do have to maintain a certain 
level, otherwise we will not maintain our position in the world. It is 
also true in my view that, if we don't wish to be the world's No. 1 
superpower, then it is a very valid question as to who, then, do we 
expect to be the world's No. 1 superpower? Because other nations, I 
think, would be perfectly willing to do so.
  Mr. President, I have a letter to Chairman Strom Thurmond, and I 
quote from it:

       We strongly support further reductions in base structure 
     proposed by the Secretary of Defense. Any process must be 
     based on military utility, but sensitive to the impact such 
     reductions will have on the Service communities in which our 
     people live. We ask your assistance in addressing this 
     difficult issue.
       Sincerely, John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint 
     Chiefs of Staff; Joseph W. Ralston, Vice Chairman; Dennis 
     Reimer, General, United States Army, Chief of Staff; Jay L. 
     Johnson, Admiral, U.S. Navy, Chief of operations; Ronald R. 
     Fogleman, General, United States Air Force; Charles Krulak, 
     General, U.S. Marine Corps, Commandant of the Marine Corps.

  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this letter and a letter 
I will read in a few minutes from the Secretary of Defense be printed 
in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                                   Chairman of the


                                        Joint Chiefs of Staff,

                                     Washington, DC, June 4, 1997.
     Hon. Strom Thurmond,
     Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: As the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 
     appropriately notes, achieving the type of force this country 
     will need in the 21st century requires significant increases 
     in our investment accounts. Given other pressures on the 
     federal budget, we must make every effort to find the funds 
     within the Department of Defense budget.
       Since the end of the Cold War, the Defense base structure 
     has been reduced approximately 26 percent. When the QDR 
     reductions are complete, the overall end strength of the 
     department will have been reduced by over 36 percent.
       We strongly support further reductions in base structure 
     proposed by the Secretary of Defense. Any process must be 
     based on military utility, but sensitive to the impact such 
     reductions will have on the Service communities in which our 
     people live.
       We ask your assistance in addressing this difficult issue.
           Sincerely,
     Joseph W. Ralston,
       Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
     Dennis J. Reimer,
       General, U.S. Army Chief of Staff.
     Ronald R. Fogleman,
       General, U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff.
     John M. Shalikashvili,
       Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
     Jay L. Johnson,
       Admiral, United States Navy Chief of Naval Operations.
     Charles C. Krulak,
       General, U.S. Marine Corps, Commandant of the Marine Corps.
                                  ____



                                     The Secretary of Defense,

                                    Washington, DC, June 24, 1997.
     Hon. John McCain,
     U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear John: As you consider the Fiscal Year 1998 National 
     Defense Authorization Bill, I urge you to add a provision 
     that would permit the Department to conduct two additional 
     base closure and realignment rounds, in FY99 and FY01. 
     Reducing excess infrastructure was an essential element of 
     the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The Department has 
     already reduced its overseas base structure by almost 60 
     percent and must now bring its domestic base structure into 
     balance with its force structure.
       With the expiration of the previous BRAC legislation, the 
     Department needs a process to close or realign excess 
     military installations. Even after four rounds of base 
     closures, we have eliminated only 21 percent of our U.S. base 
     structure while force structure will drop by 36 percent by 
     FY03. The QDR concluded that additional infrastructure 
     savings were required to close this gap and begin to reduce 
     the share of the defense budget devoted to infrastructure. 
     Base closings are an integral part of this plan. The QDR 
     found that the Department has enough excess base structure to 
     warrant two additional rounds of BRAC, similar in scale to 
     1993 and 1995.
       The Department estimates two additional base closure rounds 
     would result in savings of approximately $2.7 billion 
     annually. These savings are critical to the Department's 
     modernization plans. We must modernize our force structure 
     over the long term, laying the groundwork now for the 
     platforms and technologies our forces need in the future. 
     Without the ability to modernize, we would face future 
     threats with obsolete forces. Additionally, the Department 
     will continue to waste resources by maintaining excess 
     military installations, impacting readiness.
       As you may know, when I was in the Senate, a base in my 
     state was closed as a result of the 1991 BRAC. Therefore, 
     making a recommendation for further BRAC rounds is not 
     something I take lightly. However, the Service Chiefs all 
     believe that additional BRAC rounds are necessary. Further, 
     there have been many communities which have been successful 
     in their base reuse efforts. I am enclosing, for your 
     consideration, additional information on BRAC, the views of 
     the Joint Chiefs of Staff and community success stories 
     including a New York Times piece on how Charleston survived 
     the closing of the Charleston Naval Base.
       I would greatly appreciate your support for an amendment to 
     authorize additional base closures and would be pleased to 
     answer any questions or to discuss this matter with you.
           Sincerely,
                                                       Bill Cohen.
       Enclosure

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I do not think we can lightly ignore--or 
not seriously consider, I guess is a better way of saying it--this 
letter from the individuals that we have asked to lead our military. 
Every one of these individuals knows the pain and hardship that comes 
about when a base is closed. But each of these individuals has been 
charged by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to 
run our military establishment. And all of those individuals feel, not 
just supportive of what Secretary Cohen is saying, but obviously that 
this is a very important issue if they are going to be able to carry 
out their responsibilities.
  Mr. President, I have a letter from the Secretary of Defense, 
Secretary Bill Cohen, former Senator Bill Cohen, whom we all know quite 
well. Secretary of Defense Cohen says:

       Reducing excess infrastructure was an essential element of 
     the Quadrennial Defense Review. The Department has already 
     reduced its overseas base structure by almost 60 percent and 
     must now bring its domestic base structure into balance with 
     its force structure.

                           *   *   *   *   *

       Base closings are an integral part of this plan. The QDR 
     found the Department has enough excess base structure to 
     warrant two additional rounds of BRAC, similar in scale to 
     1993 and 1995.
       The Department estimates two additional base closure rounds 
     would result in savings of approximately $2.7 billion 
     annually. These savings are critical to the Department's 
     modernization plans.

  Let me say that again:

       These savings are critical to the Department's 
     modernization plans.

  He goes on to say:

       As you may know, when I was in the Senate, a base in my 
     State was closed as a result of the 1991 BRAC. Therefore, 
     making a recommendation for further BRAC rounds is not 
     something I take lightly. However, the Service Chiefs all 
     believe that additional BRAC rounds are necessary.

  Mr. President, I think it might be appropriate to point out at this 
time, in light of what I just read from Secretary Cohen's letter, that 
there are bases in my State that I know will be vulnerable in light of 
two additional rounds of base closing. And I know that I will have to 
go back to my home State, if one of them is closed, and say: Yes, I'm 
the guy who proposed the amendment for two more rounds of base 
closings.
  But I will also tell the people of my State that I did it because I 
told them, when I sought to serve in this body, that I would act in the 
national interest first. I would also add that we went through a base 
closing in my State, in the case of Williams Air Force Base, and I am 
happy to say, by the way, as has been the case in many bases in many 
areas of the country, that the community has ended up by generating 
more economic benefit than less. That certainly has not been in all 
cases, but it certainly has been in many.
  Mr. President, I want to point out that there are several urban 
success stories: Charleston Naval Base, Charleston, SC, where currently 
there are 32 agencies reusing this former naval base; Pease Air Force 
Base, Portsmouth, NH, the establishment of

[[Page S7058]]

Pease International Tradeport created more than 1,161 new jobs; 
Sacramento Army Depot, Sacramento, Packard Bell NEC, the country's 
largest manufacturer of personal computers, has created more than 5,000 
jobs at this former depot; Williams Air Force Base, now known as the 
Williams Gateway Airport, quickly emerged as an international aviation 
and aerospace center where more than 20 companies engage in aircraft 
maintenance; Mather Air Force Base; Gentile Air Force Station, 
Kettering, OH; Norton Air Force Base, San Bernardino; Fort Benjamin 
Harrison, Indianapolis; Griffiss Air Force Base; Cameron Station, 
Alexandria; Naval Air Station/Naval Aviation Depot Alameda, Alameda--
the list goes on and on.
  Mr. President, there are a large number of success stories. That does 
not diminish the fact that in some rural areas there will be 
significant economic impact. There is no doubt about that. But it also 
is part of the BRAC process that economic impact is a factor in the 
determination of a base closing.
  Mr. President, I have talked too long a time, probably, on this 
issue, because the issue is well known to my colleagues. I am grateful 
to my colleague from Michigan, Senator Levin, who, along with me in the 
Armed Services Committee deliberations, tried to--we were cosponsors of 
an amendment; had it put in the authorization bill. We were defeated on 
a tie vote. I appreciate the efforts of Senator Levin very much on this 
issue.
  This is a nonpartisan issue. It is an issue that has to do with the 
future military capabilities of this country and our ability, over 
time, if called upon, to defend our vital national security interests. 
It is not possible to modernize the force, maintain the level of 
training and readiness and recruit the qualified men and women in an 
all-volunteer force if we refuse to put back into balance the base 
support structure with the fighting forces and operational forces that 
are necessary to do the fighting.
  My friend from Virginia, Senator Robb, former Marine Corps officer, 
carries around with him from time to time a chart that is very simple. 
It shows what he calls the tooth to tail--tooth being the fighting 
forces, the tail being those in support--and how those two lines have 
diverged steadily over the intervening years. With this BRAC closure we 
may not cause that trend to reverse, but at least we can level it off. 
I believe we must do so.
  I know there will be a lot of debate on this amendment, and I hope we 
can agree to this and move forward.
  I feel so strongly about this particular issue that unless we do 
include a base closing round and unless we do something about the depot 
issue, if I were the President of the United States, I would be very 
tempted to veto this legislation.
  Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on this amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California.
  Mr. LEVIN. Will the Senator from California yield for a unanimous 
consent request?
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Yes.


                         Privilege of the Floor

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Greg Renden, 
Senator Wellstone's intern, be allowed the privilege of the floor for 
the duration of the debate on this bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from California.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I thank the Senator from Michigan, and I thank the 
Chair.
  Mr. President, in my 4\1/2\ years in this body, I have not seen an 
effort as egregious, as badly flawed, as unfair as the base closure 
process. I happen to have great respect for the Senator from Arizona 
and the Senator from Michigan, but I think to adopt this amendment at 
this time is really only to continue this kind of egregious pursuit. I 
hope, in the course of my remarks, to at least point out some of the 
areas where I find the base closure process very wanting.
  The Senator from Arizona spoke of States with big electoral clout, 
and I would have to plead guilty. No State has bigger electoral clout 
than California. I also hasten to point out that no State has suffered 
more base closures than California--29 bases cited for closure to date, 
and the largest number of jobs lost all across this Nation. In net jobs 
lost to date, California has lost 123,000 net jobs. The next State in 
net jobs lost is Pennsylvania at 35,000. So we are more than four times 
Pennsylvania's job loss. The next highest State in total number of 
bases closed to California is Texas, then Pennsylvania, then New York, 
then Illinois.
  If I really believed that this was going to end up being an important 
cost saving for the U.S. military, I would say, ``All right, Dianne, 
you may represent this State, but, by and large, this is for the best 
interest of the military.'' I don't believe it, and I have seen no 
evidence to date to corroborate that. I believe strongly that it is 
much too soon to begin another round without having some of this 
information.
  We don't know how much the four rounds cost. We don't know how much 
the four rounds have saved. And we haven't met our commitments to local 
communities impacted by these closures, despite the letter of the 
distinguished Secretary of Defense to the contrary.
  The CBO--even the CBO--the 1995 BRAC Commission, they both say wait. 
CBO recommends waiting until at least 2001 for another round. They say:

       The Congress should consider authorizing an additional 
     round of base closures if the Department of Defense believes 
     that there is a surplus of military capacity after--

  And I stress the word ``after''--

     all rounds of BRAC have been carried out. That consideration, 
     however, should follow an interval during which DOD and 
     independent analysts examine the actual impact of the 
     measures that have been taken thus far.

  (Mr. HAGEL assumed the chair.)
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I would like this distinguished body to know that we 
cannot get a single figure from the U.S. Navy as to what the cost 
savings actually will be from the closures of the Navy bases in the 
State of California. Not a single figure. They will not give us 
estimates. And yet we are going to run ahead, pass another round and 
begin this same procedure again. It doesn't make any sense.

  Let me quote what the BRAC 1995 commission itself recommended:

       . . . the Commission recommends that the Congress authorize 
     another Base Closure Commission for the year 2001 . . . 
     [giving] military services time to complete the current 
     closures in an orderly fashion--

  Which has not happened, I might allude to--

     while ensuring that the Defense Department has the 
     opportunity in the future to make further reductions . . .

  In addition to these new BRAC rounds beginning too quickly, and 
contrary to what DOD and supporters of this amendment claim, the base 
reuse process has been cumbersome and has been fraught with 
bureaucratic nightmares.
  Secretary Cohen's letter of June 24 says that the DOD has assigned 
``transition coordinators'' to each base to solve closure problems and 
to speed the process. Well, let me say, as one Senator from California, 
this approach has not worked well. I have had to intervene with DOD for 
communities in my State numerous times to fight for a community's needs 
in just this past year alone.
  Let me speak for a moment about environmental costs. I think every 
Member of this body knows that the costs of environmental remediation 
are grossly underestimated, grossly underbudgeted. DOD claims it is 
``empowering communities'' by speeding base cleanup, and I would like 
to give you the results in California of what is termed ``speedy base 
cleanup.''
  Environmental remediation--that is just remediation--is in place at 
only 29 percent of the Army BRAC sites; 14 percent of the Navy BRAC 
sites; and 18 percent of the Air Force BRAC sites in my State. 
Environmental remediation has not been completed at a single base 
closed in any of the four rounds in the State of California.
  This issue is important, because without clean property, transfers by 
deed cannot occur and individuals cannot get financing. Therefore, if 
they don't have the bases cleaned up, they can't be effectively and 
fully put to use.

[[Page S7059]]

  Let me take the four California instances that the Secretary of 
Defense raises in his letter. First, Castle Air Force Base. That is in 
California's Central Valley. It was closed by BRAC in 1991. To date, 
there have been 262 separate sites at this base identified for cleanup; 
65 of these sites have not yet even been evaluated to determine what 
contaminants are in the soil or water; and none of the sites--none of 
the sites--on this base, held out as a model, have remediation efforts 
currently in place.
  Second base: Mather Air Force Base in Sacramento was closed by BRAC 
in 1988. To date, there have been 87 sites identified for cleanup; 15 
have not yet been evaluated to determine what contaminants are in the 
soil or the water; and only 39 of the sites, or 44 percent, have 
remediation efforts in place. So 55 percent of the sites haven't even 
begun to be worked on yet.
  Another of these sterling examples, Norton Air Force Base in southern 
California, closed by BRAC in 1988. To date, 25 sites have been 
identified for cleanup; 6 have not yet been evaluated to determine what 
contaminants are in the soil or water; and only 10 of the sites, or 40 
percent, have remediation efforts in place.
  None of the environmental cleanup has been completed at any of the 
bases anywhere in California. These were bases, Mather and Norton, that 
were closed nearly 10 years ago, and yet they are not close to being 
clean. No transfer by deed have yet occurred at Norton and a very 
limited number of these transfers by deed have occurred at Mather.
  Alameda Naval Air Station and Naval Aviation Depot was closed by BRAC 
in 1993. One of the real problems I had when this was closed was that 
Alameda had 7,600 units of housing that were going to be vacated. The 
fleet, the nuclear carriers were to be moved to Everett and San Diego. 
Everett had no housing for the wings. Housing had to be built. MilCon 
was not included in the cost of closing that base.

  To date at Alameda, there have been 30 sites identified for cleanup. 
Only one of these sites has not yet been evaluated to determine what 
contaminants are in the soil or water. But none of the sites have 
remediation in place. So at Alameda, they have done some 
identification; they have done no remediation.
  Sacramento Army Depot was closed by BRAC in 1991, and this is 
probably California's most successful reuse site to date. They have 16 
sites identified for cleanup. All cleanup sites have been evaluated, 
and 12 sites, or 75 percent, have remediation efforts in place.
  It should also be pointed out, there is no deadline for the 
completion of environmental cleanup at BRAC sites. Let me, once again, 
make this point clear. Communities can't reuse a base when they don't 
know when it is going to be clean. The law has been liberalized to 
allow long-term, interim leases to be granted for dirty property, but 
these leases are limited in scope, and the potential buyer cannot 
obtain financing under these circumstances, and this has further 
delayed and deterred base reuse.
  DOD has given communities estimates as to when their bases will be 
clean, but DOD will not guarantee these completion dates, and every 
year, environmental cleanup is underfunded and every year it is delayed 
even more.
  The Air Force estimates that Castle Air Force Base should have 
environmental remediation in place by the year 2000 and that it should 
be complete by 2018. So the total base cannot be transferred into 
private reuse at Castle Air Force Base until the year 2018.
  The Air Force estimates that Mather should have environmental 
remediation in place by 1999 and that this should be complete by the 
year 2027. So it will take to 2027 for the process to be completed and 
the base to be transferred.
  The Air Force estimates that Norton Air Force Base should have 
environmental remediation in place by 1999, and that this should be 
complete by 2012. So, again, one has to wait for the base to be 
transferred.
  DOD is also far behind on the transfer of base closure property, due 
in large part to environmental contamination. In my State, and this is 
the largest State, only 4 percent of the acreage--4 percent of 79,618 
acres--have been transferred by deed to new owners.
  So we are contemplating here a new BRAC closure round when only 4 
percent of the land covered in California has been deeded to new 
owners. It does not make sense. If one is thinking about the 
communities and really means that reuse should work, how can you go 
ahead with a new round where you have 80,000 acres of land and only 4 
percent of them at this stage have been deeded to a local entity?
  Only 19 percent of these acres have been transferred by long-term 
lease, and a whopping 49 percent are still sitting there with no action 
on any kind of transfer having taken place.
  So one-half of the acreage that has been closed in California has no 
plan for a transfer at this stage, and we are still contemplating a new 
round.
  Many of these base closure communities are working hard to make the 
best of their misfortune and many are optimistic about the prospects of 
base reuse. But before we pile on these additional rounds, let us look 
candidly at some of the difficulties they are facing.
  In Tustin, CA, the community is trying to reuse the Tustin Marine 
Corps Air Station. After 14 months of negotiations for an interim lease 
for one of the large blimp hangars and the loss of nine potential film 
tenants, a lease was approved by the city of Tustin and the Navy's 
Southwest Engineering Division. When the Pentagon subsequently rejected 
this lease, the prospective tenant, Walt Disney Productions, simply got 
fed up and left to lease space elsewhere.
  So here you had a base with a prime potential tenant, and the 
bureaucratic nightmare that has ensued caused it to be rejected, and 
Disney walked off and went somewhere else. So that was the 10th one 
they lost.
  At Norton Air Force Base, the Worldpointe Trade Center project that 
Secretary Cohen lauds in his June 24 letter will not happen due to a 
lack of financing. The community has regrouped, though, and now this 
project will be replaced by an industrial park that will take 5 years 
to build and yield only 40 percent of the jobs hoped for with the trade 
center development.
  At Mather Air Force Base in Sacramento, the Air Force and Sacramento 
County have finally reached agreement on the sale of 1,200 housing 
units. It took four separate appraisals and 5 years of negotiations to 
finally reach the price of $4.25 million--the same price as the 
county's 1993 appraisal.
  At George Air Force Base in southern California, it took 20 months to 
get a signed economic development conveyance. It was submitted by the 
community in February 1995 and finally signed in 1996.
  Another EDC at Mare Island Naval Shipyard was submitted in January of 
1996--of 1996--and a year and a half later is still pending. They are 
still waiting for a decision.
  The city of Long Beach just completed a negotiated sale with the 
former Long Beach Naval Hospital. After 18 months of negotiations, the 
city will have to pay the Navy $8.6 million to buy back this 30-acre 
site that the city sold to the Navy in 1964 for 10 dollars. So they 
sold it to the Navy for 10 dollars and now they buy it back at $8.6 
million. To make matters worse, the Navy required that the city provide 
the Navy with a letter of credit to secure two promissory notes to buy 
back the property. This cost the city of Long Beach an additional 
$50,000.
  Finally, the goal of base closures was to save DOD money so that we 
could modernize our force. If anybody could come in here and say, look, 
the Navy has saved x dollars in California by closing bases, I would 
say, OK, now we know either it was cost efficient or it was not cost 
efficient and we have a sound basis on which to make another judgment.
  But as I said before, the Navy will not give my office a single 
figure as to what cost savings can be anticipated from closure of major 
Navy bases in the State of California. Yet, we are going to go about 
another round today.
  The GAO and the CBO both say that DOD's estimated savings cannot be 
quantified. GAO and CBO cannot quantify what the military says the 
savings estimates are.

  DOD has not included the total cost of environmental cleanup in its 
net savings figures. By 2001, DOD claims

[[Page S7060]]

that it will have saved nearly $14 billion from BRAC. To their credit, 
they did include the cost of environmental cleanup through 2001. That 
was $7.3 billion. But they did not include the cost of BRAC cleanup for 
these sites after 2001. In California alone this will cost another 
$1.56 billion.
  So, in the costs that have been provided by the military to this 
body, with California alone it is $1.56 billion shy, short, lacking, 
not defined, not there; and yet we would go ahead with another round 
regardless of knowing what the true costs and true savings actually 
are.
  Let us look at how much additional cleanup funding four of five 
California success stories will need past the year 2001.
  Castle will require an additional $53.1 million.
  Mather will require an additional $73.8 million.
  Norton will require an additional $1.25 million.
  Alameda Naval Air Station and Naval Aviation Depot will require an 
additional $73.4 million.
  None of this is counted before we make the decision. And I am just 
giving you four bases here--not 29.
  The true costs of BRAC should include all of these costs related to 
closure, not just those funded directly by the BRAC account. Until they 
do, frankly, I will not vote ever for another round. Just because these 
costs are funded from other Federal accounts does not mean that they 
are any less real.
  So what is happening, Mr. President, is that they fund some of this 
from other accounts and they do not cost them in. So that way the 
military costs look less, but the Federal costs--it is all the same, it 
all comes from the same taxpayer, all goes into the same budget, but it 
is not counted here.
  DOD's Office of Economic Adjustment grants to base closure 
communities for base reuse planning, $125 million. It is not counted 
here, not counted as a cost. It is a cost? Of course it is a cost.
  The Department of Commerce, Economic Development Administration 
grants to base closure communities, $371 million. It is not counted 
here as a cost.
  FAA grants to establish airports at closed bases, $182 million. It is 
not counted here.
  It is like MilCon, except MilCon is in the defense budget. These are 
not in the defense budget. They are necessary, but not counted.
  Department of Labor job retraining grants, $103 million. It is not 
counted in the cost of base closure.
  So without at least a firm accounting of how much the first four 
rounds of BRAC cost and how much was saved, I cannot and I do not 
believe any Member of this body should support a new round.
  We have moved too fast in closing these bases. We need to look at the 
bottom line. What are these closures costing, not only the Defense 
Department, but the FAA, the Department of Commerce, the Department of 
Labor in retraining grants, the Office of Economic Adjustment? What are 
the costs? And factor those costs in. What are the costs of MilCon for 
all of the rounds? Factor those costs in as well.
  Later this afternoon it is my understanding that Senator Dorgan will 
be offering an amendment to propose a study to come up with just this 
very information. I think to proceed with another round until the study 
is done and until we have the specific information would really be a 
major, major mistake.
  We need to look at operations and maintenance. We need to look at 
military construction, environmental cleanup costs, base reuse costs 
and economic redevelopment costs also funded by the Federal Government, 
unemployment compensation costs, military health care costs and force 
structure costs. All of this should be looked at, I believe, by an 
independent agency, figures ascertained on which responsible people can 
depend, and then another decision can be made on another day about 
another round.
  I think this is ill-advised. It is too fast. And it will simply 
complicate one flawed procedure with another flawed round.
  I thank the Chair and I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who seeks recognition?
  Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I strongly support the amendment which has 
been offered by Senator McCain to have an additional two rounds of base 
closings. I do so for many, many reasons. But let me just cite first 
that we have a recommendation which is as strong a one as I have ever 
seen from the uniformed military of this country, pleading with us to 
reduce excess baggage, the infrastructure that they no longer need 
because it is costing money which is desperately needed elsewhere.

  We cannot successfully do what we need to do for the defense of this 
Nation, they are telling us--and I will quote that letter in a moment--
if we continue to carry excess infrastructure which we simply no longer 
needed. Now, we are going to hear lots of reasons why it is tough to do 
it and lots of reasons why we should not do it. We will address those 
one by one.
  But when you get a letter, which we have received, signed by the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, every single member, a so-called 24-star letter, 
it does not happen very often around here. But when we get a letter 
from General Shalikashvili and the Vice Chairman Joe Ralston, and each 
of the Chiefs signing a letter as succinct and to the point as this one 
is, I think we ought to give it the most serious consideration. We 
cannot just shed this and say, base closing is tough or we cannot prove 
precisely how much money it saves. We have a pretty good idea, by the 
way, and I will get to that in a moment. But we just cannot simply say, 
base closings are tough. And they are. Let me tell you, my State knows 
it. Percentagewise, it is one of the 10 hardest hit States with base 
closings, and we still have facilities where people feel they are at 
risk.
  But this is what the letter from the Joint Chiefs says. It is 
addressed to our chairman, Senator Thurmond. I am going to read it all. 
It is a short letter, but it is very much to the point.

       Dear Mr. Chairman.
       As the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) appropriately 
     notes, achieving the type of force this country will need in 
     the 21st century requires significant increases in our 
     investment accounts. Given other pressures on the federal 
     budget, we must make every effort to find the funds within 
     the Department of Defense budget.
       Now that is point one. We have to make every effort we can 
     to find the funds necessary for future investments in the 
     defense of this country inside the defense budget. That is a 
     statement based on reality. It is a statement based on the 
     desire of all of us to get down to a zero deficit and to 
     begin to pay off the national debt. It is a statement based 
     on the reality that the defense budget is not going to grow 
     faster or in a different way than what we have projected in 
     our 5-year defense budget, unless, of course, world 
     circumstances change.

  Then the letter goes on:

       Since the end of the Cold War, the Defense base structure 
     has been reduced approximately 26 percent. When the QDR 
     reductions are complete, the overall end strength of the 
     department will have been reduced by over 36 percent.
       We strongly support further reductions in base structure 
     proposed by the Secretary of Defense. Any process must be 
     based on military utility, but sensitive to the impact such 
     reductions will have on the Service communities in which our 
     people live.
       We ask your assistance in addressing this difficult issue.

  Now, they are asking our assistance to do something which is 
difficult, and it is difficult politically, and every one of us knows 
that. I don't think there is any one of us who has a facility in our 
State that we have not been worried about it, that we have not gone to 
bat for, that we have not been an advocate for and, in some cases, have 
won a battle for a base and, in other cases, lost a battle for a base.
  That is one of the reasons we are here, to be advocates for our 
States, and we do that proudly. I have done that for bases in my State. 
I have won some and I have lost some. We have lost every Strategic Air 
Command base in my State--all three, gone--and it has been painful. 
They have been in rural communities. In one case, most recently, up in 
the Upper Peninsula of Michigan, it was the largest single employer in 
the Upper Peninsula, Sawyer Air Force.
  Has the environmental cleanup gone as predicted? It has not gone as 
fast.

[[Page S7061]]

Have we struggled to make sure the leases are available to people who 
want to lease that property? We have; we work with them every day. Is 
it working out OK? It is. Is it tough? It is. Have there been 
dislocations? Yes. But is there any alternative if we are going to do 
our job to come up with the necessary resources to defend this country? 
Is there any alternative but to shed the excess baggage which our Joint 
Chiefs are asking us to shed? This is not easy for them, either. Those 
are communities that they have their hearts and souls in. But what they 
are telling us is we must bite this political bullet again if we are 
going to save the funds necessary for modernization, for investment 
accounts, for readiness, for the other things which we need to do in 
our defense budget.
  The Quadrennial Defense Review reached the same conclusion. The 
Secretary of Defense has reached the same conclusion. So the amendment 
is simple. It authorizes the same process that we used in 1991, 1993, 
and 1995 for two new rounds in 1999 and 2001. We have changed this 
process over the years. We have tried to make the environmental cleanup 
faster. We worked on the leases to make sure that they be available to 
lease land, even before it was finally cleaned up. We tried to improve 
the notice requirements, the fairness requirements. We made lots of 
changes over the years. But to say we are going to not continue to do 
what our uniformed military says we must do to avoid wasting billions 
of dollars each year because it is politically difficult or because we 
cannot determine the precise amount, in an audited fashion, of the 
savings, it seems to me, is inconsistent with the desire of this body 
to protect the Nation's defense.
  This process has the Secretary of Defense, again, making 
recommendations to a commission, nominated by the President, confirmed 
by the Senate. During those confirmation hearings, we got into all of 
the kinds of issues and concerns which each of us has relative to base 
closing. The commission, after being confirmed by the Senate, reviews 
these recommendations and makes their own recommendations to the 
President. The President then reviews the recommendation, either sends 
those back to the commission for additional work or forwards them, 
without changes, to the Congress, and then the recommendations of the 
commission go into effect unless disapproved by a joint resolution of 
the Congress. That is the process.
  Has it been perfect? It has not. There have been many changes made in 
this process over the years. This amendment is open to other changes in 
terms of how do we approve the process. But to say that the process is 
not perfect means we should perfect it. It does not mean that we should 
ditch it when it has led to significant savings already and when it is 
essential to lead to additional savings in the future.
  The case for closing more military bases is simply clear, and it is 
compelling. From 1989 to 1997, the Department of Defense reduced total 
active duty military end strength by 32 percent, and that figure will 
grow to 36 percent by 2003 as a result of the recently completed 
Quadrennial Defense Review, known as the QDR. So we are going to be 
reducing the active end strength, the number of people in our military, 
by 36 percent. But even after the four base closure rounds that are now 
completed, the reduction in domestic base structure will be 21 percent. 
So we have a gap. We have excess. We have surplus. We have baggage we 
must shed. We have facilities that are no longer being fully used, 
facilities that are not being run in a way which makes economic sense. 
These are facilities which we can no longer justify keeping.

  Which are those facilities? Does anyone really believe that we on the 
Senate floor could decide which facilities need to be closed? It was 
the inability of the Congress to make those kinds of decisions which 
brought the Base Closure Commission into effect to begin with. We 
realized a few years back that we could not close bases ourselves. It 
is too difficult politically. There are too many pressures on us. There 
are too many tradeoffs that are possible. So we created a BRAC 
commission, giving ourselves a final right to veto, but basically 
saying that this is the only realistic way we are going to downsize the 
unneeded structure.
  Now, this year, General Shalikashvili, who is our Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs, testified before our committee as follows: ``As difficult 
as it is politically, we will have to further reduce our 
infrastructure. We, perhaps, have more excess infrastructure today than 
we did when the BRAC process started. In the short run, we need to 
close more facilities, as painful and as expensive as it is.'' That is 
his quote.
  One line in that quote, I hope, if nothing else, will remain with us: 
``We, perhaps, have more excess infrastructure today than we did when 
the BRAC process started.''
  Now, both the QDR and the independent National Defense Panel--and 
this is the group of citizens outside the Defense Department that have 
been appointed by the President--both the QDR, the Quadrennial Defense 
Review, inside the Defense Department, and the independent National 
Defense Panel have concluded that further reductions in DOD 
infrastructure--that is the base structure of the Department of 
Defense--are essential to free up the money that we need to modernize 
our forces.
  On May 23, Secretary Cohen wrote to the chairman, Senator Thurmond, 
and to me, asking the Congress to act this year on his request to 
authorize two additional base closure rounds in 1999 and 2001. Though 
we will not get the final report of the National Defense Panel until 
later this year, they do have an interim report dated May 15 which 
accompanies the Quadrennial Defense Review. This is what the outside 
citizens panel said about base closures:

       We endorse the Secretary's plan to request authority for 
     two additional rounds of base closure and realignment. We 
     strongly urge the administration to support legislation that 
     will start this process in 1999 and encourage Congress to 
     approve the request despite constituency challenges.

  Several weeks ago, the Armed Services Committee received a letter, as 
I indicated, which all six members of the Joint Chiefs signed. We do 
not get these 24-star letters every day or every week or even every 
year. I am not sure I can even remember the last 24-star letter that we 
have received. But now the Chiefs, every one of them, say that the 
committee should reduce base structure supported by the Secretary of 
Defense.
  While I have read this letter, I ask unanimous consent, Mr. 
President, that a copy of the letter from the Chiefs be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                                   Chairman of the


                                        Joint Chiefs of Staff,

                                     Washington, DC, June 4, 1997.
     Hon. Strom Thurmond,
     Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman. As the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 
     appropriately notes, achieving the type of force this country 
     will need in the 21st century requires significant increases 
     in our investment accounts. Given other pressures on the 
     federal budget, we must make every effort to find the funds 
     within the Department of Defense budget.
       Since the end of the Cold War, the Defense base structure 
     has been reduced approximately 26 percent. When the QDR 
     reductions are complete, the overall end strength of the 
     department will have been reduced by over 26 percent.
       We strongly support further reductions in base structure 
     proposed by the Secretary of Defense. Any process must be 
     based on military utility, but sensitive to the impact such 
     reductions will have on the Service communities in which our 
     people live.
       We ask your assistance in addressing this difficult issue.
           Sincerely,
     Joseph W. Ralston,
       Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
     Dennis J. Reimer,
       General, United States Army, Chief of Staff.
     Ronald R. Fogleman,
       General, United States Air Force, Chief of Staff.
     John M. Shalikashvili,
       Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
     Jay L. Johnson,
       Admiral, United States Navy, Chief of Naval Operations.
     Charles C. Krulak,
       General, U.S. Marine Corps, Commandant of the Marine Corps.

  Mr. LEVIN. The service chiefs have also made the case for shrinking 
our base structure. In testimony before the committee, General Reimer 
said:

       We cut 36 percent out of the force structure and 21 percent 
     of the infrastructure in

[[Page S7062]]

     the Army. I think we need to balance those two out or we are 
     going to pay a heavy price that we should not have to pay.

  The testimony of the service chiefs makes this point very clear. The 
issue is not base closures or no base closures. The issue is either we 
shrink the base structure or we are going to have to cut modernization. 
If we make the wrong choice and do not close any more bases, this 
problem is not going to go away. If we keep excess bases open and try 
to protect modernization by cutting the size of our forces instead, 
that will further increase the amount of excess base structure, which 
will, in turn, increase the pressure to close bases.
  This problem is not going to go away. This problem will get worse if 
we delay it. If we cut forces instead of closing bases, that will 
inevitably lead to increased operating costs and increases days away 
from home for the smaller number of personnel who will be left. This 
issue is not going to go away. It will fester and get worse unless we 
address it. It will not be easier to determine and make this decision a 
year from now or 2 years from now than it is now.
  The reason there is so much pressure coming from our defense 
establishment to authorize more base closures is because the Defense 
Department understands that reductions in the base structure are 
essential to the modernization of our forces. Every dollar we spend to 
keep bases open that we do not need--excess bases--is a dollar we 
cannot spend on modernization programs that our military forces do 
need.
  As Secretary Cohen said in his preface to the QDR report:

       In essence, our combat forces are headed toward the 21st 
     century, but our infrastructure is stuck in the past. We 
     cannot afford this waste of resources in an environment of 
     tough choices and fiscal constraint. We must shed weight.

  This is not just a choice which the Defense Department faces. This is 
not just Secretary Cohen's problem. This is our problem, and it is a 
problem which will get worse unless we make this decision earlier 
rather than later.
  We cannot just tell the Department of Defense, ``Reform yourself.'' 
The Department of Defense can reform if they want to, which they do, 
but they can't reform if we can't let them. It requires legislative 
action. As General Fogleman, who is Chief of Staff of the Air Force, 
said to our committee, ``Getting lean and mean is no easy feat. We can 
be mean if we have to, but we need your help to get lean.''
  Make no mistake, if we don't act this year to approve and to 
authorize additional base closure rounds, there will not be any 
additional base closures before the turn of the century. No bases have 
been or will be closed outside of the Base Closure Commission process 
contained in this amendment, and every year we delay facing this issue, 
we delay achieving the potential savings that we need to modernize our 
forces.
  Now, the argument has been made that we can't prove exactly how much 
previous base closures have saved. I agree that we don't know exactly 
how much base closures have saved. We can't audit it; it is not that 
precise. But I don't know of any disagreement over the fact that 
closing bases has saved, and will save, substantial amounts of money. 
The savings don't always come as quickly as the Department of Defense 
originally forecasts, for a number of reasons. But the savings have 
been there, and they are documented.
  The CBO concluded in that same report, which was read before, that 
``BRAC actions will result in significant long-term savings.'' Now, the 
Department of Defense makes an estimate on savings. These estimates are 
available for Members of the Senate. They are based on 100 or so 
reports of base closings. Their estimate is that implementing the BRAC 
actions in the first four rounds will result in $23 billion in one-time 
implementation costs--that is the cost--and this is offset by savings 
of $36.5 billion--that's the savings--for a total net savings of $13.5 
billion. So that is between 1990 and 2001 when the implementation of 
the first four rounds is supposed to be concluded. That is a net 
savings--deducting the investment from the gross savings--of $13.5 
billion. That's what Secretary Cohen has written us. That is what he 
has testified to. That is the best information that is available.
  Secretary Cohen estimates that each of the additional BRAC rounds 
that he is asking the Congress to approve will save $1.4 billion a year 
once they are fully implemented. That is comparable to the savings that 
will be achieved from the 1991 and 1995 rounds.
  Maybe 5 years from now we are going to find that the actual savings 
from the first four rounds of base closures will be slightly smaller or 
slightly larger than the $5.6 billion I have referred to. But there is 
no question that there are large, ongoing savings from shrinking our 
base structure. Before the first base closure round, we had 
approximately 500 domestic military bases. When all of the bases from 
the first four BRAC rounds are closed, we will have about 400 bases. So 
80 percent of the bases will remain after all four BRAC rounds are 
implemented, even though we will have seen a reduction of one-third of 
our force structure.
  Now, the exact amount that we are saving is impossible to prove--
these are approximations and estimates--for lots of reasons, including 
the fact that these savings represent money we would have spent to pay 
civilians we no longer have and to operate bases that we no longer 
have. So they are, by definition, estimates; we can't audit them. But I 
cannot imagine someone trying to argue that we are not going to save 
large sums of money by operating 400 bases instead of 500 bases. That 
is 100 fewer bases at which we have to pay for electricity, heat, 
water, telephone service, maintenance, and security.
  These BRAC savings, Mr. President, are an important part of the funds 
that are going to finance the future modernization of the armed 
services that will keep our military the most technologically advanced 
and lethal fighting force in the world.
  Some people have expressed concern that funds from base closures may 
not go toward modernization. But this amendment includes a provision 
that would require the Department to ensure that all savings that come 
from future base closings go toward modernization programs.
  Now, over the last few months, another issue has been raised, an 
issue relative to the question of privatization in place. Some of our 
colleagues complain about the implementation of the 1995 Base Closure 
Commission recommendation with respect to the closing of two Air Force 
depots, at Kelly and Sacramento. There are clearly very strong feelings 
on this issue, and understandably so. I don't agree with those who say 
that what happened, however, in 1995, whatever one's view of those 
events are, somehow justifies refusing to ever close any more bases.
  My own view is that we should let the market decide the most 
efficient way to redistribute the workload of these two closing depots 
and that the way to let the market decide that is through a fair and 
open competition.
  Deputy Secretary of Defense John White testified before our Readiness 
Subcommittee in May that the Department's policy is no longer to 
privatize the work of these two closing depots in place, but to compete 
their workload between the public depots and the private sector. 
Secretary Cohen wrote a letter to the majority and minority leaders 
reaffirming the Department's policy of competing this work. He also 
testified before our committee that, ``If you disagree with giving the 
commission this kind of discretion''--he was referring to privatization 
in place-- ``then you can always restrict it in the future.''
  That is what the amendment does. To address the problem of 
privatization in place for future BRAC rounds, this amendment includes 
language that would allow the Secretary of Defense to privatize in 
place the workload of a closing military installation only when it is 
explicitly recommended by the Base Closure Commission as either the 
correct way to close the base or as one option.
  But whatever our view is of privatization in place at the two air 
logistic centers that were closed by the 1995 Base Closure Commission, 
that is no reason to cut off our nose to spite our face and keep excess 
base structures open at a huge, unjustifiable cost in the future.

  As I said a moment ago, I know personally how painful the base 
closing process is. Michigan never had a very large military presence, 
but we rank seventh among all States in the percentage of total BRAC 
job losses. So we

[[Page S7063]]

know in our State, and we know that we have a few additional facilities 
that some people think could be at risk.
  If we are serious about modernizing our military forces and if we are 
serious about maintaining the qualitative technological edge that we 
have, then we have no choice but to reduce our infrastructure costs so 
that they are in line with our foresight.
  The Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs are right. We need to 
close more bases if we are going to modernize our forces, and we are 
not going to be able to do that unless this amendment is adopted.
  I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
  Mr. ROBERTS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas is recognized.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I appreciate the opportunity to speak on 
behalf of the overall defense bill and to give credit where credit is 
due in regard to the distinguished chairman of the committee, Senator 
Thurmond, and the distinguished ranking member from Michigan, Senator 
Levin. I want to pay tribute to their leadership. I think the committee 
did great work, and there was much bipartisan agreement. I think we had 
a very difficult task in this regard.
  I would like to draw the attention of my colleagues to a study called 
``America's National Interests'' by the Commission on America's 
National Interest. It was about a year ago, and I served on the 
commission with some very qualified people who have a great deal of 
expertise in regard to defense matters. The cochairs were Robert 
Ellsworth, Andrew Goodpaster, and Rita Hauser. The study was done by 
the Center for Science and International Affairs of Harvard University 
and also by the Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom and the Rand Corp.
  Basically, they had an executive summary that pretty well said this: 
No. 1, American foreign policy and American national interests don't 
really represent a very high blip on the national attention radar 
screen. They said America was adrift. ``In the wake of the Cold War, 
the American public's interest in foreign policy has declined sharply 
and political leaders have been pressed to attend to immediate domestic 
concerns.'' Certainly that is true. ``After four decades of unusual 
single-mindedness in containing Soviet expansion, we have seen five 
years of ad hoc fits and starts.'' This was last year, remember. ``If 
it continues, this drift will threaten our values, our fortunes, and 
indeed our lives.''
  I think the committee took an important first step in trying to end 
this drift. They mentioned confusion and the lack of a national 
strategy as we try to determine how much money to spend on defense, 
which, after all, is the first obligation of the Federal Government.
  So having said that, I want to again thank Senator Levin and Senator 
Thurmond for their leadership. However, I must rise in opposition to 
the amendment as argued for by Senator Levin and as proposed by Senator 
McCain. I am talking about BRAC. I am talking about the effort to, 
obviously, reduce the excess infrastructure that we have in regard to 
our national defense system.
  I want to make it very clear and I want to really emphasize that I do 
not support--and I don't know of anybody in the Senate or, for that 
matter, in the House of Representatives who supports--carrying excess 
or unproductive capacity in our military infrastructure. After all, how 
could anybody stand up here and say that they were supporting that? 
Having said that, I don't think we should sign onto another BRAC 
process until we are confident that the process will be done without 
making it a political football or without receiving an answer to 
several very fundamental questions, which I would like to go into.
  No. 1, we need to certify what is meant by overcapacity. Everybody 
seems to agree that there is excess capacity in the structure of the 
military. I think that is obvious. Senator Levin just went over that. 
But if you ask different people where exactly that excess 
infrastructure exists, a variety of answers will certainly be given. 
Many argue that there is a great disparity between the reduction of 
military end-strength, down 36 percent--Senator McCain mentioned that. 
Every proponent of the BRAC process and of this amendment will tell you 
that the military end-strength is down 36 percent and reduction of 
military base structure is down 21 percent. Now, there is a 
relationship between these two. I know that. But there is no numerical 
correlation that would define what percentage of base closure we should 
strive for. That is extremely important. If there were such a numerical 
correlation, closing any of our bases would help bring the percentage 
in line.

  I think common sense tells us that it is a lot more complex than 
simple percentages. If we all agree that excess capacity exists--and I 
think we do--I think that the Department of Defense, before we approve 
something like this amendment, should develop a certified list defining 
that excess capacity. What's wrong with that? I might add, I think we 
probably have that list already prepared. Why not really delineate the 
amount of excess and the priority of eliminating that excess and the 
difficulty of restoring the capability if required by a military 
operation? Let me repeat that. Let us try to delineate the amount of 
excess and the priority of eliminating that excess and, most important, 
the difficulty of restoring the capability if required by a military 
operation.
  Once you lose the base, once you lose that infrastructure, like 
Humpty-Dumpty, it is off the wall, gone; you can't regain it. It is not 
reasonable to agree to a BRAC if we don't fully understand the nature 
and location and the amount of the reported excess.
  I have the same letter from Secretary Cohen and the letter 
illustrated on the minority side from the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
expressing their support for a BRAC. Secretary Cohen, a good friend, a 
former colleague, said this: ``With the expiration of the previous BRAC 
legislation, the Department needs a process to close or realign excess 
military installations. Even after four rounds of base closures, we 
have eliminated only 21 percent''--here we go again--``of our U.S. base 
structure while force structure will drop by 36 percent by fiscal year 
2003.''
  Let me repeat again what I think is a fallacy. Secretary Cohen's 
letter--I know it is not his intent, but his letter suggests the direct 
correlation, again in percentage points, between base closures of 21 
percent and force structure reductions of 36 percent. There is no 
direct correlation between the reduction of troops and how many bases 
should be cut. There is, of course, a connection, but to suggest there 
is some kind of a mathematical correlation is false. It is misleading. 
Exactly how we could get into indiscriminate cutting of facilities--the 
assumption of such a simple-minded statement is that all bases are 
equal.
  Senator Levin has just indicated that of 100 bases remaining, and 
there is a need to reduce base structure by perhaps 15 percent, that 
any 15 bases would do the trick. Unfortunately, this is the exact 
argument--down 36 percent in troops but only 21 percent in bases--which 
was made in behalf of this whole argument. It is the very reason we 
need to understand which bases are in excess and which bases support 
the strategy. If it is 15 percent and you cut 15 bases out of 100, if 
that doesn't have anything to do with what kind of a base it is, what 
kind of force is there, or what the mission of the base is, I don't 
think that correlation really makes any sense.
  Let's talk about the type of facilities to be considered once the DOD 
develops a certified list of excess capacity, and then what specific 
types of facilities to be considered for closure should be provided. If 
the Department of Defense demonstrates that certain types of facilities 
do not represent excess capacity, it doesn't make any sense to include 
them in the process. Why would we want to do that?
  The effect of this action would shorten and focus the BRAC process. 
We would have successful BRAC, we would eliminate a lot of the 
headaches, pain and suffering, and the politics that the proponents of 
this amendment always talk about. Just as important, it would let those 
communities with military facilities as neighbors know whether they 
need to be concerned or not and prevent them from spending large sums 
of money to help save their bases. That is what happens.
  As soon as this amendment is passed--I hope it does not; the 
committee did not pass it and the House of

[[Page S7064]]

Representatives did not pass it--every community next to a base in 
America will hire a consultant, spending large sums of money, and will 
end up in BRAC purgatory. It is not necessary. We could shorten the 
process and get this job done with a better process.
  Let's talk about the criteria to be used for closure recommendations.
  There needs to be a full discussion of the criteria used for the BRAC 
process. I have the old criteria here somewhere, but, obviously, this 
isn't the criteria that is going to be used. This is the former base 
realignment and closure criteria. I thought the new criteria were going 
to be judged on the Bottom-Up Review and the QDR and the National 
Defense Panel. The National Defense Panel hasn't made a comment on 
where we are headed in terms of national defense strategy. We don't 
have the criteria yet. I think we are putting the cart before the 
horse.
  So, at any rate, I think we need a full discussion of the criteria 
used for the BRAC process to ensure the results of the process are 
consistent with the strategy, as I have indicated, of the Bottom-Up 
Review and the QDR. For example, it makes little sense to me to use the 
same criteria of the last BRAC since we have substantially altered the 
military since then and our strategy has been changed. That is why we 
are going through this. A critical analysis of the criteria and their 
weight in the process is required. We should not inadvertently cut meat 
from our capacity if fat exists somewhere else simply because the 
criteria we used is flawed.
  I want to talk about cost for just a moment. It seems to me, despite 
the claims of, I think, $2.7 billion that the letter indicated that we 
are going to save--and I think Senators Levin, McCain, and others 
listed $13.5 billion by the year 2001--I question that either in 
magnitude or when those savings will be seen. The whole purpose of this 
process, as proposed by the authors of this amendment, is to save the 
precious defense dollars.
  Let me point out that we are supposed to be talking about national 
strategy here. The committee did its best, but in terms of trying to 
determine how much we spend on defense in the post-cold-war period, we 
said, ``OK, you can have all the strategy you want, but don't spend 
more than $250 billion.''
  So it is budget driven and numbers driven, and the whole key argument 
in behalf of this is to save the precious defense dollars and use them 
for procurement and modernization and quality of life. So you close the 
bases. You save the money. And, as the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 
Secretary, and the proponents of the amendment said, we are going to 
improve the quality of life, modernization, and procurement.
  Well, I am not sure that those savings will be there. And, second, I 
will tell you where the money will go. If we could earmark this money, 
maybe put it in a lockbox and give the key to Senator Thurmond--I sure 
trust him as to where the money should go--I might support this. But do 
you know where the money is going to go? Peacekeeping missions. For 
peacekeeping missions since President Clinton took office: 1993, $2.441 
billion; 1994, $1.9 billion; 1995, $2.16 billion; 1996, $3.3 billion; 
1997, projected $3.27 billion. I am not sure that even accounts for 
Bosnia.

  We are talking about savings that are going to occur in the outyears. 
And, yet, we have been using the peacekeeping fund for modernization 
and readiness and quality of life? That is what has been happening. If 
we could earmark these savings for all of the very good purposes that 
proponents of this amendment are talking about, it might be one thing. 
But we are not.
  So what will happen is that we will go through this whole process 
only to find out that we are putting a lot of people into what I call 
BRAC purgatory only to find out that we don't have the separation by 
the people who really do that right now between those bases that are 
needed and not, and also the problem with cost savings only to find out 
that it will be spent for peacekeeping.
  I am not opposed to peacekeeping in every instance. But it seems to 
me in terms of our national strategy and in America's national 
interest, I am not sure that that has been simply well spent.
  I would like to associate myself with the remarks of Senator 
Feinstein of California, and I would like to say that I know that it is 
the right thing to do in regard to base closures. Nobody in this 
Senate--nobody anywhere--is for saving excess infrastructure. That is 
just not a possible position, and we shouldn't do that.
  I might add in closing, Mr. President, that I am one who is concerned 
about some of my colleagues who with some degree of condescending 
understanding look at me and say, ``Well, now, you know, we all have 
politics, and we all have the pain of politics.'' I know it is going to 
be hard. This is not premised on any base in Kansas. This is based on a 
firm belief that this may be the right thing to do. But we are going at 
it the wrong way, and it is very premature.
  So for the reasons that I have listed--and I would only add that 
there is no reason why we can't wait on the QDR, the review, and the 
National Defense Panel, have the new criteria, certify the excess, 
earmark the savings, and, yes, then go ahead with some kind of a BRAC. 
There is no reason why we can't do that. But it seems to me that we are 
rushing to judgment here, and I think it would be very 
counterproductive. I think we should watch out for the law of 
unintended affects.
  I rise in opposition to the amendment offered by the Senator from 
Arizona and as agreed to by the Senator from Michigan and urge my 
colleagues to take another look at this. Let's take a little time. 
Let's do this right.
  I yield the floor.
  Ms. SNOWE addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Burns). The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. SNOWE. Thank you.


                         Privilege of the Floor

  Mr. President, first of all, I ask unanimous consent that the 
privilege of the floor be granted to two of my staff members, Tom 
Vecchiolla and Peggy Kline, during the pending consideration of the 
Defense authorization bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, thank you.
  First of all, I would like to commend the chairman of the Senate 
Armed Services Committee, Senator Thurmond, and the ranking member, 
Senator Levin, for their tremendous efforts in bringing the Defense 
Department authorization bill to the floor. I certainly think they have 
taken a great deal of initiative and leadership in putting this 
legislation together. I appreciate their efforts in that regard.
  I certainly want to associate myself with the remarks made by the 
Senator from Kansas, Senator Roberts, on the amendment that has been 
offered by our colleague from Arizona, Senator McCain. It is an 
amendment that I certainly will oppose in proposing more rounds of 
military base closures and realignment.
  I am certain the committee rejected the call for new base closings, 
and the Senate should follow suit.
  As we all know, the administration has asked for two more rounds of 
base closings with the intent of realizing $2.8 billion per year in 
savings from these new BRAC rounds. The administration further stated 
that these estimated savings are to be used to meet the well-
established requirements for $60 billion in procurement funding which 
is necessary to modernize our forces to meet the challenges of the 21st 
century.
  I have consistently asked the question as to exactly what has 
happened to the savings in the past four BRAC rounds that started in 
1988. The Pentagon estimated the savings to occur from those four 
rounds to be in the area of $57 billion over the next 20 years with the 
annualized savings of upwards of $5.6 billion per year starting in the 
year 2001. In its April 1995 report, the GAO estimated that such 
savings projects their estimates at less than $17 billion over the next 
20 years, past the number that had been projected by the Department of 
Defense, with annual recurring savings possibly being in the area of 
$1.8 billion in the year 2001.

  Mr. President, GAO conducted a further analysis and issued a 
following report in April 1996. In this report GAO found that the total 
amount of actual savings that may be estimated from the four previous 
BRAC rounds is uncertain, for a number of reasons, the primary of 
which, according to the

[[Page S7065]]

GAO, is that the DOD accounting systems do not provide adequate 
information or isolate their impact from that of other DOD initiatives.
  Despite the fact that the DOD has complied with legislative 
requirements for submitting annual costs and savings estimates, the GAO 
further stated that the estimates' usefulness is limited because the 
estimates are not budget quality and that the inclusion of these 
estimates of reduced personnel costs by all of the services are not 
uniform and, further, the GAO determined that certain community 
assistance costs were excluded. In fact, in one example, GAO identified 
the fact that DOD BRAC cost estimates included more than $781 million 
in economic assistance to local communities as well as other costs.
  In December 1996, the Congressional Budget Office, in its report, 
stated that it was unable to confirm or accept DOD's estimates of cost 
savings because the DOD is unable to report actual spending and savings 
from BRAC action.
  So now we have the Pentagon, the GAO, and the Congressional Budget 
Office with differing estimates on what has actually been saved and 
what is supposed to happen as a result of these four BRAC rounds since 
1988. There is no consensus on the numbers. That, indeed, in my 
opinion, is a significant problem, if we are to predicate future 
closings on these savings and estimated savings for the future.
  The fact is we are chasing an elusive infrastructure savings because 
there is no straight-line corollary between the size of our forces and 
the infrastructure required to meet two nearly simultaneous major 
regional conflicts. The Department of Defense has even admitted to the 
GAO investigators that they do not have accounting systems in place to 
isolate the impact of specific initiatives such as BRAC.
  So, in fact, we have no comprehensive adjustment of the reduction of 
the infrastructure that has occurred as a result of the four previous 
rounds of base closings and the impact on munitions as well as our 
forces. In fact, when these base closing rounds were first initiated, 
one of the greatest concerns that I had was that they would 
underestimate the cost of savings and overestimate the savings to 
accomplish the base closings.
  Mr. President, the projections for national defense outlays decrease 
34 percent over the period from 1990 to the year 2002. We have all seen 
the downward pressure in defense spending. In fact, we have seen a 
reduction of more than 40-percent in the defense budget since 1985. 
Future years' defense plans call for a 40 percent increase in the 
defense modernization budget within the confines of an overall defense 
budget that essentially will remain flat over the next few years. But 
yet, we have seen a procurement budget that has plummeted from $54 
billion in 1990 to today's level of just over $42 billion.
  It is interesting, because in the same time that we are seeing a 
reduction in procurement, we have had four previous rounds of base 
closings. You might have thought that money would have been invested in 
the procurement budget, but, in fact, the contrary has happened because 
again the Department of Defense underestimated the cost that is 
required to close these bases and overestimated the savings.
  As of May 1997, the DOD has invested $14 billion in base closings. 
The total implementation costs of the four previous BRAC actions 
through 2001 are estimated at $23 billion. Through fiscal year 1996, 
the DOD estimates that it may have saved through cost avoidance 
approximately $10 billion.
  So, in simple terms, to date we have spent $14 billion to avoid costs 
of $10 billion. Yet, we are promised by the DOD that the savings is in 
the outyear savings--savings that even DOD's own budget analysts say 
they are not equipped to track.
  The promise for the outyears has been a recurring theme for the 
Pentagon over the last 4 years. How many times have each of us heard 
that the fix for the procurement account is in the outyears? And each 
year we see the administration's request for procurement steadily 
decline. In fact, in each of these 4 years since the Pentagon completed 
the Bottom-Up Review an investment in the procurement accounts has 
actually been postponed.
  The procurement request for 1998 is $42 billion, whereas the fiscal 
year 1995 program had projected reaching $54 billion by now. So we have 
not seen the funding promised, and the DOD cannot show it to us in its 
own budgets, and the reasons are obvious. The funding has migrated 
elsewhere.
  In its own Quadrennial Defense Review, the DOD said the $18 billion 
meant for procurement under the 1995 plan has disappeared. The QDR 
report tells us that the funding migrated to three places. First, it 
went to unprogrammed operating expenses such as contingency operations 
like Bosnia. The second place was unrealized savings from initiatives 
like outsourcing or business process reengineering which failed to 
achieve the objectives and expectations, similar to the failure to 
achieve the levels of savings expected in the previous four BRAC 
rounds. And the third, of course, was new program demands.
  The QDR stated national defense policy of shape-respond-prepare 
reinforces the fact that U.S. forces will conduct smaller scale 
contingency operations for peacetime engagement. These operations 
include, according to the report, intervention, limited strike, no-fly 
zone enforcement, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, humanitarian 
assistance, and disaster relief. The QDR further projects that U.S. 
involvement in the smaller scale contingency operations will increase 
over the next 20 years.
  So we can expect more and more peacekeeping operations, far beyond 
the traditional missions of peacekeeping operations, that are going to 
require more robust military requirements. The QDR cites the obvious 
problem that DOD has had with the constant migration of funds which 
were planned for procurement ending up in operation and support 
activities. This certainly has been the case in the last few years to 
pay for operations like Bosnia and other areas where we have developed 
peacekeeping operations.
  Since 1991, in over 39 separate contingency operations in Southwest 
Asia, Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, et cetera, it is estimated that the 
taxpayers will pay over $17 billion for these operations. And as I 
illustrate in this chart here today, I think we can get an example of 
the multiple operations that the United States has been engaged in just 
in the decade of the 1990's. We know that in 1989 we spent less than 
$100 million in peacekeeping operations. In the decade of the 1990's 
alone we have spent the grand total of $17.2 billion and counting.
  We all know the administration has underestimated the costs of our 
participation in the forces in Bosnia, not to mention the length of 
time. It is estimated that we will spend upward of $6.8 to $7 billion 
until June 1998. My expectation is that we will have underestimated 
those costs as well. But we have spent a total of $17.2 billion in 
peacekeeping operations. That is an exorbitant price that we are now 
paying for unbudgeted, for the most part, operations and missions 
elsewhere--unanticipated and in most cases unbudgeted. The cost for 
Bosnia, as I said, has been over $7.2 billion, assuming we withdraw in 
June 1998. The cost for these operations have quadrupled--quadrupled--
since 1991. The fact is the Department of Defense has been heavily 
taxed to meet these deployments.
  We know that of the $17.2 billion that will have been spent in 
contingency operations through June 1998, about $8 billion of this 
amount was reimbursed to the Department of Defense by Congress through 
supplementals. The Department of Defense, however, has also told us 
that $2.3 of the $17.2 billion total were service absorbed costs, 
funding that was taken directly out of procurement and other accounts 
to pay for these operations.
  Mr. President, I suspect that the remaining difference of almost $7 
billion was siphoned from procurement accounts as well as the 
operations and readiness accounts to pay for these contingency 
operations. We have asked the Department of Defense for these figures 
and they cannot provide them. As of 1997, we readily know that we were 
facing over 2.5 billion dollars' worth of unfunded contingency 
operations and that required, as we know, a supplemental appropriation 
which we passed a couple of weeks ago. But we must ask the question, 
because it has been asked but it has not been answered, how many 
modernization programs got impacted as procurement

[[Page S7066]]

dollars were siphoned from the modernization programs by the DOD 
comptroller to pay for these unprogrammed operations? It is obvious 
that this is a persistent problem. We know that we can expect more of 
the same. In fact, the QDR report that was issued by the 
administration, as I said previously, expects that small scale 
contingency operations will be high over the next 20 years, so that we 
literally cannot anticipate the numerous unbudgeted operations in which 
the United States will participate.
  The State Department did a compilation in 1995 of the voluntary 
contributions of the United States in 13 other countries to support 
U.N. peacekeeping operations. The United States provided for 54 percent 
of those costs--54 percent--11 other countries, NATO countries and 
Australia, 45 percent, and Japan less than 1 percent.
  So it is obvious and clearly apparent that the United States is 
assuming an enormous cost and burden for these peacekeeping operations. 
And as I also said earlier, these peacekeeping operations are not 
within the traditional operations as we have known them in the past 
where we are upholding and enforcing a cease-fire agreement that has 
been reached by two or more parties. These operations have gone beyond 
that to peace enforcement where we are imposing a peace on recalcitrant 
parties. That requires more military expertise, weaponry, and 
requirements on the part of our own military as we have seen not only 
in Somalia but, of course, as we have seen in Bosnia.

  The point of all of this is that what we are seeing happening in the 
Defense Department's budget is that more and more of the funds are 
being drawn from operations and the readiness account, indeed, from 
modernization, because even the administration has not been able to 
meet its own procurements modernization goal of $60 billion. The fact 
is a $17 billion gap in the modernization goal because that money is 
being drawn away into these operations.
  I believe that the pressure to come up with more base closing rounds 
is premised on the need to finance these operations; that we will see 
whatever savings we can achieve from base closings will not be realized 
in the modernization accounts. The fact is we have no guidance from the 
administration in terms of what the administration is apt to spend on 
base closings because we know there are enormous up-front costs just in 
the environmental cleanup arena alone, not to mention all the other 
costs associated with base closings that require up-front expenditures. 
So we do not have the costs nor the real savings realized in the 
future. And yet at the same time we are spending more and more of the 
Defense Department's immediate funds on these peacekeeping operations 
for which we have not been able to precisely project what the costs 
will be in the future.
  These missions have quadrupled since 1991. We can expect more of the 
same. And yet we do not have a comprehensive analysis of the impact of 
the four previous rounds. They have not been completed. They have not 
come through yet. And so the administration is now asking for two more 
rounds without even knowing what the previous rounds have exacted in 
terms of the impact on our forces, our mission, as well as our 
infrastructure.
  We know that once a base is closed, it is lost forever; it is 
irreplaceable, and yet we have had no thorough analysis done on what 
the impact will be for the future. I believe that the pressure for more 
base closing rounds from the administration is due to the fact that 
more of these dollars are being siphoned away from modernization and 
into peacekeeping operations. So we could have two more rounds, but we 
do not know what the savings will be, we do not know whether or not it 
is going to go into modernization, and we do not know what the impact 
will be on our forces as well as our mission.
  I believe we are relying on a flawed approach to achieve the savings 
from infrastructure reductions that have yet to be realized, and we are 
finding that the Defense Department is spending billions of dollars on 
contingency operations which have little or no relevance to our vital 
national interests, and yet we are willing to cut the heart out of our 
military infrastructure within our sovereign borders without fully 
evaluating the impact to our national defense.
  The fact is I believe that we are on a collision course with less 
than expected savings from base closings and an increased number of 
contingency operations that will result in a further degradation of our 
force readiness and it will delay much needed procurement.
  I realize that we are facing limited resources within the Defense 
Department's budget and within our own overall Federal budget, but we 
must also be concerned for our troops and our resources, that they are 
not overtaxed in support of these numerous contingency operations over 
which we obviously have had little control. We have to take a more 
judicious approach to the deployment of our forces in view of our 
constrained resources as well as protecting our vital national 
interests, not only for today but also for tomorrow.
  So I ask the Senate to reject the amendment that has been offered by 
the Senator from Arizona because I believe clearly that we have to 
begin a thorough examination of what has already transpired before we 
take any future actions that we will regret, and at the same time I 
hope that it will put some pressure on this administration to begin a 
thorough reexamination of the necessity of constantly deploying troops 
in areas that perhaps they should not be engaged.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. ROBB addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. ROBB. Mr. President, I thank both the chairman and ranking member 
of the Armed Services Committee for their handling of this bill and for 
their help in bringing it to this particular position. I particularly 
want to commend my friend, the ranking member, the distinguished 
Senator from Michigan, for his advocacy of this particular amendment. I 
am pleased to join as a cosponsor with the Senator from Michigan and 
the Senator from Arizona and others. But I recognize it is a very 
difficult amendment for all concerned, as the Senator from Michigan so 
eloquently explained a few minutes ago on this floor. I know his 
particular State was more impacted in terms of strategic air base 
closures.
  My own State is more dependent on defense spending on a per capita 
basis than any other State in the Union. Year after year more defense 
dollars, per capita, are spent in Virginia than in any other State. So 
this is not a popular or easy issue in my own State. But I have tried 
to analyze the reasons why most of those who do oppose this particular 
amendment are opposed. It seems to me, Members are opposing another 
BRAC round for three principal reasons: No. 1, unwillingness to endure 
the pain of another closure round; No. 2, concerns about the accuracy 
of estimated savings; and, No. 3, concerns over the integrity of the 
process.
  Regarding the pain of closures, I can only say that I see the choice 
as a simple one. We can either preserve jobs and facilities in our own 
States or we can provide desperately needed funding to ensure that our 
troops can fight and win in future wars, which, of course, is the 
reason that we have a national defense capability in the first place. 
By virtually every expert estimate, early in the new century we will 
simply be unable to fund a force necessary to support a very prudent 
and measured national military strategy.
  During the cold war, our massive base infrastructure had substantial 
duplication built in because of enormous uncertainties about the scale 
and consequences of a strategic war with the Soviet Union. Much of that 
duplication we probably could have done without, but I would certainly 
concede that military construction in Members' home States or districts 
has undeniable appeal politically. But we no longer have the luxury of 
duplicating infrastructure just to keep the folks back home happy.
  As many have noted, every dollar we keep spending on bases we don't 
really need is a dollar we cannot spend on maintaining end strength, 
replacing aging weapons systems, advancing our military technology to 
ensure dominance of the future battlefield, and keeping quality of life 
at a level that will ensure strong recruiting and retention.

[[Page S7067]]

  The second rationale for opposing a new BRAC round stems from the 
assertion that because we don't know exactly how much we saved from 
previous BRAC rounds, that we should not go forward until we do. If we 
accept this rationale, however, we would never have another round of 
base closures, which I suspect would be just fine with many who cite 
this reason for opposing the effort. But if our net savings from 
another BRAC round are significant, although indefinite, it seems to me 
we ought to move forward now. Why should we postpone doing what we know 
we are going to have to do anyway, just because our estimate of savings 
are imprecise, as long as we know they are significant?
  The reality is that the long-term savings from the first four-base 
closure rounds will exceed $5 billion a year when they are completed. 
It just so happens the Secretary of Defense is still seeking 
approximately that much money to meet the modernization objectives that 
he set forth in the Quadrennial Defense Review. New base closure 
commissions, if they are courageous enough to close the bulk of the 
remaining excess bases, should add billions in additional savings. If 
Members want to conduct more studies on exactly how much has been and 
will be saved by BRAC rounds, that's fine, but let's not hold up this 
process for a study that we know will tell us that billions will be 
saved.
  The third reason Members are opposing a new BRAC round is their 
concern about the integrity of the BRAC process in light of the attempt 
to privatize-in-place the work at Kelly and McClellan Air Force depots, 
or ALC's. To avoid any future ambiguities about this matter, a 
provision here clarifies that privatization in place will be allowed 
only if the BRAC explicitly permits this at a military installation.
  None of these reasons for opposing another base closure round, in my 
judgment, is compelling. The responsible thing to do, I believe, for 
our Nation's security is to cut excess infrastructure as soon as 
possible. Waiting will only delay the inevitable and cost our military 
billions in funds that are badly needed for maintaining force 
structure, supporting training and day-to-day operations, and 
adequately funding modernization.
  I urge my colleagues, in this case, to make the responsible choice, 
the choice that the Secretary of Defense, that all of the service 
Secretaries, that all of the service chiefs and that all of the CINC's 
agree is the only responsible choice, and that is to begin another 
round of BRAC closures as soon as possible.

  With that, I thank the Chair and I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota.


                 Amendment No. 771 to Amendment No. 705

     (Purpose: To require a report on the actual costs and savings 
 attributable to previous base closure rounds and on the need, if any, 
                  for additional base closure rounds)

  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I rise today to offer a second-degree 
amendment to the amendment that has been offered by Senators McCain and 
Levin, an amendment that was just supported by my colleague and friend 
from Virginia. I do this with great respect for the views of those who 
have offered the amendment on base closing. But I come to a different 
conclusion than they do on this subject, and represent that conclusion 
with a second-degree amendment. When I conclude my remarks, I will send 
my second-degree amendment to the desk.
  I would tell my colleagues I offer the amendment on my behalf, on 
behalf of Senator Lott, Senator Daschle, Senator Thurmond, Senator 
Domenici, Senator Conrad, Senator Feinstein, Senator Dodd, Senator 
Bingaman, Senator Boxer, Senator Burns, Senator Landrieu, Senator 
Roberts, and Senator Ford.
  I am offering this second-degree amendment to the amendment now 
pending, which would authorize two additional rounds of base closures, 
one in 1999 and the other in the year 2001.
  For those unfamiliar with the issue of base closures, they should 
know that we have established in this country previously, on several 
occasions--actually, through four rounds, but three of them really full 
rounds--something called the Defense Base Realignment and Closure 
Commission. And the Commission then begins to study what kind of 
military installations do we have in this country, where are they, what 
is their capability, and how many of them might now be surplus and 
might be closed in order to save money for the future. That is what the 
base closure process was about.
  I have supported the base closure process on those occasions. I have 
voted for it and believed it was appropriate, as we downsized the 
military after the cold war, that we also then needed to get rid of the 
surplus in our facilities and save the money that we can save that is 
necessary for other areas, such as training and readiness and weapons 
programs and other priorities. So I have supported that in the past, 
believing that as you downsize force structure, you also are going to 
have surplus military installations that must, in fact, be closed.
  In the process of doing that, we have ordered the closures in the 
rounds of 1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995. That resulted in the decisions to 
close 97 military installations in this country. The military is 
slightly over halfway through the process of closure of these 97 
installations; slightly more than one-half of those bases have, in 
fact, been closed. In fact, the second base closure round is scheduled 
to finish this month, and those are the bases that the 1991 Base 
Closure Commission decided to close. The 1993 and 1995 closures, the 
third round and the fourth round, they will be shut down completely--
and they are in the process now--but they will be shut down completely 
perhaps in the year 2001. So we have been involved in the substantial 
shutdown of military facilities under the Base Closure Commission 
process, have done it now for a number of years--9 years this process 
has been in effect--and now the proposal in this defense authorization 
amendment is to say, let's have two additional rounds of base closures.
  What is the problem with that and why do I offer an amendment? Let me 
describe my amendment first and then describe the problem. I say in my 
amendment that the Secretary of Defense shall prepare and submit to 
Congress, to the defense committees of Congress, a report on the costs 
and the savings attributable to the base closure rounds before 1996, 
and on the need, if any, for additional base closure rounds. The rest 
of the second-degree amendment describes what we would like the 
Secretary to report to us on. The amendment also would prohibit the 
funding of further base closure commissions until the Congress has 
received that report.

  But I would like to go through a series of charts, to tell you why I 
think there are significant questions that must be answered before this 
Congress should authorize one additional or two additional rounds of 
base closures.
  The General Accounting Office, the GAO, which is the congressional 
accounting watchdog agency, says that ``Congressional auditors can't 
verify the estimates of base closure savings''; the Department of 
Defense ``cannot provide information on actual savings'' from the 
previous rounds; the DOD's savings estimates, according to the GAO, are 
``inconsistent . . . unreliable . . . incomplete.'' That is the GAO.
  The Congressional Budget Office, the nonpartisan Congressional Budget 
Office, says: ``The Congressional Budget Office was unable to confirm 
or assess the Department of Defense's estimates of costs and savings 
because the Defense Department is unable to report actual spending and 
savings for BRAC actions''--in other words, the base closures.
  The Congressional Budget Office also says:

       CBO cannot evaluate the accuracy of DOD's estimates without 
     empirical data.
       The DOD does not track . . . actual savings that have 
     accrued.

  And on the specific subject of the McCain-Levin amendment, the 
Congressional Budget Office says this about additional rounds of base 
closing:

       The Congress could consider authorizing an additional round 
     of base closures if the Department of Defense believes that 
     there is a surplus of military capacity after all rounds of 
     BRAC have been carried out.

  And then it says, and this is important for my colleagues to 
understand:

       That consideration, however, should follow an interval 
     during which the Department of

[[Page S7068]]

     Defense and independent analysts examine the actual impact of 
     the measures that have been taken thus far.

  Finally, CBO says:

       Such a pause [or an interval] would allow the Department of 
     Defense to collect the data necessary to evaluate the 
     effectiveness of initiatives and to determine the actual 
     costs incurred and the actual savings achieved.

  That is not me. It is not a conservative or liberal or Democrat or 
Republican; that is the General Accounting Office, the GAO, the 
investigative watchdog, and the Congressional Budget Office, the 
nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office, saying that after all of these 
rounds of base closures, they can't get information about what have the 
costs and the savings been.
  What has been the experience? What is the impact for the American 
taxpayer on all of this? How much do you save when you close them down? 
And what have been the costs of closing them down?
  The Congressional Budget Office says it would be a reasonable thing 
to do to have an interval to really evaluate what are you doing, what 
are you achieving, how much are you saving. That is why I think it 
makes no sense for us in this authorization bill to proceed immediately 
now, before nearly one-half of the bases that have been previously 
ordered closed are closed, and say, ``Well, now, let's do two 
additional rounds. We don't know what the costs and benefits are of the 
previous rounds, we don't know what the savings to the taxpayers have 
been, we don't know what the costs have been, but let's order two more 
rounds.''
  So I offer a second-degree amendment that says the Secretary of 
Defense shall prepare and submit to the congressional defense 
committees a report on the costs attributable to base closure rounds. 
Let's get a full accounting before we move for two additional base 
closure rounds.
  Let me respond to some of the other statements that have been made on 
this issue. Proponents of more base closures suggest more closures are 
needed to match the base infrastructure to our force structure. They 
say as the force structure comes down, clearly we should be able to 
close some bases, and that is true. But let's look at the figures.
  According to Congressman Hefley, the chairman of the House National 
Security Committee's Subcommittee on Military Installation and 
Facilities, if you measure by plant replacement the value of bases in 
the United States and around the world, base infrastructure has fallen 
by 27 percent, very close to the one-third or 33 percent reduction in 
force structure. Other estimates of reduction in base structure are 
either not calculating the plant replacement value or they are 
calculating values of only bases in the Continental United States, 
which ignores the 43 percent reduction in U.S. bases overseas.
  In addition to that, the military's operational bases--that is, the 
bases that host the combat units--are already closing down in 
proportion to the defense drawdown. For example, when all the BRAC 
rounds are done, the Air Force will have closed 22 of 74 major air 
bases, 30 percent; the Navy will have closed 10 of 17 naval stations, 
nearly 60 percent, and 12 of 29 naval air stations, 40 percent; the 
Army will have closed 10 major combat and training facilities, about 
one-third of those Army bases. So with respect to the operational 
bases, there has already been an appropriate amount of base closing 
done.
  Proponents of the amendment to authorize two additional rounds of 
base closings say we need more base closing rounds in order to be able 
to afford new weapons. We will achieve savings from base closings and, 
therefore, be able to afford the new weapons programs. Let's examine 
just a bit what these arguments mean by asking what the savings from 
base closures are or will be or have been with what sketchy information 
we have.
  There are various estimates of savings from the BRAC implementation 
period from 1988 to the year 2001. The Congressional Budget Office in 
December said they were not able to get very much information. They 
estimated, with what information they had, that we would save $5.3 
billion in that period, this despite four base closing rounds in 
closures that began 9 years ago.
  So, if this number is accurate, with sketchy information, yes, base 
closures save some money but very slowly, and if future base closing 
commissions decide to close bases in 2001, the savings would be 
available, again, very slowly perhaps by the year 2010. And the savings 
here are only estimates from sketchy information that both the GAO and 
the Congressional Budget Office indicate is unreliable and incomplete. 
They say the information on this is simply not available from the 
Department of Defense.
  The Government Accounting Office and the Congressional Budget Office 
also say in closing military installations that the Department of 
Defense has not taken into account the full cost of environmental 
cleanup when a base is closed, the accurate proceeds from the sale of 
land in closing bases, the economic transition costs, especially those 
not funded by the Department's base closing program, the higher costs 
of operation at bases that gain missions from the bases that are closed 
and higher construction costs at the bases that gain missions.

  In summary, Mr. President, my amendment is important because it would 
require the Pentagon to report to Congress on what have been the actual 
costs and savings in four base closing rounds over nearly a 10-year 
period. Until and unless we get information about what are the costs 
and benefits, I don't think we ought to legislate in the dark, and that 
is what we would be doing if we were to decide now to rush off and 
authorize two additional rounds of base closures without knowing the 
impact of, the costs of, or the benefits of the closures in the 
previous four rounds.
  I am pleased to offer the amendment with some very strong support 
from some very influential Members of the Senate. The majority leader, 
Senator Lott, is a cosponsor; the minority leader, Senator Daschle; the 
distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Senator 
Thurmond; and many others.
  I think all of us feel the same way. There may be at some future date 
a need to reconcile further base capacity with troop strength. We 
understand that, we have understood that through four rounds of base 
closings. However, there will also be, and is now, a requirement that 
we understand exactly what we are doing, what are the costs and what 
are the benefits, and this would not be the time to authorize 
additional rounds of base closures prior to our having the information 
available on what we have done in the past.
  One final point. All of us perhaps have some parochial interests, and 
I would certainly understand if someone said, ``Well, but you have some 
military installations in your State.'' Yes, we do, and I have 
supported previous base closing rounds despite the fact that we have 
military installations, and it would probably not be in my best 
interest to do that, but I supported that because I understand we must 
reduce capacity in these installations.
  But, I also understand that every time you go through a base closing 
round, there are additional costs imposed on nearly every community 
that has a military installation that is not calculated anywhere on 
these papers, and that is the cost of the economic investment that 
doesn't happen and the stunted economic growth in a community because a 
potential investor says, ``That, community, I don't want to invest 
there at the moment. I want to wait a couple years to see if that 
military installation, that community is going to be there for the 
long-term future. If not, that region is going to have 20 percent 
unemployment, and the last thing I want to do is lose my investment.''
  So community after community after community has imposed on it a 
stunted cost of economic development whenever we begin this process.
  I am not here today to say I will never support another BRAC round, 
but this is the wrong time to initiate two additional rounds. If we 
look in the future at what the overcapacity might be, if there is, in 
fact, an overcapacity, then we should respond to that. But I do not 
want, in this circumstance, to authorize two rounds before we know the 
full cost, the full value and the full benefit of previous base closure 
rounds.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator Ford from the 
State of Kentucky be added as a cosponsor.

[[Page S7069]]

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, as I conclude, I send my second-degree 
amendment to the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from North Dakota [Mr. Dorgan], for himself, 
     Mr. Lott, Mr. Daschle, Mr. Domenici, Mr. Thurmond, Mr. 
     Conrad, Mrs. Feinstein, Mr. Dodd, Mr. Bingaman, Mrs. Boxer, 
     Mr. Burns, Ms. Landrieu, Mr. Ford, and Mr. Roberts, proposes 
     an amendment numbered 771 to amendment No. 705.

  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading 
of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       After ``SEC.'' on page 1, line 3 of the amendment, strike 
     all and insert:

       . REPORT ON CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT OF MILITARY BASES.

       (a) Report.--The Secretary of Defense shall prepare and 
     submit to the congressional defense committees a report on 
     the cost and savings attributable to the base closure rounds 
     before 1996 and on the need, if any, for additional base 
     closure rounds.
       (b) Elements.--The report under subsection (a) shall 
     include the following:
       (1) A statement, using data consistent with budget data, of 
     the actual costs and savings (in the case of prior fiscal 
     years) and the estimated costs and savings (in the case of 
     future fiscal years) attributable to the closure and 
     realignment of military installations as a result of the base 
     closure rounds before 1996, set forth by Armed Force, type of 
     facility, and fiscal year, including--
       (A) operation and maintenance costs, including costs 
     associated with expanded operations and support, maintenance 
     of property, administrative support, and allowances for 
     housing at installations to which functions are transferred 
     as a result of the closure or realignment of other 
     installations;
       (B) military construction costs, including costs associated 
     with rehabilitating, expanding, and construction facilities 
     to receive personnel and equipment that are transferred to 
     installations as a result of the closure or realignment of 
     other installations;
       (C) environmental cleanup costs, including costs associated 
     with assessments and restoration;
       (D) economic assistance costs, including--
       (i) expenditures on Department of Defense demonstration 
     projects relating to economic assistance;
       (ii) expenditures by the Office of Economic Adjustment; and
       (iii) to the extent available, expenditures by the Economic 
     Development Administration, the Federal Aviation 
     Administration, and the Department of Labor relating to 
     economic assistance;
       (E) unemployment compensation costs, early retirement 
     benefits (including benefits paid under section 5597 of title 
     5, United States Code), and worker retraining expenses under 
     the Priority Placement Program, the Job Training Partnership 
     Act, and any other Federally-funded job training program;
       (F) costs associated with military health care;
       (G) savings attributable to changes in military force 
     structure; and
       (H) savings due to lower support costs with respect to 
     installations that are closed or realigned.
       (2) A comparison, set forth by base closure round, of the 
     actual costs and savings stated under paragraph (1) to the 
     annual estimates of costs and savings previously submitted to 
     Congress.
       (3) A list of each military installation at which there is 
     authorized to be employed 300 or more civilian personnel, set 
     forth by Armed Force.
       (4) An estimate of current excess capacity at military 
     installations, set forth--
       (A) as a percentage of the total capacity of the 
     installations of the Armed Forces with respect to all 
     installations of the Armed Forces;
       (B) as a percentage of the total capacity of the 
     installations of each Armed Force with respect to the 
     installations of such Armed Force; and
       (C) as a percentage of the total capacity of a type of 
     installation with respect to installations of such type.
       (5) The types of facilities that would be recommended for 
     closure or realignment in the event of an additional base 
     closure round, set forth by Armed Force.
       (6) The criteria to be used by the Secretary in evaluating 
     installations for closure or realignment in such event.
       (7) The methodologies to be used by the Secretary in 
     identifying installations for closure or realignment in such 
     event.
       (8) An estimate of the costs and savings to be achieved as 
     a result of the closure or realignment of installations in 
     such event, set forth by Armed Force and by year.
       (9) An assessment whether the costs of the closure or 
     realignment of installations in such event are contained in 
     the current Future Years Defense Plan, and, if not, whether 
     the Secretary will recommend modifications in future defense 
     spending in order to accommodate such costs.
       (c) Deadline.--The Secretary shall submit the report under 
     subsection (a) not later than the date on which the President 
     submits to Congress the budget for fiscal year 2000 under 
     section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code.
       (d) Review.--The Congressional Budget Office and the 
     Comptroller General shall conduct a review of the report 
     prepared under subsection (a).
       (e) Prohibition on Use of Funds.--No funds authorized to be 
     appropriated or otherwise made available to the Department of 
     Defense by this Act or any other Act may be used for any 
     activities of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment 
     Commission established by section 2902(a) of the Defense Base 
     Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (part A of title XXIX of 
     Public Law 101-510; 10 U.S.C. 2687 note) until the later of--
       (1) the date on which the Secretary submits the report 
     required by subsection (a); or
       (2) the date on which the Congressional Budget Office and 
     the Comptroller General complete a review of the report under 
     subsection (d).
       (e) Sense of Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate that--
       (1) the Secretary should develop a system having the 
     capacity to quantify the actual costs and savings 
     attributable to the closure and realignment of military 
     installations pursuant to the base closure process; and
       (2) the Secretary should develop the system in expedient 
     fashion, so that the system may be used to quantify costs and 
     savings attributable to the 1995 base closure round.

  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. LOTT addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the Levin-McCain 
amendment and in support of the Dorgan-Daschle-Lott amendment. Before I 
speak on the substance, I want to, again, take note of the tremendous 
leadership we are receiving from the Armed Services Committee chairman, 
the Senator from South Carolina, and the cooperation we are getting 
from the Senator from Michigan as they try to move this legislation 
through. They are doing an outstanding job. I know we will start a 
series of votes later on this afternoon, and we continue to look 
forward to completing this very important legislation before the week 
is out.
  Mr. President, I have followed these base closure recommendations, 
so-called BRAC issues, now for many years. I was in the House when it 
was first proposed by a young Congressman from Texas, Dick Armey. I was 
a member of the Rules Committee, and he came to me and asked about how 
to get this procedure to be considered, to get it through the Rules 
Committee, to get it to the floor of the House of Representatives. I 
remember specifically telling him how the procedure would work, but 
assuring him from the beginning I would oppose it.
  I have always been opposed to this approach. It is one more example 
of Congress not being able to deal with the tough issues of what we 
need in terms of facilities in this country and passing the decisions 
off--the tough decisions off--to others, in this case the Commission. I 
don't think that is the way it should be done, and that is not the way 
it was done until recent years.
  In the past, the Pentagon, the Department of Defense, would make 
recommendations to Congress. Congress, through the appropriate 
committees--Armed Services and the Appropriations Committee--would 
consider those recommendations and, in some instances, base closures 
were approved, including facilities in my own State and probably most 
States in the Nation, and in others, it was rejected. But somehow over 
the years, it became more and more difficult to close these bases or to 
make decisions, to make changes in the bases, and so these so-called 
BRAC rounds gained some currency and were pushed and, in fact, passed 
through the Congress.
  We have been down this old BRAC road before, three-and-a-half or four 
times, if you will. I maintain it has not worked well. First of all, we 
found that it is a very difficult process. There is always concern 
about the fairness of how it is done. There are always some 
implications or indications that some political considerations came 
into play, and there always will be. But also I think it is important 
that we remember what it does to the communities and to the people who 
are involved.
  These are just not nameless, faceless people. These are bases in 
communities, communities that are disrupted by these proceedings, 
communities and States spending millions of dollars trying to prove the 
worth of their bases. So we know that it has had an impact on the 
communities where these bases have existed.

[[Page S7070]]

  We know it has created problems for the Defense Department among the 
various branches. We know that it is almost totally impossible to 
assess the real damages or the benefits or the savings from these 
closings. We have seen this in instance after instance. For instance, 
we have made decisions that certain bases would be closed and there 
would be certain savings. Yet, we have found that it has been very 
difficult to move toward closing those bases and getting the savings 
for no other reason than we have found, in many instances, that there 
are environmental problems in cleaning up those bases before they can 
be turned over to the private sector or the local communities.
  To this day, the recommendations of previous BRAC's have not been 
completed. We have bases or facilities, depots that supposedly were 
going to be closed. They are not closed. So without having had an 
opportunity to really assess the damage that has been done to our 
capabilities and our facilities for the military of this country, 
without having an opportunity to really get these bases closed and, 
therefore, the savings achieved, we have now the recommendation that we 
have not one but two more of these base closure rounds.
  I think that it has been a very dubious process that has caused lots 
of problems, and it should not go forward again with two more rounds 
until we fully understand the ramifications and the implications of 
what we have already done.
  So that is why I think that the Dorgan amendment is a better 
approach. It doesn't say that we will never have another base closure 
round, although I can't envision myself voting for one in the future 
anymore than I have in the past, but it does set up a legitimate, 
logical process to assess what has already happened, what has been 
achieved in terms of savings as a result of those decisions, what it 
has done to our capabilities militarily, before we go forward with 
another round.
  The amendment that has been offered by Senator Dorgan and others 
allows already authorized base closures and realignments to go forward, 
and that is important, I emphasize again, because what has already been 
agreed to has, in fact, not been completed. This would include the 97 
base closures and the 55 realignments that have already been agreed to.

  Economic and fiscal ramifications of closing and realigning bases 
Congress has already authorized will stretch well into the 21st 
century. The Pentagon estimates on the savings cannot be supported. 
GAO, for instance, recently concluded that the ``Department of Defense 
cannot provide [accurate] information on actual savings.'' The 
Congressional Budget Office has stated that it ``was unable to confirm 
or assess DOD's estimates of cost and savings because the Department is 
unable to report actual spending and savings for [these] actions.'' As 
a result of all these factors, CBO observed that additional base 
closures ``should follow an interval during which DOD and independent 
analysts examine the actual impact of the measures that have been taken 
* * * ''
  The Dorgan-Daschle-Lott amendment sets up a logical process to review 
what we have already done before we go forward with recommended rounds 
in the future. The last Base Closure Commission concurred in the 
assessment and stated that another round of base closures should not 
occur until the year 2001--not 1999, as proposed in the Levin-McCain 
amendment. That is an important point. The last Base Closure Commission 
specifically recommended that there not be another one until the year 
2001, if then, so that we could get our work done, see what happened, 
and then make an informed judgment about whether to go forward with it 
again in the future.
  This amendment provides the Pentagon with the time to develop 
accounting techniques so they can fully and accurately reflect the 
costs and savings from previous and future rounds of base closures, and 
it requires the Pentagon to prepare a report on the financial 
ramifications of past and future base closures and to have the report 
reviewed by GAO and CBO.
  In short, Mr. President, this sets up a process to take a look at 
what we have already done, evaluate it, make sure we understand the 
cost savings or the costs that have been expended to try to achieve 
what has already been agreed to before we go forward, and then and only 
then after that review should we make an informed decision about 
whether or not to have another round.
  I am going to hand out to my colleagues when we start having votes a 
list that I had prepared of facilities and activities that were 
considered by the Base Closure Commissions in the years 1991 to 1994, 
but not closed. There is a long list. And I just want to ask my 
colleagues, whether they be from California or Connecticut or Georgia 
or Minnesota or my own State or any other State, take a look at what is 
on this list.
  Think of what you have already been through, and think of the impact 
it would have on the military if some of these facilities, which are 
very fine facilities that are important for our training for the Air 
Force, for the Navy, if they should be threatened once again with being 
closed. Do you want that? So I will have this list, and I invite my 
colleagues from all over the United States to take a look at this list.
  This should not be done. We should not be closing down needed 
facilities and needed bases in the United States while we are sending 
our military men and women on humanitarian missions around the world. 
We are looking after the needs and problems around the world. That is 
fine. But what about the impact and the needs in our own communities of 
our own constituencies and most importantly of the military itself?
  I vigorously oppose the Levin-McCain amendment and I will go along 
with the Dorgan-Daschle-Lott amendment because I think it is a better 
alternative and that it sets up a logical process to evaluate whether 
or not we should ever have another Base Closure Commission.

  Mr. President, with that I yield the floor.
  Mr. NICKLES addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Faircloth). The Senator from Oklahoma.
  Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, I want to join with my colleague from 
Mississippi in urging our colleagues to vote no on the McCain 
amendment.
  Mr. President, the entire process dealing with base closure is a 
process that Congress entered into with the administration, a joint 
process where we said we would work together, set up a commission, a 
commission of experts, we call it BRAC, the Base Closing Commission, 
and they would make recommendations and send those to the President. 
The President would either accept it or reject it. He could not modify 
it. If the President did not agree with those recommendations, he could 
send it back to the Base Closing Commission and they could change it. 
But he has two options: He accepts it or rejects it.
  Same thing with Congress. Under the procedure that was set up--I 
might mention, it worked quite well the first three rounds. The 
President took the recommendations; then he would forward those on to 
Congress, and then Congress accepted them. We could not amend it. We 
could not say that it included a base from the Senator from Montana's 
home State, the chairman of the Military Construction Subcommittee, so 
we will send that specific recommendation back, or maybe a 
recommendation to close a base in the home State of the Senator from 
South Carolina or Mississippi, those are powerful Senators, the 
chairman of the Armed Services Committee, and the majority leader 
respectively.
  We did not touch those. We did not set it up that way. We set it up 
so an independent commission of experts, appointed and I might mention 
confirmed by the Senate, would work and work very hard. One of the 
toughest jobs around was for this commission to travel to all the bases 
on the so-called suspect list or the possibility list. They would visit 
these bases, and then they would make their recommendations.
  I might mention in the process, they would probably terrify the 
individual communities and all the individuals associated with those 
bases. They would terrify them because they were afraid they might lose 
their job, they were afraid they might be on the final base closure 
list, they were afraid they might lose a job they think is a pretty 
good job--in all likelihood it is a good job, and they do not want to 
lose it.
  So Congress had to--I don't know if it should be called collective 
wisdom,

[[Page S7071]]

but we said, ``Let's put it on this group, these real experts, a lot of 
retired military people, people that are going to spend the time and 
really investigate and analyze which bases should be closed.'' We have 
too much base infrastructure, so we had to close them. So that was the 
process. And it worked quite well the first three rounds.
  Then in the fourth round President Clinton changed it. We had the 
same Base Closure Commission, a good commission. They made their 
recommendations, sent it to the President, and said accept it or reject 
it. President Clinton did neither. He said: Well, we're going to accept 
all the recommendations except for two, except for ones in California 
and Texas. There are a lot of electoral votes. We have an election 
coming up. So he did not accept the base closure recommendation.
  He tried to modify it. He said: ``Well, we won't close two bases. 
We'll privatize them and keep them in existence.'' That was not what 
the Base Closure Commission had said. Congress did not have that 
option. We were not able to say, ``Wait a minute, we want to close all 
these on the list except 
for--'' We did not do that.
  So the President, in my opinion, violated the law. And I think the 
law is very clear. Other people debated, ``Wait a minute. Does he have 
the flexibility? Does the Base Closing Commission give him the option 
to privatize in place or is this something he created?'' I think it is 
something he created. That was not the intent of the Base Closing 
Commission.

  Could he fudge? Could he interpret it that way? Well, he did. So far 
he has gotten away with it. But that was not what the base closing law 
called for. That was not the intent of the Base Closing Commission. And 
certainly the President circumvented the will of the BRAC, and of the 
base closing process. I think he destroyed a lot of good will in the 
process.
  A lot of people might have been willing to say, well, we might comply 
with another round, but I will tell you, you cannot comply with another 
round if you think the executive branch might violate that trust or 
politicize this process. And that is exactly what President Clinton 
did.
  I might even read for my colleagues an op-ed article from the 
Washington Post at that time, July 14, 1995. I will just read this part 
of it.

       Over the past couple of weeks [President] Clinton has been 
     engaged in a highly publicized effort to ensure that many of 
     the jobs at McClellan Air Force Base in Sacramento will be 
     privatized. That is rather disingenuous. If the privatization 
     is real, it will merely perpetuate the expensive overcapacity 
     that the base closing is supposed to reduce. If the private-
     sector jobs rapidly fade away after another election or two, 
     the people who held them will rightly consider the whole 
     effort a sham.

  What he had was an effort to win votes, and again violate the 
process. And so should we have another couple of base closing rounds? I 
do not think so. No, not as long as there is not an understanding that 
we are all going to be in this boat together, the President is going to 
abide by the law and Congress is going to abide by the law. The 
President certainly did circumvent the law in this case.
  I will read to you a quote from a speech President Clinton made in 
Texas. He said:

       On July 1st, you were dealt a serious blow when the 
     Independent Base Closing Commission said that we ought to 
     shut Kelly down. At my insistence and my refusal to go along 
     with that specific recommendation, the Air Force developed 
     the Privatization In Place Plan that will keep thousands of 
     jobs here at this depot.

  That was made October 17, 1995.
  President Clinton is exactly right, he refused to go along with the 
specific recommendation of the Base Closing Commission. The point is, 
if he wanted to disavow the Base Closing Commission decision, he could 
have sent it back to the Commission. He said, ``I will agree with all 
these, but not these two.'' And that would have been the process to 
follow; he could have sent it back to the Base Closing Commission.
  Maybe they would have reconsidered; maybe they would not have. But he 
did not do that. He said: I am going to accept and amend. And the law 
did not give him that right. So he violated the process, and created a 
new process, and one, in my opinion, where he undermined the 
credibility that we have under this law that worked in the first three 
rounds and did not work in the fourth round. He politicized the 
process.
  Should we just have another two rounds? I do not think so. I just 
cannot see that Congress would allow another round or another two 
rounds and terrorize all these communities if they think, and the 
individual Members of Congress think, ``Well, wait a minute. Maybe 
we're not going to do this on military value. Maybe we're going to do 
it on politics. Because politics entered the last round, maybe politics 
will be in the next round.''
  The President found a clever way of doing it. We do not have to close 
any base. We will just privatize in place. We do not have to lose any 
jobs. He promised in California--there were 8,700 jobs the day the base 
closures were announced, and he said, we will have 8,700 jobs in the 
year 2001. We will have 5,000 jobs a few years later than that. We will 
promise you jobs forever. That is not privatization in place. That is 
electoral politics.
  And it is a real shame he introduced election politics into the base 
closing process, some real violation of trust for every single Member 
that had a base closed in any round--any round. If you were willing to 
say, OK, we will put our bases at risk since we are all doing it 
together for the good of the country, for the good of national defense, 
I am willing to leave my rights alone as a Senator to participate in 
this process for the good of national defense and the good of our 
country because we know we have to do it, we know we have to reduce 
excess base capacity, if we are not going to play politics a lot of 
people said they are willing to do that. Then President Clinton plays 
politics.
  So, Mr. President, I strongly urge my colleagues to vote no on the 
McCain amendment. We should not have additional base closing rounds in 
this Senator's opinion until and unless we comply and until or unless 
we make absolutely, totally, completely, sure that politics will not be 
involved in any future round.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from South 
Carolina.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise to support the Dorgan-Daschle 
amendment. I think that is the logical step to take at this time. I 
wish to commend the majority leader, Senator Lott, the assistant 
majority leader, Senator Nickles, for their excellent talks that they 
made on this subject. I wish to commend all others who took that 
position or the opposite position for participating in this debate. 
This is a very important subject. I am very pleased that so many 
Senators have taken part in this debate, which is very helpful to our 
country.
  Mr. President, I am not going to make a long talk. We have had a lot 
of talk the other day. I expect to speak less than 5 minutes.
  Mr. President, in my judgment, and that of many of my colleagues, the 
Secretary of Defense has not made a sufficient case for additional base 
closures. The one point that has been a common theme throughout the 
debate on additional base closures rounds has been the extent of actual 
overcapacity in the existing infrastructure. I am not satisfied that we 
have accurate data on this matter and should not vote for any 
additional rounds until we have an independent assessment of the 
overcapacity.
  As a second concern is that I believe that the desire for supposed 
savings is becoming the sole driving force for additional base closure, 
without consideration of continuing requirements. The Department has 
not identified the up-front cost of doing another closure round and I 
am worried that, based on experience, most of the claimed savings will 
not materialize, or be used for modernization.
  Mr. President, it is also important that the Congress understands on 
how the Department plans to proceed with the next BRAC and whether it 
will focus on facilities where excess capacity truly exists. I do not 
need to remind my colleagues that we have had four rounds of base 
closures, and that many of our communities have endured tremendous 
turmoil and great losses because of them. These communities were under 
the impression that the closures they endured would resolve the 
overcapacity problem. I recall the Department's claiming that BRAC 95

[[Page S7072]]

would be ``The Mother of all BRACs.'' In facts, this was a gross 
overstatement. I suggest that the Presidential campaign had a role in 
limiting the scope of BRAC 95, and the communities and the Nation are 
now bearing the consequences of that action.
  Despite the stated good intentions of my colleagues, I oppose taking 
action at this time. We must have a better understanding of the excess 
capacity, what the future military requirements will be and how the 
Department will pay for this expensive undertaking. Until we have that 
information, I urge the Senate to vote against this amendment.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, just briefly, a few comments on the BRAC 
amendment of Senator McCain, myself, Senator Robb and others.
  First, on the cost question. The Defense Department has testified on 
the savings. Their testimony is part of the record. The Under Secretary 
for Defense, John Goodman, before the Readiness Subcommittee of the 
Armed Services Committee, testified that their estimate of net cost in 
savings are as follows: 98 major installations closed through BRAC, 
costs through 2001, when they would be fully implemented, $23 billion; 
savings through 2001, in billions, $36.5 billion. That is a $13 billion 
savings during that period, and then after 2001, recurring savings, 
every year, because we had the courage to pass four BRAC rounds, of 
$5.6 billion.
  Now, that is our modernization shortfall. That is why the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, every single one of them, plead with us, in a very 
direct letter, plead with us to support the Secretary of Defense in his 
request for two more BRAC rounds.
  Now, there is no use coming to this floor and talking about the need 
to modernize or to make sure we have the most advanced forces in the 
world, the most ready forces in the world, with the highest moral in 
the world, when we are not willing to take the steps that are necessary 
to make those things possible. We know we are not going to get 
increases in the defense budget. We know we have a 5-year budget that 
we have to live within.
  So the question, then, is, are we going to keep excess baggage, 
infrastructure, which the Defense Department says is no longer 
necessary? It is a tough choice. I could not agree more with my friends 
from Oklahoma and Mississippi and others who have spoken about the 
difficulty that communities go through. My communities in Michigan have 
gone through it and will again if we pass this BRAC round. Three Air 
Force base communities, all three SAC bases, gone. We know something 
about that. We know about the pleas that we made to the BRAC commission 
and the Defense Department. We know about that. We know the urgencies 
of those pleas. But there is no alternative.
  History has proven over and over again that if you are going to get 
rid of excess infrastructure--and we know we have excess, and the 
experts are telling us that--it seems to me we have no reason to 
disbelieve the Joint Chiefs when they tell us we have this major 
surplus of capacity. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General 
Shalikashvili, says we have more excess capacity now than we did when 
we started the BRAC process because we have reduced the size of our 
force. Are we listening? When we get these kind of pleas from the 
uniformed military not to waste money on bases that they cannot afford 
to maintain, are we listening to them, or are we going to take an easy 
way out, which is to say give us a report.
  We have a report: the Defense Department. That is the report. That 
chart is the report for the Defense Department. Now, can they prove 
those figures so that they can be audited? No, these are estimates of 
the Defense Department. That same Congressional Budget Office which 
points out that the estimates cannot be confirmed with precision, also 
says this, which is not reported. I didn't hear the opponents of this 
amendment quote this part of the CBO report, although I may have missed 
it, in fairness to them. I didn't hear it. CBO believes that BRAC 
actions will result in significant long-term savings.
  Now, we can delay it. They will be longer term. We heard the 
argument, ``Look how long it has taken for the environmental cleanup,'' 
and that is true. It will take longer if we don't close a base, to 
clean up that base environmentally, than if we do. We know that, by the 
way, historically. We have money to clean up bases we are closing where 
we don't have money to clean up bases that are staying open. If we are 
worried about the speed with which a base is cleaned up, they are 
cleaned up more quickly, I say, ironically and sadly, when they are 
closed than when they are kept open. That is a pretty sad comment, but 
that is a fact. That is the reality.
  So if we want to speed up the environmental cleanup, you don't keep a 
base open to that purpose, and you surely don't delay closing bases 
which need to be closed if the environmental cleanup has taken too 
long. It will take longer if you delay the closing. Delaying closing of 
needless infrastructure does not speed up the environmental cleanup of 
that infrastructure; it delays the environmental cleanup of that 
infrastructure.
  Now, we are talking here about a significant sum of money in this 
defense budget. I want to just repeat these estimates: $5.6 billion is 
the estimate. People say, ``Well, we don't have the dollars.'' Yes, we 
do. Here is the report from the Defense Department. There is the chart 
from the Defense Department. These documents here are the basis of that 
report. I am not so sure how many of us want to go through each one of 
these to see if those figures add up to the $5.6 billion, but here they 
are. The savings are real. Even the CBO, which says they can't confirm 
the precision, the accuracy of these estimates, says, again, CBO 
believes that BRAC actions will result in significant long-term 
savings.

  We just got a report from Secretary Cohen addressed to Senator 
Thurmond, a letter that reads as follows: ``As the Senate moves to 
final consideration of its version of the FY 98 defense authorization 
bill, I urge you to support the McCain-Levin amendment authorizing BRAC 
rounds in 1999 and 2001.''
  Now, he is giving the estimate of the two additional rounds in terms 
of the recurring savings. I am sure this is what the next sentence 
means, because we had this testimony, in effect.

       We estimate two additional rounds would result in savings 
     of approximately $2.7 billion annually.

  I know from previous testimony he is referring to the recurring 
savings. That is a significant hunk of change, even in the defense 
budget.
  And then he says something we ought to listen to.

       These savings are absolutely critical to the department's 
     modernization plan.

  He goes on:

       There have been some questions regarding the savings 
     actually realized from previous base closures. We have taken 
     these questions seriously and asked the Department of Defense 
     Inspector General to take an independent look at this issue. 
     The Inspector General's preliminary results indicate that 
     there is no basis for concern that BRAC has not been highly 
     cost effective.

  I am going to repeat that before I continue because that is sort of 
the bottom line here.

       The Inspector General's preliminary results indicate that 
     there is no basis for concern that BRAC has not been highly 
     cost effective.

  And then Secretary Cohen goes on to say:

       The preliminary audit examined BRAC 1993 actions, including 
     the largest Navy closure, Mare Island, and eight Air Force 
     Bases closed or realigned. For these bases, the IG found that 
     DOD overestimated costs by $148 million and underestimated 
     savings by $614 million.

  The IG's report is attached to his letter. This report goes through 
some of the reasons why they actually underestimated here the savings.
  So, instead of, at least on this study by the IG, the bases actually 
saving us less than predicted, the closing of those bases that were 
studied by the IG turned out to save us more than was projected by a 
significant amount, and the reasons for it, again, were set forth in 
the IG's report.
  There is another argument that we have heard, and that argument is 
that this action has been politicized. There will be arguments back and 
forth as to whether or not the privatization in place that occurred at 
two facilities was consistent or not with the Base Closing Commission. 
You can argue that either way. Obviously, the State that is affected 
positively by the President's or the Defense Department's decision 
feels it was perfectly within the

[[Page S7073]]

scope of the Base Closing Commission's report. The States which were 
negatively affected, in their view, by that decision argue it was not 
contemplated by the Base Closing Commission.
  The Base Closing Commission report, however, says that these 
facilities ``consolidate the remaining workloads to other DOD depots 
or''--and that is the critical word for those who argue one side of 
this issue, ``or''--``or to private-sector commercial activities as 
determined by the Defense Depot Maintenance Council.''
  Well, the Defense Depot Maintenance Council determined those two 
actions should be taken so that they could be privatized in place. I 
think that, at least, is reasonably, arguably, provided for by the Base 
Closing Commission report. It says ``or''--``to consolidate the 
remaining workloads to other DOD depots or to private-sector commercial 
activities as determined by the Defense Depot Maintenance Council,'' as 
the alternative to consolidating the remaining workloads to other DOD 
depots.

  Two options were laid out by the Base Closing Commission. The DOD 
followed one option. They privatized in place. But whichever side of 
that argument one takes--and we have heard both arguments--that is no 
excuse, even if one follows the view that that was politicized, that 
they should not have been privatized in place. They should have gone to 
other DOD facilities, and that was a political decision.
  If one accepts that argument and concludes that is right, what reason 
would that be not to have future rounds of base closings? What we 
simply would do, as we have done in this bill, is to make sure that 
there will be no privatization in place in the future without the 
specific recommendation of the Base Closing Commission, which is 
created in this amendment. Why would we want to cut off our nose to 
spite our face, even if one believes that it was politicized? Why would 
we want to say we don't want to save $2 billion in the future because 
DOD or the President politicized the last round? We will cure the 
problem and disallow privatization in place, unless it is explicitly 
provided for by the Base Closing Commission--more explicit than the 
language that I even read.
  Now, our amendment does that. We are not going to cure the perceived 
problem of this privatization in place action by denying future base 
closings and denying savings of $2.3 billion a year, which Secretary 
Cohen says is the estimated savings from the next two rounds of base 
closures. We are not going to cure that problem. We are going to make 
our problem worse, not better.
  Now, we can address that problem, and some may want to do that with 
amendments on this floor. If they wish, they are free to try to offer 
amendments to reverse that decision. My own view is that we ought to 
make sure that that action is competitive and is certified by the 
inspector general of the Department of Defense as being a fair and open 
competition as between the various alternatives that are sought here.
  Let the marketplace decide--that is my view--in a fair and open 
competition. But there have been some proposals that maybe there ought 
to be amendments to cure what is perceived to be that political 
problem. That at least addresses the problem. Denying future rounds of 
base closings, which will deny us savings of billions of dollars, 
doesn't cure the perceived inequity or unfairness that resulted, many 
feel, from the privatization in place decision of the Defense 
Department. We are not curing the problem. We are just denying 
ourselves savings.
  So there is not a logical connection between those two actions. Now, 
I understand. If I were representing one of those three States, I know 
I would feel the same way they do. At least I think I would. I can 
understand that. We all represent States and feel passion for the 
States we represent. We all represent our States as advocates. We 
believe in them and we believe they ought to get a fair shake. When we 
don't think they got a fair shake, we are on the Senate floor pleading 
for our State. So I understand.
  As I said, I understand the pain of base closing. We have been 
through it, and we might face more. But I also understand what the 
Joint Chiefs are telling us when they say we have excess, surplus 
baggage, that the infrastructure exceeds the number of personnel that 
we now have. ``The tail is too big for the tooth,'' as they say in the 
military. We have to slim down. When General Shalikashvili, who is a 
distinguished soldier, Chairman of our Joint Chiefs, says we have more 
surplus capacity now than we did when the BRAC closing process began, 
we should listen.
  We are listening. We have offered this amendment to give us a chance 
to proceed to shed the excess weight that Secretary Cohen has asked us 
to shed, to save the billions that we need and cannot afford to waste 
if we are going to fully protect and defend the security of this 
Nation.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. McCAIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the senior Senator from 
Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. I thank my friend from Michigan for a very lucid and, I 
think, fact-filled discussion of this issue, which I believe has become 
more Orwellian in nature, if I might characterize it as that.
  We are now debating whether closing a base will save money or not. If 
that were not the case, Mr. President, we made a terrible mistake at 
the end of World War II. We should have kept all the bases open that we 
built all over America during World War II and should not have closed 
any of them. I am, frankly, astonished.
  Now, I think there have been valid arguments made over the process. 
There have been arguments made as to whether the process was 
politicized in the last round of BRAC. I think that there have been 
some valid points here. But, Mr. President, anyone in the world, I 
think, can understand that if you have to reduce a business, a 
corporation, or whatever it is, because the in-flow of money has been 
reduced, then you have to close a number of facilities because you 
don't have the business.

  Mr. President, the military, in many ways, is a business. They are 
assigned a mission. They receive money to carry out that mission, and 
they build the facilities and equipment and hire the men and women to 
carry out that mission. Then, as that mission is reduced and the amount 
of money to support that mission is reduced, you shrink the size of the 
support establishment.
  It is not really very complicated. To make an argument that a base 
closing does not save money over time, really, to me, defies all logic. 
Yes, there have been costs associated with base closings that were not 
anticipated. I will certainly agree with that. A lot of it had to do 
with environmental cleanup. But the fact is, Mr. President, that those 
costs would have been incurred anyway and probably would have been 
higher as years went by and the pollution and the environmental 
poisoning would have become greater. So to somehow say that because we 
had to clean up bases that were closing does not justify the bases 
being closed, that ignores the fact that sooner or later the 
environmental cleanup would have had to take place.
  Now, Mr. President, if you have three bases and you only need two, 
then you need to keep paying the electric bill at the third base, keep 
the runways paved and the housing up and the grass cut. All of those 
are costs that are associated with excess inventory. So when you don't 
have the requirement for that inventory because the mission has been 
reduced--the funding in this case--then you reduce the support 
establishment. I don't know how it could be much less complex than 
that.
  When we talk about CBO estimates, DOD savings estimates are 
inconsistent, unreliable, and incomplete, maybe they are. Maybe they 
are all those things. But you can't deny the fundamental fact that 
unless you believe we are going to increase defense spending, we have 
to have a better match-up between the support establishment and the 
operating forces, and that because our reduction in overall funding and 
our failure to implement the reductions in the support establishment is 
not matched up, we therefore are losing in this ``tooth to tail'' 
ratio, which the Senator from Virginia, Senator Robb, has talked about 
on occasion.
  One of the opponents of this amendment said that Congress should be 
doing this. I totally agree that Congress should be making these 
decisions. It is a lack of courage on the part of Congress that we have 
to turn to a

[[Page S7074]]

commission. But, Mr. President, it is perfectly clear that for 17 years 
not a base was closed, even though there was a requirement, in the view 
of one and all, to do so. It was because Congress didn't have the 
political will to do it. That is why we resorted to the Base Closing 
Commission.
  Now, if I had the confidence that Congress would act in a responsible 
fashion and we would close bases as necessary, then I would not support 
the commission. But the record is perfectly clear that, for all those 
years, we were unable to close a base because Congress was politically 
paralyzed, so we had to give the responsibility and the blame to a Base 
Closing Commission.
  The Senator from Michigan has already referred to the letter of the 
Secretary of Defense. I am told that a letter from the President is 
coming over. The inspector general of DOD found that, in some cases, 
they overestimated cost by $148 million, and they underestimated 
savings by $614 million. The inspector general is a well-respected 
individual, and her memorandum, which is contained in the cover letter 
by Secretary Cohen, I think is abundantly clear.

  Mr. President, I don't like to drag out this debate too long. I think 
that some arguments have been made that I think are important to be 
made by the opponents of this amendment. I want to make it clear that 
if the Dorgan second-degree amendment is not tabled, the Senator from 
Michigan and I intend to have a vote on our amendment up or down. So we 
will raise that amendment again until there is a final adjudication by 
this body on the McCain-Levin amendment. I hope that the Dorgan second-
degree amendment is tabled and we can have an up-or-down vote on the 
other.
  The Senator from Michigan pointed out and showed the stacks of 
information that have been sent over to the Senate. The Senator from 
Michigan and others have pointed out the abundance of information that 
has been sent over by the Department of Defense and the forms and 
reports as to how much money has been saved and where and under what 
circumstances. Yes, we underestimated the environmental cleanup costs, 
but we have underestimated the environmental cleanup costs in every 
toxic waste site in America, not just on military bases. Those toxic 
waste sites are not going to go away just because the base remains 
open. Sooner or later, that problem is going to have to be addressed. 
So I hope that we will act in agreement.
  One other thing. The letter from the chiefs of the services that came 
over, including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff--many of the 
allegations I have heard quite often are that members of the military 
are empire builders, they never want to give up a base or a weapons 
system, and they never met a weapon system they didn't love. These 
individuals are calling for these tough decisions to be made because 
they know what will happen if we don't close these bases. It will not 
free up the money, which is absolutely vital, in their view, to 
modernizing the force and retaining the men and women we need in the 
All Volunteer Force, to provide sufficient funds for training and 
operations in order to keep our military the best in the world, because 
you can't siphon off all this money into support functions and expect 
us then to have enough money left over to carry out the operations that 
are necessary.
  So, Mr. President, at the appropriate time, I will move to table the 
Dorgan second-degree amendment. I hope we can dispense with this issue 
as soon as possible.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. HATCH addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The senior Senator from Utah is recognized.
  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I want to take a few moments today to talk 
about this process. I have to say that having gone through the three 
BRAC processes we have had in the past, having traveled from city to 
city to make the cases that we made, having fought very hard to try and 
make sure the process was honest and decent, having lived through it, 
where the defense depot in Ogden was shut down--we felt, for very poor 
reasons. The only reason was that it was more interior, it seems to me, 
than the bases on the various coasts. But it seems to me that that was 
one of its great advantages. It would be much more difficult to attack 
if we got into difficulty.
  But we lived with that. We lived with the shutdown of the Tooele Army 
Base, which literally had the greatest heavy-duty vehicle repair 
facility in the world, just completed at a cost of almost $200 million 
to the taxpayers. And they shut down. Now they wish they had not 
because they now don't have the facilities or quite the same capability 
to take care of Army heavy-duty vehicles. It was a stupid thing to do. 
But that is what they did, in spite of the fact that Utahans have the 
chemical weapons destruction facility there. And we put up with all of 
the hazardous problems of storing chemical weapons in Utah and even 
transporting them around with various aspects in and out of Utah and 
with the chemical weapons demilling that we do there.
  Utahans have always been very patriotic. They have supported the 
military as much, if not more so, than any other State in the Union, 
and I think the attitude is still that way in spite of some of these 
glaring inequities that have occurred. We lived with those. We can 
accept them.
  I agree with the distinguished Senator from Arizona. We should shut 
down bases that do not deserve to compete, or really aren't 
competitive, or really are dealing with old, worn-out, less modernized 
facilities and also equipment, and work done on various less modernized 
pieces of equipment. But what we are getting very upset about lately is 
that we went all through this BRAC process, and we worked our tails off 
trying to make a case for the Hill Air Force Base and Ogden Air 
Logistics Command. We did. It came out No. 1 without question. It was 
the best Air Logistics Command in all of the Air Force--in all of the 
military. The work force was one of the best in the history of the 
country. And we won. So did Tinker Air Force Base. So did Warner 
Robins.
  Mr. President, they won because they were more competitive. These 
three bases won because they could do a better job. They won because 
they literally made sense as far as keeping our Air Force modernized 
and working well with the best equipment possible. Three work forces 
appeared to be the best, and certainly Hill was No. 1. Since that has 
happened, Hill has gone down to about a 54 or 55 percent utilization of 
capacity.
  I have to say this. With that low utilization of capacity, which 
should be up around 85 percent had the transition work been given to 
Hill, and which we hope will be given to Hill, if we could get it up 
over 70 percent of capacity, as high as 85 percent of capacity, Hill 
Air Force Base would be so competitive that nobody could compete with 
them in the world today. But at 54 or 55 percent, it means that the 
costs are much higher than literally they would be if we were utilizing 
the capacity in a fair and decent manner.
  I have to say that we have had many Air Force people tell us they 
don't want to ever see Hill hurt because it is the best Air Logistics 
Command in the armed services today. But their hands are somewhat tied 
by the administration that is playing politics with the BRAC process.
  The administration has indicated because there are two Presidential 
States involved that even though the full BRAC process said that 
McClellan Air Force Base in Sacramento had to be shut down and that 
Kelly Air Force Base in San Antonio had to be shut down, the 
administration has indicated they don't want them shut down. As a 
matter of fact, they are now talking about privatization in place. It 
is nice to talk about that if all things were equal--if literally good 
business principles were practiced; if literally there was not any 
stacking of the deck in either case; if literally the regulations that 
would be written would be fair. Maybe there could be an argument for 
that.
  But the only argument that should be made for privatization in place 
is after the consolidation of the three Air Logistic Commands that won 
the competition. Once they are consolidated, then I have no problem 
with trying to place some privatization and have private companies bid 
on some of the work.
  Keep in mind that one reason why we don't go straight to 
privatization is because during time of war, we want to be able, above 
all things, to be functional, and we don't want to have to

[[Page S7075]]

worry about whether prices are going to be jacked up by private 
companies, or whether or not we have the capacity to take care of the 
needs of our fighting men and women overseas, or for any other number 
of reasons.
  Mr. President, the President's politicization of the BRAC95 process 
has become a common theme on this floor. I admire the willingness of so 
many of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to explicitly state 
that privatization-in-place was not intended by BRAC, and that this 
deliberate evasion of the BRAC recommendations can only portend defeat 
for those seeking future BRAC rounds.


           utah does not deserve to lose three bracs in a row

  My State, Utah, does not deserve to lose in three successive BRAC 
rounds. We lost 5,000 jobs from the closure of two installations, the 
Tooele Army Depot in BRAC91 and the Defense Depot at Ogden in BRAC93. 
But Hill Air Force Base, and the Ogden Air Logistics Center, is a 
different case.
  Hill is the best of the best among maintenance depots, rated as a 
tier I installation. That means the highest military value. By 
contrast, Kelly and McClellan were rated tier III--meaning the lowest 
military value. To privatize at the worst depots is to demean the 
merits of the Air Force and BRAC decisions to preserve the best, and 
the best is the work force at Hill.
  I can make the case that BRAC91 was wrong. The Army put $250 million 
into the finest consolidated maintenance depot for wheeled combat 
vehicles in the world. A couple of years later, it shut it down and 
moved the work to the Red River Army Depot at Texarkana. Then what do 
you think happened? Red River was designated for closure! But it gets 
worse--DOD virtually abandoned Tooele until the Tooele County 
Commission, to its everlasting credit, aggressively beat the bushes for 
users, successfully bringing Detroit Diesel onto the former base.
  The point is that Utahns can and do turn bad situations into 
successes. We can deal with adversity, but we do not have to deal with 
the type of unfairness and outrageous discrimination that is being 
dealt to my State by the President.
  Let me remind my colleagues that Hill met the best of the BRAC95 
parameters, which included military value and return on investment.
  Utah is a terrific investment for the Air Force and the Nation:
  DOD is mindful of Utah's value for the same reasons that domestic and 
foreign businesses flock to the State. And they certainly don't come 
because of our political clout alone--after all, we have only five 
electoral votes.
  Utah's attraction lies with its people, its business climate, its 
youthful and well-educated work force.
  The State has the highest educational level in the United States, 
according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
  Money Magazine and Business Week, among other sources, repeatedly 
cite it as the best place to do business, the best place to live, and 
the so-called Software Valley of the World.
  And its workforce is the youngest in the country and teeming with 
skilled college graduates who work. Ask any business in Utah about the 
Utah work ethic; in fact, ask the BRAC commissioners! Ask the Air 
Force!
  In a few words: Utahns are the real return on investment, and it is 
why the Air Force and BRAC have heavily endorsed the retention of Hill.
  Utah's military value is unmatched. The BRAC commissioners didn't 
miss a thing in assessing Hill's military value. It hosts the gateway 
to the Nation's largest exercise site, the Utah Test & Training Range, 
covering 2,675 square miles. This is the only range in the world on 
which every active Air Force aircraft can exercise--keep that point in 
mind. If Hill is not properly used, or if the President's privatization 
deception causes an underutilized Hill to suffer in a future BRAC 
round, I will tell you now that this range will not longer be available 
to DOD. It is just that simple. People in Utah are going to turn 
against them.
  Even though we have been the most patriotic State, or equal to any 
other patriotic State in the Union.
  I will not allow the citizens of my State to become a DOD trash can--
dumping bombs on our fragile terrain, using our remote regions for 
developing chemical defenses or demilitarizing dangerous chemical 
munitions, for example. We tolerate as day-to-day sacrifices certain 
activities that we see other States revolting against.
  We want Hill's military value appreciated and developed precisely the 
way that BRAC intended, and that means consolidating core workload at 
Hill. We want this work at the best depot. Like most other Americans, 
we do not want privatization of the workload at the site of the worst 
depot. We want the ICBM depot at Hill to flourish, the F-16 
logistics management program, and the C-130 depot programs to be 
expanded as intended. We deserve--because we have earned--the F-22 and 
Joint Strike Fighter depot programs over the next decade.

  Hill does not work well at the current 50-percent capacity usage 
level, nor at the 66-percent level which it would have in the outyears 
if privatization in place occurs. We work best when we are at full 
capacity, and that is why BRAC directed a consolidation package that 
would put Hill at 86-percent utilization in the year 2001. It was done, 
to repeat myself, because Hill is the best of the best.


                hill reflects the utah ``can-do'' spirit

  Mr. President, Utah is a State populated initially by pioneers who 
lived and overcame adversity--even in the face of outrageous unfairness 
and persecution. Today, the Old Mormon Trail is alive with men and 
women of all ages, and of all faiths, who are re-re-creating that 
spirit as they trek toward Utah.
  We overcame the unfairness of Tooele Army Depot loss, as I mentioned.
  Despite our remote location, we are a literate, sophisticated State 
with 17 percent of the Utah adult speaking a foreign language, most 
fluently.
  Our small State with just over 1 million persons in the work force, 
has over 1,800 information technology and computer software companies.
  Our unemployment rate is 3.5 percent, while our job creation rate is 
twice that of the United States at 7.3 percent.
  And, we are the fifth fastest growing State.
  Mr. President, I could go on--but my point has been made, I believe. 
It is that, like many other Members of both the House and Senate, we 
demand fairness. When we appoint an independent commission, we expect 
its recommendations to be honored by a Chief Executive who is President 
of all the people, not just those with the greatest number of potential 
votes.


                         privatization in place

  Mr. President, the Base Realignment Commission--BRAC--issue that 
affects us most deeply is the evasion of the BRAC recommendation to 
consolidate workload at a public depot or at a commercial private 
sector facility. This BRAC recommendation has been distorted by the 
Clinton administration to allow what has now become known as 
privatization in place.
  In the next few minutes, I will present eight reasons why 
privatization in place will not work. It is not economically feasible, 
and it is inherently unfair to the public depot competitor:
  First, it will worsen already deteriorated efficiency in the depot 
system;
  Second, GAO has identified current wasteful depot practices that beg 
reform, something that privatization in place can't provide;
  Third, past depot reforms have not succeeded;
  Fourth, the problem of excess capacity is not solved;
  Fifth, it will not produce promised cost savings;
  Sixth, the best depots are being sacrificed on a shaky political 
alter;
  Seventh, the case for privatization in place has yet to be made; and
  Eighth, the privatization-in-place competition lacks the elements of 
fairness expected in Government solicitations.


  privatization-in-place will compound identified depot inefficiencies

  Mr. President, the Depot Caucus is an informal group of Members of 
Congress with strong interests in averting the problems of depot waste 
and inefficiency. Our goal is to ensure the availability of high-
readiness equipment to our Armed Forces.
  Depot operations are part of service logistics, which is probably the 
most difficult of all military specialties.

[[Page S7076]]

Even some of history's top military strategists, Napoleon and von 
Clausewitz, to name two of the greatest, failed to insert military 
logistics into their battle plans and strategies. Yet, military 
logistics has long been one of the great strengths of our military 
services. It has also been an undeniable cause of our success on the 
battlefield.

  My point here is that we cannot afford the inefficiencies and waste 
that privatization in place will bring to an already cumbersome depot 
system in DOD.


        gao has found depot operations wasteful and inefficient

  GAO has identified $2.5 billion of losses over 4 years directly 
related to an Air Force depot system that is already encumbered with 40 
percent excess capacity. In its May 1997 report on defense depot 
operations, the GAO said ``DOD consistently experienced losses [in 
depot operations] * * *, and has had to request additional funding to 
support their operations.''
  Why do I raise this specific point? Because depot operations are 
expected to at least break even. That has always been one of the Air 
Force depot system's ever-elusive goals. But, instead, the system will 
sustain operating losses for fiscal year 1997, which the Air Force 
estimates at $1.7 billion. This exceeds even the GAO forecasted losses.
  Let me add that operating losses is an auditor's term of art. GAO's 
mandate is to audit organizational and operational procedures to 
evaluate efficiency and effectiveness, predictors of program quality.


     depot financial management reforms have helped only marginally

  This is not to say that DOD hasn't been working the problem; it's 
just not getting any better. Let me give you an example.
  In 1995, DOD streamlined the financial management of its depot 
operations by devolving control over depot financing from the office of 
the Secretary of Defense to the military services. This reform shifted 
accountability for the Defense Business Operating Fund [DBOF], placing 
it at the service level. I share GAO's demand for better 
accountability. But the problems plaguing DBOF just followed the so-
called reforms.
  First, the Air Force, not unlike the Navy, advance billed its 
customers, which are the military units sending equipment to the depots 
and which pay for the services of the depots. The advance billing came 
to $2.9 billion, which was to ensure that sufficient cash balances were 
available to pay for the goods, services, and other stock items 
required by the depots to service the assets. Still, the Air Force will 
operate this year at the $1.7 billion deficit that I mentioned earlier.
  The second point regarding this reform is that there is simply too 
little demand for depot service. It's a classic supply-demand problem 
that every undergraduate encounters in textbooks. I suggest to my 
colleagues that if they owned a chain of auto repair facilities--let's 
say 5--and there was significant excess capacity, the logical thing 
would be to close two garages and consolidate the work in the remaining 
three. Unlike a lot of what the Air Force does, this is not rocket 
science.
  But, I can't place too much blame on the Air Force. They have four 
big problems, the last of which is beyond their control:
  First, they're faced with 40 percent overcapacity;
  Second, they have a resulting $1.7 billion deficit this year;
  Third, there are gross inefficiencies and distortions that always 
accrue to business planning when you have to advance bill your 
customers; and
  Fourth, they now have some members of their board of directors, 
including Congress, telling them to throw caution to the wind and 
sustain these inefficiencies anyway!
  Many Members of this body have run businesses. Is there anyone here 
who could keep afloat under these conditions?
  My last point on current inefficiencies is that these problems were 
not unknown before we compiled the Defense depot provisions in the bill 
before us today.
  You'll recall that during the BRAC process we used a sophisticated 
analytical modeling technique called COBRA [Cost of Base Realignment 
Activities]. The parameters and formulas applied by the COBRA model 
long ago uncovered the same problems. Academicians say that a model's 
strength is related to its ability to predict and explain. The accuracy 
with which BRAC uncovered, explained, and predicted the problems that 
we are discussing today suggests COBRA's efficacy. Perhaps some other 
agencies of government ought to try it.


                     the problem of excess capacity

  Mr. President, the GAO testified before the Senate Defense 
Appropriations Subcommittee hearing last month. In his testimony before 
that panel, the Assistant Comptroller General made the following 
observation on excess capacity. DOD's 40 percent excess capacity, he 
said, ``is a significant contribution toward inefficiency and high cost 
of DOD's maintenance program and in generating significant losses in 
the depot maintenance activity group of the services' working capital 
funds.'' This was in further reference to the annual $1.7 billion 
annual Air Force depot system loss referred to earlier.

  Still more importantly, the GAO testimony continued--and I want to 
emphasize the following remarks:

       The Air Force's plans for implementing BRAC recommendations 
     will do little to reduce excess capacity and will likely 
     result in increased depot maintenance prices.

  Here, of course, the GAO witness was referring to Air Force proposals 
to implement privatization in place to avoid the BRAC recommendation 
for the consolidation of workload to depots or other commercial private 
activities. In the case of San Antonio and Sacramento, this expressly 
excludes privatization in place as an alternative to closure.
  Mr. President, as a customer of the depot system, you don't have real 
market choice if you cannot utilize alternatives to suppliers who lock 
you into higher prices. My point is that depots are forced to be 
inefficient, both as competitors as well as business operators, where 
we deny them the opportunity to rid themselves of excess capacity to 
bring down costs.
  The problem of waste gets worse. GAO found a $689 million loss from 
continued excess capacity related to the DOD privatization in place 
plan. If you multiply this amount over 6 years, which is the statutory 
period for the phase-out of BRAC closures, the loss to the taxpayers is 
a staggering $4.1 billion. Imagine what it would be if an 8-year 
contract, as proposed in the McClellan competition, were to be awarded!
  Again, I plead with my colleagues who have been in business to stop 
and think about this--could you keep your customers if you just kept 
raising prices, while requiring them to disperse badly needed operating 
funds to pay for services in advance?
  It may be great theater, but it's a lousy business practice. And it 
is even worse as public policy. We are gouging the taxpayers to 
subsidize such outrageous waste. We need to put a stop to it by 
preventing privatization in place.


          privatization in place does not produce cost savings

  Mr. President, GAO has also criticized the overly optimistic 
assumptions about cost savings that were anticipated from privatization 
in place where it had been authorized. I repeat: where authorized, to 
distinguish from the plain language of the BRAC recommendation 
regarding Sacramento and San Antonio, which stated ``consolidation . . 
. to commercial private sector activities,'' which in no way allows the 
inference of privatization in place. Privatization in place was not 
intended. This is a point clearly made by the ranking minority member 
of the Readiness Subcommittee and junior Senator from Virginia on this 
floor last Thursday evening.
  But, let me turn to a case study where privatization in place was 
directly recommended by BRAC. Let's look at the results. I refer to the 
BRAC 1993 decision regarding the Air Force Aerospace Guidance and 
Metrological Center located at Newark AFB, Ohio. GAO performed an audit 
of facility operations under privatization in place and found that the 
Air Force itself estimated costs to be $9 to $32 million higher than 
those before the operation went private. In fact, I was told by the Air 
Force over the weekend that there remain nearly 150 government 
employees at the site.

[[Page S7077]]

  Despite this history, the solicitation for privatization at McClellan 
is actually forecasting a 25 percent cost savings! Every sensible 
government accountant that I've spoken to claims this figure is at best 
vastly inflated.


the president is sacrificing the best depots on a shaky political alter

  Politicization of the BRAC process is risky both economically and 
militarily. The consequences are already quite clear:
  Both the House an Senate will deny the President future BRAC rounds. 
Who among us can support continuation of a process that has become 
blatantly political? Who is willing to roll the dice with the 
livelihoods of workers in their States, let alone the lives of our 
servicemen and women?
  We are denying DOD critically needed modernization moneys that were 
to come from the BRAC savings.
  Worse, still, we are courting the serious deterioration of combat 
efficiency and safety if our armed services do not get technologies--
technologies which are already in the hands of our adversaries, some of 
them Third World countries.
  There is not the least likelihood that demand will rise to meet the 
sustained levels of excess capacity perpetuated by the President's 
actions. For example, modern weapon systems have reduced programmed 
depot maintenance. The F-16, for one, has no routine depot-maintenance 
requirements. And that aircraft is to be replaced by the Joint Strike 
Fighter, which has even a longer mean-time-between-failures 
requirement--MTBF means the average that a system can operate without 
major replacement or overhaul. The F-22, which will replace the F-15, 
also has no programmed depot maintenance.

  But the problems of excess capacity get worse. GAO has calculated 
that the 5 depots left in place will have 57 million direct work hours 
to perform 32 million direct work hours of labor, and, the requirement 
will fall by over 37 percent to 20 million direct work hours by 1999. 
This means that the depot system will have over 2\1/2\ times the amount 
of labor it needs.
  Mr. President, the President's politicization of BRAC is costing our 
defense structure the best of the best.
  The BRAC decision could not have been more clear. Hill AFB was a Tier 
I depot, meaning that it had the highest military value. San Antonio 
and Sacramento, by contrast, were Tier III--or installations which had 
the lowest military value. The ratings were made by the Air Force and 
used extensively in the BRAC rounds. Yet, the Air Force is now being 
brow-beaten by its political masters in the Clinton administration into 
renouncing its own objective rankings.
  At the same time, these Tier III installations are being extended the 
same rewards that were fairly won by the hard work of the Utah, 
Georgia, and Oklahoma bases. Mr. President, what does this say for 
merit? Or, will the Senate merely go on record with the message that 
lots of electoral votes carry the day?
  What statement are we making to motivate government employees to 
provide their best effort? How much political distortion and corruption 
of good performance are we willing to tolerate?
  Let me put a more positive face on some of these problems. Let's 
consider the value to the taxpayer of pursuing the BRAC 
recommendations, that is, keeping the best, while eliminating the 
poorer performers. According to GAO, the elimination of the San Antonio 
and Sacramento depots, as proposed by BRAC, would produce the following 
gains:
  Excess capacity, by 1999, would fall from 65 percent to 27 percent. 
On the other hand, if the bases are not closed, San Antonio will have 
89 percent of its maximum capacity idled, while Sacramento will be at 
90 percent;
  Average hourly rates would be reduced by $6 per hour; and
  That $182 million would be saved annually from these types of 
economies of scale and efficiencies.
  Regrettably, I have to say that the President's attitude toward the 
noncoastal Western States, and especially my own State of Utah, cannot 
escape our attention. It should be foremost in the thoughts of every 
Senator from this region.
  The President has repeatedly interfered with, tried to disrupt, and 
tried to knock off course the most economically vibrant regional 
economy in the Nation.
  Need another example? Among other punitive land use regulations, he 
has usurped without prior consultation 1.7 million acres of land in my 
State, arbitrarily removing them from economic development and other 
generally beneficial uses. I refer here to the grand Staircase-
Escalante National Monument.
  It troubles me substantially that the President, even though he is in 
his second term, is simply not acting as the President of all the 
people and all the States. He is acting as the President for the large, 
electorally rich States. If this were not true, the decision to 
implement the BRAC recommendation would be a no-brainer.


      The privatization in place competition is inherently unfair

  Mr. President, I have done a thorough assessment of the proposal for 
privatization in place at McClellan. I find two major flaws that 
starkly stack the deck against the public depot and favor private 
bidders.
  First, the public depot bidders are forced to bear an unfair share of 
the costs of transitioning the Sacramento depot from active Air Force 
status.
  The DOD Cost of Competition Handbook stipulates that both public and 
private bidders must cite the transition costs in their bids. However, 
the private bidder doesn't include the costs of early retirement, 
separation, or relocation for workers at Sacramento who lose their 
jobs. But the public depot shows it as an accounting charge because 
it's paid by the taxpayer.
  This becomes a form of double accounting. In fact, BRAC intended, and 
Congress provided the moneys, to fund personnel transition costs 
regardless of who wins. Yet, the impression is left that this is a cost 
that will be integrated into the depot's cost to its customers.
  Second, the private bidders get substantial financial and performance 
advantages from the use of the excess capacity intended to be closed by 
BRAC.
  The local redevelopment authority can determine its own cost of 
leasing the facility to the private bidder. What an incentive. There is 
nothing to keep the leasing agreement from covering just about 
anything, such as depreciation writeoffs, improvements, and even 
equipment and facility maintenance. All of this allows the private 
bidder to be artificially low.
  Yet another inequity denies the public depot from beginning military 
construction related to the workload transfer until the contract is 
awarded. This means the work must be performed at the Sacramento 
location for an indeterminate period of time, adding to the public 
bidder's cost. And, of course, reducing the fairness of the 
competition.
  The McClellan bid consists of a 5-year contract with three 1-year 
options, for a possible total award of 8 years. The options are 
performance based. This means that the LRA is certain to expend moneys 
on facilities maintenance in order to allow the private contractor to 
achieve better productivity, and through that level of performance, 
ensure the option awards. The public depot, on the other hand, must 
invest in facilities modernization and reflect this investment in its 
cost.


         the case for privatization in place just can't be made

   Mr. President, on the basis of all available evidence, we should 
conclude that privatization in place cannot fairly or reasonably 
produce cost savings. More likely, it will contribute to waste and 
inefficiency. In support of this proposition, I want to make the 
following closing arguments:
  First, depots are already among the most critical or so-called high-
risk areas of the Federal Government.
  High risk is a special designation used by GAO to alert Congress to 
areas that are highly vulnerable to waste, fraud, abuse, and 
mismanagement.
  Second, GAO has already forecast that, by the end of fiscal year 
1999, San Antonio will have 89 percent of its maximum productive 
capacity as excess, while Sacramento's excess capacity will be at 90 
percent. Both of these levels are more than twice the current 40 
percent excess capacity that we are arguing about today. In other 
words, the problem is going to be doubly bad by the end of the next 
fiscal year if we don't solve it now by ending privatization in place.

[[Page S7078]]

  Again, these problems are caused in great part by diminished workload 
requirements related to force downsizing. Yet, as I said earlier, it is 
the savings generated by reducing infrastructure that are fueling our 
ability to modernize our equipment, something that almost every Member 
of this body knows is necessary.
  Third, GAO told the Appropriations Committee panel that: ``the Air 
Force has the most serious excess capacity problem.'' The combined 
losses could reach about $500 million if the Sacramento and San Antonio 
facilities are kept in the inventory.
  Let me remind my colleagues of the value of the BRAC findings that I 
mentioned earlier. I need to repeat this: in making its determinations 
regarding both these depots, BRAC leaned heavily on the Air Force's own 
designation of the Sacramento and San Antonio ALC's as so-called Tier 
III installations. This means, as most of us involved in the BRAC 
process will recall, that the installations had the lowest military 
value. I challenge anyone to argue that there is some redemptive value 
that could follow from the revival of installations that the Air Force 
itself realized should be closed.
  I might add, Mr. President, that Utah has been on the low end of the 
BRAC process in other areas. My State has lost two installations. I 
must admit that I fought hard to prevent those losses. I do not deny 
the trauma that the closure of such a large military facility causes 
States and communities. And, I admit that if the situation were 
reversed, I might be making the same weak arguments my colleagues from 
California and Texas are making today. I am well aware of what is at 
stake for my colleagues from Texas and California.
  But, this does not excuse the Clinton administration from its 
responsibilities either to the defense of our country, to the ensuring 
the safest possible equipment for our servicemen and women, or to the 
taxpayers who are footing the bills. The President needs to take the 
broad view. And, by rejecting the BRAC recommendations--and 
compromising the entire BRAC process for unsupportable political 
reasons--he clearly has not.
  We should not tolerate diversions from, or the politicization of, the 
BRAC recommendations. The very nature of downsizing means that there 
will be losers and survivors. We must make every effort to protect the 
integrity that the process itself demands.
  But, more importantly, one of our essential duties under the 
Constitution is to provide for the common defense. Congress and the 
President have the ultimate responsibility for the support of our Armed 
Forces. It is a duty we cannot delegate. I simply ask each of my 
colleagues these questions:
  Do we fulfill that duty when we knowingly allow diversions that 
produce gross inefficiencies in the operation of military services from 
the recommendations of an independent commission?
  And do we honor our obligations by denying funds produced by these 
recommendations for the provision of technologically superior equipment 
and training for our fighting men and women?
  We need to affirm our duties and obligations. Only then will we take 
a major step toward giving our citizens and our fighting men and women 
the type of defense the country expects.
  Mr. President, let me just say, in conclusion, that I want this 
process to work. It is very difficult for me to support a future BRAC 
process if this is going to be politicized the way we see it being 
politicized right now. After all, the pain, suffering, inconvenience, 
and difficulties in traveling around the country and meeting time after 
time with the military, with the various administrations, and so forth, 
to have to put up with what is going on right now is just unacceptable.
  Frankly, I can't support a future BRAC process if that is the best we 
can do with this one, which I thought was fair and which came out with 
very tough decisions. They weren't easy. I feel sorry for anybody who 
has lost anything. But we have lost plenty, too.
  All I can say is, if we lose this, then I am never going to get over 
it. I don't think the people of Utah are going to get over it, and I 
think, frankly, the country will be poorer for it, and I think our 
national security interests will be poorer for it.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from South 
Carolina.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator 
Sessions and Senator Inhofe be added as cosponsors to amendment 420 
offered by Senator Cochran.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                         Privilege of the Floor

  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Jeanine 
Esperne of Senator Kyl's staff be granted privileges of the floor 
during consideration of S. 936.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at 5:30 
p.m. today, there be 15 minutes of debate equally divided between 
Senator Wellstone and Senator Thurmond, or his designee, and 15 minutes 
of debate between Senator Gorton and Senator Inouye; and, immediately 
following that debate, the Senate proceed to vote on or in relation to 
the Wellstone amendment 670, to be followed by a vote on or in relation 
to the Gorton amendment 424, to be followed by a vote on or in relation 
to the Dodd amendment 765; and, finally there be 2 minutes for debate 
equally divided before the second and third vote.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I further ask unanimous consent that no 
other amendments be in order to the above-listed amendments.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DOMENICI addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, parliamentary inquiry. Is the Dorgan 
amendment with reference to base closures pending?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes.
  Mr. DOMENICI. I would like to speak for a few moments on the subject. 
I will not take long.
  Mr. President, I rise in support of the Dorgan-Domenici amendment to 
require the Department of Defense to submit a report to Congress 
detailing the costs and savings of previously authorized base closure 
rounds and on the need, if any, for further base closure rounds prior 
to the Congress authorizing the Department to move forward with 
additional closures. This amendment stands for a simple proposition. It 
says that as Members of Congress we will take our oversight 
responsibilities seriously when major decisions that affect the lives 
of all Americans are on the table. It says that we will take a long 
hard look at where we have been before we chart a course for where we 
are going. We owe the people we represent a commitment to carefully 
analyze what the last four rounds of base closure dating back to 1989 
have accomplished before we decide to give the authority to the 
Department of Defense to conduct two more base closure rounds. This 
amendment does not say that additional base closure rounds are not 
necessary, or that they will not be needed in the future. This 
amendment simply requires that the Congress be able to have essential 
factual data about the costs and savings associated with previous 
rounds before we authorize legislation that would give the Department 
of Defense the authority to conduct new rounds. This amendment is 
reasonable, it is fair, and it offers a common sense approach to the 
serious modernization problems we face.
  Mr. President, I want to make clear before I begin that I understand 
the argument of those who say that BRAC savings are an important part 
of the funds that will finance the future modernization of our Armed 
Forces and keep our military the most technologically advanced and 
lethal fighting force in the world. I understand that the Quadrennial 
Defense Review and the National Defense Panel established by the 
Congress concluded that further reductions in the DOD base structure 
are essential to free up money we need to modernize our forces. I am 
aware that in a recent letter, all members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
urged the Congress to ``strongly support further reductions in base 
structure proposed by the Secretary of Defense.'' Nevertheless, Mr. 
President, the question is not whether the savings are needed, the

[[Page S7079]]

question is will the necessary savings for force modernization be 
present if we conduct two more rounds of closure? In that regard, no 
one can guarantee that the savings will be present after two more 
rounds. No one can guarantee the projected savings from previous rounds 
will be what they are currently estimated. The QDR did not guarantee 
the savings will be present, the National Defense Review Panel has not 
assured the Congress that the savings will be present, and the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff has not assured the Congress that the savings will be 
present if we close more bases.
  There have been four rounds of base closure--1988, 1991, 1993, 1995. 
They have resulted in decisions to close 97 of 495 major bases in the 
United States. Between 1990 and 2001 the DOD estimates that BRAC 
actions will produce a total of $13.5 billion in net savings. After 
2001, when all of the previous BRAC actions must be completed, steady 
State savings are estimated by the DOD to be $5.6 billion per year. CBO 
estimates that it will cost $23.4 billion to close all 97 bases. These 
costs are mostly due to environmental cleanup at closing bases, 30 
percent, additional operations and maintenance at receiving bases, 35 
percent, and additional construction and renovations and receiving 
bases, 30 percent.

  CBO projects at total of $57 billion in savings by the year 2020. CBO 
estimates that DOD will save about $28.7 billion during the BRAC 
implementation process, 1988-2001, which means a net savings of only 
$5.3 billion during those years. Half of the $57 billion in savings are 
projected to come from lower operations and maintenance costs; a 
quarter from less spending on personnel, including civilians whose jobs 
are eliminated; the remainder comes from projected land sales.
  Mr. President, the main question we must ask ourselves is how 
reliable is this cost savings information? The answer, unfortunately, 
is that no one really knows. Not the Department of Defense, not the 
Congress, not the President.
  We in New Mexico have had a fair amount of experience with the base 
closure process and one fact that we have learned is that what the 
Department of Defense estimates in savings cannot, and should not be 
taken for granted. We need to examine carefully whether the savings 
promised have some basis in reality. The responsible choice is to see 
where we have been before we set a course of where we are going.
  For example, during the 1995 BRAC process the Secretary of Defense 
recommended that Kirtland Air Force Base undergo a major realignment. 
Before we took a long hard look at their numbers for costs and savings, 
the Department of the Air Force estimated that it would spend $277.5 
million to realign the base while projecting a $464.5 million in 
savings over 20 years.
  Mr. President, what would you say if I told you that not only did we 
find that the Air Force's costs and savings were wholly inaccurate, but 
that after careful analysis by my staff, knowledgeable members of the 
community, and others in the congressional Delegation, the Secretary of 
Defense for the first time in the history of the BRAC process wrote to 
the BRAC Commission and told them that ``* * * the recommendation for 
the realignment of Kirtland Air Force Base no longer represents a 
financially or operationally sound scenario.''
  Specifically, we found that if the Air Force major realignment of 
Kirtland Air Force Base passed that the Department of Energy would have 
to assume $64 million in conversion costs and that it would cost an 
additional $30.6 million per year to maintain the safety, security, and 
viability of the critical base operations that remained.
  Mr. President, the New Mexico experience with BRAC may be unique, but 
it serves to make the essential point that we are making with this 
amendment. The driving factor behind base closure decisions should 
continue to be the overall cost to the taxpayer. In our case, the 
original half-billion cost savings turned out to be a half-billion new 
cost to the taxpayer. The message of the New Mexico experience is that 
we need to carefully examine the Department's projected costs and 
savings in order to thoughtfully determine whether it is a wise 
decision to give the Department of Defense the legislative authority 
they need to conduct additional base closure rounds. The Dorgan-
Domenici amendment will give the Congress the necessary data to make 
this decision in a thoughtful and precise manner.

  Mr. President, the Senators from New Mexico and North Dakota are not 
the only people who think that the Department of Defense's current 
costs and savings projections may not be reliable. The Congressional 
Budget Office says it ``cannot evaluate the accuracy of DOD's estimates 
without empirical data.'' In even stronger words the CBO states that 
the ``Department is unable to report actual spending and savings for 
BRAC actions.'' CBO recommends that, ``Congress could consider asking 
DOD to establish an information system that would track the actual 
costs and savings of closing military bases. The system could apply to 
BRAC IV bases because DOD is just beginning to shut down those bases 
and virtually all the work remains to be done.''
  In addition to the CBO's analysis, the Government Accounting Office 
had this to say, ``DOD cannot provide accurate information on actual 
savings because (1) information on base support costs was not retained 
for some closing bases and (2) the services' accounting systems cannot 
isolate the effect on support costs at gaining bases.''
  Mr. President, the task we have before us is clear. My advice to 
Senators is to make the responsible choice and let us take a careful 
look before we leap into two new rounds of base closure. There will be 
enough time for the Department of Defense to close additional bases if 
the costs and savings of the first four rounds prove to be accurate. 
Even those who argue for additional base closure rounds today will not 
tell you that the future of our military's capability rests on deciding 
at this moment in time to give the DOD the authority to conduct 
additional rounds of base closure. By making the responsible choice 
today and voting for the Dorgan-Domenici amendment Senators will show 
that they are concerned about the modernization of our forces by 
requiring the data that shows the savings required to finance that 
modernization will be present at the end of the closure process.
  Mr. President, I believe that the Dorgan-Domenici amendment will 
provide the information necessary for the Congress to make decision of 
whether to authorize additional rounds of base closure sound, well 
reasoned, and based on fact. I ask my colleagues for their support, and 
I yield the floor.
  Mr. BROWNBACK addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas.
  Mr. BROWNBACK. I would like to speak briefly in favor of the Dorgan-
Lott second-degree amendment and associate myself with that amendment. 
I do think it is important before we go forward with additional BRAC's 
that we know and can certify the amount of money that has been saved by 
prior BRAC rounds. I do not think we have taken that into 
consideration. There is a lot that is also associated with closure 
costs.
  But more to the point on this particular issue, it seems to me that 
we have been through this BRAC process here now for several rounds, and 
some of that may have been very healthy to do, but that we ought to 
stop and appraise just what was good about that, and, more importantly, 
I think we need to go through a BRAC on domestic discretionary 
spending. Let us look at some of the programs that are discretionary 
programs, not entitlement programs but discretionary programs, say, 
within the Department of Commerce or, say, within the Department of 
Energy. Let us go through a BRAC there. Let us take a look at those and 
have a vote up or down. We ought to be focusing our effort there where 
we know we have some wasteful programs. We know there is money that is 
being wasted and spent not for a good reason or cause.
  We have gone through that on some of the military bases as far as 
looking at some bases that may not be necessary to have, but would it 
not be so much wiser now to focus on some of these discretionary 
programs? They are in the media virtually every day--the Advanced 
Technology Program being a corporate welfare program, for one instance. 
We have other programs that have been identified. We have a fleet of 
ships under the Commerce Department that we have been saying for

[[Page S7080]]

a long time ought to be privatized rather than being run there. That is 
a wasteful spending program. I have a list of those that I think we 
ought to go through far before we start up some other BRAC round in the 
military when we do not even know what sort of cost or what sort of 
savings we have had associated within it.
  So, Mr. President, I just think we have a lot better things that we 
could be doing with our time and focus on rather than going back 
through a BRAC round. I do think it is constructive, through the 
Dorgan-Lott approach, to get a sense of where we are costwise, get a 
sense of what cost we have with closing a military base, get a strategy 
going here which guarantees that further base closures will not 
jeopardize national security. We need to look at all those things 
before we go forward with another BRAC round.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. THURMOND. The floor is available. Any Senator who now wishes to 
express himself on the other side of this issue has the opportunity. We 
are going to be voting here in just a little bit.
  Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, I rise to strongly oppose efforts to 
authorize additional rounds of base closings. I believe that it is bad 
policy to close more bases without accurately knowing the ramifications 
of previous cuts.
  Congress has already approved four rounds of base closings, the 
latest round occurring in 1995. My State of California has suffered 
unfairly during this process, losing 27 major installations. Job losses 
from these closings are estimated to exceed 250,000, and the total 
economic loss will top $8 billion.
  Although the California economy is experiencing an economic upturn, 
unemployment in my State continues to run two percentage points above 
the national average. It is clear that communities in California are 
disproportionately being hurt by the BRAC process.
  It is unfair to ask my State to bear the brunt of yet another round 
of base closings. It is even more egregious to ask Californians to go 
through another round of closings when they are still suffering from 
previous rounds. Past BRAC rounds will continue to weigh heavily on my 
State because many bases from the 1995 closure round will not close 
until 1999 or after. Furthermore, some of these closures have not 
proven to be cost-efficient, and that is one reason why we are not 
seeing the savings that had been previously promised.
  I believe that we should not even consider future base closings until 
we have had the time to properly analyze the ramifications of the 
previous four rounds. We need to have solid data about the long-term 
costs and benefits of base closures. More importantly, we need to make 
sure that we understand the effect these closures have had on the real 
people whose lives drastically change when a base in their community is 
closed.
  That is why we should pass the Dorgan Amendment, of which I am a 
cosponsor. This amendment would require the Department of Defense to 
issue a report on the long-term costs and savings incurred from the 
previous rounds of base closings before future BRAC's could go forward. 
I simply can not see how we can entertain the idea of additional rounds 
of base closures without first having the benefit of solid data and 
hard numbers from previous BRAC's.
  Mr. President, Californians are amazingly resilient. They have 
overcome devastating floods, disastrous earthquakes and terrorizing 
floods. Our state has gone through a lot. But I promise that California 
will not suffer further economic damage from another round of base 
closings until I have exhausted every tool available to me as a 
Senator. I urge my colleagues to oppose a new round of base closures.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I appreciate the opportunity to say just a 
couple of more words about the amendment that is now pending. It is a 
second-degree amendment offered to the first-degree amendment that had 
been previously offered by Senator McCain and Senator Levin.
  I indicated when I started out I have great respect for both of them. 
We reach a different conclusion and come to a different judgment on 
this question, and I do want to say in response to some of the 
discussion that has been held in this Chamber that this is not a 
question about whether closing bases saves money. I accept the notion 
that closing military installations saves money.
  That is why I have been involved in supporting four previous base 
closing rounds. It clearly will save money. We do not know how much. I 
do not think anyone here knows how much. The Congressional Budget 
Office has reviewed it, the Government Accounting Office has reviewed 
it, and they are trying to understand how much money is saved and what 
are the costs. Are we saving a little bit of money and having very 
substantial costs? Are we saving a lot of money? We do not know. There 
has not been a decent accounting.
  I am not standing here quibbling about whether closing additional 
bases will save money. It likely will save money. The question is 
should we in this authorization bill launch two additional rounds of 
base closures when the GAO and the Congressional Budget Office 
indicate--especially CBO indicates --it would be wise for us to have an 
interval at this point during which we fully understand what we have 
done in the previous four rounds by which we have said let us close 100 
military installations only about 50 of which are now closed.
  Let us finish the job we have done in the previous four rounds before 
we decide whether and when we initiate two additional rounds of base 
closing. We might discover that the basis for the previous closures and 
the conditions under which those closures were ordered and the 
experience of those closures might persuade us to do something 
different, maybe closing other installations in a different way. I do 
not know. But we ought to have the benefit of that experience and that 
knowledge before we proceed.
  That is the issue. I know the Senate Democratic leader is in the 
Chamber and wishes to speak on this subject, and I shall not go 
further. I may have something to say later. But this is an interesting 
and, I think, a useful discussion for us to have, and I appreciate the 
cosponsorship of both the majority leader and the minority leader to my 
second-degree amendment.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I commend the distinguished Senator from 
North Dakota for his extraordinary work on this particular amendment 
and appreciate very much his advocacy and the effort he has made 
throughout the day to make the case. He and others have spoken 
eloquently and very persuasively. There is little else I can add. 
Nevertheless, I do want to touch on a number of issues largely for the 
purpose of emphasis. I think it is very critical that we have an 
opportunity to talk through this matter as carefully as we can.
  Let me also give great credit to our distinguished ranking member. I 
have had the good fortune to work with him on so many issues, and it is 
extraordinarily rare that I find myself in disagreement with him on 
anything. So for me to be in this position, in fact standing at his 
desk, is a very uncomfortable situation, to say the least.
  Mr. LEVIN. If the Democratic leader will reciprocate just for a 
moment and yield, I am also standing at his desk, so we are even.
  Mr. DASCHLE. I thank Senator Thurmond, the distinguished chairman, 
who is standing at another desk, for his leadership and the effort he 
has made in moving this bill.
  Past Congresses have approved four rounds of base closures --1988, 
1991, 1993 and 1995. We have already agreed to close 97 out of the 495 
military bases and realign an additional 55 bases. I have joined with 
many others in voting yes every step of the way. Yes on authorizing 
four rounds of base closures. Yes on closing 97 bases. And yes on 
aligning 55 others. So, let no one doubt this Senator's willingness to 
cast a difficult vote in support of our national defense. I have done 
so in the past and am prepared to do so in the future.
  However, voting to close more bases at this time makes no sense--for 
our military, for our budget and, perhaps most importantly, for local 
communities. This is the position not only of the Senators from the 
Dakotas and

[[Page S7081]]

Senators from across the country, it is also the position, as the 
distinguished Senator from North Dakota noted, of the Congressional 
Budget Office, of the General Accounting Office, and even the Base 
Closure Commission.
  I will get back to that in just a minute. The principal argument 
advanced by supporters of this particular amendment is a fiscal one. 
The Pentagon needs to achieve savings to stay within its $1.4 trillion 
budget.
  Setting aside the issue for the amount of whether the Pentagon really 
needs $1.4 trillion--and given the current international circumstances 
and the sacrifices we are asking of important domestic problems--we 
need to look at the proponents' claims about future significant 
savings.
  According to Pentagon's figures, we did not break even on base 
closures until 1996, nearly a decade after we began the current phase 
of base closings. In other words, the Pentagon's figures indicate we 
did not save one dime during the first eight years of base closures; 
instead we spent billions and billions of additional dollars. It is 
only after nearly a decade of economic dislocation and hardship that 
the Pentagon's own analysis begins to demonstrate any net savings.
  In fact it takes up to 6 years to close a base once Congress has 
authorized its closure, and of the 97 bases Congress voted to close 
since 1988, we have actually closed just over half this number. Since 
the last round of base closures was passed in 1995, it will take the 
Pentagon until the year 2001 just to complete action on the bases we 
have already voted to close.
  So, Mr. President, the question is, since we have not even closed 
about one-half the bases that were scheduled for closure, why is it 
that we are now making the effort to move to close still more before we 
have completed our work on the last ones?
  CBO and the General Accounting Office do not trust Pentagon figures. 
In fact, CBO's analysis shows that the Pentagon has consistently 
overestimated the savings that will accrue from a given round of base 
closures. In the first round, the Pentagon estimated that we would 
achieve $844 million in savings for the period 1990 to 1995. 
Subsequently, it turned out that instead of saving money, the round 
actually lost $517 million. For the second round of base closures, the 
Pentagon initially estimated that we would save $2.916 billion from 
1992 to 1997. What happened? We did not save $2.9 billion. We will be 
fortunate to save about one-third of that amount, roughly $972 million. 
For the third round, the Pentagon estimated that we would lose $715 
million for the period 1994 to 1999. It now estimates we will not lose 
quite as much, about $553 million. Clearly less than a stellar record 
for the Pentagon's forecasters.

  So the estimates according to the Department of Defense itself, which 
has generated this kind of skepticism from the General Accounting 
Office and the Congressional Budget Office, is that we are not doing as 
well as we had originally anticipated; we are not making the savings in 
base closings that we expected.
  The sharp fall in Pentagon savings estimates are really represented 
by this graph. The Pentagon's forecast for savings from the first round 
of base closure was reduced by 161 percent for the period 1990 to 1995. 
In the second of base closures, the Pentagon savings estimate has been 
revised downward by 67 percent. And in the third round, the Pentagon 
has already acknowledged that it miscalculated by about 23 percent.
  This chart proves as clearly, I think, as anyone can that on the 
basis of savings there is real reason to question whether or not we 
have achieved the stated goals of the Base Closure Commission--
161 percent off the mark in the first one, 67 percent off the mark in 
the second one and 23 percent off the mark in the third one.

  GAO and CBO, two independent congressional advisory organizations, 
have each conducted thorough examinations of the costs and savings 
inherent in the base closure process. And they concur in their 
findings: They can reach no conclusions on savings from base closures, 
given the Pentagon's current accounting system. As expressed by GAO in 
a recent report, ``[the Defense Department] cannot provide accurate 
information on actual savings''. As stated by CBO in a December 1996 
report, ``CBO was unable to confirm or assess DOD's estimates of cost 
and savings because the [Defense] Department is unable to report actual 
spending and savings for [base closure] actions.''
  What we do know so far is that there has been a gross overestimation 
of what will have achieved in savings to date. So, before we decide to 
go to yet another round, the question presents itself, is this the 
right time? Not knowing how much we are going to achieve, not knowing 
whether or not we are going to save or actually spend more money, is 
this the time to commit to yet another base closing round?
  As I said, there are a lot of different policy questions involved 
here. One is savings. Another is the tremendous ripple effect through 
the local economies that will be felt well into the next century with 
yet another base closing round. We are going to be living with severe 
dislocations and economic loss, we know that. We are also going to be 
living with short-term degradation in military capability as individual 
military units pick up their operations and move from one base to the 
other.
  And we really have not looked at alternative approaches to achieve 
savings within the $1.4 trillion defense budget. And there are 
alternative cost saving approaches. For example, the bill before us 
contains an additional $5 billion additional commitment for weapons 
systems that were either not requested by the Pentagon or not requested 
in the quantities proposed in this bill. Let me say this again. This 
bill contains over $5 billion for weapons systems that the Pentagon 
judged unnecessary for national security. By my calculation if we were 
to attempt to save this same $5 billion through base closures alone, it 
would take until nearly the end of the first decade of the 21st 
century. In other words, by paring back weapons systems that even the 
Pentagon did not request, we could save today what would take roughly a 
decade to accomplish through base closures--even if we accept the 
Pentagon's rosy and highly questionable assumptions regarding potential 
savings.
  So, instead of focusing exclusively on surplus bases, perhaps we need 
to be discussing other ways with which to achieve any necessary 
savings. Looking at surplus weapons systems may be one way to do it. I 
am prepared to look at any and all options. However, before we commit 
to an approach that may not generate savings and that may not give us 
the framework within which a very thoughtful consideration of 
infrastructure can take place, we should do what this second-degree 
amendment sets forth.
  The second-degree amendment is based on two major assumptions. First, 
Congress should allow already authorized base closures to go forward 
before we cause still more dislocation and hardship. Second, Congress 
should be fully informed about the implications of past and future 
closings before we commit ourselves to still more closings.
  Therefore, rather than launch another round immediately, the second-
degree provides the Pentagon with time to develop accounting techniques 
so that they and we can fully and accurately understand the costs and 
savings from previous and future rounds of base closures. This 
amendment requires the Pentagon to prepare a report on these financial 
changes and to have that report reviewed by the GAO and CBO. Finally, 
our amendment requires the Pentagon to do all of this in a timely 
manner.
  Just as important is what this amendment does not do. The amendment 
does not preclude future base closures that may reveal themselves to be 
justified once we fully understand the ramifications. If there are to 
be future base closures, we simply want to be able to ensure that we 
understand where we are today in terms of infrastructure changes we 
have already approved and to be able to accurately assess the long-term 
impact of any proposed future changes. That is the concept that I think 
the CBO itself has articulated.

  According to the Congressional Budget Office, consideration of 
additional base closures ``should follow an interval during which DOD 
and independent analysts examine the actual impact of the measures that 
have been taken thus far. Such a pause [they add] would allow the 
Department of Defense to

[[Page S7082]]

collect data necessary to evaluate the effectiveness of initiatives and 
to determine the actual costs incurred and savings achieved. Additional 
time would also allow more informed assessment of the local impacts of 
the bases already closed.''
  Finally Mr. President, after hearing the views of GAO and CBO, I ask 
the Senate to consider the perspective of the last Base Closure 
Commission. Largely as a result of the continued turbulence and the 
lack of hard information, the Commission itself recommended that 
Congress not authorize another round of closures until the year 2001. 
Only our amendment is consistent with the findings of the Base Closure 
Commission.
  So based upon the analysis presented to us by CBO, by the GAO, by the 
Base Closure Commission, I think to move yet another round at this time 
is just premature.
  My record on base closures is clear. I have supported then when I 
thought they were needed and would produce the desired outcome--a 
leaner, more effective military that minimizes disruptions to our 
communities. GAO and CBO indicate that the Pentagon cannot tell us 
today what we have saved from past rounds, let alone yet-to-be 
determined future rounds. The only statement that can be made with any 
confidence is that our communities will suffer dislocations and 
disruptions well into the 21st century from actions that we have 
already taken.
  The case for inflicting additional suffering on them is far from 
compelling, especially when there are many other ways to achieve the 
necessary efficiencies within our defense budget. What we need to do is 
to find them. GAO, CBO, and the Base Closure Commission all acknowledge 
as much.
  Let's work together to see that happens. Only one base closure 
amendment protects the interests of our military and our communities, 
that is the second-degree amendment pending. I urge its support.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the letter we 
just received from the Secretary of Defense about the savings which 
have resulted from BRAC 1993 actions, a letter dated July 9, 1997, be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                     The Secretary of Defense,

                                     Washington, DC, July 9, 1997.
     Hon. Strom Thurmond,
     Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: As the Senate moves to final 
     consideration of its version of the FY 98 Defense 
     Authorization Bill, I urge you to support the McCain-Levin 
     amendment authorizing BRAC rounds in 1999 and 2001. We 
     estimate two additional rounds would result in savings of 
     approximately $2.7 billion annually. These savings are 
     absolutely critical to the Department's modernization plans.
       There have been some questions regarding the savings 
     actually realized from previous base closures. We have taken 
     these questions seriously and asked the Department of Defense 
     Inspector General (DoDIG) to take an independent look at this 
     issue. The IG's preliminary results indicate that there is no 
     basis for concern that BRAC has not been highly cost 
     effective. The preliminary audit examined BRAC 93 actions, 
     including the largest Navy closure (Mare Island) and eight 
     Air Force bases closed or realigned. For these bases, the IG 
     found that DoD overestimated costs by $148 million and 
     underestimated savings by $614 million. I have attached a 
     copy of the IG's preliminary report for your review.
       I would greatly appreciate your support for two additional 
     BRAC rounds and hope you find this information useful in your 
     consideration of the McCain-Levin amendment.
       Enclosure.
     Bill Cohen.
                                  ____

                                                Inspector General,


                                        Department of Defense,

                                     Arlington, VA, June 23, 1997.
     Memorandum for Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 
       (Acquisition and Technology)
     Subject: Review of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Costs 
       and Savings

       This is to provide the interim results of the audit being 
     conducted by this office in response to the Under Secretary 
     of Defense for Acquisition and Technology memorandum of 
     February 7, 1997. The audit objectives are to compare the 
     BRAC costs and savings estimates in previous budgets with 
     actual experience and to identify lessons learned regarding 
     management controls for estimating and tracking BRAC costs 
     and savings.
       The lack of records makes retroactive reconstruction of 
     actual costs and savings from pre-1993 BRAC impossible at 
     this point. Likewise, it is too soon to assess BRAC 95 costs 
     and savings. We have focused our review, therefore, on the 
     BRAC 93 round. The audit universe for BRAC 93 is comprised of 
     cost estimates totalling $7.3 billion and savings estimates 
     of $7.5 billion through FY 1999. The bulk of both the BRAC 93 
     budgeted costs and savings, $5.2 billion and $4.6 billion 
     respectively, was related to Navy installations. During the 
     first portion of the audit, we reviewed the experience at the 
     largest BRAC 93 site, Mare Island Naval Shipyard, and all 
     eight Air Force BRAC 93 sites. In addition, we started 
     identifying construction project cancellations at all Navy 
     sites. The nine fully audited installations had BRAC cost 
     estimates of $1.1 billion and savings estimates of $1.8 
     billion.
       The initial audit results indicate that the Navy and Air 
     Force erred on the side of conservative estimating, over-
     estimating costs at the sites reviewed by up to $148 million 
     and underestimating savings by $614 million. The reasons for 
     the variances included:
       Some cost estimates were related to block obligations for 
     one-time implementation costs, which were never adjusted to 
     reflect actual disbursements. Researching these largely 
     invalid obligations could free up significant funding for 
     current BRAC requirements.
       Canceled military construction projects valued at $8 
     million at Mare Island were not counted in savings estimates.
       An additional $58 million of canceled construction projects 
     at other Navy BRAC 93 sites was not counted because 
     incomplete projects funded in prior year programs were not 
     counted, even if they were curtailed.
       The Navy assumed that 40 percent of the indirect civilian 
     labor costs at Mare Island would transfer to other shipyards, 
     but the audit indicated minimal related increases in other 
     shipyards indirect costs.
       Reductions for base operation support costs at Mare Island 
     were underestimated after the first year of closure.
       Documentation did not exist to explain differences between 
     the Air Force biennial budget and reductions reflected in the 
     Air Force Future Years Defense Plan.
       The results of the audit to date, while not fully staffed 
     nor statistically projectable across either BRAC 93 or all 
     BRAC rounds, appear to corroborate the DoD position that 
     concerns that BRAC has not been highly cost effective are 
     unfounded. As a result of consultation with the Deputy Under 
     Secretary of Defense (Industrial Affairs and Installations), 
     we plan to continue auditing the BRAC 93 costs and savings. 
     In our audit report this fall, we will provide 
     recommendations for management controls on estimating and 
     tracking costs and savings for any future BRAC rounds.
       We hope that this update is helpful. If there are 
     questions, please feel free to contact me or Mr. Robert J. 
     Lieberman, Assistant Inspector General for Auditing, at (703) 
     604-8901.
                                                     Eleanor Hill,
                                                Inspector General.

  Mr. LEVIN. As I indicated before, Mr. President, since we are talking 
about estimated savings, the IG that was requested by the Department of 
Defense to make these estimates found that the costs were overestimated 
by $148 million and savings underestimated by $614 million, which means 
in this study by the DOD IG, there were significantly greater savings 
than had been predicted by the BRAC commission. That, of course, is 
somewhat different--very different--in terms of the evidence of that 
presented by the distinguished Democratic leader. We are not sure 
whether the leader's numbers came from the original Department of 
Defense estimates before they went to BRAC, and that is something we 
will check out, because in all but one case, the commission produced 
savings significantly less than had been requested by the Department of 
Defense.
  Finally, relative to the argument that the cost of previous base 
closures have been underestimated, one of the reasons the original 
Department of Defense estimates were high was that they estimated the 
savings from the sale of land. We changed the rules in the middle on 
that one. The revenue never materialized because we changed the rules, 
very consciously, to provide that most base property would be given 
away when the base was closed rather than sold. We did that to make 
economic redevelopment more feasible. That has benefited all of our 
States just about where these closings have taken place. So that is 
another possible

[[Page S7083]]

explanation for the difference in these numbers.
  I yield the floor. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If the Senator will withhold.


                     Amendment No. 670, As Modified

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, on the amendment 
offered by the Senator from Minnesota, there will now be 15 minutes of 
debate equally divided between the Senator from Minnesota and the 
Senator from South Carolina. Who yields time?
  Mr. WELLSTONE addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, this amendment, which is an amendment 
that I have offered with Senator Harkin, from Iowa, is very simple and 
straightforward. It authorizes, so it is not subject to a point of 
order, it just authorizes the Secretary of Defense to transfer to the 
Secretary of Agriculture $5 million over the next 5 years, $25 million 
altogether. That is $5 million out of a $265 billion Pentagon budget, a 
budget that is some $2.6 billion more than the Pentagon itself has 
requested.
  So out of that $2.6 billion more than the Pentagon has requested, 
this is an amendment that says take $5 million and transfer it to the 
Secretary of Agriculture; that is to say, authorize the Secretary of 
Defense to transfer this to the Secretary of Agriculture.
  This $5 million program per year was eliminated. We should never have 
done that. This is to correct an egregious mistake that we made. This 
has everything in the world to do with malnutrition and hunger among 
children. This $5 million has been used effectively nationwide--a small 
amount of money--as a catalyst, as an outreach program, to enable 
States and school districts to set up and expand the School Breakfast 
Program. As a matter of fact, I think one of the reasons it was 
eliminated was that it had been so successful, in fact, in enabling 
school districts to expand the School Breakfast Program, the argument 
then being we would have to invest more resources in the School 
Breakfast Program.
  I read from a letter received from the Food Research & Action Center 
that points out that only ``seven of ten, 71.4 percent, of the schools 
that offer school lunch participate in the School Breakfast Program. 
This represents only 65,000 of the almost 92,000 schools that'' 
participate. ``Additionally, just 39.6 percent of low-income children 
participating in the National School Lunch Program also participate in 
the School Breakfast Program. While more than 14 million low-income 
children participate in the National School Lunch Program, only 5.6 
million participate in the School Breakfast Program.''
  Is it too much to ask, as we keep talking about our children being 
our most precious resource, given the fact that all these children are 
God's children, is it too much to ask for $5 million to be put back 
into this program that has been so successful? That is what this 
amendment is all about.
  Mr. President, there are 8 million children who don't participate, 
and if these children had a chance to get a good breakfast and these 
children, therefore, were not hungry, they would be in a much better 
position to learn. When children are hungry and children do not have a 
good breakfast and can't start out the day, they are not going to be 
able to learn, and when they are not able to learn, as adults, they are 
not able to earn. This amendment should be adopted with 100 votes.
  I reserve the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I oppose the amendment offered by 
Senator Wellstone in regard to the School Breakfast Program.
  I remind my colleagues that the President proposed the repeal of 
these startup grants during last year's welfare debate. In addition, 
the Democratic substitute welfare reform bill contained a provision to 
repeal these grants. Obviously, people across the political spectrum 
believe this grant program to be unnecessary.
  I also remind my colleagues that this requirement was not identified 
in the budget request, and presently, about four in every five low-
income children already attend a school with a school breakfast 
program. The breakfast program has expanded to the extent that it is 
not clear additional funds are necessary or would have the effect of 
bringing more schools into the program.
  The last point I want to make is that transferring funds from the 
Department of Defense, even making the authority discretionary, is bad 
precedent. We shouldn't make this a precedent. We, in the Congress, 
should make these decisions and not delegate them to the Secretary of 
Defense.
  Mr. President, we have a budget agreement. We should not void this 
agreement and our responsibilities to make these decisions. I urge my 
colleagues to defeat this amendment.
  I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, might I ask how much time I have?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota has 4 minutes, 18 
seconds.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. I am waiting for my colleague, Senator Harkin. I ask 
unanimous consent to add Senator Harkin as an original cosponsor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. I ask unanimous consent that a variety of letters of 
endorsement be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                                   Food Research &


                                                Action Center,

                                     Washington, DC, July 9, 1997.
     Senator Paul Wellstone,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Wellstone: We are writing to enthusiastically 
     support your amendment to the DOD Reauthorization Bill which 
     would authorize the transfer of funds from DOD to the school 
     breakfast and summer food start up and expansion programs.
       Both the school breakfast and summer food programs remain 
     under-utilized and many public and private sponsors require 
     special initial funding to get programs off the ground. 
     Funding is necessary to inform potential sponsors of the 
     availability of these programs and how to qualify.
       Only approximately seven of ten (71.4%) of the schools that 
     offer school lunch participate in the School Breakfast 
     Program. This represents only 65,000 of the almost 92,000 
     schools that offer school lunch also offer school breakfast. 
     Additionally, just 39.6% of the low-income children 
     participating in the National School Lunch Program also 
     participate in the School Breakfast Program. While more than 
     14 million low-income children participate in the National 
     School Lunch Program, only 5.6 million participate in the 
     School Breakfast program. Participation rates for the Summer 
     Food Program are even lower.
       Your amendment and your efforts on behalf of low-income 
     children will not only serve the immediate need to get food 
     into children's bellies, but will also serve the long-term 
     goal of feeding their brains, and getting them ready to 
     learn!
           Sincerely,
     Edward Cooney,
       Deputy Director.
     Ellen Teller,
       Senior Attorney for Government Affairs.
                                  ____



                                          Bread for the World,

                                  Silver Spring, MD, July 9, 1997.
       Dear Senator Wellstone: Bread for the World, a grassroots 
     Christian citizens' movement against hunger, heartily 
     supports your efforts to strengthen the School Breakfast 
     Program. We hereby endorse your amendment to require the 
     Secretary of Defense to transfer $5 million to the Secretary 
     of Agriculture to provide funds for outreach and startup for 
     the School Breakfast Program.
       We agree with you that a hungry child can not learn the way 
     they should and we know that in the end, this hurts not only 
     the child, but our society as a whole. A nation as blessed as 
     ours should not allow children to go hungry.
       Thank you for your continued commitment to hungry children.
           Sincerely,
                                               Lynette Engelhardt,
     Domestic Policy Analyst.
                                  ____



                                                       AFSCME,

                                     Washington, DC, July 9, 1997.
     Hon. Paul Wellstone,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Wellstone: On behalf of the 1.3 million 
     members of the American Federation of State, County and 
     Municipal Employees (AFSCME), we strongly support your 
     amendment to transfer $5 million from the Department of 
     Defense to the School Breakfast Program to fund the outreach 
     and startup grant program.
       The School Breakfast Program has proven successful in 
     improving the health and educational achievement of children 
     who have been able to participate. Unfortunately, about 
     27,000 schools do not offer the School Breakfast Program 
     because they lack the

[[Page S7084]]

     capital funds needed to meet the startup costs. This deprives 
     eight million low-income children of the opportunity to eat a 
     nutritious and healthy meal in school. In prior years, the $5 
     million grant program was critical in enabling schools to 
     establish a breakfast program.
       We support your amendment to continue the outreach and 
     startup School Breakfast grant program with $5 million for 
     fiscal year 1998 by transferring the funds from the 
     Department of Defense's budget.
           Sincerely,
                                              Charles M. Loveless,
                                          Director of Legislation.

  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, the Wellstone amendment would require 
the Secretary of Defense to transfer $5 million to the Secretary of 
Agriculture for school breakfasts
  The purpose of the nondefense program that Senator Wellstone wants to 
support with defense funds may be laudatory; however, the amendment is 
ill-considered and very problematic.
  First the amendment would, in principle, violate the bipartisan 
budget agreement that Congress has completed with the President and 
that we are working hard to enforce: the amendment would reduce the 
amount of defense spending the agreement specifies and would increase 
nondefense discretionary spending above the levels of the agreement.
  Second, the amendment would violate the intent of firewalls that 
Congress has adopted over the years--and as recently as the 1998 budget 
resolution that we just passed last month. As all Senators know, these 
firewalls are designed to prevent transfers between defense 
discretionary spending and nondefense discretionary spending, and they 
establish a 60-vote point of order against such transfers. However, the 
amendment has been modified to go to great lengths to circumvent a 
Budget Act point of order and has confused the issue of whether it 
actually constitutes a Budget Act violation.
  Third, the amendment imposes an unfair obligation on the 
Appropriations Committee. If the amendment is passed, the 
Appropriations Committee is given the Hobson's choice of having to 
repeal the Wellstone amendment or to seek a directed scoring of the 
transferred money so that it would count as nondefense discretionary 
spending--as it should. This would, in turn, require the relevant 
appropriations subcommittees to find offsets for this additional 
nondefense discretionary spending. If the Appropriations Committee 
reports a Defense appropriation bill consistent with the letter and 
intent of the Wellstone amendment, it will immediately be subject to a 
60-vote point of order.
  For all of these reasons, the Wellstone amendment is bad legislation, 
and I urge all Senators to reject it, whether or not they favor the 
program that would benefit from this amendment.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, this should be an easy vote for 
Senators: $5 million out of over $2 billion more than the Pentagon 
asked for to have an outreach program and enable local school districts 
to buy refrigerators so they can have a school breakfast program so 
that we can make sure that all of our children go to school and are 
able to learn.
  It is that simple. I mean, where are our priorities? We can't even 
come up with $5 million? This is not a mandate. This just simply 
authorizes the Secretary of Defense to transfer this. This is a way 
that we as a Senate can, in fact, commit a little bit more by way of 
resources to make sure that there is an adequate nutritious breakfast 
for more children who go to school in America. How in the world can you 
vote against it?
  I reserve the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, how much time do I have left?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Two minutes, thirty-nine seconds.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Might I ask whether or not the other side intends to 
respond at all? If not, I will finish up. I am trying to wait for 
Senator Harkin, but I will go ahead and conclude. Might I ask whether 
the other side has yielded back its time?
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, no.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina wishes to keep 
his time reserved.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, a report from Tufts University Center 
on Hunger, Poverty and Nutrition on the link between nutrition and 
cognitive development in children states that even before results are 
detectable, inadequate food intake limits the ability of children to 
learn, affecting their social interactions, intuitiveness, and overall 
cognitive functions.
  Come on, we have to stop having all of these conferences on early 
childhood development and talking about children, and now we know that 
we have some 8 million children who don't get a chance to participate 
in this program, we know there are many children who are malnourished, 
and we know for $5 million a year out of this budget, which is $265 
billion, $2.6 billion more than the Pentagon asked for, we can't even 
make this kind of small commitment to children in America? That is what 
this vote is about.
  I reserve the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time is reserved. Who yields 
time?
  Mr. THURMOND. I yield such time as he may require to Senator 
Coverdell.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia is recognized for the 
5 minutes, 40 seconds remaining of the time of the Senator from South 
Carolina.
  Mr. COVERDELL. I thank the Senator from South Carolina and compliment 
him on his fine work as chairman of the Armed Services Committee.


                           Amendment No. 771

  Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to be added as 
a cosponsor of the Dorgan-Lott-Daschle second-degree amendment to the 
McCain amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, the McCain amendment purports to create 
another series of base realignment closure commissions. I am opposed to 
that and have so stated and have so advised the Secretary of Defense. I 
do not believe there should be another Base Realignment Closure 
Commission until the administration can certify to the Congress that 
all the work of the previous Base Realignment Closure Commissions has 
occurred and properly.
  Many of us, particularly in the States affected by Air Force depots, 
believe the President and the administration undermined BRAC and 
undermined the confidence in the people and the Congress with regard to 
its integrity, because essentially the President overrode the 1995 BRAC 
recommendations, in our judgment, particularly as they relate to Kelly 
Air Force Base in Texas and McClellan Air Force Base in California. 
That is in dispute. I certainly acknowledge the comments and 
characterizations that have been made by the good Senators from Texas 
and California.
  But this issue must be resolved and it must restore the confidence of 
the Congress and it must reassert an integrity into the process for the 
people who undergo this horrendous process, that the legislation has to 
apply to the President, the administration and the Department of 
Defense, not just to the people in Congress.
  I rise in opposition to the McCain amendment and in support of the 
second-degree amendment offered by Senators Dorgan, Lott and Daschle.
  I yield any remaining time back to the managing Senator.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.


                     Amendment No. 670, As Modified

  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I move to table Wellstone amendment 670.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has not been yielded back on both 
sides.
  Mr. THURMOND. I yield back any time I have.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina yields back 
the remainder of his time. The Senator from Minnesota has 52 seconds.
  Mr. HARKIN. How much time, Mr. President?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Fifty-two seconds.
  Mr. HARKIN. How much?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Fifty-two.
  Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I rise in support of the Wellstone 
amendment. This School Breakfast Program has been one of the best in 
this country. Already we have kids getting school

[[Page S7085]]

lunches, but they don't get the school breakfast.
  I say that if you ever want to see a clean plate, you go to a school 
breakfast program. These kids come in, they are hungry, there is not a 
drop of food left when they put those trays back into the hopper. The 
school lunch may be a little different.
  If you really want to have an impact on early childhood education and 
getting these kids to learn, this is the place to put the money. It was 
wrong to take it out of welfare reform. I tried at that time to put the 
money in, and we could not do it. It was wrong for this to be taken out 
in the welfare reform to save that kind of money. It does not save 
money. It ruins lives because we are not providing the money for the 
outreach program for the school breakfast startups and for the summer 
feeding program.
  This is a small amount of money. I think out of this whole defense 
thing we could at least authorize the Secretary of Defense to transfer 
a measly $5 million to get this job done.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time is now yielded back. Time has expired 
on this amendment.


                           Amendment No. 424

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question now occurs on amendment No. 424 
offered by the Senator from Washington [Mr. Gorton]. Debate on this 
amendment is limited to 15 minutes equally divided between Senator 
Gorton and Senator Inouye.
  Who yields time?
  Mrs. MURRAY addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Washington.
  Mrs. MURRAY. Thank you, Mr. President.
  Mr. President, I come to the floor this evening to speak on amendment 
No. 424 to the defense authorization legislation that was proposed 
yesterday by my colleague, Senator Gorton. I am a cosponsor of this 
amendment to require the Navy to reopen the selection process for the 
donation of the USS Missouri.
  From the beginning, I have followed closely the Navy's handling of 
the Missouri, working with Senator Gorton, Congressman Norm Dicks, the 
Washington congressional delegation, and my constituents. The ``Mighty 
Mo'' is a relic of immense importance and historical significance. It 
was on the decks of this great battleship that World War II came to a 
welcome end.
  The Missouri is particularly valued by the residents of my home State 
where she has been berthed for most of the last 40 years in Bremerton. 
She is a source of great pride to the veterans in my State, many of 
whom served in World War II, including in the Pacific theater and 
aboard the Missouri.
  I have reviewed yesterday's debate over the amendment, and I want to 
take this opportunity to make several additional remarks for the 
Record.
  I first want to commend both Senator Gorton and Senator Inouye. The 
debate was indicative of the immense interest in the Missouri and all 
of the States that competed for the honor of displaying this important 
piece of our history.
  While I cannot speak for the other applicants, I know of the care, 
the time, and the commitment demonstrated by the Bremerton, WA, 
community in preparing its proposal to the Navy. Bremerton, Kitsap 
County and Washington State have developed a kinship with the ``Mighty 
Mo.'' It is because of this kinship with the battleship, and our 40-
year record of paying tribute to the Missouri each and every day, that 
I continue to believe that Bremerton is the ideal home for the 
Missouri.
  Last August, the Secretary of the Navy announced the decision to 
award the Missouri to Honolulu, HI. Following the Navy's decision, 
significant questions were raised regarding the Navy's process in 
awarding the battleship. It is those questions, including a General 
Accounting Office report, that brings me here today to seek the 
Senate's support for our amendment to reopen the Missouri donee 
selection process.
  I want to reiterate what our amendment seeks to accomplish. We simply 
seek only the Senate's support to instruct the Navy to conduct a new 
donee selection process. We do not seek to influence or prejudge that 
selection process. We only want a fair competition administered by the 
Navy in a manner worthy of this great battleship.
  I recognize that the Navy is under no obligation to conduct a 
competition for important relics like the Missouri, but the fact is the 
Navy did conduct a competition for the Missouri. Having conducted this 
competition, I think it is only fair to the competing communities to 
expect the Navy to conduct itself in an aboveboard and a forthright 
manner.
  Clearly, significant mistakes were made by the Navy in the Missouri 
competition. The GAO report clearly identifies the Navy's numerous 
shortcomings in this competition. Proponents and opponents can and do 
differ over whether the Navy's handling of the competition influenced 
the outcome. But I find it very difficult to conclude that all 
communities were treated fairly by the Navy. And that is what we are 
asking for today. It really is just a simple matter of fairness for all 
of the competing communities.
  I urge my colleagues to support the Gorton-Murray-Feinstein 
amendment.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. INOUYE addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Hawaii.
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, the matter before us goes much deeper than 
the gallant lady, the U.S.S. Missouri. It involves the process of 
competition in the U.S. Government. Every day there is some 
competition. There is a competition between two great manufacturing 
plants to see whether this plant should build a tank or that plant. 
There are competitions going on as to what company should build the 
joint strike fighter or the C-17 or the B-2. Should it be Boeing? 
Should it be McDonnell Douglas?
  These competitions are part of the life of the U.S. Government. And 
if we look upon this measure before us as a simple Missouri amendment, 
then we have not seen the deeper picture; we will be setting a very, 
very dangerous precedent, Mr. President.
  This competition was won fairly and impartially. If the Congress of 
the United States is to take a step to overturn this decision, then 
what will happen to all the other competitions that we have been faced 
with? Whenever there is a contest on who would build that submarine--
should it be Norfolk or should it be Connecticut?--if Connecticut wins, 
should Norfolk come to the Congress and appeal the case, or vice versa?
  Mr. President, let me just read once again from the letter from the 
Secretary of the Navy. The Secretary says--and this is from a letter 
dated June 10; and it is part of the Record at this moment:

       I have reviewed the General Accounting Office report .  .  
     . and I find that it contains nothing that would warrant 
     reopening the process. The General Accounting Office stated 
     that the Navy ``impartially applied'' the donation selection 
     process, and that all applicants received the same 
     information at the same time .  .  . I remain confident that 
     my selection of Pearl Harbor was in the best interest of the 
     Navy and our Nation, based on the impartial review of the 
     relative merits of the four acceptable applications. .  .  . 
     The General Accounting Office also noted, however, that none 
     of the applicants requested clarification on any aspect of 
     these two criteria [that the proponents speak of].

  No one complained about the process when it was ongoing. The 
complaints come at the end of the process.
  It may interest you, Mr. President, to know that the State of 
Missouri--and this ship is named after the State of Missouri--by 
resolution that was passed unanimously by the Missouri Senate, the 
general assembly, the House of Representatives concurring:

       . . . memorialize the Congress of the United States, the 
     President of the United States, the Chief of Naval 
     Operations, and the Secretary of the Navy to take any 
     appropriate action necessary to permanently locate the U.S.S. 
     Missouri at Pearl Harbor, Honolulu, Hawaii, next to the 
     U.S.S. Arizona Memorial, for the purpose of serving as a 
     Naval Memorial and Museum. . . .

  There is another organization, Mr. President. It is the Iowa Class 
Preservation Association. The U.S.S. Missouri is an Iowa class 
battleship. I will not read the whole letter, but I ask unanimous 
consent that it be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

[[Page S7086]]

                  Iowa Class Preservation Association

     To: Mr. Jerry Kremkow, USS Missouri Memorial Association, 
         2610 Kilihau St., Honolulu, HI.
       Dear Mr. Kremkow, The Iowa Class Preservation Association 
     is a non-profit organization that is dedicated to acquiring 
     the museum rights to one of the Iowa Class Battleships 
     currently in storage.
       All four ships were recently released by the US Navy and of 
     these only the USS Missouri, which looks like she's heading 
     to Pearl Harbor, seems safe from the scrap yard. Our 
     organization plans on acquiring and establishing one of the 
     three other ships as a museum in the city of San Diego, CA. 
     We believe that the combination of port facilities, tourism 
     base and the lack of capital ship museums on the west coast 
     would make San Diego an ideal location for a ship exhibit.
       Our major concern is that the East Coast already has 
     several battleship and aircraft carrier museums and has 
     reached it saturation point. There is no way all three 
     battleships will be able to survive on the East Coast. 
     Therefore unless we can bring one of the three to the West 
     Coast, it is highly likely that at least one of these fine 
     ships will be scrapped.
       As stated the purpose of our group is to save one of the 
     ships that is in danger of being lost due to lack of support. 
     As long as your organization is diligently seeking to acquire 
     the USS Missouri we will support you and not seek to obtain 
     the Missouri. We personally feel that a berth near the USS 
     Arizona Memorial would be an appropriate place for such an 
     historic ship. We look forward to working with your 
     organization in saving two of the magnificent battleships.
           Sincerely,
     Robert Daniels,
       President.
     Steven Rupp,
       Vice President.

  Mr. INOUYE. It says that:

       The Iowa Class Preservation Association  .  .  .  is 
     dedicated to acquiring the museum rights to one of the Iowa 
     Class Battleships currently in storage.

                           *   *   *   *   *

       We personally feel that a berth near the USS Arizona 
     Memorial would be an appropriate place for [the Missouri].

  Here we have a letter from the Navy League of the United States. And 
I ask unanimous consent that this letter, as well as another, be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                             Navy League of the United States,

                                    Arlington, VA, March 31, 1995.
     Hon. John H. Dalton,
     Secretary of the Navy,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Secretary Dalton: I am writing on behalf of The USS 
     Missouri (BB63) Memorial Association and its efforts to have 
     the Battleship enshrined at Pearl Harbor.
       As you are probably aware, the Navy League of the United 
     States is quite strong in the Pacific Area and particularly 
     in Honolulu which has the largest Navy League Council in the 
     world. This project has the complete support of the Pacific 
     Area Navy League, which has supplied much of manpower and 
     motivation to move this effort along for the past two years.
       Our Hawaii Navy League councils, led by the Honolulu 
     Council have a proven record of ``getting the job done'' with 
     projects such as The Pearl Harbor Memorial, The Bowfin 
     Memorial, commissioning of USS Lake Erie and provisions of 
     MARS equipment for vessels deploying out of or thru Pearl 
     Harbor. We feel that this tribute to peace and victory 
     belongs along side of the revered USS Arizona Memorial in 
     Pearl Harbor. We urge you to look favorably on this project 
     and award USS Missouri to the Memorial Association for its 
     purposes.
           Yours very truly,
     J. Walsh Hanley.
                                  ____



                             Navy League of the United States,

                                 Jefferson City, MO, July 9, 1997.
       Dear Senator: In Executive Session this afternoon the Board 
     of Directors of the Mid-Missouri Council of the Navy League 
     of the United States voted in favor of the transfer of the 
     battleship U.S.S. Missouri to Pearl Harbor. We feel this is 
     the most appropriate location for the Missouri.
       We are opposed to the Gorton Amendment and urge you to vote 
     against it.
           Sincerely,
                                                     Herman Smith,
                                                        President.

  Mr. INOUYE. In part it states:

       This project has the complete support of the Pacific Area 
     Navy League, which has supplied much of [the] manpower and 
     motivation to move this effort along for the past two years.

  Mr. President, I have a letter from the American Legion of the 
Department of Missouri, Inc. I ask unanimous consent that it be printed 
in the Record.

  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                              The American Legion,


                                 Department of Missouri, Inc.,

                                 Jefferson City, MO, July 9, 1997.
     Hon. Daniel K. Inouye,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Inouye: I am writing on behalf of The American 
     Legion State of Missouri to express our stronger possible 
     disagreement with the proposed Gorton Amendment (S. Admt. 
     424) to the Defense Authorization Bill (S. 936).
       If adopted, this amendment will stop the transfer of the 
     battleship Missouri to Pearl Harbor and force the Secretary 
     of the Navy to reopen the competition. The American Legion 
     State of Missouri in convention voted unanimously to transfer 
     the battleship to Pearl Harbor. The 1996 General Assembly 
     State of Missouri unanimously passed a concurrent resolution 
     supporting the transfer to Pearl Harbor.
       Pearl Harbor was chosen by the Secretary of the Navy after 
     rigorous evaluation as the site most suitable for 
     memorializing the Missouri. The process was fair and honest, 
     and the results should be carried out. We agree with this 
     decision.
       USS Missouri belongs in Pearl Harbor, within sight of USS 
     Arizona, where future generations can come and understand 
     American's involvement in World War II, from beginning to 
     end.
       I urge you and the honorable members of the United States 
     Senate to vote against the Gorton Amendment.
           Sincerely,
                                         James S. (Jim) Whitfield,
                       Chairman, Legislative Assistance Committee.

  Mr. INOUYE. This letter makes it very clear that:

       [The] USS Missouri belongs in Pearl Harbor, within site of 
     the USS Arizona, where future generations can come and 
     understand America's involvement in World War II, from 
     beginning to end.

  Mr. President, the GAO report has been cited. The GAO report makes it 
very clear that Pearl Harbor won the competition without question. And, 
more importantly, Hawaii did not lose the competition even if it is 
based solely on financial and technical issues.
  Mr. President, I realize that no one relishes the thought of losing. 
We all want to win. But the human affairs of this Nation would tell us 
that at times one wins and another loses. And if we are to set a 
precedent that whenever someone loses that he will come to Congress to 
appeal his case, the process that we have established for the past 
decades to determine decisions that are very necessary to our Defense 
Department, if such be subject to appeal at each turn by the Congress, 
we will get nowhere.
  I just hope that those of us here will recognize from this report and 
from all other reports that this competition was won fairly and 
impartially and that it is in the public interest and the interests of 
the Navy and our Nation that this ship be based in Pearl Harbor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
  Who yields time?
  There are approximately 3 minutes and 30 seconds remaining for the 
proponents of the amendment.
  Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                     Amendment No. 670, as Modified

  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I had previously moved to table the 
Wellstone amendment. It seems there is some misunderstanding, but I so 
move to table the Wellstone amendment and I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Collins). The question is on agreeing to 
the motion to table the Wellstone amendment numbered 670, as modified.
  The yeas and nays have been ordered.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Indiana [Mr. Coats] is 
necessarily absent.
  Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Maryland [Ms. Mikulski] is 
necessarily absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 65, nays 33, as follows:

[[Page S7087]]

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 162 Leg.]

                                YEAS--65

     Abraham
     Allard
     Ashcroft
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Breaux
     Brownback
     Bryan
     Burns
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Cleland
     Cochran
     Collins
     Coverdell
     Craig
     D'Amato
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Domenici
     Enzi
     Faircloth
     Frist
     Gorton
     Graham
     Gramm
     Grams
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Hatch
     Helms
     Hollings
     Hutchinson
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Inouye
     Kempthorne
     Kerrey
     Kyl
     Landrieu
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     McCain
     McConnell
     Murkowski
     Nickles
     Robb
     Roberts
     Roth
     Santorum
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith (NH)
     Smith (OR)
     Snowe
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thurmond
     Warner

                                NAYS--33

     Akaka
     Baucus
     Boxer
     Bumpers
     Byrd
     Conrad
     Daschle
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Glenn
     Harkin
     Jeffords
     Johnson
     Kennedy
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murray
     Reed
     Reid
     Rockefeller
     Sarbanes
     Specter
     Torricelli
     Wellstone
     Wyden

                             NOT VOTING--2

     Coats
     Mikulski
      
  The motion to lay on the table the amendment (No. 670), as modified, 
was agreed to.
  Mr. THURMOND. Madam President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. KERRY. I move to lay that on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. THURMOND. Madam President, I ask for order in the Senate.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will be in order.


                           Amendment No. 424

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, there will now be 2 
minutes of debate, equally divided, on the Gorton amendment No. 424.
  Who yields time?
  Mr. GORTON. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that there be 4 
minutes equally divided.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. GORTON. Madam President, I ask the Chair to bring the Senate to 
order, please.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will be in order. The Senator from 
Washington is entitled to be heard.
  Mr. REID addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate is still not in order. The 
Presiding Officer would appreciate it if the Senate would be in order. 
The Presiding Officer hopes not to break the gavel.
  The Senator from Nevada is recognized.
  Mr. REID. Madam President, I have two congressional fellows, and I 
ask unanimous consent that they be allowed floor privileges during the 
pendency of this action.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. KEMPTHORNE addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho is recognized.
  Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that King 
Gillespie of my staff be allowed floor privileges.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Washington is recognized.
  Mr. GORTON. Madam President, a few years ago, when the battleship 
Missouri was decommissioned for the second time, after more than 30 
years, the Navy began a process to determine where it could become a 
permanent historic monument. The Navy carried on that process over an 
extended period of time under the rules that had been applicable to all 
previous donations.
  Two weeks before it made its final decision, the Navy informed the 
applicants of two additional and quite separate considerations. It did 
not tell any of the applicants the weight those considerations would be 
given. It did not inform them of the fact that they could submit 
additional items. They were really quite separate from the first set of 
considerations. At the end of that first round, Bremerton and Honolulu 
were essentially tied. At end of the second and unfair round, the Navy 
awarded the Missouri to Honolulu.
  The General Accounting Office--our General Accounting Office--has 
reported these changes, has reported that this was the wrong thing to 
do, and has reported that the Navy should change its processes in the 
future.
  My amendment does not seek to change the location of the Missouri. It 
just asks the Navy to start the process over again, to treat all 
applicants fairly, to set the rules in advance, and not to change the 
rules just before the game is over without telling people what the 
weight of the new rules will be.
  I ask for your votes on it as a matter of simple fairness to all of 
the applicants--both in California and Washington and in Hawaii--in a 
process which is very important to each one of these communities and 
which the Navy, very regrettably, has carried on in a totally unfair 
fashion to this point.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
  Mr. BUMPERS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas.
  Mr. BUMPERS. Madam President, this proposal is very important both to 
the opponents and proponents. I am still unable to hear because of the 
noise in the Senate.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.


                         Privilege of the Floor

  Mr. THURMOND. Madam President, I ask that Janice Nielsen, a 
legislative fellow working in Senator Craig's office, be granted the 
privilege of the floor during the duration of the debate on S. 936, the 
defense authorization bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. INOUYE addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Hawaii is recognized.
  Mr. INOUYE. Madam President, the GAO report makes it very clear that 
the competition was impartial and fair and that, when all the numbers 
were counted, Pearl Harbor was the winner because, as the Secretary of 
the Navy has indicated, it will serve our Nation's interests and the 
interests of the U.S. Navy to have the Missouri memorialized and made 
into a monument next to the Arizona so that all Americans from this day 
on will be able to see in one place the beginning and the end of World 
War II.
  But, more importantly, Madam President, this amendment does not 
involve just the Missouri. It involves the process of competition. If 
the Congress is to be called upon at each time whenever someone loses, 
where do we end? Whenever there is a competition for the building of a 
submarine, should the losing State come forward to the Congress and ask 
for reconsideration? If they lose a carrier, should the losing State 
come here and ask the colleagues here for reconsideration? We have 
competition going on at every moment of the day.
  Madam President, let us not set a bad precedent. I think the time has 
come for decision. The merits are clear. The State of Missouri is in 
favor of their ship being berthed in Hawaii. The American Legion is in 
favor of that. The Navy League of the Pacific is in favor of that. I 
think the Nation would prefer to have the U.S.S. Missouri have its 
final resting place in Pearl Harbor where it belongs.
  Thank you, very much.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has expired.
  The question occurs on amendment No. 424 offered by the Senator from 
Washington [Mr. Gorton].
  Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina is recognized.
  Mr. THURMOND. Madam President, I ask unanimous-consent that the 
remaining rollcall votes in this series be limited to 10 minutes each.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. COATS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
  Mr. COATS. Madam President, I was unavoidably delayed by the weather 
coming in and just missed that last vote. I wonder if it would be all 
right with my colleagues if I ask unanimous consent to be recorded in 
favor of the tabling on the last vote.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Parliamentarian informs the Presiding 
Officer that unfortunately that unanimous-consent request is not 
permissible under the Senate rules.

[[Page S7088]]

  Mr. COATS. That is acceptable to me, if the Record will indicate that 
I made the request.
  Mr. BYRD addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia is recognized.
  Mr. BYRD. Madam President, I hope that the Record will show nothing 
with reference to the Parliamentarian. The rule clearly states that 
once the Chair has announced the results of a vote no Senator may be 
allowed to vote. Moreover, the Chair cannot even entertain such a 
request under the rule.
  Mr. COATS. Madam President, I withdraw that request. I wouldn't want 
to do anything to offend the rules. I have been flying in from Nairobi, 
Africa, for the last 32 hours on British Airways, which has been on 
strike, and had to change. And I can't tell you what I have gone 
through in the last 32 hours to try to get here for these votes. But I 
wouldn't want to offend the rules.
  So I will leave it at that.
  I withdraw my request.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment 
No. 424 offered by the Senator from Washington [Mr. Gorton]. On this 
question, the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call 
the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Maryland [Ms. Mikulski] is 
necessarily absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
who desire to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 46, nays 53, as follows:

                      {Rollcall Vote No. 163 Leg.}

                                YEAS--46

     Abraham
     Allard
     Ashcroft
     Boxer
     Burns
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Coats
     Collins
     Coverdell
     Craig
     D'Amato
     DeWine
     Domenici
     Enzi
     Faircloth
     Feinstein
     Frist
     Gorton
     Gramm
     Grams
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Helms
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Jeffords
     Kempthorne
     Kyl
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     McConnell
     Murray
     Nickles
     Roth
     Santorum
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith (OR)
     Snowe
     Specter
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Wellstone

                                NAYS--53

     Akaka
     Baucus
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Breaux
     Brownback
     Bryan
     Bumpers
     Byrd
     Cleland
     Cochran
     Conrad
     Daschle
     Dodd
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Feingold
     Ford
     Glenn
     Graham
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Hollings
     Hutchinson
     Inouye
     Johnson
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     McCain
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murkowski
     Reed
     Reid
     Robb
     Roberts
     Rockefeller
     Sarbanes
     Smith (NH)
     Stevens
     Thurmond
     Torricelli
     Warner
     Wyden

                             NOT VOTING--1

       
     Mikulski
       
  The amendment (No. 424) was rejected.
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. FORD. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 765

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will be in order so that we can 
proceed to the next vote.
  Under the previous order, there will now be 2 minutes of debate 
equally divided on the Dodd amendment No. 765.
  Who yields time?
  Mr. DODD addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut is recognized.
  Mr. DODD. Madam President, I understand from the distinguished 
chairman of the committee there is no objection to this amendment. My 
colleague from Arizona, Senator McCain, and I offered this amendment. 
We are asking for a recorded vote here because in so many instances 
over the past 5 years when we have had votes on Mexico, every one of 
them has been over a negative issue. This resolution merely commends 
the people of Mexico and the Government of Mexico for the very fine 
election that they had last Sunday. I thought it would be worthwhile 
for this body to say to Mexico how much we appreciate and admire their 
process last week and hope it portends great news for the coming years.
  With that, Madam President, I yield back the remainder of my time.
  Mr. THURMOND. Madam President, I yield back my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time is yielded back. The question now is 
on agreeing to amendment No. 765 proposed by the Senator from 
Connecticut [Mr. Dodd]. The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk 
will call the roll.
  The bill clerk called the roll.
  Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Vermont [Mr. Jeffords] 
is necessarily absent.
  Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Maryland [Ms. Mikulski] is 
necessarily absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
who desire to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 98, nays 0, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 164 Leg.]

                                YEAS--98

     Abraham
     Akaka
     Allard
     Ashcroft
     Baucus
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Boxer
     Breaux
     Brownback
     Bryan
     Bumpers
     Burns
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Cleland
     Coats
     Cochran
     Collins
     Conrad
     Coverdell
     Craig
     D'Amato
     Daschle
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Enzi
     Faircloth
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Frist
     Glenn
     Gorton
     Graham
     Gramm
     Grams
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Helms
     Hollings
     Hutchinson
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Inouye
     Johnson
     Kempthorne
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Kyl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     McCain
     McConnell
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nickles
     Reed
     Reid
     Robb
     Roberts
     Rockefeller
     Roth
     Santorum
     Sarbanes
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith (NH)
     Smith (OR)
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thurmond
     Torricelli
     Warner
     Wellstone
     Wyden

                             NOT VOTING--2

     Jeffords
     Mikulski
       
  The amendment (No. 765) was agreed to.
  Mr. THURMOND. Madam President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. BREAUX. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.


                   Modification to Amendment No. 705

  Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I send a modification to my amendment 
No. 705 to the desk and ask unanimous consent it be made a part of 
amendment 705.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered.
  The modification follows:

       On page 4, after the period on line 12, add at the end of 
     subparagraph (2) under (c) Privatization in Place: ``Nothing 
     in this provision would prevent a private contractor, using 
     facilities on a closed military base, from competing for 
     defense contracts or from receiving or being awarded a 
     contract if the bid is deemed to save money under established 
     procurement procedures, provided that the competition offers 
     a substantially equal opportunity for public sector entities 
     and private sector entities to compete on fair terms without 
     regard to the location where the contract will be 
     performed;''


          Amendment No. 771 to Amendment No. 705, as Modified

  Mr. THURMOND. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that there now 
be 10 minutes equally divided, prior to a vote on the Dorgan second-
degree amendment to the McCain amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered.
  The Senate will be in order.
  Mr. THURMOND. Madam President, I yield my 10 minutes to Senator 
McCain.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona is recognized.
  Mr. McCAIN. I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Texas.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas is recognized for 2 
minutes. The Senate will be in order.
  Mr. GRAMM. Madam President, could we have order? We are limited to 
the time we have, and I think it is important everybody be heard.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will be in order.
  The Senator from Texas.
  Mr. GRAMM. Madam President, we have cut defense since 1985 by 34 
percent. We have closed 18 percent of the military bases. We have more 
nurses in Europe than we have combat infantry officers in Europe. We 
have a huge

[[Page S7089]]

overhang of bureaucracy, a huge overhang of bases that we have to shear 
down to the size that is required for the force that we are now willing 
to fund in the House and Senate. In short, with this huge overhang of 
bureaucracy and bases, we have a tiger but increasingly the tooth is 
too small and the tail is too long.
  Nobody wants base closings. We have closed five bases in my State. 
But we all know it is something that needs to happen. So I intend to 
support the amendment of the Senator from Arizona. I intend to oppose 
the Dorgan amendment, which for all practical purposes kills the 
underlying amendment.
  I think basically we have to recognize defense has been cut by 34 
percent. We have closed only 18 percent of the military bases. If we 
are going to preserve modernization, if we are going to keep the pay 
and benefits to maintain the finest people in uniform we have ever had, 
we are going to have to close more military bases.
  So, I hate it, as I am sure many of our colleagues do, but there is 
no alternative, given the amount of money that the House and Senate are 
willing to appropriate. I urge my colleagues to defeat the Dorgan 
amendment and to support the McCain amendment.
  I yield the remainder of my time to Senator McCain.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Could we clarify the unanimous consent agreement we are 
operating under? I understand there is 10 minutes equally divided 
between the proponents and opponents of the Dorgan amendment, is that 
correct?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.
  Mr. DORGAN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator North Dakota.
  Mr. DORGAN. The Senator from Texas has just used information that is 
not accurate. He is referring only, when he talks about 18 percent, to 
the bases in this country. We have also closed bases overseas. When you 
add that to it, the total bases closed represent about 27 percent of 
the infrastructure.
  But the point of my second-degree amendment is to say this: Let us at 
this point not authorize two additional rounds of base closures until 
we figure out what we have done, what the consequences of what we have 
done are in the last four rounds. We do not have all the facts about 
what the last four rounds have given us in terms of costs and benefits.
  Let me not speak for myself. Let me have the Congressional Budget 
Office do it, and the GAO has done something similar. It says:

       The Congress could consider authorizing an additional round 
     of base closures if the Department of Defense believes that 
     there is a surplus of military capacity after all rounds of 
     BRAC have been carried out.

  That is what CBO says. Then CBO says:

       That consideration, however, should follow an interval 
     during which the DOD and independent analysts examine the 
     actual impact of the measures that have been taken thus far.

  Why does CBO say that we ought to wait and take a measure of what we 
have done? Because they cannot get the facts. No one knows what are the 
costs and what are the savings. What CBO is saying is let's figure out 
what we have done. We have ordered the closure of nearly 100 military 
installations and only about half of them have been fully closed. At 
this point, let us finish that closure, assess the costs and the 
benefits, and then proceed, if necessary, to authorize additional base 
closures.
  I reserve the remainder of my time.
  Mr. STEVENS. Will the Senator yield a minute-and-a-half to me?
  Mr. DORGAN. I will be happy to yield a minute-and-a-half to the 
Senator from Alaska.
  Mr. STEVENS. Madam President, I join the majority leader in 
supporting the Dorgan amendment. I do so because, in our recent trips 
overseas, we have found a new military base, a U.S. military base in 
Kuwait; we have a new one at Prince Sultan in Saudi Arabia; we have 
been expanding a new one at Aviano, in Italy. The Hungarians believe we 
are going to continue to maintain their base once they join NATO.
  It will take no Base Closure Commission for the administration to 
start closing bases overseas. I would rather see them stop building new 
bases overseas. But, certainly we need a report like this to try and 
get some idea about what is going on.
  Last, I would say this, almost 40 percent of our military personnel 
today who are combat personnel are overseas. I do not believe we should 
have a Base Closure Commission to decide how many bases to close here 
at home until they return. It is not time to have a new base closure 
commission.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. I wonder if the Senator from Arizona will yield me 1 
minute?
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, 60 percent of the bases overseas have been 
closed, and that is a fact. I don't know where the Senator from Alaska 
has been traveling, but I suggest he go to Germany where we have 
basically dismantled our huge defense establishment, which was 
necessary and no longer is. There are stacks and stacks of information 
that can be provided about the costs that have been reduced as a result 
of the base closings that have taken place.
  Finally, we are now in an Orwellian argument that not closing bases 
somehow saves money. It is the strangest argument I have been through 
on the floor of the Senate. We have to reduce these.
  I do not intend to move to table the Dorgan amendment. I expect the 
Dorgan amendment will win. But I will tell my colleagues right now, 
this will be a sad day.
  This will be a sad day in the history of the Senate, because we will 
not have fulfilled our obligations to the men and women in the military 
because we continue to siphon off money to pay for bases that we don't 
need instead of paying for the troops and the equipment that they need 
to fight and win.
  Mr. LEVIN. Will the Senator yield 1 minute to me?
  Mr. McCAIN. I yield to the Senator from Rhode Island, former 
Secretary of the Navy, and then the remaining time to the Senator from 
Michigan.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Brownback). The Senator from Rhode Island 
is recognized. Mr. President, I support the Levin-McCain amendment, 
which will allow the Defense Department to reduce its excess 
infrastructure and use resulting savings for needed equipment 
modernization.

  After four rounds of base closings (1988, 1991, 1993 and 1995), the 
U.S. military has eliminated 21 percent of its base structure. Overall 
force structure, people and weapons starting in 1988 and ending 5 years 
from now on the other hand, is being reduced by 36 percent. This gap 
between the level of our forces and our infrastructure should not 
continue to exist indefinitely. If we do not continue the process of 
reducing excess capacity, the Defense Department will not have the 
funds to modernize its increasingly outdated weaponry and continue to 
maintain adequate readiness.
  Today, we have heard arguments that the savings promised by earlier 
base closure rounds either have not materialized or have not been fully 
accounted for. Mr. President, I do not believe that we have to document 
exactly how much has been saved to the last nickel from previous BRAC's 
in order to continue this necessary process.
  The fact of the matter is that previous base closures have resulted 
in substantial savings, currently estimated to be a total of $13.5 
billion. The final amount of these savings may not be known for years. 
Perhaps these savings have not been as great as originally thought, but 
they have been there. You simply cannot reduce 21 percent of your 
infrastructure and not come up with some significant cost savings. 
Secretary of Defense Cohen--who endured some very painful base closings 
in his State as a Senator--has estimated that two additional rounds 
would result in savings of approximately $2.7 billion annually.
  Mr. President, all six members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff--who 
account for some 24 stars--have written Congress to urge two additional 
base closures. The previous BRAC itself also recommended additional 
reductions. The Joint Chiefs recognize that our troops ought to be 
armed with the very best equipment when called to battle. It was this 
technological edge that proved so valuable in the gulf war.

[[Page S7090]]

  But these weapons have a cost, and continuing to expend valuable 
resources on unneeded infrastructure will hinder modernization and 
detract from readiness. I urge support for the Levin-McCain amendment 
and opposition to the Dorgan amendment.
  Mr. President, I certainly hope the prediction of the Senator from 
Arizona is not accurate, that the Dorgan amendment will prevail. I 
think it is not a good amendment. We have to reduce the base structure 
in the country as we bring down the forces. I support the efforts of 
Senator McCain vigorously and hope he will prevail.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan has 1 minute.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I support the McCain amendment and very 
much oppose the Dorgan amendment. I hope we will listen to General 
Shalikashvili. This is what he said when he testified:

       As difficult as it is politically, we will have to further 
     reduce our infrastructure. We have more excess infrastructure 
     today than we did when the BRAC process started. We need to 
     close more facilities, as painful and as expensive as it is.

  We should listen to the head of our uniformed military. The Secretary 
of Defense has told us we cannot afford this waste of resources in an 
environment of tough choices and fiscal constraint. We must shed 
weight. The savings are on this chart. They have been estimated by the 
Department of Defense. We have a letter from all of the Joint Chiefs 
pleading with us, it is called a 24-star letter, all the Joint Chiefs, 
and the chairman and the vice chairman pleading with us to shed excess 
weight.
  I hope we will not adopt the Dorgan amendment. If we adopt it, it 
will destroy the possibility that this year--this year--as we propose 
in the McCain amendment, we will again do what we must do, as painful 
as it is. And those of us who come from States which have had bases 
closed and which face additional base closings, as I do in my State, 
understand that pain.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired. The Senator 
from North Dakota controls 2 minutes.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I yield a minute to the Senator from 
Oklahoma.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma is recognized for 1 
minute.
  Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to vote in favor of 
the Dorgan-Lott substitute and against the McCain amendment. Even if 
this substitute is not adopted, I urge them to vote against the McCain 
amendment, and the reason is, for the first time in the four base 
closing rounds, this administration played politics. They said, ``Well, 
we're going to accept all of them except for two.'' That has never 
happened. It didn't happen in the first round, it didn't happen in the 
second round, and it didn't happen in the third round. It happened in 
the fourth round.
  I don't think we should give them additional rounds until we have a 
clear understanding that we are not going to play politics. We are 
going to close bases on the merits and not on electoral votes.
  I urge my colleagues to vote in favor of the Dorgan-Lott substitute.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota controls 1 
minute 12 seconds.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, first of all, I have voted for every 
previous round of base closings and intend to vote again when 
additional bases are needed to be closed, but if this is, in fact, 
about saving money, then let us at least pay some heed to the 
Congressional Budget Office.
  The Congressional Budget Office says that additional base closing 
rounds ought to follow an interval during which the Department of 
Defense and independent analysts examine the actual impact of what has 
been done so far. If this is, in fact, about saving money, let's take 
the advice of the Congressional Budget Office and figure out what we 
have done before we decide to do more, what has the cost and the 
benefit been of what we have done.
  The majority leader, the minority leader, Senator Thurmond, Senator 
Stevens, and so many others have cosponsored this second-degree 
amendment, which is very simple. The second-degree amendment asks the 
Secretary of Defense to prepare and submit to Congress a report on the 
costs and savings on the closure rounds that have already been 
occurring and to give us information that we don't now have before we 
proceed to talk about additional rounds of base closures.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has expired.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that my colleague, 
the Senator from Virginia, who has been standing to make a statement, 
be granted 30 seconds.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered. The Senator from Virginia is recognized for 30 seconds.
  Mr. ROBB. I thank my colleague from Arizona. We have given a great 
deal of attention to the fact that the tooth-to-tail ratio is 
completely out of whack. It used to be 50-50 10 years ago. It is close 
to 70-30 now. The tail being the support of everything else. If we want 
to support force structure, if we want to be capable of carrying out 
our commitments, we have to cut infrastructure. The savings start as 
soon as we begin to cut infrastructure. We can argue about how many 
dollars later on.
  With that, Mr. President, I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
  Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. THURMOND. Adopt the Dorgan-Lott second-degree amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. A rollcall has not been requested on this 
amendment.
  Mr. McCAIN. I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to amendment No. 
771, offered by the Senator from North Dakota [Mr. Dorgan] to amendment 
No. 705, as modified. The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk 
will call the roll.
  Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Maryland [Ms. Mikulski] is 
necessarily absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 66, nays 33, as follows:
  The result was announced--yeas 66, nays 33, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 165 Leg.]

                                YEAS--66

     Abraham
     Akaka
     Allard
     Ashcroft
     Baucus
     Bennett
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Boxer
     Breaux
     Brownback
     Bumpers
     Burns
     Campbell
     Cleland
     Cochran
     Collins
     Conrad
     Coverdell
     Craig
     D'Amato
     Daschle
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Faircloth
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Frist
     Graham
     Grams
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Hatch
     Helms
     Hollings
     Hutchinson
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Jeffords
     Johnson
     Kempthorne
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Lott
     Mack
     McConnell
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nickles
     Roberts
     Santorum
     Sarbanes
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith (NH)
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thompson
     Thurmond
     Torricelli

                                NAYS--33

     Biden
     Bryan
     Byrd
     Chafee
     Coats
     Enzi
     Feingold
     Glenn
     Gorton
     Gramm
     Grassley
     Harkin
     Inouye
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Kyl
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lugar
     McCain
     Reed
     Reid
     Robb
     Rockefeller
     Roth
     Smith (OR)
     Thomas
     Warner
     Wellstone
     Wyden

                             NOT VOTING--1

       
     Mikulski
       
  The amendment (No. 771) was agreed to.
  Mr. THURMOND. I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. FORD. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


               Amendment No. 705, As Modified, As Amended

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on the McCain amendment No. 
705, as modified, as amended.
  Mr. LEVIN. Have the yeas and nays been ordered?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to vitiate the yeas and 
nays on amendment No. 705?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The question now occurs on agreeing to McCain amendment No. 705, as 
modified, as amended.
  The amendment (No. 705), as modified, as amended, was agreed to.

[[Page S7091]]



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