Congressional Record, Volume 143 Issue 96 (Wednesday, July 9, 1997)

[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 96 (Wednesday, July 9, 1997)]
[House]
[Pages H4985-H5002]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

{time} 1900
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. McInnis). Pursuant to House Resolution
179 and rule XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of
the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration
of the bill, H.R. 1775.

{time} 1900

In the Committee of the Whole

Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole
House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the
bill (H.R. 1775) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1998 for
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the U.S.

[[Page H4986]]

Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other
purposes, with Mr. Thornberry in the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The CHAIRMAN. When the Committee of the Whole rose earlier today,
amendment No. 2 offered by the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Conyers]
had been disposed of.
Pursuant to the order of the House of today, the Chairman of the
Committee of the Whole may postpone until a time during further
consideration in the Committee of the Whole a request for a recorded
vote on any amendment and may reduce to not less than 5 minutes the
time for voting by electronic device on any postponed question that
immediately follows another vote by electronic device without
intervening business, provided that the time for voting by electronic
device on the first in any series of questions shall not be less than
15 minutes.

Amendment No. 3 Offered by Mr. Frank of Massachusetts

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to
offer an amendment that was printed in the Record. I ask unanimous
consent because I, relying on advice I was given earlier, thought that
we were going to have amendments in order at any time. Therefore, I
missed the specific time. I ask unanimous consent to offer an amendment
which is covered by the time agreement articulated by the gentleman
from Florida.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to amending title I of the bill at
this point?
There was no objection.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment No. 3 offered by Mr. Frank of Massachusetts:
Page 6, after line 24, insert the following new section:

SEC. 105. REDUCTION IN FISCAL YEAR 1998 INTELLIGENCE BUDGET.

(a) Reduction.--The amount obligated for activities for
which funds are authorized to be appropriated by this Act
(including the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred
to in section 102(a)) may not exceed--
(1) the amount that the bill H.R. 1775, as reported in the
House of Representatives in the 105th Congress, authorizes
for such activities for fiscal year 1998, reduced by
(2) the amount equal to 0.7 percent of such authorization.
(b) Exception.--The amounts appropriated pursuant to
section 201 for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement
and Disability Fund may not be reduced by reason of
subsection (a).
(c) Transfer and Reprogramming Authority.--(1) The
President, in consultation with the Director of Central
Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense, may apply the
limitation required by subsection (a) by transferring amounts
among accounts or reprogramming amounts within an account, as
specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations
referred to in section 102(a).
(2) Before carrying out paragraph (1), the President shall
submit a notification to the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, which notification
shall include the reasons for each proposed transfer or
reprogramming.

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask
unanimous consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed
in the Record.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from
Massachusetts?
There was no objection.
The CHAIRMAN. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from
Massachusetts [Mr. Frank] and a Member opposed, the gentleman from
Florida [Mr. Goss], will each control 15 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Frank].
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as
I may consume. I thank the chairman and ranking member for allowing me
to offer this amendment, although because of the misinformation I
missed the time.
We had a long debate about cutting this. We now have a shorter one
because we have got a time agreement. The amendment I offer would
reduce the authorization by 0.7 percent, seven-tenths of 1 percent. I
cannot tell the Members how much that is in dollars because there might
be a spy that knows algebra and if a spy knew algebra he could take
0.7, he could multiply, he could do some other things and he would know
the total. I certainly would not want to violate the law by indicating
the total. So in deference to the algebraic literate Iranians who may
be lurking, I will tell any Member who comes to me privately what the
dollar amount is. Let me say it is significant. Seven-tenths of 1
percent does not look like a lot, but we are not dealing here with the
NEA or the CPB or low-income fuel assistance. We are here dealing with
national security, which means it is serious money. So I will be glad
to tell people how much we are talking about. I cannot tell it publicly
because they are listening. What I am proposing to do is to reduce this
to the amount the President requested.
We have had conversations about how the amount was reduced. Ten years
ago, we faced a heavily nuclear armed Soviet Union. Fortunately, we no
longer have that serious problem. Indeed, the greatest intelligence
problem in Europe in the months and years ahead may be to keep track of
just how many countries have joined NATO. We certainly have had a
substantial reduction in the threat, and we have not had a remotely
commensurate reduction in the spending.
I happen to believe that the administration has given in and asked
for too much in the national security area, but I accept the judgment
of the House, we are not going to make any substantial reduction of the
sort I voted for. But I do not understand how we could vote to raise
what the President has requested for this item. Because, remember, we
are in the zero sum game situation of the budget deal, and every $10 or
$100 or $200 million by which we raise what the President has asked for
in this account, we must reduce somewhere else. We must reduce
elsewhere in defense or we must reduce in transportation. Members here
almost voted to increase transportation. So the question before us is,
shall we at this point increase by a significant albeit unstatable sum
what the President has asked for for intelligence, knowing that we do
this at the cost of other important items?
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Florida [Mr. Young], the distinguished chairman of the Subcommittee on
National Security of the Committee on Appropriations.
Mr. YOUNG of Florida. I thank the gentleman for yielding me this
time.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this amendment. The proponent
of the amendment is suggesting it is a small amount, it is only 0.7
percent, but what the gentleman assumes with this amendment is the
members of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence did not pay
attention to what was being done when this bill was being marked up.
The truth of the matter is that under the chairmanship of the gentleman
from Florida [Mr. Goss] and the leadership of the gentleman from
Washington [Mr. Dicks], the ranking minority member, the members of
this committee, and the staff looked at every item in this bill and
looked at it closely to see where we needed to add or to see where we
could save a few dollars to try to come in with as low a number as
possible. I think we did a pretty good job. My job as chairman of the
appropriations Subcommittee on National Security, the chairman's
responsibility, and all the Members of this Congress, our
responsibility to our Nation, to the people that we represent, is to
keep the Nation secure, and that requires a very effective intelligence
community to establish worldwide information that we need. And who
needs it? Not only do people at the Pentagon, not only the people at
the CIA but the soldiers in the field need it, the people that we send
to battle need intelligence. Would it not be a shame to send somebody
into combat and not provide them the necessary intelligence?
That is what we are trying to do, is to have an effective
intelligence operation, to guarantee a commitment that I and many of my
colleagues have made over the years that we are not going to be willing
to send an American into a hostile situation unless we know we have
done the best to provide him with the best training, with the best
equipment, the best technology and the best intelligence, and knowledge
of the situation. That is what we

[[Page H4987]]

are doing here today. We are trying to guarantee that our soldiers and
those responsible for our Nation's security have the intelligence, the
knowledge that they need. We have done the very best we could to get as
much for the money. I would say that the committee has done a good job,
and I compliment the leadership of the committee. I would hope that the
Members of the House would be willing to vote a strong no on this
amendment as they did on the Sanders amendment earlier this evening.
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 3 minutes. I
understand that the chairman, a hardworking diligent chairman of an
appropriations subcommittee would argue that we never should change
what his committee does. I understand that. I do not think, however,
that we should treat every amendment to an appropriations or an
authorization bill as a vote of confidence.
I have great confidence in the gentleman from Florida and the
gentleman from Washington, but the argument of the gentleman from
Florida is that once the committee has done the work, in fact, I do not
know why we are here, let us just ratify what the committees do. He
argues that my amendment would endanger the troops. Apparently General
Shalikashvili did not think so. Secretary Cohen did not think so. The
Director of the CIA did not think so, assuming we had one at the time.
You are never sure over there.
The fact is that I am proposing what the administration asks for. As
much as I agree that the committee did its work, I am unprepared to
conclude that the administration and the National Security Council and
the Secretary of Defense and all the others did not do their work. So
we are not talking here about blind guesses. We are talking about
choosing between the administration's figure and this figure.
Second, it is very clear that we could cut 0.7 percent without in any
way endangering military intelligence. The intelligence agencies, the
CIA in particular, went on a little job hunt after the Soviet Union
collapsed. They were a little underemployed, I think. They have now
become the source of economic intelligence. I believe we do better with
the free market in terms of economic intelligence.
This amendment says the President will reduce after reporting to the
committees, and I want to make one statement that I promised betrays no
national security. We can cut 0.7 percent of this without in any way
endangering military intelligence, tactical, strategic battlefield,
global, et cetera. The CIA does a number of other things. It does some
better than other intelligence agencies do.
The President and the national security advisers, I believe, cannot
be accused of endangering the troops, and that is what this amendment
would carry out.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from South
Carolina [Mr. Spence], the distinguished chairman of the Committee on
National Security.
(Mr. SPENCE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. SPENCE. I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.
Mr. Chairman, H.R. 1775 specifically supports future military needs
in terms of planning, operations, and force protection. Part of this
support includes making sure that this Nation understands the nature of
the threat that we face. For tomorrow's forces as well as the
population at large, our major concern is the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction.
The intelligence community plays a vital role in detecting and
monitoring the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Numerous
intelligence sources, including imagery, signals and human
intelligence, provide vital information to policymakers and military
commanders who must determine ways to deter, prevent, halt or seize the
transfer of weapons of mass destruction and associated technologies.
A recently released CIA report on foreign countries' acquisition of
technology useful for the development or production of weapons of mass
destruction highlights the national security threat posed by the spread
of such weapons of mass destruction and technology. This report reveals
the following, and I would like to take it one at a time.
Iran aggressively continues to acquire all types of weapons of mass
destruction, technology and advanced conventional weapons. China and
Russia have been primary sources for missile-related goods, while China
and India supply the bulk of Iran's chemical weapons equipment.
During the last half of 1996, China was the most significant supplier
of weapons of mass destruction related goods and technology to foreign
countries, especially to Iran and Pakistan. China provided a tremendous
variety of assistance to both Iran's and Pakistan's ballistic missile
programs and to their nuclear programs.
In the last half of 1996, Russia supplied a variety of ballistic
missile-related goods to foreign countries, especially to Iran. Russia
also was an important source for nuclear programs in Iran and to a
lesser extent India and Pakistan.
The intelligence community must focus a great deal of effort on
monitoring such activities. The fiscal year 1998 intelligence
authorization bill will help the intelligence community in its
nonproliferation efforts by encouraging investments in new technologies
and encouraging the community to work together as a more flexible
corporate whole.
Mr. Chairman, I do not believe that it is prudent to make
indiscriminate cuts to intelligence programs that the oversight
committees have carefully reviewed and recommended to this body.

{time} 1915

Consequently I oppose the gentleman's amendment, and I encourage my
colleagues to vote ``no'' as well.
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the
gentlewoman from California [Ms. Pelosi], a current member of the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I was afraid the gentleman from
Massachusetts was announcing my resignation from the committee without
my knowledge. I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me, and,
yes, I do rise as a member of the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence in support of the gentleman's amendment. I think it is a
commonsense amendment that is well-thought-out and worthy of the
support of our colleagues.
As a member of the committee I with great reluctance voted against
the Sanders amendment, which I think deserved this House's attention
because it was a big cut, an across-the-board cut, not giving the
discretion to the director or to the community to designate where that
cut would come from. That was a 10-percent cut; this is a 0.7-percent
cut, less than 1 percent.
Certainly, while every other aspect of this budget is subjected to
the harsh scrutiny of fiscal responsibility, certainly there is 0.7
percent in the intelligence budget that can be cut, and that will be
done, according to this amendment, by the intelligence community, by
the director reporting to the committee and, of course, with the
approval of the President of the United States, the No. 1 consumer of
intelligence in our country, and this figure, the 0.7 percent reduction
in the budget, represents the President's request.
Mr. Chairman, certainly we want the President to have all of the
intelligence he needs to make the important and crucial decisions for
our country, whether they relate to the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction or issues relating to our own military and their
activities. So by giving the discretion to the Director of Central
Intelligence, our colleague, the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr.
Frank] says that this cut can be nonmilitary. Certainly there is 0.7
percent in nonmilitary spending, answering the challenge that one of
our other colleagues made that this will hurt our troops in the field.
I do not think that General Shalikashvili had that in mind when he
supported the administration's request for this figure which I cannot
mention, but that it is a 0.7 percent reduction.
As some of my colleagues have mentioned, we need information.
Intelligence is information, but it is not raw data. It is information
that is gathered and then has analysis performed upon it, and then when
it is intelligence it is

[[Page H4988]]

presented to its consumers, which are the military and policy makers in
our country. And as I have said, our commander in chief, our President
of the United States, is the biggest consumer of this intelligence
information and the most important one. So why would the President be
asking for an intelligence budget that was less than he needed?
I supported the Conyers amendment earlier to disclose the aggregate
figure of the intelligence budget because I thought, I believed, that
the intelligence community should make that figure known to the
American people so that it can be accountable for that figure, only the
aggregate figure. While every other, as I say, item in this budget has
to answer and be accountable to the American people, why does not the
intelligence community have to do that as well? Is it because it
cannot, in order to resist a small cut of less than 1 percent, if the
full figure were divulged, it would have to justify why it could not
absorb a 0.7 percent decrease.
I think today we are making some mistakes here. We should be
accountable to the American people by disclosing the aggregate figure.
We rejected that. But certainly this body should be able to support the
administration's request, the request of the leading consumer of
intelligence in this country, the President of the United States, for
his budget number, and I urge my colleagues to support the Frank
amendment.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. Bereuter], a former member of the
committee, a very valuable member of the House Committee on
International Relations and the chairman of the North Atlantic Assembly
Delegation of this body.
(Mr. BEREUTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I oppose the Frank amendment. This is a
case of data-free analysis. It is not based on an assessment of the
work of the committee or the needs of the intelligence community. Now
admittedly it is difficult for Members to make that kind of an
assessment, but we give a special responsibility and privilege to
Members of this House to serve 6, now 8 years on the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, to make the tough decisions, to make an
assessment about what is appropriate. And we rotate them off the
committee so they cannot become co-opted, so they are objective. Also I
would point out that this is the recommendation of the intelligence
authorization committee by unanimous vote.
Now some supporters of cuts in intelligence funding say that since
the end of the cold war there is no longer the national security
threat. Actually there is, but it is more diverse. The one that we face
today is more complicated. Today's problems include terrorism,
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, instability, and the
foreign intelligence threat which has not gone away.
Now in May of this year I had the privilege of leading a North
Atlantic Assembly delegation to the Aviano NATO base in Italy, and I
saw some dramatic improvements we are making which are going to help
our tactical leaders on any future battlefield. There have been big
changes since the Persian Gulf war. If we ever have to face combat
again, in the Balkans or wherever, the kind of intelligence changes we
are spending our money on now are going to be making a big, big
difference on the safety and success of our troops and other military,
naval, and air force personnel.
When I was on the committee I focused during the last 3 or 4 years on
high-technology issues, and I would tell my colleagues that our
intelligence expenditures in that area protects and serves well our
military and our intelligence community. We must protect against the
espionage or theft of advanced technologies that represent huge
investments of our defense dollars. The files of the Intelligence
Committee are replete with stories of how the intelligence community
saved tens of millions of dollars for the defense acquisition community
by protecting against our technological lead in military and
intelligence matters.
I would also say that we cannot talk much about the security threats
that we have solved, and about the terrorism threats that we have met.
But, for example, we can talk about Ramsi Youssef, who was involved in
the World Trade Center bombing. Without the intervention of the
Intelligence Committee he successfully would have simultaneously bombed
a number of planes crossing the Pacific. We were able to intervene
there because of our intelligence capability to stop that threat and
save not just hundreds of lives but probably thousands of lives.
So the intelligence protects against the intelligence theft of
valuable proprietary investments. The committee has repeatedly
encouraged us to adequately fund this area.
Let me say that what committee assessment has shown in budgetary and
programmatic shortfalls. Clearly in the current budget environment the
President of the committee cannot address all of the needs. What this
budget represents is a good-faith effort by the Members we have given
the responsibility for this whole House of Representatives to make an
assessment about the kind of increases or modest adjustments in our
intelligence budget meets the most critical needs. If the Frank
amendment passes, funding for some modernization, for training and
improved intelligence collection, and especially analysis, will be
sacrificed. We are not going to lose it all for we are making progress,
but there are dramatic improvements that can be made without this
amount of additional money that the committee has recommended.
I urge my colleagues to support the recommendations of the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence unanimously approved by this
authorizing committee and approve them.
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 2 minutes.
The argument for committee infallibility continues to lack any
persuasive effect. The gentleman said I am offering an amendment
without analysis. I am offering the President's budget. I very much
have to disagree that the President and the National Security Council
and the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency
and the Joint Chiefs did no analysis. That simply is not worthy of
consideration. The argument is that our committee, which we designated,
is infallible, and the administration and all of the people involved in
national security did no informational work here at all.
The gentleman mentioned that we need to protect private investment.
Well, I would disagree that that is an absolute national security
priority. I just voted in committee for the Export-Import Bank, to
protect it, but the argument that we have got to in a secret budget
fund economists and others to analyze economics and that once the
committee has put its imprimatur on the figure it is unchallengeable is
simply not sensible.
I do think we have a right to say given the priorities, given
priorities in the environment and law enforcement on the streets and
other things, all of which are hurting in this budget, we would rather
not put an extra x hundred million dollars into economic analysis by
the intelligence people. We may tell people that they can do their own
security checking when they are investing. And no, I do not equate
terrorism with economic investment, and I insist that the 0.7 percent
can come out of areas that have zero, zero to do with physical
security, zero to do with the military, zero to do with proliferation.
They clearly are doing much more than 0.7 percent in a whole lot of
other areas.
But I simply have to reject this notion that what the committee did
must be accepted and we dismiss as somehow totally improvident and
endangering our troops what the administration proposed.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished
ranking member himself, the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks].
Mr. DICKS. I appreciate the gentleman's yielding this time to me, and
without fear of disclosure here my good friend from Massachusetts [Mr.
Frank], and he and I voted together on disclosing the overall number,
but he asked me a very important question. He asked me how much the
intelligence budget has been cut in nominal terms and figuring
inflation.
Now this does not violate any intelligence prohibitions. I want to
tell my colleagues that between 1992 and 1997

[[Page H4989]]

in nominal terms the cut is 13.4 percent. In real terms, considering a
2-percent inflation rate, which is very, very low, the cut has been
21.4 percent. So I would point out to our colleagues we have cut this
budget. We have also cut defense by about 40 percent.
Now I still believe that intelligence is a force multiplier. By being
able to use these national technical means, being able to use UAV's, by
getting this information to our commanders, we can save American lives,
and I believe that we carefully went through this budget. We added some
money, we cut some money, and Mr. Young is here. We did the same thing
over the last 2 days in the Appropriations Subcommittee on National
Security. So we do not always agree with everything the President does.
We see some areas, for example, in analysis where we think more needs
to be done. We added money for that.
So I would urge the committee to stay with the recommendations of our
bipartisan Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Fifteen members
voted for this, and I think that the right thing to do is to stay with
that recommendation, I would stress again when you consider inflation,
we've cut this budget by 21.4 percent since 1992.

{time} 1930

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance
of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Frank] is
recognized for 4 minutes.
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from
Washington for his candor. He just said the committee, the infallible,
highly respected committee, added money in analysis. So that means we
can cut their additions without affecting technical means, without
affecting battlefield intelligence. So we are fighting now over the
sanctity of the economic and political analysis.
I submit to those of us who have seen this that we are not here
endangering anybody's security. We are talking about the extent to
which we get political judgments made and economic judgments made. That
is what is at issue.
The gentleman said that the amount has been cut in nominal terms, in
dollars, 13 percent. He also used a 21 percent real figure, but I have
to tell the gentleman, as he knows, his Republican colleagues with whom
he is allied on this measure do not accept that. We have people who
say, none of this inflation stuff, a cut is a cut. So the argument that
we cut by not meeting inflation, he should understand, is repudiated by
the honest gentlemen on the other side.
They would certainly never claim that we give an inflation factor for
defense and not for Medicare. These are people who repudiate the notion
that we fail to keep Medicare up with inflation, you are cutting it,
and the gentleman would not want to get them in trouble by arguing
contrariwise here.
So then the question is, is it outrageous that we reduce in dollars
13 percent from 1992? The 1992 budget formulated in 1991 was still
formulated at a time that was the height of the cold war. The Soviet
Union was crumbling. We were not sure of that then.
I agree that terrorism is a problem, but terrorism is not a new
problem. There was terrorism in 1982. There was terrorism in 1989; the
bombing in Lebanon; terrible things have happened. Terrorism is not a
new problem. Nuclear proliferation is not a new problem. India and
Pakistan did not get their nuclear weapons a week ago. All those things
were there, and we had the heavily armed Soviet Union and the Warsaw
Pact. So I would submit that there has been a reduction in the physical
threat the United States faces of greater than 13 percent.
I think the capacity of our enemies, particularly the Soviet Union,
to damage us has been more than 13 percent. I think when the Warsaw
Pact nations switched sides, when Poland, and Hungary, and the Czech
Republic go from being our enemies, as we consider them to be in 1980's
and early 1990's to being on our side, that is more than a 13 percent
reduction in the real threat.
We have a difficult budget situation. We will be underfunding by most
measures COPS on the streets. Yes, there are dangers to Americans, but
there are dangers to most Americans more immediately, unfortunately, in
their own communities from a handful of criminals who terrorize them.
We have provided in the past the Federal money to help that. That
competes with this.
Money for transportation safety competes with this. Money to clean up
the environment, to undo Superfund, competes with this. Money to help
poor elderly people heat their homes competes with this.
The question is not in the abstract, is it a good idea to have an
extra couple of hundred million, $300 million, whatever, $150 million,
I have to disguise it, million. The question is, do we increase the
analysis capacity, the economic analysis capacity of the intelligence
community over the recommendation of the administration, and take that
money from other programs?
If Members vote against this amendment and they vote to give the
intelligence community this extra analysis money, I hope Members will
be good enough to make that clear when people come to them and say, I
would like more money for NIH, more money for cancer research, for COPS
on the streets. When Members say to them, I am sorry, I agree but I
cannot afford it, have the grace to tell them that one of the reasons
we cannot afford it is that we gave this money to the intelligence
community over and above what was asked for, because that is what is at
issue.
We are talking about a zero sum game. If Members vote to give more
than was asked to the intelligence community, more than was asked by
the enemies community and the President and his national security
advisors, explain to people what we are taking that away from.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 minutes to the distinguished
ranking member, the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks].
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, the only thing I would want to maybe say to
my friend, the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Frank], is that if we
take the money away from the intelligence community, that money is not
going to go to NIH, it is not going to go to Medicare or Medicaid. It
is going to go to defense spending. That is where it is going to go. It
is going to go to somewhere else in the defense budget, because under
the 602(b), the defense budget is there. We do not take money from it
and move it somewhere else. It is going to be either intelligence or
something else in defense. We think that this is the right balance
between the two.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, this amendment assumes that the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence just simply plussed up the program funding
without regard to the merits of the program, without due deliberation,
and simply because we wanted to increase the numbers. That is not true.
If we cut 0.7 percent, we do not get the President's budget. We added,
we cut, we changed programs, we did all kinds of things. We are not at
the President's budget. We are not at the President's program. There
may be a number that is similar but we do not have a program that is
similar.
We have a program that provides more security for Americans, American
interests, whether they are here or abroad, than the President's
program does because this House and our Founding Fathers in their
divine wisdom created balance of power, oversight, and our opportunity
to check and balance with each other. We have a better product as a
result of this.
I am proud of our product and I think it is better than what I
believe is not thoughtless, a well-intentioned, but an amendment that
does come out without sufficient thought to what happens, because a
disproportionate share of the gentleman's amendment will fall to
important parts of the program; because we have to spend a very large
part for architecture, which everybody knows. And 0.7 percent of
architecture means one thing, and 0.7 percent of something else which
is very small but vital means something else. I do not want to get in
that position.
I think we have been extremely thoughtful, and I think that as the
gentleman understands the classified documents that we have worked
with, as well as the nonclassified, and goes through them all, he would
have to come to the same conclusion.

[[Page H4990]]

Mr. Chairman, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence looked
at all the programs we went into. I tried to explain that across-the-
board cuts like this do not get into the kind of cost-benefit
assessment we did on a program-by-program basis, which is what we do
and what we certainly did, and the record will show.
I think to be totally honest, when we go across the board in a cut
like this, basically, to be honest, I think an approach that goes to a
0.7-percent reduction gets us to a lack of critical examination and
intellectual rigor. It just simply is a number, like 10 percent, 5
percent, 50 percent, or any other percent, it is a number. It is not an
intellectual cost-benefit program by program, which is what we have
done.
I think that the gentleman's amendment puts the authorization at the
level of the President's request but it does not get the President's
program, as I said. I want to congratulate the President because I
think he made a pretty good effort. But I think we have done a value-
added approach, which is what our job is, value-added, next branch of
government. We did it.
Mr. Chairman, the other thing I have to say is that unanimously on
the committee every Republican and every Democrat saw areas where
funding was clearly inadequate for intelligence needs. We are short on
some programs that I worry about. I think the ranking member would say
the same.
We could have done much more. We would love to have done much more.
The gentleman mentioned a 13-percent reduction. Boy, I would hate to be
one of the casualties in that 13-percent area that I had to go to the
parents and say, gee, we just picked a number and we reduced it, and
unfortunately you were in the target zone; oh, gee, that is too bad.
The fact of the matter is we could have done better. The fact of the
matter is we did do better. Where we did better was in our bill.
Mr. Chairman, I think that it is fair to say that for the gentleman
from Washington [Mr. Dicks] and myself, that we have made painful
decisions to forego funding for some very important intelligence
activities, but we both agree that we do not have all that we would
like to have. I think we are down at the point now where my conscience
says, any more and we are in deep trouble.
I have talked about the disproportionate problem because we do have
fixed infrastructure, fixed overhead, as the gentleman well knows. We
cannot accept reductions in our efforts to detect weapons
proliferators, I am sure the gentleman would agree, locate terrorists,
I am sure the gentleman would agree, determine nefarious activities
from rogue states, and on and on. We just cannot give up anymore.
The CHAIRMAN. All time on this amendment has expired.
The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from
Massachusetts [Mr. Frank].
The question was taken; and the Chair announced that the noes
appeared to have it.
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote,
and pending that, I make the point of order that a quorum is not
present.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the previous order of the House, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from
Massachusetts [Mr. Frank] will be postponed.
The point of no quorum is considered withdrawn.

Parliamentary Inquiry

Mr. DICKS. I have a parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state his parliamentary inquiry.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, does that mean that the gentleman from
Massachusetts [Mr. Frank] has to re-request a recorded vote when we go
back to vote on this at a later point?
The CHAIRMAN. The request for a recorded vote will be the pending
business.
Mr. DICKS. I thank the Chair.
The CHAIRMAN. Are there further amendments to title III?

Amendment No. 6 offered by Ms. Waters

Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I offer amendment No. 6.
The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment No. 6 offered by Ms. Waters:

Page 10, after line 15, insert the following new section:

SEC. 306. STUDY OF CIA INVOLVEMENT IN THE USE OF CHEMICAL
WEAPONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF WAR.

Not later than August 15, 1999, the Inspector General of
the Central Intelligence Agency shall conduct, and submit to
Congress in both a classified and declassified form, a study
concerning Central Intelligence Agency involvement (or
knowledge thereof) of the use of chemical weapons by enemy
forces against Armed Forces of the United States during the
Persian Gulf War. Such study shall determine--
(1) Whether there is any complicity of Central Intelligence
Agency agents, employees, or assets in the use of chemical
weapons;
(2) whether there is any use of appropriated funds for such
purposes; and
(3) the extent of involvement of other elements of the
Intelligence Community of the United States or foreign
intelligence agencies in the use of such weapons.

Ms. WATERS (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous
consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the
Record.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman
from California?
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point of order on the amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman
from California?
Mr. GOSS. Reserving the right to object, Mr. Chairman, I want to be
clear which amendment we are on, Mr. Chairman. I do not have the same
numbering system. There are two amendments.
Ms. WATERS. If the gentleman will yield, it is amendment No. 6.
Mr. GOSS. The subject of this amendment is chemical weapons, chemical
weapons in the Gulf?
Ms. WATERS. A study of the Central Intelligence Agency involved in
the use of chemical weapons in the Persian Gulf war.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my reservation of objection.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman
from California?
There was no objection.
The CHAIRMAN. Under a previous order of the House, the time will be
alloted, 30 minutes to the gentlewoman from California [Ms. Waters],
and 30 minutes to a Member opposed to the amendment.
The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from California [Ms. Waters].
Ms. WATERS. I yield myself such time as I may consume, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I offer this amendment to establish a study of the
Central Intelligence Agency, the CIA. This study is designed to explore
the involvement and the use of chemical weapons in the Persian Gulf
war. Specifically, this amendment requires the Inspector General of the
Central Intelligence Agency to conduct a study and submit to Congress
in both a classified and declassified form a report of its findings.
Mr. Chairman, I think it is important to expand a little bit on why I
would want such a study. In order to do that, I would like to read
information from the New York Times, May 6, 1997, the Tuesday late
edition. It starts with the information concerning George J. Tenet, the
fifth nominee for director of Central Intelligence in the last 4 years.
It states that he would be questioned by a Senate committee on that
Tuesday, and the betting is, they said, that his nomination will be
quickly approved by the panel and then promptly confirmed by the full
Senate. The article goes on to explain what has been happening in
trying to keep directors of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the
turnover and the turmoil that this agency has been experiencing.
Mr. Chairman, they say, ``This turmoil at the top of American
intelligence has no parallel except in the Watergate era, when five men
served in rapid succession as director of Central Intelligence from
1972 to 1977, years when the agency was devastated by a disclosure of
its Cold War history of assassination plots, coups, and dirty tricks.''
What is important about this article, however, is that it identifies
much of the turmoil, much of the criticism, much of the faux pas, much
of the problems that this agency has been experiencing. But this
amendment today centers on what happened in Iraq. It talks about secret
operations were exposed in Iraq, France, Japan, India, and Italy, but
then it really targets in on the agency, the fact that the agency sat
on evidence that chemical weapons had been present at the Iraq
munitions dump blown up soon after the Persian Gulf war.
Members have heard references to this today, when they talk about the

[[Page H4991]]

20,000 soldiers that were exposed to sarin gas. Mr. Chairman, this is
unacceptable. As Members know, I served on the Committee on Veterans'
Affairs. I learned a lot in the period of time that I served on that
committee.

{time} 1945

I gained deep respect for the sacrifices that are made by families
and members in our armed services. I also witnessed a lot of other
things having served on that committee.
These loyal individuals who gave of themselves, most of whom were
very proud to serve their country, many of them belonging to families
where they had other family members who had served their country, had
died serving their country in previous wars, many of them now ailing
and sick and disabled, many of them fighting day and in and day out
because they cannot get their claims adjudicated with their own
government. I learned deep respect for the veterans of this country,
having served, watched them come to the Congress of the United States
oftentimes asking for assistance and not getting that assistance, many
of them not being taken care of properly in the veterans hospitals
around the Nation, but they continued to be very loyal, very committed,
very patriotic.
And I learned something else: Members of this House could wax
eloquently about their support of the Members who had served, our
veterans, members of the armed services. They could say over and over
again how much respect they had for them, how much they honored and
cherished them and how we should do everything in our power to make
their lives comfortable once they had served. But it is very
interesting, when we look at what the Central Intelligence Agency did
to them in Iraq, how they had information about the chemicals that were
stored there and they did not share this information, they did not tell
them they were at risk and they exposed these 20,000 individuals.
How can we be comfortable with this agency that has been identified
over and over today as an agency with serious problems, with serious
trouble, an agency that is too closely associated with trafficking in
drugs, an agency that has relationships with some of the worst people
in the world, murderers, drug dealers, terrorists, an agency that has
broken down where we have members who are there to protect and serve,
who are selling us out, identified in a most prominent way in all of
the news media of this country? Knowing all of this we do not want to
in any way touch them.
Why are we so afraid of the CIA? Why are we as public policymakers
not willing to pull them in? Why are we not ready to rap their wrists?
I have heard Members on this floor talk about all of the agencies
that have failed and how they want to cut them. I have heard many times
about the poverty programs and how they have not worked and how they
have been fraught with problems and troubles. Well, we have an agency
that is embarrassing us, an agency where our allies are telling us, get
them out of their country, an agency that has committed just about
every ill and every sin that any intelligence group could commit. Do we
want to cut them back a little bit? Five percent? No, we do not want to
do that. Do we want to share information about the budget? Do we want
to shine the spotlight on this agency in any way? No, we do not want to
do that.
In this post-cold-war era, we are satisfied to continue to let them
run rampant. But I do not think we ought to do that. I think if we do
nothing else, if we do not care about the children and communities that
are the victims of drugs having been brought into this country where we
have identified CIA involvement, which will be in my next amendment, if
we do not care about the terrorists, who we claim to want to get rid of
in the world, being associated with our own intelligence community, if
we do not care about the fact that the breakdown in the agency is
causing too much strife and dissemination of information, do we not
care enough about the veterans to send a message to them to say to
them, yes, the CIA was wrong; no, you should not have been put at risk;
no, they should not have withheld this information; yes, they should be
punished for having done so; yes, we should do everything that we can
to make sure it does not happen again?
This is not about a movie. This is not something somebody made up.
This is not gossip or speculation. This is fact. The fact of the matter
is 20,000 soldiers exposed to sarin gas, information withheld,
information that the CIA simply could say, oh, yes, we forgot to tell
you; yes, we apologize; no, we should not have done it. That is not
enough. Thirty billion dollars being spent on an intelligence
community, no real oversight, no real transparency, no real
understanding by the public policymakers who come to this floor year in
and year out and simply give their vote to the intelligence community,
not knowing how it is spent and what they are doing.
I think it is about time we live up to the responsibilities that have
been bestowed upon us as public policymakers. It is about time that we
say, no agency is so big and so bad that it threatens us in ways that
cause us not to be good public policymakers.
Yes, there is a need for intelligence. I am not naive. I do
understand that we need intelligence. But I am saying to my colleagues,
the CIA does not deserve our support. I am saying to my colleagues, on
the Senate side, Senator Moynihan has said, strike them from the
budget. Get rid of them. Over here, a modest amount tried, just cut
them by 5 percent. And we sit and hold our hands and get up and make
excuses about why we cannot control the CIA, why we do not have a right
to do the oversight that we must do, why they are different from every
other agency that we deal with, why we do not want to know, why we want
to keep our heads in the sand.
It is not right. We can do better than this. So I offer this
amendment. It is a very modest amendment. This amendment would simply,
again, establish a study of the Central Intelligence Agency and their
involvement in the use of chemical weapons in the Persian Gulf war.
This is a limit to design, to do that, and I would like to send a
message to the veterans that we all honor and cherish, the ones that we
love so much because of the sacrifices that they have made, the ones
who may die from this exposure, the ones whose families may never be
satisfied that their health needs will be taken care of. I would like
us to send a message here this evening, if we have got the guts to do
it, I would like for us to send a message that we care. And not only do
we care, we are going to do something about it. It is time to get rid
of the rhetoric and step up to the plate and put our actions where our
mouths are in terms of loving the veterans and the soldiers that have
given to us and do this modest, very modest amendment that would shed
some light on what happened in the Persian Gulf War; why did it happen
and how do we prevent it from ever happening again?
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Amendment Offered by Mr. Goss to the Amendment No. 6 Offered by Ms.
Waters

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment to the amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. Goss to the amendment No. 6
offered by Ms. Waters:
Strike all after ``Sec. 306.'' and insert in lieu thereof
the following:

``Review of the Presence of Chemical Weapons in the Persian Gulf
Theater

``The Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency
shall conduct a review to determine what knowledge the
Central Intelligence Agency had about the presence or use of
chemical weapons in the Persian Gulf Theater during the
course of the Persian Gulf War. The Inspector General shall
submit a report of his findings to the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, no later than August 15, 1998 in both
classified and unclassified form. The unclassified form shall
also be made available to the public.''

The CHAIRMAN. The amendment is not separately debatable. Pursuant to
the previous order of the House, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss]
is recognized for 30 minutes.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I originally rose in opposition to the Waters amendment, but now I am
rising in support of my substitute amendment.
I think it is very important that we understand here that this is not
a new subject and that there are unclassified documents available to
the public on

[[Page H4992]]

Khamisiyah and what happened there. One is entitled Khamisiyah
Historical Perspective on Related Intelligence of 9 April 1997. And the
second, more to the point, is CIA Supports the U.S. Military During the
Persian Gulf War of 16 June 1997, which deals very directly with the
subject at hand. These are available for all Members and the public at
large, any veterans or soldiers or military civilians or anybody who
would be interested. It is a very important subject. I quite agree with
that.
The gentlewoman has pointed to her love of veterans and soldiers, and
I certainly admire that and I will also say that I agree with it. I
have a great many veterans in my district. We have a very large
veterans population, seems to grow larger every day, which is not
surprising given the wonderful area where I live in southwest Florida.
I think it is very important, however, that we understand that this
is not an issue that has been ignored. I would like very much,
therefore, to explain a little bit further what my substitute amendment
will do in addition to these reports that are already out.
The gentlewoman is seeking an IG report and we have designed an
approach that would bring about a result, I think, while avoiding some
of the pitfalls I see in going with the gentlewoman's original
amendment.
The Intelligence Committee is obviously very concerned about the
issue of chemical weapons exposure during the gulf war or any other
time, and we have been closely monitoring the DCI efforts to examine
this subject fully. Again, the committee was very pleased to see the
April release of the unclassified report from the DCI, that would be
director of the Central Intelligence Agency, related to the events at
the Khamisiyah storage facility where Iraqi, and I underscore, Iraqi
chemical weapons were stored and were subsequently destroyed by U.S.
troops. And in that process it is apparent that some have suffered
exposure to chemical weapons.
The question has to be asked. What happened? What went wrong? We
tried to find out. Since this is the first I have heard from the
gentlewoman on this subject but not the first I have heard on the
subject, I am going to encourage her to read these reports. And I will
make them available if she has not already.
From the report we know that there was a breakdown in analysis and
communications between the intelligence community and the Department of
Defense related to the knowledge of chemical weapons storage at this
particular facility. There was a ground location problem involved and
how it was referred to.
We also know that steps are already being taken by both the
intelligence community and the defense to make sure that this does not
happen again. Again it is addressed in these reports.
Our committee remains very vigilant about monitoring the progress of
that effort and other efforts because we know the catastrophic
consequences of mishandling or not knowing the maximum amount about
chemical warfare and all its ramifications. The Waters amendment
implies that the CIA or CIA employees were complicit, and I think that
word was used in her amendment, in the use of chemical weapons against
U.S. troops. That is an accusation that obviously disturbs me and any
American very greatly and warrants immediate consideration.
The facts that I know are that intelligence and defense were never
closer in their working relationship even though there were
opportunities for things to go wrong as there are in any hostile combat
situation or any peacetime situation, as we know. But former chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell, is I think, a man well
regarded and certainly was well regarded in accomplishments of his
duties in these events stated, and I quote: No combat commander has
ever had as full or complete a view of his adversary as did our field
commander. Intelligence support to operation Desert Shield and Desert
Storm was a success story.
I am not making that up. That is not a newspaper story. That is
something that Colin Powell said.
Mr. Chairman, I note that there are many, many studies that have been
or are being conducted, several under the watchful eye of the
Presidential Commission on Gulf War Illness. This is entirely
appropriate. This committee will continue its oversight
responsibilities and continue to look at activities related to this
issue that belong in the area of the intelligence community, as I have
said we are doing, as witnessed by these reports.

{time} 2000

I have said in my substitute that the gentlewoman's amendment calls
on the CIA's Inspector General to conduct a review to determine what
knowledge the Central Intelligence Agency had about the presence or the
use of chemical weapons in the Persian Gulf theater during the course
of the gulf war. This report would be submitted to the intelligence
committees of the Congress, that would be both committees, no later
than August 15, 1998 in both classified and unclassified form. And,
frankly, I think it will happen much sooner because much of the work
has already been done.
I believe the substitute will reach the goal the gentlewoman seems to
have, the goal of getting as much information as possible about what we
knew of the presence or use of chemical weapons during the gulf war
without prejudging the outcome or implying complicity on the part of
the men and women who work so hard on behalf of our national security.
I want to point that out. People are watching this debate. We are on
C-SPAN. I know that it is for the benefit of the Members, but
inevitably there are other observers who watch what goes on here,
including the men and women of our intelligence community. I am sure
that they feel a little bit let down when somebody implies that they
may have been using or complicit in chemical warfare against American
troops overseas.
I have trouble with that. I hope they do not believe that that is the
feeling of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence because it is
clearly not. I believe very strongly in oversight, the need for good
discipline, a piercing look at what we are doing, calling it when we
see it when there is a problem, not shrinking from that, but I
certainly do not think we want to denigrate the men and women who are
working so hard for our national security if it is not warranted. And
in my case I have not seen any facts whatsoever to warrant it.
I hope the gentlewoman will support our approach, which is offered
for our mutual interest of getting at the truth. And that is what we
seek, the truth. I will urge my colleagues to support the substitute to
the Waters amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
First, I would like to deal with the way in which the gentleman from
Florida [Mr. Goss] characterized the inquiry that I am seeking. I asked
that a study be done to make determinations. I did not come to any
conclusions about the involvement of the CIA. The idea of asking for
the study is to make certain determinations, and I think that should be
clear.
Further, allow me to share with the Members of this House that I
believe that the gentleman from Florida and I are saying the same
thing. It needs to be looked at. I brought this to the floor today
because I intended very much to create a platform for a discussion
about this issue. I am extremely concerned, even though the gentleman
from Florida believes that I should know that some studying has been
done, that just as I do not know other Members of this House do not
know, the public does not know, and that we are left with the accounts
that we have learned about. We have heard the CIA say, yes, we had the
information and, yes, we should have revealed it. That much we know.
I think the gentleman from Florida and I and other Members of this
House want to shed some light on this. We want more information. We
want to be able to share with the American public everything that we
know about what happened, and we want to be in a position to use
whatever power we have to make sure it never happens again.
So I am pleased, Mr. Chairman, that I am joined and embraced, by way
of this substitute amendment, because while it may be structured a
little bit differently, I am pleased that it would get the information
a little bit sooner than the way that I had structured the amendment.
Either way, whether it is 1

[[Page H4993]]

year from now or 2 years from now, and for some reason it falls on my
birthday, August 15, that is all right with me.
So let me just say that I think that having brought it here, it
served a purpose. It got me what I wanted. It forced the discussion. It
created the debate about something that never should be in the dark,
and it got my colleagues on the other side of the aisle joining with me
to have a study so that we can reveal everything that we know. And with
that, that is all I ask. I am pleased to accept the substitute and I
thank the gentleman from Florida for recognizing that it needed to be
done.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
Ms. WATERS. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I want to rise in support of the substitute,
and I appreciate the efforts of the gentlewoman from Los Angeles, who
has been very interested in this subject. I think the language drafted
by the chairman gets to what we all want to get to.
Let me just say that when this happened, I had some serious
reservations about the studies that were done by the Defense
Department, the work that was done by the CIA on this. I asked Mr.
Deutch, when he was still the director of the Central Intelligence
Agency, to have the Inspector General start a study.
So the chairman is right, the Inspector General has already engaged
in this, and particularly about the destruction of chemical weapons at
a storage site in Khamisiyah. I also asked them to look at the whole
question of what did the CIA know, when did it know it, and what did it
say to the Department of Defense and to the Army and to the other units
that were there about their knowledge about what was stored at these
various sites.
This is one of those situations where knowledge may not have been
shared in a timely way, and there was destruction of some of these
weapons, and I am not sure we still, even to this day, know exactly
what all those weapons were. I am worried that this goes beyond just
chemical weapons; that we may have had biological or other infectious
agents that were released on our own people. And whether it was done by
the Iraqis or it was done in our destroying these weapons, there are a
lot of unanswered questions.
I think one of the big problems here is the Department of Defense did
such a lousy job of investigating this thing initially that it created
suspicion everywhere. We had all these veterans coming home with these
various symptoms and it just did not add up, and the Department's
continued denial after denial after denial, and then finally having to
say, oh yes, we may have made a big mistake here and there may have
been something that actually happened, is one of the reasons why there
is such suspicion, not only on the part of Members of Congress but on
the part of the American people, about what actually happened over
there.
That is why I insisted with Mr. Deutch that the Inspector General,
Fred Hintz, out at the CIA, would do the investigation. I did not want
the CIA, in essence, investigating itself. I wanted the independent
Inspector General of the CIA tasked for this.
So I think what this study does is expand upon that, and I think it
does get the information that my colleague wants sooner by making the
date August. I am certainly glad it is on her birthday. I hope the
report is something that she will find joyous. And hopefully this is
not a report we will all be embarrassed about, and I hope it is not.
The bottom line here is I think the chairman has crafted a good
compromise. I would like to see us accept it and then move on to the
next amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the
gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCollum].
Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I simply want to rise first of all to
support the substitute amendment. I think what the chairman of the
committee has offered is a perfectly logical proposal, and that is that
the Inspector General report, after a review, what knowledge the
Central Intelligence Agency had about the presence of the use of
chemical weapons in the Persian Gulf theater during the course of the
war over there.
I am, however, very disturbed by the language that was in the
underlying amendment, and I do want to point this out. I think it needs
to be reiterated. There is not a shred of evidence that I know of,
anywhere in my tenure in looking at this matter, and I have been
involved as a member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
looking into this matter for some time now, that would support the idea
that we need a study, which the language of this original underlying
amendment said, a study concerning the Central Intelligence Agency's
involvement in the use of chemical weapons by enemy forces against
armed forces of the United States during the Persian Gulf War.
The insinuation or the implication, not that they knew something
about the chemical weapons or that they had some knowledge in the
efforts that were going on over there to destroy those weapons, but
that they, the CIA, was involved in some way supporting the use of
those weapons, involved in the use of those weapons by our enemies, by
our enemies, is outrageous in my opinion. And I do not appreciate the
underlying premise here.
So I think the substitute is terribly important, and I am
appreciative of the fact the gentlewoman is willing to accept the
substitute because, as I said, there is no shred of evidence whatsoever
anywhere that our intelligence community in any way aided or abetted
the enemy, which the implication, whether she intended it or not, is
there in the underlying amendment.
So I am very supportive of this substitute, I urge its adoption, and
I wanted the Record to be very clear that our men and women, as far as
I can determine, as long as the eye can see, operating for our
intelligence community, have been honorable supporters of the American
cause and patriots. Whether we agree with everything they do or do not
do, certainly they have not been working for the enemy.
Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire of how much time I have
remaining?
The CHAIRMAN. The gentlewoman from California [Ms. Waters] has 10\1/
2\ minutes remaining, and the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] has 21
minutes remaining.
Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume,
because I think it is important to point out that not only did I accept
the gentleman from Florida's substitute amendment, but I also offered,
prior to that acceptance, an explanation of the wording that the other
gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCollum] now is trying to latch on to in
order to in some way imply that I made accusations unfairly.
If I had not accepted the substitute, perhaps he could do that kind
of spinning. But the fact that I accepted the substitute explains very
clearly, and in a way that cannot be misunderstood, what I am doing and
why I am doing it, and that I congratulated them for embracing me, I
think, does away with that kind of specious argument.
Certainly it is honorable for Members of this House, elected by the
people, to come to this floor and raise the questions, no matter how
hard they are, no matter how unpopular they are, no matter how
difficult they are. And oftentimes when that is done, it is
misunderstood by people who do not have the guts or the nerve to do
that themselves. And sometimes it is embarrassing to take this floor
and kind of push and nudge people into doing what they should be doing
anyway. I understand that. But there comes a time when we need to do
that.
I chose this moment, at this time, on this legislation to make an
issue of what had happened in the Persian Gulf. I chose at this time,
at this moment to point out that 20,000 of our soldiers were at risk.
No matter whether it was intended or not, it happened. I chose at this
time to demand more information, to share with the public, to demand an
investigation so that we could have in writing something that people
could pick up and read and know where we are going and what we are
doing. I chose to do that because I think that is my responsibility and
I do feel strongly about this.
So we can spin it any way we want, we can define it any way we want,
but

[[Page H4994]]

I know what I have said and I know what I am doing and I am pleased
that the gentleman has joined with me to do it, no matter how much he
may not have liked the fact that I brought it, no matter how much the
gentleman may not have liked the fact that I raised the kinds of
questions that are oftentimes embarrassing. None of us like to think
that we invest so much in our intelligence community to have those
kinds of terrible costly mistakes.
Having said all of that, Mr. Chairman, the bottom line is we move
forward with the substitute amendment that I have embraced. And,
hopefully, this is a bipartisan concern, a bipartisan effort to do the
right thing, to focus the attention on what happened there, get the
answers that we can get and then move to make sure that it does not
happen again.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
Ms. WATERS. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.

{time} 2015

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I think that we ought to accept what the
gentlewoman from California [Ms. Waters] has said here. She is willing
to accept this compromise. I would like to see this be a bipartisan
study supported on both sides of the aisle, and I would urge that we
all yield back our time and have a vote and move forward.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, we are prepared to yield back. We have no
further speakers on this subject at this time, and as long as we
understand that this satisfies the full unanimous-consent request we
had for the 30 minutes on either side and includes my substitute
amendment, and that is the issue we will be voting on first, we are
prepared to yield back.
Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I am prepared to yield back my time. I
thank the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] for joining with me in this
very special and important effort.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] to the amendment offered by the
gentlewoman from California [Ms. Waters].
The amendment to the amendment was agreed to.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentlewoman from California [Ms. Waters], as amended.
The amendment, as amended, was agreed to.
The CHAIRMAN. Are there further amendments to title III?

Amendment No. 7 Offered by Ms. Waters

Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I offer amendment No. 7.
The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment No. 7 offered by Ms. Waters:

Page 10, after line 15, insert the following new section:

SEC. 306. CLANDESTINE DRUG STUDY COMMISSION.

(a) Establishment.--There is established a commission to be
known as the ``Clandestine Drug Study Commission'' (in this
section referred to as the ``Commission'').
(b) Duties.--The Commission shall--
(1) secure the expeditious disclosure of public records
relevant to the smuggling and distribution of illegal drugs
into and within the United States by the Central Intelligence
Agency or others on their behalf or associated with the
Central Intelligence Agency;
(2) report on the steps necessary to eradicate any Central
Intelligence Agency involvement with drugs or those
identified by Federal law enforcement agencies as drug
smugglers; and
(3) recommend appropriate criminal sanctions for the
involvement of Central Intelligence Agency employees involved
in drug trafficking or the failure of such employees to
report their superiors (or other appropriate supervisory
officials) knowledge of drug smuggling into or within the
United States.
(c) Membership.--The Commission shall be comprised of nine
members appointed by the Attorney General of the United
States for the life of the Commission. Members shall obtain a
security clearance as a condition of appointment. Members may
not be current or former officers or employees of the United
States.
(d) Compensation.--Members of the Commission shall serve
without pay but shall each be entitled to receive travel
expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, in
accordance with sections 5702 and 5703 of title 5, United
States Code.
(e) Quorum.--A majority of the Members of the Commission
shall constitute a quorum.
(f) Chairperson; Vice Chairperson.--The Chairperson and
Vice Chairperson of the Commission shall be elected by the
members of the Commission.
(g) Obtaining Official Data.--The Commission may secure
directly from any department or agency of the United States
information necessary to enable it to carry out this section.
Upon request of the Chairperson or Vice Chairperson of the
Commission, the head of that department or agency shall
furnish that information to the Commission.
(h) Subpoena Power.--
(1) In general.--The Commission may issue subpoenas
requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the
production of any evidence relating to any matter which the
Commission is empowered to investigate by this section. The
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence may be
required from any place within the United States at any
designated place of hearing within the United States
(2) Failure to obey a subpoena.--If a person refuses to
obey a subpoena issued under paragraph (1), the Commission
may apply to a United States district court for an order
requiring that person to appear before the Commission to give
testimony, produce evidence, or both, relating to the matter
under investigation. The application may be made within the
judicial district where the hearing is conducted or where
that person is found, resides, or transacts business. Any
failure to obey the order of the court may be punished by the
court as civil contempt.
(3) Service of subpoenas.--The subpoenas of the Commission
shall be served in the manner provided for subpoenas issued
by a United States district court under the Federal Rules of
Civil procedure for the United States district courts.
(4) Service of process.--All process of any court to which
application is to be made under paragraph (2) may be served
in the judicial district in which the person required to be
served resides or may be found.
(i) Immunity.--The Commission is an agency of the United
States for the purpose of part V of title 18, United States
Code (relating to immunity of witnesses). Except as provided
in this subsection, a person may not be excused from
testifying or from producing evidence pursuant to a subpoena
on the ground that the testimony or evidence required by the
subpoena may tend to incriminate or subject that person to
criminal prosecution. A person, after having claimed the
privilege against self-incrimination, may not be criminally
prosecuted by reason of any transaction, matter, or thing
which that person is compelled to testify about or produce
evidence relating to, except that the person may be
prosecuted for perjury committed during the testimony or made
in the evidence.
(j) Contract Authority.--The Commission may enter into and
perform such contracts, leases, cooperative agreements, and
other transactions as may be necessary in the conduct of the
functions of the Commission with any public agency or with
any person.
(k) Report.--The Commission shall transmit a report to the
President, Attorney General of the United States, and the
Congress not later than three years after the date of the
enactment of this Act. The report shall contain a detailed
statement of the findings and conclusions of the Commission,
together with its recommendations for such legislation and
administrative actions as the Commission considers
appropriate.
(l) Termination.--The Commission shall terminate on upon
the submission of report pursuant to subsection (k).
(m) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated $750,000 to carry out this section.

Modification to Amendment No. 7 Offered by Ms. Waters

Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to modify the
amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the modification.
The Clerk read as follows:

Modification to amendment No. 7 offered by Ms. Waters of
California:
In subsection (h), strike paragraphs (2), (3), and (4), and
strike ``(1) In General.--''.
Strike subsection (i) and redesignate subsections (j), (k),
(l), and (m) as subsections (i), (j), (k), and (l),
respectively.
In subsection (k) (as so redesignated), strike ``subsection
(k)'' and insert ``subsection (j)''.

[[Page H4995]]

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman
from California?
Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, I would
like to know from the gentlewoman, if she can explain, is the
modification designed to correct the germaneness problem with the
underlying amendment?
Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. McCOLLUM. I yield to the gentlewoman from California.
Ms. WATERS. Yes, it is, Mr. Chairman. I was advised that any
reference to ``immunity'' would not be appropriate in this legislation,
and it is designed to delete all references to ``immunity'' in this
amendment.
Mr. McCOLLUM. And is it further my understanding from the
gentlewoman, if I might continue the reservation, that the agreement
would be that she would have the 1-hour time limit that we have agreed
upon to apply to this? I believe that is the Chair's understanding of
this, regardless of the modification, is that not correct, 30 minutes
to a side? Or is it 15 to a side? What is the time limit, Mr. Chairman?
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would inform the gentleman that under the
previous order of the House, the gentlewoman from California [Ms.
Waters] is entitled to 30 minutes and a Member opposed thereto is
entitled to 30 minutes.
Mr. McCOLLUM. And that would be applicable, Mr. Chairman, to this
modification if the unanimous consent is agreed to?
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman is correct.
Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my reservation of objection.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the modification offered by the
gentlewoman from California [Ms. Waters]?
There was no objection.
The CHAIRMAN. The amendment is modified.
Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my reservation of a point of
order.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Florida withdraws his point of
order.
The gentlewoman from California [Ms. Waters] is recognized for 30
minutes.
Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I offer this amendment to establish a clandestine drug
study commission. This commission would be composed of nine members
appointed by the U.S. Attorney General and would be required to report
on the following:
Report on the steps necessary to eradicate any CIA involvement with
drugs or those identified by Federal law enforcement agencies as drug
smugglers.
No. 2, secure disclosure or the gathering of Government public
records relevant to the smuggling and distribution of illegal drugs
into and within the United States by the CIA or others on their behalf
or associated with the CIA.
In addition, my amendment would authorize funds to be appropriated in
the amount of $750,000.
Mr. Chairman and Members, I am sure there are those both within this
House and within the sound of my voice who would wonder why would we
need such an amendment, why would I take this floor and talk about
taking steps to make sure that the CIA is not involved in drugs or drug
smuggling.
Mr. Chairman, I do this because over the past year I have learned
more than I have ever wanted to know about the CIA and drugs. How did
it get started? It got started with a revelation about drug smuggling
and drug trafficking that ended up in South Central Los Angeles back in
the 1980's.
Oh, there has been a lot of controversy about the report. Many are
aware that the San Jose Mercury News revealed that there was a drug
ring and the basic points of that report remain uncontested. There are
some points in the report that are contested. For example, the report
said that as a result of the drug trafficking, millions of dollars were
funneled to the Contras from the sale of drugs, crack cocaine in
particular.
The exception that was taken to that identification simply was an
exception that said instead of saying millions of dollars, they should
have said they estimated there were millions of dollars. I can accept
that. I maintain there should not have been $1 from the sale of drugs
to support the Contras.
But this revelation got me involved, and I have spent a lot of time
looking at the CIA and the allegations of their involvement in drug
trafficking in south central Los Angeles. It has taken me to many
places, all the way to Nicaragua, where I have gone up to a place
called Grenada and interviewed a prisoner who is well known to have
been connected with the Cali cartel and sold drugs both for the
Sandanistas and the Contras.
Since my visit there, I made it known to the Inspector General, who
is involved in an investigation, and the Inspector General further has
sought out information from this individual. Even members of the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence fold followed me to
Nicaragua and interviewed the same person that had been revealed to me.
But that is just a small part of the information that has come to me.
As a result of my involvement, a lot of things have happened. The
sheriff's department of the county of Los Angeles filed an extensive
report about many of the allegations. The investigations continue.
The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence is involved. The
Inspector General of the CIA, the Inspector General of the Justice
Department, they are still doing interviews, and I do not know what is
going to happen. Hopefully there will be a report. Hopefully there will
be hearings. But I have learned enough to know that the CIA has come
too close, rubbed shoulders with, and been involved in some ways that
should make us all uncomfortable, with drug dealers.
Mr. Chairman, I have been involved for a long time and taken a closer
look at the Central Intelligence Agency and these allegations that CIA
operatives or assets have been involved in or had knowledge of drug
trafficking in the United States. I mention South Central Los Angeles,
but one need look no further than the current newspaper to find there
are recent occasions of CIA involvement with drugs.
Let us look at Venezuela. Earlier this year, there was a general
named Gen. Ramon Guillen Davila, Venezuela's former drug czar, who was
indicted by Federal prosecutors in Miami for smuggling cocaine into the
United States.
And according to the New York Times, uncontested by the CIA, this
article that appeared as early as November 1993, they talked about the
CIA and its so-called antidrug program in Venezuela and guess what?
They concluded, and it is documented, that our CIA shipped a ton of
nearly pure cocaine into the United States in 1990. That is a fact,
uncontested.
When you unravel this story, you find that the CIA concocted some
scheme to talk about the only way it could apprehend drug dealers was
to get involved in shipping this cocaine and selling this cocaine. They
went to the DEA to get their permission to do it, and the DEA turned
them down flat and said they would not be involved in this scheme in
any shape, form, or fashion.
But the CIA defied the DEA and they shipped this pure cocaine into
the United States in 1990, and they have since acknowledged that they
defied the laws of this government and allowed the drugs to be sold on
the streets of the United States of America. I challenge anybody to
tell me that it did not happen, because it is documented.
Now let me tell you what unnerves me about this. We spend a lot of
money in this House, we spend a lot of money in this Government to
apprehend drug dealers, to try to get rid of drug trafficking. We spend
a lot of money on drug education and prevention. We even spend money on
alternative crop development in countries that we want to get out of
the business of raising the coca leaf. We spend billions of the
taxpayers' dollars.
Knowing this and being involved in this struggle, it really unnerves
me to find out that my own CIA brought cocaine into the United States
and allowed it to get on the streets and be sold. Do you know what that
means? We are representing communities

[[Page H4996]]

where drugs are devastating our communities. People are becoming
addicted. Oh, and it is not simply in inner cities, it is in rural
communities, it is in suburbia, it is everything, everywhere. It is
swallowing us up.
I do not know what kind of cockamamie scheme they could have cooked
up to talk about this would help them to apprehend drug dealers by
allowing drugs to be sold on the streets of the United States of
America. How many more people became addicted? How many more people got
involved in crime? How many more people became a part of the
destruction that we all hate so much? I do not like it and I am not
going to get off this business about who they are and what they do and
their involvement with drugs until this body has the guts and the
nerves to do something about it.

{time} 2030

The joint CIA/Venezuela force was headed by General Davila and the
ranking CIA officer, I am going to call the names, was Mark McFarlin,
who worked with the antiguerrilla forces in El Salvador in the 1980's.
Not one CIA official has ever been indicted or prosecuted for this
abuse of authority. I will give it to my colleagues again. General
Davila and Mark McFarlin. Look it up.
What happened? Why can we not ask the questions? Why are we not
outraged that these drugs found their way into our cities?
Let me go a little bit further and talk about this alignment, this
association, the CIA being involved, coming too close to people who
traffic in drugs. In a March 8, 1997, Los Angeles Times article, it was
reported that Lt. Col. Michel Francois, one of the CIA's Haitian
agents, and I defy anybody to tell me he was not, a former army officer
and a key leader in the military regime that ran Haiti between 1991 and
1994, he was indicted in Miami and charged with smuggling 33 tons of
cocaine into the United States. The article detailed that Francois met
face to face with the leaders of three Colombian cartels to arrange for
drug shipments to pass through Haiti via a private airstrip that he
helped to build and protect. The CIA was right there in Haiti while he
was building this airstrip. He was trained by the CIA. Francois is the
CIA's boy.
Lieutenant Colonel Francois was trained by the U.S. Army in military
command training for foreign officers in Georgia. He was a senior
member of the Service Intelligence Agency, a Haitian intelligence
organization founded with the help of the CIA in 1986.
After the 1991 coup put Francois in power, the cocaine seizures in
Haiti just plummeted to near zero. He could do whatever he wanted to
do. He built a strip. He met with the cartels. All of this is in DEA
reports. U.S. prosecutors have requested the extradition of Francois
from Honduras, where he has been living under a grant of political
asylum. When I tell my colleagues our own CIA is documented as having
brought cocaine in, in the Venezuelan fiasco, and when I tell my
colleagues that Francois is a creation of the CIA and that the
apprehension of drugs and drug smuggling and trafficking went down once
he took charge, I am accusing the CIA of being too close, of being too
involved, for turning its head.
Mr. Chairman, let me just wrap up my comments by saying I have
pointed out today on several occasions some of the problems with the
Central Intelligence Agency. I have pointed out the fact that some of
our allies and our friends around the world have been sending us this
quiet but stern message. They are asking us to leave. I have talked
about something that none of us are proud of, the fact that there is a
breakdown in this agency and we have people that we pay to protect and
serve literally endangering us all with the selling of information. I
have pointed out that not only do we have all of this occurring, but
that our own soldiers were put at risk because something is wrong in
this CIA. I am disturbed that we could not get much support in trying
to slap them on the wrist, cut the budget just a little bit, but I am
convinced that the American people will join us in the struggle because
this is a struggle and a battle that we are going to have to wage for a
long time.
I am not accusing the Members who have taken this floor in efforts to
protect the CIA. I understand. There are responsible Members of this
House who really believe, despite the problems of the CIA, everything
should be done to protect them, to make sure they have all the money
they need to operate with, that somehow if we question them, we are
going to put at risk their ability to gather the intelligence
information we need.
We need to redefine the role of the CIA in this post-cold-war era.
Who are they and what do they do? Someone pointed out to me today that
in every aspect of our society, with the new technology we have been
able to reduce personnel, we have been able to put in systems and
processes to better manage information, we have been able to reduce
cost, and many on the opposite side of the aisle have made these
arguments time and time again as they have gone about cutting and
redesigning and privatizing and all of those things that we hear about
on the floor.
Why is it the CIA escapes any of this? Why has the new technology not
caught up with the CIA? Why can we not shine the light in ways that we
understand, where the money is going? Why can we not redesign the ways
in which we relate to them and still respect some of the secrecy and
privacy that is needed?
I say to my colleagues, today I have been afforded the opportunity to
take this floor and talk about this issue in the hopes that we can
focus, we can really put this on our radar screen and begin to raise
questions and get the American public involved in raising questions. I
hope that this debate will allow that.
I am under no illusions about everything that I want being embraced
by the protectors of the CIA, right or wrong. But I know one thing:
This platform that is afforded to me by the voters on this floor of
Congress is an important tool to be used to create a discussion. I see
my responsibility to create discussions that maybe others will not. I
am not afraid of the CIA, I am not going to run from the CIA, I am not
going to tuck my tail and duck my head and talk about their
untouchables. This day we unveiled some of the problems, along with
other Members who have taken this floor.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the gentlewoman's
amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] is recognized for
30 minutes.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from California [Mr. Dixon].
Mr. DIXON. I thank the chairman of the committee for yielding me this
time.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in reluctant opposition to the Waters amendment,
reluctant for several reasons. The gentlewoman from California [Ms.
Waters] is the chairman of our Congressional Black Caucus. She
represents a community that I represent, Los Angeles County, cities in
that community, but probably most importantly because I think we, both
of us, as well as most Members of this House, are seeking accurate and
truthful information as it relates to the CIA involvement in crack
cocaine in Los Angeles, or any other community of this country, and any
involvement it has had with members or assets of the community in
either aiding or abetting or having knowledge of the CIA involvement in
the distribution of drugs.
The reason I rise in opposition to it, this commission that is being
offered here as an amendment suggests that the process that we have
here is either not operating in good faith or is broken. As most of the
Members know, the inspector generals of the CIA and the Justice
Department are investigating this matter at this point in time. Both
gentlemen have reputations for not only being independent but calling
it like it is, and I doubt if anyone here feels that if they find some
wrongdoing or some culpability on the part of the CIA that in fact they
will not include it in their reports.

It has been my experience as a member of the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence that no member of that committee is an
apologist or tries to represent the interests of the CIA, but as the
gentlewoman from California [Ms. Waters] does, represents the

[[Page H4997]]

interests of the citizens of this country. And so I stand here not as
an apologist for the CIA, but with the same goal that the gentlewoman
from California [Ms. Waters] has, to get to the facts in this matter.
Mr. Chairman, we all know that facts that are suggested or alluded to
in newspaper articles, there may be some truth to them, they may be
entirely true, or they may be entirely untrue. But I think it is the
responsibility of the House and the inspector generals to take the
first cut at sorting out those facts.
The gentlewoman from California [Ms. Waters] is right, that other
than the publisher of the San Jose Mercury, no one has contested the
points made in the article. No one has contested those points at this
point in time because factually no one knows exactly what has occurred.
This committee is about verifying facts in that report. I daresay we
would be derelict if we came to the House on a bit-by-bit basis to
either sanction what was in the article or criticize it, the point
being that the investigations, if they are to go forward, will come to
some conclusions about the validity of the arguments and the points
made in the article.
As it relates to the CIA and drug trafficking, I can say that I think
the CIA has made some terrible blunders in the past. I do not think
that there is anyone here that would deny that. But the issue before us
is whether or not they were either involved in trafficking by aiding
and abetting, or knew of, had knowledge of, drug traffickers.
The reports that I have read thus far do not lead me to that
conclusion at this point in time. Let me say that again: The reports
that I have read thus far do not lead me to that conclusion at this
point in time.
I have read the newspaper articles, I have read other materials and
interviewed people, and at some point in time I may be joining the
gentlewoman from California [Ms. Waters] on this floor asking for some
type of public commission. But now is not the time, I suggest to the
members of this committee. Now is the time to let the structure of the
Justice Department, the CIA inspector general and the House to move
forward in an objective evaluation.
I am not naive enough to think whatever this committee finds and
whatever the Inspector Generals find, that in fact there will be a
consensus opinion. And if there is not a consensus opinion and there is
fault to be found with either a lack of thoroughness or professionalism
or even covering up, that would be the time to move forward with some
commission. I have reservations about the composition of the commission
and some of the structure, but I am sure that the gentlewoman from
California [Ms. Waters] and I at the appropriate time could work that
out.
For example, there is a prohibition in here that any employee of the
U.S. Government, past or present, could not be a member of that
commission. I think that there are many people who have been employed
by the U.S. Government who have expertise and abilities that could
appropriately serve on the commission, and I would feel it is certainly
insulting to say that anyone who has ever worked for Government could
not be objective in this issue.
As it relates to the issue of people who have been assets of the CIA,
whether they be in Venezuela or Haiti, there is no doubt that some of
the assets should never have been employed by the CIA. There is no
doubt that some of them have been involved in drug trafficking. But
that is like saying some Member of Congress being arrested for drugs,
that the Congress of the United States is responsible for it.

{time} 2045

Let us sort through the facts without emotion. Then let people come
forward and criticize the report, scrub it, examine it, and then at
that point in time I may be joining the gentlewoman from California
[Ms. Waters] on some outside citizens panel to review that material and
to carry the investigation forward, but now is not the time.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire as to how much time I have
remaining?
The CHAIRMAN. The gentlewoman from California [Ms. Waters] has 12\1/
2\ minutes remaining, and the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] has 16
minutes remaining.
Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, let me just say that I hold the gentleman from
California [Mr. Dixon] in the highest esteem and respect, and I have
worked with him, and we do share this area of Los Angeles where the
drug trafficking took place, where the CIA is alleged to have been
deeply involved in trafficking in drugs and the profits of which, some
of them, went to fund the contras, the contras having been created by
the CIA. That was their body, and the FDN, the army of the contras, was
a creation of the CIA's.
And I am working to get to the bottom of this, but my commission that
I am asking for is not only about that. This is more generic, and it
encompasses the question of drug trafficking, period, by the CIA.
And I would like to raise a question of the gentleman from California
[Mr. Dixon] so that I can help make a determination about his
representations regarding the investigations that are going on and the
possibility that he may join me, depending on what he has discovered or
they discovered as a result of the House intelligence investigation.
Has the gentleman's committee investigated the Venezuelan dope
dealing of the CIA where I have in no uncertain terms identified on the
floor of Congress the fact that they were responsible for tons of
cocaine coming into the United States that got sold on the streets of
America? Has the gentleman done anything about that? Has he looked at
that?
Mr. DIXON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
Ms. WATERS. I yield to the gentleman from California.
Mr. DIXON. Mr Chairman, yes, there has been testimony before the
committee. There has not been a thorough investigation, but there has
been testimony before the committee by the CIA.
The CIA, as I recall their testimony, one, denied that they ever
approved it because they recognized that in fact it would be hard to
trace once it got into the United States and also DEA rejected it.
It is true that this man was an operative in form at some point in
time with the CIA, but they deny ever having approved or sanctioned
this activity, and this activity, according to them, was taken on
independently by the general.
Ms. WATERS. May I ask of the gentleman whether or not there has been
any report on it, and since this exposure was given to this in the New
York Times, we have not seen a response of any kind, we have not seen
the work of the gentleman's committee answering this in any way.
Mr. Chairman, we cannot have the New York Times or any other
newspaper documenting and court records documenting trafficking in
cocaine by the CIA and CIA operatives, and we just sit mum and not tell
the American public anything.
So is there a report on this in any way? If there is no report, would
the gentleman be willing to issue some kind of report between him and
the chairman? Could the gentleman from California make some
representation about what he will be willing to do, given we know this
information about drug trafficking by the CIA?
Mr. DIXON. Yes. The staff informs me that in fact there has been a
report to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence by the
inspector general, and I am sure with certain permission that the
gentlewoman from California could review that report. But I will
indicate to her since she has raised it and created the inference that
the CIA was involved, I feel duty obligated to go forward and look at
this once again.
Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, yes, let me be clear about this one, and I
do not go this far even in the South L.A. one. I am accusing the CIA on
this one based on the information that I have of having been
responsible for tons of cocaine coming into the United States that got
sold on the streets of America. That is an accusation that I am making
clear, simple, and without any reservations.
So what I am saying to the gentleman:
It is not enough for me to see the report. What can we do to share
this information with the American public? Is

[[Page H4998]]

there anything that can be done to shed some light on this?
Mr. DIXON. If the gentlewoman will continue to yield, first of all I
think that it would be good for her to read the report.
Ms. WATERS. I will do that.
Mr. DIXON. So that the CIA's perspective on this is there, and
perhaps the committee chairman or others, since this issue has been
raised that the report can be scrubbed and that some materials could be
released; but I do think, Mr. Chairman, that we have a responsibility
with the charge made just on the floor that the CIA was responsible for
the Venezuelan drug transaction, to either refute or make some
statement about this based upon an investigation in the materials that
we have already collected. I think that is a very serious allegation.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield to me?
Ms. WATERS. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
Mr. GOSS. As far as I am concerned, if the gentlewoman has some new
information that is additional or supplemental or complementary to any
of the previous work that has been done on this, that she would bring
it to the committee's attention, that we will obviously attend to it
forthwith. My understanding is that there has been some work done on
this; I do not know the exact status, because we are dealing with
somewhat of a new subject that is just a little bit off the record here
of what I thought we were talking about, but I am certainly willing, as
we have been all along the way on this, with the gentlewoman, with the
gentleman from California [Mr. Dixon], and as seen with the gentlewoman
from California [Ms. Millender-McDonald] earlier in our colloquy.
Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I do not want to be snowed, I do not want
to be patronized, I do not want to be talked to in that way. I have
asked. I have made an accusation on the floor of Congress about the CIA
and the Venezuelan drug deal, and I am asking the gentleman based on
the information that he has, is there any way that he can shed some
light or share this information with the American public?
I want to know.
Mr. GOSS. If the gentlewoman will continue to yield, the gentlewoman
is referring, I think, to events that transpired before I was
privileged to be on this committee, and that is why, since I had no
forewarning that that was going to be a subject today, I am simply not
prepared to give her any specific information.
I am certainly welcome to assure that we will attend to her request
to see if there is anything into it, as we would with any Member who
brings forward that type of a serious allegation.
Ms. WATERS. Could the gentleman be a little bit clearer about what it
is he is committing to? The gentleman said he would attend to it. Could
the gentleman tell me how he can satisfy the concerns that I have
raised, and I am not being facetious at this point, but I have made a
specific charge, and I am asking the gentleman, even though he was not
the Chair, the records did not leave with the last Chair; I want to
know what can the gentleman do to shed some light on this information?
Mr. DIXON. If the gentlewoman will yield and if I could suggest to
the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss], one, that a lot of this
evidentiary material will come out in the trial. As I understand, he is
on trial in Florida. Second, I do think, Mr. Chairman, we have an
obligation to go back and look at the inspector general's report, and,
as I recall it, it did not in any way involve the CIA and the
transportation or distribution of the drugs that the gentleman is being
charged with.
But this is a very serious accusation that the gentlewoman from
California [Ms. Waters] is making, and I want to emphasize it. She is
alleging that the CIA was involved with the Venezuelan general in
bringing drugs into the country. I assume that means either aiding,
abetting, or being a sponsor of those drugs.
Ms. WATERS. That is right.
Mr. DIXON. And I think that we have a responsibility to, once again,
go back and look at this case, notwithstanding the prosecution that is
going on in Florida and notwithstanding what the inspector general has
said.
Ms. WATERS. And also would the gentleman add to this discussion
whether or not the former drug czar who worked with the CIA is going to
be extradited for this case? Is there an extradition problem?
Mr. GOSS. If the gentlewoman will yield to me, I presume these
questions are being directed to me.
Ms. WATERS. The gentleman from Florida or anybody else who can answer
that.
Mr. GOSS. Let me clearly tell the gentlewoman that I have tremendous
respect for the gentleman from California [Mr. Dixon], and I think Mr.
Dixon has said exactly the right thing.
The specific facts that the gentlewoman is basing her allegation on,
I would like to know what they are. I will then deal with those facts,
and I will advise the gentlewoman of relevant information, and the
gentleman from California [Mr. Dixon] will be part of that process, as
he has been, because he has been doing stellar service for our
committee on this matter in Los Angeles because it is clearly part of
his representation.
Ms. WATERS. The gentleman from California [Mr. Dixon] said that he
felt a responsibility to answer my charge. What the gentleman from
Florida is saying is if I can bring him more information----
Mr. GOSS. No, I am saying, if the gentlewoman will continue to yield,
I will be very happy to join Mr. Dixon in responding as exactly as he
has done. But it would be helpful to me to know all of the details of
what the gentlewoman knows.
I take very seriously, living in Florida, which is not unlike the
problem in California, of drug smuggling and the impact we see on our
streets. We have a problem. We are not insensitive to this, I assure my
colleague, and I assure her that there are unfolding events every
minute in the war on drugs, every minute, and the intelligence part of
that we are attending to. We are committing dollars, and we hope we
have the gentlewoman's support for our budget for those dollars.
Ms. WATERS. Oh, no. I have been to every budget committee, every
appropriations committee where there are appropriations for drugs to
talk about the Black Caucus' No. 1 priority of eradicating drugs in
this Nation. It is not only our No. 1 priority, we have come, we have
testified before the committees, we have supported the drug czar, we
have supported the President's budget, we have even asked for more
money, and we have come up with ways by which to work closer with the
drug czar on this issue.
So we are serious about this, but let me just say this:
Given my friend and my colleague's representations, along with the
gentleman from Florida, about feeling a responsibility to respond to
the very serious accusation that I have made here today, I accept that
as not only a representation for himself, but for him and others, and
the committee; and even though we are clear that my bringing forth new
information is not a condition for his moving forward, if I have or can
locate new information, I will be happy to work with the gentleman on
it. But I do expect that this commitment on the House of the floor that
has been made about shedding light per the gentleman from California
[Mr. Dixon] and supported by the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] is
something that we can rely on.
So let me just say this:
My colleague whom I have worked with not just since I came to
Congress 6 years ago, but about 30 years now, having served with him in
the State of California in the assembly and prior to that when I
managed campaigns and all of that, I accept----
The CHAIRMAN. All time of the gentlewoman from California [Ms.
Waters] has expired.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I am very happy to yield 1 more minute to the
gentlewoman from California to wrap up.
Ms. WATERS. I thought when the gentleman heard the word ``accept'' he
would be generous, and I thank him very much.
I accept his representations that these investigations are going on
now, and I know that. And I do think that perhaps it is a little
premature, and maybe that is something we will do after if, in fact, we
do not believe that the information is credible, the work

[[Page H4999]]

has been good, or we learn more about it.

{time} 2100

I do think that that would be the correct order of things. Today
provided us with the opportunity to shed more light, to get something
moving. I accept that he rejects, he does not accept, my amendment. He
believes the commission is premature. He will work with me. I will work
with the gentleman, I will work with the other gentlemen, and everyone
else.
Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to withdraw my amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman
from California?
There was no objection.
The CHAIRMAN. Are there further amendments to title III of the bill?
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the remainder of
the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute be considered as
read and printed in the Record.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from
Florida?
There was no objection.
The text of the remainder of the committee amendment in the nature of
a substitute is as follows:
TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SEC. 401. MULTIYEAR LEASING AUTHORITY.

(a) In General.--Section 5 of the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949 is amended--
(1) by redesignating paragraphs (a) through (f) as
paragraphs (1) through (6), respectively;
(2) by inserting ``(a)'' after ``Sec. 5.'';
(3) by striking ``and'' at the end of paragraph (5), as so
redesignated;
(4) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (6), as
so redesignated, and inserting ``; and'';
(5) by inserting after paragraph (6) the following new
paragraph:
``(7) Notwithstanding section 1341(a)(1) of title 31,
United States Code, enter into multiyear leases for up to 15
years that are not otherwise authorized pursuant to section 8
of this Act.''; and
(6) by inserting at the end the following new subsection:
``(b)(1) The authority to enter into a multiyear lease
under subsection (a)(7) shall be subject to appropriations
provided in advance for (A) the entire lease, or (B) the
first 12 months of the lease and the Government's estimated
termination liability.
``(2) In the case of any such lease entered into under
clause (B) of paragraph (1)--
``(A) such lease shall include a clause that provides that
the contract shall be terminated if budget authority (as
defined by section 3(2) of the Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 622(2))) is not
provided specifically for that project in an appropriations
Act in advance of an obligation of funds in respect thereto;
``(B) notwithstanding section 1552 of title 31, United
States Code, amounts obligated for paying termination costs
in respect of such lease shall remain available until the
costs associated with termination of such lease are paid;
``(C) funds available for termination liability shall
remain available to satisfy rental obligations in respect of
such lease in subsequent fiscal years in the event such lease
is not terminated early, but only to the extent those funds
are in excess of the amount of termination liability in that
subsequent year; and
``(D) annual funds made available in any fiscal year may be
used to make payments on such lease for a maximum of 12
months beginning any time during the fiscal year.''.
(b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a)
applies with respect to multiyear leases entered into
pursuant to section 5 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act
of 1949, as amended by subsection (a), on or after October 1,
1997.

SEC. 402. CIA CENTRAL SERVICES PROGRAM.

The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a
et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new
section:

``central services program

``Sec. 21. (a) Establishment.--The Director may--
``(1) establish a program to provide the central services
described in subsection (b)(2); and
``(2) make transfers to and expenditures from the working
capital fund established under subsection (b)(1).
``(b) Establishment and Purposes of Central Services
Working Capital Fund.--(1) There is established a central
services working capital fund. The Fund shall be available
until expended for the purposes described in paragraph (2),
subject to subsection (j).
``(2) The purposes of the Fund are to pay for equipment,
salaries, maintenance, operation and other expenses for such
services as the Director, subject to paragraph (3),
determines to be central services that are appropriate and
advantageous to provide to the Agency or to other Federal
agencies on a reimbursable basis.
``(3) The determination and provision of central services
by the Director of Central Intelligence under paragraph (2)
shall be subject to the prior approval of the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget.
``(c) Assets in Fund.--The Fund shall consist of money and
assets, as follows:
``(1) Amounts appropriated to the Fund for its initial
monetary capitalization.
``(2) Appropriations available to the Agency under law for
the purpose of supplementing the Fund.
``(3) Such inventories, equipment, and other assets,
including inventories and equipment on order, pertaining to
the services to be carried on by the central services
program.
``(4) Such other funds as the Director is authorized to
transfer to the Fund.
``(d) Limitations.--(1) The total value of orders for
services described in subsection (b)(2) from the central
services program at any time shall not exceed an annual
amount approved in advance by the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget.
``(2) No goods or services may be provided to any non-
Federal entity by the central services program.
``(e) Reimbursements to Fund.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, the Fund shall be--
``(1) reimbursed, or credited with advance payments, from
applicable appropriations and funds of the Agency, other
Intelligence Community agencies, or other Federal agencies,
for the central services performed by the central services
program, at rates that will recover the full cost of
operations paid for from the Fund, including accrual of
annual leave, workers' compensation, depreciation of
capitalized plant and equipment, and amortization of
automated data processing software; and
``(2) if applicable credited with the receipts from sale or
exchange of property, including any real property, or in
payment for loss or damage to property, held by the central
services program as assets of the Fund.
``(f) Retention of Portion of Fund Income.--(1) The
Director may impose a fee for central services provided from
the Fund. The fee for any item or service provided under the
central services program may not exceed four percent of the
cost of such item or service.
``(2) As needed for the continued self-sustaining operation
of the Fund, an amount not to exceed four percent of the net
receipts of the Fund in fiscal year 1998 and each fiscal year
thereafter may be retained, subject to subsection (j), for
the acquisition of capital equipment and for the improvement
and implementation of the Agency's information management
systems (including financial management, payroll, and
personnel information systems). Any proposed use of the
retained income in fiscal years 1998, 1999, and 2000, shall
only be made with the approval of the Director of the Office
of Management and Budget and after notification to the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of
the Senate.
``(3) Not later than 30 days after the close of each fiscal
year, amounts in excess of the amount retained under
paragraph (2) shall be transferred to the United States
Treasury.
``(g) Audit.--(1) The Inspector General of the Central
Intelligence Agency shall conduct and complete an audit of
the Fund within three months after the close of each fiscal
year. The Director of the Office of Management and Budget
shall determine the form and content of the audit, which
shall include at least an itemized accounting of the central
services provided, the cost of each service, the total
receipts received, the agencies or departments serviced, and
the amount returned to the United States Treasury.
``(2) Not later than 30 days after the completion of the
audit, the Inspector General shall submit a copy of the audit
to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the
Director of Central Intelligence, the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and
the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
``(h) Definitions.--For purposes of this section--
``(1) the term `central services program' means the program
established under subsection (a); and
``(2) the term `Fund' means the central services working
capital fund established under subsection (b)(1).
``(i) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated to the Fund $5,000,000 for the purposes
specified in subsection (b)(2).
``(j) Termination.--(1) The Fund shall terminate on March
31, 2000, unless otherwise reauthorized by an Act of Congress
prior to that date.
``(2) Subject to paragraph (1) and after providing notice
to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives and the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate, the Director of Central
Intelligence and the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget--
``(A) may terminate the central services program and the
Fund at any time; and
``(B) upon any such termination, shall provide for
dispositions of personnel, assets, liabilities, grants,
contracts, property, records, and unexpended balances of
appropriations, authorizations, allocations, and other funds
held, used, arising from, available to, or to be made
available in connection with such Fund, as may be
necessary.''.

SEC. 403. PROTECTION OF CIA FACILITIES.

Subsection (a) of section 15 of the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403o(a)) is amended--
(1) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(a)'';
(2) by striking ``powers only within Agency
installations,'' and all that follows through the end, and
inserting the following: ``powers--
``(A) within the Agency Headquarters Compound and the
property controlled and occupied by the Federal Highway
Administration located immediately adjacent to such Compound
and in the streets, sidewalks, and the open

[[Page H5000]]

areas within the zone beginning at the outside boundary of
such Compound and property and extending outward 500 feet;
and
``(B) within any other Agency installation and in the
streets, sidewalks, and open areas within the zone beginning
at the outside boundary of any such installation and
extending outward 500 feet.''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
``(2) The performance of functions and exercise of powers
under paragraph (1) shall be limited to those circumstances
where such personnel can identify specific and articulable
facts giving such personnel reason to believe that their
performance of such functions and exercise of such powers is
reasonable to protect against physical attack or threats of
attack upon the Agency installations, property, or employees.
``(3) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to
preclude, or limit in any way, the authority of any Federal,
State, or local law enforcement agency or of any other
Federal police or Federal protective service.
``(4) The rules and regulations enforced by such personnel
shall be the rules and regulations promulgated by the
Director and shall only be applicable to the areas referred
to in paragraph (1).
``(5) On December 1, 1998, and annually thereafter, the
Director shall submit a report to the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and
the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate that
describes in detail the exercise of the authority granted by
this subsection, and the underlying facts supporting the
exercise of such authority, during the preceding fiscal year.
The Director shall make such report available to the
Inspector General of the Agency.''.
TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

SEC. 501. AUTHORITY TO AWARD ACADEMIC DEGREE OF BACHELOR OF
SCIENCE IN INTELLIGENCE.

(a) Authority for New Bachelor's Degree.--Section 2161 of
title 10, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:

``Sec. 2161. Joint Military Intelligence College: academic
degrees

``Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense,
the president of the Joint Military Intelligence College may,
upon recommendation by the faculty of the college, confer
upon a graduate of the college who has fulfilled the
requirements for the degree the following:
``(1) The degree of Master of Science of Strategic
Intelligence (MSSI).
``(2) The degree of Bachelor of Science in Intelligence
(BSI).''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The item relating to that section
in the table of sections at the beginning of chapter 108 of
such title is amended to read as follows:

``2161. Joint Military Intelligence College: academic degrees.''.

SEC. 502. UNAUTHORIZED USE OF NAME, INITIALS, OR SEAL OF
NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE.

(a) Extension, Reorganization, and Consolidation of
Authorities.--Subchapter I of chapter 21 of title 10, United
States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following
new section:

``Sec. 425. Prohibition of unauthorized use of name,
initials, or seal: specified intelligence agencies

``(a) Prohibition.--Except with the written permission of
the Secretary of Defense, no person may knowingly use, in
connection with any merchandise, retail product,
impersonation, solicitation, or commercial activity in a
manner reasonably calculated to convey the impression that
such use is approved, endorsed, or authorized by the
Secretary of Defense, any of the following (or any colorable
imitation thereof):
``(1) The words `Defense Intelligence Agency', the initials
`DIA', or the seal of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
``(2) The words `National Reconnaissance Office', the
initials `NRO', or the seal of the National Reconnaissance
Office.
``(3) The words `National Imagery and Mapping Agency', the
initials `NIMA', or the seal of the National Imagery and
Mapping Agency.
``(4) The words `Defense Mapping Agency', the initials
`DMA', or the seal of the Defense Mapping Agency.''.
(b) Transfer of Enforcement Authority.--Subsection (b) of
section 202 of title 10, United States Code, is transferred
to the end of section 425 of such title, as added by
subsection (a), and is amended by inserting ``Authority To
Enjoin Violations.--'' after ``(b)''.
(c) Repeal of Reorganized Provisions.--Sections 202 and 445
of title 10, United States Code, are repealed.
(d) Clerical Amendments.--
(1) The table of sections at the beginning of subchapter II
of chapter 8 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by
striking out the item relating to section 202.
(2) The table of sections at the beginning of subchapter I
of chapter 21 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by
striking out the items relating to sections 424 and 425 and
inserting in lieu thereof the following:

``424. Disclosure of organizational and personnel information:
exemption for Defense Intelligence Agency, National
Reconnaissance Office, and National Imagery and Mapping
Agency.
``425. Prohibition of unauthorized use of name, initials, or seal:
specified intelligence agencies.''.
(3) The table of sections at the beginning of subchapter I
of chapter 22 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by
striking out the item relating to section 445.

SEC. 503. EXTENSION OF AUTHORITY FOR ENHANCEMENT OF
CAPABILITIES OF CERTAIN ARMY FACILITIES.

Effective October 1, 1997, section 506(b) of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Public
Law 104-93; 109 Stat. 974) is amended by striking out
``fiscal years 1996 and 1997'' and inserting in lieu thereof
``fiscal years 1998 and 1999''.
TITLE VI--MISCELLANEOUS COMMUNITY PROGRAM ADJUSTMENTS

SEC. 601. COORDINATION OF ARMED FORCES INFORMATION SECURITY
PROGRAMS.

(a) Program Execution Coordination.--The Secretary of a
military department or the head of a defense agency may not
obligate or expend funds for any information security program
of that military department without the concurrence of the
Director of the National Security Agency.
(b) Effective Date.--This section takes effect on October
1, 1997.

SEC. 602. AUTHORITY OF EXECUTIVE AGENT OF INTEGRATED
BROADCAST SERVICE.

All amounts appropriated for any fiscal year for
intelligence information data broadcast systems may be
obligated or expended by an intelligence element of the
Department of Defense only with the concurrence of the
official in the Department of Defense designated as the
executive agent of the Integrated Broadcast Service.

SEC. 603. PREDATOR UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE.

(a) Transfer of Functions.--Effective October 1, 1997, the
functions described in subsection (b) with respect to the
Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle are transferred to the
Secretary of the Air Force.
(b) Functions To Be Transferred.--Subsection (a) applies to
those functions performed as of June 1, 1997, by the
organization within the Department of Defense known as the
Unmanned Aerial Joint Program Office with respect to the
Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle.
(c) Transfer of Funds.--Effective October 1, 1997, all
unexpended funds appropriated for the Predator Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle that are within the Defense-Wide Program
Element number 0305205D are transferred to Air Force Program
Element number 0305154F.

SEC. 604. U-2 SENSOR PROGRAM.

(a) Requirement for Minimum Number of Aircraft.--The
Secretary of Defense shall ensure--
(1) that not less than 11 U-2 reconnaissance aircraft are
equipped with RAS-1 sensor suites; and
(2) that each such aircraft that is so equipped is
maintained in a manner necessary to counter available threat
technologies until the aircraft is retired or until a
successor sensor suite is developed and fielded.
(b) Effective Date.--Subsection (a) takes effect on October
1, 1997.

SEC. 605. REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
JUSTIFICATION BOOKS.

(a) In General.--The congressional budget justification
books for any element of the intelligence community submitted
to Congress in support of the budget of the President for any
fiscal year shall include, at a minimum, the following:
(1) For each program for which appropriations are requested
for that element of the intelligence community in that
budget--
(A) specification of the program, including the program
element number for the program;
(B) the specific dollar amount requested for the program;
(C) the appropriation account within which funding for the
program is placed;
(D) the budget line item that applies to the program;
(E) specification of whether the program is a research and
development program or otherwise involves research and
development;
(F) identification of the total cost for the program; and
(G) information relating to all direct and associated costs
in each appropriations account for the program.
(2) A detailed accounting of all reprogramming or
reallocation actions and the status of those actions at the
time of submission of those materials.
(3) Information relating to any unallocated cuts or taxes.
(b) Definitions.--For purposes of this section:
(1) The term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning
given that term in section 3 of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a).
(2) The term ``congressional budget justification books''
means the budget justification materials submitted to
Congress for any fiscal year in support of the budget for
that fiscal year for any element of the intelligence
community (as contained in the budget of the President
submitted to Congress for that fiscal year pursuant to
section 1105 of title 31, United States Code).
(c) Effective Date.--Subsection (a) shall take effect with
respect to fiscal year 1999.

SEC. 606. COORDINATION OF AIR FORCE JOINT SIGINT PROGRAM
OFFICE ACTIVITIES WITH OTHER MILITARY
DEPARTMENTS.

(a) Contracts.--The Secretary of the Air Force, acting
through the Air Force Joint Airborne Signals Intelligence
Program Office, may not modify, amend, or alter a JSAF
program contract without coordinating with the Secretary of
any other military department that would be affected by the
modification, amendment, alteration.
(b) New Developments Affecting Operational Military
Requirements.--(1) The Secretary of the Air Force, acting
through the Air Force Joint Airborne Signals Intelligence
Program Office, may not enter into a contract described in
paragraph (2) without coordinating with the Secretary of the
military department concerned.
(2) Paragraph (1) applies to a contract for development
relating to a JSAF program that may

[[Page H5001]]

directly affect the operational requirements of one of the
Armed Forces (other than the Air Force) for the satisfaction
of intelligence requirements.
(c) JSAF Program Defined.--For purposes of this section,
the term ``JSAF program'' means a program within the Joint
Signals Intelligence Avionics Family of programs administered
by the Air Force Joint Airborne Signals Intelligence Program
Office.
(d) Effective Date.--This section takes effect on October
1, 1997.

SEC. 607. DISCONTINUATION OF THE DEFENSE SPACE RECONNAISSANCE
PROGRAM.

Not later than October 1, 1999, the Secretary of Defense
shall--
(1) discontinue the Defense Space Reconnaissance Program (a
program within the Joint Military Intelligence Program); and
(2) close the organization within the Department of Defense
known as the Defense Space Program Office (the management
office for that program).

SEC. 608. TERMINATION OF DEFENSE AIRBORNE RECONNAISSANCE
OFFICE.

(a) Termination of Office.--The organization within the
Department of Defense known as the Defense Airborne
Reconnaissance Office is terminated. No funds available for
the Department of Defense may be used for the operation of
that Office after the date specified in subsection (d).
(b) Transfer of Functions.--(1) Subject to paragraphs (3)
and (4), the Secretary of Defense shall transfer to the
Defense Intelligence Agency those functions performed on the
day before the date of the enactment this Act by the Defense
Airborne Reconnaissance Office that are specified in
paragraph (2).
(2) The functions transferred by the Secretary to the
Defense Intelligence Agency under paragraph (1) shall include
functions of the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office
relating to its responsibilities for management oversight and
coordination of defense airborne reconnaissance capabilities
(other than any responsibilities for acquisition of systems).
(3) The Secretary shall determine which specific functions
are appropriate for transfer under paragraph (1). In making
that determination, the Secretary shall ensure that
responsibility for individual airborne reconnaissance
programs with respect to program management, for research,
development, test, and evaluation, for acquisition, and for
operations and related line management remain with the
respective Secretaries of the military departments.
(4) Any function transferred to the Defense Intelligence
Agency under this subsection is subject to the authority,
direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense.
(c) Report.--(1) Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall
submit to the committees named in paragraph (2) a report
containing the Secretary's plan for terminating the Defense
Airborne Reconnaissance Office and transferring the functions
of that office.
(2) The committees referred to in paragraph (1) are--
(A) the Committee on Armed Services and the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the
Committee on National Security of the House of
Representatives.
(d) Effective Date.--Subsection (a) shall take effect at
the end of the 120-day period beginning on the date of the
enactment of this Act.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there further amendments to the committee amendment
in the nature of a substitute?

Announcement By The Chairman

The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the order of the House of today,
proceedings will now resume on the amendment on which further
proceedings were postponed: amendment No. 3 offered by the gentleman
from Massachusetts Mr. Frank].

Amendment Offered by Mr. Frank of Massachusetts

The CHAIRMAN. The pending business is the demand for a recorded vote
on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr.
Frank] on which further proceedings were postponed and on which the
noes prevailed by voice vote.
The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The Clerk designated the amendment.

Recorded Vote

The CHAIRMAN. A recorded vote has been demanded.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 182,
noes 238, not voting 14, as follows:

[Roll No. 255]

AYES--182

Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allen
Baldacci
Barcia
Barrett (WI)
Becerra
Bentsen
Berry
Blagojevich
Blumenauer
Bonior
Borski
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd
Brown (CA)
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Camp
Campbell
Capps
Carson
Chabot
Clay
Clayton
Clyburn
Condit
Conyers
Costello
Coyne
Cummings
Danner
Davis (FL)
Davis (IL)
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
Dellums
Dingell
Doggett
Dooley
Doyle
Duncan
Engel
Ensign
Eshoo
Etheridge
Evans
Farr
Fazio
Filner
Flake
Foglietta
Ford
Fox
Frank (MA)
Furse
Gejdenson
Gephardt
Gonzalez
Goode
Goodlatte
Gordon
Green
Gutierrez
Hall (OH)
Hall (TX)
Hamilton
Hastings (FL)
Hefner
Hilliard
Hinchey
Hooley
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
Johnson (WI)
Johnson, E. B.
Kanjorski
Kennedy (MA)
Kennedy (RI)
Kennelly
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kind (WI)
Kleczka
Klug
Kucinich
LaFalce
Lampson
Lantos
Largent
Leach
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lofgren
Lowey
Luther
Maloney (CT)
Maloney (NY)
Markey
Matsui
McCarthy (MO)
McCarthy (NY)
McDermott
McGovern
McKinney
Meehan
Meek
Menendez
Millender-McDonald
Miller (CA)
Minge
Mink
Moakley
Moran (VA)
Morella
Nadler
Neal
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Owens
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Paul
Payne
Pelosi
Peterson (MN)
Petri
Pomeroy
Porter
Poshard
Price (NC)
Ramstad
Rangel
Riggs
Rivers
Rodriguez
Roemer
Rohrabacher
Rothman
Roukema
Roybal-Allard
Royce
Rush
Sabo
Sanchez
Sanders
Sanford
Sawyer
Schumer
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Shays
Skaggs
Snyder
Spratt
Stabenow
Stark
Stenholm
Stokes
Strickland
Stupak
Tanner
Tauscher
Thompson
Thurman
Tierney
Torres
Traficant
Upton
Velazquez
Vento
Waters
Watt (NC)
Waxman
Weygand
Woolsey

NOES--238

Aderholt
Andrews
Archer
Armey
Bachus
Baesler
Baker
Ballenger
Barr
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Barton
Bass
Bateman
Bereuter
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop
Bliley
Blunt
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bono
Brady
Bryant
Bunning
Burr
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Calvert
Canady
Cannon
Cardin
Castle
Chambliss
Chenoweth
Christensen
Clement
Coble
Coburn
Combest
Cook
Cooksey
Cox
Cramer
Crane
Crapo
Cubin
Cunningham
Davis (VA)
Deal
DeLay
Deutsch
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Dicks
Dixon
Doolittle
Dreier
Dunn
Ehlers
Ehrlich
Emerson
English
Everett
Ewing
Fawell
Foley
Forbes
Fowler
Franks (NJ)
Frelinghuysen
Frost
Gallegly
Ganske
Gekas
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Goodling
Goss
Graham
Granger
Greenwood
Gutknecht
Hansen
Harman
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Hayworth
Hefley
Herger
Hill
Hilleary
Hinojosa
Hobson
Hoekstra
Holden
Horn
Hostettler
Houghton
Hoyer
Hulshof
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hyde
Inglis
Istook
Jenkins
John
Johnson (CT)
Jones
Kaptur
Kasich
Kelly
Kim
King (NY)
Kingston
Klink
Knollenberg
Kolbe
LaHood
Latham
LaTourette
Lazio
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
Lipinski
Livingston
LoBiondo
Lucas
Manzullo
Martinez
Mascara
McCollum
McCrery
McHale
McHugh
McInnis
McIntosh
McIntyre
McKeon
McNulty
Metcalf
Mica
Miller (FL)
Molinari
Mollohan
Moran (KS)
Murtha
Myrick
Nethercutt
Neumann
Ney
Northup
Norwood
Nussle
Ortiz
Packard
Pappas
Parker
Paxon
Pease
Peterson (PA)
Pickering
Pickett
Pitts
Pombo
Portman
Pryce (OH)
Quinn
Radanovich
Rahall
Redmond
Regula
Riley
Rogan
Rogers
Ros-Lehtinen
Ryun
Salmon
Sandlin
Saxton
Scarborough
Schaefer, Dan
Schaffer, Bob
Scott
Sessions
Shadegg
Shaw
Sherman
Shimkus
Shuster
Sisisky
Skeen
Skelton
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (OR)
Smith (TX)
Smith, Adam
Smith, Linda
Snowbarger
Solomon
Souder
Spence
Stearns
Stump
Sununu
Talent
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Thomas
Thornberry
Thune
Tiahrt
Turner
Visclosky
Walsh
Wamp
Watkins
Watts (OK)
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
White
Whitfield
Wicker
Wise
Wolf
Wynn
Young (AK)
Young (FL)

NOT VOTING--14

Berman
Collins
Edwards
Fattah
Johnson, Sam
Manton
McDade
Oxley
Reyes
Schiff
Slaughter
Towns
Wexler
Yates

{time} 2120

The Clerk announced the following pair:
On this vote:

Mr. Yates for, with Mr. McDade against.

Messrs. FOLEY, WATTS of Oklahoma, and STEARNS changed their vote from
``aye'' to ``no.''

[[Page H5002]]

Ms. EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON of Texas, and Messrs. PAUL, SPRATT,
JEFFERSON, HALL of Texas, and STENHOLM changed their vote from ``no''
to ``aye.''
So the amendment was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
The CHAIRMAN. There being no further amendments to the bill, the
question is on the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute,
as amended.
The committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended,
was agreed to.
The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the Committee rises.
Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr.
LaHood) having assumed the chair, Mr. Thornberry, Chairman of the
Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that
that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 1775) to
authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1998 for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the U.S. Government, the Community
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and
Disability System, and for other purposes, pursuant to House Resolution
179, he reported the bill back to the House with an amendment adopted
by the Committee of the Whole.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rule, the previous question is
ordered.
Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment to the committee
amendment in the nature of a substitute adopted by the Committee of the
Whole? If not, the question is on the amendment.
The amendment was agreed to.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third
reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, was read
the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the
table.

____________________