[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 96 (Wednesday, July 9, 1997)]
[House]
[Pages H4985-H5002]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                              {time}  1900
          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. McInnis). Pursuant to House Resolution 
179 and rule XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of 
the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration 
of the bill, H.R. 1775.

                              {time}  1900


                     In the Committee of the Whole

  Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole 
House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the 
bill (H.R. 1775) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1998 for 
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the U.S.

[[Page H4986]]

Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central 
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other 
purposes, with Mr. Thornberry in the chair.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The CHAIRMAN. When the Committee of the Whole rose earlier today, 
amendment No. 2 offered by the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Conyers] 
had been disposed of.
  Pursuant to the order of the House of today, the Chairman of the 
Committee of the Whole may postpone until a time during further 
consideration in the Committee of the Whole a request for a recorded 
vote on any amendment and may reduce to not less than 5 minutes the 
time for voting by electronic device on any postponed question that 
immediately follows another vote by electronic device without 
intervening business, provided that the time for voting by electronic 
device on the first in any series of questions shall not be less than 
15 minutes.


         Amendment No. 3 Offered by Mr. Frank of Massachusetts

  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to 
offer an amendment that was printed in the Record. I ask unanimous 
consent because I, relying on advice I was given earlier, thought that 
we were going to have amendments in order at any time. Therefore, I 
missed the specific time. I ask unanimous consent to offer an amendment 
which is covered by the time agreement articulated by the gentleman 
from Florida.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to amending title I of the bill at 
this point?
  There was no objection.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment No. 3 offered by Mr. Frank of Massachusetts:
       Page 6, after line 24, insert the following new section:

     SEC. 105. REDUCTION IN FISCAL YEAR 1998 INTELLIGENCE BUDGET.

       (a) Reduction.--The amount obligated for activities for 
     which funds are authorized to be appropriated by this Act 
     (including the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred 
     to in section 102(a)) may not exceed--
       (1) the amount that the bill H.R. 1775, as reported in the 
     House of Representatives in the 105th Congress, authorizes 
     for such activities for fiscal year 1998, reduced by
       (2) the amount equal to 0.7 percent of such authorization.
       (b) Exception.--The amounts appropriated pursuant to 
     section 201 for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement 
     and Disability Fund may not be reduced by reason of 
     subsection (a).
       (c) Transfer and Reprogramming Authority.--(1) The 
     President, in consultation with the Director of Central 
     Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense, may apply the 
     limitation required by subsection (a) by transferring amounts 
     among accounts or reprogramming amounts within an account, as 
     specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     referred to in section 102(a).
       (2) Before carrying out paragraph (1), the President shall 
     submit a notification to the Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, which notification 
     shall include the reasons for each proposed transfer or 
     reprogramming.

  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask 
unanimous consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed 
in the Record.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Massachusetts?
  There was no objection.
  The CHAIRMAN. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from 
Massachusetts [Mr. Frank] and a Member opposed, the gentleman from 
Florida [Mr. Goss], will each control 15 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Frank].
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as 
I may consume. I thank the chairman and ranking member for allowing me 
to offer this amendment, although because of the misinformation I 
missed the time.
  We had a long debate about cutting this. We now have a shorter one 
because we have got a time agreement. The amendment I offer would 
reduce the authorization by 0.7 percent, seven-tenths of 1 percent. I 
cannot tell the Members how much that is in dollars because there might 
be a spy that knows algebra and if a spy knew algebra he could take 
0.7, he could multiply, he could do some other things and he would know 
the total. I certainly would not want to violate the law by indicating 
the total. So in deference to the algebraic literate Iranians who may 
be lurking, I will tell any Member who comes to me privately what the 
dollar amount is. Let me say it is significant. Seven-tenths of 1 
percent does not look like a lot, but we are not dealing here with the 
NEA or the CPB or low-income fuel assistance. We are here dealing with 
national security, which means it is serious money. So I will be glad 
to tell people how much we are talking about. I cannot tell it publicly 
because they are listening. What I am proposing to do is to reduce this 
to the amount the President requested.
  We have had conversations about how the amount was reduced. Ten years 
ago, we faced a heavily nuclear armed Soviet Union. Fortunately, we no 
longer have that serious problem. Indeed, the greatest intelligence 
problem in Europe in the months and years ahead may be to keep track of 
just how many countries have joined NATO. We certainly have had a 
substantial reduction in the threat, and we have not had a remotely 
commensurate reduction in the spending.
  I happen to believe that the administration has given in and asked 
for too much in the national security area, but I accept the judgment 
of the House, we are not going to make any substantial reduction of the 
sort I voted for. But I do not understand how we could vote to raise 
what the President has requested for this item. Because, remember, we 
are in the zero sum game situation of the budget deal, and every $10 or 
$100 or $200 million by which we raise what the President has asked for 
in this account, we must reduce somewhere else. We must reduce 
elsewhere in defense or we must reduce in transportation. Members here 
almost voted to increase transportation. So the question before us is, 
shall we at this point increase by a significant albeit unstatable sum 
what the President has asked for for intelligence, knowing that we do 
this at the cost of other important items?
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Florida [Mr. Young], the distinguished chairman of the Subcommittee on 
National Security of the Committee on Appropriations.
  Mr. YOUNG of Florida. I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this amendment. The proponent 
of the amendment is suggesting it is a small amount, it is only 0.7 
percent, but what the gentleman assumes with this amendment is the 
members of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence did not pay 
attention to what was being done when this bill was being marked up. 
The truth of the matter is that under the chairmanship of the gentleman 
from Florida [Mr. Goss] and the leadership of the gentleman from 
Washington [Mr. Dicks], the ranking minority member, the members of 
this committee, and the staff looked at every item in this bill and 
looked at it closely to see where we needed to add or to see where we 
could save a few dollars to try to come in with as low a number as 
possible. I think we did a pretty good job. My job as chairman of the 
appropriations Subcommittee on National Security, the chairman's 
responsibility, and all the Members of this Congress, our 
responsibility to our Nation, to the people that we represent, is to 
keep the Nation secure, and that requires a very effective intelligence 
community to establish worldwide information that we need. And who 
needs it? Not only do people at the Pentagon, not only the people at 
the CIA but the soldiers in the field need it, the people that we send 
to battle need intelligence. Would it not be a shame to send somebody 
into combat and not provide them the necessary intelligence?
  That is what we are trying to do, is to have an effective 
intelligence operation, to guarantee a commitment that I and many of my 
colleagues have made over the years that we are not going to be willing 
to send an American into a hostile situation unless we know we have 
done the best to provide him with the best training, with the best 
equipment, the best technology and the best intelligence, and knowledge 
of the situation. That is what we

[[Page H4987]]

are doing here today. We are trying to guarantee that our soldiers and 
those responsible for our Nation's security have the intelligence, the 
knowledge that they need. We have done the very best we could to get as 
much for the money. I would say that the committee has done a good job, 
and I compliment the leadership of the committee. I would hope that the 
Members of the House would be willing to vote a strong no on this 
amendment as they did on the Sanders amendment earlier this evening.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 3 minutes. I 
understand that the chairman, a hardworking diligent chairman of an 
appropriations subcommittee would argue that we never should change 
what his committee does. I understand that. I do not think, however, 
that we should treat every amendment to an appropriations or an 
authorization bill as a vote of confidence.
  I have great confidence in the gentleman from Florida and the 
gentleman from Washington, but the argument of the gentleman from 
Florida is that once the committee has done the work, in fact, I do not 
know why we are here, let us just ratify what the committees do. He 
argues that my amendment would endanger the troops. Apparently General 
Shalikashvili did not think so. Secretary Cohen did not think so. The 
Director of the CIA did not think so, assuming we had one at the time. 
You are never sure over there.
  The fact is that I am proposing what the administration asks for. As 
much as I agree that the committee did its work, I am unprepared to 
conclude that the administration and the National Security Council and 
the Secretary of Defense and all the others did not do their work. So 
we are not talking here about blind guesses. We are talking about 
choosing between the administration's figure and this figure.
  Second, it is very clear that we could cut 0.7 percent without in any 
way endangering military intelligence. The intelligence agencies, the 
CIA in particular, went on a little job hunt after the Soviet Union 
collapsed. They were a little underemployed, I think. They have now 
become the source of economic intelligence. I believe we do better with 
the free market in terms of economic intelligence.
  This amendment says the President will reduce after reporting to the 
committees, and I want to make one statement that I promised betrays no 
national security. We can cut 0.7 percent of this without in any way 
endangering military intelligence, tactical, strategic battlefield, 
global, et cetera. The CIA does a number of other things. It does some 
better than other intelligence agencies do.
  The President and the national security advisers, I believe, cannot 
be accused of endangering the troops, and that is what this amendment 
would carry out.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from South 
Carolina [Mr. Spence], the distinguished chairman of the Committee on 
National Security.
  (Mr. SPENCE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. SPENCE. I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.
  Mr. Chairman, H.R. 1775 specifically supports future military needs 
in terms of planning, operations, and force protection. Part of this 
support includes making sure that this Nation understands the nature of 
the threat that we face. For tomorrow's forces as well as the 
population at large, our major concern is the proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction.
  The intelligence community plays a vital role in detecting and 
monitoring the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Numerous 
intelligence sources, including imagery, signals and human 
intelligence, provide vital information to policymakers and military 
commanders who must determine ways to deter, prevent, halt or seize the 
transfer of weapons of mass destruction and associated technologies.
  A recently released CIA report on foreign countries' acquisition of 
technology useful for the development or production of weapons of mass 
destruction highlights the national security threat posed by the spread 
of such weapons of mass destruction and technology. This report reveals 
the following, and I would like to take it one at a time.
  Iran aggressively continues to acquire all types of weapons of mass 
destruction, technology and advanced conventional weapons. China and 
Russia have been primary sources for missile-related goods, while China 
and India supply the bulk of Iran's chemical weapons equipment.
  During the last half of 1996, China was the most significant supplier 
of weapons of mass destruction related goods and technology to foreign 
countries, especially to Iran and Pakistan. China provided a tremendous 
variety of assistance to both Iran's and Pakistan's ballistic missile 
programs and to their nuclear programs.
  In the last half of 1996, Russia supplied a variety of ballistic 
missile-related goods to foreign countries, especially to Iran. Russia 
also was an important source for nuclear programs in Iran and to a 
lesser extent India and Pakistan.
  The intelligence community must focus a great deal of effort on 
monitoring such activities. The fiscal year 1998 intelligence 
authorization bill will help the intelligence community in its 
nonproliferation efforts by encouraging investments in new technologies 
and encouraging the community to work together as a more flexible 
corporate whole.
  Mr. Chairman, I do not believe that it is prudent to make 
indiscriminate cuts to intelligence programs that the oversight 
committees have carefully reviewed and recommended to this body.

                              {time}  1915

  Consequently I oppose the gentleman's amendment, and I encourage my 
colleagues to vote ``no'' as well.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the 
gentlewoman from California [Ms. Pelosi], a current member of the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I was afraid the gentleman from 
Massachusetts was announcing my resignation from the committee without 
my knowledge. I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me, and, 
yes, I do rise as a member of the House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence in support of the gentleman's amendment. I think it is a 
commonsense amendment that is well-thought-out and worthy of the 
support of our colleagues.
  As a member of the committee I with great reluctance voted against 
the Sanders amendment, which I think deserved this House's attention 
because it was a big cut, an across-the-board cut, not giving the 
discretion to the director or to the community to designate where that 
cut would come from. That was a 10-percent cut; this is a 0.7-percent 
cut, less than 1 percent.
  Certainly, while every other aspect of this budget is subjected to 
the harsh scrutiny of fiscal responsibility, certainly there is 0.7 
percent in the intelligence budget that can be cut, and that will be 
done, according to this amendment, by the intelligence community, by 
the director reporting to the committee and, of course, with the 
approval of the President of the United States, the No. 1 consumer of 
intelligence in our country, and this figure, the 0.7 percent reduction 
in the budget, represents the President's request.
  Mr. Chairman, certainly we want the President to have all of the 
intelligence he needs to make the important and crucial decisions for 
our country, whether they relate to the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction or issues relating to our own military and their 
activities. So by giving the discretion to the Director of Central 
Intelligence, our colleague, the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. 
Frank] says that this cut can be nonmilitary. Certainly there is 0.7 
percent in nonmilitary spending, answering the challenge that one of 
our other colleagues made that this will hurt our troops in the field. 
I do not think that General Shalikashvili had that in mind when he 
supported the administration's request for this figure which I cannot 
mention, but that it is a 0.7 percent reduction.
  As some of my colleagues have mentioned, we need information. 
Intelligence is information, but it is not raw data. It is information 
that is gathered and then has analysis performed upon it, and then when 
it is intelligence it is

[[Page H4988]]

presented to its consumers, which are the military and policy makers in 
our country. And as I have said, our commander in chief, our President 
of the United States, is the biggest consumer of this intelligence 
information and the most important one. So why would the President be 
asking for an intelligence budget that was less than he needed?
  I supported the Conyers amendment earlier to disclose the aggregate 
figure of the intelligence budget because I thought, I believed, that 
the intelligence community should make that figure known to the 
American people so that it can be accountable for that figure, only the 
aggregate figure. While every other, as I say, item in this budget has 
to answer and be accountable to the American people, why does not the 
intelligence community have to do that as well? Is it because it 
cannot, in order to resist a small cut of less than 1 percent, if the 
full figure were divulged, it would have to justify why it could not 
absorb a 0.7 percent decrease.
  I think today we are making some mistakes here. We should be 
accountable to the American people by disclosing the aggregate figure. 
We rejected that. But certainly this body should be able to support the 
administration's request, the request of the leading consumer of 
intelligence in this country, the President of the United States, for 
his budget number, and I urge my colleagues to support the Frank 
amendment.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. Bereuter], a former member of the 
committee, a very valuable member of the House Committee on 
International Relations and the chairman of the North Atlantic Assembly 
Delegation of this body.
  (Mr. BEREUTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I oppose the Frank amendment. This is a 
case of data-free analysis. It is not based on an assessment of the 
work of the committee or the needs of the intelligence community. Now 
admittedly it is difficult for Members to make that kind of an 
assessment, but we give a special responsibility and privilege to 
Members of this House to serve 6, now 8 years on the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, to make the tough decisions, to make an 
assessment about what is appropriate. And we rotate them off the 
committee so they cannot become co-opted, so they are objective. Also I 
would point out that this is the recommendation of the intelligence 
authorization committee by unanimous vote.
  Now some supporters of cuts in intelligence funding say that since 
the end of the cold war there is no longer the national security 
threat. Actually there is, but it is more diverse. The one that we face 
today is more complicated. Today's problems include terrorism, 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, instability, and the 
foreign intelligence threat which has not gone away.
  Now in May of this year I had the privilege of leading a North 
Atlantic Assembly delegation to the Aviano NATO base in Italy, and I 
saw some dramatic improvements we are making which are going to help 
our tactical leaders on any future battlefield. There have been big 
changes since the Persian Gulf war. If we ever have to face combat 
again, in the Balkans or wherever, the kind of intelligence changes we 
are spending our money on now are going to be making a big, big 
difference on the safety and success of our troops and other military, 
naval, and air force personnel.
  When I was on the committee I focused during the last 3 or 4 years on 
high-technology issues, and I would tell my colleagues that our 
intelligence expenditures in that area protects and serves well our 
military and our intelligence community. We must protect against the 
espionage or theft of advanced technologies that represent huge 
investments of our defense dollars. The files of the Intelligence 
Committee are replete with stories of how the intelligence community 
saved tens of millions of dollars for the defense acquisition community 
by protecting against our technological lead in military and 
intelligence matters.
  I would also say that we cannot talk much about the security threats 
that we have solved, and about the terrorism threats that we have met. 
But, for example, we can talk about Ramsi Youssef, who was involved in 
the World Trade Center bombing. Without the intervention of the 
Intelligence Committee he successfully would have simultaneously bombed 
a number of planes crossing the Pacific. We were able to intervene 
there because of our intelligence capability to stop that threat and 
save not just hundreds of lives but probably thousands of lives.
  So the intelligence protects against the intelligence theft of 
valuable proprietary investments. The committee has repeatedly 
encouraged us to adequately fund this area.
  Let me say that what committee assessment has shown in budgetary and 
programmatic shortfalls. Clearly in the current budget environment the 
President of the committee cannot address all of the needs. What this 
budget represents is a good-faith effort by the Members we have given 
the responsibility for this whole House of Representatives to make an 
assessment about the kind of increases or modest adjustments in our 
intelligence budget meets the most critical needs. If the Frank 
amendment passes, funding for some modernization, for training and 
improved intelligence collection, and especially analysis, will be 
sacrificed. We are not going to lose it all for we are making progress, 
but there are dramatic improvements that can be made without this 
amount of additional money that the committee has recommended.
  I urge my colleagues to support the recommendations of the Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence unanimously approved by this 
authorizing committee and approve them.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 2 minutes.
  The argument for committee infallibility continues to lack any 
persuasive effect. The gentleman said I am offering an amendment 
without analysis. I am offering the President's budget. I very much 
have to disagree that the President and the National Security Council 
and the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency 
and the Joint Chiefs did no analysis. That simply is not worthy of 
consideration. The argument is that our committee, which we designated, 
is infallible, and the administration and all of the people involved in 
national security did no informational work here at all.
  The gentleman mentioned that we need to protect private investment. 
Well, I would disagree that that is an absolute national security 
priority. I just voted in committee for the Export-Import Bank, to 
protect it, but the argument that we have got to in a secret budget 
fund economists and others to analyze economics and that once the 
committee has put its imprimatur on the figure it is unchallengeable is 
simply not sensible.
  I do think we have a right to say given the priorities, given 
priorities in the environment and law enforcement on the streets and 
other things, all of which are hurting in this budget, we would rather 
not put an extra x hundred million dollars into economic analysis by 
the intelligence people. We may tell people that they can do their own 
security checking when they are investing. And no, I do not equate 
terrorism with economic investment, and I insist that the 0.7 percent 
can come out of areas that have zero, zero to do with physical 
security, zero to do with the military, zero to do with proliferation. 
They clearly are doing much more than 0.7 percent in a whole lot of 
other areas.
  But I simply have to reject this notion that what the committee did 
must be accepted and we dismiss as somehow totally improvident and 
endangering our troops what the administration proposed.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished 
ranking member himself, the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks].
  Mr. DICKS. I appreciate the gentleman's yielding this time to me, and 
without fear of disclosure here my good friend from Massachusetts [Mr. 
Frank], and he and I voted together on disclosing the overall number, 
but he asked me a very important question. He asked me how much the 
intelligence budget has been cut in nominal terms and figuring 
inflation.
  Now this does not violate any intelligence prohibitions. I want to 
tell my colleagues that between 1992 and 1997

[[Page H4989]]

in nominal terms the cut is 13.4 percent. In real terms, considering a 
2-percent inflation rate, which is very, very low, the cut has been 
21.4 percent. So I would point out to our colleagues we have cut this 
budget. We have also cut defense by about 40 percent.
  Now I still believe that intelligence is a force multiplier. By being 
able to use these national technical means, being able to use UAV's, by 
getting this information to our commanders, we can save American lives, 
and I believe that we carefully went through this budget. We added some 
money, we cut some money, and Mr. Young is here. We did the same thing 
over the last 2 days in the Appropriations Subcommittee on National 
Security. So we do not always agree with everything the President does. 
We see some areas, for example, in analysis where we think more needs 
to be done. We added money for that.
  So I would urge the committee to stay with the recommendations of our 
bipartisan Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Fifteen members 
voted for this, and I think that the right thing to do is to stay with 
that recommendation, I would stress again when you consider inflation, 
we've cut this budget by 21.4 percent since 1992.

                              {time}  1930

  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance 
of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Frank] is 
recognized for 4 minutes.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from 
Washington for his candor. He just said the committee, the infallible, 
highly respected committee, added money in analysis. So that means we 
can cut their additions without affecting technical means, without 
affecting battlefield intelligence. So we are fighting now over the 
sanctity of the economic and political analysis.
  I submit to those of us who have seen this that we are not here 
endangering anybody's security. We are talking about the extent to 
which we get political judgments made and economic judgments made. That 
is what is at issue.
  The gentleman said that the amount has been cut in nominal terms, in 
dollars, 13 percent. He also used a 21 percent real figure, but I have 
to tell the gentleman, as he knows, his Republican colleagues with whom 
he is allied on this measure do not accept that. We have people who 
say, none of this inflation stuff, a cut is a cut. So the argument that 
we cut by not meeting inflation, he should understand, is repudiated by 
the honest gentlemen on the other side.
  They would certainly never claim that we give an inflation factor for 
defense and not for Medicare. These are people who repudiate the notion 
that we fail to keep Medicare up with inflation, you are cutting it, 
and the gentleman would not want to get them in trouble by arguing 
contrariwise here.
  So then the question is, is it outrageous that we reduce in dollars 
13 percent from 1992? The 1992 budget formulated in 1991 was still 
formulated at a time that was the height of the cold war. The Soviet 
Union was crumbling. We were not sure of that then.
  I agree that terrorism is a problem, but terrorism is not a new 
problem. There was terrorism in 1982. There was terrorism in 1989; the 
bombing in Lebanon; terrible things have happened. Terrorism is not a 
new problem. Nuclear proliferation is not a new problem. India and 
Pakistan did not get their nuclear weapons a week ago. All those things 
were there, and we had the heavily armed Soviet Union and the Warsaw 
Pact. So I would submit that there has been a reduction in the physical 
threat the United States faces of greater than 13 percent.
  I think the capacity of our enemies, particularly the Soviet Union, 
to damage us has been more than 13 percent. I think when the Warsaw 
Pact nations switched sides, when Poland, and Hungary, and the Czech 
Republic go from being our enemies, as we consider them to be in 1980's 
and early 1990's to being on our side, that is more than a 13 percent 
reduction in the real threat.
  We have a difficult budget situation. We will be underfunding by most 
measures COPS on the streets. Yes, there are dangers to Americans, but 
there are dangers to most Americans more immediately, unfortunately, in 
their own communities from a handful of criminals who terrorize them. 
We have provided in the past the Federal money to help that. That 
competes with this.
  Money for transportation safety competes with this. Money to clean up 
the environment, to undo Superfund, competes with this. Money to help 
poor elderly people heat their homes competes with this.
  The question is not in the abstract, is it a good idea to have an 
extra couple of hundred million, $300 million, whatever, $150 million, 
I have to disguise it, million. The question is, do we increase the 
analysis capacity, the economic analysis capacity of the intelligence 
community over the recommendation of the administration, and take that 
money from other programs?
  If Members vote against this amendment and they vote to give the 
intelligence community this extra analysis money, I hope Members will 
be good enough to make that clear when people come to them and say, I 
would like more money for NIH, more money for cancer research, for COPS 
on the streets. When Members say to them, I am sorry, I agree but I 
cannot afford it, have the grace to tell them that one of the reasons 
we cannot afford it is that we gave this money to the intelligence 
community over and above what was asked for, because that is what is at 
issue.
  We are talking about a zero sum game. If Members vote to give more 
than was asked to the intelligence community, more than was asked by 
the enemies community and the President and his national security 
advisors, explain to people what we are taking that away from.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 minutes to the distinguished 
ranking member, the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks].
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, the only thing I would want to maybe say to 
my friend, the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Frank], is that if we 
take the money away from the intelligence community, that money is not 
going to go to NIH, it is not going to go to Medicare or Medicaid. It 
is going to go to defense spending. That is where it is going to go. It 
is going to go to somewhere else in the defense budget, because under 
the 602(b), the defense budget is there. We do not take money from it 
and move it somewhere else. It is going to be either intelligence or 
something else in defense. We think that this is the right balance 
between the two.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, this amendment assumes that the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence just simply plussed up the program funding 
without regard to the merits of the program, without due deliberation, 
and simply because we wanted to increase the numbers. That is not true. 
If we cut 0.7 percent, we do not get the President's budget. We added, 
we cut, we changed programs, we did all kinds of things. We are not at 
the President's budget. We are not at the President's program. There 
may be a number that is similar but we do not have a program that is 
similar.
  We have a program that provides more security for Americans, American 
interests, whether they are here or abroad, than the President's 
program does because this House and our Founding Fathers in their 
divine wisdom created balance of power, oversight, and our opportunity 
to check and balance with each other. We have a better product as a 
result of this.
  I am proud of our product and I think it is better than what I 
believe is not thoughtless, a well-intentioned, but an amendment that 
does come out without sufficient thought to what happens, because a 
disproportionate share of the gentleman's amendment will fall to 
important parts of the program; because we have to spend a very large 
part for architecture, which everybody knows. And 0.7 percent of 
architecture means one thing, and 0.7 percent of something else which 
is very small but vital means something else. I do not want to get in 
that position.
  I think we have been extremely thoughtful, and I think that as the 
gentleman understands the classified documents that we have worked 
with, as well as the nonclassified, and goes through them all, he would 
have to come to the same conclusion.

[[Page H4990]]

  Mr. Chairman, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence looked 
at all the programs we went into. I tried to explain that across-the-
board cuts like this do not get into the kind of cost-benefit 
assessment we did on a program-by-program basis, which is what we do 
and what we certainly did, and the record will show.
  I think to be totally honest, when we go across the board in a cut 
like this, basically, to be honest, I think an approach that goes to a 
0.7-percent reduction gets us to a lack of critical examination and 
intellectual rigor. It just simply is a number, like 10 percent, 5 
percent, 50 percent, or any other percent, it is a number. It is not an 
intellectual cost-benefit program by program, which is what we have 
done.
  I think that the gentleman's amendment puts the authorization at the 
level of the President's request but it does not get the President's 
program, as I said. I want to congratulate the President because I 
think he made a pretty good effort. But I think we have done a value-
added approach, which is what our job is, value-added, next branch of 
government. We did it.
  Mr. Chairman, the other thing I have to say is that unanimously on 
the committee every Republican and every Democrat saw areas where 
funding was clearly inadequate for intelligence needs. We are short on 
some programs that I worry about. I think the ranking member would say 
the same.
  We could have done much more. We would love to have done much more. 
The gentleman mentioned a 13-percent reduction. Boy, I would hate to be 
one of the casualties in that 13-percent area that I had to go to the 
parents and say, gee, we just picked a number and we reduced it, and 
unfortunately you were in the target zone; oh, gee, that is too bad. 
The fact of the matter is we could have done better. The fact of the 
matter is we did do better. Where we did better was in our bill.
  Mr. Chairman, I think that it is fair to say that for the gentleman 
from Washington [Mr. Dicks] and myself, that we have made painful 
decisions to forego funding for some very important intelligence 
activities, but we both agree that we do not have all that we would 
like to have. I think we are down at the point now where my conscience 
says, any more and we are in deep trouble.
  I have talked about the disproportionate problem because we do have 
fixed infrastructure, fixed overhead, as the gentleman well knows. We 
cannot accept reductions in our efforts to detect weapons 
proliferators, I am sure the gentleman would agree, locate terrorists, 
I am sure the gentleman would agree, determine nefarious activities 
from rogue states, and on and on. We just cannot give up anymore.
  The CHAIRMAN. All time on this amendment has expired.
  The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from 
Massachusetts [Mr. Frank].
  The question was taken; and the Chair announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote, 
and pending that, I make the point of order that a quorum is not 
present.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the previous order of the House, further 
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from 
Massachusetts [Mr. Frank] will be postponed.
  The point of no quorum is considered withdrawn.


                         Parliamentary Inquiry

  Mr. DICKS. I have a parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Chairman.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state his parliamentary inquiry.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, does that mean that the gentleman from 
Massachusetts [Mr. Frank] has to re-request a recorded vote when we go 
back to vote on this at a later point?
  The CHAIRMAN. The request for a recorded vote will be the pending 
business.
  Mr. DICKS. I thank the Chair.
  The CHAIRMAN. Are there further amendments to title III?


                 Amendment No. 6 offered by Ms. Waters

  Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I offer amendment No. 6.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment No. 6 offered by Ms. Waters:

       Page 10, after line 15, insert the following new section:

     SEC. 306. STUDY OF CIA INVOLVEMENT IN THE USE OF CHEMICAL 
                   WEAPONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF WAR.

       Not later than August 15, 1999, the Inspector General of 
     the Central Intelligence Agency shall conduct, and submit to 
     Congress in both a classified and declassified form, a study 
     concerning Central Intelligence Agency involvement (or 
     knowledge thereof) of the use of chemical weapons by enemy 
     forces against Armed Forces of the United States during the 
     Persian Gulf War. Such study shall determine--
       (1) Whether there is any complicity of Central Intelligence 
     Agency agents, employees, or assets in the use of chemical 
     weapons;
       (2) whether there is any use of appropriated funds for such 
     purposes; and
       (3) the extent of involvement of other elements of the 
     Intelligence Community of the United States or foreign 
     intelligence agencies in the use of such weapons.

  Ms. WATERS (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous 
consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the 
Record.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman 
from California?
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point of order on the amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman 
from California?
  Mr. GOSS. Reserving the right to object, Mr. Chairman, I want to be 
clear which amendment we are on, Mr. Chairman. I do not have the same 
numbering system. There are two amendments.
  Ms. WATERS. If the gentleman will yield, it is amendment No. 6.
  Mr. GOSS. The subject of this amendment is chemical weapons, chemical 
weapons in the Gulf?
  Ms. WATERS. A study of the Central Intelligence Agency involved in 
the use of chemical weapons in the Persian Gulf war.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my reservation of objection.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman 
from California?
  There was no objection.
  The CHAIRMAN. Under a previous order of the House, the time will be 
alloted, 30 minutes to the gentlewoman from California [Ms. Waters], 
and 30 minutes to a Member opposed to the amendment.
  The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from California [Ms. Waters].
  Ms. WATERS. I yield myself such time as I may consume, Mr. Chairman.
  Mr. Chairman, I offer this amendment to establish a study of the 
Central Intelligence Agency, the CIA. This study is designed to explore 
the involvement and the use of chemical weapons in the Persian Gulf 
war. Specifically, this amendment requires the Inspector General of the 
Central Intelligence Agency to conduct a study and submit to Congress 
in both a classified and declassified form a report of its findings.
  Mr. Chairman, I think it is important to expand a little bit on why I 
would want such a study. In order to do that, I would like to read 
information from the New York Times, May 6, 1997, the Tuesday late 
edition. It starts with the information concerning George J. Tenet, the 
fifth nominee for director of Central Intelligence in the last 4 years.
  It states that he would be questioned by a Senate committee on that 
Tuesday, and the betting is, they said, that his nomination will be 
quickly approved by the panel and then promptly confirmed by the full 
Senate. The article goes on to explain what has been happening in 
trying to keep directors of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the 
turnover and the turmoil that this agency has been experiencing.
  Mr. Chairman, they say, ``This turmoil at the top of American 
intelligence has no parallel except in the Watergate era, when five men 
served in rapid succession as director of Central Intelligence from 
1972 to 1977, years when the agency was devastated by a disclosure of 
its Cold War history of assassination plots, coups, and dirty tricks.''
  What is important about this article, however, is that it identifies 
much of the turmoil, much of the criticism, much of the faux pas, much 
of the problems that this agency has been experiencing. But this 
amendment today centers on what happened in Iraq. It talks about secret 
operations were exposed in Iraq, France, Japan, India, and Italy, but 
then it really targets in on the agency, the fact that the agency sat 
on evidence that chemical weapons had been present at the Iraq 
munitions dump blown up soon after the Persian Gulf war.
  Members have heard references to this today, when they talk about the

[[Page H4991]]

20,000 soldiers that were exposed to sarin gas. Mr. Chairman, this is 
unacceptable. As Members know, I served on the Committee on Veterans' 
Affairs. I learned a lot in the period of time that I served on that 
committee.

                              {time}  1945

  I gained deep respect for the sacrifices that are made by families 
and members in our armed services. I also witnessed a lot of other 
things having served on that committee.
  These loyal individuals who gave of themselves, most of whom were 
very proud to serve their country, many of them belonging to families 
where they had other family members who had served their country, had 
died serving their country in previous wars, many of them now ailing 
and sick and disabled, many of them fighting day and in and day out 
because they cannot get their claims adjudicated with their own 
government. I learned deep respect for the veterans of this country, 
having served, watched them come to the Congress of the United States 
oftentimes asking for assistance and not getting that assistance, many 
of them not being taken care of properly in the veterans hospitals 
around the Nation, but they continued to be very loyal, very committed, 
very patriotic.
  And I learned something else: Members of this House could wax 
eloquently about their support of the Members who had served, our 
veterans, members of the armed services. They could say over and over 
again how much respect they had for them, how much they honored and 
cherished them and how we should do everything in our power to make 
their lives comfortable once they had served. But it is very 
interesting, when we look at what the Central Intelligence Agency did 
to them in Iraq, how they had information about the chemicals that were 
stored there and they did not share this information, they did not tell 
them they were at risk and they exposed these 20,000 individuals.
  How can we be comfortable with this agency that has been identified 
over and over today as an agency with serious problems, with serious 
trouble, an agency that is too closely associated with trafficking in 
drugs, an agency that has relationships with some of the worst people 
in the world, murderers, drug dealers, terrorists, an agency that has 
broken down where we have members who are there to protect and serve, 
who are selling us out, identified in a most prominent way in all of 
the news media of this country? Knowing all of this we do not want to 
in any way touch them.
  Why are we so afraid of the CIA? Why are we as public policymakers 
not willing to pull them in? Why are we not ready to rap their wrists?
  I have heard Members on this floor talk about all of the agencies 
that have failed and how they want to cut them. I have heard many times 
about the poverty programs and how they have not worked and how they 
have been fraught with problems and troubles. Well, we have an agency 
that is embarrassing us, an agency where our allies are telling us, get 
them out of their country, an agency that has committed just about 
every ill and every sin that any intelligence group could commit. Do we 
want to cut them back a little bit? Five percent? No, we do not want to 
do that. Do we want to share information about the budget? Do we want 
to shine the spotlight on this agency in any way? No, we do not want to 
do that.
  In this post-cold-war era, we are satisfied to continue to let them 
run rampant. But I do not think we ought to do that. I think if we do 
nothing else, if we do not care about the children and communities that 
are the victims of drugs having been brought into this country where we 
have identified CIA involvement, which will be in my next amendment, if 
we do not care about the terrorists, who we claim to want to get rid of 
in the world, being associated with our own intelligence community, if 
we do not care about the fact that the breakdown in the agency is 
causing too much strife and dissemination of information, do we not 
care enough about the veterans to send a message to them to say to 
them, yes, the CIA was wrong; no, you should not have been put at risk; 
no, they should not have withheld this information; yes, they should be 
punished for having done so; yes, we should do everything that we can 
to make sure it does not happen again?
  This is not about a movie. This is not something somebody made up. 
This is not gossip or speculation. This is fact. The fact of the matter 
is 20,000 soldiers exposed to sarin gas, information withheld, 
information that the CIA simply could say, oh, yes, we forgot to tell 
you; yes, we apologize; no, we should not have done it. That is not 
enough. Thirty billion dollars being spent on an intelligence 
community, no real oversight, no real transparency, no real 
understanding by the public policymakers who come to this floor year in 
and year out and simply give their vote to the intelligence community, 
not knowing how it is spent and what they are doing.
  I think it is about time we live up to the responsibilities that have 
been bestowed upon us as public policymakers. It is about time that we 
say, no agency is so big and so bad that it threatens us in ways that 
cause us not to be good public policymakers.
  Yes, there is a need for intelligence. I am not naive. I do 
understand that we need intelligence. But I am saying to my colleagues, 
the CIA does not deserve our support. I am saying to my colleagues, on 
the Senate side, Senator Moynihan has said, strike them from the 
budget. Get rid of them. Over here, a modest amount tried, just cut 
them by 5 percent. And we sit and hold our hands and get up and make 
excuses about why we cannot control the CIA, why we do not have a right 
to do the oversight that we must do, why they are different from every 
other agency that we deal with, why we do not want to know, why we want 
to keep our heads in the sand.
  It is not right. We can do better than this. So I offer this 
amendment. It is a very modest amendment. This amendment would simply, 
again, establish a study of the Central Intelligence Agency and their 
involvement in the use of chemical weapons in the Persian Gulf war. 
This is a limit to design, to do that, and I would like to send a 
message to the veterans that we all honor and cherish, the ones that we 
love so much because of the sacrifices that they have made, the ones 
who may die from this exposure, the ones whose families may never be 
satisfied that their health needs will be taken care of. I would like 
us to send a message here this evening, if we have got the guts to do 
it, I would like for us to send a message that we care. And not only do 
we care, we are going to do something about it. It is time to get rid 
of the rhetoric and step up to the plate and put our actions where our 
mouths are in terms of loving the veterans and the soldiers that have 
given to us and do this modest, very modest amendment that would shed 
some light on what happened in the Persian Gulf War; why did it happen 
and how do we prevent it from ever happening again?
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.


  Amendment Offered by Mr. Goss to the Amendment No. 6 Offered by Ms. 
                                 Waters

  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment to the amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Goss to the amendment No. 6 
     offered by Ms. Waters:
       Strike all after ``Sec. 306.'' and insert in lieu thereof 
     the following:

   ``Review of the Presence of Chemical Weapons in the Persian Gulf 
                                Theater

       ``The Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency 
     shall conduct a review to determine what knowledge the 
     Central Intelligence Agency had about the presence or use of 
     chemical weapons in the Persian Gulf Theater during the 
     course of the Persian Gulf War. The Inspector General shall 
     submit a report of his findings to the House Permanent Select 
     Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on 
     Intelligence, no later than August 15, 1998 in both 
     classified and unclassified form. The unclassified form shall 
     also be made available to the public.''

  The CHAIRMAN. The amendment is not separately debatable. Pursuant to 
the previous order of the House, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] 
is recognized for 30 minutes.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I originally rose in opposition to the Waters amendment, but now I am 
rising in support of my substitute amendment.
  I think it is very important that we understand here that this is not 
a new subject and that there are unclassified documents available to 
the public on

[[Page H4992]]

Khamisiyah and what happened there. One is entitled Khamisiyah 
Historical Perspective on Related Intelligence of 9 April 1997. And the 
second, more to the point, is CIA Supports the U.S. Military During the 
Persian Gulf War of 16 June 1997, which deals very directly with the 
subject at hand. These are available for all Members and the public at 
large, any veterans or soldiers or military civilians or anybody who 
would be interested. It is a very important subject. I quite agree with 
that.
  The gentlewoman has pointed to her love of veterans and soldiers, and 
I certainly admire that and I will also say that I agree with it. I 
have a great many veterans in my district. We have a very large 
veterans population, seems to grow larger every day, which is not 
surprising given the wonderful area where I live in southwest Florida.
  I think it is very important, however, that we understand that this 
is not an issue that has been ignored. I would like very much, 
therefore, to explain a little bit further what my substitute amendment 
will do in addition to these reports that are already out.
  The gentlewoman is seeking an IG report and we have designed an 
approach that would bring about a result, I think, while avoiding some 
of the pitfalls I see in going with the gentlewoman's original 
amendment.
  The Intelligence Committee is obviously very concerned about the 
issue of chemical weapons exposure during the gulf war or any other 
time, and we have been closely monitoring the DCI efforts to examine 
this subject fully. Again, the committee was very pleased to see the 
April release of the unclassified report from the DCI, that would be 
director of the Central Intelligence Agency, related to the events at 
the Khamisiyah storage facility where Iraqi, and I underscore, Iraqi 
chemical weapons were stored and were subsequently destroyed by U.S. 
troops. And in that process it is apparent that some have suffered 
exposure to chemical weapons.
  The question has to be asked. What happened? What went wrong? We 
tried to find out. Since this is the first I have heard from the 
gentlewoman on this subject but not the first I have heard on the 
subject, I am going to encourage her to read these reports. And I will 
make them available if she has not already.
  From the report we know that there was a breakdown in analysis and 
communications between the intelligence community and the Department of 
Defense related to the knowledge of chemical weapons storage at this 
particular facility. There was a ground location problem involved and 
how it was referred to.
  We also know that steps are already being taken by both the 
intelligence community and the defense to make sure that this does not 
happen again. Again it is addressed in these reports.
  Our committee remains very vigilant about monitoring the progress of 
that effort and other efforts because we know the catastrophic 
consequences of mishandling or not knowing the maximum amount about 
chemical warfare and all its ramifications. The Waters amendment 
implies that the CIA or CIA employees were complicit, and I think that 
word was used in her amendment, in the use of chemical weapons against 
U.S. troops. That is an accusation that obviously disturbs me and any 
American very greatly and warrants immediate consideration.
  The facts that I know are that intelligence and defense were never 
closer in their working relationship even though there were 
opportunities for things to go wrong as there are in any hostile combat 
situation or any peacetime situation, as we know. But former chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell, is I think, a man well 
regarded and certainly was well regarded in accomplishments of his 
duties in these events stated, and I quote: No combat commander has 
ever had as full or complete a view of his adversary as did our field 
commander. Intelligence support to operation Desert Shield and Desert 
Storm was a success story.
  I am not making that up. That is not a newspaper story. That is 
something that Colin Powell said.
  Mr. Chairman, I note that there are many, many studies that have been 
or are being conducted, several under the watchful eye of the 
Presidential Commission on Gulf War Illness. This is entirely 
appropriate. This committee will continue its oversight 
responsibilities and continue to look at activities related to this 
issue that belong in the area of the intelligence community, as I have 
said we are doing, as witnessed by these reports.

                              {time}  2000

  I have said in my substitute that the gentlewoman's amendment calls 
on the CIA's Inspector General to conduct a review to determine what 
knowledge the Central Intelligence Agency had about the presence or the 
use of chemical weapons in the Persian Gulf theater during the course 
of the gulf war. This report would be submitted to the intelligence 
committees of the Congress, that would be both committees, no later 
than August 15, 1998 in both classified and unclassified form. And, 
frankly, I think it will happen much sooner because much of the work 
has already been done.
  I believe the substitute will reach the goal the gentlewoman seems to 
have, the goal of getting as much information as possible about what we 
knew of the presence or use of chemical weapons during the gulf war 
without prejudging the outcome or implying complicity on the part of 
the men and women who work so hard on behalf of our national security.
  I want to point that out. People are watching this debate. We are on 
C-SPAN. I know that it is for the benefit of the Members, but 
inevitably there are other observers who watch what goes on here, 
including the men and women of our intelligence community. I am sure 
that they feel a little bit let down when somebody implies that they 
may have been using or complicit in chemical warfare against American 
troops overseas.
  I have trouble with that. I hope they do not believe that that is the 
feeling of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence because it is 
clearly not. I believe very strongly in oversight, the need for good 
discipline, a piercing look at what we are doing, calling it when we 
see it when there is a problem, not shrinking from that, but I 
certainly do not think we want to denigrate the men and women who are 
working so hard for our national security if it is not warranted. And 
in my case I have not seen any facts whatsoever to warrant it.
  I hope the gentlewoman will support our approach, which is offered 
for our mutual interest of getting at the truth. And that is what we 
seek, the truth. I will urge my colleagues to support the substitute to 
the Waters amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  First, I would like to deal with the way in which the gentleman from 
Florida [Mr. Goss] characterized the inquiry that I am seeking. I asked 
that a study be done to make determinations. I did not come to any 
conclusions about the involvement of the CIA. The idea of asking for 
the study is to make certain determinations, and I think that should be 
clear.
  Further, allow me to share with the Members of this House that I 
believe that the gentleman from Florida and I are saying the same 
thing. It needs to be looked at. I brought this to the floor today 
because I intended very much to create a platform for a discussion 
about this issue. I am extremely concerned, even though the gentleman 
from Florida believes that I should know that some studying has been 
done, that just as I do not know other Members of this House do not 
know, the public does not know, and that we are left with the accounts 
that we have learned about. We have heard the CIA say, yes, we had the 
information and, yes, we should have revealed it. That much we know.
  I think the gentleman from Florida and I and other Members of this 
House want to shed some light on this. We want more information. We 
want to be able to share with the American public everything that we 
know about what happened, and we want to be in a position to use 
whatever power we have to make sure it never happens again.
  So I am pleased, Mr. Chairman, that I am joined and embraced, by way 
of this substitute amendment, because while it may be structured a 
little bit differently, I am pleased that it would get the information 
a little bit sooner than the way that I had structured the amendment. 
Either way, whether it is 1

[[Page H4993]]

year from now or 2 years from now, and for some reason it falls on my 
birthday, August 15, that is all right with me.
  So let me just say that I think that having brought it here, it 
served a purpose. It got me what I wanted. It forced the discussion. It 
created the debate about something that never should be in the dark, 
and it got my colleagues on the other side of the aisle joining with me 
to have a study so that we can reveal everything that we know. And with 
that, that is all I ask. I am pleased to accept the substitute and I 
thank the gentleman from Florida for recognizing that it needed to be 
done.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Ms. WATERS. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I want to rise in support of the substitute, 
and I appreciate the efforts of the gentlewoman from Los Angeles, who 
has been very interested in this subject. I think the language drafted 
by the chairman gets to what we all want to get to.
  Let me just say that when this happened, I had some serious 
reservations about the studies that were done by the Defense 
Department, the work that was done by the CIA on this. I asked Mr. 
Deutch, when he was still the director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency, to have the Inspector General start a study.
  So the chairman is right, the Inspector General has already engaged 
in this, and particularly about the destruction of chemical weapons at 
a storage site in Khamisiyah. I also asked them to look at the whole 
question of what did the CIA know, when did it know it, and what did it 
say to the Department of Defense and to the Army and to the other units 
that were there about their knowledge about what was stored at these 
various sites.
  This is one of those situations where knowledge may not have been 
shared in a timely way, and there was destruction of some of these 
weapons, and I am not sure we still, even to this day, know exactly 
what all those weapons were. I am worried that this goes beyond just 
chemical weapons; that we may have had biological or other infectious 
agents that were released on our own people. And whether it was done by 
the Iraqis or it was done in our destroying these weapons, there are a 
lot of unanswered questions.
  I think one of the big problems here is the Department of Defense did 
such a lousy job of investigating this thing initially that it created 
suspicion everywhere. We had all these veterans coming home with these 
various symptoms and it just did not add up, and the Department's 
continued denial after denial after denial, and then finally having to 
say, oh yes, we may have made a big mistake here and there may have 
been something that actually happened, is one of the reasons why there 
is such suspicion, not only on the part of Members of Congress but on 
the part of the American people, about what actually happened over 
there.
  That is why I insisted with Mr. Deutch that the Inspector General, 
Fred Hintz, out at the CIA, would do the investigation. I did not want 
the CIA, in essence, investigating itself. I wanted the independent 
Inspector General of the CIA tasked for this.
  So I think what this study does is expand upon that, and I think it 
does get the information that my colleague wants sooner by making the 
date August. I am certainly glad it is on her birthday. I hope the 
report is something that she will find joyous. And hopefully this is 
not a report we will all be embarrassed about, and I hope it is not.
  The bottom line here is I think the chairman has crafted a good 
compromise. I would like to see us accept it and then move on to the 
next amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCollum].
  Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I simply want to rise first of all to 
support the substitute amendment. I think what the chairman of the 
committee has offered is a perfectly logical proposal, and that is that 
the Inspector General report, after a review, what knowledge the 
Central Intelligence Agency had about the presence of the use of 
chemical weapons in the Persian Gulf theater during the course of the 
war over there.
  I am, however, very disturbed by the language that was in the 
underlying amendment, and I do want to point this out. I think it needs 
to be reiterated. There is not a shred of evidence that I know of, 
anywhere in my tenure in looking at this matter, and I have been 
involved as a member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
looking into this matter for some time now, that would support the idea 
that we need a study, which the language of this original underlying 
amendment said, a study concerning the Central Intelligence Agency's 
involvement in the use of chemical weapons by enemy forces against 
armed forces of the United States during the Persian Gulf War.
  The insinuation or the implication, not that they knew something 
about the chemical weapons or that they had some knowledge in the 
efforts that were going on over there to destroy those weapons, but 
that they, the CIA, was involved in some way supporting the use of 
those weapons, involved in the use of those weapons by our enemies, by 
our enemies, is outrageous in my opinion. And I do not appreciate the 
underlying premise here.
  So I think the substitute is terribly important, and I am 
appreciative of the fact the gentlewoman is willing to accept the 
substitute because, as I said, there is no shred of evidence whatsoever 
anywhere that our intelligence community in any way aided or abetted 
the enemy, which the implication, whether she intended it or not, is 
there in the underlying amendment.
  So I am very supportive of this substitute, I urge its adoption, and 
I wanted the Record to be very clear that our men and women, as far as 
I can determine, as long as the eye can see, operating for our 
intelligence community, have been honorable supporters of the American 
cause and patriots. Whether we agree with everything they do or do not 
do, certainly they have not been working for the enemy.
  Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire of how much time I have 
remaining?
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentlewoman from California [Ms. Waters] has 10\1/
2\ minutes remaining, and the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] has 21 
minutes remaining.
  Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume, 
because I think it is important to point out that not only did I accept 
the gentleman from Florida's substitute amendment, but I also offered, 
prior to that acceptance, an explanation of the wording that the other 
gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCollum] now is trying to latch on to in 
order to in some way imply that I made accusations unfairly.
  If I had not accepted the substitute, perhaps he could do that kind 
of spinning. But the fact that I accepted the substitute explains very 
clearly, and in a way that cannot be misunderstood, what I am doing and 
why I am doing it, and that I congratulated them for embracing me, I 
think, does away with that kind of specious argument.
  Certainly it is honorable for Members of this House, elected by the 
people, to come to this floor and raise the questions, no matter how 
hard they are, no matter how unpopular they are, no matter how 
difficult they are. And oftentimes when that is done, it is 
misunderstood by people who do not have the guts or the nerve to do 
that themselves. And sometimes it is embarrassing to take this floor 
and kind of push and nudge people into doing what they should be doing 
anyway. I understand that. But there comes a time when we need to do 
that.
  I chose this moment, at this time, on this legislation to make an 
issue of what had happened in the Persian Gulf. I chose at this time, 
at this moment to point out that 20,000 of our soldiers were at risk. 
No matter whether it was intended or not, it happened. I chose at this 
time to demand more information, to share with the public, to demand an 
investigation so that we could have in writing something that people 
could pick up and read and know where we are going and what we are 
doing. I chose to do that because I think that is my responsibility and 
I do feel strongly about this.
  So we can spin it any way we want, we can define it any way we want, 
but

[[Page H4994]]

I know what I have said and I know what I am doing and I am pleased 
that the gentleman has joined with me to do it, no matter how much he 
may not have liked the fact that I brought it, no matter how much the 
gentleman may not have liked the fact that I raised the kinds of 
questions that are oftentimes embarrassing. None of us like to think 
that we invest so much in our intelligence community to have those 
kinds of terrible costly mistakes.
  Having said all of that, Mr. Chairman, the bottom line is we move 
forward with the substitute amendment that I have embraced. And, 
hopefully, this is a bipartisan concern, a bipartisan effort to do the 
right thing, to focus the attention on what happened there, get the 
answers that we can get and then move to make sure that it does not 
happen again.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Ms. WATERS. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.

                              {time}  2015

  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I think that we ought to accept what the 
gentlewoman from California [Ms. Waters] has said here. She is willing 
to accept this compromise. I would like to see this be a bipartisan 
study supported on both sides of the aisle, and I would urge that we 
all yield back our time and have a vote and move forward.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, we are prepared to yield back. We have no 
further speakers on this subject at this time, and as long as we 
understand that this satisfies the full unanimous-consent request we 
had for the 30 minutes on either side and includes my substitute 
amendment, and that is the issue we will be voting on first, we are 
prepared to yield back.
  Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I am prepared to yield back my time. I 
thank the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] for joining with me in this 
very special and important effort.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] to the amendment offered by the 
gentlewoman from California [Ms. Waters].
  The amendment to the amendment was agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentlewoman from California [Ms. Waters], as amended.
  The amendment, as amended, was agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN. Are there further amendments to title III?


                 Amendment No. 7 Offered by Ms. Waters

  Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I offer amendment No. 7.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment No. 7 offered by Ms. Waters:

       Page 10, after line 15, insert the following new section:

     SEC. 306. CLANDESTINE DRUG STUDY COMMISSION.

       (a) Establishment.--There is established a commission to be 
     known as the ``Clandestine Drug Study Commission'' (in this 
     section referred to as the ``Commission'').
       (b) Duties.--The Commission shall--
       (1) secure the expeditious disclosure of public records 
     relevant to the smuggling and distribution of illegal drugs 
     into and within the United States by the Central Intelligence 
     Agency or others on their behalf or associated with the 
     Central Intelligence Agency;
       (2) report on the steps necessary to eradicate any Central 
     Intelligence Agency involvement with drugs or those 
     identified by Federal law enforcement agencies as drug 
     smugglers; and
       (3) recommend appropriate criminal sanctions for the 
     involvement of Central Intelligence Agency employees involved 
     in drug trafficking or the failure of such employees to 
     report their superiors (or other appropriate supervisory 
     officials) knowledge of drug smuggling into or within the 
     United States.
       (c) Membership.--The Commission shall be comprised of nine 
     members appointed by the Attorney General of the United 
     States for the life of the Commission. Members shall obtain a 
     security clearance as a condition of appointment. Members may 
     not be current or former officers or employees of the United 
     States.
       (d) Compensation.--Members of the Commission shall serve 
     without pay but shall each be entitled to receive travel 
     expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, in 
     accordance with sections 5702 and 5703 of title 5, United 
     States Code.
       (e) Quorum.--A majority of the Members of the Commission 
     shall constitute a quorum.
       (f) Chairperson; Vice Chairperson.--The Chairperson and 
     Vice Chairperson of the Commission shall be elected by the 
     members of the Commission.
       (g) Obtaining Official Data.--The Commission may secure 
     directly from any department or agency of the United States 
     information necessary to enable it to carry out this section. 
     Upon request of the Chairperson or Vice Chairperson of the 
     Commission, the head of that department or agency shall 
     furnish that information to the Commission.
       (h) Subpoena Power.--
       (1) In general.--The Commission may issue subpoenas 
     requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the 
     production of any evidence relating to any matter which the 
     Commission is empowered to investigate by this section. The 
     attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence may be 
     required from any place within the United States at any 
     designated place of hearing within the United States
       (2) Failure to obey a subpoena.--If a person refuses to 
     obey a subpoena issued under paragraph (1), the Commission 
     may apply to a United States district court for an order 
     requiring that person to appear before the Commission to give 
     testimony, produce evidence, or both, relating to the matter 
     under investigation. The application may be made within the 
     judicial district where the hearing is conducted or where 
     that person is found, resides, or transacts business. Any 
     failure to obey the order of the court may be punished by the 
     court as civil contempt.
       (3) Service of subpoenas.--The subpoenas of the Commission 
     shall be served in the manner provided for subpoenas issued 
     by a United States district court under the Federal Rules of 
     Civil procedure for the United States district courts.
       (4) Service of process.--All process of any court to which 
     application is to be made under paragraph (2) may be served 
     in the judicial district in which the person required to be 
     served resides or may be found.
       (i) Immunity.--The Commission is an agency of the United 
     States for the purpose of part V of title 18, United States 
     Code (relating to immunity of witnesses). Except as provided 
     in this subsection, a person may not be excused from 
     testifying or from producing evidence pursuant to a subpoena 
     on the ground that the testimony or evidence required by the 
     subpoena may tend to incriminate or subject that person to 
     criminal prosecution. A person, after having claimed the 
     privilege against self-incrimination, may not be criminally 
     prosecuted by reason of any transaction, matter, or thing 
     which that person is compelled to testify about or produce 
     evidence relating to, except that the person may be 
     prosecuted for perjury committed during the testimony or made 
     in the evidence.
       (j) Contract Authority.--The Commission may enter into and 
     perform such contracts, leases, cooperative agreements, and 
     other transactions as may be necessary in the conduct of the 
     functions of the Commission with any public agency or with 
     any person.
       (k) Report.--The Commission shall transmit a report to the 
     President, Attorney General of the United States, and the 
     Congress not later than three years after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act. The report shall contain a detailed 
     statement of the findings and conclusions of the Commission, 
     together with its recommendations for such legislation and 
     administrative actions as the Commission considers 
     appropriate.
       (l) Termination.--The Commission shall terminate on upon 
     the submission of report pursuant to subsection (k).
       (m) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated $750,000 to carry out this section.

  Ms. WATERS (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous 
consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the 
Record.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman 
from California?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point of order against the 
amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCollum] reserves a 
point of order against the amendment.
  Under the previous order of the House, the gentlewoman from 
California [Ms. Waters] will be recognized for 30 minutes in support of 
her amendment and a Member opposed will be recognized for 30 minutes.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from California 
[Ms. Waters].


         Modification to Amendment No. 7 Offered by Ms. Waters

  Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to modify the 
amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the modification.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Modification to amendment No. 7 offered by Ms. Waters of 
     California:
       In subsection (h), strike paragraphs (2), (3), and (4), and 
     strike ``(1) In General.--''.
       Strike subsection (i) and redesignate subsections (j), (k), 
     (l), and (m) as subsections (i), (j), (k), and (l), 
     respectively.
       In subsection (k) (as so redesignated), strike ``subsection 
     (k)'' and insert ``subsection (j)''.


[[Page H4995]]


  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman 
from California?
  Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, I would 
like to know from the gentlewoman, if she can explain, is the 
modification designed to correct the germaneness problem with the 
underlying amendment?
  Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. McCOLLUM. I yield to the gentlewoman from California.
  Ms. WATERS. Yes, it is, Mr. Chairman. I was advised that any 
reference to ``immunity'' would not be appropriate in this legislation, 
and it is designed to delete all references to ``immunity'' in this 
amendment.
  Mr. McCOLLUM. And is it further my understanding from the 
gentlewoman, if I might continue the reservation, that the agreement 
would be that she would have the 1-hour time limit that we have agreed 
upon to apply to this? I believe that is the Chair's understanding of 
this, regardless of the modification, is that not correct, 30 minutes 
to a side? Or is it 15 to a side? What is the time limit, Mr. Chairman?
  The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would inform the gentleman that under the 
previous order of the House, the gentlewoman from California [Ms. 
Waters] is entitled to 30 minutes and a Member opposed thereto is 
entitled to 30 minutes.
  Mr. McCOLLUM. And that would be applicable, Mr. Chairman, to this 
modification if the unanimous consent is agreed to?
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman is correct.
  Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my reservation of objection.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the modification offered by the 
gentlewoman from California [Ms. Waters]?
  There was no objection.
  The CHAIRMAN. The amendment is modified.
  Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my reservation of a point of 
order.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Florida withdraws his point of 
order.
  The gentlewoman from California [Ms. Waters] is recognized for 30 
minutes.
  Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I offer this amendment to establish a clandestine drug 
study commission. This commission would be composed of nine members 
appointed by the U.S. Attorney General and would be required to report 
on the following:
  Report on the steps necessary to eradicate any CIA involvement with 
drugs or those identified by Federal law enforcement agencies as drug 
smugglers.
  No. 2, secure disclosure or the gathering of Government public 
records relevant to the smuggling and distribution of illegal drugs 
into and within the United States by the CIA or others on their behalf 
or associated with the CIA.
  In addition, my amendment would authorize funds to be appropriated in 
the amount of $750,000.
  Mr. Chairman and Members, I am sure there are those both within this 
House and within the sound of my voice who would wonder why would we 
need such an amendment, why would I take this floor and talk about 
taking steps to make sure that the CIA is not involved in drugs or drug 
smuggling.
  Mr. Chairman, I do this because over the past year I have learned 
more than I have ever wanted to know about the CIA and drugs. How did 
it get started? It got started with a revelation about drug smuggling 
and drug trafficking that ended up in South Central Los Angeles back in 
the 1980's.
  Oh, there has been a lot of controversy about the report. Many are 
aware that the San Jose Mercury News revealed that there was a drug 
ring and the basic points of that report remain uncontested. There are 
some points in the report that are contested. For example, the report 
said that as a result of the drug trafficking, millions of dollars were 
funneled to the Contras from the sale of drugs, crack cocaine in 
particular.
  The exception that was taken to that identification simply was an 
exception that said instead of saying millions of dollars, they should 
have said they estimated there were millions of dollars. I can accept 
that. I maintain there should not have been $1 from the sale of drugs 
to support the Contras.
  But this revelation got me involved, and I have spent a lot of time 
looking at the CIA and the allegations of their involvement in drug 
trafficking in south central Los Angeles. It has taken me to many 
places, all the way to Nicaragua, where I have gone up to a place 
called Grenada and interviewed a prisoner who is well known to have 
been connected with the Cali cartel and sold drugs both for the 
Sandanistas and the Contras.
  Since my visit there, I made it known to the Inspector General, who 
is involved in an investigation, and the Inspector General further has 
sought out information from this individual. Even members of the House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence fold followed me to 
Nicaragua and interviewed the same person that had been revealed to me.
  But that is just a small part of the information that has come to me. 
As a result of my involvement, a lot of things have happened. The 
sheriff's department of the county of Los Angeles filed an extensive 
report about many of the allegations. The investigations continue.
  The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence is involved. The 
Inspector General of the CIA, the Inspector General of the Justice 
Department, they are still doing interviews, and I do not know what is 
going to happen. Hopefully there will be a report. Hopefully there will 
be hearings. But I have learned enough to know that the CIA has come 
too close, rubbed shoulders with, and been involved in some ways that 
should make us all uncomfortable, with drug dealers.
  Mr. Chairman, I have been involved for a long time and taken a closer 
look at the Central Intelligence Agency and these allegations that CIA 
operatives or assets have been involved in or had knowledge of drug 
trafficking in the United States. I mention South Central Los Angeles, 
but one need look no further than the current newspaper to find there 
are recent occasions of CIA involvement with drugs.
  Let us look at Venezuela. Earlier this year, there was a general 
named Gen. Ramon Guillen Davila, Venezuela's former drug czar, who was 
indicted by Federal prosecutors in Miami for smuggling cocaine into the 
United States.
  And according to the New York Times, uncontested by the CIA, this 
article that appeared as early as November 1993, they talked about the 
CIA and its so-called antidrug program in Venezuela and guess what? 
They concluded, and it is documented, that our CIA shipped a ton of 
nearly pure cocaine into the United States in 1990. That is a fact, 
uncontested.
  When you unravel this story, you find that the CIA concocted some 
scheme to talk about the only way it could apprehend drug dealers was 
to get involved in shipping this cocaine and selling this cocaine. They 
went to the DEA to get their permission to do it, and the DEA turned 
them down flat and said they would not be involved in this scheme in 
any shape, form, or fashion.
  But the CIA defied the DEA and they shipped this pure cocaine into 
the United States in 1990, and they have since acknowledged that they 
defied the laws of this government and allowed the drugs to be sold on 
the streets of the United States of America. I challenge anybody to 
tell me that it did not happen, because it is documented.
  Now let me tell you what unnerves me about this. We spend a lot of 
money in this House, we spend a lot of money in this Government to 
apprehend drug dealers, to try to get rid of drug trafficking. We spend 
a lot of money on drug education and prevention. We even spend money on 
alternative crop development in countries that we want to get out of 
the business of raising the coca leaf. We spend billions of the 
taxpayers' dollars.
  Knowing this and being involved in this struggle, it really unnerves 
me to find out that my own CIA brought cocaine into the United States 
and allowed it to get on the streets and be sold. Do you know what that 
means? We are representing communities

[[Page H4996]]

where drugs are devastating our communities. People are becoming 
addicted. Oh, and it is not simply in inner cities, it is in rural 
communities, it is in suburbia, it is everything, everywhere. It is 
swallowing us up.
  I do not know what kind of cockamamie scheme they could have cooked 
up to talk about this would help them to apprehend drug dealers by 
allowing drugs to be sold on the streets of the United States of 
America. How many more people became addicted? How many more people got 
involved in crime? How many more people became a part of the 
destruction that we all hate so much? I do not like it and I am not 
going to get off this business about who they are and what they do and 
their involvement with drugs until this body has the guts and the 
nerves to do something about it.

                              {time}  2030

  The joint CIA/Venezuela force was headed by General Davila and the 
ranking CIA officer, I am going to call the names, was Mark McFarlin, 
who worked with the antiguerrilla forces in El Salvador in the 1980's. 
Not one CIA official has ever been indicted or prosecuted for this 
abuse of authority. I will give it to my colleagues again. General 
Davila and Mark McFarlin. Look it up.
  What happened? Why can we not ask the questions? Why are we not 
outraged that these drugs found their way into our cities?
  Let me go a little bit further and talk about this alignment, this 
association, the CIA being involved, coming too close to people who 
traffic in drugs. In a March 8, 1997, Los Angeles Times article, it was 
reported that Lt. Col. Michel Francois, one of the CIA's Haitian 
agents, and I defy anybody to tell me he was not, a former army officer 
and a key leader in the military regime that ran Haiti between 1991 and 
1994, he was indicted in Miami and charged with smuggling 33 tons of 
cocaine into the United States. The article detailed that Francois met 
face to face with the leaders of three Colombian cartels to arrange for 
drug shipments to pass through Haiti via a private airstrip that he 
helped to build and protect. The CIA was right there in Haiti while he 
was building this airstrip. He was trained by the CIA. Francois is the 
CIA's boy.
  Lieutenant Colonel Francois was trained by the U.S. Army in military 
command training for foreign officers in Georgia. He was a senior 
member of the Service Intelligence Agency, a Haitian intelligence 
organization founded with the help of the CIA in 1986.
  After the 1991 coup put Francois in power, the cocaine seizures in 
Haiti just plummeted to near zero. He could do whatever he wanted to 
do. He built a strip. He met with the cartels. All of this is in DEA 
reports. U.S. prosecutors have requested the extradition of Francois 
from Honduras, where he has been living under a grant of political 
asylum. When I tell my colleagues our own CIA is documented as having 
brought cocaine in, in the Venezuelan fiasco, and when I tell my 
colleagues that Francois is a creation of the CIA and that the 
apprehension of drugs and drug smuggling and trafficking went down once 
he took charge, I am accusing the CIA of being too close, of being too 
involved, for turning its head.
  Mr. Chairman, let me just wrap up my comments by saying I have 
pointed out today on several occasions some of the problems with the 
Central Intelligence Agency. I have pointed out the fact that some of 
our allies and our friends around the world have been sending us this 
quiet but stern message. They are asking us to leave. I have talked 
about something that none of us are proud of, the fact that there is a 
breakdown in this agency and we have people that we pay to protect and 
serve literally endangering us all with the selling of information. I 
have pointed out that not only do we have all of this occurring, but 
that our own soldiers were put at risk because something is wrong in 
this CIA. I am disturbed that we could not get much support in trying 
to slap them on the wrist, cut the budget just a little bit, but I am 
convinced that the American people will join us in the struggle because 
this is a struggle and a battle that we are going to have to wage for a 
long time.
  I am not accusing the Members who have taken this floor in efforts to 
protect the CIA. I understand. There are responsible Members of this 
House who really believe, despite the problems of the CIA, everything 
should be done to protect them, to make sure they have all the money 
they need to operate with, that somehow if we question them, we are 
going to put at risk their ability to gather the intelligence 
information we need.
  We need to redefine the role of the CIA in this post-cold-war era. 
Who are they and what do they do? Someone pointed out to me today that 
in every aspect of our society, with the new technology we have been 
able to reduce personnel, we have been able to put in systems and 
processes to better manage information, we have been able to reduce 
cost, and many on the opposite side of the aisle have made these 
arguments time and time again as they have gone about cutting and 
redesigning and privatizing and all of those things that we hear about 
on the floor.
  Why is it the CIA escapes any of this? Why has the new technology not 
caught up with the CIA? Why can we not shine the light in ways that we 
understand, where the money is going? Why can we not redesign the ways 
in which we relate to them and still respect some of the secrecy and 
privacy that is needed?
  I say to my colleagues, today I have been afforded the opportunity to 
take this floor and talk about this issue in the hopes that we can 
focus, we can really put this on our radar screen and begin to raise 
questions and get the American public involved in raising questions. I 
hope that this debate will allow that.
  I am under no illusions about everything that I want being embraced 
by the protectors of the CIA, right or wrong. But I know one thing: 
This platform that is afforded to me by the voters on this floor of 
Congress is an important tool to be used to create a discussion. I see 
my responsibility to create discussions that maybe others will not. I 
am not afraid of the CIA, I am not going to run from the CIA, I am not 
going to tuck my tail and duck my head and talk about their 
untouchables. This day we unveiled some of the problems, along with 
other Members who have taken this floor.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the gentlewoman's 
amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] is recognized for 
30 minutes.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from California [Mr. Dixon].
  Mr. DIXON. I thank the chairman of the committee for yielding me this 
time.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in reluctant opposition to the Waters amendment, 
reluctant for several reasons. The gentlewoman from California [Ms. 
Waters] is the chairman of our Congressional Black Caucus. She 
represents a community that I represent, Los Angeles County, cities in 
that community, but probably most importantly because I think we, both 
of us, as well as most Members of this House, are seeking accurate and 
truthful information as it relates to the CIA involvement in crack 
cocaine in Los Angeles, or any other community of this country, and any 
involvement it has had with members or assets of the community in 
either aiding or abetting or having knowledge of the CIA involvement in 
the distribution of drugs.
  The reason I rise in opposition to it, this commission that is being 
offered here as an amendment suggests that the process that we have 
here is either not operating in good faith or is broken. As most of the 
Members know, the inspector generals of the CIA and the Justice 
Department are investigating this matter at this point in time. Both 
gentlemen have reputations for not only being independent but calling 
it like it is, and I doubt if anyone here feels that if they find some 
wrongdoing or some culpability on the part of the CIA that in fact they 
will not include it in their reports.

  It has been my experience as a member of the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence that no member of that committee is an 
apologist or tries to represent the interests of the CIA, but as the 
gentlewoman from California [Ms. Waters] does, represents the

[[Page H4997]]

interests of the citizens of this country. And so I stand here not as 
an apologist for the CIA, but with the same goal that the gentlewoman 
from California [Ms. Waters] has, to get to the facts in this matter.
  Mr. Chairman, we all know that facts that are suggested or alluded to 
in newspaper articles, there may be some truth to them, they may be 
entirely true, or they may be entirely untrue. But I think it is the 
responsibility of the House and the inspector generals to take the 
first cut at sorting out those facts.
  The gentlewoman from California [Ms. Waters] is right, that other 
than the publisher of the San Jose Mercury, no one has contested the 
points made in the article. No one has contested those points at this 
point in time because factually no one knows exactly what has occurred. 
This committee is about verifying facts in that report. I daresay we 
would be derelict if we came to the House on a bit-by-bit basis to 
either sanction what was in the article or criticize it, the point 
being that the investigations, if they are to go forward, will come to 
some conclusions about the validity of the arguments and the points 
made in the article.
  As it relates to the CIA and drug trafficking, I can say that I think 
the CIA has made some terrible blunders in the past. I do not think 
that there is anyone here that would deny that. But the issue before us 
is whether or not they were either involved in trafficking by aiding 
and abetting, or knew of, had knowledge of, drug traffickers.
  The reports that I have read thus far do not lead me to that 
conclusion at this point in time. Let me say that again: The reports 
that I have read thus far do not lead me to that conclusion at this 
point in time.
  I have read the newspaper articles, I have read other materials and 
interviewed people, and at some point in time I may be joining the 
gentlewoman from California [Ms. Waters] on this floor asking for some 
type of public commission. But now is not the time, I suggest to the 
members of this committee. Now is the time to let the structure of the 
Justice Department, the CIA inspector general and the House to move 
forward in an objective evaluation.
  I am not naive enough to think whatever this committee finds and 
whatever the Inspector Generals find, that in fact there will be a 
consensus opinion. And if there is not a consensus opinion and there is 
fault to be found with either a lack of thoroughness or professionalism 
or even covering up, that would be the time to move forward with some 
commission. I have reservations about the composition of the commission 
and some of the structure, but I am sure that the gentlewoman from 
California [Ms. Waters] and I at the appropriate time could work that 
out.
  For example, there is a prohibition in here that any employee of the 
U.S. Government, past or present, could not be a member of that 
commission. I think that there are many people who have been employed 
by the U.S. Government who have expertise and abilities that could 
appropriately serve on the commission, and I would feel it is certainly 
insulting to say that anyone who has ever worked for Government could 
not be objective in this issue.
  As it relates to the issue of people who have been assets of the CIA, 
whether they be in Venezuela or Haiti, there is no doubt that some of 
the assets should never have been employed by the CIA. There is no 
doubt that some of them have been involved in drug trafficking. But 
that is like saying some Member of Congress being arrested for drugs, 
that the Congress of the United States is responsible for it.

                              {time}  2045

  Let us sort through the facts without emotion. Then let people come 
forward and criticize the report, scrub it, examine it, and then at 
that point in time I may be joining the gentlewoman from California 
[Ms. Waters] on some outside citizens panel to review that material and 
to carry the investigation forward, but now is not the time.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire as to how much time I have 
remaining?
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentlewoman from California [Ms. Waters] has 12\1/
2\ minutes remaining, and the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] has 16 
minutes remaining.
  Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, let me just say that I hold the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Dixon] in the highest esteem and respect, and I have 
worked with him, and we do share this area of Los Angeles where the 
drug trafficking took place, where the CIA is alleged to have been 
deeply involved in trafficking in drugs and the profits of which, some 
of them, went to fund the contras, the contras having been created by 
the CIA. That was their body, and the FDN, the army of the contras, was 
a creation of the CIA's.
  And I am working to get to the bottom of this, but my commission that 
I am asking for is not only about that. This is more generic, and it 
encompasses the question of drug trafficking, period, by the CIA.
  And I would like to raise a question of the gentleman from California 
[Mr. Dixon] so that I can help make a determination about his 
representations regarding the investigations that are going on and the 
possibility that he may join me, depending on what he has discovered or 
they discovered as a result of the House intelligence investigation.
  Has the gentleman's committee investigated the Venezuelan dope 
dealing of the CIA where I have in no uncertain terms identified on the 
floor of Congress the fact that they were responsible for tons of 
cocaine coming into the United States that got sold on the streets of 
America? Has the gentleman done anything about that? Has he looked at 
that?
  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Ms. WATERS. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. DIXON. Mr Chairman, yes, there has been testimony before the 
committee. There has not been a thorough investigation, but there has 
been testimony before the committee by the CIA.
  The CIA, as I recall their testimony, one, denied that they ever 
approved it because they recognized that in fact it would be hard to 
trace once it got into the United States and also DEA rejected it.
  It is true that this man was an operative in form at some point in 
time with the CIA, but they deny ever having approved or sanctioned 
this activity, and this activity, according to them, was taken on 
independently by the general.
  Ms. WATERS. May I ask of the gentleman whether or not there has been 
any report on it, and since this exposure was given to this in the New 
York Times, we have not seen a response of any kind, we have not seen 
the work of the gentleman's committee answering this in any way.
  Mr. Chairman, we cannot have the New York Times or any other 
newspaper documenting and court records documenting trafficking in 
cocaine by the CIA and CIA operatives, and we just sit mum and not tell 
the American public anything.
  So is there a report on this in any way? If there is no report, would 
the gentleman be willing to issue some kind of report between him and 
the chairman? Could the gentleman from California make some 
representation about what he will be willing to do, given we know this 
information about drug trafficking by the CIA?
  Mr. DIXON. Yes. The staff informs me that in fact there has been a 
report to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence by the 
inspector general, and I am sure with certain permission that the 
gentlewoman from California could review that report. But I will 
indicate to her since she has raised it and created the inference that 
the CIA was involved, I feel duty obligated to go forward and look at 
this once again.
  Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, yes, let me be clear about this one, and I 
do not go this far even in the South L.A. one. I am accusing the CIA on 
this one based on the information that I have of having been 
responsible for tons of cocaine coming into the United States that got 
sold on the streets of America. That is an accusation that I am making 
clear, simple, and without any reservations.
  So what I am saying to the gentleman:
  It is not enough for me to see the report. What can we do to share 
this information with the American public? Is

[[Page H4998]]

there anything that can be done to shed some light on this?
  Mr. DIXON. If the gentlewoman will continue to yield, first of all I 
think that it would be good for her to read the report.
  Ms. WATERS. I will do that.
  Mr. DIXON. So that the CIA's perspective on this is there, and 
perhaps the committee chairman or others, since this issue has been 
raised that the report can be scrubbed and that some materials could be 
released; but I do think, Mr. Chairman, that we have a responsibility 
with the charge made just on the floor that the CIA was responsible for 
the Venezuelan drug transaction, to either refute or make some 
statement about this based upon an investigation in the materials that 
we have already collected. I think that is a very serious allegation.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield to me?
  Ms. WATERS. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
  Mr. GOSS. As far as I am concerned, if the gentlewoman has some new 
information that is additional or supplemental or complementary to any 
of the previous work that has been done on this, that she would bring 
it to the committee's attention, that we will obviously attend to it 
forthwith. My understanding is that there has been some work done on 
this; I do not know the exact status, because we are dealing with 
somewhat of a new subject that is just a little bit off the record here 
of what I thought we were talking about, but I am certainly willing, as 
we have been all along the way on this, with the gentlewoman, with the 
gentleman from California [Mr. Dixon], and as seen with the gentlewoman 
from California [Ms. Millender-McDonald] earlier in our colloquy.
  Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I do not want to be snowed, I do not want 
to be patronized, I do not want to be talked to in that way. I have 
asked. I have made an accusation on the floor of Congress about the CIA 
and the Venezuelan drug deal, and I am asking the gentleman based on 
the information that he has, is there any way that he can shed some 
light or share this information with the American public?
  I want to know.
  Mr. GOSS. If the gentlewoman will continue to yield, the gentlewoman 
is referring, I think, to events that transpired before I was 
privileged to be on this committee, and that is why, since I had no 
forewarning that that was going to be a subject today, I am simply not 
prepared to give her any specific information.
  I am certainly welcome to assure that we will attend to her request 
to see if there is anything into it, as we would with any Member who 
brings forward that type of a serious allegation.
  Ms. WATERS. Could the gentleman be a little bit clearer about what it 
is he is committing to? The gentleman said he would attend to it. Could 
the gentleman tell me how he can satisfy the concerns that I have 
raised, and I am not being facetious at this point, but I have made a 
specific charge, and I am asking the gentleman, even though he was not 
the Chair, the records did not leave with the last Chair; I want to 
know what can the gentleman do to shed some light on this information?
  Mr. DIXON. If the gentlewoman will yield and if I could suggest to 
the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss], one, that a lot of this 
evidentiary material will come out in the trial. As I understand, he is 
on trial in Florida. Second, I do think, Mr. Chairman, we have an 
obligation to go back and look at the inspector general's report, and, 
as I recall it, it did not in any way involve the CIA and the 
transportation or distribution of the drugs that the gentleman is being 
charged with.
  But this is a very serious accusation that the gentlewoman from 
California [Ms. Waters] is making, and I want to emphasize it. She is 
alleging that the CIA was involved with the Venezuelan general in 
bringing drugs into the country. I assume that means either aiding, 
abetting, or being a sponsor of those drugs.
  Ms. WATERS. That is right.
  Mr. DIXON. And I think that we have a responsibility to, once again, 
go back and look at this case, notwithstanding the prosecution that is 
going on in Florida and notwithstanding what the inspector general has 
said.
  Ms. WATERS. And also would the gentleman add to this discussion 
whether or not the former drug czar who worked with the CIA is going to 
be extradited for this case? Is there an extradition problem?
  Mr. GOSS. If the gentlewoman will yield to me, I presume these 
questions are being directed to me.
  Ms. WATERS. The gentleman from Florida or anybody else who can answer 
that.
  Mr. GOSS. Let me clearly tell the gentlewoman that I have tremendous 
respect for the gentleman from California [Mr. Dixon], and I think Mr. 
Dixon has said exactly the right thing.
  The specific facts that the gentlewoman is basing her allegation on, 
I would like to know what they are. I will then deal with those facts, 
and I will advise the gentlewoman of relevant information, and the 
gentleman from California [Mr. Dixon] will be part of that process, as 
he has been, because he has been doing stellar service for our 
committee on this matter in Los Angeles because it is clearly part of 
his representation.
  Ms. WATERS. The gentleman from California [Mr. Dixon] said that he 
felt a responsibility to answer my charge. What the gentleman from 
Florida is saying is if I can bring him more information----
  Mr. GOSS. No, I am saying, if the gentlewoman will continue to yield, 
I will be very happy to join Mr. Dixon in responding as exactly as he 
has done. But it would be helpful to me to know all of the details of 
what the gentlewoman knows.
  I take very seriously, living in Florida, which is not unlike the 
problem in California, of drug smuggling and the impact we see on our 
streets. We have a problem. We are not insensitive to this, I assure my 
colleague, and I assure her that there are unfolding events every 
minute in the war on drugs, every minute, and the intelligence part of 
that we are attending to. We are committing dollars, and we hope we 
have the gentlewoman's support for our budget for those dollars.
  Ms. WATERS. Oh, no. I have been to every budget committee, every 
appropriations committee where there are appropriations for drugs to 
talk about the Black Caucus' No. 1 priority of eradicating drugs in 
this Nation. It is not only our No. 1 priority, we have come, we have 
testified before the committees, we have supported the drug czar, we 
have supported the President's budget, we have even asked for more 
money, and we have come up with ways by which to work closer with the 
drug czar on this issue.
  So we are serious about this, but let me just say this:
  Given my friend and my colleague's representations, along with the 
gentleman from Florida, about feeling a responsibility to respond to 
the very serious accusation that I have made here today, I accept that 
as not only a representation for himself, but for him and others, and 
the committee; and even though we are clear that my bringing forth new 
information is not a condition for his moving forward, if I have or can 
locate new information, I will be happy to work with the gentleman on 
it. But I do expect that this commitment on the House of the floor that 
has been made about shedding light per the gentleman from California 
[Mr. Dixon] and supported by the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] is 
something that we can rely on.
  So let me just say this:
  My colleague whom I have worked with not just since I came to 
Congress 6 years ago, but about 30 years now, having served with him in 
the State of California in the assembly and prior to that when I 
managed campaigns and all of that, I accept----
  The CHAIRMAN. All time of the gentlewoman from California [Ms. 
Waters] has expired.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I am very happy to yield 1 more minute to the 
gentlewoman from California to wrap up.
  Ms. WATERS. I thought when the gentleman heard the word ``accept'' he 
would be generous, and I thank him very much.
  I accept his representations that these investigations are going on 
now, and I know that. And I do think that perhaps it is a little 
premature, and maybe that is something we will do after if, in fact, we 
do not believe that the information is credible, the work

[[Page H4999]]

has been good, or we learn more about it.

                              {time}  2100

  I do think that that would be the correct order of things. Today 
provided us with the opportunity to shed more light, to get something 
moving. I accept that he rejects, he does not accept, my amendment. He 
believes the commission is premature. He will work with me. I will work 
with the gentleman, I will work with the other gentlemen, and everyone 
else.
  Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to withdraw my amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman 
from California?
  There was no objection.
  The CHAIRMAN. Are there further amendments to title III of the bill?
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the remainder of 
the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute be considered as 
read and printed in the Record.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Florida?
  There was no objection.
  The text of the remainder of the committee amendment in the nature of 
a substitute is as follows:
                 TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

     SEC. 401. MULTIYEAR LEASING AUTHORITY.

       (a) In General.--Section 5 of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency Act of 1949 is amended--
       (1) by redesignating paragraphs (a) through (f) as 
     paragraphs (1) through (6), respectively;
       (2) by inserting ``(a)'' after ``Sec. 5.'';
       (3) by striking ``and'' at the end of paragraph (5), as so 
     redesignated;
       (4) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (6), as 
     so redesignated, and inserting ``; and'';
       (5) by inserting after paragraph (6) the following new 
     paragraph:
       ``(7) Notwithstanding section 1341(a)(1) of title 31, 
     United States Code, enter into multiyear leases for up to 15 
     years that are not otherwise authorized pursuant to section 8 
     of this Act.''; and
       (6) by inserting at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(b)(1) The authority to enter into a multiyear lease 
     under subsection (a)(7) shall be subject to appropriations 
     provided in advance for (A) the entire lease, or (B) the 
     first 12 months of the lease and the Government's estimated 
     termination liability.
       ``(2) In the case of any such lease entered into under 
     clause (B) of paragraph (1)--
       ``(A) such lease shall include a clause that provides that 
     the contract shall be terminated if budget authority (as 
     defined by section 3(2) of the Congressional Budget and 
     Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 622(2))) is not 
     provided specifically for that project in an appropriations 
     Act in advance of an obligation of funds in respect thereto;
       ``(B) notwithstanding section 1552 of title 31, United 
     States Code, amounts obligated for paying termination costs 
     in respect of such lease shall remain available until the 
     costs associated with termination of such lease are paid;
       ``(C) funds available for termination liability shall 
     remain available to satisfy rental obligations in respect of 
     such lease in subsequent fiscal years in the event such lease 
     is not terminated early, but only to the extent those funds 
     are in excess of the amount of termination liability in that 
     subsequent year; and
       ``(D) annual funds made available in any fiscal year may be 
     used to make payments on such lease for a maximum of 12 
     months beginning any time during the fiscal year.''.
       (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) 
     applies with respect to multiyear leases entered into 
     pursuant to section 5 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act 
     of 1949, as amended by subsection (a), on or after October 1, 
     1997.

     SEC. 402. CIA CENTRAL SERVICES PROGRAM.

       The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a 
     et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
     section:


                       ``central services program

       ``Sec. 21. (a) Establishment.--The Director may--
       ``(1) establish a program to provide the central services 
     described in subsection (b)(2); and
       ``(2) make transfers to and expenditures from the working 
     capital fund established under subsection (b)(1).
       ``(b) Establishment and Purposes of Central Services 
     Working Capital Fund.--(1) There is established a central 
     services working capital fund. The Fund shall be available 
     until expended for the purposes described in paragraph (2), 
     subject to subsection (j).
       ``(2) The purposes of the Fund are to pay for equipment, 
     salaries, maintenance, operation and other expenses for such 
     services as the Director, subject to paragraph (3), 
     determines to be central services that are appropriate and 
     advantageous to provide to the Agency or to other Federal 
     agencies on a reimbursable basis.
       ``(3) The determination and provision of central services 
     by the Director of Central Intelligence under paragraph (2) 
     shall be subject to the prior approval of the Director of the 
     Office of Management and Budget.
       ``(c) Assets in Fund.--The Fund shall consist of money and 
     assets, as follows:
       ``(1) Amounts appropriated to the Fund for its initial 
     monetary capitalization.
       ``(2) Appropriations available to the Agency under law for 
     the purpose of supplementing the Fund.
       ``(3) Such inventories, equipment, and other assets, 
     including inventories and equipment on order, pertaining to 
     the services to be carried on by the central services 
     program.
       ``(4) Such other funds as the Director is authorized to 
     transfer to the Fund.
       ``(d) Limitations.--(1) The total value of orders for 
     services described in subsection (b)(2) from the central 
     services program at any time shall not exceed an annual 
     amount approved in advance by the Director of the Office of 
     Management and Budget.
       ``(2) No goods or services may be provided to any non-
     Federal entity by the central services program.
       ``(e) Reimbursements to Fund.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of law, the Fund shall be--
       ``(1) reimbursed, or credited with advance payments, from 
     applicable appropriations and funds of the Agency, other 
     Intelligence Community agencies, or other Federal agencies, 
     for the central services performed by the central services 
     program, at rates that will recover the full cost of 
     operations paid for from the Fund, including accrual of 
     annual leave, workers' compensation, depreciation of 
     capitalized plant and equipment, and amortization of 
     automated data processing software; and
       ``(2) if applicable credited with the receipts from sale or 
     exchange of property, including any real property, or in 
     payment for loss or damage to property, held by the central 
     services program as assets of the Fund.
       ``(f) Retention of Portion of Fund Income.--(1) The 
     Director may impose a fee for central services provided from 
     the Fund. The fee for any item or service provided under the 
     central services program may not exceed four percent of the 
     cost of such item or service.
       ``(2) As needed for the continued self-sustaining operation 
     of the Fund, an amount not to exceed four percent of the net 
     receipts of the Fund in fiscal year 1998 and each fiscal year 
     thereafter may be retained, subject to subsection (j), for 
     the acquisition of capital equipment and for the improvement 
     and implementation of the Agency's information management 
     systems (including financial management, payroll, and 
     personnel information systems). Any proposed use of the 
     retained income in fiscal years 1998, 1999, and 2000, shall 
     only be made with the approval of the Director of the Office 
     of Management and Budget and after notification to the 
     Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of 
     the Senate.
       ``(3) Not later than 30 days after the close of each fiscal 
     year, amounts in excess of the amount retained under 
     paragraph (2) shall be transferred to the United States 
     Treasury.
       ``(g) Audit.--(1) The Inspector General of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency shall conduct and complete an audit of 
     the Fund within three months after the close of each fiscal 
     year. The Director of the Office of Management and Budget 
     shall determine the form and content of the audit, which 
     shall include at least an itemized accounting of the central 
     services provided, the cost of each service, the total 
     receipts received, the agencies or departments serviced, and 
     the amount returned to the United States Treasury.
       ``(2) Not later than 30 days after the completion of the 
     audit, the Inspector General shall submit a copy of the audit 
     to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the 
     Director of Central Intelligence, the Permanent Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and 
     the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
       ``(h) Definitions.--For purposes of this section--
       ``(1) the term `central services program' means the program 
     established under subsection (a); and
       ``(2) the term `Fund' means the central services working 
     capital fund established under subsection (b)(1).
       ``(i) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated to the Fund $5,000,000 for the purposes 
     specified in subsection (b)(2).
       ``(j) Termination.--(1) The Fund shall terminate on March 
     31, 2000, unless otherwise reauthorized by an Act of Congress 
     prior to that date.
       ``(2) Subject to paragraph (1) and after providing notice 
     to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives and the Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the Senate, the Director of Central 
     Intelligence and the Director of the Office of Management and 
     Budget--
       ``(A) may terminate the central services program and the 
     Fund at any time; and
       ``(B) upon any such termination, shall provide for 
     dispositions of personnel, assets, liabilities, grants, 
     contracts, property, records, and unexpended balances of 
     appropriations, authorizations, allocations, and other funds 
     held, used, arising from, available to, or to be made 
     available in connection with such Fund, as may be 
     necessary.''.

     SEC. 403. PROTECTION OF CIA FACILITIES.

       Subsection (a) of section 15 of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403o(a)) is amended--
       (1) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(a)'';
       (2) by striking ``powers only within Agency 
     installations,'' and all that follows through the end, and 
     inserting the following: ``powers--
       ``(A) within the Agency Headquarters Compound and the 
     property controlled and occupied by the Federal Highway 
     Administration located immediately adjacent to such Compound 
     and in the streets, sidewalks, and the open

[[Page H5000]]

     areas within the zone beginning at the outside boundary of 
     such Compound and property and extending outward 500 feet; 
     and
       ``(B) within any other Agency installation and in the 
     streets, sidewalks, and open areas within the zone beginning 
     at the outside boundary of any such installation and 
     extending outward 500 feet.''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
       ``(2) The performance of functions and exercise of powers 
     under paragraph (1) shall be limited to those circumstances 
     where such personnel can identify specific and articulable 
     facts giving such personnel reason to believe that their 
     performance of such functions and exercise of such powers is 
     reasonable to protect against physical attack or threats of 
     attack upon the Agency installations, property, or employees.
       ``(3) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to 
     preclude, or limit in any way, the authority of any Federal, 
     State, or local law enforcement agency or of any other 
     Federal police or Federal protective service.
       ``(4) The rules and regulations enforced by such personnel 
     shall be the rules and regulations promulgated by the 
     Director and shall only be applicable to the areas referred 
     to in paragraph (1).
       ``(5) On December 1, 1998, and annually thereafter, the 
     Director shall submit a report to the Permanent Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and 
     the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate that 
     describes in detail the exercise of the authority granted by 
     this subsection, and the underlying facts supporting the 
     exercise of such authority, during the preceding fiscal year. 
     The Director shall make such report available to the 
     Inspector General of the Agency.''.
         TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

     SEC. 501. AUTHORITY TO AWARD ACADEMIC DEGREE OF BACHELOR OF 
                   SCIENCE IN INTELLIGENCE.

       (a) Authority for New Bachelor's Degree.--Section 2161 of 
     title 10, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:

     ``Sec. 2161. Joint Military Intelligence College: academic 
       degrees

       ``Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense, 
     the president of the Joint Military Intelligence College may, 
     upon recommendation by the faculty of the college, confer 
     upon a graduate of the college who has fulfilled the 
     requirements for the degree the following:
       ``(1) The degree of Master of Science of Strategic 
     Intelligence (MSSI).
       ``(2) The degree of Bachelor of Science in Intelligence 
     (BSI).''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The item relating to that section 
     in the table of sections at the beginning of chapter 108 of 
     such title is amended to read as follows:

``2161. Joint Military Intelligence College: academic degrees.''.

     SEC. 502. UNAUTHORIZED USE OF NAME, INITIALS, OR SEAL OF 
                   NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE.

       (a) Extension, Reorganization, and Consolidation of 
     Authorities.--Subchapter I of chapter 21 of title 10, United 
     States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following 
     new section:

     ``Sec. 425. Prohibition of unauthorized use of name, 
       initials, or seal: specified intelligence agencies

       ``(a) Prohibition.--Except with the written permission of 
     the Secretary of Defense, no person may knowingly use, in 
     connection with any merchandise, retail product, 
     impersonation, solicitation, or commercial activity in a 
     manner reasonably calculated to convey the impression that 
     such use is approved, endorsed, or authorized by the 
     Secretary of Defense, any of the following (or any colorable 
     imitation thereof):
       ``(1) The words `Defense Intelligence Agency', the initials 
     `DIA', or the seal of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
       ``(2) The words `National Reconnaissance Office', the 
     initials `NRO', or the seal of the National Reconnaissance 
     Office.
       ``(3) The words `National Imagery and Mapping Agency', the 
     initials `NIMA', or the seal of the National Imagery and 
     Mapping Agency.
       ``(4) The words `Defense Mapping Agency', the initials 
     `DMA', or the seal of the Defense Mapping Agency.''.
       (b) Transfer of Enforcement Authority.--Subsection (b) of 
     section 202 of title 10, United States Code, is transferred 
     to the end of section 425 of such title, as added by 
     subsection (a), and is amended by inserting ``Authority To 
     Enjoin Violations.--'' after ``(b)''.
       (c) Repeal of Reorganized Provisions.--Sections 202 and 445 
     of title 10, United States Code, are repealed.
       (d) Clerical Amendments.--
       (1) The table of sections at the beginning of subchapter II 
     of chapter 8 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by 
     striking out the item relating to section 202.
       (2) The table of sections at the beginning of subchapter I 
     of chapter 21 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by 
     striking out the items relating to sections 424 and 425 and 
     inserting in lieu thereof the following:

``424. Disclosure of organizational and personnel information: 
              exemption for Defense Intelligence Agency, National 
              Reconnaissance Office, and National Imagery and Mapping 
              Agency.
``425. Prohibition of unauthorized use of name, initials, or seal: 
              specified intelligence agencies.''.
       (3) The table of sections at the beginning of subchapter I 
     of chapter 22 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by 
     striking out the item relating to section 445.

     SEC. 503. EXTENSION OF AUTHORITY FOR ENHANCEMENT OF 
                   CAPABILITIES OF CERTAIN ARMY FACILITIES.

       Effective October 1, 1997, section 506(b) of the 
     Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Public 
     Law 104-93; 109 Stat. 974) is amended by striking out 
     ``fiscal years 1996 and 1997'' and inserting in lieu thereof 
     ``fiscal years 1998 and 1999''.
         TITLE VI--MISCELLANEOUS COMMUNITY PROGRAM ADJUSTMENTS

     SEC. 601. COORDINATION OF ARMED FORCES INFORMATION SECURITY 
                   PROGRAMS.

       (a) Program Execution Coordination.--The Secretary of a 
     military department or the head of a defense agency may not 
     obligate or expend funds for any information security program 
     of that military department without the concurrence of the 
     Director of the National Security Agency.
       (b) Effective Date.--This section takes effect on October 
     1, 1997.

     SEC. 602. AUTHORITY OF EXECUTIVE AGENT OF INTEGRATED 
                   BROADCAST SERVICE.

       All amounts appropriated for any fiscal year for 
     intelligence information data broadcast systems may be 
     obligated or expended by an intelligence element of the 
     Department of Defense only with the concurrence of the 
     official in the Department of Defense designated as the 
     executive agent of the Integrated Broadcast Service.

     SEC. 603. PREDATOR UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE.

       (a) Transfer of Functions.--Effective October 1, 1997, the 
     functions described in subsection (b) with respect to the 
     Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle are transferred to the 
     Secretary of the Air Force.
       (b) Functions To Be Transferred.--Subsection (a) applies to 
     those functions performed as of June 1, 1997, by the 
     organization within the Department of Defense known as the 
     Unmanned Aerial Joint Program Office with respect to the 
     Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle.
       (c) Transfer of Funds.--Effective October 1, 1997, all 
     unexpended funds appropriated for the Predator Unmanned 
     Aerial Vehicle that are within the Defense-Wide Program 
     Element number 0305205D are transferred to Air Force Program 
     Element number 0305154F.

     SEC. 604. U-2 SENSOR PROGRAM.

       (a) Requirement for Minimum Number of Aircraft.--The 
     Secretary of Defense shall ensure--
       (1) that not less than 11 U-2 reconnaissance aircraft are 
     equipped with RAS-1 sensor suites; and
       (2) that each such aircraft that is so equipped is 
     maintained in a manner necessary to counter available threat 
     technologies until the aircraft is retired or until a 
     successor sensor suite is developed and fielded.
       (b) Effective Date.--Subsection (a) takes effect on October 
     1, 1997.

     SEC. 605. REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET 
                   JUSTIFICATION BOOKS.

       (a) In General.--The congressional budget justification 
     books for any element of the intelligence community submitted 
     to Congress in support of the budget of the President for any 
     fiscal year shall include, at a minimum, the following:
       (1) For each program for which appropriations are requested 
     for that element of the intelligence community in that 
     budget--
       (A) specification of the program, including the program 
     element number for the program;
       (B) the specific dollar amount requested for the program;
       (C) the appropriation account within which funding for the 
     program is placed;
       (D) the budget line item that applies to the program;
       (E) specification of whether the program is a research and 
     development program or otherwise involves research and 
     development;
       (F) identification of the total cost for the program; and
       (G) information relating to all direct and associated costs 
     in each appropriations account for the program.
       (2) A detailed accounting of all reprogramming or 
     reallocation actions and the status of those actions at the 
     time of submission of those materials.
       (3) Information relating to any unallocated cuts or taxes.
       (b) Definitions.--For purposes of this section:
       (1) The term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning 
     given that term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a).
       (2) The term ``congressional budget justification books'' 
     means the budget justification materials submitted to 
     Congress for any fiscal year in support of the budget for 
     that fiscal year for any element of the intelligence 
     community (as contained in the budget of the President 
     submitted to Congress for that fiscal year pursuant to 
     section 1105 of title 31, United States Code).
       (c) Effective Date.--Subsection (a) shall take effect with 
     respect to fiscal year 1999.

     SEC. 606. COORDINATION OF AIR FORCE JOINT SIGINT PROGRAM 
                   OFFICE ACTIVITIES WITH OTHER MILITARY 
                   DEPARTMENTS.

       (a) Contracts.--The Secretary of the Air Force, acting 
     through the Air Force Joint Airborne Signals Intelligence 
     Program Office, may not modify, amend, or alter a JSAF 
     program contract without coordinating with the Secretary of 
     any other military department that would be affected by the 
     modification, amendment, alteration.
       (b) New Developments Affecting Operational Military 
     Requirements.--(1) The Secretary of the Air Force, acting 
     through the Air Force Joint Airborne Signals Intelligence 
     Program Office, may not enter into a contract described in 
     paragraph (2) without coordinating with the Secretary of the 
     military department concerned.
       (2) Paragraph (1) applies to a contract for development 
     relating to a JSAF program that may

[[Page H5001]]

     directly affect the operational requirements of one of the 
     Armed Forces (other than the Air Force) for the satisfaction 
     of intelligence requirements.
       (c) JSAF Program Defined.--For purposes of this section, 
     the term ``JSAF program'' means a program within the Joint 
     Signals Intelligence Avionics Family of programs administered 
     by the Air Force Joint Airborne Signals Intelligence Program 
     Office.
       (d) Effective Date.--This section takes effect on October 
     1, 1997.

     SEC. 607. DISCONTINUATION OF THE DEFENSE SPACE RECONNAISSANCE 
                   PROGRAM.

       Not later than October 1, 1999, the Secretary of Defense 
     shall--
       (1) discontinue the Defense Space Reconnaissance Program (a 
     program within the Joint Military Intelligence Program); and
       (2) close the organization within the Department of Defense 
     known as the Defense Space Program Office (the management 
     office for that program).

     SEC. 608. TERMINATION OF DEFENSE AIRBORNE RECONNAISSANCE 
                   OFFICE.

       (a) Termination of Office.--The organization within the 
     Department of Defense known as the Defense Airborne 
     Reconnaissance Office is terminated. No funds available for 
     the Department of Defense may be used for the operation of 
     that Office after the date specified in subsection (d).
       (b) Transfer of Functions.--(1) Subject to paragraphs (3) 
     and (4), the Secretary of Defense shall transfer to the 
     Defense Intelligence Agency those functions performed on the 
     day before the date of the enactment this Act by the Defense 
     Airborne Reconnaissance Office that are specified in 
     paragraph (2).
       (2) The functions transferred by the Secretary to the 
     Defense Intelligence Agency under paragraph (1) shall include 
     functions of the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office 
     relating to its responsibilities for management oversight and 
     coordination of defense airborne reconnaissance capabilities 
     (other than any responsibilities for acquisition of systems).
       (3) The Secretary shall determine which specific functions 
     are appropriate for transfer under paragraph (1). In making 
     that determination, the Secretary shall ensure that 
     responsibility for individual airborne reconnaissance 
     programs with respect to program management, for research, 
     development, test, and evaluation, for acquisition, and for 
     operations and related line management remain with the 
     respective Secretaries of the military departments.
       (4) Any function transferred to the Defense Intelligence 
     Agency under this subsection is subject to the authority, 
     direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense.
       (c) Report.--(1) Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall 
     submit to the committees named in paragraph (2) a report 
     containing the Secretary's plan for terminating the Defense 
     Airborne Reconnaissance Office and transferring the functions 
     of that office.
       (2) The committees referred to in paragraph (1) are--
       (A) the Committee on Armed Services and the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
       (B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the 
     Committee on National Security of the House of 
     Representatives.
       (d) Effective Date.--Subsection (a) shall take effect at 
     the end of the 120-day period beginning on the date of the 
     enactment of this Act.

  The CHAIRMAN. Are there further amendments to the committee amendment 
in the nature of a substitute?


                      Announcement By The Chairman

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the order of the House of today, 
proceedings will now resume on the amendment on which further 
proceedings were postponed: amendment No. 3 offered by the gentleman 
from Massachusetts Mr. Frank].


            Amendment Offered by Mr. Frank of Massachusetts

  The CHAIRMAN. The pending business is the demand for a recorded vote 
on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. 
Frank] on which further proceedings were postponed and on which the 
noes prevailed by voice vote.
  The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The Clerk designated the amendment.


                             Recorded Vote

  The CHAIRMAN. A recorded vote has been demanded.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 182, 
noes 238, not voting 14, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 255]

                               AYES--182

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allen
     Baldacci
     Barcia
     Barrett (WI)
     Becerra
     Bentsen
     Berry
     Blagojevich
     Blumenauer
     Bonior
     Borski
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Camp
     Campbell
     Capps
     Carson
     Chabot
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clyburn
     Condit
     Conyers
     Costello
     Coyne
     Cummings
     Danner
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (IL)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Dellums
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Dooley
     Doyle
     Duncan
     Engel
     Ensign
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Evans
     Farr
     Fazio
     Filner
     Flake
     Foglietta
     Ford
     Fox
     Frank (MA)
     Furse
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Gonzalez
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Gordon
     Green
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hall (TX)
     Hamilton
     Hastings (FL)
     Hefner
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hooley
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     Johnson (WI)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Kanjorski
     Kennedy (MA)
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kennelly
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind (WI)
     Kleczka
     Klug
     Kucinich
     LaFalce
     Lampson
     Lantos
     Largent
     Leach
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Luther
     Maloney (CT)
     Maloney (NY)
     Markey
     Matsui
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McKinney
     Meehan
     Meek
     Menendez
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller (CA)
     Minge
     Mink
     Moakley
     Moran (VA)
     Morella
     Nadler
     Neal
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Paul
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Peterson (MN)
     Petri
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Poshard
     Price (NC)
     Ramstad
     Rangel
     Riggs
     Rivers
     Rodriguez
     Roemer
     Rohrabacher
     Rothman
     Roukema
     Roybal-Allard
     Royce
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanchez
     Sanders
     Sanford
     Sawyer
     Schumer
     Sensenbrenner
     Serrano
     Shays
     Skaggs
     Snyder
     Spratt
     Stabenow
     Stark
     Stenholm
     Stokes
     Strickland
     Stupak
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Thompson
     Thurman
     Tierney
     Torres
     Traficant
     Upton
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Waters
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Weygand
     Woolsey

                               NOES--238

     Aderholt
     Andrews
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baesler
     Baker
     Ballenger
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bateman
     Bereuter
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop
     Bliley
     Blunt
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Brady
     Bryant
     Bunning
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Canady
     Cannon
     Cardin
     Castle
     Chambliss
     Chenoweth
     Christensen
     Clement
     Coble
     Coburn
     Combest
     Cook
     Cooksey
     Cox
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cubin
     Cunningham
     Davis (VA)
     Deal
     DeLay
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Dicks
     Dixon
     Doolittle
     Dreier
     Dunn
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     English
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fawell
     Foley
     Forbes
     Fowler
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frost
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gekas
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Goodling
     Goss
     Graham
     Granger
     Greenwood
     Gutknecht
     Hansen
     Harman
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hill
     Hilleary
     Hinojosa
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Holden
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Inglis
     Istook
     Jenkins
     John
     Johnson (CT)
     Jones
     Kaptur
     Kasich
     Kelly
     Kim
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Klink
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaHood
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lazio
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     Lipinski
     Livingston
     LoBiondo
     Lucas
     Manzullo
     Martinez
     Mascara
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McHale
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntosh
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     McNulty
     Metcalf
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Molinari
     Mollohan
     Moran (KS)
     Murtha
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Neumann
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Ortiz
     Packard
     Pappas
     Parker
     Paxon
     Pease
     Peterson (PA)
     Pickering
     Pickett
     Pitts
     Pombo
     Portman
     Pryce (OH)
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Rahall
     Redmond
     Regula
     Riley
     Rogan
     Rogers
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Ryun
     Salmon
     Sandlin
     Saxton
     Scarborough
     Schaefer, Dan
     Schaffer, Bob
     Scott
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Sherman
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Sisisky
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (OR)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith, Adam
     Smith, Linda
     Snowbarger
     Solomon
     Souder
     Spence
     Stearns
     Stump
     Sununu
     Talent
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Thune
     Tiahrt
     Turner
     Visclosky
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Watkins
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     White
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wise
     Wolf
     Wynn
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                             NOT VOTING--14

     Berman
     Collins
     Edwards
     Fattah
     Johnson, Sam
     Manton
     McDade
     Oxley
     Reyes
     Schiff
     Slaughter
     Towns
     Wexler
     Yates

                              {time}  2120

  The Clerk announced the following pair:
  On this vote:

       Mr. Yates for, with Mr. McDade against.

  Messrs. FOLEY, WATTS of Oklahoma, and STEARNS changed their vote from 
``aye'' to ``no.''

[[Page H5002]]

  Ms. EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON of Texas, and Messrs. PAUL, SPRATT, 
JEFFERSON, HALL of Texas, and STENHOLM changed their vote from ``no'' 
to ``aye.''
  So the amendment was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  The CHAIRMAN. There being no further amendments to the bill, the 
question is on the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, 
as amended.
  The committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended, 
was agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the Committee rises.
  Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. 
LaHood) having assumed the chair, Mr. Thornberry, Chairman of the 
Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that 
that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 1775) to 
authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1998 for intelligence and 
intelligence-related activities of the U.S. Government, the Community 
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and 
Disability System, and for other purposes, pursuant to House Resolution 
179, he reported the bill back to the House with an amendment adopted 
by the Committee of the Whole.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rule, the previous question is 
ordered.
  Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment to the committee 
amendment in the nature of a substitute adopted by the Committee of the 
Whole? If not, the question is on the amendment.
  The amendment was agreed to.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third 
reading of the bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, was read 
the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the 
table.

                          ____________________