[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 96 (Wednesday, July 9, 1997)]
[House]
[Pages H4948-H4985]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 179 and rule 
XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House 
on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 1775.

                              {time}  1421


                     In the Committee of the Whole

  Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole 
House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 
1775) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1998 for intelligence 
and intelligence-related activities of the U.S. Government, the 
Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency 
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, with Mr. 
Thornberry in the chair.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered as having 
been read the first time.
  Under the rule, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] and the 
gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks] will each control 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss].

[[Page H4949]]

  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank the members of the House 
Intelligence Committee who have worked so hard in putting this bill 
together. In particular, I appreciate the very fine work of the 
gentleman from California [Mr. Lewis] and the gentleman from Florida 
[Mr. McCollum], our subcommittee chairmen.
  But I also have to point out that the gentleman from Washington [Mr. 
Dicks], the committee's ranking Democrat, and other Democratic members 
of the committee have played an extraordinarily constructive and 
helpful role in the formulation of this legislation. It is truly 
bipartisan.
  Finally, I would like to say to the staff on both sides of the aisle, 
``Thank you for a job well done.'' They are a dedicated, talented, and 
professional group who have very special knowledge that serves the 
United States of America extremely well.
  This bill, which the committee reported out unanimously, is the 
product of a lot of work, intensive deliberation, and cooperation. The 
committee held seven full committee and two subcommittee budget 
hearings. In addition, there were over 100 staff and member briefings 
on programs, specific activities, and budget requests.
  H.R. 1775 authorizes the funds for fiscal year 1998 for all of the 
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the U.S. 
Government. The National Security Act requires that spending for 
intelligence be specifically authorized. This is the only route we 
have.
  The intelligence budget has three major components: the national 
foreign intelligence program, known as NFIP; the tactical intelligence 
and related activities program, known as TIARA; and the joint military 
intelligence program, known as JMIP.
  NFIP funds activities providing intelligence to national policymakers 
and includes programs administered by such agencies as the Central 
Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the Defense 
Intelligence Agency. TIARA, or Tactical Intelligence Activities, reside 
exclusively in the Department of Defense. They consist in large part of 
numerous reconnaissance and target acquisition programs that are a 
functional part of the basic military force structure and provide 
direct information in support of military operations. The Joint 
Military Intelligence Program provides military intelligence 
principally to defensewide or theater-level consumers.
  Although our committee has jurisdiction over these three intelligence 
programs, we must work closely with the Committee on National Security, 
particularly in the oversight and authorization of the TIARA and JMIP 
programs where we share jurisdiction. I would like to publicly 
acknowledge and personally thank the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. 
Spence] for the extraordinary cooperation that we received from him, 
the members of his committee and the members of his committee staff.
  I would be remiss if I did not also mention the cooperation we have 
received from the Committee on Appropriations, particularly and most 
importantly from my colleague on this committee, the gentleman from 
Florida [Mr. Young], who also chairs the Subcommittee on Defense 
Appropriations and sits, of course, on HIPCE.
  Due to the classified nature of much of the work of the Committee on 
Intelligence, I cannot discuss many of the specifics of the bill before 
the House except in the broadest terms. In order to understand those 
specifics, I strongly urge those Members who have not already done so 
to read the classified annex to this bill. The annex is available in 
the committee office in the Capitol. It is about a 2-minute walk from 
here, for those who are interested, and I hope all are interested.
  Despite classification restrictions, there are several major elements 
of the bill that I can discuss here today. In this year's budget 
review, the committee continued to place heavy emphasis on 
understanding and addressing the future needs of the intelligence 
community, preparing for those needs and the several distinct roles 
that intelligence is going to play in our national security in what is, 
in fact, a different world situation today.
  Based on the threats we believe the United States will confront in 
the future, the committee's budget review focused on two specific 
areas. First, we looked at which intelligence programs are properly 
structured and sufficiently prepared to meet future needs and 
requirements. Second, we looked at the intelligence community's 
collection and analytical shortfalls.
  Unfortunately, the committee review revealed few areas where the 
intelligence community is well situated for the future, and an 
overabundance of shortfalls were found. These shortfalls are due, in 
part, to the fact that intelligence resources are stretched too thin 
while handling an ever-increasing multitude of issues.

  I would like to point out that this is not any kind of a shock to the 
intelligence community. It is realizing the fact that we are stretched 
thin and need to deal with it. Nonetheless, the committee is concerned 
that the intelligence community is not moving fast enough in some of 
the areas to address the threats of the future.
  Given these concerns, the committee has begun to address the 
shortfalls we see in the intelligence community's budgeting and 
responsibilities. In this year's mark the committee has specifically 
addressed the following issues:
  First, we have taken actions to help the intelligence community 
improve its analytic depth and breadth through improved training, 
targeted hiring, and the use of analytic tools. There is no point to 
have information if you cannot value enhance with the proper analysis.
  Second, the intelligence community places too much emphasis on 
intelligence collection at the expense of downstream activities. 
Downstream activities are processing the information we get, analyzing, 
disseminating, and so forth. We have to get a better balance. If we 
spend all our money collecting and none for analyzing, we will be awash 
in information that is not going to do us much good.
  Third, our espionage capabilities are limited and dependent on ad hoc 
funding. We have taken steps to tie funding for clandestine operations 
to the long-term needs of analysts, policymakers, and the military. 
That is putting it where we need it. I think that is almost the most 
critical part of this whole bill, from my personal perspective.
  Fourth, we have pushed the intelligence community toward developing, 
acquiring, investing in, and deploying more flexible technological 
capabilities in order to collect key information on the highest 
priority targets.
  Finally, we have continued our efforts from the last Congress to make 
the intelligence community work corporately across traditional 
bureaucratic boundaries and to enhance flexibility. The committee 
believes that such efforts are absolutely essential if the intelligence 
community is to succeed in dealing with increasingly complex threats to 
U.S. national interests.
  Very clearly, turf wars have no place in national security. Again, I 
congratulate the gentleman from California [Mr. Thomas], the former 
chairman, and the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks] for the work 
they did to bring this matter forward in the previous Congress, and we 
are following forward on that.

                              {time}  1430

  Those threats and concerns are broader and more diverse to our 
national security than they ever have been. Among them are those issues 
that have been called the transnational threats. Those include 
terrorism, the proliferation of advanced weapons and weapons of mass 
destruction, narcotics trafficking and global criminal racketeering. 
Such problems demand that the intelligence community have a worldwide 
view and a highly flexible set of resources. Given the nature of these 
threats, our intelligence eyes and ears and brains are more important 
than they ever have been.
  As an example, in the realm of counterterrorism, we are aware of the 
recent success our intelligence community has had in locating 
international terrorists so as to allow law enforcement agencies to 
apprehend them and bring them to justice. Less well known, however, 
because we must guard against revealing intelligence methods, are the 
numerous successes intelligence has had in recent months in detecting 
terrorist activities in advance

[[Page H4950]]

and foiling them, so Members did not read about them in the paper. U.S. 
facilities that would have been destroyed are intact today. American 
lives that could have been lost have been saved.
  As another example, in the area of counterproliferation, I would 
direct my colleagues' attention to this unclassified report which has 
been prepared by the CIA which describes the role of various countries 
in providing technologies and material for the development of weapons 
of mass destruction and their delivery systems by various rogue regimes 
around the world. This report, entitled ``The Acquisition of Technology 
Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction Advanced Conventional 
Munitions,'' put out by the Director of Central Intelligence, covers 
the time between July and December 1996 at the request of this 
committee. It is a very important report. The media has picked it up. 
It is unclassified. It tells us the world is real, the world is 
dangerous and there are people involved in serious mischief. It has 
received a great deal of attention in the press because of its rather 
extraordinary findings. When we read the classified evidence that is 
behind that report, we find it is even more extraordinary. That 
includes a great deal of specific and reliable intelligence that has 
given our policymakers and our military excellent insights into the 
activities of various countries and what we must do in response. Anyone 
who does not see the immense value to our national security to such 
work by the intelligence community I think is probably living in 
blissful ignorance of the dangers growing around us from rogue regimes 
that are getting closer and closer to being able to threaten Americans 
anywhere in the world with terrible weapons of extraordinary power.
  In closing, I strongly urge all Members to support this 
authorization. It is the unanimously accepted product of a bipartisan 
committee. It makes significant improvements, measured by over 200 
cuts, yes, I said cuts, and some additions to the President's budget 
request, and yet it comes in at less than 1 percent above the 
President's request when all is said and done. I am convinced that in 
supporting it, we are supporting the development of critically 
important intelligence capabilities that will make us all safer and 
will surely save the lives of many Americans, whether they be soldiers 
in the field, tourists on their vacation abroad, common Americans at 
home going about their business and their lives, all of this for today 
and for the years ahead.
  Mr. Chairman, before I close, I would like to take one more moment to 
acknowledge an individual who is, I am sure, celebrating his last 
authorization process on the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence. I said we had extraordinarily good staff. We do. But this 
year an individual, Mr. Ken Kodama, the senior substantive expert on 
the minority side, is retiring later this year after 9 years on the 
committee. Mr. Kodama represents the finest level of professionalism 
that other staff should emulate. His service to the full committee has 
been invaluable as well as to the subcommittee. In fact, Mr. Chairman, 
the reason that I could make some of the comments that I did at the 
beginning of this statement was in large part due to our ability to 
interact with Mr. Kodama in a truly bipartisan nature. To put it 
simply, he will be sorely missed. We wish him the best in his future 
endeavors, and I personally want to thank him for his assistance.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume, 
and I rise in support of the pending legislation.
  Mr. Chairman, first of all, let me say that I really agree with what 
the chairman has just mentioned. Ken Kodama has served this committee 
extraordinarily well. He has been a part of our senior Democratic staff 
and just one of the most professional people we have. We wish him and 
his family well in his future endeavors and compliment him again on his 
outstanding work.
  I want to congratulate the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss], the 
chairman, for the effort he has made to ensure that the committee 
functions in a bipartisan fashion as much as possible. This bill 
reflects this effort. He is to be commended for it. Few legislative 
products can achieve total harmony, and we do have some differences 
with the majority on this measure. Those differences, while relatively 
few in number, do concern some important matters. But I very much 
appreciate the determination of the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] 
that the issues on which we could not reach agreement within the 
committee would have a substantive rather than a political basis. I 
also want to applaud the committee staff for their outstanding work and 
professionalism on this bill and on the other work of the committee.
  H.R. 1775 provides for a slight increase in funding over the amounts 
authorized by the Congress for intelligence and intelligence-related 
activities in fiscal year 1997 and the amounts requested by the 
President for fiscal year 1998. Although these increases are small, 1.7 
percent above the amount authorized by Congress last year, and 0.7 
percent above the amount requested by the President this year, I 
recognize that there are some who believe that we are already spending 
too much money on intelligence. I would say to those holding that view 
that the provision of accurate and timely intelligence to policymakers 
and military commanders is absolutely critical to our national 
security. The collection, processing, analysis and dissemination of 
intelligence is in many cases reliant on technologies which are both 
rapidly changing and quite expensive. The alternative to making the 
investments necessary to maintain superiority in these areas is to 
accept an increased risk of not obtaining that critical information 
which might make a difference in a trade negotiation, disrupt the plans 
of a terrorist or permit the tracking of chemical warfare agents.
  In my judgment, the authorization levels in this bill are adequate to 
ensure that the intelligence agencies continue to provide the kind of 
information essential to sound policy determinations and successful 
military operations. I do not believe that a reduction in those amounts 
would be wise.
  Although it is important that intelligence activities be adequately 
funded, it is equally important that the available funds be used in 
ways which maximize their impact. Spreading resources too thinly by 
trying to cover everything is a good way of ensuring a general level of 
inadequate performance.
  We should remember that, although intelligence is information, not 
all information used by policymakers or military commanders is provided 
appropriately by intelligence agencies. In my judgment, the 
intelligence community best performs its function when it concentrates 
on providing information unobtainable by other means. It is essential 
that intelligence agencies not be tasked either by others or by 
themselves to acquire information which is more readily available from 
other parts of Government or is of little utility.
  The gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss], the chairman, has described 
the bill, but I want to note my concern with section 608, which would 
terminate the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office [DARO]. I believe 
it is clear that changes are coming to the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense and support offices generally in the Pentagon. These offices 
can and should be streamlined. But that result should be the product of 
decisions made after all available evidence is gathered rather than 
before. In the case of section 608, the committee took action without a 
single hearing. In fact, the only evidence formally presented to the 
committee was laudatory of DARO and strongly advocated its 
continuation. I expect that we will use some of the time before 
conference to better explore DARO's role and its future. I also expect 
that we will review some of the other actions taken in the bill on 
certain National Reconnaissance Office programs. Changes in the 
direction of highly complex activities should be undertaken with a 
clear understanding of their likely consequences.
  Mr. Chairman, despite these areas of reservation and disagreement, 
this is on balance a good bill, which I intend to support. It can be 
made better in conference, and I shall work with the gentleman from 
Florida [Mr. Goss], the chairman, toward that end. The bill deserves 
the support of the House today, however, and I urge that it be 
approved.

[[Page H4951]]

  Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from California 
[Ms. Pelosi] for the purpose of a colloquy with the chairman because of 
her responsibilities as the ranking member on the Subcommittee on 
Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs of the 
Committee on Appropriations.
  (Ms. PELOSI asked and was given permission to revise and extend her 
remarks.)
  Ms. PELOSI. I thank the distinguished ranking member for yielding me 
this time and for his leadership on this important committee.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise to engage the gentleman from Florida, chairman 
of the committee, in a colloquy concerning section 305 of the bill.
  As the chairman knows, this section of the bill extends for 1 year 
the authority of the President to delay the imposition of a sanction 
upon a determination that to proceed with the sanction would risk a 
compromise of an ongoing criminal investigation or an intelligence 
source or method. My first question, Mr. Chairman, is whether the 
legislative history of this provision, enacted in 1995, would be 
applicable to this extension of the authority for 1 more year?
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Ms. PELOSI. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
  Mr. GOSS. I would assure the gentlewoman from California that it is 
the intent of the committee that the legislative history of this 
provision as it was developed in the debate in 1995 is applicable to 
the exercise of this authority. Indeed, the report to accompany H.R. 
1775 reiterates the joint explanatory statement of the committee of 
conference on the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 
to make completely clear that the original legislative history of this 
provision continues to govern its implementation.
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, is it then the case that the committee 
intends this provision will be narrowly construed and only used in the 
most serious of circumstances, when a specific sensitive intelligence 
source or method or criminal investigation is at risk?
  Mr. GOSS. That is certainly the intent of the committee.
  Ms. PELOSI. Is it also the case that the law requires the 
intelligence source or method or law enforcement matter in question 
must be related to the activities giving rise to the sanction, and the 
provision is not to be used to protect generic or speculative 
intelligence or law enforcement concerns?
  Mr. GOSS. That is also the case.
  Ms. PELOSI. Finally, Mr. Chairman, does the committee expect that 
reports concerning a decision to stay the imposition of a sanction 
shall include a determination that the delay in the imposition of a 
sanction will not be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of the 
United States' nonproliferation objectives or significantly increase 
the threat or risk to U.S. military forces?
  Mr. GOSS. Yes, it does.
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman of the committee for 
engaging in this colloquy, and for his confirmation of the 
understanding that we had when this provision was first enacted.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Ms. PELOSI. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.
  Mr. DICKS. I wanted to just say that I concur in all the statements 
made by the chairman. This is also the understanding that I have of 
this provision.
  Ms. PELOSI. I appreciate the ranking member's cooperation in that.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of an amendment to be offered by the 
gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCollum]. I have been concerned for some 
time about the coordination of our Government's response to any 
intelligence activities which may be undertaken by the People's 
Republic of China, including those in the United States. The McCollum 
amendment will contribute to our ability to respond appropriately to 
any Chinese espionage activities which may occur. I urge its adoption 
and commend his leadership for bringing it to the floor.
  Mr. Chairman, I strongly support the amendment.
  I have been concerned for some time about the coordination of our 
Government's response to any intelligence activities which may be 
undertaken by the People's Republic of China. The United States 
presents a tempting target for any nation seeking economic, diplomatic, 
or technological advantage. One of the chief responsibilities of our 
intelligence agencies is to counter efforts by foreign intelligence 
services to improperly acquire information in these areas. The extent 
to which foreign governments are engaged in such practices ought to be 
evaluated by our Government and business leaders in determining the 
type of relationship the United States should have with those 
governments. Those determinations can not be made, and the 
effectiveness of the efforts by the intelligence community to provide 
the information necessary to support them can not be judged, unless 
they are periodically reviewed in a comprehensive fashion.
  The reports required by this amendment will help in that review. They 
will assist the Congress and the public in evaluating the extent of the 
threat posed by the intelligence activities of the People's Republic of 
China and will better ensure that the United States is positioned 
properly to respond to it. By requiring the reports to be submitted 
jointly by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the amendment recognizes the division 
of responsibility which exists between those intelligence activities of 
the United States primarily conducted overseas and those primarily 
conducted within our borders. I do not favor a blurring of those areas 
of responsibility and expect that the wording of the amendment is clear 
enough to ensure that does not occur.
  Mr. Chairman, countries spy on one another. That has been a fact of 
life on this planet since people began to live behind national 
boundaries. The bill we consider today is a reflection of that fact. It 
seeks to ensure that the United States is effective at spying on others 
and preventing others from spying on us. This amendment will contribute 
to our ability to respond appropriately to any Chinese espionage 
activities which may occur, and I urge its adoption.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania [Mr. Shuster].
  (Mr. SHUSTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. SHUSTER. Mr. Chairman, we should not be beguiled into thinking 
that because the cold war is over that we face a safer world in which 
we live, because in many respects it is just as dangerous or even more 
dangerous. Two threats that I want to focus on are the twin evils of 
illegal drugs and terrorism and the relationship to our intelligence 
activities. When I had the privilege of serving as the ranking member 
of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, I was deeply 
involved in the creation of the counternarcotics center out at the 
Central Intelligence Agency. Today that center is known as the crime 
and counternarcotics center. It indeed has matured into one of the most 
effective of the DCI centers. In fact, some of its successes have been 
published but many of its successes still must remain classified.

                              {time}  1445

  Some of us are concerned, however, about the number and functions of 
Federal counternarcotics intelligence programs, and therefore in this 
year's authorization we have asked that the intelligence community, in 
coordination with the Office of National Drug Control Policy, develop a 
new drug intelligence architecture based on an assessment of the 
effectiveness of the national security and law enforcement drug 
intelligence systems, the drug intelligence architecture.
  Indeed, Mr. Chairman, this year's Intelligence Authorization Act also 
authorizes the National Drug Intelligence Center. It was chartered in 
1991. It became a reality largely because of the strong support 
envisioned of the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Murtha]. The 
National Drug Intelligence Center was included in the intelligence 
budget last year, and I am pleased to report that this year's 
intelligence authorization continues to provide support for the 
program. This center provides strategic drug analysis to policymakers.
  With regard to terrorism, Mr. Chairman, it is a growing concern 
because of the growing access which terrorists have to weapons of mass 
destruction, and in fighting terrorism the capability of our human 
intelligence assets is of extraordinary importance; and indeed I am 
fearful that our clandestine service is in danger of being destroyed,

[[Page H4952]]

in danger of being destroyed by an atmosphere of risk aversion, an 
atmosphere which permeates from the highest levels and filters down 
into the Central Intelligence Agency and other intelligence agencies.
  Indeed, the case officers in our intelligence service who handle the 
agents around the world are involved in very risky business. It is 
risky business, and it is dangerous business, and it takes years to 
develop a productive agent, particularly in hostile places of the 
world.
  So I would urge my colleagues to support this legislation, to 
recognize the successes of our intelligence service and to also 
recognize the problems we face.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Dixon] who has been one of the most attentive, 
hardworking members of our committee.
  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the ranking member for yielding me 
time, and, Mr. Chairman, I would like to take this time to make a 
report to the body on the CIA contra crack cocaine investigation being 
conducted by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
  As all of my colleagues may recall beginning last August 18, the San 
Jose Mercury News published a three-part series alleging that 
Nicaraguan drug traffickers introduced, financed, and distributed crack 
cocaine into the African-American community of Los Angeles. The article 
further stated that the profits from the drug sales were used to 
provide lethal and nonlethal assistance to the Nicaraguan contras to 
support their struggle against the Sandinista government. Lastly the 
article implied, and very seriously implied, that the CIA either backed 
or condoned the drug activities.
  In September 1996, the House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence initiated a formal investigation into the charges levied 
in the San Jose Mercury articles. The scope of our investigation is as 
follows:
  First, we are asking the question and investigating whether there 
were any CIA operatives or assets involved in the supply of sales or 
drugs in the Los Angeles area; second, if CIA operatives or assets were 
involved, did the CIA have knowledge of the supply or sale of drugs in 
the Los Angeles area by anyone associated with the agency; third, did 
any other U.S. Government agency or employee within the intelligence 
community have knowledge of the supply or sale of drugs in the Los 
Angeles area between 1979 and 1996; fourth, were any CIA officers 
involved in the supply or sale of drugs in the Los Angeles area since 
1979; fifth, did the Nicaraguan contras receive any financial support 
through the sale of drugs in the United States during the period when 
the CIA was supporting the contra effort? If so, were any CIA officials 
aware of this activity? And finally, sixth, what is the validity of the 
allegations in the San Jose Mercury News?
  The Justice Department Inspector General and the CIA Inspector 
General have both launched probes into the allegations contained in 
these newspaper articles. At the beginning of their investigation, both 
inspector generals expected to have their investigations completed by 
the fall of this year. The committee has received periodic updates on 
the status of the two reviews and at this point it is expected that the 
inspector generals will complete their task this fall and will issue 
reports.
  The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence has a practice 
of not completing its investigation of a matter until the committee has 
had the opportunity to review the work of the inspector general. We 
will not complete our investigation until we have an opportunity to 
review the results of the inspector generals' reports as part of the 
committee's inquiry into this very important and relevant matter.
  Reviewing the conclusions of the inspector generals' reports as part 
of the committee's investigation should not be construed by anyone as 
though we are relying on the results of the inspector general. Quite 
the contrary. Since the beginning of the committee's investigation, the 
committee has made trips to Los Angeles and Managua, Nicaragua to 
interview individuals allegedly possessing information on these 
allegations. Additionally, the committee has had one witness brought to 
Washington for the purpose of conducting an interview. Committee staff 
is in the process of reviewing over 6 feet of documents compiled by the 
CIA pertaining to this issue. Additionally, the Drug Enforcement Agency 
has briefed staff and provided information on certain aspects of this 
investigation.
  The Congressional Research Service, pursuant to the request of the 
committee, is compiling background data on the Iran-contra 
investigations, and Iran-contra documents have been retrieved from the 
National Archives and reviewed to determine what light they may shed on 
this matter.
  Finally, the committee attended and participated in two town hall 
meetings in south central Los Angeles where citizens expressed their 
concerns and views of this case. Last year when the fiscal year 1997 
Intelligence Authorization Act was being considered on the floor, 
members of the committee pledged to our colleagues and to the American 
public that a full and thorough investigation into these allegations 
would be conducted. On March 12 of this year, the committee reviewed 
and ratified its ongoing inquiry into the San Jose Mercury News 
allegations. This year for the 105th Congress, the committee ratified 
the scope of this investigation.
  While many may have differences of opinions and draw different 
conclusions from our committee's report when it is finally made, I hope 
that we will all agree on its thoroughness, its professionalism, and 
the bipartisanship that has surrounded the investigation.
  I want to once again assure the American public and all of my 
colleagues that this investigation is moving in a detailed and thorough 
manner.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished 
gentlewoman from California [Ms. Millender-McDonald].
  Ms. MILLENDER-McDONALD. Mr. Chairman, I rise today because of the 
concerns that I have, given the bill that is on the floor before us, 
and certainly one that I intend to vote on. I have several questions 
especially pertaining to the report that the gentleman from California 
[Mr. Dixon] has just articulated, and I am sorry I came in on the tail 
end.
  As my colleagues very well know, my district was the hardest hit with 
reference to the drug proliferation and the drug trafficking and the 
allegations that the CIA was involved in that. As my colleagues know, 
my district represents that of Watts in south central California as 
well as Compton. Since that time, I have called for investigations, 
that of the Department of Justice as well as the Central Intelligence 
Agency, and I have been in conversations with the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Dixon] on what the Select Committee on Intelligence is 
all about and what they are doing.
  The questions that I have for either the chairman, the ranking 
member, or the gentleman from California [Mr. Dixon] is what is going 
on in terms of the hearings, or are there hearings in terms of a select 
committee on intelligence?
  Is the intelligence community cooperating with this committee by any 
means?
  And what is the timetable for getting a report to us so that I can 
articulate that to my community with reference to the ongoing 
investigation, if in fact they have begun to do that?
  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Ms. MILLENDER-McDONALD. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Chairman, first of all I would like to compliment the 
gentlewoman for her participation. As I indicated in my remarks, there 
have been two hearings in Los Angeles, both of them coordinated by her 
and her office, one with the director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency and one with the inspector general from the Justice Department. 
Both, hearings, gave an opportunity to see the people that would be 
conducting the investigations from Justice and the CIA and give the 
community a chance to have some input.
  As it relates to hearings, no decision has been made but I do think 
that there will be a discussion about the appropriate hearings that 
could be conducted. But it really will be based on the conclusions that 
the committee comes to.
  Certainly I think that the committee will have called before it and 
examined the reports of the CIA respectively and the Justice Department 
as to the findings that the inspector generals make.

[[Page H4953]]

  And as it relates to a timetable, I would think that no earlier than 
October-November would we be prepared to make a report to the House. 
Perhaps even longer. I think it is more important, rather than being on 
a timetable, but to be thorough and cover each base of these serious 
allegations.
  Ms. MILLENDER-McDONALD. And upon the report that the gentleman is 
talking about, will he then return back to my community, as was 
suggested at the hearing when the director came to south central? Will 
he then bring that report to the community that has been devastated by 
the drugs when that report is completed?
  Mr. DIXON. It is my personal view, and I cannot speak for the 
committee, but there must be some public document on this issue that is 
released to the community. Whether or not there will be another hearing 
in Los Angeles I think will be a committee decision that the chairman 
and ranking member certainly will have input into.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Ms. MILLENDER-McDONALD. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I would respond, if the gentlewoman will 
yield, that it is very much my intention to make sure that where 
taxpayers' dollars are used there is an appropriate accounting; if 
there is anything classified that justifies classification, we will 
have to deal with that. But it is not my intent to do that. It is my 
intent to report back what we find. That is the purpose of the 
investigation, and we will be dealing with the work of not only our own 
investigation but the investigation, as the gentleman from California 
[Mr. Dixon] has said, with the other IG's that are doing work, and 
frankly there is another committee in the other body working also.
  So I believe we do not know all of the answers yet, but I think the 
gentlewoman can go forward in good faith, understanding we are going to 
do our best to be fully accountable.
  Ms. MILLENDER-McDONALD. Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the 
gentleman's continuous dialog with me.
  Mr. GOSS. Assuredly.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from 
Florida [Mr. McCollum] my colleague who serves us well on the committee 
and serves well on the Committee on the Judiciary as well.
  Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for fiscal year 1998. As chairman of the Subcommittee 
on Human Intelligence, Analysis, and Counterintelligence, I am pleased 
to report that this year's authorization bill identifies and corrects 
some of the fundamental shortfalls in the investments we must make to 
ensure that this Nation will have an intelligence community that can 
take the national security challenges of this country into the 21st 
century.

                              {time}  1500

  Particularly, this authorization bill makes the investments in human 
intelligence, in analysis, and in counterintelligence that will be 
necessary to future efforts against narcotics, terrorism, 
proliferation, and other transnational threats, areas that require 
human interaction on the ground to answer some of our most vexing 
questions.
  I think complacency is probably much greater today than it should be 
in the minds of most Americans. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and 
the dismantling of the Soviet Union, most Americans think we are a more 
secure world. I, quite frankly, having viewed matters daily from the 
purview of the Committee on Intelligence, question that we are in a 
more secure world. We are in a less stable world. We are in a world 
where intelligence is more necessary than ever.
  We have in Russia KGB, former KGB members, who are engaged in 
organized crime. We have the potential threat of proliferation and 
movement of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons that once were 
fairly secure. At least we knew where they were going to be, over in 
Russia. They may go anywhere now: into the Middle East, into the hands 
of terrorists, into the seven terrorist states that we have to be 
involved with and concerned with, from Iran and Iraq, North Korea, 
Libya, Sudan, Syria, all of those; Cuba. Then there is China, the 
question of what happens in the future. We have continuing, ongoing 
concerns in drug trafficking, and so on goes the list.
  Mr. Chairman, no technology can replace the critical role of the 
human collector of intelligence on the plans and intentions of our 
adversaries and terrorists, traffickers, and proliferators. I am happy 
to report that the collectors of human intelligence, or human as we 
call them in the CIA and elsewhere in the intelligence community, are 
hard-working, and they are working hard against the high priority 
targets we have set.
  In the budget request, however, the committee found a significant 
shortfall in technical and other supports these collectors will need in 
future years to continue their fine efforts to gather human 
intelligence to these threats. We cannot expect the collectors to 
overcome high technology employed by drug traffickers, for example, 
without technology of their own.
  The committee also found a lack of long-term planning in the focus 
and funding of collection operations. We cannot expect human collectors 
to perform well when funded on an ad hoc basis year to year. I am 
pleased to report that this authorization bill does indeed provide 
adequate support for the eyes and ears of the intelligence community 
upon which so much of the knowledge about national and transnational 
threats depend.
  We have directed the community to develop a system for projecting the 
long-term funding needs of these vital collection efforts so we may 
continue to provide these efforts with adequate support. The all-source 
analyst stands at the center of the planning of this committee and the 
intelligence community for the needs of the policymakers of the next 
century.
  We will look at the all-source analyst to anticipate future needs for 
intelligence, and to provide support to the policymakers and to the 
military: Where will the next Iraq or Somalia be? What are the 
terrorist threats in a specific country? What successes is a rogue 
regime having in developing chemical or biological weapons?
  We will also look to that analyst for direction in what information 
about these crises we may obtain through open sources and what we must 
obtain through human or technical clandestine collection. In that 
light, Mr. Chairman, the authorization bill directs and begins to fund 
the restoration of an analyst cadre pared too lean over the past couple 
of years to cover the projected needs of policymakers.
  As our report makes clear, this committee will remain engaged in that 
restoration and will look to the all-source analyst to guide the 
intelligence community.
  Finally, Mr. Chairman, I note with grim satisfaction that during the 
past 2 months we have seen the final sentencing phase of the successful 
prosecutions of an FBI agent and a CIA officer arrested for spying on 
behalf of the Soviet Union and Russia. The success of both prosecutions 
depended first of all upon the counterintelligence officers within the 
FBI and the CIA who were able to do and to think the unthinkable; that 
is, that an American agent, an officer, could engage in such treachery, 
and to pursue investigations to such a conclusion. Success depended as 
well upon the willingness on the part of the leadership of the FBI and 
the CIA to make the sacrifices that would have been necessary to 
prosecute these cases through a course to full trial.
  Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to report that the authorization bill as 
reported reflects recognition of this committee of the efforts of the 
counterintelligence officers, and supports the means by which their 
vigilance may be continued.
  In sum, this authorization bill acknowledges and supports the focused 
efforts of the human intelligence collector, the crucial role of the 
analyst, and the difficult but necessary role of the 
counterintelligence officer. The bill makes surgical cuts and strategic 
adds that are necessary to the effectiveness of the intelligence 
community in providing the support to policymakers we need well into 
the next century.
  I want to thank Chairman Goss for the direction and guidance he has 
given to both this committee and to the subcommittee, and I conclude my 
remarks by saying I certainly support this bill.

[[Page H4954]]

  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman 
from California, Ms. Jane Harman, a very outstanding member of our 
committee and a member of the Committee on Armed Services.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the ranking member for yielding 
time to me.
  Mr. Chairman, it is an honor to serve as a new member of the 
Committee on Intelligence. I commend our chairman and the ranking 
member and the staff for their bipartisanship and professionalism.
  I sought appointment to this committee during two terms of Congress 
because I have a keen interest in issues relating to technology and 
satellite architecture. I often boast that I represent the aerospace 
center of the universe, the 36th district in California. Surely it is 
the satellite center of the universe. Also, as the ranking member said, 
I serve on the Committee on National Security, which gives me some 
additional insight into the defense functions served by our 
intelligence agencies.
  I rise in support of this bill, although I would like to share with 
our colleagues several reservations. My reservations concern a comment 
made by our chairman as part of his opening remarks. He said, in part, 
and I quote, ``We have pushed the intelligence community toward 
developing, acquiring, investing in, and deploying more flexible 
technological capabilities in order to collect key information on the 
highest priority targets.''
  I certainly agree that we should push technology and that we should 
do collection on the highest priority targets, but I would also suggest 
that the consequences of doing this could lead to some bad results: 
First, program instability, and, second, proceeding with change without 
a full understanding of its consequences. This is a point made by the 
gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks] in his opening remarks. It seems 
to me that our goal here is to make the right choices and the right 
changes among competing technologies.
  As to levels of funding, I support the level in this bill, the 
product of a thoughtful and professional exercise. Could we spend some 
dollars better? Sure, and we should. But let us do that, rather than 
mandate across-the-board cuts which may result in limiting our 
technological options.
  As I said in debate on this bill in the last Congress, intelligence 
funding is intelligent funding. Better information earlier is better 
offense and better defense. Our judgments about our worldwide 
geopolitical options and our defense strategic options on a particular 
battlefield depend in substantial part on good intelligence. To 
shortchange intelligence funding is to shortchange U.S. national 
security.
  Finally, I just want to comment on the colloquy we just had between 
the gentleman from California [Mr. Dixon], the gentlewoman from 
California [Ms. Millender-McDonald] and our chairman. I support what 
the committee is doing to thoroughly understand and study whether or 
not the CIA played any role in drug trafficking in California.
  I would tell our colleagues that this issue is of intense interest in 
the Los Angeles community, and I hope that we share whatever we can 
appropriately share with the affected communities as soon as we can 
appropriately do so.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Ms. HARMAN. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I want to commend the gentlewoman on her 
statement. One of the things that I hope as we go through the rest of 
this process is that we can blend together our great respect for the 
all-source analyst, but also recognize that we have the finest national 
technical means in the world in terms of gathering intelligence. That 
should not be undervalued. In fact, I think what we need to do is blend 
these capabilities of human intelligence and our national technical 
means, and remember the gulf war, where we had a very major problem in 
the dissemination of imagery.
  I just made a visit to Molesworth in England and saw the improvements 
in dissemination of imagery to the people who are serving us so well in 
Bosnia. I have been to the CAOC, the all-source center in Italy, have 
seen the combination of all these intelligence sources, from satellites 
to UAV's, human, everything coming into one room, and then being made 
immediately available to the battlefield commander in Bosnia.
  So I just want the House to know that a lot of very important 
improvements have been made. I just want to make certain that we do 
not, in the rush to cut various programs, cut some of these things that 
are crucial both in signals and in imagery to giving us the kind of 
advantage that our military commanders need. This is very, very 
important to keep a balanced approach.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for his comments. I 
think all of us on the committee would agree that the revolution in 
military affairs for the future contains a huge technology component.
  I was just urging that as we proceed to push the envelope, we not 
throw out technologies that function well in pursuit of some future 
technology.
  Mr. Chairman, I also want to complete my comment about the importance 
of disseminating information to Los Angeles residents. As I think 
everyone on our committee knows, certainly the gentleman from 
Washington [Mr. Dixon] knows, and other Members from Los Angeles know, 
this issue has garnered intense interest.
  If this committee can put it to rest finally by virtue of a very 
careful and thorough study, we need to communicate the results of that 
study to the residents of Los Angeles. I would urge us to do that as 
soon as possible.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 15 seconds to assure the 
gentlewoman from California that I am interested in the truth. All of 
the resources and assets that we have and are bringing to bear on this 
are designed to bring the truth to the people of the United States of 
America, and particularly to those who are affected in Los Angeles.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from 
New York [Mr. Boehlert], a member of the committee who is not only my 
great friend, but has shown me the way forward on some of these issues. 
I think we are going to hear about that.
  (Mr. BOEHLERT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Chairman, the bill before us today provides the 
necessary, and I emphasize necessary, funding for the operations of our 
Nation's intelligence functions. It also provides continuing support, 
in keeping with the committee's work over the previous 2 years in 
building the intelligence community for the 21st century.
  This bill makes major improvements to the President's budget request 
by taking some critically needed steps forward, particularly in the 
areas of building up human intelligence capabilities and analysis and 
improving technical collection abilities. It puts some needed logic in 
the area of unmanned aerial vehicle management, and it builds on some 
existing directions forged last year in such areas as the national 
reconnaissance program.
  Mr. Chairman, to do all of this the bill increases the President's 
budget by only about seven-tenths of a percent, so I want to 
congratulate the chairman of the committee and the ranking member for 
the outstanding work and guidance they have provided.
  The worldwide scene and many of our national interests have changed, 
Mr. Chairman, since the dissolution of the Soviet empire. However, the 
world is not necessarily a significantly safer place since the end of 
the cold war. This bill recognizes the fact that despite the very real 
lessening of a threat to our national being, several rogue states, 
radical movements, and transnational threats such as terrorism, 
organized crime, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
continue to clearly present a danger to our Nation and our people.
  It is important to understand that the focus of our intelligence 
community in peacetime is to maintain a knowledge level of the world 
that allows us to maintain that peace we so dearly cherish. Our 
intelligence services are, for example, fully employed now around the 
world helping to ensure that we are not caught by some surprise in 
places such as Bosnia or the

[[Page H4955]]

Persian Gulf or the Korean Peninsula. This bill focuses on right-sizing 
and right-equipping our intelligence services, both civilian and 
military, to perform their critical functions to preserve that peace.
  Mr. Chairman, it should be noted that during the preparation of this 
bill each budgetary line item in the President's request was valued on 
its individual merits in relation to the whole of the U.S. intelligence 
efforts. The committee did not work to a specific or artificially 
developed top line number. Instead, the committee added funding as 
necessary to critical programs and made some cuts to programs that it 
considered overfunded. The resulting authorization is therefore highly 
defensible in the aggregate and in a line-by-line analysis. This is a 
view I am sure is shared by those Members of the House who have 
examined the classified annex wherein each budgetary line is explained 
in detail.
  Mr. Chairman, this is a good product brought forward by a committee 
that has worked cooperatively, and it is a pleasure for me and a 
privilege to be a new member of the committee and watch the high degree 
of professionalism that exists in all its deliberations, not only high 
degree of professionalism, but a high degree of bipartisanship.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to my colleague, the 
gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Sanford Bishop, a new member of the 
committee and a person who has spent considerable time and effort on 
intelligence matters.
  Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of H.R. 1775, the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 1998. I also stand 
before the Members today to commend and congratulate Chairman Goss and 
the ranking Democratic member, the gentleman from Washington [Mr. 
Dicks], for their efforts in producing a bipartisan measure that 
enhances our Nation's intelligence collection, analytical, and 
dissemination processes.

                              {time}  1515

  Mr. Chairman, one only has to look at any one of our Nation's major 
newspapers on any given day to learn of the unstable and unpredictable 
world in which we now live. Just last weekend Cambodia erupted in 
violence as forces loyal to Cambodia's two prime ministers took to the 
streets of Phnom Penh and engaged in armed clashes. This year alone we 
have witnessed the spread of civil strife in a number of countries, 
including Albania, Kenya, Congo, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, to name just a 
few.
  When violence erupts in these countries, it is the intelligence 
community that is called upon to sort out what the threat is to U.S. 
persons, what the facts are, who the players are, what the likely 
outcome is, and what ramifications such actions may have for the region 
and most importantly for our Nation's security.
  We need to consider whether a shortage of qualified intelligence 
analysts exists in many regions of the world that have been inflicted 
with unexpected violence that threatens the stability of that region. 
H.R. 1775 addresses this problem by providing additional resources to 
be directed and enhancing and expanding the analytical talent pool 
throughout the intelligence community. This is especially important to 
our military personnel who are often called upon to perform 
noncombatant evacuations of U.S. citizens from regions that are beset 
with violence.
  Prior to the military conducting an evacuation, intelligence must be 
collected and analyzed so as to protect our military forces who perform 
these important and valuable missions. Additionally, the military has 
in the past and will in the future be called upon as part of the U.N. 
peacekeeping force. The Department of Defense needs qualified analysts 
for force protection, counterterrorism and to assess the plans and 
intentions of hostile forces. Let us not forget that the military has 
drawn down more than any other Federal agency, and the reduction in 
personnel in dollars continues today.
  Intelligence acts as a force multiplier. And if we are to continue on 
a downward path in funding our Nation's armed services, which concerns 
me greatly, then we certainly need to take every step to ensure that 
our intelligence capabilities are sufficient to provide policymakers 
with the necessary information they need to make key decisions 
affecting our national security.
  In addition to the ever-increasing number of contingencies that await 
us in the future, old enemies combined with the explosion of technology 
create new challenges for our intelligence communities. Russia, China, 
Iran, Iraq, the Korean peninsula, Bosnia, terrorism and proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction continues to pose a threat to the 
national security of the United States.
  The measure before us this afternoon provides funding for our country 
to aggressively collect intelligence against those important targets. 
One of the best methods used to collect intelligence on these targets 
is human intelligence.
  I am pleased to report that this measure before us enhances the human 
intelligence collection capabilities throughout our intelligence 
community. Technology provides us a window into areas that are often 
hidden and protected against physical intrusion. While technical means 
of collecting intelligence may shed light on a number of programs, 
including proliferation activities, human intelligence is one sure-fire 
way of gathering information on plans and intentions as well as 
timetables. We must retool our human officer cadre to provide them with 
the skills and the tools necessary to accomplish their mission in the 
next century. This bill provides the requisite tools and enhances 
training to meet these future challenges.
  Mr. Chairman, let me again thank the gentleman from Florida [Mr. 
Goss] and the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks] for their 
leadership in fashioning a bill that provides critical support to our 
intelligence community.
  I urge my colleagues to support this measure and in doing so to 
support the men and women of the U.S. intelligence community, our 
military forces and our diplomatic corps around the globe. They are the 
people who sacrifice often in far-away places that we who live in 
America can always enjoy a safe, secure, and high quality of life. We 
owe them and the people of our Nation no less.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Nevada [Mr. Gibbons], a new member of our committee who 
has brought a wealth of value and experience.
  (Mr. GIBBONS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the 
time.
  Mr. Chairman, I also rise today in support of the Intelligence 
Authorization Act. As a new member of this intelligence committee, I 
have had the unique privilege to participate in the development of this 
act. The gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss], chairman, and the ranking 
minority member, the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks], are both to 
be commended for their incredibly hard work and leadership. Their 
efforts and stewardship of the committee as a whole and especially the 
fine work of the committee staff have resulted in an act which provides 
the United States an intelligence community which is properly equipped, 
properly funded and properly supervised for the difficult intelligence 
tasks confronting this Nation well into the future.
  This is no easy task, Mr. Chairman. Many people think the United 
States no longer faces the worldwide threat that we once did during the 
cold war era. However, it would be foolhardy to say that the threats to 
this Nation have gone away. In fact, one could say that the number of 
threats has actually increased. The post-cold war proliferation of 
relatively cheap weapons of mass destruction, the increase of fanatical 
terrorism and the rise of transnational threats such as drug cartels 
dictate that we have a stronger, not weaker intelligence capability.
  It could easily be debated that such threats are more diverse and 
more difficult to monitor and defend against than was the single major 
threat we faced during the cold war years.
  Mr. Chairman, this act works toward an intelligence capability and 
community that is better postured to deal with these new and diverse 
threats. There are those who say we spend too much for the Nation's 
intelligence

[[Page H4956]]

services and capabilities. Because of security interests, I cannot 
speak for the specific dollar amount this authorization act recommends 
for intelligence activities; however, I can say that the security of 
the Nation does not come cheap.
  Intelligence is the foundation for maintaining that security, and it 
has often been said that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of 
cure.
  I would submit that a relatively small investment in our 
intelligence, understanding of the threats to our country, is what is 
worth much more than the cost of recovering from the damage.

  Knowledge of our potential foes is without question worth the 
investment. Is that investment large in terms of real dollars? Yes, of 
course it is. But again, an ounce of prevention, the same old adage.
  Mr. Chairman, I would like to close with a thought about the future. 
Specifically with respect to intelligence technology development that 
this act supports, the Nation's policymakers require valid, useful and 
up-to-date intelligence on national and transnational threat issues, as 
I have mentioned. In order to maintain such information in an 
increasingly complex world, the intelligence community must invest in 
modern and equally complex technology.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the 
gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Traficant], my friend and distinguished 
colleague who was mentioned on the Imus show this morning.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from Ohio 
[Mr. Traficant].
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Traficant] is recognized 
for 2 minutes and 30 seconds.
  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I do not have as much confidence as 
everybody else who is here. I may give it a chance. I have respect for 
the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] and for the gentleman from 
Washington [Mr. Dicks]. But quite frankly, we heard about the collapse 
of the Soviet Union on CNN. We learned about the fall of the Berlin 
Wall on CNN. We learned about the invasion of Kuwait on CNN. I honest 
to God believe we might save a lot of money by getting rid of our 
intelligence community and giving the money to CNN.
  There is an issue that concerns me, and I know it will be ruled 
nongermane, but during the Vietnam war we had 450 commandos, South 
Vietnamese, to perform espionage services. They were captured by the 
North Vietnamese. The CIA lived up and the DIA and our intelligence 
community kept their payments and compensation to their families up 
until 1965, until they were listed as missing. Then they cut off those 
payments. Even though the Congress of the United States passed $20 
million in compensation for those commandos who helped us during 
Vietnam, the CIA has said, no, and they cite the Totten doctrine, an 
1876 Supreme Court ruling, Totten versus the United States, as the 
grounds for not in fact meeting that compensation level. The Totten 
doctrine simply bars enforcement of secret contracts making them 
nonenforceable and not eligible to be adjudicated in a court of law. 
The Traficant amendment would simply create a three-member panel 
appointed by the Supreme Court that would rule whether or not these 
secret cases may be eligible for adjudication and could set them up in 
camera.
  Let me say one last thing. The quality of our field operatives is 
evidently very bad when we are hearing about all these revolutions on 
CNN. Word is getting out that if our intelligence community is not 
going to toe the line and take care of their field operatives, what 
type of an intelligence community do you have without good street 
people? In America we call them snitches in the police departments. To 
the intelligence community we call them spies. Evidently from the 
amount of spying we have going on, we can use a little more fairness in 
this whole situation.
  I understand this has a bearing and naturally it is more within the 
purview and jurisdiction of the Committee on the Judiciary.
  But listen very carefully, a three-member panel appointed by the 
Supreme Court that would simply review these cases for cause and then 
have the option of making them eligible for adjudication and if they 
did it could be in camera. I think this has much to do with the 
camaraderie, much to do with the ability of our field operatives or we 
will have no field operatives. So when that debate comes up, I ask my 
colleagues to listen, especially Committee on the Judiciary members.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to my distinguished 
colleague, the gentleman from New Hampshire [Mr. Bass] a member of the 
committee.
  Mr. BASS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Florida for 
yielding me the time. I rise in support of the intelligence committee 
authorization. I would make a couple of points.
  First of all, this is not a fat budget. This is a lean budget. It 
represents a less than 1 percent increase over what the President's 
request was. I would point out that as we heard the chairman of the 
Committee on National Security talk last week, the defense budget in 
this country has gone down for 13 successive years and the intelligence 
budget as well has suffered from these declines.
  I would point out that the Intelligence Committee has spent a 
considerable amount of time in the last 4 to 5 months examining the 
priorities in the Intelligence Committee. You have heard other speakers 
this morning talk about the need for better exploitation of all the 
information that we are receiving from our various collectors.
  Second, the need to pay more attention to the issue of human 
intelligence and the need to develop better human intelligence around 
the world, I believe that intelligence is important to this country. It 
has been important to this country ever since it was founded.
  Let me remind my colleagues that when Paul Revere road out of Boston 
to warn the patriots that the British were coming, he did not do it 
because the British told him they were coming. It was because he had a 
spy at the top of the Old North Church.
  Intelligence was important in the Civil War. Intelligence was 
important in the First and Second World Wars. Indeed, the Air Force was 
founded as a result of the need to get behind enemy lines to understand 
what was going on.
  Indeed, Mr. Chairman, intelligence in this country saves lives. It 
makes it possible for leaders in this country to make informed 
decisions about what needs to be done. It protects the national 
security of this Nation. It saves money in the rest of the defense 
budget and it strengthens this country as we move forward into the 21st 
century. I am pleased to be a member of this important committee. I am 
pleased to support this authorization.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  I think Members who are watching well understand that we have a very 
rich and diverse committee that has worked very hard with the other 
appropriate committees, the Committee on National Security and the 
Committee on Appropriations. We take our job very seriously. Everybody 
has something thoughtful to say and to add. The cold war is over but 
the danger is not gone. We are doing our best to make sure every 
intelligence dollar is spent well. Obviously that is a never-ending 
task.

                              {time}  1530

  Quite seriously, those who read the newspaper are not getting the 
full story, and those who wish to speak, I would hope, would go and 
read the classified annex so they are dealing with the same support 
level of fact that we are on the committee.
  And, finally, I would simply say I agree with my distinguished 
colleague, the ranking member, and the gentlewoman from California [Ms. 
Harman], who spoke about the need for balance, the proper balance 
between collection, technology, and all of that. We strive for that 
proper balance. It is a moving target, it is a moving world, and we 
will be doing this in a moving way for many years to come. I hope we 
have it right for now. If we do not, we have a conference ahead of us 
where we will have a chance to do things again. I urge full support of 
this bill, Mr. Chairman.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Traficant has offered a similar 
provision in years past with a goal of ensuring that the intelligence 
community maximizes its purchase of American-made products. That is a 
goal I support.

[[Page H4957]]

  We have worked with the gentleman from Ohio on other occasions to 
preserve the spirit of his amendment in conference even though the 
committee is aware that the record of the intelligence community on the 
procurement of U.S. products is exemplary. We will do so again this 
year and we are pleased to accept the amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. All time for general debate has expired.
  Pursuant to the rule, the committee amendment in the nature of a 
substitute printed in the bill shall be considered under the 5-minute 
rule by titles and each title shall be considered read. No amendment to 
the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute is in order 
unless printed in the Congressional Record.
  The Clerk will designate section 1.
  The text of section 1 is as follows:
       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence Authorization 
     Act for Fiscal Year 1998''.

  The CHAIRMAN. Are there any amendments to section 1?
  If not, the Clerk will designate title I.
  The text of title I is as follows:

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

     SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal 
     year 1998 for the conduct of the intelligence and 
     intelligence-related activities of the following elements of 
     the United States Government:
       (1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
       (2) The Department of Defense.
       (3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
       (4) The National Security Agency.
       (5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, 
     and the Department of the Air Force.
       (6) The Department of State.
       (7) The Department of the Treasury.
       (8) The Department of Energy.
       (9) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       (10) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
       (11) The National Reconnaissance Office.
       (12) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency.

     SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

       (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The 
     amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and 
     the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 1998, 
     for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related 
     activities of the elements listed in such section, are those 
     specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 1775 of the 105th 
     Congress.
       (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made 
     available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate 
     and House of Representatives and to the President. The 
     President shall provide for suitable distribution of the 
     Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within 
     the executive branch.

     SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.

       (a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the 
     Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director 
     of Central Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian 
     personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 
     1998 under section 102 when the Director of Central 
     Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to 
     the performance of important intelligence functions, 
     except that the number of personnel employed in excess of 
     the number authorized under such section may not, for any 
     element of the intelligence community, exceed two percent 
     of the number of civilian personnel authorized under such 
     section for such element.
       (b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of 
     Central Intelligence shall promptly notify the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of 
     the Senate whenever he exercises the authority granted by 
     this section.

     SEC. 104. COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

       (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated for the Community Management Account of 
     the Director of Central Intelligence for fiscal year 1998 the 
     sum of $147,588,000. Within such amount, funds identified in 
     the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in 
     section 102(a) for the Advanced Research and Development 
     Committee and the Environmental Intelligence and Applications 
     Program shall remain available until September 30, 1999.
       (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the 
     Community Management Account of the Director of Central 
     Intelligence are authorized a total of 313 fulltime personnel 
     as of September 30, 1998. Such personnel may be permanent 
     employees of the Community Management Account elements or 
     personnel detailed from other elements of the United States 
     Government.
       (c) Classified Authorizations.--In addition to amounts 
     authorized to be appropriated by subsection (a) and the 
     personnel authorized by subsection (b)--
       (1) there is authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 
     1998 such amounts, and
       (2) there is authorized such personnel as of September 30, 
     1998,

     for the Community Management Account, as are specified in the 
     classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 
     102(a).
       (d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of 
     the National Security Act of 1947 (as added by section 304 of 
     this Act), during fiscal year 1998 any officer or employee of 
     the United States or member of the Armed Forces who is 
     detailed to an element of the Community Management Account 
     from another element of the United States Government shall be 
     detailed on a reimbursable basis; except that any such 
     officer, employee, or member may be detailed on a 
     nonreimbursable basis for a period of less than one year for 
     the performance of temporary functions as required by the 
     Director of Central Intelligence.
       (e) National Drug Intelligence Center.--
       (1) In general.--Of the amount authorized to be 
     appropriated in subsection (a), the amount of $27,000,000 
     shall be available for the National Drug Intelligence Center. 
     Within such amount, funds provided for research, development, 
     test, and engineering purposes shall remain available until 
     September 30, 1999, and funds provided for procurement 
     purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2000.
       (2) Transfer of funds.--The Director of Central 
     Intelligence shall transfer to the Attorney General of the 
     United States funds available for the National Drug 
     Intelligence Center under paragraph (1). The Attorney General 
     shall utilize funds so transferred for the activities of the 
     Center.
       (3) Limitation.--Amounts available for the Center may not 
     be used in contravention of the provisions of section 
     103(d)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     403-3(d)(1)).
       (4) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
     the Attorney General shall retain full authority over the 
     operations of the Center.

  The CHAIRMAN. Are there any amendments to title I?
  If not, the Clerk will designate title II.
  The text of title II is as follows:

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

     SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central 
     Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal 
     year 1998 the sum of $196,900,000.

  The CHAIRMAN. Are there any amendments to title II?
  If not, the Clerk will designate title III.
  The text of title III is as follows:

                     TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS

     SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS 
                   AUTHORIZED BY LAW.

       Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, 
     retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be 
     increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may 
     be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits 
     authorized by law.

     SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

       The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not 
     be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any 
     intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by 
     the Constitution or the laws of the United States.

     SEC. 303. ADMINISTRATION OF THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF 
                   CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

       Subsection (e) of section 102 of the National Security Act 
     of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403) is amended by adding at the end the 
     following new paragraph:
       ``(4) The Office of the Director of Central Intelligence 
     shall, for administrative purposes, be within the Central 
     Intelligence Agency.''.

     SEC. 304. DETAIL OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PERSONNEL--
                   INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ASSIGNMENT PROGRAM.

       (a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end 
     the following new section:


 ``detail of intelligence community personnel--intelligence community 
                           assignment program

       ``Sec. 113 (a) Detail.--(1) Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of law, the head of a department with an element in 
     the intelligence community or the head of an intelligence 
     community agency or element may detail any employee within 
     that department, agency, or element to serve in any position 
     in the Intelligence Community Assignment Program on a 
     reimbursable or a nonreimbursable basis.
       ``(2) Nonreimbursable details may be for such periods as 
     are agreed to between the heads of the parent and 
     host agencies, up to a maximum of three years, except that 
     such details may be extended for a period not to exceed 1 
     year when the heads of the parent and host agencies 
     determine that such extension is in the public interest.
       ``(b) Benefits, Allowances, Travel, Incentives.--An 
     employee detailed under subsection (a) may be authorized any 
     benefit, allowance, travel, or incentive otherwise provided 
     to enhance staffing by the organization from which they are 
     being detailed.
       ``(c) Annual report.--(1) Not later than March 1 of each 
     year, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall 
     submit to the permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of 
     the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the Senate a report describing the detail of 
     intelligence community

[[Page H4958]]

     personnel pursuant to subsection (a) for the previous 12-
     month period, including the number of employees detailed, the 
     identity of parent and host agencies or elements, and an 
     analysis of the benefits of the program.
       ``(2) The Director shall submit the first of such reports 
     not later than March 1, 1999.
       ``(d) Termination.--The authority to make details under 
     this section terminates on September 30, 2002.''.
       (b) Technical Amendment.--Sections 120, 121, and 110 of the 
     National Security Act of 1947 are hereby redesignated as 
     sections 110, 111, and 112, respectively.
       (c) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents contained in 
     the first section of such Act is amended by striking the 
     items relating to sections 120, 121, and 110 and inserting 
     the following:

``Sec. 110. National mission of National Imagery and Mapping Agency.
``Sec. 111. Collection tasking authority.
``Sec. 112. Restrictions on intelligence sharing with the United 
              Nations.
``Sec. 113. Detail of intelligence community personnel--intelligence 
              community assignment programs.''.
       (d) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) 
     of this section shall apply to an employee on detail on or 
     after January 1, 1997.

     SEC. 305. APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS LAWS TO INTELLIGENCE 
                   ACTIVITIES.

       Section 905 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     441d) is amended by striking ``1998'' and inserting ``1999''.


                Amendment No. 5 Offered by Mr. Traficant

  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment to title III that 
deals with the Totten doctrine.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment No. 5 offered by Mr. Traficant:
       Page 10, after line 15, insert the following new section:

     SEC. 306. ESTABLISHMENT OF 3-JUDGE DIVISION OF THE UNITED 
                   STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF 
                   COLUMBIA FOR DETERMINATION, OF WHETHER CASES 
                   ALLEGING BREACH OF SECRET GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS 
                   SHOULD BE TRIED IN COURT.

       (a) Assignment of Judges.--The Chief Justice of the United 
     States shall assign 3 circuit judges or justices (which may 
     include senior judges or retired justices) to a division of 
     the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
     Columbia for the purpose of determining whether an action 
     brought by a person, including a foreign national, in a court 
     of the United States of competent jurisdiction for 
     compensation for services performed for the United States 
     pursuant to a secret Government contract may be tried by the 
     court. The division of the court may not determine that the 
     case cannot be heard solely on the basis of the nature of the 
     services to be provided under the contract.
       (b) Assignment and Terms.--Not more than 1 justice or judge 
     or senior or retired judge may be assigned to the division of 
     the court from a particular court. Judges and justices shall 
     be assigned to the division of the court for periods of 2-
     years each; the first of which shall commence on the date of 
     the enactment of this Act.
       (c) Factors in Division's Deliberations.--In deciding 
     whether an action described in subsection (a) should be tried 
     by the court, the division of the court shall determine 
     whether the information that would be disclosed in 
     adjudicating the action would do serious damage to the 
     national security of the United States or would compromise 
     the safety and security of intelligence sources inside or 
     outside the United States. If the division of the court 
     determines that the case may be heard, the division may 
     prescribe steps that the court in which the case is to be 
     heard shall take to protect the national security of the 
     United States and intelligence sources and methods, which may 
     include holding the proceedings in camera.
       (d) Referral of Cases.--In any case in which an action 
     described in subsection (a) is brought and otherwise complies 
     with applicable procedural and statutory requirements, the 
     court shall forthwith refer the case of the division of the 
     court.
       (e) Effect of Division's Determination.--If the division of 
     the court determines under this section that an action should 
     be tried by the court, that court shall proceed with the 
     trial of the action, notwithstanding any other provision of 
     law.
       (f) Other Judicial Assignments Not Barred.--Assignemt of a 
     justice or judge to the division of the court under 
     subsection (a) shall not be a bar to other judicial 
     assignments during the 2-year term of such justice or judge.
       (g) Vacancies.--Any vacancy in the division of the court 
     shall be filled only for the remainder of the 2-year period 
     within which such vacancy occurs and in the same manner as 
     the original appointment was made.
       (h) Support Services.--The Clerk of the United States Court 
     of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit shall serve 
     as the clerk of the division of the court and shall provide 
     such services as are needed by the division of the court.
       (i) Definitions.--For purposes of this section--
       (1) the term ``secret Government contract'' means a 
     contract, whether express or implied, that is entered into 
     with a member of the intelligence community, to perform 
     activities subject to the reporting requirements of title V 
     of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 and 
     following); and
       (2) the term ``member of the intelligence community'' means 
     any entity in the intelligence community as defined in 
     section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     App. 401a(4)).
       (j) Applicability of Section.--
       (1) In general.--This section applies to claims arising on 
     or after December 1, 1976.
       (2) Waiver of statute of limitations.--With respect to any 
     claim arising before the enactment of this Act which would be 
     barred because of the requirements of section 2401 or 2501 of 
     title 28, United States Code, those sections shall not apply 
     to an action brought on such claim within 2 years after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act.

  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I will reserve a point of order, if this is 
the amendment I think it is, that the gentleman's amendment is not 
germane.
  The CHAIRMAN. The point of order is reserved and the gentleman from 
Ohio [Mr. Traficant] is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I had cited earlier this whole issue 
dealing with the Totten doctrine. Totten versus United States, the 
Supreme Court ruling in 1876, dealt with a secret contract where 
Abraham Lincoln, President Lincoln, had an individual working in an 
underground capacity. Upon the death of this individual, there was a 
lawsuit that emanated from those services, and from there came the 
decision that secret contracts are unenforceable and not eligible for 
adjudication.
  So the Totten doctrine, in essence, bars the judiciary from 
adjudicating disputes arising out of secret government contracts. Now, 
that is in 1876. Now we have come to an intelligence community where we 
have many intelligence operatives that believe they have been wronged. 
If they attempt to adjudicate these matters or seek relief through the 
courts, the Totten doctrine is simply cited and they are barred from 
any further adjudicative action.
  What the Traficant amendment would do, and I understand the point of 
germaneness here, but there must be some commitment coming from the 
leadership of intelligence if we are to do anything about the 
camaraderie and the ability to have good field operatives. We must look 
at the Traficant amendment.
  Now, let me just close out here. The amendment calls for a three-
member panel appointed by the Supreme Court in the U.S. District Court 
of Appeals in the Nation's Capital. They would review these claims, 
they would have the option of saying there is meritorious claim here or 
not. And if they did, they could set up that trial in camera.
  We at this point have already gone into that judiciary type of 
activity. We have at this time allowed certain types of Federal 
judiciary cases on secret contracts involving, for example, the CIA and 
private contractors, to be adjudicated. They have been handled without 
any breach of national security.
  And for those opponents who say our judges are not prepared to deal 
with these secret issues, I think if they can handle these broad tax 
cases, complicated environmental and toxic waste types of cases, they 
can certainly handle these.
  I know it is not the intention of the Congress of the United States 
to have 450 South Vietnamese, many of them who have given up their 
lives in espionage activities for our country, to have been abandoned. 
And what we have on record is that they have been abandoned by our 
intelligence community and then their families, and in agreements made 
with their families, that agreement was abrogated. That compensation 
was not made, to the point where Congress gave $20 million last year 
and that money has still not been given to the survivors of those 
individuals who gave up their lives in our efforts in Southeast Asia. 
Unbelievable to me. And they cite, among other reasons, the Totten 
doctrine.
  So all I am saying is that at some particular point, I understand the 
germaneness issue, but I know that the gentleman's committee has been 
fair, but I believe this hurts camaraderie, this hurts our acquisition 
and recruiting of top-notch agents. The word is out that one can get 
shafted; watch yourself. That is not the type of predicate we need to 
recruit the type of individuals that give us the intelligence we need. 
And we will keep reading and hearing about intelligence activities from 
CNN not from our own intelligence sources.

[[Page H4959]]

  So I will ask, if I could, Mr. Chairman, the chairman of the 
Judiciary Subcommittee with jurisdiction to give consideration, since 
they are considering this to be a germaneness problem to Judiciary. But 
let me also say this to the intelligence community: Even though this is 
a Judiciary matter, its overtones in intelligence are so great, the 
shadows so great, I do not believe we can have a good intelligence 
program without addressing this old statute.
  Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. TRAFICANT. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
  Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I am actually not the chairman of the 
critical subcommittee, the one on courts, but I am a member of the 
Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property, and I would agree to 
work with the gentleman toward getting a hearing, an opportunity in the 
Committee on the Judiciary and the Subcommittee on Courts and 
Intellectual Property to go over this proposal.
  I think it is a proposal that needs to be discussed, but I have no 
authority to be the chairman to say that I can hold the hearing. This 
is not my subcommittee.
  Mr. TRAFICANT. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, let me just say to 
the gentleman that I appreciate that.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. TRAFICANT. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.
  (Mr. DICKS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I would say to the gentleman that we are now 
checking at the Defense Department about the $20 million. And the 
gentleman, I think, has made a very important case here.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Ohio Mr. [Traficant] has 
expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. Traficant was allowed to proceed for 2 
additional minutes.)
  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I will continue to yield to the 
gentleman from Washington.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I think what the gentleman is most concerned 
about is getting the money released and doing it in the proper way, and 
we will do everything we can to help him achieve his objective.
  Mr. TRAFICANT. I also want the gentleman to help me in advancing the 
issue of looking at the Totten doctrine, because we will not recruit 
the types of agents we need to do our job properly.
  Mr. DICKS. We will certainly follow up on that issue.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. TRAFICANT. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished gentleman from Ohio 
for yielding.
  I think the issue is a very important issue and it has been well 
outlined by the gentleman from Ohio, and I think with the assurance of 
my colleague from Florida to proceed and the assurance that I have 
personally given the gentleman to look into the matter in terms of why 
those payments have not been made, which again I cannot usurp 
appropriations matters, this is not my area, but we want to make sure 
that the gentleman's fairness issues are well regarded.
  I would point out it was, as the gentleman knows, the U.S. Congress, 
not the intelligence community, that made the decision for the relief. 
I think that is entirely appropriate. I think when we go back and look 
at the Totten decision, and I think it probably is time to look at 
that, again not my area of jurisdiction, I think we have to ask 
ourselves questions about the appropriate oversight. I think that is 
entirely relevant and entirely timely.
  Mr. TRAFICANT. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, I am going to ask 
Congress to enforce the release of that $20 million to those surviving 
families of those South Vietnamese commandos who gave their lives to 
help us out in Southeast Asia.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will continue to yield, as 
the gentleman well knows, it is in the supplemental appropriations. 
Congress has appropriated the money. They are working on the 
regulations.
  We just talked to Mr. Hamre's office, the Comptroller of the 
Department of Defense, and they think they will have the regulations 
finished by the end of July in order to get the money out.
  Mr. TRAFICANT. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, the money was 
appropriated last year and I think they should get on with it.
  I appreciate the dialog we have had here and I ask for consideration 
in some other vehicle that comes up.
  Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to withdraw my amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Ohio?
  There was no objection.
  The CHAIRMAN. The amendment is withdrawn.


                   Amendment Offered by Mr. Traficant

  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. Was the amendment printed in the Congressional Record?
  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, this is the amendment authorized by 
unanimous consent.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Traficant:
       Page 10, after line 15, insert the following new section:

     SEC. 306. COMPLIANCE WITH BUY AMERICAN ACT.

       No funds appropriated pursuant to this Act may be expended 
     by an entity unless the entity agrees that in expending the 
     assistance the entity will comply with sections 2 through 4 
     of the Act of March 3, 1933 (41 U.S.C. 10a-10c, popularly 
     known as the ``Buy American Act'').

     SEC. 307. SENSE OF CONGRESS; REQUIREMENT REGARDING NOTICE.

       (a) Purchase of American-Made Equipment and Products.--In 
     the case of any equipment or products that may be authorized 
     to be purchased with financial assistance provided under this 
     Act, it is the sense of the Congress that entities receiving 
     such assistance should, in expending the assistance, purchase 
     only American-made equipment and products.
       (b) Notice to Recipients of Assistance.--In providing 
     financial assistance under the Act, the head of the 
     appropriate element of the Intelligence Community shall 
     provide to each recipient of the assistance a notice 
     describing the statement made in subsection (a) by the 
     Congress.

     SEC. 308. PROHIBITION OF CONTRACTS.

       If it has been finally determined by a court or Federal 
     agency that any person intentionally affixed a fraudulent 
     label bearing a ``Made in America'' inscription, or any 
     inscription with the same meaning, to any product sold in or 
     shipped to the United States that was not made in the United 
     States, such person shall be ineligible to receive any 
     contract or subcontract made with funds provided pursuant to 
     this Act, pursuant to the debarment, suspension, and 
     ineligibility procedures described in sections 9.400 through 
     9.409 of title 48, Code of Federal Regulations.

  Mr. TRAFICANT (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous 
consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the 
Record.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Ohio?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, one of the most innovative Members of 
the House, the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Barney Frank, said 
this is the Spy America Amendment, so I will accept that. He is usually 
very brilliant. I will call it the Spy Buy America Amendment.
  If we are going to have all these covert buys and all this covert 
budget, we can have a covert understanding that when they buy these 
high-technology James Bond items, they try to buy them in America and 
from American producers, from American workers and companies who pay 
corporation taxes and who pay income taxes and excise taxes and hidden 
taxes and sales taxes and property taxes and State taxes and estate 
taxes and inheritance taxes and surtaxes and hidden taxes. We should 
hold them to account in an attempt to at least buy in America.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. TRAFICANT. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to accept the amendment, of 
course, because I understand it was inadvertently left out, and it is 
not a new issue; it is one that I have supported before.
  I just want to make sure the gentleman is entirely clear that 
occasionally, because of the uniqueness of the intelligence business, 
it is necessary to

[[Page H4960]]

buy something that is not American made or to acquire something that is 
not American made, and I want the gentleman to fully understand that 
that is not a violation of the spirit.
  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, if the gentleman 
was, for example, a Korean spy, he would want to buy American to make 
us think that the gentleman was close to America. So who is to know? It 
is like a stealth amendment.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. TRAFICANT. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.
  (Mr. DICKS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman yielding.
  We have no problem with his amendment. We have supported it 
enthusiastically in the past, but the chairman is correct; we have to 
understand there will be times when we will have to do something that 
might breach the amendment.
  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, we understand that.
  I ask for support on the amendment and move the question.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Traficant].
  The amendment was agreed to.


                Amendment No. 4 Offered by Mr. Mc Collum

  Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. Was the amendment printed in the Congressional Record?
  Mr. McCOLLUM. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment No. 4 offered by Mr. McCollum:
       Page 10, after line 15, insert the following new section:

     SEC. 306. REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE PEOPLE'S 
                   REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

       (a) Report to Congress.--Not later than 1 years after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, 
     the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation, jointly, in consultation 
     with the heads of other appropriate Federal agencies, 
     including the National Security Agency, and the Departments 
     of Defense, Justice, Treasury, and State, shall prepare and 
     transmit to the Congress a report on intelligence activities 
     of the People's Republic of China, directed against or 
     affecting the interests of the United States.
       (b) Delivery of Report.--The Director of Central 
     Intelligence and the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation, jointly, shall transmit classified and 
     unclassified versions of the report to the Speaker and 
     minority leader of the House of Representatives, the majority 
     and minority leaders of the Senate, the Chairman and Ranking 
     Member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of 
     the House of Representatives, and the Chairman and Vice-
     Chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     Senate.
       (c) Contents of Report.--Each report under subsection (a) 
     shall include information concerning the following:
       (1) Political, military, and economic espionage.
       (2) Intelligence activities designed to gain political 
     influence, including activities undertaken or coordinated by 
     the United Front Works Department of the Chinese Communist 
     Party.
       (3) Efforts to gain direct or indirect influence through 
     commercial or noncommercial intermediaries subject to control 
     by the People's Republic of China, including enterprises 
     controlled by the People's Liberation Army.
       (4) Disinformation and press manipulation by the People's 
     Republic of China with respect to the United States, 
     including activities undertaken or coordinated by the United 
     Front Works Department of the Chinese Communist Party.

  Mr. McCOLLUM (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous 
consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the 
Record.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Florida?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I rise to offer this amendment today, 
which is a very simple amendment, that would require the Director of 
the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation to jointly prepare an annual report on the 
intelligence activities of the People's Republic of China and, most 
specifically, those which are directed against or affect the interest 
of the United States.
  Some of the news reports on the fund-raising scandals that we have 
been reading about recently suggest that the People's Republic of China 
has apparently has decided to take a more aggressive approach toward 
influencing American politics. This is occurring at all levels of our 
political system, through the use of legitimate, such as through 
lobbying, as well as covert influence.
  At the same time, the Chinese are also relying heavily on the success 
of their economic espionage efforts to make their economy more 
competitive with ours. We also have concerns, that I think most 
Americans share, with the increasing buildup of the Chinese military 
operations and capabilities, and the potential that that poses a threat 
to our national security interests in the Pacific rim region.
  A China specialist at the Department of Defense recently summarized a 
growing threat posed by China's intelligence agencies by saying:

       The Ministry of State Security is an aggressive 
     intelligence service which is coming of age in an 
     international arena. The combination of a relatively stagnant 
     economy and an increasingly competitive global economic 
     environment will force China to rely more heavily on the 
     illegal acquisition of high-technology modernization. Arms 
     production and sales are increasingly being used to gain hard 
     currency and expand global political influence. The MSS will 
     be required to produce intelligence to support this assertive 
     role in the global commercial and political environments.

  He went on to say:
       Western democracies, such as the United States, must adjust 
     the focus of their clandestine intelligence and 
     counterintelligence operations if they are to meet the MSS's 
     forward posture effectively.

  The annual report that this amendment authorizes and requires would 
document significant developments involving China's Ministry of State 
Security, the military intelligence department of the People's 
Liberation Army, and other Chinese intelligence entities operating 
against the United States.

                              {time}  1545

  The report is specifically intended to cover trends in the following 
areas: First, political, military, and economic espionage by Chinese 
intelligence services; second, intelligence activities designed to gain 
political influence, including activities undertaken or coordinated by 
the United Front Works Department of the Chinese Communist Party; 
third, efforts to gain direct or indirect influence through commercial 
or noncommercial intermediaries subject to control by the People's 
Republic of China, including enterprises controlled by the People's 
Liberation Army; and fourth, disinformation and press manipulation by 
the Government of the People's Republic of China against the United 
States.
  Various agencies from the intelligence and law enforcement 
communities will be tasked to provide input on Chinese intelligence 
activities within the United States and elsewhere. Some of the agencies 
being tasked to contribute to the annual report include the Central 
Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense, Department of Justice, 
National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of 
State, and Department of the Treasury.
  The classified version of the annual report will be provided to the 
leadership of both the House and the Senate as well as to the two 
intelligence oversight committees. An unclassified version will be 
prepared so that the American people can be provided with a general 
summary of the nature of the Chinese intelligence threat to the United 
States.
  My colleagues, I believe, will find this amendment to be one that is 
very crucial and very important, although very simple. It is not one 
that requires anything more than a gathering of information for us, but 
I think it is information that is something critical that we have and 
that it be prepared in these two different versions: First, the 
classified version for our committee's use primarily; and second, a 
version which can be revealed to the American public in general terms 
so we can keep track and the public can keep track of what the Chinese 
community may or may not be doing with respect to interests of the 
United States through its intelligence efforts.
  I have no more complicated issue than that to present.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  Mr. Chairman, I congratulate my colleague, the gentleman from Florida

[[Page H4961]]

[Mr. McCollum], for what I think is a very important addition to the 
work of the committee. Events have obviously transpired in a very clear 
way, in a very public and visible way on the subject of China in recent 
days, and I think this amendment to H.R. 1775 is a very valuable 
addition.
  I would also like to thank the gentleman for his initiative on the 
issue. The intelligence activities of China that are directed against 
United States interests is a subject that has caught us all up. It 
certainly is of central importance to the committee, and it is of 
concern to the people of the Nation as well.
  Anybody who has been watching television, whether it is CNN or any 
others that are covering events of the world, will know that there is a 
lot happening. The People's Republic of China has deployed an 
intelligence service worldwide that is acquiring assets and technology 
illegally and against the interests of the United States and its 
businesses and subsidiaries here and overseas.
  The gentleman's statement outlines, as well as can be done in this 
forum, the threat presented by China's Ministry of State, Security and 
Military Intelligence Department, the People's Liberation Army. The old 
days of the threat of China goes only so far as its Army can walk are 
clearly behind us.
  The amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCollum] 
directs that the two agencies in the best position to gather 
intelligence on the threat, the FBI and CIA, report annually to 
Congress on the specifics of Chinese intelligence activities and 
acquisitions that affect United States interests.
  What this amendment does is to recognize and to regularize reporting 
on the threat to America and Americans that we in the committee have 
received from excellent but ad hoc briefings from these two agencies 
and others as well, frankly, in the community.
  I welcome the gentleman's initiative, as I said, and commend it and 
look forward to a more structured version of the excellent classified 
information on this matter that we have received to date from the 
community. The classified information we have received to date, and I 
can say this, justifies entirely the initiative presented to us today, 
in my view.
  I referred earlier to a report on proliferation, which is 
unclassified, which I referred to all Members. I also applaud the 
gentleman's requirement that the FBI and CIA produce an unclassified 
version of their annual reports for public dissemination. As I have 
said, Americans and American businesses and subsidiaries here and 
overseas should be concerned about this threat from Chinese 
intelligence activities in the United States and elsewhere. The 
committee will, in that regard, promote the dissemination of any and 
all possible warning information as appropriate.
  At the same time, Mr. Chairman, it will come as no surprise to anyone 
at all familiar with intelligence that there will be limits on what the 
intelligence community will be able to provide the public without 
damage to the national security or to the sources and methods at risk 
in the collection. This is a very important target, and it is going to 
be a more important target, I think, in the next century. Very clearly, 
we have to be careful about our capabilities to deal with the target.
  Acknowledging this constraint, upon which lives as well as 
intelligence depend, I repeat my wholehearted support to the amendment 
of the gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCollum] and look forward to the 
badly needed process that it does create, in which I serve and which I 
think will serve oversight extremely well. I am going to support the 
amendment.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GOSS. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.
  Mr. DICKS. I thank the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] for 
yielding.
  Mr. Chairman, I have no objection to the amendment on this side. In 
fact, the gentlewoman from California [Ms. Pelosi] wanted to be here to 
speak on it, but had to be in a markup in the Committee on 
Appropriations.
  I appreciate the gentleman yielding.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, I am happy to have the 
ranking member remind me of that. I should have referred to the Record. 
The Record will clearly show that the gentlewoman from California [Ms. 
Pelosi] has already spoken in support of this amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCollum].
  The amendment was agreed to.


                 Amendment No. 1 Offered by Mr. Sanders

  Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, I offer amendment No. 1.
  Mr. Chairman, I was in a markup and was of the understanding that the 
gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Conyers] would be offering his first. I 
ask unanimous consent to return to title I and that my amendment be 
allowed to proceed in order.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Vermont?
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, I would like 
to explain my reservation.
  I understand the gentleman's dilemma. We have a Committee on Rules, 
and we have rules for a reason, to try and have an orderly process. I 
believe, however, that the debate that the gentleman proposes to bring 
forward is a debate of great value. I am, therefore, willing to not 
object.
  Normally I would object because I think the process is important. As 
I say, I think this debate is worth it; and on the basis of the 
gentleman's request for unanimous consent, I will not object.
  Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my reservation of objection.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Vermont?
  There was no objection.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment No. 1 offered by Mr. Sanders: At the end of title 
     I, add the following new section:

     SEC. 105. LIMITATION ON AMOUNTS AUTHORIZED TO BE 
                   APPROPRIATED.

       (a) Limitation.--Except as provided in subsection (b), 
     notwithstanding the total amount of the individual 
     authorizations of appropriations contained in this Act, 
     including the amounts specified in the classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations referred to in section 102, there is 
     authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1998 to carry 
     out this Act not more than 90 percent of the total amount 
     authorized to be appropriated by the Intelligence 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997.
       (b) Exception.--Subsection (a) does not apply to amounts 
     authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence 
     Agency Retirement and Disability Fund by section 201.

  Mr. SANDERS (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous 
consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the 
Record.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Vermont?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Florida [Mr. 
McCollum] very much, because this is an important debate and one that I 
am going to ask for another unanimous consent that I had discussed 
previously.


         Modification to Amendment No. 1 Offered by Mr. Sanders

  Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, essentially, the amendment as recorded 
called for a 10-percent reduction in the intelligence agencies; and I 
would like to change that to a 5 percent reduction. I ask unanimous 
consent that the amendment be allowed to be 5 percent rather than 10 
percent.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the modification.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Modification to amendment No. 1 offered by Mr. Sanders:
       In the proposed amendment, strike ``90 percent'' and insert 
     ``95 percent.''

  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Vermont?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank my Republican 
colleague and my Democratic colleague for their indulgence. This is an 
important debate and I very much appreciate their allowing it to go 
forward.
  Mr. Chairman, the amendment that I have offered is simple, and I 
would hope would be supported by all, especially those people concerned 
about the deficit and those people concerned about national priorities. 
What this

[[Page H4962]]

amendment does is cut the intelligence budget by 5 percent from the 
level authorized for fiscal year 1997 while still protecting the CIA 
retirement and disability funds.
  Mr. Chairman, although the amount authorized by this bill is 
classified, there are various press reports which have indicated that 
funding for all the intelligence activities is currently about $30 
billion, which means that this amendment would cut approximately $1.5 
billion from the intelligence agencies.
  Mr. Chairman, in my opinion, this debate is about a number of key 
factors: No. 1, our sense of national priorities. Is it appropriate to 
increase funding for an already bloated intelligence budget at exactly 
the same time as we propose painful cuts for senior citizens in 
Medicare, for low-income people in Medicaid, for others in housing, for 
kids, for the environment? How appropriate is it to say that we will 
cut $1.5 billion in home health care for seniors but not cut $1.5 
billion for an intelligence budget which, in my view and in the view of 
many, already has too much money.
  Mr. Chairman, if we are serious about deficit reduction, we cannot 
only go after working people and low-income people, we also have to 
have the courage to go after the intelligence community. Mr. Chairman, 
let me be frank that, for whatever reasons, despite the end of the cold 
war, despite the collapse of the Soviet Union and international 
communism, the intelligence community has not experienced the kind of 
appropriate cuts that had been made with many other agencies, including 
the Department of Defense.
  Mr. Chairman, in 1996 the U.S. Senate, led by Senators Hank Brown and 
Warren Rudman, completed a report on the efficacy and appropriateness 
of the activities of the U.S. intelligence community in the post-cold 
war global environment. Let me read a brief portion from that report, 
which is commonly referred to as the 1996 Aspin-Brown Commission 
Report. They say, and I quote:

       In general, from 1980 until the present, intelligence grew 
     at a faster rate than defense when defense spending was going 
     up and decreased at a slower rate when defense spending was 
     going down. As a result, intelligence funding

Now this is 1990--

     is now at a level 80 percent above where it was in 1980, 
     while defense overall, other than intelligence, is now 4 
     percent below its 1980 level.

  Mr. Chairman, the Congress has asked almost every agency to examine 
its budget and make appropriate cuts as we try to move toward a 
balanced budget. It is appropriate, now that the cold war is over, to 
ask the intelligence community to do that as well.
  Mr. Chairman, in recent years a number of our allies have made public 
their intelligence budget, something I think we should do, but that is 
not for this debate. But let me tell what you we have learned from some 
of those countries who have made public their intelligence budgets.
  In the United Kingdom, our strong ally, under a conservative 
government, intelligence spending was reduced from 957 million pounds 
in 1993 down to 701 million pounds in 1997. That is Great Britain. 
Canada also reduced its intelligence budget. They understood that the 
cold war is over. They had other priorities. I think we might want to 
learn something from our allies.
  Mr. Chairman, not only do we have to look at our priorities and what 
our allies are doing; we have got do ask the simple question, are we 
getting good value for money that we are spending on intelligence? I 
would argue that there is a wide cross-section of opinion from the left 
and the right that says no, that the intelligence budgets are 
inefficient and wasteful, that they can be cut without loss of value in 
terms of the needs of the American people.
  Mr. Chairman, what I would like to do now is not give you my opinion 
but to quote various newspapers, totally public reports, nothing secret 
or nothing confidential here, and tell you what some of the newspapers 
are reporting.
  The New York Times front page, May 16, 1996, and I quote:

       In a complete collapse of accountability, the government 
     agency that builds spy satellites accumulated about $4 
     billion in uncounted secret money, nearly twice the amount 
     previously reported to Congress, intelligence officials 
     acknowledged today.

  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Vermont [Mr. Sanders] 
has expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. Sanders was allowed to proceed for 3 
additional minutes.)
  Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, what NRO did was to lose track of $4 
billion, an amount roughly equal to the annual budgets for the FBI and 
the State Department combined. They lost the money.
  John Nelson, appointed last year as the National Reconnaissance 
Office's top financial manager and given the task of cleaning up the 
problem, said in an interview published today in a special edition of 
Defense Week that the secret agency had gone, and I quote the 
gentleman, ``a fundamental financial meltdown,'' an excerpt from the 
article in the New York Times.
  Let me further quote from the New York Times, same article:

       The reconnaissance office found itself in trouble in 1994 
     for constructing what several Senators called a stealth 
     building. The Senate Intelligence Committee protested that 
     the agency had built itself a headquarters outside Washington 
     costing more than $300 million, without disclosing the 
     building's true cost and size.

  That is the New York Times.
  According to another newspaper, the New York Daily News, December 16, 
1996, and I quote, page 27, editorial:

       Two huge threats are looming before the U.S. intelligence 
     community as national security advisor Anthony Lake prepares 
     to become director of central intelligence. The first is a 
     Marine reserve sergeant out in San Diego. Armed with a 
     personal computer and a network of contacts around the world, 
     Eric Nelson has developed and E-mail system that consistently 
     beat the Defense Intelligence Agency's reporting on 
     terrorism, chemical and biological warfare, political 
     profiles, background on hot spots, nuclear weapons, 
     international crime and political analysis. ``He really 
     covers the ground,'' says Marine Colonel G.I. Wilson at the 
     Pentagon. ``And best of all, he is quick. His secret is that 
     he only uses open, i.e., unclassified sources. He has been 
     immensely successful. All the armed services use him.''

                              {time}  1600

  This is a guy on his own, an ex-marine.
  ``Nelson's threat to the $40 billion intelligence community? His 
operating cost is about $20 a month.''
  Twenty dollars a month and he is doing work that the intelligence 
community is not able to do. And on and on it goes.
  Last, let me quote from another article in the New York Times, March 
3, 1997:
  ``Breaking with its past, the CIA has severed its ties to roughly 100 
foreign agents, about half of them in Latin America, whose value as 
informers was outweighed by their acts of murder, assassination, 
torture, terrorism and other crimes, Government officials said today.''
  The New York Times continues:
  ``The agency found that the violence and corruption of scores of 
those informers were so bad, and the quality of the information they 
provided comparatively so marginal, that they were not worth the tens 
of thousands they were paid annually.''
  The article continues, ``The Latin American division of the CIA's 
clandestine service proved to be one of the most riddled with foreign 
agents who are killers and torturers, that the agency has violent men 
on its payroll,'' et cetera, et cetera.
  Mr. Chairman, I would ask that the Members say no to the intelligence 
communities and support the Sanders amendment lowering it by 5 percent.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment. As 
President Dewey used to say, ``Be careful what you read in the 
newspapers.''
  I think it is very important that we remember that my ranking member 
has addressed a lot of the issues that the distinguished gentleman from 
Vermont has just brought forward to us in previous sessions of the 
Congress in previous years.
  We are very concerned with our responsibilities to do our job of 
oversight to make sure that we are providing the best possible means of 
defense for Americans and America through the use of eyes and ears and 
brains around the world, our intelligence business, because despite the 
fact that the cold war is over, the danger to America and Americans and 
American interests is clearly not. Anybody who thinks it is might want 
to look in the newspapers about the World Trade Center bombing

[[Page H4963]]

or they might want to look in the newspapers about the bombing in Saudi 
Arabia that regrettably cost the lives of some American troops and much 
wounding of hundreds of American troops, and on and on. Or they might 
want to go upstairs and take a look in the Intelligence Committee's 
area and of course every Member of this Congress is cordially invited 
to come upstairs and take a look at any time in what we are doing and 
what information we have as long as they are willing to comply with the 
accountability and responsibility that goes along with that knowledge.
  We think that it is very important that we have what I will call a 
factual analysis and we on the committee have tried to give it our best 
bet on what the facts are and what the analysis of the facts are. We 
have not done a data-free analysis. We have come to a thoughtful 
conclusion of where we are.
  I cannot overstate my opposition to across-the-board cuts, anyway, to 
intelligence bills, and even though I know that the gentleman from 
Vermont is well-intentioned, we have had this debate before, such an 
approach to budget cutting I do not think is good and it is 
indiscriminate.
  To make cuts by a percentage or a number grabbed out of thin air, 
whether it is 10 percent or 5 percent or any other percent, completely 
undercuts the duty of Congress to deliberate and make thoughtful 
decisions on behalf of our constituents in the best interests of the 
Nation.
  Remember, this is the one piece of legislation that must be 
authorized. We have an authorization charter on this committee that 
nobody else has. In our representative democracy, Members of Congress 
are elected to make responsible, informed spending decisions based on 
the close scrutiny of the costs and the benefits of specific government 
programs. That is what this permanent select committee has done.
  The select committee has analyzed and reviewed the intelligence and 
intelligence-related activities of the United States to determine the 
benefit provided by those programs to the national security interests 
of the United States, and that is the bill we have in front of us 
today.
  To my colleagues who favor this amendment, let me ask, to what 
specific programs are they opposed? What should we cut back? Which 
programs should be terminated? Which intelligence targets should be 
dropped? Specific modifications to intelligence programs would be more 
appropriate than the broad brush approach that the gentleman proposes.
  In the gentleman's testimony to the Committee on Rules that was 
submitted in support of the amendment, he noted programs that he 
considers to be bloated wastes of taxpayers' money. In support of this 
5 percent budget slashing amendment, he contends that the NRO, which we 
have heard about, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, NIMA, and 
the National Security Agency simply collect too much information to be 
thoroughly analyzed and used by policymaking consumers. He argues that 
because some information is not put to its best use, the entire 
intelligence community should suffer a 5 percent reduction in funding.
  Because the gentleman is unhappy with the overall lack of analytical 
capabilities of the intelligence community, which I would note is 
something that the committee specifically seeks to correct through this 
bill in a very thoughtful and deliberate and specific manner, he wants 
to reduce the analytical resources by an additional 5 percent. That is 
counterintuitive and counterproductive.
  If Members come up to the committee spaces and read the classified 
annex to the bill, they will see that the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence on a bipartisan basis did its job. The committee reviewed 
each program for its merit and its benefit to national security. The 
committee truly scrubbed each program to ensure the money would be well 
spent. We had a lot of debate about that.
  The committee held 7 full committee budget hearings, as I said, 
scores of briefings, 100 or so Member and staff briefings, and on and 
on. The committee thoroughly, let me repeat, the committee thoughtfully 
and thoroughly and with careful deliberation made appropriate 
adjustments to the President's intelligence budget proposal.
  The committee reported increases for those programs where it found 
the President's plan lacking, and it reduced authorization levels where 
appropriate and necessary.
  If Members have looked at the schedule of authorizations, they will 
see that the committee has made drastic, substantial, and real cuts, 
not just reductions in budget request levels but real cuts in several 
programs. The committee did so based on the merits of the program, not 
simply to achieve a percentile decrease that is altogether meaningless. 
These reductions were made for good government reasons.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] has 
expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. GOSS was allowed to proceed for 2 
additional minutes.)
  Mr. GOSS. At the same time, however, the committee has increased 
authorization levels for certain other programs to ensure that the U.S. 
government has adequate intelligence capabilities so that another 
Kamisiyah does not occur, so that collected intelligence is not wasted, 
to adequately support all our deployed Armed Forces and to properly 
address global crises that threaten our national security interests 
without diminishing our capabilities in other areas of this still 
treacherous world.
  Just because the cold war is over does not make this world more safe. 
Quite the contrary. Radical regimes exist that wish us harm, and 
transnational threats of terrorism, narcotrafficking, organized crime 
and weapons proliferation actually threaten our way of life on a daily 
basis whether we are here or abroad.
  This amendment would indiscriminately make cuts where program funding 
has already been reduced by significant amounts and cut those programs 
that need additional budgetary resources. This amendment requires no 
thought for what is needed, how things operate or the fixed cost of a 
strong national security enjoyed by all Americans. It is purely a 
number thing.
  If this amendment passes, how will we explain to the American public 
that the funding for the FBI, the CIA, and others against international 
terrorists was cut back? How will we justify the reduction in our 
ability to monitor the unfair trade and economic policies of business 
competitors? What will we say to your business constituents after we 
reduce our ability to determine when foreign countries and foreign 
corporations try to steal us blind of our technology and commercial 
secrets? Should we hamstring our efforts to stay one step ahead of the 
radical regimes who are feverishly working to develop nuclear, 
chemical, and biological weapons and the missile systems to deliver 
them? And they are.
  That is what this amendment would do. This amendment would also put 
our deployed troops at risk. Passage of this amendment will result in 
higher casualties in all likelihood because of the inability to provide 
the necessary force protection. We have had a sad lesson there 
recently.
  This indiscriminate 5 percent reduction in the authorization levels 
will result in less accurate and less timely intelligence that is 
critical to disclosing the threatening capabilities or evil intentions 
of our foes. The parents of those serving this country in the armed 
services will want to know the justification for increasing the threat 
to their children.
  The global strategic reality is that we have won the cold war, but we 
have not resolved the danger problem.
  Mr. DeFAZIO. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  The gentleman from Florida makes a good case against across-the-board 
cuts. I for one have never particularly favored across-the-board cuts, 
but in this case we are confronted with a budget that is secret. We 
cannot come out here and debate the individual elements of the budget 
or the individual allocations to the individual components of this 
budget because it is secret. If I went up to the little room upstairs 
and found out how much the National Reconnaissance Office is getting 
and I came down here to the floor and revealed it, I would be subject 
to censure or removal from the House. So how is it that we can approach 
this more reasonably as long as we keep these numbers secret? What can 
our enemies learn from knowing how much

[[Page H4964]]

money we spend or waste on the intelligence services, whether it is 
well spent or wasted?
  The sum is phenomenal. It is reported in the press to be more than 
$30 billion, an increase this year of about $1 billion. Perhaps the 
gentleman could help me out here. Could the gentleman from Florida tell 
me what the 5-percent cut would constitute? How much money would the 5-
percent cut constitute?
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. DeFAZIO. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I would invite the gentleman to come upstairs 
to the committee quarters and we will be happy to share with him, we 
will provide as much staff as he likes, we will walk him through line 
by line and we will be the better for it and so will the gentleman.
  Mr. DeFAZIO. Reclaiming my time, I thank the gentleman, but here on 
the floor, in the people's House, for the people of the United States 
who pay the taxes that constitute this secret budget, we cannot know 
how much a 5-percent cut constitutes, so we cannot know whether it is 
prudent or imprudent.
  The gentleman said one other thing that particularly intrigued me, 
and this did concern me. He said the FBI would not be able to protect 
against international terrorists if this 5-percent cut went through.
  How much will be cut by this 5-percent cut from the budget of the FBI 
to combat international terrorism?
  Mr. GOSS. If the gentleman will yield further, it is impossible to 
know in foresight. Let me put it this way. In hindsight we have 
discovered that if we had better equipment in the question of the 
bombing of the World Trade Center in New York, we may very well have 
avoided that.
  Mr. DeFAZIO. But again we cannot reveal the number.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. DeFAZIO. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the dilemma that the 
gentleman has described. There is perhaps one other solution. Perhaps 
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence would determine, and the 
leadership as well, to accept the gentleman from Vermont [Mr. Sanders] 
as a member of the committee, and that way he would be privy to the 
information that has been pointed out by the gentleman from Florida 
[Mr. Goss] as necessary to effect a specific solution. Because right 
now there is not only no way that the gentleman from Vermont [Mr. 
Sanders] can be specific to those seven excellent questions, but 
neither can any other Member in the House of Representatives who is not 
on the committee.
  Mr. DeFAZIO. I thank the gentleman.
  Again the dilemma we have here, and I do not like across-the-board 
cuts, is we are not given an option. Yes, I can go to the room 
upstairs. The gentleman can show me the individual budgets of the 
individual agencies, but I cannot come down here to the floor and use 
that information in any way. I cannot come down here and say, ``Well, 
the National Reconnaissance Office is up by $1 billion, I want to cut 
$500 million there because they are spending it on this particular 
satellite that I do not think is helpful.'' I can do none of that on 
the floor. I can go up there and be imbued with information that will 
tie my hands and my tongue if I come to the floor. I could not talk 
about the amount of money here if I had been up there to review the 
budget. I can only talk about it because I read it in the New York 
Times. I know there will be an amendment later to reveal the total 
amount of money spent, and I would hope the gentleman would support 
that and I hope this gentleman will support that.
  Mr. DICKS. And I will.
  Mr. DeFAZIO. And I would hope it passes.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. DeFAZIO. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.
  Mr. DICKS. I would urge the gentleman to come up to the room 
upstairs.
  Mr. DeFAZIO. The gentleman wants to tie my tongue.
  Mr. DICKS. You got it, baby.
  Mr. DeFAZIO. I do want to see the special room sometime, but I do not 
want to look at any of the documents in there.
  Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. DeFAZIO. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.
  Mr. BONIOR. First of all, Mr. Chairman, I would like to commend my 
colleagues here who have taken the leadership position on this 
committee, my dear old friend the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks] 
and the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss], who knows probably more 
about this, him and the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest], than 
anybody in this institution, and for their capable staffs.
  Having said all those nice things, let me encourage Members to follow 
the line of my friend from Oregon and support the gentleman from 
Vermont [Mr. Sanders], and I hope the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. 
Frank] if the Sanders amendment does not pass. All the gentleman from 
Massachusetts [Mr. Frank] wants to do is keep us within the bounds of 
the administration, keep it basically at a freeze, and also the Conyers 
amendment, which will get to the point of this discussion that we are 
having right now of revealing what the number is.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Oregon [Mr. DeFazio] has 
expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. DeFAZIO was allowed to proceed for 2 
additional minutes.)
  Mr. DeFAZIO. Mr. Chairman, I continue to yield to the gentleman from 
Michigan.
  Mr. BONIOR. I would say to my friend from Oregon, we need these 
amendments because this is a Rip Van Winkle budget. If Rip Van Winkle 
was just waking up, he would not know that the cold war was over, that 
the world has changed, that our intelligence needs are dramatically 
different than they were a decade ago.

                              {time}  1615

  But that is exactly how this intelligence budget is framed, like 
nothing has changed, and the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] who I 
have deep respect for, is absolutely right. We actually need a strong 
intelligence budget for those things that occurred at the World Trade 
Center and occurred in the Middle East and took so many lives. But let 
us be realistic.
  Mr. DeFAZIO. How much of this budget is spent on those particular 
terrorist threats?
  Mr. BONIOR. We do not know.
  Mr. DeFAZIO. We do not know.
  Mr. BONIOR. We do not know.
  Mr. DeFAZIO. But even if we wanted to beef up those portions of the 
budget, we could not do that here on the floor?
  Mr. BONIOR. I think we probably could. I think we probably could.
  Mr. DeFAZIO. We could transfer from one account to another since we 
do not know what is in the accounts?
  Mr. BONIOR. That is kind of the dilemma here that we are facing.
  And so I would say to my friend that what we need to do is to work 
together to rein this in. Today the drive to a balanced budget is 
reducing spending dramatically.
  In fact, we read in the paper this morning that the budget is going 
to be down about $45 billion, the annual budget, a tremendous drop 
since 1993. Yet today we are spending 95 percent more than our major 
allies combined on intelligence, combined, and twice as much as nations 
that are viewed as rogue states.
  So as my colleagues know, here we are, we have got about $112 billion 
bill to refurbish schools that are falling apart across this country, 
we have got 10 million kids in this country without health insurance, 
and we are spending, according to the New York Times, over $30 billion 
on intelligence, and the cold war is what? Nine years, seven years, 
eight years over with?
  It does not make any sense, so I urge my colleagues, support Sanders, 
support Frank and support Conyers.
  Mr. BASS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  I rise in opposition to the Sanders amendment. The implication from 
the discussion they have been hearing here is that intelligence in this 
country has been developed as a result of the cold war. Well, the cold 
war is yet a small part of an entire history of this country especially 
its strategic interests which have been around since the Constitution 
was written.

[[Page H4965]]

  Let me just point out that the debate here is on the amendment not 
the other extraneous issues. We will debate when we reach, if we do, 
the Conyers amendment, the issue of publicity of intelligence 
authorization or authorizing numbers, but let me just point out that 
this amendment in essence implies that the Permanent Select Committee 
on Intelligence in the 6 or 7 months that it has been working on its 
budget has not really done its work.
  The fact of the matter is, as the chairman has mentioned, we have 
held numerous hearings, we have had plenty of hearings to discuss each 
and every line item as has been amply discussed. Every Member of the 
Congress, Republican or Democrat, could come up and examine these 
numbers in any level of detail.
  The fact of the matter is, as the chairman has mentioned, we have 
held numerous hearings, we have had plenty of hearings to discuss each 
and every line item as has been amply discussed. Every Member of the 
Congress, Republican or Democrat, could come up and examine these 
numbers in any level of detail.
  The fact of the matter is that it is surprising to me that any 
amendment that would be offered at a 10-percent reduction yesterday and 
then turn into a 5-percent reduction today can be called a responsible 
amendment. It only goes to show that when the chairman said, ``What 
would you cut,'' that there is no real intention here of being serious 
about reducing this budget.
  The fact is the committee has been responsible in dealing with this 
budget on a line-by-line basis over the last 7 months. The 
distinguished gentleman from Michigan calls this a Rip Van Winkle 
budget; I would point out that this amendment is probably a blind man's 
bluff amendment because we have absolutely no idea what the impact 
would be.
  That is not responsible legislating, and I urge my colleagues to 
oppose this amendment.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. BASS. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished gentleman from New 
Hampshire for doing that. I did want to point out on a serious note 
that any Member of the U.S. House of Representatives, of course, enjoys 
a very high privilege for serving here, but they also enjoy the 
opportunity to examine classified information, and I believe that that 
is a wonderful opportunity. I hope Members will take advantage of it; I 
mean that very sincerely because I think that they get a better 
impression of what our responsibilities in the area of national 
security are by examining classified information and material available 
to the committee then they do by reading various newspapers which 
inevitably have a slant or point of view and less than full 
information, or even watching C-Span which is always dramatic; excuse 
me, CNN which is always dramatic.
  But that is not really the point. The other point I wanted to make is 
this:
  We have clearly got a responsibility, the 15 Members of the House 
Permanent Select Committe on Intelligence. Oversight has come a long 
way, baby, since we first started to have oversight of the intelligence 
community. We needed oversight. It all started back, and my colleague 
has said a long time ago, but in the Second World War became apparent 
that we needed to deal with the oversight question and organize 
intelligence, and shortly after that we did. And oversight has become 
much more sophisticated, much more organized, I believe much more 
representative.
  But it is true, the 15 of us on that committee have a responsibility 
to all of the other Members of this body to make the right decisions. 
We have brought forward a bill, 15 to zero, that we do not all agree 
with every item on to be sure, but, 15 to zero, we have brought our 
colleagues a bipartisan bill which we think is about right for where we 
are to go into conference with, and we are asking our colleagues to 
basically understand that we have not come out of thin air, that we 
have worked hard and deliberately, going time and time again into these 
programs dealing with these agencies, making them justify how they 
expend these moneys.
  I am a fiscal conservative. I would not be voting for pork or waste. 
I assure that the Members who know me know that is true. As I say, I 
think we have got it about right, I think the members of this committee 
have done a very good job, and I think a straight across the board cut 
that is totally indiscriminate is going to do serious damage and not 
going to get the kind of benefits or savings that the well intentioned 
sponsors of the amendment has envisaged.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, in these days with the cold war behind us, Berlin Wall 
having come down, we find ourselves in a comparable era, as we did in 
the 1920's and the early 1930's where there was no known adversary on 
the horizon.
  I support the bill as it is, and I oppose the amendment to reduce the 
authorization.
  Serving on the Committee on National Security, and there are a few of 
us on this Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence that do, also as 
a member of this committee, I know the value of timely and accurate 
intelligence to military commanders as well as to the administration 
and the State Department. In these days where the predictability of the 
future is so cloudy, that is when, Mr. Chairman, it is all the more 
important for us to have the best, the finest intelligence network we 
can.
  More than that, it is more than just being able to collect 
intelligence. We need the analysts who can give us that predictive 
analysis as to where we think problems may arise. Successful military 
operations, successful diplomatic operations which minimize the risk of 
problems and lives of American service men and women cannot, simply 
cannot be conducted without excellent intelligence and excellent 
analysis.
  As a member of both of the committees that deal with this I pay 
particular attention to the needs of the military as well as the other. 
I believe this bill responds to those needs, I support it. A cut, I 
think, would be doing a disservice to our diplomats, it would be doing 
a disservice to those who serve in uniform, a disservice to those who 
want to keep our country free and our interests keen in the days and 
years ahead.
  Mr. PAUL. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this amendment. I understand this 
amendment originally suggested that we cut 10 percent of this budget. 
This amendment says we cut 5 percent. This is a very reasonable amount 
in this time when we are supposed to be working in tight budgets. Of 
course we can make the argument that rather than spending money on 
international spying activities that could be better spent here at 
home, and I think there is a lot to that argument.
  But I am pleased with the amendment, and I am very happy that the 
amendment is brought to the floor because, if nothing else, the 5 
percent of savings that we might get if we pass the amendment, we do 
not know the exact figures so we cannot even make that calculation, it 
is not going to make or break the budget even though it could be 
helpful. But the amendment allows us to come to the floor and at least 
express a concern, and we have heard many of these concerns already. It 
is just a chance to get on the floor and say to the Congress and to our 
colleagues, Whoa, let's slow up a minute, let's think for a minute what 
we're doing and what have we been doing.
  It is now accepted that the activities of the CIA is they are proper 
and something that we have had for a long time, but the CIA is a rather 
new invention. It is part of the 20th century. It came up after World 
War II. But it was pointed out earlier that this is not exactly true 
because we have been dealing with intelligence for a long time, and 
that is true. But it has always been dealt with in national defense, it 
was strictly limited, and it was handled by the military. But since 
World War II, since the time that we have built and tried to run the 
American empire, we have to have our spy agents out there. Now we have 
a civilian international spy agency.
  I might ask my colleagues really if they would even be inclined to 
read the Constitution in a strict manner where would they get this 
authority that we

[[Page H4966]]

have to go out, have an organization like this that is very poorly 
followed by the Congress? We know very little in general about what 
happens when it comes to our Government being involved in overthrow of 
certain leaders around the world. I would suggest that when the history 
of the 20th century is written that many of us will not be very proud 
of the history of the CIA and the involvement that they have been 
involved in over these many years. I think the activity of the CIA has 
gone a long way to give America a bad reputation.
  This does not mean that we should not have intelligence and we should 
not be concerned about national defense, but if it were done in a 
proper manner it would be done without an organization such as the CIA. 
These very secret clandestine activities of the CIA really is very 
unbecoming of a free society. It is not generally found in a society 
which is considered free and open and that the people know what is 
going on.
  It surprised me a little bit to hear it even admitted earlier that 
some of the activity of the CIA is involved with, business activity 
that we have to be thinking about business espionage, many of us have 
made this accusation challenge that, yes, we have the CIA that 
represents big business in many parts of the world. And I think this is 
the case. And not only do we have our business interests reaching out 
to many areas of the world and we have a very internationalistic 
interventionist foreign policy, we have troops in so many countries, 
over a hundred countries.
  I would really like somebody to get up here today that is 
knowledgeable; tell me how many countries we have CIA agents in. If we 
have troops in 100 countries, we may have CIA agents in 200 countries. 
But I do not know that, and possibly it will be buried someplace, but I 
am not allowed to come down here and explain it to the American people.
  The American people are responsible. They pay the bills. They are the 
ones who have to fight the wars if we go and do something nonsensical. 
And was the CIA involved in Vietnam? It certainly was. There was a 
killing of a leader in Vietnam that escalated that affair which led to 
war and killing and the death of many young Americans.
  So we in the Congress should be more responsible so we can tell the 
people exactly what is going on, exactly what it is going to cost and 
exactly what the ramifications are when these agents are dealing in 
other countries.

                              {time}  1630

  I would say that the CIA does not have a very good reputation among 
many Members of Congress nor among many citizens of this country. They 
are concerned about it and would like to know a lot more about it.
  Is there any chance the CIA could have funding outside of the so-
called normal appropriations process? I think there is a very good 
chance that is possible and that they may well have been involved in 
drug dealing.
  Mr. BROWN of California. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite 
number of words.
  Mr. Chairman, I thought for the last several years that I would stay 
out of these debates about the CIA, but I am torn to come back and say 
a few words here.
  I had the pleasure of serving on the Committee on Intelligence for a 
few years, and I finally resigned in disgust because I did not find 
either that the intelligence was very reliable, and certainly that the 
rules and regulations with which the process was conducted were utterly 
asinine.
  We have had references here to statements in the newspapers about the 
level of funding and other things involving the CIA. I, as most Members 
know, have been involved with the space program for 30-odd years. I 
thought I knew something about space activities and the kinds of things 
that the CIA was doing in overhead collection. I was getting my 
information from scientific journals and some of the researchers who 
were doing the work on these kinds of collection systems.
  I was precluded by the rules with regard to my serving on the 
Committee on Intelligence from reflecting not what I saw in newspapers 
but what I saw in scientific journals or scientific reports of various 
kinds. This is kind of asinine, to classify something that the most 
informed people have already published. Mr. Chairman, I thought this 
was something that we really ought to get away from, but I found that 
my loyalty to the country was questioned if I even brought this up for 
discussion, in many cases.
  Now progress is being made, not very much, but some. The members of 
the committee are honorable people who are trying to do a better job, 
and I commend them for it, because it is frequently a thankless task. 
When I was on the committee, I served under the chairmanship of the 
gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Lee Hamilton, and the gentleman from Ohio, 
Mr. Lou Stokes, and they were honorable people, wonderful people who 
were doing their best for the welfare of this country. Nevertheless, 
they were constrained by the same rules and practices that I was 
constrained by to sort of go along with the system.
  I remember the time, for example, when we would be invited down to 
the White House, and Admiral Poindexter, at that time National Security 
Adviser, and Ollie North would lie through their teeth to us about what 
was going on. Every time a critical event came up, they would invent 
some new lie to explain it to us. Mr. Chairman, I did not particularly 
like that, but I suppose I could understand it.
  Actually, the whole intelligence apparatus, or the CIA in particular, 
and the National Reconnaissance Office, which I suppose we are still 
precluded from mentioning on the floor because it is classified, are 
actually a secret army for the President. They do what he says and they 
kind of protect him in the process, and we saw this occurring over long 
periods of time.
  I am not sure that that really is what we need from an intelligence 
agency. We do need intelligence, without regard to the fact that the 
cold war is over. This is a dangerous world and we need intelligence. 
Going back to the writings of that great Chinese author, Sun Dzu, who 
wrote with regard to war, about war 2,500 years ago, good intelligence 
collection was the most important thing that any military commander 
could have, regardless. It is still true today, that it is essential.
  But we are not getting good intelligence. If so, we would have known 
far more about the economic, social, and other conditions in the Soviet 
Union which led to its collapse. We would know far more about the kind 
of cultural and religious conflicts taking place in the Islamic nations 
than we know. We know practically nothing, as a matter of fact. We are 
not going to get it from the CIA.
  I think the committee is beginning to understand that there are 
problems with our intelligence collection in certain vital areas, such 
as those that I have mentioned. Their suggestion that we might consider 
a civilian reserve corps may be the best idea that has come out of the 
Committee on Intelligence in a long time, because with a civilian 
reserve corps of people who understand the language and the culture and 
the economies of the areas that we have an intelligence interest in, we 
will get more and better intelligence than we have ever had before.
  With regard to analytical capabilities, it has been known for two 
decades that the CIA was collecting huge amounts of information which 
they never bothered to analyze. We would apparently not give them the 
money to analyze it, and if we did, they cached it away to pay for a $3 
billion building, or whatever.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California [Mr. Brown] 
has expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. BROWN of California was allowed to proceed 
for 2 additional minutes.)
  Mr. BROWN of California. Mr. Chairman, the committee's report 
recognizes these things and lays them out specifically and then asks 
for more money. This is ridiculous. If we are getting inadequate 
intelligence and intelligence analysis today, why reward that with more 
money? Maybe it would be a healthy lesson if we would cut them 5 
percent or 10 percent.
  We have been doing this with another agency that I am very well 
acquainted with, NASA, for the last several years. I regretted it. I 
hated it, because I felt that NASA was doing a good job and producing 
huge benefits to the American people through the technology it

[[Page H4967]]

developed and sponsored. But they survived it, and they are doing a 
better job today.
  The landing of a rover on Mars, for example, was done at half the 
cost that we thought it would be done a few years ago, because we have 
found that we can do things faster, cheaper, and better.
  Why cannot the CIA and the other intelligence agencies live with that 
same kind of discipline? I think they could. I think it would be good 
for them. The intelligence would be better. The country would be better 
served. We could say that we are enhancing the security of this country 
and our understanding of the rest of the world and saving money at the 
same time. That is what we should be trying to do. We are doing it in 
every other area, and I think it is time we applied it to the 
intelligence agencies.
  Mr. OWENS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  (Mr. OWENS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. OWENS. Mr. Chairman, one speaker has implied that we are not 
serious when we offer this amendment because we know it is not going to 
pass. I regret that it will not pass. We are reduced to a ceremonial 
action each year. Once again we are here to impose what I consider a 
civilized and reason-based ceremony on a very primitive Congress, which 
goes through a ritual of blindly authorizing more than $30 billion for 
a CIA that should have been streamlined and downsized at the end of the 
cold war. By the most conservative estimate in the New York Times, this 
is $30 billion that we are talking about.
  We ought to take 5 percent of that, which is $1.5 billion; $1.5 
billion may seem like a small amount compared to the overall CIA 
budget, but our entire proposed initiative by the President on school 
construction was merely $5 billion over a 5-year period; $5 billion 
over a 5-year period, which means we could fund the school construction 
initiative out of this cut and still have $2.5 billion left over for 
other matters, like the empowerment zones in poverty areas. So we are 
talking about money that could do a great deal that is probably being 
wasted in a CIA that is unaccountable.
  The very basic but baffling instinct and superstition of this 
congressional village is to insist that tampering with the secret 
budget of the CIA is taboo. The CIA is untouchable. There is fear that 
dangerous, invisible demons will rise up and destroy our village if we 
disturb this almighty Washington wizard.
  It is not reasonable, what we do here. Downsizing, streamlining, and 
restructuring are vitally necessary for this Federal agency, just as it 
was useful in other Federal agencies. The era of big government is 
over. We are proud to keep repeating that the era of big government is 
over. The era of the big unaccountable CIA should also be over, but 
nobody wants to touch the big, unaccountable CIA.
  We have just heard more than 1 hour of general debate which did not 
grapple with the following taboo subjects.
  They did not talk really in the general debate about the failure of 
the CIA to predict the collapse of the Soviet Union, the greatest 
failure of all. They did not talk about the dangerous and costly 
interference with administrative diplomatic initiatives, policy 
initiatives, in Haiti.
  Somebody just said a few minutes ago that the CIA is the President's 
secret army. It certainly did not behave like the President's secret 
army in Haiti, because the President authorized one policy and took one 
set of initiatives and the CIA was funding the organization in Haiti 
called FRAPH, which had a big demonstration of wielding pistols, 
shooting guns, and stopped a peaceful initiative to bring some police 
officers in to help train the Haitian police.
  We later had to have a costly military operation in order to deal 
with the criminals in Haiti. The CIA did it. Emanuel Constanz, who 
headed that organization, was on the payroll of the CIA. He was 
arrested for a while and then set free. He is out there free somewhere 
now. The CIA has never explained their relationship with Emanuel 
Constanz and the FRAPH organization.
  The loss of $40 billion in petty cash funds. It was written in the 
New York Times that the petty cash funds of the National Reconnaissance 
Agency somehow lost $2 billion first, and later on they said no, it is 
$4 billion, lost and later recovered, of course.
  The Aldrich Ames affair. His name has not been mentioned during 
general debate at all. Aldrich Ames was very dangerous. At least 10 
agents, 10 operatives of the CIA, by their own admission, lost their 
lives, yet Aldrich Ames is alive and well now, and he intimidates the 
CIA with interviews that he gives from prison. He makes fun of the CIA. 
Aldrich Ames was said to receive $2 to $3 million for his treason.
  Harald Nicholson, another highly placed CIA person recently was given 
20 years; he will be out in 10 years, for betraying his country, for 
selling secrets. First it was for $120,000 and later on they said maybe 
it was $300,000. Who knows how much it was. But this pattern in the CIA 
occurs at very high levels. Aldrich Ames was a very high level person 
in charge of the Eastern European and Soviet operation; very high level 
people are selling out for dollars. Something must be wrong somewhere.
  It was $7.5 billion that we talked about over a 5-year period. Surely 
we can use it and put it to better purposes than have it go on existing 
in this unaccountable agency. If we start with a 5 percent cut, maybe 
next time it will be a 10 percent cut and maybe next time we will go to 
the real purpose of restructuring, restructuring the CIA to fit its 
mission in the present time.
  Common sense, combined with scientific reasoning, should be allowed 
to prevail over the primitive kinds of instincts that are employed when 
we have discussions of the CIA. It is not rational what we are doing, 
not scientific, not based on reason, not based on the evidence that 
exists.
  The CIA budget was increased to deal with the evil empire. The evil 
empire no longer exists. The evil empire gets aid from us, and they use 
some of that aid to pay our agents. Russia pays our agents out of some 
of the aid we give them. Ridiculous.
  Ms. WATERS. I move to strike the requisite number of words, Mr. 
Chairman.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this amendment. It seems almost 
impossible that this Congress would not embrace a 10-percent, a measly 
10-percent reduction in this intelligence budget. I am not going to 
talk at this moment about everything that I have learned about the CIA 
and their drug dealing and other activities. I am just going to talk 
about what some of our allies think about them.
  In a Los Angeles Times article Monday, March 17, 1997, our 
international allies' dislike of the CIA's clandestine activities is 
stated as such.
  I quote: ``Around the world, America's friends are sending a quiet 
but stern message to the Central Intelligence Agency: The cold war is 
over, the rules of the spy game have changed, and it's time for the 
United States to curb its espionage operations on its allies' turf.
  ``At least four friendly nations, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, and 
France, have halted secret CIA operations on their territory during the 
past 2 years.'' In Germany a CIA officer was ordered to leave the 
country, get out, apparently for trying to recruit a German official. 
In 1995 there was a major intelligence failure in Paris when the French 
uncovered and put an end to an economic espionage operation run by our 
CIA.
  In the Washington Post there was an article entitled ``House panel 
affirms some allegations against CIA.'' This was March 18, 1997. The 
Washington Post reported that a House intelligence committee report 
affirmed a previous conclusion that CIA contacts in Guatemala were 
involved in serious human rights violations with the agency's knowledge 
and their involvement, which was improperly kept from Congress in the 
early 1990's.

                              {time}  1645

  In fact, the article stated, and I quote, ``The report represents a 
sharp criticism of the CIA from a Republican-controlled committee that 
has tended to be more sympathetic to CIA arguments that it must deal 
with unsavory individuals to get good intelligence,'' unquote.

[[Page H4968]]

  What is the mission of the CIA in the post-cold war environment? Is 
it necessary to continue allocating $30 billion to this intelligence 
effort? Should we not use these funds for other purposes such as job 
development or school infrastructure or rehabilitation? I am encouraged 
that the New York Times on March 3, 1997, recently reported that the 
CIA was doing some scrubbing, they called it, in an effort to sever 
ties with 100 foreign agents, about half of them in Latin America, 
whose value as informers was outweighed by their acts of murder, 
assassination, torture, terrorism and other crimes. According to these 
articles, the Latin American division of the CIA's clandestine service 
proved to be the one most riddled with foreign agents who were killers 
and torturers, and that the CIA also has had on its payroll people who 
are terrorists and drug dealers. I am going to talk about drug dealers 
in an amendment that I am going to bring up, but I want Members to keep 
fixed on that. Drug dealers who were terrorists and, of course, drug 
dealers.
  It is not enough to cleanse some of the rogue agents employed by the 
CIA in their clandestine activities. We really need to eliminate the 
CIA. The Defense Intelligence Agency, the DIA, needs to take over the 
functions and responsibilities currently held by the CIA. There are 
overlapping functions between the CIA and the DIA. So while I think 
they need to be eliminated, certainly this very small modest request 
for a 10-percent reduction, a 5-percent reduction, 5 percent, 10 
percent, whatever, should be done. It should be embraced by everybody. 
It would show that at least we are concerned about this agency that is 
just riddled with problems. I mean this agency is a disgrace. Time and 
time again we find these articles that are appearing that are talking 
about not only our agents who are selling us out but all of the rogues 
and the terrorists and the dope dealers that they are dealing with. Do 
we not want to do something about the CIA? Are we not ashamed? Do we 
not feel that we have enough power to rein them in?
  I will be back with my own amendment to deal with them on dope 
dealing.
  Ms. FURSE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  I rise in support of the Sanders amendment which would cut 
intelligence funding by 5 percent. Now, other agencies have been 
reduced. Do Members know that the State Department has had its budget 
cut 20 percent in the past 5 years? But we are going to give the 
intelligence department, and I use the word in quotes, an ``increase.'' 
It is absolutely preposterous to even think about spending more on 
intelligence when the cold war is over.
  I have heard colleagues say, well, this is a dangerous world. I 
agree. It is a dangerous world. This is a dangerous country where 10 
million children have no health insurance. It is a dangerous country 
when gangs threaten citizens in the streets. It is a dangerous country 
where 3 people get shot in the capital city. Yet we have cut those 
programs. We have cut the programs which solved those problems, but we 
increase the budget for the Central Intelligence Agency. Of course I 
say we increase it, but how do I know? We do not even know exactly how 
much we spend because that has been a secret since it was started.
  I would like to quote from the Constitution of the United States. It 
says, and I quote, ``a regular statement and account of the receipts 
and expenditures of all public money shall be published from time to 
time.'' The CIA has simply exempted itself from this constitutional 
requirement. I wonder if that is constitutional to have a secret 
budget.
  I can guess why the CIA might want to keep some of its activities in 
the dark, but unfortunately for them the news is out anyway. The 
Intelligence Oversight Board, a Presidential panel, has recently 
reported on some of the activities of the CIA. I have heard some of my 
colleagues mention them, the horrors of the Guatemalan incidents, the 
stuff in Haiti, the fact that we gave weapons to the Mujahedin in 
Afghanistan which are now turned on us in Bosnia. But I would like to 
ask whether we got value for the money we spent. Did we get value? That 
is a good question for us to ask the American people.
  We have recently learned about a computer error during the Persian 
Gulf war. Well, that sounds bad, a computer error, but think of the 
horror of that computer error. It exposed 120,000 United States troops 
to sarin nerve gas, sarin nerve gas, the gas that killed so many in 
Japan. The CIA had known about Iraqi storage of these agents since 
1985, but it did not alert the United States military which 
subsequently blew up the bunker in 1991. They knew the exact, the CIA 
knew the exact coordinates but all this money we spent on them, the 
information was filed under a spelling error. So the military did not 
get the intelligence. All this intelligence we have paid for, did not 
get it. So 20,000 American servicemen and women were exposed to sarin 
gas. I do not think we get value for the money we spend and I think we 
spend too much of it.
  Our intelligence apparatus is a cold war creation that now includes 
thirteen agencies, employs 150,000 people, and yet we are not allowed 
to talk about what it is spent on. We are not allowed to come down and 
tell the American people, that dollar you sent us for your Federal 
income tax which we are giving to the CIA, we are not going to tell you 
about it, even though the Constitution says we should.
  So it is time to rein it in. It is time to make this agency live by 
the same rules we are asking of all others. I urge Members' support for 
the Sanders amendment. It is a support for fiscal responsibility and 
for sanity.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words, and I rise in opposition to the Sanders amendment.
  First of all, I would say to my colleagues, I think Mr. Goss is 
right. What we read in the newspapers is not necessarily correct. The 
number that has been bandied around here today is not necessarily 
correct.
  Second, I think it is important to realize that the Central 
Intelligence Agency receives only a small fraction of the money that is 
spent on the intelligence effort. The overwhelming part of the 
intelligence budget is spent at the Department of Defense on defense-
related activities. I would point out to my colleagues that if they go 
back and look at World War I, look at World War II, look at Desert 
Storm/Desert Shield, intelligence played a major role in our victory in 
those wars.
  The second lesson I think it is important to remember is that after 
World War II, we cut back our military spending. We cut back on 
intelligence. Then we wound up in Korea and we wound up in a military 
mess. After the Vietnam war, we cut back on defense. We cut back on 
intelligence. What happened? We wound up weakening our military and we 
had to come back and restore it and spend a tremendous amount of 
effort, and when we did do that, we wound up having a very successful 
effort in Desert Storm/Desert Shield.
  Again, in my judgment, the amount of money we are spending with 15 
Members of the Congress that have reviewed this very carefully, going 
through it on a line item by line-item basis, I think is about right.
  I oppose this amendment. I will also say as a senior member of the 
defense appropriations subcommittee that we are going to be within our 
602(b) allocation when the appropriation bill comes to the floor. So I 
want to assure everyone that defense will be within our 602(b) 
allocation.
  Now, let us get down to the specifics as much as we can. I urge 
everyone who has spoken today with all the passion, all the concern, 
please come up to the Intelligence Committee. We will see that you are 
briefed. We will see that you have an opportunity to look at these 
numbers and to see why we think that the authorization that is 
presented here is about right.
  Having had some experience in the defense area, I want to tell my 
colleagues, I believe intelligence is a force multiplier. We have cut 
defense overall, and the intelligence budget is part of that, by over 
$100 billion between 1985 and 1995. Intelligence has not been cut as 
much as defense. But I will tell my colleagues this: It has been cut 
significantly, maybe not enough for some, but it has been cut 
significantly. For Members to stand up here and say intelligence has 
not been cut is simply inaccurate. It has been cut very significantly.

[[Page H4969]]

  I will just tell my colleagues, I believe that the information that 
we get, if Members go back to Desert Storm/Desert Shield, we were able 
to do things there because of the intelligence-gathering success that 
we had that gave our soldiers a critical advantage. We were able to end 
that war rapidly, using a combination of air power and intelligence, 
and we did it rapidly and saved American lives.
  I want to point out to my colleagues, this is serious business. This 
is serious business. I agree with my colleague who said if you can take 
this amendment from 10 to 5 percent in one afternoon, one has to 
question just how seriously it has been thought out. So I would argue 
that the intelligence that we get, especially for the military, is 
absolutely crucial. As we get better and better at this, through our 
national technical means, we are going to solve some of the problems we 
had in the gulf war. One was broad area search. General Schwarzkopf 
wanted to have a better idea of what the enemy was doing. With a 
combination of our satellites and our UAV's, we are going to be able in 
the future to let commanders know really what is going on behind enemy 
lines. That will be an enormous advantage. One of the problems we had 
there was finding the Scud launchers, and they could have devastated 
the 500,000 troops we had there if they used chemical and biological 
weapons.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks] 
has expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. Dicks was allowed to proceed for 2 
additional minutes.)
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, if they had used chemical and biological 
weapons on the 500,000 American troops sitting out there in that 
desert, they could have done devastating damage. We could have taken 
huge casualties. It was lucky for us that those Scuds were not 
accurate. We cannot expect that to happen in the future.
  With the improvements in intelligence, we are going to be able to 
target those Scud launchers which we had such a difficult time finding 
in the past, using Link 16 and other developments that come from our 
national technical means that will be fused into the cockpit of our 
advanced aircraft.
  One of the things we have worked on for the last 20 years is to take 
advantage of these investments in intelligence to give our military 
people a significant advantage against any enemy. My hope and prayer is 
that this will lead to deterrence, that we will be able to prevent 
future wars because when they go up against the United States, they are 
going to know we have a very capable force and, No. 2, that that force 
has the best possible intelligence. That will save money and save 
American lives and prevent future wars.
  Military strength and intelligence strength will help prevent 
conflict in the future.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. DICKS. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I would just ask the 
gentleman, he and I agree we should not be under this restriction but 
we are, he cannot give us the dollar figure. He said intelligence has 
already been cut. Could he tell us what the percentage cut was?
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I cannot tell the gentleman that.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will 
continue to yield, he cannot tell me because the Iranians would find 
out.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I am going to vote for the Conyers 
amendment. I voted for it for the last several years, because I think 
we ought to have that number out there. I will tell the gentleman this, 
it is a significant cut.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. I have a later amendment dealing with a 
cut, in case this one does not pass. Maybe we can have that number by 
then, what the percentage was of what it was cut.
  Mr. DICKS. I will just tell the gentleman that when we look at the 
highwater mark and take it back down, it is a significant reduction.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks] 
has again expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. Dicks was allowed to proceed for 30 
additional seconds.)

                              {time}  1700

  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, as I said, I will support the Conyers 
amendment when the gentleman from Michigan offers that amendment. I 
think the American people have a right to know.
  One of the reasons I want it out there is because the number that is 
being bandied around here today is inaccurate. It is inaccurate. I 
would like to have the American people know what the truth is.
  I would like to also have them know, frankly, what the CIA percentage 
of that is, because it is a lot different than what we have heard today 
on the floor.
  Again to my colleagues, please come up to the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence and get the real facts. I think it is 
embarrassing to have these numbers bandied around on this floor that 
are simply inaccurate.
  Mr. STARK. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Sanders amendment 
to H.R. 1775, the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1997.
  The cold war is over. The specter of communism no longer lurks on the 
horizon. While we face new challenges in this new age, the need for 
clandestine activity has been severely lessened. I support the Sanders 
amendment to reduce the intelligence authorization by 10 percent.
  While the exact level of appropriations is confidential, the New York 
Times reports that over $30 billion is spent to support the 
intelligence community. A 10-percent cut would place $3 billion back 
into deficit spending, or provide funds for many other more necessary 
activities.
  Thirty billion dollars is more than twice the combined intelligence 
budgets of our supposed hostile nations--North Korea, Iraq, Iran, 
Syria, Libya, and Cuba. It is also more than the intelligence budgets 
of the United Kingdom, Australia, Germany, and Canada combined.
  Within so many other pressing domestic priorities, can the taxpayers 
of this country afford $30 billion, or more for intelligence activity?
  I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting the Sanders amendment 
to H.R. 1775.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Vermont [Mr. Sanders], as modified.
  The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.


                             Recorded Vote

  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 142, 
noes 289, not voting 3, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 253]

                               AYES--142

     Abercrombie
     Allen
     Baldacci
     Barcia
     Barrett (WI)
     Becerra
     Bentsen
     Blumenauer
     Bonior
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Camp
     Campbell
     Capps
     Carson
     Chabot
     Chenoweth
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clyburn
     Coburn
     Condit
     Conyers
     Costello
     Coyne
     Cummings
     Danner
     Davis (IL)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Dellums
     Doggett
     Duncan
     Ensign
     Eshoo
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Filner
     Foglietta
     Foley
     Ford
     Fox
     Frank (MA)
     Furse
     Gephardt
     Gonzalez
     Green
     Gutierrez
     Gutknecht
     Hall (TX)
     Hastings (FL)
     Hill
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hoekstra
     Hooley
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Johnson (WI)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Kanjorski
     Kennedy (MA)
     Kilpatrick
     Kind (WI)
     Kleczka
     Kucinich
     Lewis (GA)
     Lofgren
     Luther
     Maloney (CT)
     Maloney (NY)
     Manzullo
     Markey
     Martinez
     McCarthy (MO)
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McKinney
     Meehan
     Metcalf
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller (CA)
     Minge
     Mink
     Moakley
     Morella
     Nadler
     Neal
     Neumann
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Owens
     Pastor
     Paul
     Payne
     Peterson (MN)
     Petri
     Porter
     Poshard
     Ramstad
     Rangel
     Rivers
     Roemer
     Rohrabacher
     Roybal-Allard
     Royce
     Rush
     Sanchez
     Sanders
     Schumer
     Sensenbrenner
     Serrano
     Shays
     Slaughter
     Stabenow
     Stark
     Stenholm
     Stokes
     Strickland
     Stupak
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Tierney
     Torres
     Towns
     Traficant
     Upton
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Waters
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Woolsey
     Yates

                               NOES--289

     Ackerman
     Aderholt
     Andrews
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baesler
     Baker
     Ballenger
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bateman
     Bereuter
     Berman
     Berry
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop
     Blagojevich
     Bliley
     Blunt

[[Page H4970]]


     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Borski
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Brady
     Bryant
     Bunning
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Canady
     Cannon
     Cardin
     Castle
     Chambliss
     Christensen
     Clement
     Coble
     Collins
     Combest
     Cook
     Cooksey
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cubin
     Cunningham
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (VA)
     Deal
     DeLay
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Dooley
     Doolittle
     Doyle
     Dreier
     Dunn
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     Engel
     English
     Etheridge
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fawell
     Fazio
     Flake
     Forbes
     Fowler
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frost
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gejdenson
     Gekas
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Gordon
     Goss
     Graham
     Granger
     Greenwood
     Hall (OH)
     Hamilton
     Hansen
     Harman
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Hefner
     Herger
     Hilleary
     Hobson
     Holden
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Inglis
     Istook
     Jefferson
     Jenkins
     John
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones
     Kaptur
     Kasich
     Kelly
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kennelly
     Kildee
     Kim
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Klink
     Klug
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaFalce
     LaHood
     Lampson
     Lantos
     Largent
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lazio
     Leach
     Levin
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     Lipinski
     Livingston
     LoBiondo
     Lowey
     Lucas
     Manton
     Mascara
     Matsui
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McDade
     McHale
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntosh
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     McNulty
     Meek
     Menendez
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Molinari
     Mollohan
     Moran (KS)
     Moran (VA)
     Murtha
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Ney
     Northup
     Ortiz
     Oxley
     Packard
     Pallone
     Pappas
     Parker
     Pascrell
     Paxon
     Pease
     Pelosi
     Peterson (PA)
     Pickering
     Pickett
     Pitts
     Pombo
     Pomeroy
     Portman
     Price (NC)
     Pryce (OH)
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Rahall
     Redmond
     Regula
     Reyes
     Riggs
     Riley
     Rodriguez
     Rogan
     Rogers
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Rothman
     Roukema
     Ryun
     Sabo
     Salmon
     Sandlin
     Sanford
     Sawyer
     Saxton
     Scarborough
     Schaefer, Dan
     Schaffer, Bob
     Scott
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Sherman
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Sisisky
     Skaggs
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (OR)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith, Adam
     Smith, Linda
     Snowbarger
     Snyder
     Solomon
     Souder
     Spence
     Spratt
     Stearns
     Stump
     Sununu
     Talent
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thornberry
     Thune
     Thurman
     Tiahrt
     Turner
     Visclosky
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Watkins
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Wexler
     Weygand
     White
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wise
     Wolf
     Wynn
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                             NOT VOTING--3

     Cox
     Edwards
     Schiff

                              {time}  1729

  Messrs. RYUN, CRANE, BARTLETT of Maryland, and FLAKE changed their 
vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
  Messrs. McDERMOTT, BARRETT of Wisconsin, ROYCE, BENTSEN, STRICKLAND, 
and MOAKLEY, Ms. HOOLEY of Oregon, and Ms. TAUSCHER changed their vote 
from ``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the amendment was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.


                 Amendment No. 2 Offered by Mr. Conyers

  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. Was the amendment printed in the Congressional Record?
  Mr. CONYERS. Yes, Mr. Chairman, it was.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Conyers: Page 10, after line 15, 
     insert the following new section:

     SEC. 306. ANNUAL STATEMENT OF THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF 
                   INTELLIGENCE EXPENDITURES FOR THE CURRENT AND 
                   SUCCEEDING FISCAL YEARS.

       At the time of submission of the budget of the United 
     States Government submitted for fiscal year 1999 under 
     section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, and for each 
     fiscal year thereafter, the President shall submit to 
     Congress a separate, unclassified statement of the 
     appropriations and proposed appropriations for the current 
     fiscal year, and the amount of appropriations requested for 
     the fiscal year for which the budget is submitted, for 
     national and tactical intelligence activities, including 
     activities carried out under the budget of the Department of 
     Defense to collect, analyze, produce, disseminate, or support 
     the collection of intelligence.

  Mr. CONYERS (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous 
consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the 
Record.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Michigan?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, in order to assist Members planning, which we 
are trying to do, I ask unanimous consent that debate on the Conyers 
amendment and all amendments thereto be limited to 40 minutes, equally 
divided.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Florida?
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, I support a 
limitation for this reason: This is precisely the same amendment that 
was offered a year ago, and it received 176 votes. Although we have a 
lot of speakers, I think the lateness of the hour and the fact that 
this bill has been brought under the 5-minute rule requires that we 
accede to the chairman's request.
  Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my reservation of objection.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Florida?
  There was no objection.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Conyers] and the 
gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] each will control 20 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Conyers].
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  This amendment is precisely the same one that was voted on last year 
that makes this modest proposal, that the aggregate amounts of all 
intelligence agencies be revealed in the President's budget and in the 
final appropriation for intelligence. It is a simple compilation, and I 
know some people did know this, of 14 different intelligence agencies 
in the military budget. It has been examined with great care by the 
Commission on the Role and Capabilities in the Intelligence Community, 
chaired by the Secretary, former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, by 
Warren Rudman, and even the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] served 
with some distinction on this committee. They recommend this.
  The Council on Foreign Relations recommends this. In last year's 
Senate bill, this provision was included. I apologize, it is not 
radical, it is not revolutionary, it is embarrassingly modest, the 
aggregate figure of 14 intelligence agencies.
  The President of the United States has indicated that he would accede 
to this request. The ranking member of the Committee on National 
Security has supported us year after year, so we are only doing what 
other allies of ours do on this subject. England reveals their 
aggregate figure, Canada reveals their aggregate figure, Germany 
reveals their aggregate figure, Australia reveals their aggregate 
figure. We are moving in the same way that the Framers of the 
Constitution moved in 1790 and 1793 when they made public disclosure of 
their aggregate sum even though British spying and counterespionage was 
at a very intense level.
  I urge that Members support the measure. I would like to point out 
for those who will be spared this argument of why you do not go up to 
the green room and look at the intelligence figures. First of all, 
there are 14 of them. This is why only four Members have done this. 
Second, you are then bound by the House rules of secrecy and who knows 
what you can or cannot say.
  What we are saying is that for two reasons, we need this amendment 
very badly. One is that we must not undermine the legitimacy of the 
need for secrecy where it does exist. Secondly, unless we reveal the 
aggregate budget, we will not gain the support of the American people.
  For those reasons, I urge that we please support this amendment when 
it comes to a vote.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise today to offer a modest but long overdue 
proposal. My amendment would simply declassify the aggregate amount of 
the intelligence budget. Specifically, it would require the President 
to provide an unclassified statement of the bottom-line number of the 
current appropriated amount and the amount being requested. It would 
not disclose any operations. It would not reveal any agency budgets. It 
would simply provide the American

[[Page H4971]]

taxpayers with information they are clearly entitled to.
  The amendment is modeled after my bill, H.R. 753, the Intelligence 
Budget Accountability Act, a bill with 83 Democratic and Republican 
cosponsors. That bill, and the amendment I am offering today, seek to 
implement a key recommendation of a congressionally-mandated Commission 
on Intelligence Reform.
  The Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States 
Intelligence Community was chaired by former Secretary of Defense 
Harold Brown and former Republican Senator Warren Rudman. Dr. Brown, 
who is now at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and 
Senator Rudman, who served on the Intelligence Committee, both endorsed 
the Intelligence Budget Accountability Act in a letter. Even a former 
Director of Central Intelligence, Stansfield Turner, wrote me a letter 
supporting my bill. I am submitting all these materials for the Record.
  I would also like to point out that the gentleman from Florida who is 
the current chairman of the House Intelligence Committee sat on the 
Brown-Rudman Commission when it recommended disclosure of the 
intelligence budget. When the Commission's report came out, the White 
House publicly declared that ``The President is persuaded that 
disclosure of the annual budget for intelligence should be made public, 
and that this can be done without any harm to intelligence 
activities.'' So my amendment is really a mainstream proposal, with the 
support of Republicans and Democrats in and out of government.
  During my service as chairman of the Government Operations Committee, 
I became intimately familiar with mounds of classified information and 
with secrecy policy. I became convinced that too much secrecy is not 
only counterproductive to our democracy, but it also undermines the 
credibility of our legitimate secrets.
  Another congressionally-mandated study, the Commission on Protecting 
and Reducing Government Secrecy made some of the same observations. 
This Commission was chaired by Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, and the 
gentleman from Texas who served as the chair of the House Intelligence 
Committee last year. It observed in its report that ``Secrecy exists to 
protect national security, not government officials and not agencies.'' 
It also noted that the expansion of the national security bureaucracy 
has far outpaced oversight by the public and the Congress.
  It's time to stop blurring legitimate secrecy that serves our 
national defense with arbitrary secrecy that is used to avoid the 
debate on the balanced budget.
  You will likely hear some of my colleagues today say that once we 
disclose the aggregate figure on the intelligence budget, we'll be 
starting down a slippery slope. This is absurd. The Defense 
Appropriations Committee in 1994 accidentally disclosed not only the 
total figure, but even an agency by agency breakdown. Three years later 
we're still waiting to hear how that harmed our national security.
  You will also likely hear some say today that it is currently within 
the President's power to disclose the intelligence budget, and if he 
wants to he can. Talk about debating the chicken and the egg. That is 
precisely what this amendment would do anyway: require the President to 
submit an unclassified statement of the current appropriated amount and 
the current requested amount.
  Finally, as a member of the Judiciary Committee, I would like to 
mention that the Constitution wanted all arms of the government to be 
fiscally accountable. Article I, section 9, clause 7 states that ``No 
Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of 
Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the 
Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from 
time to time.''
  I think if the Framers could disclose the aggregate figure of their 
secret expenditures after the Revolutionary War, then we sure can 
disclose such a sum after the cold war. I urge a ``yes'' vote on the 
amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I include the following:
       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence Budget 
     Accountability Act of 1997''.

     SEC. 2. PURPOSE.

       It is the purpose of this Act to require the publication of 
     the aggregate intelligence budget figure to provide a more 
     thorough accounting of Government expenditures as required by 
     article I, section 9, clause 7 of the Constitution.

     SEC. 3. FINDINGS.

       The Congress finds that--
       (1) article I, section 9, clause 7 of the Constitution 
     states that ``No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but 
     in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular 
     Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all 
     public Money shall be published from time to time.'';
       (2) during the Cold War the United States did not provide 
     to the American people a ``regular Statement and Account of 
     the . . . Expenditures'' for intelligence activities;
       (3) the failure to provide to the American people a 
     statement of the total amount of expenditures on intelligence 
     activities prevents them from participating in an informed, 
     democratic decision concerning the appropriate level for such 
     expenditures; and
       (4) the Report of the Commission on the Roles and 
     Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community 
     recommended the disclosure of ``the total amount of money 
     appropriated for intelligence activities during the current 
     fiscal year and the total amount being requested for the next 
     fiscal year''.

     SEC. 4. ANNUAL STATEMENT OF THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF INTELLIGENCE 
                   EXPENDITURES FOR THE PRECEDING FISCAL YEAR.

       Section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, is amended 
     by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph:
       ``(31) a separate, unclassified statement of the 
     appropriations and proposed appropriations for the current 
     fiscal year, and the amount of appropriations requested for 
     the fiscal year for which the budget is submitted, for 
     national and tactical intelligence activities, including 
     activities carried out under the budget of the Department of 
     Defense to collect, analyze, produce, disseminate, or support 
     the collection of intelligence.''.
                                  ____


                          Original Cosponsors

       Pete Stark, Lynn Rivers, Luis Gutierrez, Maurice Hinchey, 
     Sam Farr, David Bonior, Earl Blumenauer, George Miller (CA), 
     Bob Filner, Peter DeFazio, Louise Slaughter, Ron Dellums, 
     Nancy Pelosi, Jerrold Nadler, Jim Oberstar, Cynthia McKinney, 
     Mel Watt (NC), Sidney Yates, Nita Lowey, John Olver, Anna 
     Eshoo, Ed Pastor, Nydia Velazquez.

                         Additional Cosponsors

       Norm Dicks, Barney Frank (MA), Bennie Thompson, Eleanor-
     Holmes Norton, Earl Pomeroy, Sheila Jackson-Lee, Bernie 
     Sanders, Bobby Rush, Jim McGovern, Sander Levin, Lee 
     Hamilton, Bill Luther, John Lewis (GA), Adam Smith (WA), 
     Martin Meehan, Danny Davis (IL), Floyd Flake, Lane Evans, 
     Elizabeth Furse, David Minge, Xavier Becerra, John Tierney, 
     George Brown (CA), Neil Abercrombie, Chaka Fattah, Ron Kind, 
     Debbie Stabenow, Maxine Waters, Diana DeGette, Carolyn 
     Maloney (NY), Tom Allen, Vic Fazio, Ron Paul, Henry Gonzalez, 
     Lucille Roybal-Allard, Tom Barrett (WI), Major Owens, Ted 
     Strickland, William Delahunt, Rod Blagojevich, Carrie Meek, 
     Jim Clyburn, Lynn Woolsey, Dennis Kucinich, William Coyne, 
     Eddie Bernice Johnson, Ellen Tauscher, Chris Shays, Darlene 
     Hooley, Esteban Torres, James Traficant, Charles Rangel, 
     Robert Underwood, John Spratt, David Skaggs, James Maloney 
     (CT), Donna Christian-Green, Joe Kennedy (MA), Alcee Hastings 
     (FL), Julian Dixon (CA), Sam Gejdenson (CT).
                                  ____



                                     House of Representatives,

                                   Washington, DC, March 31, 1997.

  Support Fiscal Accountability: Cosponsor H.R. 753--The Intelligence 
                       Budget Accountability Act

       Dear Colleague: I recently re-introduced the Intelligence 
     Budget Accountability Act. This bill will make public the 
     total appropriations for the current fiscal year and the 
     total amount being requested for the new fiscal year. The 
     intelligence budget includes funding for the CIA, the 
     National Security Agency and other intelligence services. It 
     also includes funding for the intelligence function of 
     agencies such as the DEA and the FBI. If Congress is going to 
     honestly deal with balancing the budget, it only makes sense 
     that it at least acknowledge the tens of billions of dollars 
     it spends on intelligence every year.
       Keeping the intelligence budget secret is unnecessary after 
     the demise of the cold war, unfair to American taxpayers, and 
     inconsistent with the accountability requirements of the 
     Constitution. The Constitution clearly states that ``No Money 
     shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of 
     Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and 
     Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money 
     shall be published from time to time.'' Half a century and 
     hundreds of billions of dollars later, it is time that we 
     begin meeting our obligation to inform the public how their 
     tax dollars are spent.
       Official public disclosure of the intelligence budget is 
     long overdue. Last year's Congressionally mandated report to 
     President Clinton by the Brown-Aspin Commission entitled 
     ``Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. 
     Intelligence'' recommended opening up the spy budget. It 
     proposed that ``at the beginning of each congressional budget 
     cycle, the President or a designee disclose the total amount 
     of money appropriated for intelligence activities for the 
     current fiscal year . . . and the total amount being 
     requested for the next fiscal year.'' The Senate Intelligence 
     Committee unsuccessfully sought to implement this 
     recommendation during last year's intelligence authorization 
     process.
       A copy of the bill is on the reverse. If you would like to 
     co-sponsor or if you need more information please do not 
     hesitate to contact Mr. Carl LeVan of my staff at 5-5126.
           Sincerely,
                                                John Conyers, Jr.,
                                               Member of Congress.

[[Page H4972]]

     
                                  ____
                                Congress of the United States,

                                   Washington, DC, April 30, 1997.

  Former Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner Supports 
              Making the Intelligence Budget Total Public

       Dear Colleague: We are writing to bring a letter (on the 
     reverse) to your attention from Admiral Stansfield Turner, 
     the former Director of Central Intelligence, and to urge your 
     support for the Intelligence Budget Accountability Act of 
     1997. This legislation would declassify the aggregate 
     figure--just the bottom line number--of the intelligence 
     budget for the current fiscal year and the amount requested 
     for the next fiscal year.
       The intelligence budget includes spending for the CIA and a 
     dozen other agencies with an intelligence function. This 
     figure has been classified by the executive branch since the 
     birth of the modern national security establishment in 1947. 
     We believe, like Admiral Turner, that this multibillion 
     dollar budget can be made public without harm to the national 
     security of the United States.
       We hope you will join the growing bipartisan list of 
     members who have decided to co-sponsor H.R. 753. If you have 
     any questions, or would like to co-sponsor, please do not 
     hesitate to call Mr. Carl LeVan in the office of Rep. Conyers 
     at 5-5126.
           Sincerely,
     John Conyers, Jr.
     Lee Hamilton.
     Bill Luther.
       Members of Congress.
                                  ____



                                            Stansfield Turner,

                                                 February 7, 1997.
     Hon. John Conyers, Jr.,
     House of Representatives, Russell House Office Building, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Representative Conyers: I am pleased that you are 
     again introducing legislation to require the open publication 
     of the aggregate intelligence budget figure.
       It has been my opinion since shortly after becoming the 
     Director of Central Intelligence in 1977 that there would be 
     no harm to the country's security in releasing such a figure. 
     I agree fully with the emphasis in the legislation on the 
     importance of all government agencies being accountable to 
     the public. While total accountability may not be feasible in 
     the case of intelligence budget, just one aggregate figure 
     certainly is.
       I wish you every success.
           Yours,
                                           Adm. Stansfield Turner,
     U.S. Navy (retired).
                                  ____



                                     House of Representatives,

                                                    April 8, 1997.

 Common Sense Budget Accountability--H.R. 753, the Intelligence Budget 
                           Accountability Act

       Dear Colleague: I am writing to urge your support of H.R. 
     753, the Intelligence Budget Accountability Act and to bring 
     a letter (on the reverse) from Taxpayers for Common $ense to 
     your attention. This important legislation, introduced by 
     Representative Conyers and twenty other Members of Congress, 
     would simply declassify the aggregate figure of the 
     intelligence budget.
       The intelligence budget, which is widely believed to be 
     over $30 billion a year, has been classified for fifty years. 
     Now that the Cold War is over and the war on the deficit has 
     begun, it is time for a fair accounting of our expenses. As 
     Taxpayers for Common $ense point out in their letter, ``the 
     intelligence agencies, just like all other federal agencies, 
     should be accountable to those who pay their bills--the 
     taxpayers.''
       Unaccountable spending has been a demonstrated problem in 
     the past with the intelligence agencies. For example, we 
     learned in 1994 that the National Reconnaissance Office 
     (NRO), which handles spy satellites, was building a luxurious 
     $300 million complex with an extra fourteen acres. Then the 
     public found out that the NRO had accumulated $4 billion in 
     unspent funds, half of which it had simply lost track of. An 
     unclassified bottom line number of the intelligence spending 
     would help end the excessive secrecy that makes this kind of 
     budget banditry possible.
       Certainly if we are serious about balancing the budget, we 
     should know at least in a general way where billions of 
     dollars are spent. Our nation needs to be secure from foreign 
     threats, but our budget process also must maintain a sense of 
     integrity. An official acknowledgment of how much we spend on 
     intelligence would help provide that integrity. H.R. 753 
     meets this criteria by requiring the current requested and 
     appropriated amounts be unclassified.
       If you have any questions or would like to cosponsor, 
     please contact Tim Bromelkamp in the office of Representative 
     Minge at 5-2331 or Carl LeVan in the office of Representative 
     Conyers at 5-5126.
           Sincerely,
                                                      David Minge,
     Member of Congress.
                                  ____



                                   Taxpayers for Common $ense,

                                   Washington, DC, March 17, 1997.

    Taxpayers ``Need to Know'' Where the Intelligence Budget Goes--
                         Cosponsor Conyers Bill

       Dear Representative: Taxpayers for Common $ense urge you to 
     cosponsor H.R. 753, the Intelligence Budget Accountability 
     Act. Sponsored by Rep. John Conyers, this bill would require 
     that the aggregate intelligence budget figure be disclosed to 
     the public. The intelligence agencies, just like all other 
     federal agencies, should be accountable to those who pay 
     their bills--the taxpayers.
       Disclosing the intelligence agencies' aggregate budget 
     figure does not threaten national security. In 1996, the 
     Congressionally-mandated Brown-Aspin Commission declared that 
     classifying the aggregate budget figure is not a matter of 
     national security and the figure should be disclosed to the 
     public. Both President Clinton and the Senate Intelligence 
     Committee supported the Commission's conclusion. The Conyers 
     bill would simply require that the total amounts requested 
     and currently appropriated for intelligence activities should 
     be unclassified.
       The intelligence agencies should not be allowed to keep 
     their multi-billion-dollar budget a secret. At a time when 
     all federal programs are under increased scrutiny and must 
     meticulously account for their spending, it is only fair that 
     the overall level of spending on intelligence be available to 
     the taxpayers. Taxpayers should know the amount spent on 
     intelligence in order to make informed choices regarding the 
     allocation of government funds.
       In the military, secrets are shared only with those who 
     ``need to know.'' Taxpayers for Common $ense urges that this 
     same standard be applied to the intelligence budget. 
     Taxpayers pay the intelligence budget, and their support and 
     trust is ultimately the strength of the intelligence 
     services. We urge you to defend the taxpayers' ``need to 
     know'' where their money goes by supporting the Conyers bill.
           Sincerely,
                                                    Jill Lancelot,
     Legislative Director.
                                  ____



                                Congress of the United States,

                                     Washington, DC, May 22, 1997.
     Hon. Harold Brown,
     Counselor, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
         Washington, DC
     Hon. Warren Rudman,
     Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison, Washington, DC
       Dear Dr. Brown and Senator Rudman: Last year the Commission 
     on the Rules and Capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence 
     Community, which you cochaired, submitted its report to the 
     President and the Congress as mandated by the Fiscal Year 
     1995 Intelligence Authorization Act. One of the Commission's 
     recommendations was the disclosure of the aggregate figure of 
     the intelligence budget. The Intelligence Budget 
     Accountability Act, which we all strongly support, would 
     implement this key recommendation.
       The intelligence budget has been classified by the 
     Executive branch since 1947. The Church Committee, the Pike 
     Committee and the Rockefeller Commission in the 1970's all 
     suggested some level of disclosure. Your Commission 
     specifically proposed that ``at the beginning of each 
     congressional budget cycle, the President or a designee 
     disclose the total amount of money appropriated for 
     intelligence activities for the current fiscal year and the 
     total amount being requested for the next fiscal year.'' H.R. 
     753, a bipartisan bill with 80 cosponsors, is modeled after 
     this recommendation and seeks to implement it precisely as 
     proposed in the Report.
       We believe that secrecy is important to effective 
     intelligence, but it needs to be compatible with a democratic 
     form of government. As the Commission pointed out, 
     intelligence agencies need to be responsible ``not only to 
     the President, but to the elected representatives of the 
     people, and, ultimately to the people themselves. They are 
     funded by the American taxpayers.'' We agree with this 
     observation and would like to hear your opinion of the 
     proposed legislation which is enclosed.
           Sincerely,
     John Conyers, Jr.
     Ronald V. Dellums.
     Lee Hamilton.
     Christopher Shays.
       Members of Congress.
                                  ____

                                            Center for Strategic &


                                        International Studies,

                                      Washington, DC, June 2, 1997
     Hon. John Conyers, Jr.,
     Hon. Ronald V. Dellums,
     Hon. Lee Hamilton,
     Hon. Christopher Shays,
     House of Representatives,
     Washington, DC.
       Gentlemen: In response to your letter of May 22, I continue 
     to subscribe to the statement that you quote from the report 
     of the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the U.S. 
     Intelligence Community, recommending disclosure of the total 
     amount of money appropriated for intelligence activities 
     during the current fiscal year and the total amount being 
     requested for the next fiscal year. H.R. 753 appears to meet 
     this criterion and therefore I believe it would accomplish 
     the purpose of the Commission's recommendations. It is 
     important, in my judgment, that no breakdown of the total 
     into its components be made public. Senator Rudman joins me 
     in this response.
           Sincerely,
                                                     Harold Brown.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde],

[[Page H4973]]

the distinguished chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, a 
gentleman who is well versed on this issue.
  (Mr. HYDE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, with some but not a great deal of reluctance, 
I rise to oppose the amendment of my good friend from Michigan. 
Traditionally, the aggregate amount of funds spent to support our 
intelligence agencies has not been disseminated publicly. It is a 
classified amount. However, it is not unavailable to this House. There 
are six committees in Congress that have access to that number, three 
in the House, three in the other body: The Permanent Select Committee 
on Intelligence, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on 
National Security. Those committees are set up to receive this 
information, they are cleared for top secret, and they have the ability 
to absorb it and to do with it whatever is necessary in our democratic 
process.
  The classified records are available to be looked at. The gentleman 
from Michigan [Mr. Conyers] objects to that because you are then bound 
by an oath of secrecy. Well, then do not go look at it, but you have 
got six committees in this Congress to get that information.
  Why do we keep it secret? It is a mistake to think that the 
intelligence budgets of these agencies is a static thing. There are 
bumps. Sometimes it goes up, sometimes it goes down. What does that 
signify? It means we may be working on an expensive new weapons system, 
and that information ought not to be made available to those who wish 
us harm. There is no urgency, there is no need for this to be made 
public other than to tell the rest of the world or give them a hint as 
to what we are doing and perhaps even why we are doing it. The amount 
of money is overseen by six congressional committees bipartisanly. It 
is available to anybody who has a burning need to know by going and 
reviewing the classified annex. And so there is no need to violate what 
has traditionally been the case; that is, keep the aggregate amount 
confidential, keep it classified so that our adversaries, and believe 
me there are some out there, do not have an idea or a clue as to what 
we are working on.
  With good wishes to my friend from Michigan, I just think his 
amendment is wrong and I hope it is defeated.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 30 seconds, because the 
amicable nature of the ranking member and the chairman of the Committee 
on the Judiciary is very close, and I respect his learned judgment. But 
this time he is up against the Secretary of Defense, the former 
Secretary of the CIA. The gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] was on this 
committee as well, the Committee on Foreign Relations in the other 
body, the framers of the Constitution and 176 of his colleagues.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Washington [Mr. 
Dicks], the distinguished ranking member of the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, absent a clear national security interest, 
information should not be classified. In fact, Executive Order 12,958, 
which governs classification, prohibits classifying information unless 
to do so is required to protect national security.
  I do not think anybody can stand up here tonight and say that 
disclosing the number, disclosing this number, is going to do anything 
to harm national security. I do not believe a case can be made that the 
aggregate budget figure for intelligence meets that standard. The 
arguments that are made in favor of keeping the budget secret have 
little to do with the number in question and more to do with the 
potential damage that could occur if more information were released.

                              {time}  1745

  Some people are afraid that public release of the intelligence budget 
will lead to drastic cuts in intelligence spending. Not only is that an 
improper reason for classification, but I firmly believe we can defend 
the overall amount, as we just did, we spent on intelligence as well as 
we will defend the overall amount we spend on defense. Releasing the 
aggregate budget total changes business as usual, and some people are 
understandably uncomfortable with changing the practices of 50 years. 
But this is not a radical proposition. It is an idea that has been 
endorsed by two panels of experienced and knowledgeable experts serving 
on the Aspen Brown Commission and the Council on Foreign Relations.
  The overall intelligence budget figure is a significant piece of 
information by which the American people can judge the operations of 
their Government. I believe we should tell the American people about 
how we are spending their hard-earned money. We tell them what the 
overall number for defense is; I do not see how we can then argue that 
we cannot tell them what the overall number for intelligence is, and 
frankly I think it would do a lot to clear up much of the confusion 
that we have heard today on the floor about what this number is 
because, as I said earlier, the number that we have heard is 
inaccurate, significantly inaccurate.
  So I rise in strong support of the Conyers amendment. I remember our 
colleague, Congressman Glickman, who was chairman when we were in the 
majority, was the first chairman of this committee to strongly endorse 
this. I think it is time to do it, and I hope we can do it today on a 
bipartisan basis.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
distinguished gentleman from California [Mr. Lewis], subcommittee 
chairman.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. LEWIS of California. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I will be brief.
  I just want to say to my friend, the gentleman from Washington [Mr. 
Dicks], who surprises me that he is for disclosing this amount of 
money, the truth is, of course, the aggregate figures do not tell us 
anything. They give us a rough idea, but the next step is who is 
getting what? If we want to know the aggregate, we want to know who is 
spending it and for what purpose. What is the National Reconnaissance 
Office spending? What is the CIA spending? What is the DIA spending? 
And we want to break it down so it means something. That is the next 
step. The aggregate figure does not really inform us.
  But the gentleman and I know it is the opening wedge in a total lay 
it on the table strategy, what agency is spending how much money, for 
what systems, and for what covert activity and for what satellites, and 
what are we spending overseas? And it never ends.
  And so that is why it ought to remain secret, in my opinion.
  Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Chairman, I must say following the 
remarks of both the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks] and the 
gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] I cannot help but be a bit 
disconcerted by that disconnect, for I am quite surprised at the 
position of the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks] as well. In the 
short time, 4 years, that it has been my privilege to serve on this 
committee, I have become very, very impressed by the fact that America 
is pretty good at what they do. A combination of my service on the 
defense subcommittee of Appropriations and this committee tells me that 
America is more than just leading the world, we are the strength for 
the future of peace in the world, in no small part because of the work 
done by many of these agencies. But there is little doubt that those 
who suggest that the gross number means almost nothing, there is 
absolutely no doubt in my mind that underlying that is the balance. And 
it is not the people here in this room who necessarily want to know 
what may be all of the spending of some of our subagencies involved. It 
is the people who would be our enemies who would like to have that 
information.
  Excellent work being done by the FBI as well as other agencies 
relative to controlling the impact of drugs in our society, a 
tremendous war developing there that will be very important to the 
future of our youth. Absolutely no question that the impact that we are 
beginning to have upon potential terrorists is very important as 
related to this work.
  There are those who love to see what our satellites are all about, 
exactly what they mean and what we are spending. Indeed it is very 
important that we recognize that it is the people who largely wish 
America ill who like to have those kinds of details, and because of 
that I am supporting the

[[Page H4974]]

chairman's position. I certainly would urge the ranking member to 
reconsider his position, for America's future is involved in the work 
that we are about in the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from 
Washington [Mr. Dicks], the frequently talked about ranking member.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I want to say to my friend from California, 
Mr. Lewis, and my friend, the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Hyde, who 
has served on this committee with great distinction, I still go back to 
Executive Order 12958 which governs classification. It prohibits 
classifying information unless to do so is required to protect national 
security.
  Now I do not see how anybody can make a case that this number has 
anything to do with national security. It is the amount of money we 
spend on intelligence, but by disclosing it I do not see how we in any 
way endanger national security, and therefore we cannot classify it.
  It is almost an open and shut case, and that is why I think the 
gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Conyers] is correct in calling for this to 
be disclosed.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 15 seconds because some may 
be surprised at the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks] but I am not 
surprised at the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde). Mr. Hyde said it 
makes hardly any difference what the aggregate amount would be. He is 
worried about what comes after that. Well, we are not legislating about 
after that, and he is quite right. It does not make any difference.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I think this is, as the gentleman from Michigan has said, a debate we 
have had many times, and I tend to believe that not much has changed 
and the previous wisdom we have had that it is correct, that the matter 
should remain classified. I realize that the gentleman has quoted the 
Aspen Brown report, and in fact I did dissent from the vote on that. 
That was a consensus report. I argued for the position of keeping the 
matter classified. In that particular group of people, it was not seen 
that way. Not all of those people have had the same experience that 
those of us on the Senate committee have had, and there is a legitimate 
disagreement about this.
  The other point I think is very important is that no good deed seems 
to go unpunished, no matter what we do around here. I would point out, 
and I am reading from the committee report, the committee has 
authorized additional resources in the fiscal year 1998 budget for CIA 
classification management, including declassification activities in 
support of Executive Order 12958.
  Now I know that the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Frank] has a 
cutting amendment we are going to hear, and I know the gentleman from 
Vermont [Mr. Sanders] had a cutting amendment. Well yes, we did put 
more money in this bill to get to the declassification question, and I 
certainly believe as part of the declassification question we ought to 
be examining the issue that the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Conyers] 
has raised. I think it is a very fair debate to ask and we should do it 
in a comprehensive way.
  So I am totally prepared to say that as part of the initiative of the 
gentleman from Colorado [Mr. Skaggs] a very valued member on our 
committee, to deal with declassification, that this should be part of 
that study. I just do not want at this point to create an initiative to 
go forward and say, well, we suddenly made a decision that really is of 
interest in the Beltway, but not for the American people to suddenly 
declassify this matter. It will be of interest to those who have 
interests that are inimicable to the United States of America. They 
would dearly love to have this information. The gentleman from Illinois 
[Mr. Hyde] is right, it is a slippery slope.
  Now I realize that there are some Members who serve on other 
committees who would love to know what a percentage of the NRO budget 
is so they can get their hand on a number and say, surely the interests 
of my committee match this and surely, therefore, we could take a 
little bit here and put a little bit there. But as the gentleman from 
Washington [Mr. Dicks] has said, under 602(b) we are still in line, and 
I think that is extremely important. So my colleagues can rest assured 
that there is not really any opportunity here, there is no pork here, 
this is all proper.
  The other thing I have got to point out on this besides the slippery 
slope and the fact that there is not a clamor across this country to 
have this information, I hardly ever at a town meeting get asked, gee, 
exactly how much money is being spent on intelligence? Sometimes I get 
asked exactly what is intelligence doing, and there is this perception 
that it is all CIA, and as the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks] 
has properly said earlier in this debate today, it is much, much more. 
The CIA is indeed a very minor part of it. I am very happy to say it is 
a minor part of it. I do not think I ought to say specifically what 
that minor part is though.
  The other thing I have got to point out here, the President of the 
United States in fact can go ahead and release information. He has that 
ability. The President does not do that. The President has made the 
choice to keep the matter classified.
  Before we go off and do something like this, I think it should be 
properly studied and have the proper input from our folks in the other 
part of Government, our sister branch of Government. After all, he is 
charged with the national security. It is a matter of the Constitution, 
it is a matter of his specific charge, and he can declassify when he 
chooses with a stroke of his pen. Every President since Harry Truman 
has decided to send us the bill with the number classified. I suspect 
there is a reason for that, and I suspect that we probably ought to 
take the President and his people into consideration before we go off 
in a new direction.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Colorado [Mr. Skaggs].
  Mr. SKAGGS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for the time.
  Our distinguished friend from Illinois has really conceded the point. 
This proposal will not hurt national security. What will it do? It will 
enhance our responsibility to the American public for them to have as 
much information as possible about their government. And I think it is 
irrelevant whether we get asked at town meetings about this. I happen 
to, actually. And what does the American public learn? They have a 
sense of proportion: How much of our resources are we putting to this 
purpose? They have, I would concede, no particular need to know the 
details of particular sub-agencies. But it is a legitimate matter for 
them to have a sense in this large sense what their government is about 
in the intelligence field relative to other things that they spend 
their tax money for.
  Really all that we have by way of argument against this proposal is 
the slippery slope argument. What does that really mean? It means that 
we do not trust future Congresses to exercise judgment about what will 
and what will not protect the national security of this country.
  I think that is a highly rude position to take relative to our 
successors in these jobs. They will be able to figure this out. They 
will know whether or not further disclosures make any sense. I do not 
think that they will err in that judgment, and we can trust them to do 
so.
  On the other hand, the default position always ought to be if this 
information is not going to damage national security, let us make it 
available to the public. The real national security issue here is the 
strength of the democracy and the willingness of the American people to 
trust a government that is leveling with them whenever it possibly can.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for a brief 
question?
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Colorado has expired.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Colorado if the gentleman will yield.
  Mr. SKAGGS. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I believe that the gentleman is exactly on 
the point that if it does no damage then there is no reason to keep it 
hidden. That is a very valid point. But it is a

[[Page H4975]]

point that applies to several other pieces of information, which is 
exactly why the committee has provided at the gentleman's request, 
which I totally agree with, conceded to, applauded in committee, that 
we provide for a study on declassification.
  Does the gentleman believe that this should be outside of the study 
of the declassification that we have provided for, committed funds for 
and I hope we will have the funds when we get through with this process 
to proceed with the study.
  Mr. SKAGGS. If I can reclaim enough time to respond, I believe, as 
the gentleman knows, that funding is for looking at past classified 
information, things that have been sitting in the archives that need 
additional staffing in order to be able to be reviewed for 
declassification purposes. That is the real thrust of the funding that 
we put in the bill for declassification.

                              {time}  1800

  Mr. GOSS. Again, if the gentleman will continue to yield, I believe 
that the question of declassification includes the question of 
classification, because I think there is great abuse there, as the 
gentleman has heard me say. I believe this is comprehensive and should 
be treated as such.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. John Tierney].
  Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the efforts of my colleague, 
the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Conyers], and I voice my support for 
this amendment.
  Let me just say that I do not think any of us are not mindful of the 
comments that are made by our colleagues on the other side of this 
issue, but the fact of the matter is that the American public are the 
people that have a burning need to know at least what the aggregate 
number is in this situation.
  The time has come and it is long overdue for us to be able to have a 
debate with real numbers down here about real issues. We are in the 
midst of a debate right now in this country and in this House about the 
amount of money that we are going to be spending on programs, and in 
fact, with spending constraints on a number of programs, we are told 
the money just is not there.
  The budget these days is a zero sum game. The fact of the matter is 
that if this is the case, we should have a disclosure so the American 
public can see what proportion of our budget we are spending on so-
called intelligence matters. It ought to be known how many millions or 
billions of dollars in relation to the rest of our budget is being 
spent in this area at a time when we have schools that are in need of 
repair, when we have cities and communities that are in need of 
development, when we have infrastructure needs that are going unmet, 
roads, bridges, and airports left unbuilt, the restraint of growth and 
missing opportunities for job creation, when we have a debate over 
insuring half of our children and not insuring the other half, and when 
we continue to fail to debate the idea of having insurance available 
for all Americans.
  The Constitution requires that we have a statement and account of 
receipts and expenditures for all the money. I think it is an absolute 
disgrace that we hide here behind secrecy and say that we cannot even 
tell the American public what the aggregate number is on so-called 
intelligence matters.
  In fact, my colleague from across the aisle indicated that the 
President may well have authority to release these numbers. In fact, I 
would agree with the gentleman that he does; that in 1996 he said he 
favored doing just that. Now we see him waiting for us to move, and 
they are over there with others saying we are going to wait for him to 
move.
  The American public wants somebody to move off the dime and tell us 
what those numbers are. He ought to do it, and if he is not going to do 
it we ought to do it, because simply there is no reason in the world to 
say that security is involved.
  Mr. Chairman, we need to move on this matter. The public has a 
burning need to know.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 15 seconds.
  Mr. Chairman, the argument that the President can do it and has not 
done it but he approves of it is not a reason for us not to go ahead 
and do it. If the gentleman does not object if the President 
declassifies, then why do not we do it? We were only 30 votes away last 
year from doing it.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from California, 
Mrs. Ellen Tauscher.
  Mrs. TAUSCHER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Michigan for 
yielding time to me.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the Conyers amendment. In 
this post-cold-war era it is as important as ever that our Nation 
maintain an efficient, effective, and trustworthy intelligence 
apparatus. With national and economic security threats around the 
world, we must collect accurate information about the activities of 
countries and organizations that jeopardize our stability.
  At the same time, at the end of the cold war we are now provided with 
the opportunity to be more forthcoming about the money and the 
resources we spend on intelligence gathering. The Director of the 
Central Intelligence Agency has already taken steps to make more public 
the activities of our intelligence agencies. The fact that the general 
level of intelligence spending is a poorly kept secret only strengthens 
the argument that it should be publicly disclosed.
  As we attempt to balance the Federal budget, we are forced to make 
decisions about spending priorities. It is important that the American 
people know how much of their money proportionally is being spent to 
support the intelligence community, just as they need to know about how 
much money is spent on Medicare, transportation, and the arts.
  I intend to vote for the Intelligence Authorization Act for 1998. I 
believe it properly funds the important intelligence-related activities 
of the United States. But I also believe that the American public 
deserves to know the aggregate amount we are authorizing for these 
activities. The Conyers amendment is a commonsense proposal that places 
no threat to our national security. I encourage my colleagues to 
support this amendment.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to my 
colleague, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCollum].
  Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time 
to me.
  Mr. Chairman, I oppose the Conyers amendment, which is intended to 
force the disclosure of the aggregate total of the intelligence 
community's budget. I think primarily I oppose it for basic reasons of 
common sense, that it does not make any sense to disclose this number 
and let people who would be our enemies know what it is.
  But as Chairman Goss has noted, there are several reasons to oppose 
it. For example, one could argue that disclosure of the aggregate 
number is the first step on a slippery slope toward total disclosure of 
very highly sensitive security information. Chairman Goss has also made 
a very persuasive argument that the President already possesses the 
necessary legal authority, we have heard that discussed, to 
unilaterally disclose this information without seeking any approval of 
Congress.
  But I would like to particularly address the assertion by some that 
disclosure is required by the statement and account clause of the 
Constitution; that is, article I, section 9, clause 7.
  Professor Robert F. Turner of the University of Virginia School of 
Law testified before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on 
the issue of, and this is his quote, ``Secret funding and the 
`statement and account' clause'' in February 1994.
  Professor Turner made a number of legal and historical observations 
on the statement and account clause which are quite pertinent to 
today's debate. He said, ``The Founding Fathers did not view `secrecy' 
as being incompatible with democratic government. One of the first 
measures adopted by the Constitutional Convention of 1787 was a secrecy 
rule--without which James Madison said there would have been no 
Constitution.
  ``Perhaps the first `covert action' in which the United States was 
involved was a 1776 decision by France to secretly transfer 200,000 
pounds worth of

[[Page H4976]]

arms and ammunitions to the colonies for use in their struggle against 
King George. The offer was reported by secret messenger to Benjamin 
Franklin, chairman of the Committee of Secret Correspondence of the 
Continental Congress, and Robert Morris, the only members of the 5-man 
committee then in town. Given the sensitivity of the matter, they 
concluded--and here I quote--that `it is our indispensable duty to keep 
it secret even from Congress.'

  ``They set forth several reasons for this decision, including this 
one--and again I quote--`We find by fatal experience that Congress 
consists of too many members to keep secrets.'
  ``It should not come as a surprise to learn that the first Congress 
in 1790 appropriated a substantial contingent account for the President 
to use in making foreign affairs and intelligence expenditures, and 
that Congress expressly exempted the President from any requirement to 
inform either Congress or the public how those funds were expended. 
This was the start of a long tradition of 'secret' expenditures.''
  I believe that Professor Turner has demonstrated in his work that the 
Founding Fathers did endorse the use of certain secret funds to support 
the new Nation's intelligence and foreign policy activities. I think 
Benjamin Franklin would agree that the disclosure of the aggregate 
funding amount for the intelligence community would indeed be penny-
wise and pound-foolish.
  I am going to ask at the appropriate time, though I realize it is not 
now since we are in the time for the amendments, to put Professor 
Turner's prepared statement on secret funding into the Record and when 
that time comes in the full House I will do so.
  I again urge the defeat of the Conyers amendment. I ask that the 
Members of this body vote down the Conyers amendment. It is a dangerous 
precedent. We should not adopt it. We do have times and places for 
secrecy, and the intelligence community is one of those places where it 
is absolutely imperative.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished 
gentlewoman from California [Ms. Pelosi].
  (Ms. PELOSI asked and was given permission to revise and extend her 
remarks.)
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to 
me.
  As a member of the Committee on Intelligence, I rise in support of 
the Conyers amendment. This amendment at heart is about accountability 
and the public's right to know. The amendment supports the underlying 
belief that the government of this country is and should be accountable 
to the people of the country.
  In today's world there is no rational reason why the American public 
should be denied information about how much the United States 
Government is spending on intelligence activities. President Clinton 
recognized this fact when in April of 1996 he said that the bottom line 
for intelligence spending should be published. John Deutch, then 
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, said that same month, 
``Disclosure of the annual amount appropriated for intelligence 
purposes will inform the public and will not in itself harm 
intelligence activities.''
  The continued classification of the total amount spent annually on 
intelligence activity is not only unnecessary, but it is also 
ridiculous. U.S. intelligence spending is considered by many to be one 
of Washington's worst-kept secrets. Estimates of intelligence spending 
appear with some regularity in the press. By continuing to refuse to 
release the amount publicly, Congress is only serving to fuel 
suspicions that the government is hiding something.
  Those who support openness and accountability in government should 
support this effort to make our government accountable in one of the 
last bastions of secrecy, a secrecy that in today's world is 
unwarranted. In a democratic society citizens have a right to know what 
their tax dollars support.
  In fact, inside the Beltway an estimate of intelligence spending is 
widely reported, but ordinary citizens are oddly denied this 
information. I urge my colleagues to support openness and to support 
the Conyers amendment.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 45 seconds.
  Mr. Chairman, this just in: The reason maybe Chairman Goss' people do 
not ever ask him about it, about this financing of the intelligence, is 
that they do not know that we are not being told. They may not even 
know that he is being told.
  For my dear friend, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCollum], again, 
with whom we have had great discussions about American history, in 1770 
and 1773, in those 2 years the intelligence budgets were in the 
aggregate disclosed. If Members need a more recent time, check in 1994, 
when the Subcommittee on National Security of the Committee on 
Appropriations inadvertently released the whole blooming thing and 
nothing happened.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Washington [Mr. 
Adam Smith].
  Mr. ADAM SMITH of Washington. Mr. Chairman, I, too, rise in support 
of the Conyers amendment to disclose the aggregate budget of the 
Committee on Intelligence to the full public. I think the important 
thing to remember is the presumption should always be in favor of 
disclosure.
  As I listened to the arguments against, I do not hear anything to 
rebut that presumption. I think the American public wants to know as 
much as possible about what we do back here. Part of the reason why 
this institution has the confidence problem it has with this country is 
they figure we are keeping stuff from them, that we do not trust them 
to know what is going on back here, and they feel left out of the 
process. There should be a strong presumption in letting them into as 
much of the process as is humanly possible.
  If there is some special reason here why that cannot be done, fine. 
We can explain it and keep it secret. But no special reason has been 
offered during the course of this debate not to release the aggregate 
figure that we spend on intelligence in this country.
  There have been some camel's nose under the tent arguments about how 
in the future we might authorize the release of something that would 
cause a problem, but that is not good enough. That does not rebut the 
presumption that this body should have to disclose whatever possible to 
the public. I urge support of the amendment.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I am privileged to yield 30 seconds to the 
gentleman from California [Mr. Sherman].
  Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Chairman, we have an extraordinary event in the 
world. The entire world has virtually acquiesced to having one 
superpower. That has never happened in history. It has occurred because 
the world knows that for the most part our decisions are based on 
values and on respect for democracy.
  Democracy begins at home. A revelation of the amount that we are 
spending on security is one of the building blocks of the consensus 
that our power relies upon. Otherwise, it will only be a matter of 
time, if we do not respect our values, before the rest of the world 
questions whether there should be one superpower.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from California [Mr. Farr].
  (Mr. FARR of California asked and was given permission to revise and 
extend his remarks.)
  Mr. FARR of California. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the 
amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Conyers amendment to 
declassify the size of the Intelligence Budget
  There is simply no reason to keep the size of the Intelligence budget 
hidden.
  Former CIA Directors, including John Deutch and Bob Gates, say that 
it would not harm National Security.
  This amendment would not reveal what we spend on individual programs, 
only on intelligence as a whole.
  Other countries, like Israel and Britain, already disclose their 
spending on intelligence.
  It simply serves no purpose to keep the size of the intelligence 
budget a secret.
  At a time when the rest of the Federal Budget is being cut, slashed, 
and squeezed, the American people ought to know how much of their tax 
dollars are going to intelligence programs.
  By maintaining needless secrecy, we do nothing for American 
intelligence while keeping secrets from the American people.
  Let's bring some sunshine to Government and some honesty to the 
American people support the Conyers amendment.

[[Page H4977]]

  Mr. Chairman, It is unnecessary after the end of the cold war to keep 
the budget secret. Keeping general information like the budget 
classified undermines the credibility of other information which really 
needs to be secret.
  If we really are serious about balancing the budget, how can we sign 
a secret, multi-billion dollar blank check every year, with such a 
minimal public discussion?
  Since almost all intelligence spending is hidden in the defense 
budget, the American people are not only kept in the dark about 
intelligence spending, they are misled about the real amount of defense 
spending through false line-items in the defense budget. We need budget 
integrity.
  Porter Goss, the current Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee 
was a member of the Brown-Aspin (later the Brown-Rudman) Commission 
that recommended disclosure of the aggregate figure of the intelligence 
budget. Why should his position change?
  The intelligence budget is the worst-kept secret in Washington 
anyway. Each year it is disclosed dozens of times in the press with no 
harm done to ``national security.''
  Keeping this budget officially secret while watching it discussed 
openly in the press adds to a cynicism that the American public has 
about its government. No-one wants to foster a pessimism that 
discourages participation in our democracy.
  ``The President is persuaded that disclosure of the annual total 
budget for intelligence activities should be made public and that this 
can be done without any harm to intelligence activities.''
  With an open intelligence budget, the Director of Central 
Intelligence and others would be able to better justify the funding it 
receives from Congress. (A counter-argument might be, for example, that 
the CIA will not be able to publicly defend its budget because may of 
its successes are secret.)
  Only a handful of Members of Congress actually go look at the 
intelligence budget (as they are permitted to do). Declassifying the 
new budget request and the current fiscal year's appropriated amount 
for purposes of comparison would contribute to a more informed debate.
  Releasing the intelligence budget would help make it conform to the 
ideals for the framers of the Constitution. The Constitution states: 
``No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of 
Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the 
Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from 
time to time.''
  In 1994, Defense Appropriations Subcommittee hearings disclosed 
almost a complete breakdown of the categories of intelligence spending, 
which added up to $28 billion. Three years later, we're still waiting 
to hear how this disclosure harmed ``national security.
  Similarly, the Brown-Aspin Commission Report recommended disclosure 
only of the aggregate intelligence budget and no further detail, then 
inadvertently specified the CIA's budget at $3.1 billion in a graph. 
(See attached article.)
  The Washington Post reported that the National Reconnaissance Office, 
the intelligence agency which manages spy satellites reported a surplus 
of $3.8 billion that has accumulated over the years from unspent money 
and bad accounting practices! This is partly the result of a lack of 
open discussion about intelligence spending. (See attached article.)
  While HUD, the Department of Commerce and [insert your favorite 
agency] are fighting for their life, isn't it only fair that the 
American people at least know how many of their tax dollars are going 
to intelligence?.
  Taxpayers for Common Sense writes: ``At a time when all federal 
programs are under increased scrutiny and must meticulously account for 
their spending, it is only fair that the overall level of spending on 
intelligence be available of the taxpayers. Taxpayers should know the 
amount spend on intelligence in order to make informed choices 
regarding the allocation of government funds.''
  Other democracies such as Israel, Britain, Australia and Canada 
disclose their intelligence budgets. (FYI: Israel spends less than a 
billion shekels on the Mossad and the Shin Bet combined.)
  Larry Combest, the former Chairman of the Hose Intelligence Committee 
and last year's lone opponent of budget disclosure, was the vice-chair 
(with Senator Moynihan) of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing 
Government Secrecy. While Commission's report, released in March of 
this year, did not deal directly with the intelligence budget, it 
noted:
  ``Secrecy exists to protect national security, not government 
officials and agencies'' (page xxiii).
  ``[E]xpansion of the Government's national security bureaucracy since 
the end of World War II and the closed environment in which it has 
operated have outpaced attempts by Congress and the public to oversee 
that bureaucracy's activities'' (page 49).
  There are twelve ranking members who are so-sponsors of H.R. 753, 
ranging the ideological spectrum, including: Representatives John 
Conyers, Norm Dicks, John Spratt, Lee Hamilton, George Brown, Ron 
Dellums, Lane Evans, Sam Gejdenson, Henry Gonzalez, George Miller, Jim 
Oberstar, and Charles Rangel.

                              {time}  1815

  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  May I point out that the arguments, the more we go over them each 
year, the more it becomes clear that there is very little objection to 
revealing the aggregate budget for the 14 intelligence agencies in our 
system. It is a practice that is followed by at least four of our 
allies that I know with no harm. It is like trying to get us to agree 
to a secret that is already open.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. CONYERS. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I want to commend the gentleman for his 
initiative. To my friend who says this is a slippery slope, we can say 
what the number is and say, out of that we fund the CIA, the DIA, the 
NSA, NIMA, right down the line. We do not have to tell them what that 
second amount is. I think it would do a lot to help the American people 
understand how many different entities are funded by this budget and 
how much of it is in the Department of Defense. We have heard all kinds 
of misstatements here today on the floor. I think we look kind of 
foolish. Numbers are in the New York Times. They are not that far off. 
They are wrong but they are not that far off. In my judgment, it is 
time for us to let the American people know. I think the gentleman 
deserves to be commended for his initiative.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman.
  The fact of the matter is that for us to say to the American people 
that they really do not need to know this or that nobody is asking me 
about it so we will keep it from them is the shallowest kind of 
presentation to make. We need to know the aggregate amount. I am 
confident for one that this body will not proceed down a slippery 
slope. I do not think this body, no matter what we do on this measure 
today, will further want to break this thing down.
  I am not certain that I would support any further disclosure than the 
revelation of the aggregate amount.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will continue to yield, I 
certainly agree with the gentleman. I would oppose going to the 
individual amounts, but I think the aggregate will help us with the 
American people.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GOSS. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
  Mr. McCOLLUM.  Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to make a point that in 
the time for general leave, I am going to ask to have the Turner 
statement with regard to constitutionality inserted right after my 
remarks during this debate. I know this is not the formal place, but we 
seem to need to put a place marker in there. I thank the gentleman for 
yielding to me.
  Mr. Chairman, I include the following for the Record:

Secret Funding and the ``Statement and Account'' Clause: Constitutional 
and Policy Implications of Public Disclosure of an Aggregate Budget for 
            Intelligence and Intelligence-Related Activities

             (Prepared statement of Prof. Robert F. Turner)

                              Introduction

       Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to be here this afternoon to 
     provide testimony on the constitutional implications of 
     authorizing and appropriating funds for intelligence 
     operations without making the aggregate amount of those funds 
     public. It is a particular pleasure to see you again, Mr. 
     Chairman, whom I have not seen since our work together nearly 
     a decade ago in getting the U.S. Institute of Peace off the 
     ground. I am also pleased to join my old friend Dr. Lou 
     Fisher--who has done landmark scholarship in these areas--and 
     to have a chance to listen to Dr. George Carver, whose work 
     has influenced my own thinking for more than two decades.
       I understand that the Committee is considering a proposal 
     that has been around in one form or other for many years to 
     make public the aggregate sum of money appropriated for

[[Page H4978]]

     the various agencies of the Intelligence Community--money 
     which has for nearly half a century been concealed, if public 
     accounts are to be believed,\1\ largely within the budget of 
     the Department of Defense.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \1\ Footnotes at the end of article.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       This practice was authorized by Public Law 81-110, the 
     Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, section 5 of which 
     authorizes the Agency to ``receive from other Government 
     agencies such sums as may be approved by the Bureau of the 
     Budget [now OMB]'' for the performance of authorized 
     functions, and also authorizes ``any other Government agency 
     . . . to transfer to . . . the Agency such sums without 
     regard to any provisions of law limiting or prohibiting 
     transfers between appropriations.''\2\ It is perhaps worth 
     noting that this process was agreed to in 1949 by voice vote 
     in the Senate and by a vote of 348 to 4 in the House--with 
     only a single Member of either House speaking in 
     opposition.\3\
       Members of this Committee will know the current mechanics 
     of this process far better than I do, but it is my 
     understanding that the precise amounts authorized and 
     appropriated for the Intelligence Community are normally 
     known only to the two intelligence committees and select 
     members of the appropriations committees. I am working from 
     the understanding that all fund provided to the Intelligence 
     Community from the federal treasury have, in fact, been 
     appropriated by law and that the process itself is not 
     contrary to any statute. Thus, the issue I am prepared to 
     address is not whether Congress has agreed to the current 
     funding process; but rather, whether that congressionally 
     established process complies with the requirements of the 
     Constitution.
       I do not have a sense that the large majority of Americans 
     are upset at the realization that our government keeps many 
     facts concerning intelligence agencies and their work 
     secret--indeed, I suspect a scientific poll would reveal that 
     most Americans would share my own personal preference that 
     such matters ought not to be made public if there is any 
     reasonable likelihood their disclosure will compromise 
     sensitive sources or methods or in any other manner undermine 
     our security or benefit our nation's enemies.\4\
       This expectation is predicated upon the assumption that the 
     current practice is consistent with the Constitution; for, if 
     the question were worded ``should the Constitution be 
     obeyed,'' the answer would presumably also be a strong 
     affirmative. So it seems to me that, in deciding whether to 
     change the status quo, the Committee has a two-stage process 
     to undertake:
       First, you need to ascertain whether the Constitution 
     requires the publication of the aggregate annual budget for 
     intelligence and intelligence-related activities (or perhaps 
     even a more detailed accounting of those appropriations); 
     and, if the answer is yes, you need to make those figures 
     public.
       If the answer to the constitutional question is no, it 
     would seem wise to undertake a thorough policy review to 
     decide whether such figures should nevertheless be made 
     public--and, if so under what constraints or guidelines.
       While I understand that my role here this afternoon is to 
     help you answer the first question, with your permission I 
     will also comment briefly upon the broader policy issues.
     The Constitutional Issues
       Article 1, Section 9, clause 7 of the Constitution 
     provides:
       No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in 
     Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular 
     Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all 
     public Money shall be published from time to time.
       Many respected individuals and groups have concluded on the 
     basis of this language that it is unconstitutional for the 
     Congress not to publish at least the aggregate sum of 
     appropriations for the Intelligence Community.\5\ I shall 
     address that issue, but with your permission I would propose 
     to first place the issue in the context of the Founding 
     Fathers' attitude toward secrecy in the areas of foreign 
     intercourse and intelligence. I believe there is a great deal 
     of misunderstanding on this point that may confuse this 
     important debate.


         Secrecy, Democracy, and the Early American Experience

       There seems to be a common assumption that the Founding 
     Fathers viewed secrecy in government as a terrible evil, a 
     practice quite incompatible with democratic theory. While it 
     is true that they believed that an informed public was 
     essential to democratic government,\6\ they were practical 
     men who recognized that intelligence and national security 
     matters often had to be kept secret--not only from the 
     American people, but even from their elected representatives 
     in Congress.


                 The Committee of Secret Correspondence

       The obvious inability of legislative bodies to manage the 
     details of foreign intercourse led the Continental Congress 
     to establish a ``Committee of Secret Correspondence'' on 29 
     November 1775.\7\ Two weeks later, the Committee dispatched 
     Thomas Story as a secret messenger to France, Holland, and 
     England, with instructions to make contact with a network of 
     unofficial ``secret agents'' serving the United States in 
     foreign capitals--people like Silas Deane in France and 
     Arthur Lee in England.
       After meeting with Lee, Story returned to America and gave 
     this report to the Committee, as recorded in a memorandum 
     dated 1 October 1776 found among the Committee's official 
     papers:
       ``On my leaving London, Arthur Lee, Esq., requested me to 
     inform the Committee of [Secret] Correspondence that he had 
     had several conferences with the French Ambassador, who had 
     communicated the same to the French court; that in 
     consequence thereof the Duke de Vergennes had sent a 
     gentleman to Mr. Lee, who informed him that the French Court 
     could not think of entering into a war with England, but that 
     they would assist America by sending from Holland this fall 
     two hundred thousand pounds sterling worth of arms and 
     ammunition to St. Eustatius, Martinico, or Cape Francois. 
     That application was to be made to the Governours or 
     Commandants of those places by inquiring for Monsieur 
     Hortalez, and that on persons properly authorized applying, 
     the above articles would be delivered to them.'' \8\
       This may arguably have been the very first ``covert 
     operation'' to which the United States was a party, and the 
     secret offer of K200,000 worth of arms was welcome news in 
     America. But it was also recognized as highly sensitive news, 
     and for that reason Benjamin Franklin and the members of the 
     small committee he chaired agreed without dissent that it 
     could not be shared with their colleagues in the Congress. 
     Their memorandum explains:
       ``The above intelligence was communicated to the 
     subscribers [Franklin and Robert Morris], being the only two 
     members of the Committee of Secret Correspondence now in the 
     city, and our considering the nature and importance of it, we 
     agree in opinion that it is our indispensable duty to keep it 
     secret even from Congress, for the following reasons:
       ``First, Should it get to the ears of our enemies at New-
     York, they would undoubtedly take measures to intercept the 
     supplies, and thereby deprive us not only of those succours, 
     but of others expected by the same route.
       ``Second, as the Court of France have taken measures to 
     negotiate this loan of succour in the most cautious and 
     secret manner, should we divulge it immediately, we may not 
     only lose the present benefit, but also render that Court 
     cautious of any further connection with such unguarded 
     people, and prevent their granting other loans and assistance 
     that we stand in need of, and have directed Mr. Deane to ask 
     of them. For it appears from our intelligence they are not 
     disposed to enter into an immediate war with Britain, 
     although disposed to support us in our contest with them. We 
     therefore think it our duty to cultivate their favourable 
     disposition towards us, draw from them all the support we 
     can, and in the end their private aid must assist to 
     establish peace, or inevitably draw them in as parties to the 
     war.
       ``Third, We find by fatal experience that Congress consists 
     of too many members to keep secrets. . . . [Emphasis 
     added.]'' \9\
       The memorandum contained the written endorsements of 
     Richard Henry Lee and William Hooper, to whom it had been 
     shown some days later, with the notation that Lee 
     ``concur[red] heartily'' and Hooper ``sincerely approve[d]'' 
     of its contents.\10\


                     john jay and federalist no. 64

       One of the criticisms of American government under the 
     Articles of Confederation was that all functions of 
     government were entrusted to the Congress, which tended to 
     micromanage military and diplomatic affairs and could not 
     keep secrets. Robert R. Livingston agreed to serve as 
     ``Secretary of the United States of America for the 
     Department of Foreign Affairs'' in February 1782, but by the 
     end of the year he had submitted his resignation in 
     frustration. Nearly two years passed before John Jay was 
     chosen his successor as the ``agent'' of Congress in 
     diplomatic intercourse; and he, too, was quickly frustrated 
     by such things as the demand of Congress to receive every 
     proposal submitted by the Spanish Charge during treaty 
     negotiations.\11\
       Jay was particularly frustrated by the demands by 
     Congress--which, in the absence of any ``executive'' organ of 
     government, had exclusive control over war, treaties, and 
     other aspects of the nation's foreign intercourse--for access 
     to confidential information and diplomatic letter. Professor 
     Henry Wriston, in his classic 1929 study, Executive Agents 
     in American Foreign Relations, explains:
       It is interesting, in connection with the submission of 
     Lafayette's letters to Congress, to observe that Jay regarded 
     this as a serious limitation upon the value of the 
     correspondence. Congress never could keep any matter strictly 
     confidential; someone always babbled. ``The circumstances 
     must undoubtedly be of a great restraint on those public and 
     private characters from whom you would otherwise obtain 
     useful hints and information. I for my part have long 
     experienced the inconvenience of it, and in some instances 
     very sensibly.'' [Emphasis added.] \12\
       These frustrations were widely shared, and Jay went on to 
     play a key role both in explaining the Constitution as a co-
     author of the Federalist Papers and in interpreting it as the 
     nation's first Chief Justice. He took on the issues of 
     secrecy and intelligence squarely in Federalist essay number 
     64, explaining the benefits of entrusting matters requiring 
     secrecy to the Executive while requiring the approval of two-
     thirds of the Senate before the President could ratify a 
     completed treaty:

[[Page H4979]]

       There are cases where the most useful intelligence may be 
     obtained, if the persons possessing it can be relieved from 
     apprehensions of discovery. Those apprehensions will operate 
     on those persons whether they are actuated by mercenary or 
     friendly motives, and there doubtless are many of both 
     descriptions, who would rely on the secrecy of the president, 
     but who would not confide in that of the senate, and still 
     less in that of a large popular assembly. The convention have 
     done well therefore in so disposing of the power of making 
     treaties, that although the president must in forming them 
     act by the advice and consent of the senate, yet he will be 
     able to manage the business of intelligence in such manner as 
     prudence may suggest.\13\
       Jay added, with an allusion to the shortcomings of the 
     Articles of Confederation: ``So often and so essentially have 
     we heretofore suffered from the want of secrecy and dispatch, 
     that the Constitution would have been inexcusably defective 
     if no attention had been paid to those objects.'' \14\


            washington, the senate, and congressional leaks

       Further contemporary insight into the Founding Fathers' 
     perception that Congress could not keep secrets is found in 
     an informal note made by our first Secretary of State, Thomas 
     Jefferson. Beginning during his service in this capacity, 
     Jefferson made various ``notes''--what he called ``passing 
     transactions''--to assist his memory. These he later combined 
     into three volumes which we today know as The Anas. The 
     following entry is instructive:
       April 9th, 1792. The President had wished to redeem our 
     captives at Algiers, and to make peace with them on paying an 
     annual tribute. The Senate were willing to approve this, but 
     unwilling to have the lower House applied to previously to 
     furnish the money; they wished the President to take the 
     money from the treasury, or open a loan for it. . . . They 
     said . . . that if the particular sum was voted by the 
     Representatives, it would not be a secret. The President had 
     no confidence in the secresy of the Senate, and did not 
     choose to take money from the treasury or to borrow. But he 
     agreed he would enter into provisional treaties with the 
     Algerines, not to be binding on us till ratified here. 
     [Emphasis added.] \15\
       Mr. Chairman, this is an important, if largely forgotten, 
     part of our history. However, in the interest of time, I will 
     mention but one further example of the Founding Fathers' 
     recognition of the value of secrecy: and what example could 
     be more fitting than the Constitutional Convention itself.


                     the federal convention of 1787

       On 29 May 1787, the fourth day of deliberation,\16\ the 
     Constitutional Convention adopted a series of rules as part 
     of the Standing Orders of the House. Rules three through five 
     provided:
       That no copy be taken of any entry on the journal during 
     the sitting of the House without the leave of the House.
       That members only be permitted to inspect the journal.
       That nothing spoken in the House be printed, or otherwise 
     published, or communicated without leave.\17\
       The great constitutional historian Clinton Rossiter has 
     described this ``so-called secrecy rule'' as ``the most 
     critical decision of a procedural nature the Convention was 
     ever to make,'' and notes that ``in later years, Madison 
     insisted that `no Constitution would ever have been adopted 
     by the convention if the debates had been public.' '' \18\ 
     Indeed, at his insistence, Madison's own important Notes on 
     the convention were not published until 1840, four years 
     after his death and more than half a century after the 
     convention had ended.\19\
       Because the debates of the convention were held in secret, 
     and Madison's Notes were thus not available to the people 
     when they ratified the Constitution, such influential 
     contemporary records as the Federalist Papers and state 
     ratification convention debates probably deserve greater 
     weight in interpreting the document as it was understood by 
     the sovereign American people when it was ratified. 
     Nevertheless, Madison's Notes do provide important details 
     about the give-and-take that produced the constitutional 
     text, and they are certainly worthy of study. The entire 
     debate on this issue occupies approximately one page of the 
     hundreds of pages devoted by Madison to the convention 
     proceedings. It occurred only three days before the end of 
     the debate, seemingly as an afterthought, on Friday, 14 
     September 1787:
       Col. [George] Mason moved a clause requiring ``that an 
     Account of the public expenditures should be annually 
     published'' Mr. Gerry 2ded the motion.
       Mr. Govr. Morris urged that this wd. 
     be impossible in many cases.
       Mr. King remarked, that the term expenditures went to every 
     minute shilling. This would be impracticable. 
     Congs. might indeed make a monthly publication, 
     but it would be in such general statements as woud 
     afford no satisfactory information.
       Mr. Madison proposed to strike out ``annually'' from the 
     motion & insert ``from time to time,'' which would enjoin the 
     duty of frequent publications and leave enough to the 
     discretion of the Legislature. Require too much and the 
     difficulty will beget a habit of doing nothing. The articles 
     of Confederation require halfyearly publications on this 
     subject. A punctual compliance being often impossible, the 
     practice has ceased altogether.
       Mr. Wilson 2ded & supported the motion. Many 
     operations of finance cannot be properly published at certain 
     times.
       Mr. Pinkney was in favor of the motion.
       Mr. Fitzimmons. It is absolutely impossible to publish 
     expenditures in the full extent of the term.
       Mr. Sherman thought ``from time to time'' the best rule to 
     be given.
       ``Annual'' was struck out--& those words--inserted nem: 
     con:
       The motion of Col: Mason so amended was then agreed to nem: 
     con: and added after--``appropriations by law'' as follows--
     ``And a regular statement and account of the receipts & 
     expenditures of all public money shall be published from time 
     to time.'' \20\
       It is perhaps worth noting that the issue of ``secrecy'' 
     had arisen earlier that same day with respect to publishing 
     the journal of each House of Congress,\21\ and the statements 
     by Gouverneur Morris (annual publication would be 
     ``impossible in many cases''), Madison (on the need for 
     legislative discretion), James Wilson (``Many operations of 
     finance cannot be properly published at certain times'')--and 
     others who supported Madison's amendment--may have been made 
     with this concern in mind.
       That the need to protect certain secret expenditures was, 
     in fact, a primary underlying rationale for the decision to 
     give Congress discretion as to what expenditures could be 
     made public, and when, becomes clearer from a reading of the 
     debates in the state ratification conventions--especially in 
     the Virginia Convention, where both Mason and Madison were 
     present to revisit the original debate. Colonel Mason took a 
     second bite at the apple during the Virginia Convention, 
     arguing on 17 June 1788 that ``the loose expression of 
     `publication from time to time,' was applicable to any time. 
     It was equally applicable to monthly and septennial 
     periods.'' \22\ He then explained:
       The reason urged in favor of this ambiguous expression, 
     was, that there might be some mattes which might require 
     secrecy.
       In matters relative to military operations, and foreign 
     negotiations, secrecy was necessary sometimes. But he did not 
     conceive that the receipts and expenditures of the public 
     money ought ever to be concealed. The people, he affirmed, 
     had a right to know the expenditures of their money. But that 
     this expression was so loose, it might be concealed forever 
     from them, and might afford opportunities of misapplying the 
     public money, and sheltering those who did it. He concluded 
     it to be as exceptionable as any clause in so few words could 
     be. [Emphasis added.] \23\
       As had been the case in Philadelphia, Mason lost this 
     debate. But, by raising the issue again, this time in public 
     debate, he made a useful contribution to our understanding of 
     the ``original intent'' behind this clause. We now know that 
     the reason Congress was given this discretion was to protect 
     ``matters which might require secrecy,'' that Mason 
     acknowledged that secrecy was sometimes necessary in military 
     and diplomatic matters, and that--even after he warned that 
     this ``ambiguous'' language might allow Congress to keep some 
     secret expenditures ``concealed forever''--Mason's colleagues 
     at the Virginia convention were not persuaded to strengthen 
     the clause and deny Congress this discretion.


            the early practice of confidential expenditures

       Of particular value in trying to understand the original 
     constitutional scheme are the acts of the First Congress, 
     elected in early 1789. Two-thirds of its twenty-two senators 
     and fifty-nine representatives had either been members of the 
     Philadelphia Convention of 1787 or of state ratifying 
     conventions, and only seven of them had opposed ratification. 
     Therefore, their actions are entitled to special weight. As 
     Chief Justice Marshall observed in 1821, in trying to 
     determine the intent of the Founding Fathers ``[g]reat weight 
     has always been attached, and very rightly attached, to 
     contemporaneous exposition.'' \24\
       It is therefore noteworthy that the First Congress 
     appropriated a ``contingent fund'' of $40,000--a considerable 
     sum at the time \25\--for the President to use for special 
     diplomatic agents and other sensitive foreign affairs needs. 
     The statute expressly provided:
       ``The President shall account specifically for all such 
     expenditures of the said money as in his judgment may be made 
     public, and also for the amount of such expenditures as he 
     may think it advisable not to specify.'' \26\
       Note the language here--the President was not required to 
     account to Congress ``under injunction of secrecy'' for 
     sensitive expenditures, he was required simply to inform 
     Congress of the sums expended so that the fund could be 
     replenished as necessary. Congress was not to be told the 
     details, as the Founding Fathers had learned first hand the 
     harm that could be done by ``leaks.''
       It is perhaps worth noting that the contingent account was 
     not only replenished, within three years it was increased to 
     the level of one million dollars--much of it reportedly was 
     used for such expenditures as bribing foreign officials and 
     ransoming hostages.\27\
       In this era of Boland Amendments and massive appropriations 
     bills packed with ``conditions'' it may be difficult to 
     realize that the Founding Fathers envisioned something quite 
     different; but it is important, from time to time, to remind 
     ourselves of the original plan. In an 1804 letter to 
     Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin, President Thomas 
     Jefferson summarized the practice during the nation's first 
     fifteen years:

[[Page H4980]]

       ``The Constitution has made the Executive the organ for 
     managing our intercourse with foreign nations. . . . The 
     Executive being thus charged with the foreign intercourse, no 
     law has undertaken to prescribe its specific duties. . . . 
     [I]t has been the uniform opinion and practice that the whole 
     foreign fund was placed by the Legislature on the footing of 
     a contingent fund, in which they undertake no specifications, 
     but leave the whole to the discretion of the president.'' 
     \28\
       When Jefferson used his contingent account to fund a 
     paramilitary army of Greek and Arab mercenaries to invade 
     Tripoli and pressure its Bey to surrender American hostages, 
     no one seems to have complained that Congress was not 
     informed in advance of the operation.\29\ Jefferson's 
     successor, James Madison--a man of some familiarity with the 
     meaning of the Constitution and its ``Statement and Account'' 
     clause--found that he needed additional funds to underwrite a 
     covert action to gain control over disputed territory between 
     Georgia and Spanish Florida in 1811, so he asked Congress to 
     enact a ``secret appropriation'' of $100,000 for that 
     purpose. The need for secrecy having passed, the secret 
     appropriation was discretely made public years later, in 
     1818.\30\
       The modern practice arguably dates back to 1941,\31\ but 
     official congressional sanction was provided by the Central 
     Intelligence Act of 1949.\32\ Over the years a variety of 
     efforts have been made to change the practice, without 
     success.\33\ The political forces behind the current effort 
     are considerable--but so much of the rhetoric is premised 
     upon the need to ``obey the Constitution'' that it is 
     difficult to gave the sentiment on policy grounds alone.
       In reality, these constitutional concerns are ill founded. 
     The record behind Article 1, Section 9, clause 7 of the 
     Constitution--whether viewed on the basis of ``original 
     intent'' or with the gloss of historic practice--clearly 
     establishes that Congress is not required to publish either 
     an aggregate figure of the money it makes available to the 
     Intelligence Community or a more detailed accounting at this 
     time. All of these sums, I gather, have been taken from the 
     Treasury ``in consequence of appropriations made by law''--
     and most apparently have been identified already in broad 
     terms to the public as appropriations for purposes of 
     national security or national defense.
       James Mason, to be sure, objected to the argument that the 
     need for ``secrecy'' required that Congress be left with 
     discretion in this area; but in both the federal and state 
     conventions he made his case and failed to carry the day. The 
     First Congress appropriated a contingent fund for which the 
     President did not even have to disclose his expenditures to 
     Congress; and Madison himself--the ``father'' of our 
     Constitution and the author of the successful amendment to 
     the ``Statement and Account'' clause--sought and received a 
     ``secret appropriation'' that was not revealed to the public 
     for many years.


                  the view from the federal judiciary

       Any remaining doubts which might exist should be put to 
     rest by a review of the handling of this issue by federal 
     courts. The issue came before the Supreme Court in United 
     States v. Richardson,\34\ but the Court found it unnecessary 
     to reach the merits because the Complainant lacked standing. 
     However, in the course of his majority opinion, Chief Justice 
     Burger reasoned in a footnote:
       ``Although we need not reach or decide precisely what is 
     meant by `a regular Statement and Account,' it is clear that 
     Congress has plenary power to exact any reporting and 
     accounting it considers appropriate in the public interest. . 
     . . While the available evidence is neither qualitatively nor 
     quantitatively conclusive, historical analysis of the genesis 
     of cl. 7 suggests that it was intended to permit some degree 
     of secrecy of governmental operations. . . .
       ``Not controlling, but surely not unimportant, are nearly 
     two centuries of acceptance of a reading of cl. 7 as vesting 
     in Congress plenary power to spell out the details of 
     precisely when and with what specificity Executive agencies 
     must report the expenditures of appropriated funds and to 
     exempt certain secret activities from comprehensive public 
     reporting.'' [Emphasis added.] \35\
       Even more significant is the District of Columbia Circuit 
     Court of Appeal's 1980 decision in Halperin v. Central 
     Intelligence Agency,\36\ a very useful case for which we are 
     indebted to Mr. Stern's predecessor at the ACLU, my litigious 
     friend Morton Halperin. Following the Supreme Court's holding 
     in Richardson, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the District Court's 
     summary judgment in favor of the CIA. But it went further, 
     addressing the case on the merits, and holding in the 
     alternative that ``Congress and the President have 
     discretion, not reviewable by the courts, to require secrecy 
     for expenditures of the type involved in this case.'' \37\
       The Halperin court engaged in a detailed review of 
     Madison's Notes and the state convention debates, concluding 
     that: ``Madison's language strongly indicates that he 
     believed that the Statement and Account Clause, following his 
     amendment, would allow government authorities ample 
     discretion to withhold some expenditure items which 
     require secrecy.'' \38\ While noting George Mason's 
     argument that ``he did not conceive that the receipts and 
     expenditures of the public money ought ever to be 
     concealed,'' \39\ the court concluded:
       ``But the Statement and Account Clause, as adopted and 
     ratified, incorporates the view not of Mason, but rather of 
     his opponents, who desired discretionary secrecy for the 
     expenditures as well as the related operations. . . .
       ``Viewed as a whole, the debates in the Constitutional 
     Convention and the Virginia ratifying convention convey a 
     very strong impression that the Framers of the Statement and 
     Account Clause intended it to allow discretion to Congress 
     and the President to preserve secrecy for expenditures 
     related to military operations and foreign negotiations. 
     Opponents of the `from time to time' provision, it is clear, 
     spoke of precisely this effect from its enactment. We have no 
     record of any statements from supporters of the Statement and 
     Account Clause indicating an intent to require disclosure of 
     such expenditures.''\40\
       Since the Supreme Court elected not to address the issue on 
     the merits in Richardson, the Halperin case remains the 
     authoritative judicial interpretation on this subject.


                    opinion of the attorney general

       Finally, Mr. Chairman, although I have not seen it, I 
     understand that Attorney General Griffin Bell was asked by 
     President Carter to consider this issue in depth and to 
     prepare an opinion for the President. He concluding that the 
     current Intelligence Community funding practices are not in 
     conflict with the Constitution.\41\


                            issue of policy

       Mr. Chairman, I believe that the text of the Constitution, 
     the clear intentions of the Founding Fathers, and more than 
     two centuries of consistent practice, support the conclusion 
     that the current practice of concealing appropriations for 
     intelligence activities in the budgets of other agencies is 
     constitutional. As I have indicated, that conclusion has the 
     support of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, and, I am 
     informed, of the Office of the Attorney General. I believe 
     you may rest comfortably on this point, and the only reasons 
     for departing from traditional disclosure practice would be 
     of a policy nature. At this time I would like to turn briefly 
     to some of those considerations.


                      a presumption of disclosure

       Perhaps first of all, in a free society there ought to be a 
     presumption in favor of openness and the diffusion of 
     knowledge and information. This may reflect my parochial 
     prejudices as a product of Mr. Jefferson's University, but I 
     am reminded both of his caution against trying to remain 
     ``ignorant and free,'' \42\ and more directly his statement 
     that the University of Virginia would be ``based on the 
     illimitable freedom of the human mind,'' and would not be 
     ``afraid to follow truth wherever it may lead, nor to 
     tolerate any error so long as reason is left free to combat 
     it.'' \43\


                       overcoming the presumption

       Having said that, I would argue that the most compelling 
     arguments to overcome that presumption of openness are those 
     legitimately based upon the security of the nation. As John 
     Jay noted in Federalist No. 3, ``Among the many objects to 
     which a wise and free people find it necessary to direct 
     their attention, that of providing for their safety seems 
     to be the first.'' \44\ Similarly, the Supreme Court noted 
     in Haig v. Agee that ``it is `obvious and unarguable' that 
     no governmental interest is more compelling than the 
     security of the Nation.'' \45\


                 comity and deference to the president

       In addition, I urge you to recognize that the management of 
     intelligence matters was recognized by the Founding Fathers 
     to be at the core of the President's responsibilities; and, 
     toward this end, I would urge you not to decide to disclose 
     these figures if the President asks that they be kept 
     confidential. To do otherwise would depart from two centuries 
     of precedent. I don't know the preferences of the current 
     Administration on this issue, but I urge you to give them the 
     weight that comity among the branches would warrant.


                        balancing the interests

       Ultimately, if the President does not object, I would 
     suggest that you apply a balancing test in reaching your 
     decision. You are entertaining a motion to depart from a 
     practice dating back in some respects to the earliest days of 
     our country, and in others to the creation of the agencies 
     you are charged with overseeing. The proponents of change 
     ought to be expected to justify a departure from these well-
     established practices--and their constitutional arguments are 
     unpersuasive.
       Ask yourselves first, what real benefit to the American 
     people or our system of government will likely result from 
     disclosing the aggregate intelligence budget. How meaningful 
     will this one figure be to our citizens? Presumably the sums 
     are already disclosed under the broad ``National Defense'' 
     budgetary category. Will any identifiable good be served by 
     publicly identifying a portion of that larger sum as being 
     earmarked for ``intelligence and intelligence-related 
     activities?'' Would the result of these efforts not be, to 
     borrow from the argument Rufus King made in objecting to a 
     mandatory annual statements, ``such general statements as 
     would afford no satisfactory information.'' \46\


            an aggregate figure will not satisfy the critics

       You can be certain that releasing a single, aggregate 
     figure will not satisfy those who are demanding meaningful 
     information

[[Page H4981]]

     about the Intelligence Community. In 1974 a student note in 
     the New York University Journal of International Law and 
     Politics, for example, concluded that ``Not only may the 
     Constitution mandate the reporting of CIA expenditures to 
     Congress as a whole, but it may even require publication of 
     the CIA budget.'' \47\ Similarly, a 1975 note in the Yale Law 
     Journal argued that ``Even a lump-sum appropriation and 
     disclosure would prevent both Congress and the public from 
     fixing or analyzing internal priorities within the CIA; it 
     would also be impossible to determine if there has been 
     waste, corruption, or spending prohibited by statute or by 
     the Constitution.'' \48\ The observation would seem sound, 
     and once you start releasing details it will probably become 
     more difficult to draw any bright lines. Ultimately, the very 
     existence of a separate intelligence committee may be called 
     into doubt as your colleagues and the critics demand more and 
     more details and become frustrated with your inexplicably 
     selective cooperation.


               exposing your budget to ``shark'' attacks

       It strikes me that the most likely result of such a 
     disclosure from the standpoint of the American taxpayer is 
     that this large chunk of money will become highly vulnerable 
     to attack as the budgetary belt is tightened. While Americans 
     may overwhelmingly favor having an effective intelligence 
     service and a strong defense establishment, when it comes 
     down to your being pressured to cut jobs and benefits 
     programs in your districts or taking a few million here and 
     there from this gross ``intelligence'' account--money which 
     will have little clearly identifiable short-term benefits to 
     constituent groups--the intelligence budget is going to be 
     placed at risk.
       And then, I suspect, you are going to be asked to 
     ``justify'' such a large budget--and you are either going to 
     have to start ``telling secrets'' or you will face amendments 
     to cut your aggregate budget by 2% here and 3% there so the 
     money can go for health care, education, and other special 
     interests that have far more extensive and effective PR 
     operations than do the agencies you are charged with 
     overseeing. I don't think any of us want to have the CIA or 
     NSA ``propagandizing'' the American voters to pressure 
     Congress for adequate funding; and because of that handicap I 
     suggest that you have a special responsibility to the 
     American people not to allow their intelligence services to 
     be compromised in order to appease more politically powerful 
     special interest groups.
       Candidly, I don't see much in the way of identifiable 
     benefits from disclosing the current aggregate Intelligence 
     Community budget. Perhaps they are there--but the burden of 
     proof ought to be placed upon those who are advocating the 
     change.


   intelligence community budget figures ought eventually to be made 
                                 public

       This is not to say, however, that these figures ought to 
     remain perpetual secrets. On the contrary, I can think of no 
     reason why the sums made available to the Central 
     Intelligence Agency and other components of the Intelligence 
     Community in the 1940s, 1950, and 1960s ought not be made 
     public at this time (if that has not already been done). I 
     don't know whether the delay ought to be three decades, two 
     decades, or even less--but I would be inclined to defer to 
     the judgment of the President and the DCI in making such a 
     policy decision.


                     lives and freedom are at stake

       Finally, if you can identify genuine benefits to the 
     American people of disclosing this information, you need to 
     ask what harm might reasonably be foreseen to result from 
     such a change--and to weight any such harm against the 
     perceived benefits. Perhaps I am in the minority today, but I 
     believe that when the security of the nation may be at stake 
     we ought to act with a presumption of caution and secrecy. 
     The fact that the rest of the world follows that practice is 
     not proof of its wisdom--but it should give us justification 
     to pause, at least briefly, before moving off in a radically 
     new direction.
       Some experts have argued what has been called the 
     ``conspicuous bump theory''--suggesting that a foreign 
     intelligence service might be able to confirm the existence 
     of an expensive new program or technology by spotting a 
     change in the CIA or Intelligence Community budget. Former 
     DCI William Colby--a man of great wisdom and integrity, who 
     has decades of relevant experience on which to judge--has 
     suggested that the introduction of the U-2 program produced 
     just such a ``bump'' in our budget.\49\
       I am not privy to the future plans of the Intelligence 
     Community or the current details of its budget, and I can 
     certainly not identify any particular development that might 
     be compromised by publishing an aggregate figure--but I can 
     certainly conceive of such a development. Indeed, I can 
     conceive of a decision of such a development. Indeed, I can 
     conceive of a decision by the United States to curtail 
     intelligence spending dramatically--requiring the termination 
     of programs in many Third World countries--and I can project 
     that public release of figures showing a dramatic drop in 
     funding might well lead a potentially hostile foreign leader 
     to conclude that he no longer needed to abide by his NPT 
     commitments because the Americans no longer had adequate 
     resources to keep good track of his activities.


                  the intelligence ``jig-saw puzzle''

       The business of intelligence gathering is in many respects 
     much like putting together a jig-saw puzzle. If you are 
     looking at the United States, you certainly want to subscribe 
     to the Congressional Record and Aviation Week & Space 
     Technology, and also to attend scientific conferences and 
     carefully review the latest Statistical Abstract and some of 
     the thousands of other government publications that might 
     reveal some of the many pieces to the puzzle. When you see 
     areas where you are missing key pieces, perhaps you pay off a 
     secretary, seduce a file clerk, break in to a hotel room 
     while an international conference is in session to rifle a 
     briefcase or two, and perhaps eavesdrop on a few million 
     telephone calls. Much of your efforts are fruitless, but more 
     and more of the puzzle falls into place as each week goes by. 
     The ones that remain ``critically important'' are the ones 
     you do not have.
       That makes the counter-intelligence function a difficult 
     one; because, without knowing what pieces of the puzzle one's 
     adversaries have already acquired, it is virtually impossible 
     to identify any size piece as being ``vital'' to U.S. 
     security interests. And yet, quite possibly, almost any 
     single piece of the puzzle could be the critical part that 
     allows our enemies to break an important code and do us harm. 
     Thus, the tradition has developed that the intelligence 
     business ought, even in a democracy, be cloaked in a web of 
     secrecy.
       Over the years, this Committee and your Senate counterpart 
     have taken testimony from a number of former DCIs and other 
     experts asking what specific harm they could identify that 
     would result from disclosing the aggregate intelligence 
     budget. Many, if not most, of them, I gather, have said they 
     could not point to clearly identifiable harm. Others have 
     urged you not to make the figures public.
       I wonder if it might have been useful to ask them another 
     question. Ask them how much they would pay to have the annual 
     aggregate intelligence budget figures for countries like the 
     former Soviet Union, Cuba, Libya, Iran, Iraq, or North Korea. 
     Would these figures be of interest to them? Might the trends 
     in these figures over a decade or more be helpful to them? If 
     they say ``no,'' then I would be less concerned.


                               Conclusion

       Mr. Chairman, let me close with the observation that this 
     is an important issue. Other than making us feel good--a 
     byproduct, perhaps, of the strange but all too prevalent 
     belief that keeping secrets from our nation's enemies is 
     somehow ``un-American,'' ``dirty,'' or even ``evil''--I don't 
     believe that publishing the aggregate intelligence budget is 
     going to benefit very many Americans. It may make a few super 
     hawks feel relieved that we are throwing enough money at the 
     problem,\50\ I suspect Oliver Stone and others who believe 
     that the United States is an evil force in the world may buy 
     a few extra cases of Malox, and some of your constituents may 
     even accept the allegation that you will have somehow ``saved 
     the Constitution'' \51\ by passing such a disclosure 
     requirement. But most Americans simply don't know enough 
     about the Intelligence business, about how this money is 
     actually being spent, to be able to evaluate a figure 
     presumably in the tens of billions of dollars.
       The most likely consequence of publishing an unsupported 
     aggregate figure is that it will become a sitting duck for 
     colleagues seeking accounts to cut in order to satisfy the 
     demands of special interest constituent groups without 
     further adding to the deficit. You will then be forced to 
     choose between further breaking down the intelligence 
     budget--and then being asked, at minimum, to provide public 
     justification for any future increases--or watching the very 
     important sum of money you are charged with overseeing ripped 
     apart as some of your colleagues go on a feeding frenzy. 
     Members of Congress who do not understand the important 
     business of intelligence--and, equally importantly, who know 
     that this large account can't be publicly defended without 
     disclosing details that its champions will not wish to reveal 
     to our nation's enemies--are likely to argue that their pet 
     ``pork'' project can easily be funded by just taking a few 
     hundred thousand dollars from this vast ``intelligence'' 
     account--charging the DCI with finding a little more ``fat'' 
     to trim from his presumably bloated bureaucracy. It could 
     give a whole new meaning to the term ``graymail''--defend 
     your budget on the merits in public by compromising secrets, 
     or watch large chunks of it vanish before your eyes.
       The Intelligence Community could easily suffer the fate of 
     the prized sausage the fabled German butcher is said to have 
     left displayed unguarded on his counter while he swept out 
     one afternoon. He returned to find that a tiny slice had been 
     taken while he was away; but, noting its small size, he 
     concluded it really didn't matter all that much. An hours 
     later, when he returned from his storeroom, he found another 
     piece was gone. This continued for several days. Each missing 
     slice, after all, was quite modest in size and could hardly 
     be said to have destroyed the value of the whole. Little by 
     little, the prized sausage vanished. Pretty soon, only a 
     small piece of string was left--and that wasn't worth 
     fighting for either.
       In a very real sense, the Intelligence Community budget is 
     as defenseless as the sausage in the fable. We don't want the 
     CIA ``propagandizing'' the public to pressure Congress for 
     additional funds, and we know they can't discuss the 
     important details of their work without harming their 
     effectiveness even if they wanted to do so. They provide

[[Page H4982]]

     ``services'' to Americans of incalculable value, by helping 
     to keep the world peaceful and identifying threats to our 
     security sufficiently early that we can address them without 
     having to expend the lives of our young men and women in 
     uniform.
       Thanks to our Intelligence Community, we learned about the 
     existence of Soviet missiles in Cuba in 1962, and about 
     dangerous nuclear weapons and ballistic missile threats from 
     North Korea three decades later. Each of you could probably 
     add numerous other examples, because you have been entrusted 
     with special access to information that must be denied to the 
     rest of us. But, when the sharks come, you will be precluded 
     by your promise of secrecy from mentioning those examples in 
     public debate. How can you possibly expect to convince your 
     colleagues not to earmark a couple of hundred thousand 
     dollars for a new public building to honor the beloved Tip 
     O'Neil, a few million dollars for a powerful committee 
     chairman's favorite hospital--perhaps to fund some promising 
     AIDS research--or perhaps to pay for the unanticipated 
     earthquake relief needs in Los Angeles?
       It would not surprise me if some of your constituents would 
     vote to shut down the entire Intelligence Community if the 
     money saved could rescue one small child trapped in a well, 
     to ease the suffering on a pediatric cancer ward, or to take 
     a real ``bite'' out of crime. After all, the Cold War is 
     over--and many Americans couldn't find North Korea on a map 
     without great effort. One of the nice things about being 
     outside the policy process is that most Americans don't have 
     to worry about long-term strategic solvency or the risks 
     that lurk around the corner in an increasingly complex and 
     not yet safe world. They elected you to represent them in 
     deciding how to allocate the nation's limited resources, 
     and in this regard I would remind you of the famous 1774 
     speech to the Electors of Bristol, in which Edmund Burke 
     observed: ``Your representative owes you, not his industry 
     only, but his judgment; and he betrays instead of serving 
     you if he sacrifices it to your opinion.''
       Because of your membership on this important Committee, you 
     have a special duty--not only to the constituents in your 
     individual districts, but to all of the American people--to 
     oversee and pass judgment upon the work of the Intelligence 
     Community. This system has worked well, in general, by having 
     your colleagues rely upon you to make recommendations based 
     upon the special information to which you are given access. 
     Most of your colleagues hesitate to second-guess your 
     judgments, because they know they lack your expertise. Simply 
     gratuitously tossing out an aggregate budget sum--a figure 
     presumably in the tens of billions of dollars--may well break 
     some of the mystique that has helped guard these critically 
     important funds from the sharks in the past.
       As I have said, the potential consequences are great. 
     Imagine the lives that might have been saved had we been able 
     to prevent the Pearl Harbor surprise attack. Consider what 
     might have happened had we not learned of the Soviet nuclear 
     missiles in Cuba. How many more Americans might have died in 
     the gulf during Operation Desert Storm had it not been for 
     the information we were able to gain from our overhead 
     platforms?
       Information provided by the American Intelligence Community 
     reportedly helped to convince the International Atomic Energy 
     Agency that North Korea was violating its treaty commitments 
     under the NPT--and that may allow us to avoid a nuclear 
     confrontation in East Asia that could either engulf U.S. 
     forces in South Korea or, in the alternative, provoke Japan 
     to become a nuclear weapons State and undermine the Nuclear 
     Non-Proliferation Treaty. As we meet here today, American 
     intelligence assets are presumably monitoring the efforts by 
     Libya to build new poison gas facilities that could fuel 
     further terrorism and undermine our interests and the cause 
     of peace in the coming years.
       Mr. Chairman, the job which you and your colleagues on this 
     Committee have accepted is not an easy one. Today, the 
     American people are still rejoicing at the end of the Cold 
     War. They are turning inward, looking for ``peace 
     dividends.'' But you have a greater responsibility than 
     simply pandering to their short-term desires. You must decide 
     what national resources ought to be allocated to the 
     intelligence functions, and then you must try to protect 
     those funds in a very competitive budget process.
       If you err, and the nation is left unprotected, American 
     soldiers may well pay with their lives for your frugality. 
     The stakes in this game are high: they are measured in human 
     lives and individual freedom. In this regard, you may wish to 
     keep in mind that the American people are not very forgiving 
     when their elected representatives fail in their duty to 
     protect the nation's security--even when their actions are 
     initially fully in accord with the public opinion polls. Few 
     of the isolationists who tied President Roosevelt's hands in 
     the 1930s in the name of ``peace'' and ``neutrality'' 
     survived the elections following Pearl Harbor, an event which 
     itself might have been prevented by a serious national 
     intelligence collection effort.\52\
       In the backlash to Watergate and Vietnam two decades ago, 
     the American public turned against the Intelligence 
     Community--egged on, I would add, by irresponsible charges 
     from the Hill that the CIA had become a ``rogue elephant.'' 
     \53\ Our elected representatives responded by cutting back on 
     funding and reducing intelligence assets in several areas--in 
     particular we reduced money for HUMINT in such 
     ``unimportant'' areas as El Salvador. I need not emphasize 
     that by 1981 that cutback had proven to be a costly 
     mistake--both in terms of undermining our efforts to 
     assist a neighbor resist an externally-supported Leninist 
     insurgency and our campaign for important human rights 
     objectives.
       When Iranian militants seized American hostages in Tehran 
     in 1979, the American people wanted quick action. Support for 
     the CIA shot up dramatically in the polls. Some of the 
     reductions that had been made in the mid-seventies seemed 
     hard to explain, and the voters turned out an administration 
     in Washington that had, for the most part, been very much in 
     tune with the neo-isolationist sentiments of the Nation prior 
     to the ``wake up call'' from the Ayatollah Khomeini
       The Cold War is now over, but, if anything, the world is a 
     far more complex reality than was the case when Moscow held 
     the strings to many of its problem children. The existence of 
     radical regimes like those in North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Libya, 
     the Sudan--to name a few--combined with the growth of ultra 
     nationalism in Eastern Europe, the growing threat of 
     proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and our own 
     obvious vulnerability to international terrorism, make it 
     more important than ever for us to have a strong and 
     effective Intelligence Community. Human lives are at stake in 
     the decisions you make--not only those of our soldiers, but 
     also those of secretaries and office workers who may find 
     themselves in situations like the World Trade Center bombing.
       You invited me here to address the rather technical 
     question of whether the Constitution requires the publication 
     of an aggregate budget figure for the Intelligence Community. 
     My answer is that it clearly does not--a view consistent with 
     more than two centuries of established practice, and one 
     shared by the federal judiciary and at least the Carter 
     Administration's Justice Department. In contrast, it is worth 
     noting that in 1977, when your colleagues in the Senate 
     studied this issue and concluded that the aggregate budget 
     should be released, they relied upon three law review 
     articles (all written in the wake of Watergate and the 
     emotions of the Church and Pike Committee investigations) in 
     concluding that ``the legal commentators outside the 
     government who have studied this clause and publicly 
     commented have concluded that it requires disclosure of at 
     least an aggregate figure for intelligence activities.'' \54\ 
     What they did not disclose--and what most of the Senators 
     quite probably did not realize--is that each of the three law 
     review articles were nothing more than ``Notes'' written by 
     law students.\55\
       The Constitution clearly does not require you to release 
     current aggregate appropriation figures for the intelligence 
     community at this time. Whether to do so is entirely within 
     the discretion of the Congress. That leaves you with the 
     policy question of whether to publish such a figure for other 
     reasons. For the reasons already stated, I urge you to 
     consider the pros and cons of that issue very carefully 
     before making a decision. I honestly believe it would prove 
     to be a tragic mistake.
       Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That concludes my statement.

     footnotes
     \1\ Perhaps the most detailed public account I have seen to 
     date is TIM WEINER, BLANK CHECK: THE PENTAGON'S BLACK BUDGET 
     (1990).
     \2\ 50 U.S.C.A. Sec. 403 f (a).
     \3\ Douglas P. Elliott, Cloak and Ledger: Is CIA Funding 
     Constitutional?, 2 HAST. CONST. L. Q. 717, 731-32 (1975).
     \4\ I have not had time to search to see if such polls have 
     been taken, but I recall that during the height of the Gulf 
     War the polls showed overwhelming support for the 
     restrictions placed by the military upon the press.
     \5\ The ``Church Committee' concluded ``that publication of 
     the aggregate figure for national intelligence would begin to 
     satisfy the Constitutional requirement and would not damage 
     the national security.'' Quoted in, SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE 
     ON INTELLIGENCE, REPORT ON WHETHER DISCLOSURE OF FUNDS FOR 
     THE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED STATES IS IN THE 
     PUBLIC INTEREST 2 (95th Cong., 1st sess., Sen. Rep't 95-274 
     (1977). The ``Rockefeller Commission'' identified this as an 
     issue warranting congressional consideration. COMMISSION ON 
     CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES, REPORT TO THE 
     PRESIDENT 81 (1975). There have also been several ``Notes,'' 
     written by law students, reaching this conclusion. See, e.g., 
     Fiscal Oversight of the Central Intelligence Agency: Can 
     Accountability and Confidentiality Coexist?, 7 N.Y.U.J. INT'L 
     L. & POLITICS 493 (1974); The CIA's Secret Funding and the 
     Constitution, 84 YALE L. J. 608 (1975); and Douglas P. 
     Elliott, Cloak and Ledger: Is CIA Funding Constitutional?, 2 
     HAST. CONST. L. Q. 717 (1975).
     \6\ Presumably every school child is familiar with 
     Jefferson's famous maxim that, ``If a nation expects to be 
     ignorant and free, in a state of civilization, it expects 
     what never was and never will be.'' 14 WRITINGS OF THOMAS 
     JEFFERSON 384 (Mem ed. 1903). Only slightly less popular is 
     Madison's warning that ``A popular Government, without 
     popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a 
     Prologue to a Farce or a tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge 
     will forever govern ignorance. And a people who mean to be 
     their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power which 
     knowledge gives.'' 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103 
     (Gaillard Hunt, ed. 1910).
     \7\ 3 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 392 (1904-14).
     \8\ ``Verbal statement of Thomas Story to the Committee,'' 2 
     P. FORCE, AMERICAN ARCHIVES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
     NORTH AMERICAN COLONIES, Fifth Series, 818-19 (1837-53). For 
     reasons of readability, I have departed from the practice of 
     italicizing most of the proper nouns followed in the 
     original.
     \9\ Id. at 819.

[[Page H4983]]

     \10\ Id.
     \11\ An excellent discussion of this period is contained in 
     HENRY MERRITT WRISTON, EXECUTIVE AGENTS IN AMERICAN FOREIGN 
     RELATIONS 18-22 (1929).
     \12\ Id. at 23. The internal quotation is cited to a letter 
     from Jay to Thomas Jefferson (then Minister to Paris) dated 
     24 April 1787.
     \13\ The FEDERALIST, No. 64 at 434-35 (Jacob E. Cooke, ed. 
     1961) (J. Jay) (emphasis added). Jay's contribution to 
     understanding the Constitution in this essay can not be 
     understated. Discussing Jay's subsequent role in explaining 
     the meaning of the Constitution--and, specifically, this 
     essay--University of Washington Professor Arthur Bestor 
     (hardly a champion of strong executive power) has observed: 
     ``In this contribution to the Federalist Jay was of course 
     examining the completed Constitution, not offering 
     suggestions to those about to frame it. As an interpretation 
     of the original intent of the document. Jay's essay is of the 
     highest importance. His diplomatic experience commencing with 
     his appointment as minister to Spain in 1779; followed by his 
     participation, as one of the commissioners, in the 
     negotiation of peace with Great Britain; and continuing, from 
     1784 on, with his service as Secretary of the United States 
     for the department of Foreign Affairs--fitted him better than 
     anyone else to judge the intended effect of the new 
     Constitution both on the actual process of negotiation and on 
     the character of the relationship that would have to be 
     maintained between executive and legislative authorities.'' 
     Bestor, Separation of Powers in the Domain of Foreign 
     Affairs, 4 SEATON HALL L. REV. 527, 532-33 (1974). Professor 
     Gordon Baldwin concludes: ``John Jay, an experienced attorney 
     and diplomat, suggested that intelligence gathering 
     arrangements are within the sole power of the President. In 
     his view, they are a purely executive function linked to the 
     treaty negotiation process, and the information so gained 
     need not be reported to Congress.'' Gordon Baldwin, 
     Congressional Power to Demand Disclosure of Foreign 
     Intelligence Agreements, 3 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 1, 17 (1976).
     \14\ Federalist No. 64.
     \15\ The Complete Anas of Thomas Jefferson 72-73 (Franklin B. 
     Sawvel, ed. 1903). This document also appears in 1 The 
     Writings of Thomas Jefferson 191 (Paul Ford, ed., 1892).
     \16\ The Convention was to begin on the second Monday in May 
     (14 May), but a quorum did not arrive until the 25th.
     \17\ 1 Max Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 
     1787 at 15 (1966).
     \18\ Clinton Rossiter, 1787: The Grand Convention 167 (1966).
     \19\ Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention, supra 
     note 17, at xv.
     \20\ James Madison, 2 ``The Journal of the Constitutional 
     Convention,'' in 4 The Writings of James Madison 456-57 
     (Gaillard Hunt, ed. 1903). With only minor changes in 
     punctuation and typography, this same debate appears in 2 Max 
     Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 at 
     618-19 (1966).
     \21\ 4 Writings of James Madison 449-50; 2 Farrand, Records 
     of the Federal Convention 613.
     \22\ 3 Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention 326.
     \23\ Id.
     \24\ Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 418 (1821).
     \25\ Not being privy to the budgetary figures for the Central 
     Intelligence Agency I can not say with certainty, but I 
     suspect this 1790 appropriation provided the President with a 
     larger portion of the federal budget than is today allocated 
     to the CIA.
     \26\ Act of 1 July 1790, 1 Stat. 129 (1790).
     \27\ Ed Sayle, The Historical Underpinnings of the U.S. 
     Intelligence Community, 1 International Journal of 
     Intelligence and Counterintelligence 9 (1986).
     \28\ 11 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 5, 9, 10 (Mem. ed. 
     1904). For a discussion of Jefferson's theory that the 
     ``executive power'' clause of Article II, section 1, had 
     vested in the President the entire business of external 
     intercourse save for the expressed grants to Congress and the 
     Senate (such as the power of the Senate to approve 
     nominations and treaties, and the veto given Congress over a 
     decision to initiate an offensive ``war'')--a view shared by 
     Washington, Hamilton, Jay, Marshall, and others--see ROBERT 
     F. TURNER, REPEALING THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: RESTORING THE 
     RULE OF LAW IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 47-107 (1991).
     \29\ I discuss this incident in some detail in a forthcoming 
     book.
     \30\ 3 Stat. 471 (1818).
     \31\ President Roosevelt appointed ``Wild Bill'' Donovan as 
     ``Coordinator of Information''--which led directly to the OSS 
     and CIA--on 18 June of that year, and funding for the 
     Manhattan Project apparently began around 9 October. See TIM 
     WEINER, BLANK CHECK: THE PENTAGON'S BLACK BUDGET 19, 113 
     (1990).
     \32\ 63 Stat 208, Pub. L. 81-110, codified at 50 U.S.C.A. 
     Sec. 403 et seq.
     \33\ The most noteworthy of these, perhaps, was the effort by 
     the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence to change the 
     practice in 1977. While a majority of the committee voted for 
     that end, the dispute was apparently so heated that no one 
     brought the measure to the floor.
     \34\ 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
     \35\ 418 U.S. at 178 n.11.
     \36\ 629 F.2d 144 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Another useful case from 
     the same circuit is Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d. 190 (D.C. 
     Cir. 1977), in which the court rejected on standing grounds a 
     similar challenge brought by a Member of Congress, and in the 
     process concluded with respect to the ``regular Statement and 
     Account'' clause: ``This clause is not self-defining and 
     Congress has plenary power to give meaning to the provision. 
     . . . Since Congressional power is plenary with respect to 
     the definition of the appropriations process and reporting 
     requirements, the legislature is free to establish exceptions 
     to this general framework, as has been done with respect to 
     the CIA.'' Id. at 194-95.
     \37\ 629 F.2d at 162.
     \38\ Id. at 155.
     \39\ Id.
     \40\ Id. at 156.
     \41\ Letter from President Carter to the Senate Select 
     Committee on Intelligence, quoted in SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE 
     ON INTELLIGENCE, REPORT ON WHETHER DISCLOSURE OF FUNDS FOR 
     THE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED STATES IS IN THE 
     PUBLIC INTEREST at 6.
     \42\ Quoted supra, note 6.
     \43\ 15 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 303 (Mem. ed. 1903).
     \44\ Federalist No. 3 at 13-14 (Jacob E. Cooke, ed. 1961) 
     (emphasis in original).
     \45\ 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
     \46\ See supra, text accompanying note 20.
     \47\ Fiscal Oversight of the Central Intelligence Agency: Can 
     Accountability and Confidentiality Coexist?, 7 N.Y.U. J. 
     Int'l L. & Politics 493, 521 (1974).
     \48\ The CIA's Secret Funding and the Constitution, 84 YALE 
     L. J. 608, 633 n.137 (1975). Keep in mind that the Church 
     Committee said ``publication of the aggregate figure . . . 
     would begin to satisfy the Constitutional requirement . . . 
     [emphasis added].'' See supra, note 5.
     \49\ Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on 
     Whether Disclosure of Funds for the Intelligence Activities 
     of the United States is In the Public Interest 8.
     \50\ Without further details, no one will be able to make an 
     intelligent judgment about the wisdom of the expenditures 
     contained in the aggregate figure; and I predict that if you 
     do release such a figure you will be forced to break it down 
     further (at least by agency or category) within a few years.
     \51\ If your primary interest is in upholding the 
     Constitution, I can suggest any of a number of measures 
     Congress might take toward that end--such as repealing the 
     1973 War Powers Resolution, which even Senator George 
     Mitchell admits is unconstitutional, or repealing some of the 
     hundreds of new ``legislative vetoes'' that have been enacted 
     after the 1983 Supreme Court decision (INS. v. Chadha) 
     declaring such measures to be unconstitutional. See, e.g., 
     Robert F. Turner, Repealing the War Powers Resolution: 
     Restoring the Rule of Law in U.S. Foreign Policy (1991).
     \52\ See, e.g., 95 Cong. Rec. 1948 (1949) (remarks by Sen. 
     Tydings), cited in Douglas P. Elliott, Cloak and Ledger: Is 
     CIA Funding Constitutional?, 2 Hast. Const. L.Q. 717, 729 
     (1975).
     \53\ To be sure, the Intelligence Community engaged in 
     activities that most of us today would consider improper--but 
     even Senator Church ultimately acknowledged that the ``rogue 
     elephant'' metaphor he coined was inaccurate and the 
     Community has been following instructions from the nation's 
     elected political leaders.
     \54\ Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on 
     Whether Disclosure of Funds for the Intelligence Activities 
     of the United States Is in the Public Interest at 4 n.6.
     \55\ The student Notes in question are cited supra, note 5.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, this is one of the situations where there is 
a lot of misinformation, a lot of perception, a lot of misperception 
frankly. There clearly is a slippery slope here, because the gentleman 
from Michigan's amendment talks about the annual statement of the total 
amount for intelligence expenditures. The problem with that is that if 
we give a number and we say these are intelligence expenditures, then 
we have to start defining what is intelligence. It is not exactly what 
other people think it is going to be. We will have to start paring out 
different programs and different functions to determine what we mean.
  Are you talking about the amount we spend on national security? That 
should surely be a big number. It is required in the Constitution. That 
is something the Federal Government does. Are we talking about the 
intelligence function in national security? And if so, what does that 
number mean and what specifically does it include and what does it 
leave out? What is intelligence? Is the State Department gathering of 
information or reading Le Figaro, is that part of intelligence? Is that 
open source intelligence or not? You have to start making further 
descriptions and definitions. That is the slippery slope.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GOSS. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I think this bill is intelligence. We are 
the ones that just authorized it. So that is pretty much what it is.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I quite agree. The gentlewoman from 
California said one of the worst kept secrets in Washington is the 
intelligence budget. One of the worst kept secrets in Washington is, 
what is the intelligence part of the intelligence budget? What is the 
intelligence part of the defense budget?
  Some have said that we are hiding something from Americans. We are 
not trying to hide anything from Americans. We are trying to keep some 
secrets from our enemies. That is true. We are trying to do that. But I 
would point out to those who say we are trying to hide something from 
Americans, we have a representative form of government. This is 
democracy at its finest in the world. Those of us here represent those 
of us abroad in our land.
  Those of us on the committee are charged with the responsibility of 
oversight. It was not always such good oversight. It is very good 
oversight now, and we are accountable. I would say we are hiding 
nothing from the Americans because there is no American that I would 
look at right in the eye and say, we are spending the money as wisely 
and as well as we can and as appropriately as we can. Fifteen men and 
women, good and true, making that decision about what our intelligence 
needs are at this time, I have no problem with that. I think that is 
entirely reasonable.
  When I go beyond that and start talking about specifics, I start 
removing some of the confusion the enemy seize out there. I think 
confusion to

[[Page H4984]]

our enemies is not a bad thing. It is somewhat Biblical, in fact. I 
think it has worked very well over in the past. I do not see the game. 
If it is accountability, the accountability is there. We already have 
it.
  The final point of the gentlewoman from California, the President is 
somehow waiting for the signal; whoever made that statement, perhaps it 
was not the gentlewoman from California, let me tell my colleagues that 
it was President Clinton himself who classified the number when he sent 
his budget submission to Congress in March. It was not the Congress. We 
do not have the authority to classify anything. It is the executive 
branch that classifies things.
  We are putting money in our bill to examine the question of 
declassification because we are properly concerned about it. That also 
in my view means abuse of classification. I know that takes place. So I 
would suggest the right way to deal with this is to go to the 
comprehensive study we have called for in our bill, that we have 
provided for in our bill, authorized funds for and I hope we will get 
those funds from the appropriators, and I believe we are and that we 
proceed in an orderly way. That way we protect national security. We 
provide for accountability. And we give the President and his people 
the opportunity to chime in on the debate.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge a ``no'' vote on the Conyers amendment.
  Mr. STARK. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Conyers amendment 
to H.R. 1775, the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1997.
  There is no reason for the intelligence budget to be classified 
information. How can we justify a multibillion--or is it more--blank 
check every year without adequate oversight and minimum public 
discussion?
  If this Congress is serious about balancing the budget, we should not 
throw money into an unaccountable hole. Since almost all of the 
intelligence spending is hidden within the defense budget, we are 
misled about the real amount of intelligence spending through false 
line items in the defense budget. We must have budget integrity.
  The intelligence budget is routinely reported by the media without 
compromising national security. When the Government keeps this open 
secret clandestinely hidden, the American public grows increasingly 
cynical about their Government.
  I believe that our intelligence community could better justify the 
funding they receive from Congress with a disclosed budget. In the same 
vein, the intelligence community could help to balance the budget by 
submitting their funding to the same scrutiny faced by domestic 
priorities.
  This amendment is about accountability and the public's right to 
know. There is no reason to keep this information from a full and open 
debate.
  I urge my colleagues to support the Conyers amendment.
  Mr. FARR of California. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of the 
Conyers amendment to declassify the size of our Nation's intelligence 
budget.
  It makes no sense to keep the size of our intelligence budget a 
secret. It would not threaten our national security. Several former 
Directors of the Central Intelligence Agency and the bipartisan Brown-
Aspin Commission have agreed that disclosure of the aggregate 
intelligence budget would not reduce our Nation's security. In fact, 
many other countries disclose the amount they spend on intelligence, 
with no impact on their own nation's security.
  But what such secrecy does do is keep our own citizens in the dark. 
At a time when so many programs are being drastically reduced in the 
name of deficit reduction, the American taxpayer isn't even told how 
much is being spent on intelligence programs.
  I am a proud cosponsor of H.R. 753, the Intelligence Budget 
Accountability Act, which would declassify the aggregate intelligence 
budget. This is long overdue, and I urge adoption of the Conyers 
amendment to the Intelligence Authorization Act to accomplish this 
important goal.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Conyers].
  The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.


                             Recorded Vote

  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 192, 
noes 237, not voting 5, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 254]

                               AYES--192

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allen
     Andrews
     Baesler
     Baldacci
     Barcia
     Barrett (WI)
     Becerra
     Bentsen
     Berman
     Berry
     Blagojevich
     Blumenauer
     Bonior
     Borski
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Capps
     Carson
     Chabot
     Chenoweth
     Christensen
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Condit
     Conyers
     Costello
     Coyne
     Crapo
     Cummings
     Danner
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (IL)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Dellums
     Deutsch
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Doggett
     Dooley
     Duncan
     Ensign
     Eshoo
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Fazio
     Filner
     Flake
     Foglietta
     Ford
     Fox
     Frank (MA)
     Frost
     Furse
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Gonzalez
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Gordon
     Green
     Gutierrez
     Hall (TX)
     Hamilton
     Harman
     Hastings (FL)
     Hefner
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hooley
     Horn
     Istook
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Johnson (WI)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Kanjorski
     Kennedy (MA)
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kennelly
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind (WI)
     Kleczka
     Kucinich
     LaFalce
     Lampson
     Lantos
     Leach
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Luther
     Maloney (CT)
     Maloney (NY)
     Manton
     Markey
     Martinez
     Matsui
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McHale
     McKinney
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meek
     Menendez
     Metcalf
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller (CA)
     Minge
     Mink
     Moakley
     Moran (VA)
     Morella
     Nadler
     Neal
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Paul
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Peterson (MN)
     Petri
     Pomeroy
     Poshard
     Price (NC)
     Rangel
     Reyes
     Riggs
     Rivers
     Roemer
     Rohrabacher
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanchez
     Sanders
     Sawyer
     Schumer
     Scott
     Serrano
     Shays
     Sherman
     Skaggs
     Slaughter
     Smith, Adam
     Snyder
     Spratt
     Stabenow
     Stark
     Stenholm
     Stokes
     Strickland
     Stupak
     Tauscher
     Thompson
     Thurman
     Tierney
     Torres
     Traficant
     Turner
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Waters
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Wexler
     Weygand
     Woolsey

                               NOES--237

     Aderholt
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baker
     Ballenger
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bateman
     Bereuter
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop
     Bliley
     Blunt
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Brady
     Bryant
     Bunning
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Campbell
     Canady
     Cannon
     Cardin
     Castle
     Chambliss
     Coble
     Coburn
     Collins
     Combest
     Cook
     Cooksey
     Cox
     Cramer
     Crane
     Cubin
     Cunningham
     Davis (VA)
     Deal
     DeLay
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Doolittle
     Doyle
     Dreier
     Dunn
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     Engel
     English
     Etheridge
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fawell
     Foley
     Forbes
     Fowler
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gekas
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Goodling
     Goss
     Graham
     Granger
     Greenwood
     Gutknecht
     Hall (OH)
     Hansen
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hill
     Hilleary
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Holden
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Inglis
     Jefferson
     Jenkins
     John
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones
     Kaptur
     Kasich
     Kelly
     Kim
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Klink
     Klug
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaHood
     Largent
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lazio
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     Lipinski
     Livingston
     LoBiondo
     Lucas
     Manzullo
     Mascara
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McDade
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntosh
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Molinari
     Mollohan
     Moran (KS)
     Murtha
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Neumann
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Ortiz
     Oxley
     Packard
     Pappas
     Parker
     Paxon
     Pease
     Peterson (PA)
     Pickering
     Pickett
     Pitts
     Pombo
     Porter
     Portman
     Pryce (OH)
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Redmond
     Regula
     Riley
     Rodriguez
     Rogan
     Rogers
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roukema
     Royce
     Ryun
     Salmon
     Sandlin
     Sanford
     Saxton
     Scarborough
     Schaefer, Dan
     Schaffer, Bob
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Sisisky
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (OR)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith, Linda
     Snowbarger
     Solomon
     Souder
     Spence
     Stearns
     Stump
     Sununu
     Talent
     Tanner
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Thune
     Tiahrt
     Upton
     Visclosky
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Watkins
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     White
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wise
     Wolf
     Wynn
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

[[Page H4985]]



                             NOT VOTING--5

     Bass
     Edwards
     Schiff
     Towns
     Yates

                              {time}  1851

  Mr. BOB SMITH of Oregon, Mr. BOB SCHAFFER of Colorado, and Mr. GILMAN 
changed their vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
  Mr. MANTON and Ms. EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON of Texas changed their vote 
from ``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the amendment was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  Mr. SKAGGS. Mr. Speaker, I move to strike the last word.
  Mr. Speaker, I have a brief statement to make about a matter in the 
bill; and then I believe the chairman will be asking unanimous consent 
to deal with the program for the rest of the evening. I just wanted 
Members to be alerted to that. I will be brief.
  I just want to talk for a minute about something that is referenced 
in our report concerning the nonacoustic submarine warfare research 
program that is conducted by an office under the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense responsible for intelligence. It is generally referred to by 
the acronym ASAP, the Advanced Sensor Application Program.
  It was created by Congress, and we have always insisted that it be 
managed independently of the Navy. We have recently learned that there 
is an effort underway by the Navy and elements within OSD to transfer 
this program to Navy management, in direct contravention of years of 
consistent guidance from Congress.
  This came too late to be incorporated into our bill, but I want to 
the make Members aware of it. There is guidance regarding this program 
in our report. Most particularly, this language was drafted to repeat 
the congressional intent, and I quote, that ``we have repeatedly 
addressed the need to maintain two separate independent but coordinated 
nonacoustic submarine warfare programs within the Department of 
Defense.'' And it goes on to state that, ``ASAP is expected to continue 
investigating advanced technology in nonacoustical anti-submarine 
warfare.''
  Mr. Speaker, in my view, this is very important and precludes the 
Department from transferring this program to the Navy. I think that is 
the correct course. We have a great deal riding on maintaining the 
small insurance program in our nonacoustical anti-submarine warfare 
research programs.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.
  The motion was agreed to.
  Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore [Mr. 
McInnis], having assumed the chair, Mr. Thornberry, Chairman of the 
Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that 
that Committee, having had under consideration the bill, (H.R. 1775), 
to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1998 for intelligence and 
intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the 
Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency 
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, had come to 
no resolution thereon.

                          ____________________