Congressional Record, Volume 143 Issue 94 (Monday, July 7, 1997)

[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 94 (Monday, July 7, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S6877-S6906]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will now resume consideration of S.
936, which the clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (S. 936) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year
1998 for military activities of the Department of Defense,
for military construction, and for defense activities of the
Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for
such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other
purposes.

The Senate resumed consideration of the bill.
Pending:

Cochran/Durbin amendment No. 420, to require a license to
export computers with composite theoretical performance equal
to or greater than 2,000 million theoretical operations per
second.
Grams Amendment No. 422 (to amendment No. 420), to require
the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct a
study on the availability and potential risks relating to the
sale of certain computers.
Coverdell (for Inhofe/Coverdell/Cleland) amendment No. 423,
to define depot-level maintenance and repair, to limit
contracting for depot-level maintenance and repair at
installations approved for closure or realignment in 1995,
and to modify authorities and requirements relating to the
performance of core logistics functions.

Mr. LUGAR addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana is recognized.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, momentarily, when the draft of my amendment
arrives, I will send it to the desk. For the moment, I will simply
mention that the amendment I am about to offer, I will offer on behalf
of myself, Senator Bingaman, Senator Domenici, and Senator Levin.
Mr. President, I indicate that additional original cosponsors will be
Senators Hagel, Jeffords, Chafee, Specter, D'Amato, Frist, Gorton,
Snowe, Collins, Kennedy, Biden, Kerrey of Nebraska, Lieberman, Byrd,
Reed of Rhode Island, Daschle, and Robb.
I want to especially recognize Senator Domenici for his contribution
to our work on this amendment.
Mr. President, let me state at the outset that Congress established,
in 1991, with strong bipartisan support, what is known as the Nunn-
Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, the CTR.
Last year, the Senate, in a 96 to 0 vote, amended and enlarged this
important program through the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation entitled
the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act.
The CTR program at the Department of Defense, along with its
companion programs at the Department of Energy--namely, the Materials
Protection Control and Accounting Program [MPC&A] and the International
Nuclear Safety Program--have played significant roles in our efforts to
reduce the risk to the United States from loose nukes and the dangers
inherent in the operations of Soviet-designed nuclear reactors.
Each of these programs plays a key role in enhancing stability around
the world and contributes to circumscribing the threats that emanate
from weapons and materials of mass destruction.
The defense authorization bill for fiscal year 1998, as reported out
of the Committee on Armed Services, cut the funding for the Cooperative
Threat Reduction Program and the Materials Protection, Control and
Accounting Program and totally eliminated all funding for the
International Nuclear Safety Program.
Our amendment is designed to restore the funding cuts in these three
programs.

reduction in the ctr request

Mr. President, the Armed Services Committee has recommended a cut of
$60 million in the President's request of $382.2 million for the fiscal
year 1998 for the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. The sponsors of
this amendment believe that this is a mistake.
The Nunn-Lugar program's impact on the threat posed by former Soviet
weapons of mass destruction can be measured in the 81 ICBM's destroyed,
125 ICBM silos eliminated, 20 bombers destroyed, 64 SLBM launchers
eliminated, 58 nuclear test tunnels sealed, and the 4,500 warheads
taken off strategic systems aimed at us--Mr. President, let me repeat
that, 4,500 former Soviet warheads which were pointed at the United
States have been removed by the Nunn-Lugar program--all at a

[[Page S6878]]

cost of less than one-third of 1 percent of the Department of Defense's
annual budget. Without our Cooperation Threat Reduction Program,
Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus would still have thousands of nuclear
weapons. Instead, all three countries are nuclear-weapons-free.
Although the CTR Program has accomplished much, much work essential
to U.S. national security interests remains to be done. This includes:
The elimination of ICBM's, SLBM's, and heavy bombers as required
under the START I Treaty, followed by START II and perhaps START III;
increase safety and security for the transport and storage of remaining
Russian nuclear warheads; an end to production of weapons-grade
plutonium; chemical weapons reduction; and other efforts to reduce
weapons of mass destruction in the former Soviet Union and the threat
of proliferation.
The President's fiscal year 1998 budget request of $382.2 million was
a bare-bones request based on a difficult prioritization of potential
projects.
Stated simply, Mr. President, there are tens of things which need to
be done, a long list prioritized and squeezed into the $382.2 million
bare bones request. Many programs that the Congress supported in the
past failed to make the list. Indeed, there are several key projects
that cannot be funded even at the $382.2 million level which would
accelerate our strategic arms elimination programs in Russia and
Ukraine.

I am told that the committee reduction in the President's request was
motivated in part because:
Unobligated moneys remain for Belarus, which cannot be spent as long
as that country has not been recertified for the CTR program; the
Government of Japan has suggested it might purchase fissile material
containers for a major CTR project at Mayak in Russia, thereby freeing
up some CTR funds previously planned for that project; and finally,
unobligated funds for the Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs.

In fact, Mr. President, there are no extra funds available. There are
no unobligated funds that have not been designated for specific
projects and specific countries.

Belarus Decertification

The decision by the President not to recertify Belarus for the time
being resulted in $37.2 million that cannot be obligated until Belarus
is certified. The Department of Defense plans to use $15 million of
this sum to partially fund a classified project that has been briefed
to Members and notified to the Congress. A copy of that notification is
available in S-407 for any Member to read. The remainder of the Belarus
funds are intended to remain in reserve to implement previously
notified projects in Belarus in the event that Belarus is recertified
in fiscal year 1998.
Mr. President, I support the maintenance of these funds in a reserve
to implement previously notified projects. Even though the SS-25's have
left Belarus for Russia, much remains to be done in the area of
strategic system infrastructure elimination. SS-25's are mobile; they
could be returned under certain circumstances. Thus, while Belarus is
currently nuclear weapons free, much remains to be done to insure that
it remains in that status.

Japanese Container Purchase

The Japanese are negotiating with the United States manufacturer,
Westinghouse, to purchase some fissile material storage containers for
a storage facility at Mayak, Russia. This project is a major component
of the CTR program. While the Department of Defense is not yet certain
how many, if any, the Japanese will purchase, it could be that a
Japanese purchase would decrease the DOD requirements for container
purchases by as much as $15 million. Accordingly, the Department of
Defense plans to use this $15 million to augment some of the funds from
the Belarus account for the classified project. The remaining fiscal
year 1997 container funding in the amount of $23.5 million are being
notified to Congress to enable purchase of containers to complete the
50,000 container requirement.
In short, Mr. President, the Congress has been notified on a new,
classified nonproliferation project which will use all of the CTR funds
no longer needed for fissile material container, and many of the
obligated funds previously planned for Belarus in the event Belarus is
not recertified. This project is important and time-sensitive and
deserves our support.

Unobligated CTR Funds

Mr. President, the issue of unobligated CTR funds is an annual one.
Inevitable delays in obligating funds in a given fiscal year result
from the annual certification process, a very complicated process from
the beginning of the nonnuclear legislative efforts in 1991.
For example, the Department of Defense did not have authority to
spend fiscal year 1997 CTR funds until April 1997, following completion
of the certification process and notification to Congress of intent to
obligate the fiscal year 1997 funds.
Mr. President, this means simply that well over half of the year was
consumed due to the legislative requirements of the certification
process and the notification of intent to Congress.
Over the life of the CTR Program, DOD has notified to the Congress
intent to obligate approximately $1.8 billion. Of this amount, $1.3
billion has been obligated, and an additional $38.5 million soon will
be notified. Therefore, DOD has $513 million--not $700 million--in
currently unobligated CTR funds.
For fiscal year 1997, DOD has so far obligated $208 million, with
plans to obligate another $200 million by the end of the fiscal year.
As defined in the CTR Multi-year Program Plan reported to Congress
earlier this month, the remaining $313 million in unobligated funds
have been committed to specific countries by signed agreement and are
earmarked for specific CTR projects. For example, we have agreements
and have earmarked funds for SS-18 ICBM elimination in Russia and SS-24
elimination in Ukraine.
The bottom line, Mr. President, is that execution of these funds has
been thoroughly planned, and agreements with recipient nations have
been signed to allow this assistance for eliminating these strategic
systems to proceed per the DOD plan.

the material protection, control, and accounting program

Mr. President, let me turn to the second program for which we seek to
restore full funding through this amendment--this is, the Material
Protection, Control, and Accounting Program.
Mr. President, most Members can appreciate the direct benefits to our
security from assisting in the elimination of strategic weapons systems
targeted on the United States. Perhaps more difficult to comprehend is
the threat posed by the potential leakage of weapons-grade nuclear
materials.
The Material Protection, Control, and Accounting Program seeks to
secure hundreds of tons of weapons-usable nuclear materials in the
former Soviet Union and elsewhere which are inadequately secured and
are at risk of falling into the hands of criminal elements, terrorist
organizations and rogue states. In sort, this programs works to prevent
the theft or diversion of weapons-usable materials--plutonium and
highly enriched uranium.
The Department of Energy, in cooperation with Russia, the newly
independent states, and the Baltic States, has put in place equipment
at 18 sites to safeguard plutonium and weapons-usable uranium, and
agreements are in place to enhance safety and security at over 30
additional sites, including research laboratories and storage sites. If
this program is reduced by the $25 million recommended by the
committee, there would be delays of at least 2 years in securing these
sites and an estimated increased cost of $70 million.
In short, Mr. President, after a slow start in the early 1990's,
MPC&A improvements are now underway at over 50 sites in Russia, the new
independent states, and the Baltic States. Let me give some specific
examples: MPC&A upgrades at Obninsk and Kurchatov in Russia have
radically improved security for several tons of weapons-usable
material; upgraded MPC&A systems for all weapons-usable nuclear
materials in Latvia, Lithuania, Uzbekistan, Georgia, and Belarus are
complete; nuclear material detectors have been installed at all
pedestrian pathways at the Siberian Chemical Combine (Tomsk-7) and the
Chelyabinsk-70 nuclear weapons design institute. These monitors provide
a major improvement to the security of many tons of weapons-usable
nuclear material at these

[[Page S6879]]

sites; a national MPC&A training center has been established at
Obninsk, Russia, with support from DOE and the European Union; by the
end of this month, more than 1,000 nuclear specialists from the former
Soviet Union will have participated in MPC&A training courses and
technical exchanges under the auspices of the program; work is underway
to strengthen Russia's nuclear regulatory system; and MPC&A upgrades
for the Russian Navy, some 8 to 10 facilities in 1998, the icebreaker
fleet, and for nuclear materials during transportation are underway at
several sites.

Mr. President, it is noteworthy that the National Research Council
recently completed an independent external assessment of this MPC&A
program, and the National Research Council concluded; and I quote:

U.S. commitment to the program should be sustained and
funding should be continued at least at the level of FY 1996
(funding) for several more years, and increased if high-
impact opportunities arise.

In short, the Energy Department through this program has enhanced the
security surrounding hundreds of tons of nuclear weapons material, but
the vast majority of material remains poorly secured.
Mr. President, fiscal year 1998 is one of the peak-activity years for
the program, with work in progress at all large Russian nuclear sites
compromising many hundreds of tons of highly enriched uranium and
plutonium. If we reduce the fiscal year 1998 budget by $25 million, it
would kill program momentum, a momentum based on years of negotiations,
confidence building, and windows of opportunity.
Mr. President, if we do not restore these program cuts, then I fear
that work that has already been done to secure U.S. security interests
and establish project foundations would need to be done again at
considerable financial, time, and political costs. These costs would be
especially great for the high-priority dismantlement and navy sites
that we are attempting to secure. For example, security of fresh highly
enriched uranium naval fuels is at a crucial stage. It is the largest
project with the Russian Ministry of Defense--a key player in the
overall nuclear-material security picture. It is crucial to maintain
the program momentum. Security upgrades at the first facility are
underway, and 6 to 12 additional facilities will be targeted in the
1998-2002 timeframe.
Mr. President, the bottom line is that, in my judgment, the MPC&A
Program is one of the two most critical programs the U.S. Government
conducts for ensuring the strategic national security of this country.
It ranks alongside the equally critical Stockpile Stewardship Program
for maintaining the credibility and reliability of the U.S. nuclear
deterrent.

International Nuclear Safety Program

Last, Mr. President, our amendment seeks to restore funds to the
International Nuclear Safety Program. The Department of Energy is
working with the international community to increase nuclear safety
worldwide, particularly in those countries of Eastern and Central
Europe and the former Soviet Union that operate Soviet-design nuclear
reactors.
The program's focus is on projects that improve the operation,
physical condition, and safety culture at nuclear power plants; the
establishment of nuclear safety centers in the United States and
countries of the former Soviet Union; and technical leadership to
promote sound management of nuclear materials and facilities.
Mr. President, by way of background, it should be noted that the 1986
Chernobyl nuclear reactor disaster highlighted the dangers associated
with all operating Soviet-designed nuclear power reactors, particularly
those of the older, Chernobyl-type design. The safety of these reactors
is very much in the interest of the United States. Another nuclear
accident could well destabilize political and economic conditions in
the nascent democracies of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
and cost the United States vast sums in relief assistance.
This International Nuclear Safety initiative is designed to address,
through cooperative and technical innovation, the serious global
problems in the interrelated fields of nuclear safety and
nonproliferation. This activity involves engineers, manufacturers, and
scientists from many countries, and upon the DOE expertise in nuclear
matters and our national laboratories to conduct this cooperation.
Thus far, Mr. President, the Department of Energy has implemented
under this program more than 150 plant-specific safety projects,
involving 17 plant sites throughout the former Soviet Union and Eastern
and Central Europe, eight design and scientific institutes, and 21
United States commercial companies. Already, under this program, a
number of key activities have been completed, including:
Establishing nuclear safety training centers in Russia and Ukraine;
transferring United States-style emergency operating procedures to a
major Russian plant; completing nuclear safety system improvements at
three Russian plants; and establishing the Ukraine International
Research Center on Nuclear Safety, Radioactive Waste, and Radioecology.
Mr. President, this last program activity is particularly important.
The objectives of the Ukraine Center, located near the Chernobyl plant,
include: Providing support for safety improvements for all nuclear
power plants in Ukraine; to providing a focal point for international
cooperation in addressing the environmental, health and safety issues
created by the Chernobyl accident; and reducing the socioeconomic
impacts of closing the Chernobyl plant.
Mr. President, the Department of Energy also implements the United
States program to assist Ukraine in shutting down the Chernobyl nuclear
power plant, including measures for dealing with the deteriorating
sarcophagus covering the damaged unit. These activities, however, are
funded through another program.
Mr. President, unless we restore the moneys to this program as this
amendment seeks to do, we will be unable to proceed with some priority
activities in 1998, that include:
Management and operational safety improvements at Soviet-designed
nuclear power sites; engineering and technology upgrades at Soviet-
designed nuclear power sites; additional detailed plant-specific safety
assessments; assistance in the development of an independent nuclear
regulator; and support for international nuclear safety data exchanges
and cooperative research and development between the Russian
International Nuclear Safety Center and the United States Center at
Argonne National Laboratory in Idaho.
This program is part of a larger international effort designed to
reduce the risks inherent in these Soviet-designed reactors in the near
term and to assist Russia and the newly independent states to implement
self-sustaining nuclear safety programs and to achieve international
nuclear reactor safety norms.
Mr. President, I cannot assure this body that if we fully restore the
funding for this program, another Chernobyl will never take place. But
I can say that this program request is one of the best policy
instruments available to reduce the risk that the world will face
another Chernobyl-like disaster.
In summary, our proposed amendment would restore the cuts made by the
committee to these programs: $60 million in the cooperative threat
reduction programs; $25 million to the MPC&A Program; and $50 million
to the International Nuclear Safety Program.
In my view, failure to restore these funds to these important
programs could have severe consequences. It could diminish our ability
to further reduce the prospect that terrorist or rogue states would
acquire weapons-grade material; it could diminish our ability to assist
in the permanent removal of missiles, launchers, and other delivery
vehicles from the former Soviet strategic arsenal; and it could
handcuff our ability, in cooperation with others, to improve operating
safety at high-risk nuclear reactor sites in the former Soviet Union
and elsewhere, and thus dramatically reduce the risk of further
Chernobyls.
I am most hopeful that all of my colleagues will support this
amendment.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to lay aside the Grams
amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Thomas). Without objection, it is so
ordered.

[[Page S6880]]

Amendment No. 658

(Purpose: To increase (with offsets) the funding, and to improve the
authority, for cooperative threat reduction programs and related
Department of Energy programs)

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I send my amendment to the desk and ask
unanimous consent it be made in order.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk
will report.
The bill clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Indiana [Mr. Lugar], for himself, Mr.
Hagel, Mr. Jeffords, Mr. Chafee, Mr. Specter, Mr. D'Amato,
Mr. Frist, Mr. Gorton, Ms. Snowe, Ms. Collins, Mr. Kennedy,
Mr. Biden, Mr. Kerrey, Mr. Lieberman, Mr. Byrd, Mr. Reed, Mr.
Daschle, Mr. Robb, Mr. Bingaman, Mr. Domenici, and Mr. Levin
proposes an amendment numbered 658.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the
amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
On page 272, between lines 1 and 2, insert the following:

SEC. 1009. COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAMS AND RELATED
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY PROGRAMS.

(a) Decrease in Authorization of Appropriations for
Environmental Management Science Program.--Notwithstanding
any other provision of this Act, the amount authorized to be
appropriated by section 3102(f) is hereby decreased by
$40,000,000.
(b) Decrease in Authorization of Appropriations for
Environment, Safety and Health, Defense.--Notwithstanding any
other provision of this Act, the amount authorized to be
appropriated by section 3103(6) is hereby decreased by
$19,000,000.
(c) Decrease in Authorization of Appropriations for Other
Procurement, Navy.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
this Act, the amount authorized to be appropriated by section
102(c)(5) is hereby decreased by $56,000,000.
(d) Decrease in Authorization of Appropriations for
Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide.--Notwithstanding any
other provision of law, the amount authorized to be
appropriated by section 301(5) is hereby decreased by
$20,000,000.
(e) Increase in Authorization of Appropriations for Former
Soviet Union Threat Reduction Programs.--Notwithstanding any
other provision of this Act, the amount authorized to be
appropriated by section 301(22) is hereby increased by
$60,000,000.
(f) Increase in Authorization of Appropriations for
Department of Energy for Other Defense Activities.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the total
amount authorized to be appropriated by section 3103 is
hereby increased by $56,000,000.
(g) Increase in Authorization of Appropriations for
Department of Energy for Arms Controls.--Notwithstanding any
other provision of this Act, the amount authorized to be
appropriated by section 3103(1)(B) is hereby increased by
$25,000,000 (in addition to any increase under subsection (e)
that is allocated to the authorization of appropriations
under such section 3103(1)(B)).
(h) Authorization of Appropriations for Department of
Energy for International Nuclear Safety Programs.--Funds are
hereby authorized to be appropriated to the Department of
Energy for fiscal year 1998 for other defense activities in
carrying out programs relating to international nuclear
safety that are necessary for national security in the amount
of $50,000,000.
(i) Training for United States Border Security.--Section
1421 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1997 (Public Law 104-201; 110 Stat. 2725; 50 U.S.C.
2331) is amended--
(1) by striking out ``and'' at the end of paragraph (2);
(2) by striking out the period at the end of paragraph (3)
and inserting in lieu thereof ``; and''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``(4) training programs and assistance relating to the use
of such equipment, materials, and technology and for the
development of programs relating to such use.''.
(j) International Border Security Through Fiscal Year
1999.--Section 1424(b) of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (110 Stat. 2726; 10 U.S.C. 2333(b))
is amended by adding at the end the following: ``Amounts
available under the proceeding sentence shall be available
until September 30, 1999.''.
(j) Authority To Vary Amounts Available for Cooperative
Threat Reduction Programs.--(1) Section 1502(b) of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (110
Stat. 2732) is amended--
(A) in the subsection heading, by striking out ``Limited'';
and
(B) in the first sentence of paragraph (1), by striking out
``, but not in excess of 115 percent of that amount''.
(2) Section 1202(b) of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Public Law 104-106; 110 Stat. 469)
is amended--
(A) in the subsection heading, by striking out ``Limited'';
and
(B) in the first sentence of paragraph (1), by striking out
``, but not in excess of 115 percent of that amount''.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I thank the Chair, I thank Members for
allowing me to offer this important amendment at this time, and I
reiterate my hopes that all colleagues will support this activity. I
point out the debate describes the substantial achievements of the
cooperative threat reduction programs. The difficulty is always getting
moneys through the pipeline, but I believe the statement I have given
is self-explanatory with regard to these major issues.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I wonder if the Senator from Indiana would
respond to this question before I make my own statement in strong
support of his amendment, in gratitude for his amendment, and his
leadership in this area. Did I understand the Senator said that he
asked consent to lay his amendment aside?
Mr. LUGAR. No. May I respond to the distinguished Senator. I asked
the Grams amendment be laid aside and then, having gotten agreement by
the Chair, I sent my amendment to the desk and asked for unanimous
consent it be made in order, which the Chair granted.
Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Senator. We are hopeful this amendment can be
accepted, so I am glad this amendment would not be laid aside. Again, I
commend the Senator from Indiana for the extraordinary leadership that
he and Senator Nunn, when Senator Nunn was in this body, have shown in
this area which contributes so much to the security of this Nation.
One of the most cost-effective and successful defense programs that
we have to reduce threats to our country and to enhance our national
security is the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program that Senator Lugar
and Senator Nunn started in 1991. This program at the Department of
Defense, and its companion programs at the Department of Energy, have
produced important results in reducing the threat of proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons and their materials. I was disappointed that the bill before
the Senate, as it came before the Senate, does not authorize the
funding level requested by the administration for these important
programs, so I fully support the Lugar amendment.
In addition to commending Senator Lugar, I particularly want to
commend Senator Bingaman for his effort to restore these funds during
the Armed Services Committee markup process. Since 1991, these threat
reduction programs helped three Newly Independent States, Ukraine,
Belarus, and Kazakhstan, to completely rid themselves of some 6,000
nuclear weapons that they inherited from the former Soviet Union. The
CTR programs have also permitted Russia to implement the START I treaty
ahead of schedule, helping eliminate over 800 Russian nuclear missiles
and bombers. These are weapons that will never again threaten the
United States.
The Department of Energy has worked to secure tons of nuclear weapons
materials, primarily plutonium and highly enriched uranium, that were
and to a significant extent still are under inadequate safeguards and
vulnerable to theft or diversion. Keeping these dangerous materials out
of the hands of would-be proliferators reduces the likelihood that
nuclear weapons will threaten us. There is just no more important thing
that we can do for our Nation's security than to secure these nuclear
materials and to eliminate these missiles.
The job, though, is only partly finished, and much more needs to be
done. That is why it was so disappointing that the committee bill
reduced the budget request for these programs by $135 million,
including a reduction of $60 million for the Department of Defense
cooperative threat reduction programs; a reduction of $25 million for
the Department of Energy Materials Protection, Control and Accounting
Program; and a reduction of $50 million, which was the total amount
requested for the DOE International Nuclear Safety Program.
Given the great concern that the committee has appropriately
expressed for the danger of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons
and materials and the committee's interest in taking steps to reduce
this danger, those reductions were surprising indeed. In my view we
should be considering what additional efforts we can take to reduce
these threats. While the threat from such proliferation is more likely
and immediate than the threat from a ballistic missile attack on the
United

[[Page S6881]]

States, Congress has pushed to increase funding for national missile
defense while reducing funding for cooperative threat reduction. We are
underfunding the latter program at our clear peril.
There are numerous cooperative threat reduction programs that need to
be funded on an urgent basis. For example, Ukraine decided in mid-May
to eliminate all of its SS-24 intercontinental ballistic missiles, a
decision which the United States encouraged and welcomed. We should
help Ukraine eliminate these missiles so that they can never again be
used.
Furthermore, there remain large quantities of nuclear materials that
need to be secured and accounted for. The list of unfunded cooperative
threat reduction and related DOE projects is long and it represents an
urgent opportunity for the United States to take tangible and permanent
steps to reduce threats to our security. For a tiny fraction of the
defense budget we can accomplish extraordinary gains. The proliferation
in nuclear safety problems remains considerably larger and more serious
than the response has been so far.

One of the allegations which was made which supported these cuts in
committee was that there was $700 million in unobligated cooperative
threat reduction funds floating around, and thus it was argued that the
cooperative threat reduction programs could absorb a $60 million cut.
But that is not the case. The cooperative threat reduction has $513
million in unobligated funds but of this, $200 million will be
obligated by the end of the year and all of the remaining $313 million
has been committed to specific countries by signed agreements.
On another part of this program, which was the reduction in the DOE
Materials Protection, Control and Accounting Program, by the end of
June 1997, all of the fiscal year 1997 funds were obligated and sent to
the laboratories for implementation. The assumption that the 1998
fiscal year request can be reduced and offset with uncosted balances
from fiscal year 1997 or fiscal year 1996 without programmatic impact
is incorrect. The net result of a reduction of fiscal year 1998 funds
would be a reduction in the planned programmatic activities. There is a
critical need for this program. The materials protection, control and
accounting programs have a clear and direct relationship to the
national security policy of reducing the amount of fissile material
available for threat or diversion.
So, I hope we can be fully up to the challenge of taking advantage of
this opportunity to eliminate some of the most serious threats to our
security. In order to take advantage of this opportunity, we must at
least fully fund these threat-reduction and safety programs at the
requested level. I hope in the future the administration and the
Congress will agree to provide higher levels of funding for these
programs, which, again, are as important to our national security as
any programs that I know. So, I am pleased to join as a cosponsor of
the Lugar amendment and I hope all of our colleagues will support this
amendment.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, behind me are some charts that may help
Members understand the issues that we are discussing today. I cited, in
my opening statement, as did the distinguished Senator from Michigan,
the extraordinary work that has been done with cooperative threat
reduction over the years. This chart makes it graphically clear--4,500
warheads deactivated. The background of this situation was one that, at
the end of the Soviet Union, the time of the dissolution of the Soviet
Union, a number of military officers came to this country from Russia,
a number came from Ukraine and Belarus, Kazakhstan and other new
states--but the four that I cite originally were all nuclear states,
and the questions they posed to the administration of our country and
Members of Congress who are interested in this, was strictly, we
believe--they said, ``You have a vested interest in working with us to
deactivate warheads,'' and indeed we did. Mr. President, these 4,500
warheads that have been deactivated were all aimed at us. That is the
heart of the cooperative threat reduction programs--cooperation in
reducing the threat to us, of warheads aimed at us.
Likewise, 99 ICBM's have been destroyed. They are no longer in the
picture at all, in the process of working through, especially, the
nonnuclear status for Ukraine, for Kazakhstan; 140 ICBM silos have been
eliminated, they are totally out of the picture, in cooperative threat
reduction; 20 bombers have been destroyed, and so forth.
From time to time over the 6 years of the cooperative threat Nunn-
Lugar reduction program debates, Members come on this scene--perhaps
new to the entire argument--and ask why are we spending money in
Russia? Why are we working with Russians on nuclear matters? Mr.
President, we are working with Russians to destroy ICBM's, silos,
warheads that are aimed at us. In my judgment we ought to do as much of
this as we can. I would simply say the thought that some moneys might
be nibbled away from the program simply does not meet the security
needs of our country. Clearly, we ought to have a high-priority
reactivation of all projects that will lead to our security in this
area.
Mr. President, let me describe a process that has been discussed in
each of the last 6 years. It is namely how do you get from the priority
of what you want to do, to money that is available, obligated, and
spent? The cooperative threat reduction programs each year have many
challenges to overcome before funds can be obligated. In my opening
statement I cited the fact it was April of this year before the funds
the Congress appropriated last October could get into action. Why?
Because, from the very beginning of the Nunn-Lugar CTR program, an
extraordinary number of procedural challenges have been placed in the
legislation.
They were placed there by those who were, frankly, skeptical that
money ought to be spent with the Russians for any purpose. But, in any
event, by April of this year, we finally had gone through all the hoops
of that situation.
The program requires government-to-government agreement, negotiations
then with Russia, with Ukraine, with Kazakhstan, with Belarus, to
establish the legal framework for each of these transactions. Each of
the implementing agreements has to be negotiated for each project with
the ministry responsible in that country for the project.
Once the agreements are in place by country, by project, by ministry,
then a definition phase of the project can begin and that can be
lengthy as the Department of Defense negotiates the details with the
recipient country.
Then a contracting process follows. The Department of Defense uses
its standard Federal acquisition regulations for all CTR assistance,
normally contracting with United States firms to provide that
assistance. That assistance mandates free and open competition and
maximum protection of taxpayer dollars, but it is lengthy, Mr.
President, having gone through all the hoops of the implementing
arrangements and the requirement definitions, then the contracting
process, identically the same as it is with the Department of Defense
for everything else in the world with U.S. firms, open competition. All
of that must occur.
Finally, on an annual basis, DOD must certify the recipient nations
are still eligible. We have heard now that Belarus is not, for a
variety of reasons, but may become eligible again as its politics and
situation may change. Our security problems, with regard to Belarus and
those weapons, have not changed, I might add. But once certification,
again, is complete, DOD must notify Congress in considerable detail as
to how it intends to obligate the appropriated funds. After that
notification, and only after that notification, can new agreements of
amendments to the existing implementing agreements be negotiated, and
only then can DOD obligate the funds which begin the procurement cycle.
Mr. President, from time to time during this 6-year period of time,
this lengthy process of certification and notification and
renegotiation and bidding and notification of Congress has taken so
long that the whole fiscal year is complete, appropriations committees
have taken the moneys off the table, and we go back through the whole
process of reappropriating what already had been appropriated.
I do not argue with the procedures. I simply say they are tediously
careful

[[Page S6882]]

to make sure that everybody has a very good idea of precisely what is
occurring, how U.S. firms, in competition with each other, might deal
with it and with full notification of the Congress of all of this.
I reiterated this because I heard in the distinguished other body
debate during which it was blandly asserted that there is plenty of
money in the pipeline. The argument in the other body no longer
centered around the validity of the program but simply said there is
lots of money available, no need, really, to further appropriate any
more.
I am asserting there is no more money available, as a matter of fact,
for a long list of priority things our country should do for our own
security, and to nibble away and cut pieces here and there is not in
our national interest, it is not good public policy, and that is why it
is time to take time to simply reiterate, through the charts, that
dollar for dollar, year for year the money is obligated, it is called
for, it is spoken for, it is competed for, and it is examined.
Mr. President, we ought to get on with the process so that there is
no ambiguity if we want to continue to work with the Russians to
destroy ICBM's, take warheads off ICBM's, if we want to contain fissile
material that is dangerous, if we want to work with Chernobyl-type
reactors so they don't explode, not only creating damage in the
countries in which the explosion occurs, but through the fallout damage
throughout the world.
This is grim and serious business. For these reasons, I really ask
strong support of our amendment. I thank the Chair.
Mr. BINGAMAN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.
Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I want to speak briefly in support of
this amendment that Senator Lugar has offered and commend him for his
leadership on this very important issue. Senator Lugar and Senator Nunn
established this program, promoted this program, and have led the
Senate in gaining support for this program over these last several
years. I see it as one of the few shining examples that we can point to
to indicate that we are aware of the new reality, the new post-cold-war
reality that we face with Russia and with other former Soviet Union
countries.
Let me briefly describe, as Senator Lugar has and Senator Levin has,
what the amendment does. It would add or restore to the bill before us
amounts that were cut at the subcommittee level to get it back to the
level of funding that the administration requested in three different
areas. One is what is referred to as MPC&A funds--that stands for
materials protection control and accounting funds--for the Department
of Energy. The second is $50 million being restored for the
International Nuclear Safety Program, again, in the Department of
Energy. And the third item is $60 million that is being restored in the
cooperative threat reduction programs which are operated and
administered by the Department of Defense.

Mr. President, the legislative provisions that accompany this provide
greater flexibility in administering the CTR Program. They allow fiscal
year 1997 funds for international border security to be available for
obligation for 3 years and allow the Customs Service to use fiscal year
1997 funds that were provided to purchase new equipment to also be used
to provide assistance to employees to allow that new equipment to be
fully integrated into the operations of the Customs Service.
This amendment and the funds that these programs contain are intended
to reduce the danger of so-called loose nukes, or nuclear weapons that
might fall into the hands of terrorists, might fall into the hands of
people not authorized to have those weapons; also, to help reduce the
danger that fissile material, material that is essential to making of
new nuclear weapons, not fall into those same hands. The funds are
intended to help destroy ICBM silos and launchers in the former Soviet
Union and to generally help reduce the risk in the near term from the
operation of Soviet-designed nuclear powerplants.
Mr. President, the arguments have been well laid out by Senator Lugar
and Senator Levin, as well. This is a program that has accomplished a
tremendous amount already in reducing the risk of nuclear weapons.
I had the good fortune earlier this year, about 2 months ago, to
travel to Russia and to visit some of the facilities that we are
spending funds at to work on these cooperative programs with the
Russians. I traveled there with Mr. Paul Robinson, who is head of
Sandia National Laboratory, and with others who work with him at Sandia
National Laboratory on these cooperative threat reduction programs and
Department of Energy programs. I also traveled there with others from
the Department of Energy Los Alamos National Laboratory. The general
impression I received in visiting Chelyabinsk-70, which is one of the
closed cities that the Russians established in order to develop and
promote their nuclear weapons activity, the general impression was that
these funds are being extremely well used and are, in fact, increasing
the security that surrounds fissile materials and other materials that
could be used in connection with nuclear weapons.
We met with Minister Mikhaylov who is head of the Ministry of Atomic
Energy, MINATOM, and, again, I was impressed with the willingness to
continue the cooperation to work with our own Department of Energy in
making progress on these programs.
We met with admirals from the Russian Navy. They have a very
significant problem of fresh uranium that can be used as fuel in their
nuclear reactors, how to secure that, how to protect it from possible
seizure by terrorists. They clearly wanted our help. They are obtaining
our help. They need substantially more help in the years ahead. I felt
good about the level of cooperation that is occurring there.
My general conclusion from the trip was the same as the one stated by
Senator Lugar in his statement earlier, and that is that there is a
long list of useful projects that funds in these programs can be put
to. We are not short of useful activities to work on. The contrary is
the case. There are a great many things that the Russians need to do to
protect and to reduce the risk of theft of nuclear materials. We are
just now beginning to make serious progress on that. The funds that
will be restored by this amendment are essential to making that
progress. I very much believe that when you look at the entire U.S.
defense budget and say, which of the funds are the most cost-effective,
where are we getting the most national security return for the dollars
spent, the funds being spent in these programs are clearly very high on
that list.
So I urge my colleagues to support this amendment, and I hope that we
can get a unanimous vote. This is a program that needs bipartisan
support. This is not a program that should become the subject of
partisan dispute in the U.S. Senate. It is too important to our safety
and to our future and to the future of the world for us to find
ourselves in some kind of partisan dispute over funds like this or
programs like these.
Mr. President, in concluding, I ask unanimous consent that a letter
to me from the Secretary of Energy, Federico Pena, dated June 19,
expressing his strong support for this amendment be printed in the
Record.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:

The Secretary of Energy,

Washington, DC, June 19, 1997.
Hon. Jeff Bingaman,
Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Bingaman: I am writing to offer my strong
support for an amendment that I understand will be offered in
the Senate to restore the Administration's budget request for
the Department of Energy's Materials Protection, Control and
Accounting and International Nuclear Safety programs.
Additionally, I support restoration of funds for the
Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction program.
These programs serve vital U.S. national security interests
and seek to forestall the far greater costs that could result
from inadequately secured nuclear material and weapons or a
nuclear accident like Chornobyl.
The Materials Protection Control and Accounting (MPC&A)
program is working to secure hundreds of tons of weapon-
usable nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union that are
inadequately secured and at risk of falling into the hands of
criminal elements, terrorist organizations and rogue nations.
If the program were reduced by $25 million as recommended by
the Committee, there will

[[Page S6883]]

be a significant increase in total program costs and a delay
in achieving the program objectives by approximately two
years. Time and program momentum matter. Less than three
years ago, we secured kilograms of material at one site in
Russia. Today, the MPC&A program has secured tens of tons of
material at 25 sites, and is working at a total of 50 sites
where nuclear material is at risk in Russia, the Newly
Independent States, and the Baltics. However, unless funds
are restored to this program, the work that could secure
hundreds of tons of nuclear material at the largest defense-
related sites will be in jeopardy. I urge your support for
full funding to continue this vital work.
The International Nuclear Safety program is the best policy
instrument available to ensure that the world will not face
another Chornobyl-like disaster. It is vital to our overall
national security goal of helping to stabilize the former
Soviet Union. It supports the independence of Ukraine and
Lithuania and the emerging free market democracies of Central
and Eastern Europe. The focus is on projects that improve the
operation and physical condition of nuclear power plants in
the region. The program also enhances the nuclear safety
culture and regulatory infrastructure of countries with
Soviet designed reactors. Such reactors left behind by the
Soviet government continue to operate with deficiencies that,
if not corrected, could result in a serious nuclear accident
that would severely impact the region's political and
economic stability, the environment and our national
interests. Restoration of the $50 million program request is
essential to help prevent that from happening.
The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program has been
essential to destroying and dismantling hundreds of ballistic
missile launchers, silos, heavy bombers and removal of
warheads from strategic systems. Without this program,
Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakstan might retain nuclear weapons,
instead of being nuclear weapons free. The CTR program also
supports implementation of an agreement between the U.S. and
Russia to ensure that production of weapons-grade plutonium
in Russia is stopped by converting the three plutonium
production reactors exclusively to a power-producing mode. I
support the complete restoration of funds to this vitally
important program.
In each of the three areas mentioned, the costs of
preventive are much less than the costs of inaction. I urge
you to uphold America's leadership, interests and commitments
by preserving and fully funding these essential programs.
Sincerely,
Federico Pena.

Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, 6 years ago, the Congress voted to take
some dramatic steps to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism when it
approved the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program--CTR.
Since that time, as a result of work being done by CTR programs, over
1,400 nuclear warheads that were aimed at the United States or our
allies have been removed; 64 submarine ballistic missile launchers have
been eliminated; 54 intercontinental ballistic missile silos, 61 SS-18
ICBM's, and 23 strategic bombers have been eliminated. Today, Ukraine,
Belarus, and Kazakhstan no longer have any nuclear weapons with which
to threaten the United States or our allies.
Support for the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program has run high and
enjoys bipartisan support. Last year in the Senate, in a 96-to-0 vote,
we enacted the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Defense Against Weapons of Mass
Destruction. This program and its companion programs in the Department
of Energy have repeatedly withstood attempts to undo the progress that
has been made in reducing the threat of nuclear terror. Legislators
from both sides of the aisle are able to see the important benefits to
the United States, and to understand the need to move beyond cold war
attitudes that prevent us from meeting today's national security needs
to prevent nuclear terrorism.
This year, the Senate Armed Services Committee voted along partisan
lines to cut $135 million from the CTR Program, the Materials
Protection Control and Accounting Program, and the International
Nuclear Safety Program. The benefits gained from those programs are so
important that I must appeal to my colleagues on the floor of the
Senate to restore those funds so we can continue the valuable work
being done to minimize the possibility that some person or some rogue
country could threaten the United States or any other nation with
nuclear weapons.
I've already mentioned some of the benefits gained through the CTR
Program. Much more work remains to be done to dismantle Russian missile
launchers, silos, and aircraft. I urge my colleagues to continue to
support this program which reduces the threat to the United States in
such a direct manner. The $60 million cut by partisan vote in the
committee should be restored in order to continue work that is
essential to our national security interests.
The Materials Protection Control and Accounting--MPC&A--Program in
the Department of Energy--DOE--is intended to prevent theft of
smuggling of nuclear materials that could be used in nuclear weapons or
for other forms of terrorism. DOE has put security equipment in place
at 18 sites to safeguard those nuclear materials, and agreements are in
place to expand security procedures and equipment at 30 additional
sites. I recently observed the work being done by this program first
hand during a visit to Russia's nuclear research facilities. I felt
relieved to know that the Russians are now better able to control and
monitor their own nuclear materials than ever before. I am also aware,
however, that the Russians have hundreds of nuclear sites needing
additional security measures to prevent theft and unauthorized use. A
great deal of work needs to be done, and it is important that the
Congress continue to fully fund the MPC&A Program in our own national
security interest. I ask my colleagues in the Senate to support our
amendment to restore $25 million to the MPC&A Program so that this
valuable work can continue without pause.
The committee also voted on partisan lines to cut all of the funding
requested for the International Nuclear Safety Program--INSP. This
program began in the wake of international concerns over the damage
done by the Chernobyl nuclear reactor disaster. The Russians continue
to operate reactors that are similar in design to the one at Chernobyl,
and that pose a similar risk of a catastrophic accident. The INSP
Program, managed by the Department of Energy, is designed to reduce
those risks for Russia's older reactors and to help Russia and Newly
Independent States to establish self-sustaining nuclear safety programs
that enable them to reach international nuclear reactor safety
standards. It is in our national and international interest to do what
we can to ensure that those reactors are safe. I urge my colleagues to
vote to restore this important program.
As I suggested earlier, the Congress has repeatedly demonstrated its
conviction that CTR, MPC&A, INSP, and related programs serve our
national security interests. To those who say these programs are a form
of foreign aid to the Russians, I concur that ultimately the Russians
must assume full responsibility for these programs. Until they are
financially and technologically capable of doing so, it is essential to
our own interests that we assist them in putting effective security
programs into place. We know how expensive it is to support the
strategic offensive and defensive weapons systems designed to ensure
our security against nuclear weapons. We also know how dangerous and
vulnerable this country could be to nuclear terrorism which, in some
cases, we may not be able to effectively protect ourselves from. For
those modest expenditures for CTR, MPC&A, and INSP, we buy ourselves a
significant measure of security worth many times the funds invested. I
urge my colleagues in the Senate to continue their bipartisan support
for these programs and vote to restore their funding.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. LUGAR addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a strong
letter of support from the Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, and
a strong letter of support from William Cohen, Secretary of Defense,
for our amendment be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

The Secretary of State,

Washington, DC, June 24, 1997.
Hon. Strom Thurmond,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate.
Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing to urge you to support
restoration of the $135 million cut from the FY 98 Defense
Authorization Bill by the Senate Armed Services Committee for
three key arms control and nonproliferation initiatives: the
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, the Material Protection
Control and Accounting program and the International Nuclear
Safety program.

[[Page S6884]]

Reducing threats to U.S. national security from the former
Soviet arsenal of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons
continues to be one of our highest security priorities.
Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakstan are today nuclear weapons-
free, largely through encouragement and direct assistance
from the DOD Cooperative Threat Reduction program. This
program has been essential to the destruction and/or
dismantlement of nuclear weapons.
The Department of Energy's Material Protection and
Accounting (MPC&A) program and its International Nuclear
Safety program are also providing essential assistance. The
MPC&A program is targeted at improving the security of
nuclear material at 40 facilities in the former Soviet Union.
Over time, this could prove just as productive as the initial
Cooperative Threat Reduction programs in eliminating nuclear
weapons. The International Nuclear Safety program, a
principal instrument of our efforts to improve the safety of
Soviet-era civilian nuclear power reactors, could head off
another Chernobyl in the New Independent States and the
countries of Eastern and Central Europe.
Congressional reductions in these programs risk eroding our
ability to come up with solutions to important security
problems and undermine the effectiveness of our initiatives
in this region. These programs are making a difference
against today's threats to the American people. I urge your
support in restoring these funds.
Sincerely,
Madeleine K. Albright.
____

The Secretary of Defense,

Washington, DC, June 19, 1997.
Hon. Strom Thurmond,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Senate Armed Services Committee
(SASC) reduced by $60 million the President's budget request
for the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program during its
consideration of S. 450, the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1998. This cut to CTR funding undermines
our ability to accomplish the program's important national
security goals for FY98, and will put at risk the objectives
for fiscal year 1999. I strongly urge the Senate to restore
the full CTR request.
The CTR program has been essential to the reduction of
hundreds of submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers,
intercontinental ballistic missile silos and heavy bombers in
the former Soviet Union, and to the removal of 4000 warheads
from strategic systems. Without CTR, Ukraine, Belarus and
Kazakstan might still have thousands of nuclear weapons;
instead, they are all nuclear-weapons-free. Although the CTR
program has accomplished much, essential work remains to be
done. This includes: the elimination of intercontinental
ballistic missiles and silos, submarine-launched ballistic
missile launchers and heavy bombers under START I, followed
by START II and III; increased safety and security for the
transport and storage of remaining Russian nuclear warheads;
an end to production of weapons-grade plutonium; chemical
weapons destruction; and other efforts to reduce weapons of
mass destruction in the former Soviet Union and the threat of
their proliferation.
Contrary to the SASC rationale for the cut, the loss to the
program cannot be made up with prior years' funds. All
unobligated CTR funds have already been earmarked for
specific projects. The FY98 budget request of $382.2 million
is a bare-bones request based on a difficult prioritization
of a long list of potential projects. Indeed, there are
several worthwhile projects, which would accelerate our
strategic arms elimination program sin Russia and Ukraine,
that we are not able to fund at even the $382.2 million
level. The CTR program is achieving demonstrable results with
a very tight budget.
Again, I strongly urge the Senate to support this important
national security program.
Sincerely,
Bill Cohen.

Amendment No. 658, As Modified

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to modify my
amendment. On page 2 of the amendment, change line 12, which currently
reads, ``$56 million'' to ``$40 million.'' I send that modification to
the desk.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is so
modified.
The modification follows:

On page 2 of the amendment change line 12, which currently
reads ``$56 million'' to ``40 million dollars''.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, Senator Biden of Delaware, who is a
cochairman of the Senate's NATO Observer Group, is necessarily absent
to attend the NATO summit in Madrid. Senator Biden is an initial
cosponsor of Senator Lugar's and my amendment, and I ask unanimous
consent that his statement of strong support for this amendment be
printed in the Record.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. BIDEN. The amendment of Senator Lugar and others will
correct a situation that threatens the very security of the United
States. Unless recent efforts to cut the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat
Reduction Program and similar programs of the Department of Energy are
overturned, we and our children will all be in greater danger. I am
proud to be an original cosponsor of this amendment and I urge my
colleagues to support it.
The administration's request for the important Nunn-Lugar program is
for $382.2 million. Last week, the Armed Services Committee cut $60
million from that important program. At the same time, the House
National Security Committee cut $97.5 million from the Nunn-Lugar
account, and reportedly those cuts were from different parts of the
program. Thus, over 40 percent of the Nunn-Lugar program is now at
risk.
The Armed Services Committee also cut $25 million from the Energy
Department's program of international assistance in nuclear materials
protection, control and accountability, as well as all $50 million in
its program of international nuclear safety assistance. The former
program is vital to protecting the American people against the
diversion of nuclear material from former Soviet laboratories to
countries like Iran, Iraq or Libya that would like to build or buy
nuclear weapons. It also helps keep nuclear material out of the hands
of terrorists, who could use it to poison innocent people in Moscow or
Tokyo or Tel Aviv--or right here in Washington. Nuclear safety
assistance helps guard against future Chernobyl incidents, which pose
fallout dangers far beyond the borders of the former Soviet countries
in which they might occur.
The Nunn-Lugar program makes significant contributions to the
national security of our country. Through this program, we have helped
Russia to remove over 1,400 strategic nuclear warheads from deployment
sites to storage areas, to await dismantlement. We have helped Russia
to eliminate 64 SLBM launchers, 54 ICBM silo launchers, 61 SS-18 ICBM's
and 23 strategic bombers. And we have helped Belarus, Kazakstan, and
Ukraine to eliminate their strategic nuclear forces and to repatriate
all their nuclear warheads to Russia.
But the work of the Nunn-Lugar program is far from completed. Over
400 Russian SLBM launchers remain to be eliminated. Nearly 100 ICBM
silo launchers must still be destroyed, along with over 190 SS-18
missiles and another 7 strategic bombers. Over 130 tunnels must be
closed at a former nuclear test site in Kazakstan. Massive stocks of
old, but still very dangerous, chemical weapons must be destroyed. And
security must be improved in Russian storage and transportation of
nuclear material.
There are two basic ways to increase our national security. One is to
maintain the finest military and intelligence services in the world. We
do that, and I am very glad that we do.
But we do that at great expense, and at some risk. For none of us can
guarantee that nuclear deterrence will work forever, especially in a
Russia where troops and officers and nuclear scientists go for months
without pay--Russia where, within the past year, generals and lab
directors have closed the door to their offices and put bullets through
their heads, out of despair over what has happened to their programs
and their personnel.

The other basic way to increase our national security is to work with
potential foes to reduce the threat that they pose to U.S. interests or
U.S. forces. We do some of this through arms control agreements, but
often we wonder whether other countries are obeying those agreements.
The Nunn-Lugar program is a way to make sure that Russia and other
former Soviet states actually do reduce their bloated strategic nuclear
forces. It isn't free. The administration has asked for $382 million
for this program in fiscal year 1998.
But let's put that in perspective. The defense budget reported out by
the Armed Services Committee is $268 billion. So a fully-funded Nunn-
Lugar program would cost only one-seventh of 1 percent of the defense
budget. The Armed Services Committee added $2.6 billion to the
administration's request for defense spending. So the Nunn-Lugar
program costs only 14 percent of the increase. And the Armed Services
Committee's cut in this program could be restored using only 2.3
percent of that increase.

[[Page S6885]]

The Energy Department's program of international assistance in
nuclear materials protection, control and accountability--known as
MPC&A--is similarly vital to our national security. Just as the Nunn-
Lugar program helps the Russian military to improve its security for
nuclear materials, the MPC&A program helps dozens of laboratories in
the former Soviet Union to improve their security for nuclear
materials.
What are we talking about here? Often it's as simple as bars on the
windows, locks on the doors, and doors that will take more than a
crowbar to open. Just as often, however, the need is for completely
revised accountability schemes so that institutions with nuclear
materials will always know where those materials are. That is a
complicated task, and it requires a change in mind-set as much as
changes in forms or procedures.
DOD personnel who participate in Nunn-Lugar programs can relate to
the military officers who man Russia's strategic nuclear forces. But it
takes scientists to build peer relationships at former Soviet
laboratories and spread the word about nuclear control.
Just last month, a committee of the National Research Council [NRC]--
an arm of the National Academy of Sciences--reported that the MPC&A
program is beginning to have some real success. The NRC committee says:
``progress attributable to the joint efforts of U.S. and Russian
specialists in MPC&A greatly accelerated in 1995 and 1996'' and calls
that ``a significant political and organizational achievement.''
At the same time, however, the NRC committee found that ``the task
has not been completed at any Russian facility and serious efforts are
only beginning at most facilities.'' The committee says that ``much
remains to be done.'' Its principal recommendation on this program is
as follows:

For the near term it is essential that the United States
sustain its involvement until counterpart institutions are in
a position to assume the full burden of upgrading and
maintaining MPC&A programs over the long term.

This program is just taking off. If you cut it back now, it may
crash. But if, instead, we sustain and encourage this program, we can
help former Soviet scientists to turn around what remains, frankly, a
truly dangerous situation.
President Yeltsin can assure us, as he does, that Russia would never
give or sell a nuclear weapon to another state. But he cannot assure us
today that the dozens of Russian laboratories with nuclear materials
will not let potential weapons material leak out to criminals, or to
terrorists, or to rogue states that we know are willing to pay good
money for the material and technology that would enable them to
threaten the peace of the world and of our country.
President Yeltsin cannot, by himself, turn this situation around. But
we can help him, and that is what the MPC&A program does.
I do not pretend to know what should be cut in the defense bill. But
I do know that Nunn-Lugar and the similar Energy Department program are
not cash cows to be milked for other defense purposes.
Just as Senator J. William Fullbright will always be remembered for
the Fullbright fellowship program, so will Senators Sam Nunn and Dick
Lugar be remembered for the simple, brilliant idea that it's more
humane and a lot cheaper to pay for destroying Russian weapons than it
is to fight against them. Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction
projects and the Energy Department's MPC&A and International Nuclear
Safety assistance are vital programs. They are successful programs. And
they deserve our full support.
I urge my colleagues to vote for Senator Lugar's amendment, which
will help make this a safer world for all of us.
Mr. LEVIN. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. HAGEL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. HAGEL. Mr. President, I returned with six of my colleagues over
the weekend from a day in Bosnia. Majority Leader Lott and five of our
other colleagues spent the Fourth of July early in the morning until
late at night with our troops and officials in Bosnia.
I think it is appropriate that as we debate the fiscal year 1998
defense authorization bill we reflect just for a moment on the men and
women on the ground in Bosnia and the men and women who secure our
liberties around the world.
Much of the debate, much of the policy reflect numbers, reflect
general overall direction. Increasingly, that policy direction is
debated, and should be. But we tend to forget the humanness, the very
men and women of what our Armed Forces are all about.
As my colleagues and I, on the Fourth of July in Bosnia, spent a
great deal of time with the 8,500 American men and women who are part
of that large contingent in Bosnia, I could not help but reflect on
what an outstanding job these men and women do for this country, for
peace, stability around the world.
I want to add the human dynamic to this debate today, and that will
go into tomorrow, on the DOD authorization bill. Because, after all, it
is the men and women who are on the ground who are there every day and
every night who secure those liberties, for not only this country but
for the people in the area of Bosnia.
I tend to think also, when I was an infantryman in Vietnam in 1968,
our policy in Vietnam might have been better served, Mr. President, if
the Secretary of Defense and more Members of the House and the Senate
had come to Vietnam, had spent time with the troops, listening to what
they think, listening to their issues and concerns and qualifications,
and not unlike wars and peacekeeping missions throughout our history it
still is the man and the woman on the ground that we count on to secure
those liberties.
Mr. President, I appreciate the time.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to lay the
amendment of Senator Lugar aside temporarily, and we will come back to
it.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Amendment No. 718

(Purpose: To increase the amount required to be derived from sales of
strategic and critical materials in the National Defense Stockpile by
fiscal year 2007)

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I offer a technical amendment to ensure
that the revenues received from stockpile sales are sufficient to
offset the cost associated with other provisions of the bill.
Mr. LEVIN. The amendment has been cleared on this side.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from South Carolina [Mr. Thurmond] proposes an
amendment numbered 718.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent reading of the
amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:

On page 460, line 6, strike out ``$295,886,000'' and insert
in lieu thereof ``$331,886,000''.

Mr. THURMOND. I believe this amendment has been cleared by the other
side. I urge the Senate adopt this amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
The amendment (No. 718) was agreed to.
Mr. THURMOND. I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. LEVIN. I move to lay it on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

[[Page S6886]]

Amendment No. 719

(Purpose: To clarify the protections relating to disclosures of
classified material to Congress)

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I offer an amendment that would clarify and
refine the language contained in section 1068 of the bill by deleting a
reference to disclosure of information by making explicit that the
provision does not affect existing law relating to contract or whistle-
blowers.
I believe this amendment has been cleared by the other side.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Michigan [Mr. Levin] proposes an amendment
numbered 719.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent reading of the
amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:

On page 339, line 14, strike out ``the executive branch
or''.
On page 340, between lines 16 and 17, insert the following:
(d) Disclosures of Classified Information to Congress or
the Department of Justice by Contractor Employees.--It is the
sense of Congress that the Inspector General of the
Department of Defense should continue to exercise the
authority provided in section 2409 of title 10, United States
Code, regarding reprisals for disclosures of classified
information as well as reprisals for disclosures of
unclassified information.

Mr. THURMOND. I urge the Senate to adopt this amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
The amendment (No. 719) was agreed to.
Mr. LEVIN. I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. THURMOND. I move to lay it on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Amendment No. 720

(Purpose: To prohibit the provision of burial benefits under Federal
law to individuals convicted of capital offenses under Federal law)

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I offer an amendment that would suspend
all burial entitlements in Arlington National Cemetery, and any other
cemetery in the National Cemetery System, to any person convicted of a
Federal capital offense.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from South Carolina [Mr. Thurmond] proposes an
amendment numbered 720.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent reading of the
amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:

At the end of title X, add the following:

SEC. . PROHIBITION ON PROVISION OF BURIAL BENEFITS TO
INDIVIDUALS CONVICTED OF FEDERAL CAPITAL
OFFENSES.

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an individual
convicted of a capital offense under Federal law shall not be
entitled to the following:
(1) Interment or inurnment in Arlington National Cemetery,
the Soldiers' and Airmen's National Cemetery, any cemetery in
the National Cemetery System, or any other cemetery
administered by the Secretary of a military department or by
the Secretary of Veterans Affairs.
(2) Any other burial benefit under Federal law.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, on behalf of myself and Senator Inhofe,
I propose an amendment that would suspend all burial entitlements in
Arlington National Cemetery or any other cemetery administered by the
Secretary of a military department to any person convicted of a Federal
capital offense.
On Wednesday, June 18, the Senate passed S-923, denying veterans
benefits in Federal capital cases, by a vote of 98 to 0. This
legislation was introduced by Senator Specter, chairman of the
Veterans' Affairs Committee, and was intended to preclude persons
convicted of a capital Federal offense, entitlement to veterans
benefits, including burial in a national cemetery.
Mr. President, Arlington National Cemetery, the Soldiers and Airmen's
Home Cemetery in Washington, DC and various cemeteries on military
installations around the country are administered by the armed services
and, as such, are not affected by the change to title 38, United States
Code. The amendment that I propose today will deny any person convicted
of a Federal capital offense the entitlement to burial in Arlington
National Cemetery, the Soldiers and Airmen's Home Cemetery, or any
other cemetery administered by the Secretary of a military department.
This amendment complements the bill introduced by Senator Specter and
passed by the Senate this past Wednesday, and completes what I believe
was the intent of the Senate in that vote.
I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, we support the amendment. It has been
cleared on this side.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
The amendment (No. 720) was agreed to.
Mr. THURMOND. I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. LEVIN. I move to lay it on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Amendment No. 721

(Purpose: To provide the force structure necessary for maintaining five
Air National Guard C-130 aircraft units with 12 primary aircraft
authorized, one each at Martinsburg, West Virginia, Louisville,
Kentucky, Charlotte, North Carolina, Nashville, Tennessee, and Channel
Island, California, and for preserving the number of primary aircraft
authorized for Air Force Reserve C-130 aircraft units at General
Mitchell International Airport and Air Reserve Station, Wisconsin,
Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado, and Willow Grove Air Reserve
Station, Pennsylvania)

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Byrd, I offer an
amendment that would maintain the Air National Guard and Air Force
Reserve C-130 units at the current force structure level of 12
aircraft.
I believe the other side has cleared this amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Michigan [Mr. Levin] for Mr. Byrd,
proposes an amendment numbered 721.

Mr. LEVIN. I ask unanimous consent reading of the amendment be
dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:

In section 301(9), strike out ``$1,624,420,000'' and insert
in lieu thereof ``$1,631,200,000''.
In section 301(11), strike out ``$2,991,219,000'' and
insert in lieu thereof ``$3,004,282,000''.
In section 411(a)(5), strike out ``107,377'' and insert in
lieu thereof ``108,002''.
In section 411(a)(6), strike out ``73,431'' and insert in
lieu thereof ``73,542''.
In section 412(5), strike out ``10,616'' and insert in lieu
thereof ``10,671''.
At the end of subtitle B of title IV, add the following:

SEC. 413. ADDITION TO END STRENGTHS FOR MILITARY TECHNICIANS.

(a) Air National Guard.--In addition to the number of
military technicians for the Air National Guard of the United
States as of the last day of fiscal year 1998 for which funds
are authorized to be appropriated in this Act, 100 military
technicians are authorized for fiscal year 1998 for five Air
National Guard C-130 aircraft units.
(b) Air Force Reserve.--In addition to the number of
military technicians for the Air Force Reserve as of the last
day of fiscal year 1998 for which funds are authorized to be
appropriated in this Act, 21 military technicians are
authorized for fiscal year 1998 for three Air Force Reserve
C-130 aircraft units.
On page 108, line 11, reduce the amount by $20,000,000.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the amendment which I am offering enables
Air National Guard units in West Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee,
Kentucky, and California to maintain their full complement of 12 C-
130's. Without $13 million in operations and maintenance funds and $4
million in personnel funds, these units would be forced, prematurely
and perhaps unwisely, to reduce their airlift capacity to 8 aircraft
per unit.
The President's Budget for Fiscal Year 1998 reduces the Air National
Guard inventory of C-130's in these five

[[Page S6887]]

states from 12 aircraft per unit to 8 aircraft in accordance with
earlier Air Force program decisions. However, it makes no sense to
reduce the C-130 units until the completion of the Quadrennial Defense
Review [QDR] process by the Department of Defense. The purpose of the
QDR is to reassess the U.S. defense strategy, force structure,
readiness, modernization and infrastructure. Why not have the benefit
of that reassessment before we make such decisions?
The Air National Guard C-130 units are major players in the air
mobility plan of the United States Air Force. It is my belief that a
reduction of the type proposed in the budget is premature, without the
final conclusions of the QDR process. More and more reliance is being
placed upon our reserve component forces as the active duty military
establishment downsizes. It is not prudent to reduce the aircraft and
manpower levels of the very organization that is expected to respond to
global crisis situations, while supporting numerous U.S. Air Force
mobility missions in Bosnia, Southwest Asia, Central America and
throughout the United States. Consequently, the amendment I am offering
will restore the force structure, personnel, and funds necessary to
continue to operate these units at 12 aircraft.
Mr. President, the view I have expressed is supported by General
Ronald Fogleman, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, who wrote to the
distinguished Minority Whip, Mr. Ford, on May 21, 1997, as follows:

The QDR report released on May 19 clearly conveys a greater
reliance by the Total Air Force on the reserve components.
Given the concerns you have raised and our focus on reserve
components during the QDR, it is clear that the C-130 force
structure requires greater scrutiny before any reductions are
made. Therefore, I have rescinded plans to restructure ANG C-
130 units in Kentucky, West Virginia, California, North
Carolina or Tennessee. These units will remain at the current
force structure level of 12 PAA. As a result, I would greatly
appreciate your support in maintaining these levels.

Mr. President, in a similar vein, with regard to the Air Force
Reserve, the President's Budget for Fiscal Year 1998 proposes to reduce
C-130 units in Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Colorado from 12 aircraft
to 8 aircraft. In order to maintain these units at their full
complement of 12 aircraft, an amount of $6.8 million is required in
operations and maintenance funds and $1.4 million in personnel funds.
In summary, the amendment I am offering would assure that Air
National Guard units in West Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee,
Kentucky and California, and Air Force Reserve units in Pennsylvania,
Wisconsin, and Colorado are able to continue to maintain their full
complement of 12 C-130 aircraft as recommended by the Chief of Staff of
the United States Air Force.
I urge the adoption of the amendment.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, the amendment has been cleared. I urge
the Senate to adopt the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
The amendment (No. 721) was agreed to.
Mr. LEVIN. I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. THURMOND. I move to lay it on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Amendment No. 722

(Purpose: To modify authority for the conveyance of certain lands at
Rocky Mountain Arsenal, CO)

Mr. THURMOND. On behalf of Senator Allard of Colorado, I offer an
amendment which would clarify existing law to facilitate the transfer
of property from Rocky Mountain Arsenal to Commerce City, CO, in a
negotiated sale at a fair market value.
Mr. President, I believe this amendment has been cleared by the other
side. Mr. President, I urge the Senate to adopt this amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from South Carolina [Mr. Thurmond], for Mr.
Allard, proposes an amendment numbered 722.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent reading of the
amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:

At the end of subtitle B of title XXVIII, add the
following:

SEC. 28 . MODIFICATION OF LAND CONVEYANCE AUTHORITY, ROCKY
MOUNTAIN ARSENAL, COLORADO.

Section 5(c)(1) of the Rocky Mountain Arsenal National
Wildlife Refuge Act of 1992 (Public Law 102-402; 106 Stat.
1966; 16 U.S.C. 668dd note) is amended by striking out the
second sentence and inserting in lieu thereof the following
new sentence: ``The Administrator shall convey the
transferred property to Commerce City, Colorado, upon the
approval of the City, for consideration equal to the fair
market value of the property (as determined jointly by the
Administrator and the City).''.

Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I am here today to offer an amendment that
would continue the development and transformation of the Rocky Mountain
Arsenal to the Rocky Mountain Arsenal Wildlife Refuge. This has been an
ongoing cooperative effort between the Department of the Army, the
Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Shell
Oil Co., and local, State, and Federal elected officials.
The Rocky Mountain Arsenal contains 17,000 acres northwest of Denver,
CO, that was purchased by the Army in 1942 to manufacture chemical
weapons. The Army leased the property after World War II to various
chemical manufacturers through 1982. Needless to say, this had an
incredible environmental impact. However, through all of this
environmental abuse wildlife flourished. In fact, in 1986 a winter
communal roost of bald eagles was discovered on site, an incredible
occurrence considering the circumstances.
Because of its protected status, the arsenal became a haven for close
to 300 wildlife species including deer, coyotes, owls, and eagles.
Efforts were undertaken to preserve the wildlife habitat. These efforts
were rewarded in 1992 when Congress passed the Rocky Mountain Arsenal
National Wildlife Refuge Act, legislation that I supported as a Member
of the other body.
Today, cleanup efforts are still underway, but great progress has
been made. Groundwater treatment facilities are in place, 350 abandoned
wells have been closed, and soil remediation is in progress. This has
allowed portions of the arsenal to be opened to the public for wildlife
viewing. This amendment allows the public the opportunity for greater
access to the refuge.
The exact purpose of this amendment is to clarify existing law to
facilitate the transfer of property at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal to
Commerce City, CO, in a negotiated sale at fair market value. The city
will hold this land, develop it in accordance with plans made in
connection with the Fish and Wildlife Service and other governmental
entities, and ultimately sell some of this land, making proceeds
available for the continuing development of the Rocky Mountain Wildlife
Refuge visitor center.
The Government Services Administration objected to the original
language in Public Law 102-402. We have worked with GSA in formulating
legislative language that meets the requirements of GSA as well as my
intent and the intent of Commerce City.
I am always pleased when the Federal Government can work with local
governments to provide a public benefit at no cost to the taxpayer.
This is one such case.
Finally, I would like to thank Chairman Thurmond for his assistance
and leadership on this amendment, and appreciate the hard work and
diligence of his staff.
Mr. LEVIN. The amendment has been cleared on this side.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
The amendment (No. 722) was agreed to.
Mr. THURMOND. I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. LEVIN. I move to lay it on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Amendment No. 723

(Purpose: To require a study of eye safety at small arms firing ranges
of the Armed Forces and the development of an eye injury reporting
protocol for the ranges)

Mr. LEVIN. On behalf of Senator Rockefeller, I offer an amendment

[[Page S6888]]

that would direct the Secretary of Defense to conduct a study of eye
safety in military small arms firing ranges and the development of an
eye injury prevention program.
I think this amendment has been cleared. It is a very good amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Michigan [Mr. Levin], for Mr. Rockefeller,
proposes an amendment numbered 723.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent reading of the
amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:

At the end of subtitle D of title X, add the following:

SEC. ____. EYE SAFETY AT SMALL ARMS FIRING RANGES.

(a) Actions Required.--The Secretary of the Defense shall--
(1) conduct a study of eye safety at small arms firing
ranges of the Armed Forces; and
(2) develop for the use of the Armed Forces a protocol for
reporting eye injuries incurred in small arms firing
activities at the ranges.
(b) Agency Tasking.--The Secretary may delegate authority
to carry out the responsibilities set forth in subsection (a)
to the United States Army Center for Health Promotion and
Preventive Medicine or any other element of the Department of
Defense that the Secretary considers well qualified to carry
out those responsibilities.
(c) Content of Study.--The study shall include the
following:
(1) An evaluation of the existing policies, procedures, and
practices of the Armed Forces regarding medical surveillance
of eye injuries resulting from weapons fire at the small arms
ranges.
(2) An examination of the existing policies, procedures,
and practices of the Armed Forces regarding reporting on
vision safety issues resulting from weapons fire at the small
arms ranges.
(3) Determination of rates of eye injuries, and trends in
eye injuries, resulting from weapons fire at the small arms
ranges.
(4) An evaluation of the costs and benefits of a
requirement for use of eye protection devices by all
personnel firing small arms at the ranges.
(d) Report.--The Secretary shall submit a report on the
activities required under this section to the Committees on
Armed Services and on Veterans' Affairs of the Senate and the
Committees on National Security and on Veterans' Affairs of
the House of Representatives. The report shall include--
(1) the findings resulting from the study required under
paragraph (1) of subsection (a); and
(2) the protocol developed under paragraph (2) of such
subsection.
(e) Schedule.--(1) The Secretary shall ensure that the
study is commenced not later than October 1, 1997, and is
completed within six months after it is commenced.
(2) The Secretary shall submit the report required under
subsection (d) not later than 30 days after the completion of
the study.

Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President, as ranking member of the Committee on
Veterans' Affairs, I have an especially strong interest in preventing
unnecessary injuries and illness among the men and women who serve in
our Nation's military forces. The risks that these brave men and women
face in combat are reduced through superior equipment and excellent
training, but some risks remain unavoidable. As we continue to learn
from the lessons of the gulf war, 6 years after the battle, the
complete risks of military service are still not known. Thus, it is
simple common sense to ensure that we do all we can to prevent those
risks outside of combat that are foreseeable. One such foreseeable and
preventable risk is eye injury on military firing ranges.
I thus propose an amendment to the Department of Defense
authorization bill, the military eye injury assessment amendment. This
amendment would address a military public health and prevention issue
that was brought to my attention by a retired Air Force optometrist,
Dr. John Meinhold. Dr. Meinhold was concerned about the rate of eye
injuries that occurred in the Armed Services, particularly at military
firing ranges. Unlike other public and private firing ranges throughout
the country, military firing ranges do not require the mandatory use of
safety eyewear to prevent eye injuries. Most, if not all, eye injuries
at firing ranges could be completely prevented with a very inexpensive
and low technology intervention, safety eyewear.
The requirement for protective eyewear at public and private firing
ranges is a liability issue, rather than one controlled by State or
Federal regulations. However, there is no threat of liability for the
armed services because of the so-called Feres doctrine, which is based
on a Supreme Court decision that ruled that service members generally
cannot sue the Government for injuries occurred during service. These
unnecessary eye injuries potentially affect military readiness, and in
cases of severe injury, a soldier's military career may be suddenly
ended. The lifetime costs of a single catastrophic eye injury has been
estimated to be $1 million per eye by the Bureau of Labor Statistics,
but the human costs are immeasurable.
A study by the Army found that eye injury data are not always tracked
at the local level, and minor eye injuries may not always be reported
to safety offices. It is estimated that while 90 percent of all eye
injuries are preventable, the incidence of wartime eye injuries has
increased steadily over the last 20 years.
Given these statistics and the human costs of such injuries, I wrote
the Department of Defense earlier this year to ask about this important
safety issue. After a series of letters and inquiries, the official
response I received was that no further action was needed to prevent
eye injuries since DOD officials had determined that the risk was too
low to warrant spending funds on prevention. In reviewing the
Department of Defense's very own statistics and studies, and in talking
with their health professionals, I cannot come to the same conclusion.
Any preventable injury that puts our service men and women at risk is
sufficient for our concern, especially when it is one which is as
easily prevented as this one. Even one service member who suffers from
a permanent eye injury at a firing range is one too many when that
injury could have been avoided. I am proposing that we simply assess
whether our military firing ranges should be brought up to the same
safety standard that all other firing ranges in our country must meet.
My amendment would require the Secretary of Defense to provide
funding for a 6-month study of eye safety at military firing ranges.
This study would evaluate the current medical surveillance of eye
injuries at small arms firing ranges across the service branches, and
examine current safety reporting practices and other analyses as
necessary to establish military eye injury rates and trends. It would
also develop a uniform protocol for reporting eye injuries across the
service branches. The results would be reported to the Senate Armed
Services Committee and the Senate Veterans' Affairs Committee upon
completion of the study.
I am proud to offer this amendment to protect the safety of the
members of our armed services, and I encourage my colleagues to join me
in this effort. I would like to thank the chairman and ranking member
of the Armed Services Committee for their support and their fine staff
for helping to perfect this amendment.
Mr. THURMOND. I urge the Senate to adopt this amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
The amendment (No. 723) was agreed to.
Mr. LEVIN. I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. THURMOND. I move to lay it on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Amendment No. 724

(Purpose: To extend to the Secretary of Transportation the authority to
pay a reserve affiliation agreement bonus)

Mr. THURMOND. On behalf of Senator Kempthorne, I offer an amendment
that would extend the reserve affiliation agreement bonus to the Coast
Guard.
I believe this amendment has been cleared by the other side. I urge
the Senate to adopt it.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from South Carolina [Mr. Thurmond], for Mr.
Kempthorne, proposes an amendment numbered 724.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent reading of the
amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
At the end of subtitle C of title VI, add the following:

[[Page S6889]]

SEC. 642. RESERVE AFFILIATION AGREEMENT BONUS FOR THE COAST
GUARD.

Section 308e of title 37, United States Code, is amended--
(1) in subsection (a), by striking out ``Secretary of a
military department'' in the matter preceding paragraph (1)
and inserting in lieu thereof ``Secretary concerned''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(f) The authority in subsection (a) does not apply to the
Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of Health and Human
Services.''.

Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Mr. President, I propose an amendment that would
extend the Reserve affiliation bonus to the Coast Guard.
The Coast Guard approached the committee after our markup was over
requesting that they be included in the Reserve affiliation bonus. The
Coast Guard has been experiencing difficulty in recruiting for the
Coast Guard Reserve and believe that the Reserve affiliation bonus will
assist by providing an additional incentive for members of the Coast
Guard who are leaving active duty to enlist directly in the Coast Guard
Reserve.
I will point out that this authority is discretionary and was
requested by the Coast Guard.
Mr. President, I urge the adoption of the amendment.
Mr. LEVIN. The amendment has been cleared on this side.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
The amendment (No. 724) was agreed to.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. THURMOND. I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. LEVIN. I move to lay it on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Amendment No. 725

(Purpose: To increase the number of years of commissioned service
provided for mandatory retirement of generals and admirals serving in
grades above major general and rear admiral)

Mr. THURMOND. On behalf of Senator Kempthorne, I offer an amendment
that would increase the number of years of active commission service
provided for mandatory retirement of three- and four-star generals and
admirals.
Mr. President, I believe this amendment has been cleared on the other
side. I urge the Senate to adopt it.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from South Carolina [Mr. Thurmond], for Mr.
Kempthorne, proposes an amendment numbered 725.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent reading of the
amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:

At the end of subtitle A of title V, add the following:

SEC. 505. INCREASED YEARS OF COMMISSIONED SERVICE FOR
MANDATORY RETIREMENT OF REGULAR GENERALS AND
ADMIRALS ABOVE MAJOR GENERAL AND REAR ADMIRAL.

(a) Years of Service.--Section 636 of title 10, United
States Code, is amended--
(1) by striking out ``Except'' and inserting in lieu
thereof ``(a) Major Generals and Rear Admirals Serving in
Grade.--Except as provided in subsection (b) or (c) of this
section and''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(b) Lieutenant Generals and Vice Admirals.--In the
administration of subsection (a) in the case of an officer
who is serving in the grade of lieutenant general or vice
admiral, the number of years of active commissioned service
applicable to the officer is 38 years.
``(c) Generals and Admirals.--In the administration of
subsection (a) in the case of an officer who is serving in
the grade of general or admiral, the number of years of
active commissioned service applicable to the officer is 40
years.''.
(b) Section Heading.--The heading of such section is
amended to read as follows:

``Sec. 636. Retirement for years of service: regular officers
in grades above brigadier general and rear admiral (lower
half)''.

(c) Clerical Amendment.--The item relating to such section
in the table of sections at the beginning of subchapter III
of chapter 36 of title 10, United States Code, is amended to
read as follows:

``636. Retirement for years of service: regular officers in grades
above brigadier general and rear admiral (lower half).''.

Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Mr. President, I propose an amendment that would
increase the number of years of active commissioned service provided
for mandatory retirement of generals and admirals serving in grades of
lieutenant general or vice admiral and general or admiral.
The committee has noted over the past several years that the military
services are moving senior officers through critical command and staff
positions very quickly. One reason that these senior officers move so
frequently is that there are only a few years in which a three-or four-
star general or admiral can serve before reaching the mandatory
retirement point of 35 years of service. This amendment raises the
mandatory retirement point for three stars from 35 years to 38 years of
service and the mandatory retirement point for four-star officers from
35 years to 40 years of service.
This amendment does not increase the number of general or flag
officers. Nor does it require that three- and four-star officers serve
to the mandatory retirement point. The services still have the officer
management tools currently in effect which permit the service Chief and
the service Secretary to manage their officer force in the best
interests of their service.
Mr. President, I urge the adoption of the amendment.
Mr. LEVIN. The amendment has been cleared on this side.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
The amendment (No. 725) was agreed to.
Mr. THURMOND. I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. LEVIN. I move to lay it on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Amendment No. 726

(Purpose: To authorize a land conveyance at the Army Reserve Center,
Greensboro, Alabama)

Mr. THURMOND. On behalf of Senator Shelby, I offer an amendment which
would convey 5 acres of land to Hale County, AL. The property was
originally donated to the Federal Government for the construction of an
Army Reserve Center which, due to a change in priority, was canceled.
I believe this amendment has been cleared by the other side. I urge
the Senate to adopt it.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from South Carolina [Mr. Thurmond], for Mr.
Shelby, proposes an amendment numbered 726.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent reading of the
amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:

At the end of subtitle B of title XXVIII, add the
following:

SEC. 2819. LAND CONVEYANCE, ARMY RESERVE CENTER, GREENSBORO,
ALABAMA.

(a) Conveyance Authorized.--The Secretary of the Army may
convey, without consideration, to Hale County, Alabama, all
right, title, and interest of the United States in and to a
parcel of real property consisting of approximately 5.17
acres and located at the Army Reserve Center, Greensboro,
Alabama, that was conveyed by Hale County, Alabama, to the
United States by warranty deed dated September 12, 1988.
(b) Description of Property.--The exact acreage and legal
description of the property conveyed under subsection (a)
shall be as described in the deed referred to in that
subsection.
(c) Additional Terms and Conditions.--The Secretary may
require such additional terms and conditions in connection
with the conveyance under this section as the Secretary
considers appropriate to protect the interests of the United
States.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise in support of Senator Shelby's
amendment. The amendment would return property that Hale County,
Alabama donated in 1988 to the Federal Government for the purpose of
constructing an Army Reserve center. Now the Army, due to changes in
priority, cannot construct on the site until after fiscal year 2000.
Since the community donated the property with expectations of a
Reserve center and the Army has not lived up to these expectations, I
believe that returning the property using this special legislation is
appropriate. I urge the Senate to adopt the amendment.
Mr. LEVIN. The amendment has been cleared on this side.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.

[[Page S6890]]

The amendment (No. 726) was agreed to.
Mr. THURMOND. I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. LEVIN. I move to lay it on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Amendment No. 727

(Purpose: To require the display of the POW/MIA flag on various
occasions and in various locations)

Mr. THURMOND. On behalf of Senator Campbell, I offer an amendment
which would require the display of the POW/MIA flag on various
occasions and in various locations.
I believe this amendment has been cleared by the other side. I urge
the Senate to adopt it.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from South Carolina [Mr. Thurmond], for Mr.
Campbell, proposes an amendment numbered 727.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent reading of the
amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so.
The amendment is as follows:

At the end of subtitle E of title X, add the following:

SEC. . NATIONAL POW/MIA RECOGNITION DAY.

(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The United States has fought in many wars, and
thousands of Americans who served in those wars were captured
by the enemy or listed as missing in action.
(2) Many of these Americans are still missing and
unaccounted for, and the uncertainty surrounding their fates
has caused their families to suffer tragic and continuing
hardships.
(3) As a symbol of the Nation's concern and commitment to
accounting as fully as possible for all Americans still held
prisoner, missing, or unaccounted for by reason of their
service in the Armed Forces and to honor the Americans who in
future wars may be captured or listed as missing or
unaccounted for, Congress has officially recognized the
National League of Families POW/MIA flag.
(4) The American people observe and honor with appropriate
ceremony and activity the third Friday of September each year
as National POW/MIA Recognition Day.
(b) Display of POW/MIA Flag.--The POW/MIA flag shall be
displayed on Armed Forces Day, Memorial Day, Flag Day,
Independence Day, Veterans Day, National POW/MIA Recognition
Day, and on the last business day before each of the
preceding holidays, on the grounds or in the public lobbies
of--
(1) the Capitol;
(2) major military installations (as designated by the
Secretary of Defense);
(3) Federal national cemeteries;
(4) the national Korean War Veterans Memorial;
(5) the national Vietnam Veterans Memorial;
(6) the White House;
(7) the official office of the--
(A) Secretary of State;
(B) Secretary of Defense;
(C) Secretary of Veterans Affairs; and
(D) Director of the Selective Service System; and
(8) United States Postal Service post offices.
(c) POW/MIA Flag Defined.--In this section, the term ``POW/
MIA flag'' means the National League of Families POW/MIA flag
recognized and designated by section 2 of Public Law 101-355
(104 Stat. 416).
(d) Regulations.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the agency or department responsible
for a location listed in subsection (b) shall prescribe any
regulation necessary to carry out this section.
(e) Repeal of Provision Relating to Display of POW/MIA
Flag.--Section 1084 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (36 U.S.C. 189 note, Public
Law 102-190) is repealed.

Mr. LEVIN. The amendment is cleared on this side.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. Hutchison). The question is on agreeing
to the amendment.
The amendment (No. 727) was agreed to.
Mr. THURMOND. Madam President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. LEVIN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Madam President, I take this opportunity to thank the
distinguished managers of S. 936, the Department of Defense
authorization bill, for incorporating my amendment to authorize the
flying of the POW/MIA flag over certain Federal facilities and post
offices.
This amendment contains the text of S. 528, the bill I introduced on
April 9, 1997. I am pleased that 23 of our colleagues joined in
cosponsoring S. 528. These cosponsors include Senators Conrad, Cleland,
Kempthorne, Warner, Collins, Moseley-Braun, Torricelli, Faircloth,
D'Amato, Stevens, Hutchinson, Smith, DeWine, Lott, McConnell,
Murkowski, Gregg, Lautenberg, Allard, Shelby, Craig, Grams, and
Ashcroft.
This amendment would authorize the POW/MIA flag to be displayed over
military installations and memorials around the Nation and at other
appropriate places of significance on Armed Forces Day, Memorial Day,
Flag Day, Independence Day, Veterans Day, National POW/MIA Recognition
Day, and on the last business day before each of the preceding
holidays. A similar amendment was included in the House of
Representatives Defense authorization bill.
Congress has officially recognized the National League of Families
POW/MIA flag. Displaying this flag would be a powerful symbol to all
Americans that we have not forgotten--and will not forget.
As you know, the United States has fought in many wars and thousands
of Americans who served in those wars were captured by enemy or listed
missing in action. In 20th century wars alone, more than 147,000
Americans were captured and became prisoners of war; of that number
more than 15,000 died while in captivity. When we add to this number,
those who are still missing in action, we realize that more can be done
to honor their commitment to duty, honor, and country.
The display of the POW/MIA flag would be a forceful reminder that we
care not only for them, but for their families who personally carry
with them the burden of sacrifice. We want them to know that they do
not stand alone, that we stand with them and beside them, as they
remember the loyalty and devotion of those who served.
As a veteran who served in Korea, I personally know that the
remembrance of another's sacrifice in battle is one of the highest and
most noble acts we can do. Let us now demonstrate our indebtedness and
gratitude for those who served that we might live in freedom.
I thank the managers of the DOD authorization bill for their
assistance with this amendment and urge its immediate adoption.
I thank the Chair and yield the floor.

Amendment No. 728

(Purpose: To provide a Federal charter for the Air Force Sergeants
Association)

Mr. THURMOND. Madam President, I send an amendment to the desk on
behalf of Senator McCain and ask for its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from South Carolina [Mr. Thurmond], for Mr.
McCain, proposes an amendment numbered 728.

Mr. THURMOND. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that reading
of the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:

Insert after title XI, the following new title:
TITLE XII--FEDERAL CHARTER FOR THE AIR FORCE SERGEANTS ASSOCIATION

SEC. 1201. RECOGNITION AND GRANT OF FEDERAL CHARTER.

The Air Force Sergeants Association, a nonprofit
corporation organized under the laws of the District of
Columbia, is recognized as such and granted a Federal
charter.

SEC. 1202. POWERS.

The Air Force Sergeants Association (in this title referred
to as the ``association'') shall have only those powers
granted to it through its bylaws and articles of
incorporation filed in the District of Columbia and subject
to the laws of the District of Columbia.

SEC. 1203. PURPOSES.

The purposes of the association are those provided in its
bylaws and articles of incorporation and shall include the
following:
(1) To help maintain a highly dedicated and professional
corps of enlisted personnel within the United States Air
Force, including the United States Air Force Reserve, and the
Air National Guard.
(2) To support fair and equitable legislation and
Department of the Air Force policies and to influence by
lawful means departmental plans, programs, policies, and
legislative proposals that affect enlisted personnel of the
Regular Air Force, the Air Force Reserve, and the Air
National Guard, its retirees, and other veterans of enlisted
service in the Air Force.
(3) To actively publicize the roles of enlisted personnel
in the United States Air Force.

[[Page S6891]]

(4) To participate in civil and military activities, youth
programs, and fundraising campaigns that benefit the United
States Air Force.
(5) To provide for the mutual welfare of members of the
association and their families.
(6) To assist in recruiting for the United States Air
Force.
(7) To assemble together for social activities.
(8) To maintain an adequate Air Force for our beloved
country.
(9) To foster among the members of the association a
devotion to fellow airmen.
(10) To serve the United States and the United States Air
Force loyally, and to do all else necessary to uphold and
defend the Constitution of the United States.

SEC. 1204. SERVICE OF PROCESS.

With respect to service of process, the association shall
comply with the laws of the District of Columbia and those
States in which it carries on its activities in furtherance
of its corporate purposes.

SEC. 1205. MEMBERSHIP.

Except as provided in section 1208(g), eligibility for
membership in the association and the rights and privileges
of members shall be as provided in the bylaws and articles of
incorporation of the association.

SEC. 1206. BOARD OF DIRECTORS.

Except as provided in section 1208(g), the composition of
the board of directors of the association and the
responsibilities of the board shall be as provided in the
bylaws and articles of incorporation of the association and
in conformity with the laws of the District of Columbia.

SEC. 1207. OFFICERS.

Except as provided in section 1208(g), the positions of
officers of the association and the election of members to
such positions shall be as provided in the bylaws and
articles of incorporation of the association and in
conformity with the laws of the District of Columbia.

SEC. 1208. RESTRICTIONS.

(a) Income and Compensation.--No part of the income or
assets of the association may inure to the benefit of any
member, officer, or director of the association or be
distributed to any such individual during the life of this
charter. Nothing in this subsection may be construed to
prevent the payment of reasonable compensation to the
officers and employees of the association or reimbursement
for actual and necessary expenses in amounts approved by the
board of directors.
(b) Loans.--The association may not make any loan to any
member, officer, director, or employee of the association.
(c) Issuance of Stock and Payment of Dividends.--The
association may not issue any shares of stock or declare or
pay any dividends.
(d) Disclaimer of Congressional or Federal Approval.--The
association may not claim the approval of the Congress or the
authorization of the Federal Government for any of its
activities by virtue of this title.
(e) Corporate Status.--The association shall maintain its
status as a corporation organized and incorporated under the
laws of the District of Columbia.
(f) Corporate Function.--The association shall function as
an educational, patriotic, civic, historical, and research
organization under the laws of the District of Columbia.
(g) Nondiscrimination.--In establishing the conditions of
membership in the association and in determining the
requirements for serving on the board of directors or as an
officer of the association, the association may not
discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex,
handicap, age, or national origin.

SEC. 1209. LIABILITY.

The association shall be liable for the acts of its
officers, directors, employees, and agents whenever such
individuals act within the scope of their authority.

SEC. 1210. MAINTENANCE AND INSPECTION OF BOOKS AND RECORDS.

(a) Books and Records of Account.--The association shall
keep correct and complete books and records of account and
minutes of any proceeding of the association involving any of
its members, the board of directors, or any committee having
authority under the board of directors.
(b) Names and Addresses of Members.--The association shall
keep at its principal office a record of the names and
addresses of all members having the right to vote in any
proceeding of the association.
(c) Right to Inspect Books and Records.--All books and
records of the association may be inspected by any member
having the right to vote in any proceeding of the
association, or by any agent or attorney of such member, for
any proper purpose at any reasonable time.
(d) Application of State Law.--This section may not be
construed to contravene any applicable State law.

SEC. 1211. AUDIT OF FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS.

The first section of the Act entitled ``An Act to provide
for audit of accounts of private corporations established
under Federal law'', approved August 30, 1964 (36 U.S.C.
1101), is amended--
(1) by redesignating the paragraph (77) added by section
1811 of Public Law 104-201 (110 Stat. 2762) as paragraph
(78); and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(79) Air Force Sergeants Association.''.

SEC. 1212. ANNUAL REPORT.

The association shall annually submit to Congress a report
concerning the activities of the association during the
preceding fiscal year. The annual report shall be submitted
on the same date as the report of the audit required by
reason of the amendment made in section 1211. The annual
report shall not be printed as a public document.

SEC. 1213. RESERVATION OF RIGHT TO ALTER, AMEND, OR REPEAL
CHARTER.

The right to alter, amend, or repeal this title is
expressly reserved to Congress.

SEC. 1214. TAX-EXEMPT STATUS REQUIRED AS CONDITION OF
CHARTER.

If the association fails to maintain its status as an
organization exempt from taxation as provided in the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 the charter granted in this title shall
terminate.

SEC. 1215. TERMINATION.

The charter granted in this title shall expire if the
association fails to comply with any of the provisions of
this title.

SEC. 1216. DEFINITION OF STATE.

For purposes of this title, the term ``State'' includes the
District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and the
territories and possessions of the United States.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is agreed to.
The amendment (No. 728) was agreed to.
Mr. THURMOND. I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. LEVIN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Amendment No. 658

Mr. DOMENICI. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. President. Is the pending
business the Lugar amendment?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is the pending matter.
Mr. DOMENICI. I am a cosponsor and I intend to speak on that. Are
there any limitations?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There are none.
Mr. DOMENICI. I thank the Chair. I hope that doesn't give me a
license to speak too long, but I will do my best.
Mr. President, the amendment I'm cosponsoring today is vital to
continuing the progress of our Nation's programs focused on reducing
the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Our
colleagues Senators Nunn and Lugar initiated the Cooperative Threat
Reduction program in 1991, and I was proud to join with them in the
Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act
last year. Your votes by a 96-to-0 margin last year showed the concern
that all of you shared with me that proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction is a very real threat to the security of the Nation and one
of the greatest destabilizing forces that could be unleashed on this
Planet.
In setting up the original Nunn-Lugar program and in passing the
Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act, the Congress agreed
that our Nation's national security interests are best served by
preventing the proliferation of any of the former Soviet weapons,
components, materials, technologies, or technologists. Congress labeled
the Nunn-Lugar programs as cooperative threat reduction and that phrase
was chosen very deliberately. The programs are indeed cooperative--they
involve our establishment cooperating with their establishment, and the
programs involve threat reduction--reducing the threat to our Nation.
Senator Nunn presents a series of powerful arguments on these
programs in a foreword he recently authored for the book ``Dismantling
the Cold War.'' He discusses the transition over the last few years
from a world characterized by a high risk of nuclear conflict but also
high stability, thanks to the sharply bilateral nature of that world
and the fear of using any nuclear weapons. Now we have a period of low
risk of massive global nuclear conflict, but also very low stability
because of intensification of a wide range of real and potential
conflicts around the globe. He notes that the current key question ``is
whether the U.S. and Russia, now as partners and as friends, can keep
the world safe from weapons of mass destruction as we reduce our
arsenals.'' He argues convincingly

[[Page S6892]]

against using the Nunn-Lugar program as a form of bribery to encourage
Russia to undertake specific actions, simply because these programs are
so strongly in our own best interest. In his view, ``proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction clearly is the number one national security
challenge we face.''
When we passed the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act,
we required the President to develop an integrated administration plan
for defending Americans against weapons of mass destruction. The
President's budget submission for fiscal year 1998 should have been
coordinated with his plan. But we haven't seen that plan to date--and
the country needs it. I'm very concerned with the lack of coordination
in national activities against weapons of mass destruction that this
plan would enable and I call upon the administration to develop and
release that plan. Further, I encourage that the final House-Senate
conference report reiterate the concern from Congress that this plan
needs to be a high priority item for the administration. But whether or
not the administration fulfills this requirement, I believe that
Congress needs to show its national leadership by fully funding the
cooperative threat reduction efforts. With full funding, Congress can
again emphasize, just as we did last year, that we treat the issue of
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction very very seriously.
John Deutch visited with a group of Senators just a few weeks ago to
discuss his concerns with proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
He and his colleagues argued very persuasively for increasing the funds
for defending our Nation against this threat above the administration's
request. He argued that if the 105th Congress does not continue to
strengthen U.S. capabilities to prevent and respond to the full range
of nuclear-biological-chemical terrorist attacks, the country will
remain unacceptably vulnerable to mass destruction terrorism. He stated
that ``the theat of terrorist attack with weapons of mass destruction
delivered by unconventional means is an even clearer and more present
danger to American lives and liberty than the threat of attack by
ballistic missiles.'' He also took strong issue with the current
administration's lack of coordination of efforts to defend against
weapons of mass destruction, and recommended that Congress take the
lead in directing the administration to improve the coordination
efforts. As I've already noted, this absence of a coordinating plan
from the administration is serious and Congress must continue to
demonstrate its leadership in this area by reiterating the national
need for this plan.

The United States is safer today thanks to the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici
and Nunn-Lugar initiatives. This amendment will continue our progress
to reduce the risk from ``loose nukes'' or aging reactors of Soviet
design. Through the Cooperative threat reduction programs, there are
over 1,400 fewer nuclear warheads deployed and many ballistic missile
launchers are no longer a threat to our citizens, along with many other
major improvements. Three nations--Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan--no
longer have nuclear weapons.
The International Nuclear Safety Program's funding is also being
restored by this amendment, and it is critical to prevention of another
Chernobyl. We need to apply the expertise of our national laboratories
to help the former Soviet states reduce any risks present in these
reactors. To some, the solution is to shut down these reactors, but it
isn't that simple when they are supplying power that is critically
important to their regions. The International Nuclear Safety Program is
working and must remain at full strength.
Of the three programs being restored in this amendment, I'm most
familiar with the Materials Protection Control and Accounting Program.
This program is absolutely essential to minimize the threat of nuclear
materials moving to rogue states or terrorist groups. By far the
greatest challenge to any of these groups considering creation of
nuclear weapons is obtaining the special nuclear materials--the highly
enriched uranium or plutonium that provide the fission energy source
for the bomb.
In the old Soviet Union, nuclear materials were protected with guards
and guns. The guards were well paid with stable jobs. Today, those
guards may not have been paid by their government for months. Those
guards may be wondering where their next meal is coming from, and more
willing to consider compromising the material they are charged with
protecting. Workers in the nuclear facilities are in similar straits,
and within the last few months we saw the suicide of the director of
the Russian Chelyabinsk facility out of frustration for his inability
to pay his workers.
We simply cannot rely on outdated ways of protecting nuclear
materials in a country faced with the economic hardships and turmoil
prevalent in the former Soviet Union. We need modern systems monitoring
and controlling these materials, systems of the type that have been
developed in this country and are in place wherever nuclear materials
are found in the United States.
This program is an outstanding example of international cooperation.
Work is in progress at more than 50 sites in Russia, Kazakhstan,
Ukraine, Belarus, Uzbekistan, Georgia, Lithuania, and Latvia. These
sites are estimated to have 90 percent or more of the fissile materials
outside of actual weapons--enough for tens of thousands of new weapons.
The program is also an outstanding example of cooperation among our
national laboratories--Los Alamos, Sandia, Livermore, Brookhaven,
Pacific Northwest, and Oak Ridge National Laboratories are all playing
key roles.
As just one example of the program's accomplishments, at the Siberian
chemical facility at Tomsk-7, by some measures the largest nuclear
facility in the world, upwards of 100 tons of highly enriched
uranium and plutonium are stored. Radiation monitors have now been
installed at the exit portals of the facility, significantly improving
security of all the material. And a wide range of additional security
measures are in progress as well.

The conference report language for the Nuclear Defense Authorization
Act for 1998 raises the concern that the Department of Energy is not
expending its allocated funds in this program. I've checked on the
details of this concern and learned that the accounting processes
required for this program cause as much as an 8 to 10 month delay
between when funds are allocated to a specific project and when they
are reported as spent after the work is done. We maintain good
accounting for these funds by demanding that the projects be finished
before final payment. Yet the funds must be in the Department at the
time a contract is initiated. In contrast to the conference report, I
learned that all fiscal year 1996 funds are committed and all fiscal
year 1997 funds that the committee questioned will be fully utilized.
Most of the fiscal year 1997 funds not reported as spent are already
committed to contracts.
The Materials Protection Control and Accounting Program must continue
its efforts to reduce this serious threat. We have just recently seen
new opportunities for the program to expand to include more of the
Russian naval reactor fuels. We are on a course to have most of the
known fissile material in Russia under some degree of protection by
2002. Significant security improvements have been completed in Latvia,
Lithuania, Uzbekistan, Georgia, and Belarus; 16 additional sites, 12 in
Russia, 2 in Ukraine, 2 in Kazakhstan, are scheduled for completion by
the end of 1997. Fiscal years 1998 and 1999 are the most critical for
implementing security upgrades at the very large defense facilities
with most of the material.
With our amendment today, we keep these key programs on target,
focused on reducing the threat of weapons of mass destruction. This
amendment is a significant re-emphasis of the leadership demonstrated
by Congress in the past in preventing proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. These programs are a significant contribution toward a
safer and more stable world for citizens of both the United States and
world, both for the current generation and far into the future.
I urge the Senate to adopt the amendment, which will replenish the
three programs I have just briefly outlined, without which I believe we
will be taking a giant step backward in the elimination, using the most
modern

[[Page S6893]]

means, of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, starting
with nuclear and leading on into chemical and biological. We have to
get started on the latter. Time is wasting and it is getting more and
more difficult and dangerous.
I yield the floor.
Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. THURMOND. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. THURMOND. Madam President, I just want to make a statement that
if Senators have amendments now is the time to come forward. We are
waiting to take up these amendments. We are ready to take up these
amendments. There is no use in keeping the Senate in session without
doing business here. To do business here we have to take up these
amendments. We already disposed of a number of amendments here by
consent this morning. But if anybody has an amendment now is the time
to come and offer it. It may be too late later.
Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I join the chairman's call for those who
have amendments to bring them to the floor, if possible, today or
tomorrow. One of the problems is, however, that we are facing a cloture
motion vote, and, if that is approved--and it must be the first vote--a
number of amendments that people have indicated they want to offer
would not be germane.
I want to spend just a moment or two on the situation that we are now
in relative to this pending cloture motion.
The bill before the Senate is the product of 4 days of debate and
thoughtful consideration during markup by the Senate Armed Services
Committee. At the end of the markup, the committee voted unanimously to
report this bill to the floor. It was an 18-to-0 vote.
This bill is consistent with the bipartisan budget agreement, and I
fully expect that at the proper time the Senate will give the bill a
strong bipartisan vote. We have not reached that time yet.
In recent years the Senate has debated more than 100 amendments to
the defense authorization bill and has taken 10 to 20 rollcall votes a
year. This has typically taken up to 50 to 60 hours over a period of a
week or so. Last year, for example, we disposed of 159 amendments with
19 rollcall votes, and over 63 hours of debate.
I don't see any reason to expect that Members will be offering any
fewer amendments, although we always can hope that might be the case,
or that it will take significantly less time to dispose of them this
year than it has in the past. Like previous defense authorization
bills, the bill before us is almost 500 pages long, and includes more
than 300 separate provisions.
But on Friday before the recess when the majority leader filed a
cloture motion the Senate had been considering this bill--and it is a
complex bill--for less than 8 hours, mostly on a Friday morning after
most Members had left town and after the majority leader said there
would be no votes. Not a single nongermane amendment has been adopted
until this recent series of amendments, and no major defense-related
amendment has yet been offered.
The major issues before us--the base closure issue, the depot issue,
possibly missile defense, Bosnia, NATO enlargement--have yet to be
raised. To say the least, I was surprised to see a cloture motion filed
at this early stage of the Senate's deliberations. That approach might
make some sense if there were sign of obstruction or delay in the
consideration of the bill. But that has not been the case. The floor
managers on both sides, as the chairman has said, are prepared to
consider and debate any amendment that may be forthcoming. We are
prepared to address issues and to move on with the Senate's business.
But we have not had an opportunity to do that. And we are not going to
have an opportunity to vote on any amendment prior to the vote on
cloture tomorrow since, as I understand the schedule established by the
majority leader, no votes can be scheduled for today and the first vote
tomorrow will be the cloture vote.
Members well know that the rules constrain consideration of
amendments in a postcloture situation. And they are extremely confining
rules. To be in order an amendment must also be relevant but germane
under a very strict definition of germaneness. Under postcloture rules
any amendment, no matter how relevant to the defense of the Nation, is
nongermane if it expands powers available under the bill, if it
introduces a new subject matter, or if it funds a program not already
funded in the bill. Any portion of an amendment that is not germane
makes the whole amendment out of order, and an amendment may not be
modified without the unanimous consent of the Senate.
If we were to vote cloture the major amendments that we all expect to
consider in the course of the debate would be nongermane and could not
be voted on by the Senate. For example, we have pending before us this
afternoon an amendment relative to the funding of the Nunn-Lugar
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. Unless we act on that amendment
this afternoon--that is an amendment which is addressing one of the
greatest threats that is faced by this country--that amendment would
not be in order, and we could not even vote on it.
Senators who question the administration's proposal for distributing
the workload of the two air logistics centers closed in the last BRAC
round would be denied the opportunity to raise the issue on this bill
if cloture passes. That is whether or not they come and debate it this
afternoon, and that is whether or not they come and debate it tomorrow
morning. The reason is because it is not germane technically to the
bill in a postcloture situation.

I don't happen to support adding those provisions to this bill. I
don't think we ought to add provisions to this bill that reallocate
workloads. I think we ought to leave that to a fair process. But that
is not the point.
Senators were asked to deliver amendments relating to this subject of
distributing the workload at the two air logistics centers which were
closed in the last BRAC round, and they would have no opportunity to
bring their amendments back on that subject if cloture were voted on
tomorrow.
Again, under the unanimous-consent rule that we are operating under,
cloture is the first rollcall vote that this Senate is going to be able
to have.
There is another major issue that should be debated and that we know
will be debated. That has to do with future base closure rounds. We had
a very lively discussion and debate on that in the Armed Services
Committee.
There are many of us who talked in support of the amendment of
Senator McCain relative to two new rounds of base closures. If we deny
those two new rounds we will be denying one of the highest priorities
of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But at least
we ought to have a vote on the subject, and if we vote on cloture
tomorrow--which must be the first vote regardless of when the BRAC
amendment is offered, whether it is offered this afternoon or offered
tomorrow, since under the unanimous-consent agreement that we are
operating under the first vote must be on cloture--and if that vote
passes tomorrow, then we would not be able to vote on whether or not to
add two new rounds or perhaps one new round of base closure. That is
just not right.
Amendments regarding foreign policy issues that are not currently
addressed in the bill various Senators may want to offer. Amendments
may be offered on Bosnia or on NATO expansion. Those amendments would
be out of order if cloture is voted tomorrow. The House version of this
bill has a major Bosnia-related provision. It would cut off funds for
United States ground troops in Bosnia after June 30 of next year. That
is a highly significant issue. While we don't have to debate it in this
bill, I think that some Senators may feel otherwise. I don't think they
ought to be barred from raising the issue should they choose, even
though I may not agree with their amendment.
Many other amendments that Members are planning to offer this year

[[Page S6894]]

would be out of order. Amendments involving the funding formula for the
National Guard Challenge Program, amendments relative to the North
Dakota flood close claims of Air Force personnel, amendments relative
to the reauthorization of the Sikes Act, to facilitate the preparation
of integrated natural resources management plans for military lands,
amendments to provide recruiter access to juvenile court records, and
so forth.
This is not the way that we should be doing business. We should not
be voting on cloture before we have had an opportunity to vote on
important amendments, and we will not have that opportunity under the
unanimous-consent agreement that we are operating under. We should not
be denying Members the opportunity to offer key amendments which will
require rollcall votes before the amendment process is even begun in
earnest.
I hope that we can continue to clear as many amendments as possible
this afternoon and tomorrow morning.
I happen to agree with the chairman. People who have amendments
should come down here and debate them. But the problem this cloture
motion creates for us is that we can't have rollcall votes until after
the vote on cloture tomorrow. And we know that a number of amendments
are going to require rollcall votes--legitimate amendments involving
base closures and involving the depot issue which so many of our
Members feel so strongly about.
That is why I hope we will not invoke cloture tomorrow. I think that
invoking cloture would be unfair to Members who want to bring up
amendments which require rollcall votes and to have us dispose of those
amendments.
So, Madam President, again, whether or not cloture may be needed at a
later stage in the debate of the bill, it would surely be premature to
invoke cloture tomorrow before the disposition of many important
amendments, controversial amendments and tested amendments, which
arguably require rollcall votes.
I yield the floor.
Mr. COCHRAN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.

Amendment No. 420

Mr. COCHRAN. Madam President, I know I don't need to ask consent to
return to the Cochran amendment. But the Lugar amendment has been
offered and has been the pending business. I ask that we return to the
regular order, to amendment No. 420.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has that right.
That is now the pending amendment.
Mr. COCHRAN. Madam President, amendment No. 420 was offered by me,
and is cosponsored by the distinguished Senator from Illinois, Senator
Durbin. It seeks to modify the existing export control policy that had
been instituted by the administration with respect to the exporting of
high-performance or so-called supercomputers.

supercomputer export controls

Madam President, on November 14, 1994, President Clinton issued
Executive Order 12938, the Emergency Regarding Weapons of Mass
Destruction, declaring that the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and the means of delivering them constitute ``an unusual
and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and
economy of the United States,'' and that he had therefore decided to
``declare a national emergency to deal with that threat.'' The
President reaffirmed this Executive order on November 15, 1995, and
again on November 11, 1996.
We have had several hearings recently on the subject of proliferation
in my Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security,
Proliferation, and Federal Services. And the distinguished ranking
member of the full committee, Senator Levin, is the ranking member of
that subcommittee.
We have examined cases of proliferation by the People's Republic of
China and proliferation by Russia, and I can tell you that the facts--
brought out in open session--are disturbing. The facts tell a story of
both Chinese and Russian sales of technology, components, and delivery
systems for weapons of mass destruction, as well as sales of highly
capable advanced conventional weapons and other critical military
technologies, to nations like Iran. The facts demonstrate that
President Clinton was entirely correct in describing this problem as a
national emergency.
Just last month, the Director of Central Intelligence sent Congress
an unclassified report entitled, ``The Acquisition of Technology
Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional
Munitions.'' The report covers only the period July through December
1996 and levies serious proliferation charges against, among others,
Russia and China. The report says:

China was the most significant supplier of WMD-related
goods and technology to foreign countries. The Chinese
provided a tremendous variety of assistance to both Iran's
and Pakistan's ballistic missile programs. China also was the
primary source of nuclear-related equipment and technology to
Pakistan, and a key supplier to Iran during this reporting
period. Iran also obtained considerable CW-related assistance
from China in the form of production equipment and
technology.

The intelligence community report--and I note that this report is not
the product of any single part of the intelligence community, but
represents the consensus view of the entire intelligence community--
goes on to say, and again I quote:

Madam President, the facts that emerged during my subcommittee's
hearings on Russian and Chinese proliferation are completely supported
by this latest report of the intelligence community. And we should not
be comforted by the fact that it reports on the proliferant behavior of
these nations only during the last half of 1996. For those who claim
that Chinese and Russian behavior on proliferation is getting better,
the best I can say is that it certainly is not yet good enough.
I raise the issue of proliferation because it is the principal reason
we have offered this amendment on supercomputer export controls. The
use of high-performance computers to upgrade existing weapons
capabilities or develop new ones is not some fantasy or something that
might happen in the future. It is known fact. High-performance
computers help make it possible to develop and improve weapons
capabilities that threaten the United States. Keeping them out of the
wrong hands makes America safer. Dr. Seymour Goodman, in a report used
by the administration as its basis for weakening U.S. export controls
on high-performance computers, wrote:

. . . continued export controls will slow the exacerbation
of existing nuclear threats. Control of HPC [high-performance
computer] exports, by limiting those exports or imposing
appropriate safeguards, to countries known to possess nuclear
weapons will impede their development of improved weapons and
reduce their confidence in their existing stockpile by
limiting the opportunity to conduct simulations in lieu of
live tests. Similar or more rigorous controls on HPC exports
to countries with nuclear weapons development programs could
impede their development of second-generation weapons.

The June 1997 Intelligence Community report to Congress couldn't be
more clear on this issue. It states:

. . . countries of concern continued last year to acquire
substantial amounts of WMD-related equipment, materials, and
technology, as well as modern conventional weapons. China and
Russia continued to be the primary suppliers, and are key to
any future efforts to stem the flow of dual-use goods and
modern weapons to countries to concern.

This amendment will help reduce the proliferation danger facing the
United States by requiring an individual validated license to export
all supercomputers to so-called Tier 3 countries, which include China
and Russia. Because of the new export control policy for supercomputers
announced by the Clinton administration on October 6, 1995, there
currently is no such requirement. We must act to change that policy
now.
This policy, which has been in place for almost 18 months, groups all
nations into four country tiers and establishes export licensing
requirements for high-performance computers based upon their country of
destination. Tier 1 countries, consisting primarily of our NATO allies,
are free to receive high-performance computers of unlimited capability
without an export license from the United States, while, at the other
end of the spectrum, Tier 4 countries, consisting of the last
trustworthy, cannot legally receive any of

[[Page S6895]]

these supercomputers. Almost all countries in South America, Central
America, the Caribbean, and Africa are in Tier 2, and can receive
supercomputers capable of up to 10,000 MTOPS--MTOPS are Millions of
Theoretical Operations per Second, the standard measure of computing
capability--before an export license is required.
The end-use and end-user are the critical factors for exports to any
of the 50 nations comprising Tier 3. If the end-use and user are
civilian, the policy allows exports of supercomputers capable of up to
7,000 MTOPS before an export license is required. If the Tier 3 end-use
or user is military, U.S. export licenses are required for any high-
performance computer capable of more than 2,000 MTOPS. But it is the
U.S. exporter, not the administration, which has the responsibility
under this policy for determining the end-use and user for Tier 3
exports between 2,000 MTOPS and 7,000 MTOPS. This responsibility,
difficult under any circumstances, is complicated by a company's
natural focus on making sales. Our amendment addresses only these Tier
3 exports, as depicted by the diagonally-striped area on this chart,
which I am going to show the Senate at some point in this discussion.

Our amendment applies to only a small portion of high-performance
computer exports. In fact, according to the Commerce Department's
Bureau of Export Administration, of the 1,436 supercomputers exported
from the United States from the date the new policy went into effect
through March 1997, only 91 went to Tier 3 countries. That amounts to
6.34 percent of total supercomputer exports. Does it not make sense for
our Government to be willing to check to make sure that 6.34 percent of
our supercomputer exports go to the right place? Is it unreasonable to
require the administration to be sure that American supercomputer sales
aren't going to people and places who would damage American national
security?
Our amendment doesn't prohibit the transfer of a single
supercomputer. It requires that the existing standards for transfers be
monitored by our Government. Our amendment changes only one aspect of
the policy, shifting the burden of determining end-use and end-user in
Tier 3 countries from the exporter to the administration. Why is this
so important? Listen to another part of last month's report to Congress
by the Intelligence Community, which says, ``Many Third World
countries--with Iran being the most prominent example--are responding
to Western counterproliferation efforts by relying more on legitimate
commercial firms as procurement fronts and by developing more
convoluted procurement networks.''
American exporters are not capable of determining whether a potential
purchaser is a ``procurement front'' or part of a ``more convoluted
procurement network,'' and it is wrong to place this burden on them.
The administration, and many exporters, will tell you that the
current policy is working, that closer scrutiny isn't required, but
look at this chart and what it shows you. There are American
supercomputers in Russia's and China's nuclear weapons complexes.
According to Russia's Minister of Atomic Energy, these supercomputers
are ``10 times faster than any previously available in Russia.''
According to the Chinese Academy of Sciences--which works on everything
from the D-5 ICBM, capable of reaching the United States, to uranium
enrichment for nuclear weapons--its American supercomputer provides the
Academy with ``computational power previously unknown'' and is
available--this is a quote from them--to ``all the major scientific and
technological institutes across China.'' American high performance
computers are now available to help these countries improve their
nuclear weapons and improve that which they are proliferating, courtesy
of a policy that can be called many things, but can't reasonably
labelled as ``working.''
Just last week we learned through press reports that an American
supercomputer sent to Hong Kong is now in China under the control of
the People's Liberation Army. In addition to the 47 American
supercomputers that have been shipped to China since this new policy
took effect, 20 unlicensed American supercomputers have been shipped to
Hong Kong. At least now we know where one of the Hong Kong
supercomputers is. What about the others? does this look to anyone like
a policy that's working? This is a real problem. It is a problem that
exists now. It is not a hypothetical problem. It is not a problem that
may develop in the future. This is a serious problem that threatens our
national security.
There are some opposing this amendment who claim that setting the
threshold at 2,000 MTOPS is too low, and consequently will make it
impossible for American computer manufacturers to sell personal
computers--PC's--abroad. That is just not true. It is a last minute
desperation shot at the Cochran-Durbin amendment. Let's look at the
facts:
The first fact is the 2,000 MTOPS threshold opponents express concern
over was not dreamed up by us. It is the administration's limit.
No. 2, industry suggests that by some time in the fourth quarter of
1998--this date came, incidentally, from IBM's Director of public
policy, who recently visited with my staff about this amendment--IBM
will produce, according to him, a PC capable of just over 2,000 MTOPS
for sale in the international marketplace, he said. But IBM couldn't
answer several basic questions about this PC. Its Director of public
policy didn't know the name of the PC, the expected price that would be
charged for it, how many would be produced for the U.S. market, how
many would be produced for potential foreign market sales, or even how
many would be produced for this Tier 3 market, which this amendment is
narrowly related to. It is worth remembering that this amendment that
we are talking about only affects Tier 3 countries, and he's talking to
us as if our amendment affects all sales to everybody--in the United
States, foreign countries, everywhere--and that is just not true.
IBM doesn't just build these machines overnight on an impulse or a
whim or a guess about what is out there in terms of potential sales. If
it is going to have a new top-of-the-line PC out within 15 to 16
months, as they claim through this director of public policy, it must
already have ordered the chip to run this PC. Doesn't it stand to
reason that if such a PC were just around the corner, IBM would be able
to answer some of these basic questions that I said the director could
not answer? If not, is it possible that IBM is being overly optimistic
about its capability, its projections, about the timeframe involved,
and all the other arguments that have been advanced against this
amendment?
Fact No. 3: Right now, according to William Reinsch, who is the Under
Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration, ``High end Pentium-
based personal computers sold today at retail outlets perform at about
200 to 250 MTOPS.''
Did you hear that? We are not talking about 2,000 to 7,000 MTOPS,
like some of these computer lobbyists are saying to Senators are going
to be affected by this amendment. The PC's that are out on the market
today are at much lower ranges of capability.
Let's give Secretary Reinsch the benefit of the doubt and say today's
top-end PCs are capable of running at 250 MTOPS. Secretary Reinsch said
on June 11 before my subcommittee in an open hearing that ``computer
power doubles every 18 months, and this has been the axiom in the
industry for, I think, about 15 years.''
This axiom is known as Moore's Law. The math is straightforward. If
top-end PC's are capable of 250 MTOPS today, 18 months from now they
will be capable of 500 MTOPS; 36 months from now, they will be capable
of 1,000 MTOPS; 54 months from now, in 4\1/2\ years, they will be
capable of 2,000 MTOPS. Fifty-four months from now is not, contrary to
the claims of some computer manufacturers, the fourth quarter of next
year, as was suggested to us by the director of public policy of IBM.
Of course, Moore's Law doesn't even mean that 54 months from now there
will be PC's on the market capable of 2,000 MTOPS. It only suggests
that our manufacturers should be able to build these powerful PC's 54
months from now, if Moore's Law continues to be sustained. None of our
manufacturers will build PC's this powerful unless there is a broad
market demand for such a highly capable PC, and it is unclear if the
market will even be demanding such a powerful PC many times more
powerful

[[Page S6896]]

than today's top-of-the-line PC's in just under 5 years.
If 4 or 5 years from now industry's optimism proves to be correct, I
will be pleased to return to this floor and offer legislation modifying
the 2,000 MTOPS level. But the suggestion that by next year we will
have PC's many times more powerful than our most powerful today can
only be guesswork, wishful thinking.
Fact No. 4: IBM currently sells, again according to its director of
public policy, a workstation that is capable of just over 2,000 MTOPS.
Wouldn't it make sense that future demand for the much anticipated
2,000 MTOPS PC should be similar to the current demand for the
workstation that is already on the market?
According to the Commerce Department, from January 25, 1996, when the
administration's supercomputer export control liberalization took
effect, to March of 1997, 1,436 American high-performance computers
were exported to countries in tiers 1, 2, and 3. Of these 1,436, just
91, or 6.34 percent, went to tier 3 countries. I do not know how many
of these 91 were IBM's workstation that is just over 2,000 MTOPS. We
know that at least 6 of the 91 were not manufactured by IBM--4 Silicon
Graphics machines that are now running at Russia's nuclear weapons
labs; one Silicon Graphics machine in the Chinese Academy of Sciences,
which is a key part of China's nuclear weapons complex; and one Sun
Microsystems machine that we just learned last week is now running at a
Chinese military facility in Chungsha after being diverted from Hong
Kong. So up to 85 of the 91 exported over 14 months to tier 3 countries
could have been this IBM workstation, though I doubt that all of them
consisted of that one machine. But even if all 85 were these IBM
workstations, does this sound like the kind of volume that will
overwhelm the Government's licensing apparatus? Certainly not.
The specter of American jobs being lost to unwieldy export controls
is just another part of the argument against the Cochran-Durbin
amendment that is not based on the facts.
Another argument made against our amendment is that the right way to
keep organizations from getting American supercomputer technology who
shouldn't be receiving it is for the Department of Commerce to publish
a list of prohibited end users with individual validated licenses
required for any high-performance computer export to a country or
entity on the list. This argument against the amendment at least has
the virtue of implicitly admitting that American supercomputers should
not be in Russia's and China's nuclear weapons design labs, but it is
another argument that is simply not based on the facts.
Shortly before the recent July Fourth recess, I spoke on the floor of
the Senate explaining why such a list would be, in many ways, worse
than the current situation. I won't go through all those reasons again
in the interest of time now, but I continue to believe that such a list
would be necessarily incomplete because of the requirement to protect
intelligence sources and methods. It could be used as the Department of
Commerce's guide for proliferators, and it would make it only too easy
to make a sale to a location not on the list, thus encouraging makers
of weapons of mass destruction to establish phony front organizations
for the purposes of acquiring U.S. supercomputers. They wouldn't be on
that list.

In fact, the Department of Commerce on June 30 published such a list,
and its inadequacy is obvious. The June 30 list, called by the Commerce
Department the ``Entities List,'' consists of 13 locations in 5 tier 3
countries that can receive an American supercomputer only if you have a
license, only subject to a license. So now the total list of proscribed
end users consists of 15 entities. On this list are Chelyabinsk-70 and
Arzamas-16 in Russia which have already received at least five American
supercomputers and parts of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, which also
is now manufacturing more modern nuclear weapons with America's finest
technology.
Because of this list, now America's computer exporters know that they
need a license to ship a high-performance computer to any of these
entities. What about other entities, though? What about the Chinese
company that shipped ring magnets to Pakistan last year for use in its
nuclear program? Why isn't that company on the list? It has been
subjected to sanctions imposed by our Government, and it is not on our
Government's list as a prohibited end user. What about the Chinese
company or government entity that shipped M-11 missiles to Pakistan and
now, according to press reports, is helping Pakistan build a factory
for the indigenous manufacture of M-11 missiles? Why isn't that entity
on the list? What about the Russian company or government entity
helping Iran to upgrade its nuclear program and ballistic missile
programs, why aren't they on the list?
Madam President, this list does not solve the problem. If anything,
it makes it more confused, it makes it more difficult for American
exporters to determine who should or should not receive American high-
performance computers. In many ways, this list is worse than nothing.
There are many who believe the entire high-performance computer
export control policy of this administration is a failure. However one
views this policy as a whole, there is one aspect of it that we know is
not working and it can be fixed now.
We know that American supercomputers are now in Chinese and Russian
nuclear weapons labs. We know that they should not be there. We know
that our Government, with the resources of the intelligence community,
is better able to determine the identity of end users and end uses than
is industry. Industry has no way to be able to determine the end use
and user of its products to the degree of confidence that our
intelligence agencies can do.
Right now we have the opportunity not to impose new restrictions on
our supercomputer manufacturers but to shift the burden of making end-
use and end-user determinations from industry to Government.
Look at this chart again and you will see that we are talking about
only a very small part of the overall policy. The entire chart
describes the policy and shows the number of tiers, 1 through 4, the
varying capabilities on the basis of millions of theoretical operations
per second, MTOPS, along the left side. And the only part of the entire
export business of American supercomputers that is affected by this
amendment is this part shown in the diagonal lines. The fact is, we are
talking about only 6.34 percent of supercomputer exports under this
policy that will be affected by this amendment.
The Cochran-Durbin amendment will not prevent a single supercomputer
export to anyone who should have one, but it will help ensure, though,
that only those who should have them will have them. The only
supercomputer sales that would be blocked by our amendment are those
going to foreign entities who the U.S. Government determines shouldn't
have it. It will not prevent legitimate sales to legitimate users in
the U.S. or outside the U.S., but it will help prevent a repeat of the
errors that have allowed American supercomputers to go to Russia and to
go to China and be used in their nuclear weapons labs.
Let's be clear what this debate is about. It is about U.S. national
security. If you think Russia and China shouldn't be using American
supercomputers to improve the quality of their nuclear arsenals and the
quality of the weapons systems and components and technology that they
are selling in turn to others, vote for the Cochran-Durbin amendment.
President Clinton was right when he called the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction ``an unusual and extraordinary threat to
the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United
States,'' and that it constitutes a ``national emergency.'' These
weapons, delivery systems and technologies are more readily developed
and enhanced by high-performance computers, and who makes those
computers? The United States.
If the United States is going to demonstrate that it is serious about
this issue, we must do more than complain to Russia and China every
time one of those nations engage in proliferation.
The American fight against proliferation must start at our own
borders.
I urge Senators to vote against the Grams-Boxer substitute and
support the Cochran-Durbin amendment.

[[Page S6897]]

Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the distinguished
Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. Smith] be added as a cosponsor to our
amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Collins). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
Mr. DURBIN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.
Mr. DURBIN. I rise to speak on behalf of the same amendment which my
colleague, the Senator from Mississippi, Senator Cochran, has just
described.
I am happy to join him as a cosponsor on this important amendment. I
only wish my colleagues and many others who are listening to this
debate could have been there when Senator Cochran's subcommittee met
just several weeks ago and really talked in depth about what we are
doing.
For the average layman, the average person in the United States,
there are some very technical terms involved in this debate. But the
purpose of this amendment is very clear and very straightforward. We
understand that if we give to another country certain information or
technology, they are able in many ways to use it for positive reasons.
We fear however that if that same information and technology is given
to a country which might use it for negative purposes, that it is
inconsistent with the national security of the United States.
The Cochran-Durbin amendment is an effort to make certain that we
continue to sell technology around the world, but take care not to sell
it in those countries where it may be misused.
Unfortunately, the Clinton administration over the last years has had
a change in its policy, with a more expansive, more liberal trade
policy when it comes to supercomputers. It has been my fear, and the
fear of the Senator from Mississippi, that some of these computers
which are being purchased for nominally peaceful reasons are in fact
going to be used for military purposes.
One of the examples which the Senator from Mississippi used in
closing was the whole question of weapons testing. Some 35 years ago
when President Kennedy spoke to the Nation, he challenged us as a world
to reduce nuclear arms testing so as to make this a more peaceful
planet. I think President Kennedy was right. And I support a weapons
test ban. I think the United States should continue to show leadership.
But we live in a different world some 3 decades later where a country
with a new computer, the supercomputers that we are describing, that
country may have the capability to test a nuclear weapon without ever
detonating it. They can set up all of the parameters within the
computer, test the weapon, and show its impact.
So if you are talking about reducing the proliferation of dangerous
weapons--nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons--you must
necessarily get involved in this debate, which Senator Cochran has
initiated and I have been more than happy to assist in.
Some questions have been raised. And I wonder, just for purposes of
clarification, if I could ask Senator Cochran a question or two for the
record here. I know the Senator has covered most of this in his opening
statement, but I think we ought to make a clear record for our
colleagues on the amendment.
One of the first things that is said is, well, you set the standard
too low. If a company wants to sell this computer, which we describe as
a 2,000 MTOPS computer, you have set it too low, set it at a standard
so that the computers that are going to be licensed, there is going to
be surveillance at such a level. It will not hit the ordinary business
computers.
I would like you to respond. And I know you did respond in the course
of your opening remarks to that particular criticism. If you would,
please, I yield to the Senator.
Mr. COCHRAN. If the distinguished Senator would yield, I appreciate
very much not only his question but also his very helpful involvement
in this issue and cosponsoring the amendment.
But he gets to the central point of the debate here. It is not that
this amendment sets any new levels of prohibition or granting authority
for export sales. It does not change any of those levels. The level
that is established by the administration is the 2,000 MTOPS level. We
do not change that for tier 3 countries, as demonstrated in the chart I
showed a while ago.
We were told in our hearing that 250 MTOPS is about the current power
of a PC which is sold in the market here in the country now. And that
under the so-called Moore's Law that doubles every 18 months. So it
would be 4\1/2\ years before you get to a level where you would even
reach the 2,000 MTOPS level which is the trigger level for tier 3
countries that have to have a license if the end use or the end user is
military. If they're civilian, you do not have to have a license at
all.
What this amendment changes is who determines the end use or the end
user. Our amendment says it should be the administration's
responsibility. Current policy is that exporters have the
responsibility of making that determination. That is the only thing we
change.
Mr. DURBIN. If I could pose another question to my cosponsor on this
amendment, Senator Cochran.
There have been others that have said, well, why is the United States
doing this? If we stop selling computers around the world, whatever
their capability, some other country is going to sell them. So we are
tying the hands of American business in a futile effort to stop this
march of technology.
I would appreciate it if my colleague, the Senator from Mississippi,
would address that particular complaint.
Mr. COCHRAN. Our information, derived at our hearings through expert
witnesses, was that we have the highest capability of any country in
the world in terms of supercomputer manufacturing technology. We
manufacture the state-of-the-art supercomputers. We do not have any
competitors. Japan manufactures some high-performance supercomputers
but their export policy is more restrictive than ours. They require
licensing, we do not.
What we are suggesting here is that the policy of our administration
is flawed in that it ought to make the determination in those questions
where end use and end user is relevant as to whether you can or cannot
make the sale, the Government ought to monitor and verify that this
sale is permissible. And it applies to only 6.34 percent of the total
computer sales of all American exporters in the export market.
Mr. DURBIN. I thank my colleague.
I think he noted in the course of his remarks that last week or
perhaps the week before the administration said, well, let us put out a
list of 13 or 14 different entities that we think we should take care
not to sell to. And I agree completely with the Senator from
Mississippi that it is hardly a comfort in this argument that we are
protecting the interest of the United States with this list.
It is hard to believe that our intelligence operations would make a
complete disclosure of every potentially bad purchaser around the world
without in fact disclosing very sensitive classified information. It is
far better to take the approach which the Cochran-Durbin amendment
does, which says that on a case-by-case basis there will be a license
issued by the Government to determine whether the would-be purchaser in
any way raises a suspicion that this technology is going to be misused,
used against the United States.
I think our approach to it gives the Government the power it needs to
police the sales, says to the seller, the computer company, you can
come to the Government now and entrust that decision to an entity which
should know as to which purchasers should not be trusted. And that I
think would give the industry some peace of mind. It has to be a major
embarrassment to these companies to realize now that they have sold
these supercomputers in China and in Russia and that they may be used
for military purposes against the United States.
Certainly, these companies in the United States value our security,
they are as patriotic as many others, and they would want to do the
right thing. The Cochran-Durbin amendment sets up I think a good
framework for the right decision to be made. I certainly hope that when
this amendment comes up for consideration that many of our colleagues
on both sides of the aisle

[[Page S6898]]

will stop and pause and reflect on it. Because I think it in a way
takes a look at the world as it currently exists and says we do not
want to sell to potential enemies or to suspect nations that power that
might come back someday to haunt us. It is important to increase trade,
but not at the expense of the security of the United States.
I thank my colleague from Mississippi for his leadership. And I am
happy to join him in this effort.
I yield back.
Mr. COCHRAN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that there be
printed in the Record a chart on exports of high-performance computers;
and an unclassified report from the Director of Central Intelligence,
as mentioned in my earlier remarks; and an editorial from the St. Louis
Post-Dispatch suggesting that the administration should not wait, that
it must act now on this issue.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

EXPORTS OF HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTERS FROM JANUARY 25, 1996 TO MARCH
1997

[Number of systems by country]

Argentina.............................................................4
Australia............................................................63
Austria..............................................................17
Belgium..............................................................38
Brazil...............................................................15
Canada...............................................................11
China................................................................47
Colombia..............................................................5
Croatia...............................................................1
Czech Rep.............................................................4
Denmark..............................................................10
Egypt.................................................................2
Finland...............................................................2
France...............................................................86
Germany.............................................................232
Greece................................................................1
Hong Kong............................................................20
Hungary...............................................................3
India.................................................................7
Indonesia.............................................................6
Ireland...............................................................6
Israel...............................................................17
Italy................................................................42
Jamaica...............................................................1
Japan...............................................................150
Kenya.................................................................1
Korea, South........................................................133
Luxembourg............................................................2
Malaysia.............................................................33
Mexico...............................................................24
Netherlands..........................................................23
New Zealand..........................................................15
Nigeria...............................................................2
Norway................................................................7
Peru..................................................................7
Philippines...........................................................4
Poland................................................................2
Portugal..............................................................8
Romania...............................................................4
Russia...............................................................10
Saudi Arabia..........................................................2
Singapore............................................................24
Slovak Rep............................................................1
Slovenia..............................................................2
S. Africa............................................................12
Spain................................................................37
Sweden...............................................................38
Switzerland..........................................................41
Taiwan................................................................6
Thailand.............................................................10
Turkey................................................................4
UAE...................................................................1
UK..................................................................187
Uruguay...............................................................1
Venezuela.............................................................4
Zimbabwe..............................................................1
________

Total number of systems........................................1436

The Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction
and Advanced Conventional Munitions

scope note

The DCI submitted this biannual report in response to a
Congressionally directed action in Section 721 of the FY 1997
Intelligence Authorization Act:
``(a) Not later than 6 months after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and every 6 months thereafter, the
Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to Congress a
report on
(1) the acquisition by foreign countries during the
preceding 6 months of dual-use and other technology useful
for the development or production of weapons of mass
destruction (including nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and
biological weapons) and advanced conventional munitions; and
(2) trends in the acquisition of such technology by such
countries.''
At the DCI's request, the Nonproliferation Center (NPC)
drafted this report and coordinated it throughout the
Intelligence Community. As directed by Section 721,
subsection (b) of the Act, it is unclassified.

introduction

The threat from the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and missiles is one of the highest priorities for
intelligence. In the US effort to counter weapons
proliferation, the Intelligence Community has taken an active
role in supporting US government initiatives to strengthen
export controls in supplier countries and to work with other
countries to prevent the sale of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD), advanced conventional weapons, and their related
technologies. While it is an extremely difficult problem, US
government efforts have made some progress, making both the
acquisition and development of WMD more difficult and costly
for proliferators.
Interdiction of WMD and the technologies necessary to
acquire a WMD capability is a key component in the
acquisition prevention effort. We see interdiction efforts
falling into three basic categories:
Preventing the transfer of materials through export
controls and international nonproliferation regimes;
Halting the transfer or the negotiation of transfer of
materials through diplomatic and liaison initiatives;
Seizing proscribed materials in transit, through law
enforcement agencies in cooperation with the Intelligence
Community.
Interdiction efforts are an extremely important part of our
overall nonproliferation strategy. By themselves, however,
they generally do not get countries out of the business of
proliferation. They do, though, buy time for other
initiatives that may be more successful in halting or rolling
back a WMD program. These other initiatives can include:
Diplomatic efforts designed to reduce the perceived need
for a WMD capability;
Education efforts to show that WMD-related funds would be
better spent elsewhere;
Bilateral or multilateral incentives. Such incentives could
be financial, including membership in an international
economic forum, in exchange for halting or rolling back a WMD
program;
Military assistance or security guarantees.
The US clearly leads the way in programs in all three
classes of interdiction efforts. US export license
applications of concern are scrutinized by a number of
agencies, including the Intelligence Community. The US also
is developing procedures to share appropriate end user
information with key allies in an effort to strengthen our
mutual export control activities. In addition, the procedures
for alerting other governments of impending transfers and
tracking resulting actions are in place and working.
Interdictions of shipments are occurring.
An example of a successful interdiction would be the
seizure of chemical precursors destined for Libya. Although
such a seizure would not halt Tripoli's aggressive chemical
weapons development program, at a minimum it would:
Slow Tripoli's ability to begin serial production of
chemical agents;
Provide the US time to persuade supplier nations or
companies to halt future shipments to Libya;
Allow the Intelligence Community and US law enforcement
agencies to identify and target new intelligence sources that
could contribute to rolling back Libya's CW program;
Increase the cost to Libya of its CW development program.
Interdiction successes rest, in large measure, not on the
quantity of information available to the policymaker, but on
the quality. This is true for all three classes of
interdictions. In licensing, for example, policymakers need
unambiguous intelligence information before making a decision
to deny a license, thereby denying a sale for the US company.
Likewise, demarches to other governments must be accurate or
the US will be accused of crying wolf and lose support from
even friendly countries. And interdictions of shipments in
transit often become international incidents, and potential
embarrassment if the targeted material is not found in the
shipment.
Actionable intelligence in support of interdiction efforts
requires more than cooperation between US intelligence,
policy, and law enforcement agencies. It demands close
working relationships between the United States and other
foreign governments committed to halting the proliferation of
WMD. Such relationships will, of course, include intelligence
sharing arrangements, but equally important are diplomatic,
military, and scientific exchanges at all levels.
As noted above, interdiction programs by themselves cannot
halt the proliferation of WMD. Alternative suppliers and
technologies, increasing use of denial and deception, and a
growing ability to produce indigenously weapons or their
component parts are opening new avenues to states or
organizations determined to obtain a WMD capability. The
increasing diffusion of modern technology through the growth
of the world market is making it harder to detect illicit
diversions of materials and technologies relevant to a
weapons program.
We are addressing these new challenges with more aggressive
efforts, which go beyond traditional cold-war efforts aimed
merely at understanding weapons and associated plans. We are
better integrating technical analysis with political,
military, and diplomatic analysis to provide policymakers
with information on the motivations that drive foreign
actions and decisions, and on influential opposition forces
that could support initiatives to diminish or eliminate
the proliferation threat.
Our concerns are not limited to interdicting materials and
technologies to state-sponsored WMD development programs. As
worrisome, in our judgment, are terrorist groups and cults
that seek to acquire or develop

[[Page S6899]]

chemical and biological weapons on their own. For example,
the incidents staged in March 1995 by the Japanese cult Aurn
Shinrikyo demonstrate the use of WMD is not longer restricted
to the battlefield. Terrorist groups and violent sub-national
groups need not acquire a massive infrastructure to create a
deadly, arsenal. Only small quantities of precursors,
available on the open market, are needed.
Interdiction efforts are further complicated by the fact
that most WMD programs are based on dual-use technologies and
materials that have legitimate civilian or military
applications unrelated to WMD. For example, chemicals used to
make nerve agents are also used to make plastics and to
process foodstuffs; trade in those technologies cannot be
banned.
Nonproliferation regimes provide international standards to
gauge and address behavior. They provide diplomatic tools to
isolate and punish violators. The past few years, many states
have joined these regimes and outsiders are encountering new
pressures to join. Procurement costs have risen because of
the need for convoluted efforts to hide purchases. That said,
these regimes can be deceived by determined proliferators.
The sheer volume of international commerce, increased self-
sufficiency, and the global diffusion of technology and its
dual-use nature make the regimes' road ahead a difficult one.
Intelligence will play an increasingly important role in
maintaining their effectiveness. Protecting sources
throughout this process will be a challenge.
Following are summaries by country of ACW- and WMD-related
acquisition activities (solicitations, negotiations,
contracts, and deliveries) that occurred between 1 July and
31 December 1996.

Acquisition by Country

We chose to exclude countries that already have substantial
ACW and WMD programs such as China and Russia, as well as
countries of lower priority that demonstrated little
acquisition activity of concern.

egypt

During the last half of 1996, Egypt obtained Scud-related
ballistic missile equipment from North Korea and Russia.

india

India sought some items for its ballistic missile program
during the reporting period from a variety of sources. It
also sought nuclear-related items, some of which may have
been intended for its nuclear weapons program.

iran

Iran continues to be one of the most active countries
seeking to acquire all types of WMD technology and advanced
conventional weapons. Its efforts in the last half of 1996
have focused on acquiring production technology that will
give Iran an indigenous production capability for all types
of WMD. Numerous interdiction efforts by the US government
have interfered with Iranian attempts to purchase arms and
WMD-related goods, but Iran's acquisition efforts remain
unrelenting.
For the reporting period, China and Russia have been
primary sources for missile-related goods. Iran obtained the
bulk of its CW equipment from China and India. Iran sought
dual-use biotech equipment from Europe and Asia, ostensibly
for civilian uses. Iran was actively seeking modern tanks,
SAMs, and other arms from the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS), China, and Europe. Besides some large projects
with China, Iranian nuclear-related purchases were not
focused on any particular countries and were only indirectly
related to nuclear weapons production.

iraq

We have not observed Iraq purchasing advanced conventional
weapons or WMD-related goods, although it has purchased
numerous dual-use items.

libya

Despite the UN embargo, Libya continued to aggressively
seek ballistic missile-related equipment, materials, and
technology from Europe, the CIS, and the Far East. CW-related
purchases diminished, however.

north korea

North Korea's WMD programs are largely indigenous. We
observed no significant procurement involving ACW or WMD-
related goods.

pakistan

Pakistan was very aggressive in seeking our equipment,
material, and technology for its nuclear weapons program,
with China as its principal supplier. Pakistan also sought a
wide variety of nuclear-related goods from many Western
nations, including the United States. China also was a major
supplier to Pakistan's ballistic missile program, providing
technology and assistance. Of note, Pakistan has made strong
efforts to acquire an indigenous capability in missile
production technologies.

syria

Syria continued to seek CW- and Scud-related goods during
the reporting period. Russia and Eastern Europe were the
primary target for CW-related purchases, while North Korea
and Iran have become important suppliers of Scud-related
equipment and materials.

Key Suppliers

china

During the last half of 1996, China was the most
significant supplier of WMD-related goods and technology of
foreign countries. The Chinese provided a tremendous variety
of assistance to both Iran's and Pakistan's ballistic missile
programs. China also was the primary source of nuclear-
related equipment and technology to Pakistan, and a key
supplier to Iran during this reporting period. Iran also
obtained considerable CW-related assistance from China in the
form of production equipment and technology.

russia

Russia supplied a variety of ballistic missile-related
goods to foreign countries during the reporting period,
especially to Iran. Russia was an important source for
nuclear programs in Iran and, to a lesser extent, India and
Pakistan. Russia also negotiated the sale of advanced weapon
systems, such as the SA-10 to Cyprus, and is an important
target for Middle Eastern countries seeking to upgrade and
replace their existing arms.

north korea

North Korea continued to export Scud-related equipment and
materials to countries of concern during this reporting
period.

germany

Among Western nations, Germany was the favorite target for
foreign WMD programs. German export controls were effective
in thwarting many of these attempts, but some dual-use goods
were exported, purportedly to civilian end users.

trends

Despite our efforts, countries of concern continued last
year to acquire substantial amounts of WMD-related equipment,
materials, and technology, as well as modern conventional
weapons. China and Russia continued to be the primary
suppliers, and are key to any future efforts to stem the flow
of dual-use goods and modern weapons to countries of concern.
Countries determined to maintain WMD programs over the long
term have been placing significant emphasis on securing their
programs against interdiction and disruption. In response to
broader, more effective export controls, these countries have
been tying to reduce their dependence on imports by
developing an indigenous production capability. Many Third
World countries--with Iran being the most prominent example--
are responding to Western counterproliferation efforts by
relying more on legitimate commercial firms as procurement
fronts and by developing more convoluted procurement
networks. Should countries such as Iran ever become self-
sufficient producers and exporters of WMD-related goods and
conventional weapons, however, opportunities to prevent
acquisition will be dramatically limited.
____

[From the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, July 6, 1997]

China's Dangerous Computer Diversion

The Chinese have done it again--diverted machinery
supposedly purchased for commercial purposes to military
uses. Predictably, China denies all, but the U.S. State and
Commerce departments say they have proof that China diverted
a supercomputer that can be used to upgrade military
hardware. The Clinton administration is rightly calling
attention to the problem, but may have been lax in allowing
it to happen in the first place.
Supercomputers can process so much data so quickly that any
nation possessing one can significantly upgrade its weapons.
That's why sales of supercomputers for military purposes
require a license. But under a Clinton edict adopted in 1995,
sales of supercomputers for commercial purposes don't. That
appears to have been a mistake.
U.S. officials have discovered that a supercomputer
manufactured by Sun Microsystems was sold to a Hong Kong
company, then purchased by the Chinese government. It was
supposed to be sent to a science institute in Beijing, but
ended up instead in Changsha where it is being used for
military applications, the U.S. says.
China denies it, as it also rejects State Department
charges that it has been selling nuclear and ballistic
missile technology to Pakistan and Iran. These wouldn't be
China's first untruths; last year, China diverted a huge
metal stamping machine sold by McDonnell Douglas for
commercial airline manufacture to military use.
All supercomputers are capable of so-called dual use, that
is, of being employed for both peaceful and military
purposes, so they must be carefully monitored. Though the
United States has been fairly successful in that effort with
its sales to Russia, China has been largely uncooperative.
Congress is so concerned that the House has passed a bill
reinstating the requirement that all supercomputers sold
abroad for any purpose be licensed--and their use be tracked.
In 1995, the administration deregulated the sale of
supercomputers for peaceful purposes on the ground that if
America doesn't sell its machines, the Europeans or the
Japanese would sell theirs. But the importance of slowing the
spread of higher grade nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles
requires the U.S. to prevent the sale of supercomputers which
defeat that purpose, never mind helping the computer industry
compete abroad. Only strict licensing is safe, and our
competitors should be pressured to follow that policy. The
administration shouldn't wait for Congress, but require it
now.

Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.

[[Page S6900]]

Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I would like to make a parliamentary
inquiry.
Would the Cochran amendment be germane in a postcloture situation if
cloture were approved tomorrow?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. At this time the amendment does not appear to
be germane in a postcloture situation, but the sponsor of the amendment
has not had the opportunity to make his case for germaneness, and the
Chair would rule on germaneness only after cloture had been invoked and
after the sponsor had an opportunity to make his arguments for the
amendment being germane.
Mr. LEVIN. I appreciate the Chair's care.
Mr. COCHRAN. If the Senator will yield in response to that response
by the Chair.
Mr. LEVIN. I am happy to yield.
Mr. COCHRAN. Would there be any way to modify the amendment to make
it germane in a postcloture situation?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Once cloture is invoked, it would take
unanimous consent to modify the amendment.
Mr. COCHRAN. I thank the Chair.
Mr. LEVIN. The reason I raise this, Madam President, is this is an
example of where we are prematurely faced with a cloture vote. I say
premature, because we have not had an opportunity to vote on key
amendments and will not have an opportunity to vote on key amendments,
including the Cochran amendment, before cloture. Because under the
unanimous-consent agreement that we are operating under, cloture is
going to be voted on first. That is the first vote tomorrow.
It strikes me as being unfair to amendments and to those sponsors of
amendments who have put in a serious effort on major security issues.
I do not know how I am going to vote on the Cochran amendment. I am
studying the amendment. It raises a very significant issue relative to
American security. But it is not technically germane because of our
postcloture rules. It surely is relevant to this bill in any, I think,
general sense. We are talking about the security of this Nation and we
are trying to weigh the issue here, the pros and cons of the Cochran
amendment. Surely, it is a serious national security issue which the
Senator from Mississippi has raised, the chairman of a subcommittee
which has had hearings into a very important issue.
So I urged before that we not invoke cloture tomorrow for a number of
reasons and stated that there were a number of very significant pending
amendments that would be or might be ruled nongermane after cloture,
and I failed to list this amendment as an example of that type of
amendment that could very well fall although I think by any reasonable
definition of national security this surely is relevant to that issue.
So I commend my good friend from Mississippi for raising this issue.
Again, it is an issue that I am going to be giving some real study to
this evening. It is a very thoughtful amendment. It is a carefully
drawn amendment. It is based on a current classification. And I want to
commend him on it and hope that he will be able to at least have a vote
on his amendment. That very well will be impossible if cloture were
invoked tomorrow.
Madam President, I want to ask another parliamentary inquiry because
there is a second-degree amendment which is also pending, a second-
degree amendment to the Cochran amendment. I ask the Chair the
following question.
Would the question put relative to the Grams amendment receive the
same response from the Chair as my question relative to the Cochran
amendment?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. After conferring with the Parliamentarian, the
Chair would give the same response to the question with regard to the
Grams amendment.
Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Chair.
Mr. THURMOND. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. THURMOND. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. THURMOND. Madam President, I am just notifying Senators that if
they have any amendments, come over and we'll take them up. This is the
time and this is the place. We are just killing time here, wasting
time, wasting the Government's time, wasting our time waiting on people
to come in and offer amendments. I want to say to my colleagues, if you
have an amendment, come on over here and let's take it up and get
action on it. I am here waiting to cooperate. Thank you very much.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. SPECTER. I thank the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services
Committee for asking the quorum call be rescinded and I thank the Chair
for waiting. I knew today we would be discussing the Department of
Defense authorization bill. As soon as I completed work on our hearings
for tomorrow, the Government Operations Committee, I notified the floor
that I would be coming over and I thank the Chair for waiting and I
thank the distinguished chairman for waiting.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania.
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I have sought recognition to discuss an
amendment which has been circulated with both the majority and
minority, which refers to establishing procedures for a report not
later than 90 days after the enactment of the defense authorization
bill, for the Secretary of Defense to submit to the congressional
defense committees a report containing the following: No. 1, an
assessment of the current policies and practices of the Department of
Defense with respect to the protection of members of the Armed Forces
against terrorist attack abroad, including any modifications of such
policies or practices that are proposed or implemented as a result of
the assessment; and, second, an assessment of the procedures of the
military departments intended to determine accountability, if any, in
the command structure in instances in which a terrorist attack results
in the loss of life at an installation or facility of the Armed Forces
abroad.
This report is being sought because of what happened on June 25,
1996, when a bomb detonated not more than 80 feet from the Air Force
housing complex known as Khobar Towers in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia,
killing 19 members of the Air Force and injuring hundreds more, as many
as 400 more.
This incident came under very intensive scrutiny by the Intelligence
Committee, which I chaired last year. I have very serious reservations
as to the adequacy of the Department of Defense response to the kind of
threat which was posed by having those living quarters within 80 feet
of a fence.
The Department of Defense had a report on June 13, 1996 from the
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, highlighting
security concerns in the region in which Dhahran was located.
Previously, in January 1996, the Office of Special Investigations of
the Air Force issued a vulnerability assessment for the complex, and
that assessment highlighted the vulnerability of perimeter security at
the complex, given the proximity of the complex to a boundary fence and
the lack of the protective coating mylar on its windows. And then, just
8 days before the terrorist attack, the Department of Defense received
an intelligence report detailing a high level of risk to the complex.
That report went to the highest levels of the Department of Defense and
had the picture of Khobar Towers on it.
Immediately after the incident occurred, the Secretary of Defense,
William J. Perry, said that it was very unusual to have a bomb of the
magnitude of 3,000 to 5,000 pounds used in the Mideast. I took issue
with that statement on a factual basis that on October 23, 1983,
according to the results of the Long Commission, a bomb weighing 12,000
pounds had killed 283 marines in Beirut, in the Mideast. That is the
same region where, regrettably, terrorist attacks have become all too
commonplace. So it struck me as strange that the Secretary of Defense
would say that a bomb weighing 3,000 to 5,000

[[Page S6901]]

pounds was unusual in the Mideast, when there had been a bomb of 12,000
pounds, as I say, in 1983, detonated, giving tremendous warning for
just this kind of attack; and that, in fact, a reading of the Long
Commission report, for anybody who had read it, would have demonstrated
the kind of threat which was posed by a high-powered bomb detonated
near a fence in that area.
I personally saw that fence in August 1996 when I visited Khobar
Towers in Dhahran as part of my effort and the Intelligence Committee's
efforts to try to find out exactly what had happened there. We had
testimony from General Peay, who was the four-star commander in the
area, who testified before a Senate committee in early July. Asked
about the closeness of the perimeter fence to those living quarters,
``Was it too close?'' he said words to the effect of, ``I don't know. I
just don't know.''

Certainly after the fact it is hard to understand how a ranking
general would not know that that fence was too close to the living
quarters and, realistically, before the fact, it seems hard to
understand how the commanding general would not know about the
extraordinary and unwarranted danger which was faced by the airmen who
were living in those quarters.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shalikashvili, had
visited Dhahran in the spring of 1996 and was within sight of Khobar
Towers, although, as I understand it, he did not actually visit Khobar.
But a question to be raised and a question to be answered, which has
not yet been answered by the Department of Defense, is why the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when in the area, within sight of Khobar
Towers, knowing what the security risks were, did not take a look at
that facility and make an assessment as to the vulnerability, since he
was on the spot. That is especially true in light of the fact that
there had been an attack in Riyahd, Saudi Arabia, in November 1995,
killing a number of Americans, and that four Saudis had been executed
by the Saudi Government in late May 1996, which would give rise to a
concern as to what the militants in Saudi Arabia would do next. That
was especially troublesome to the United States from a number of points
of view, one of which was that the FBI, charged with investigating
those matters overseas, had not been given access to those terrorists
before they were executed.
So, here you have the general on the spot, a brigadier general, with
the fence 80 feet from the towers, you have the four-star general in
command of the overall area even after the fact, not knowing whether
there was an unacceptable risk, and you have the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff in the vicinity, within sight of Khobar Towers, and no
corrective action taken notwithstanding all of these warnings which had
been given in a number of contexts about the danger which was present
there.
Following the attack on Khobar Towers, a commission was formed with
General Downing, a retired four-star general, in command. When he
testified before the Intelligence Committee on September 19, 1996,
among other questions I asked him about a series of criteria
established by the Secretary of Defense, Secretary William J. Perry,
about what the responsibility was of the Secretary of Defense.
General Downing testified that even under Secretary Perry's two
standards they were not met. The first two standards articulated by
Secretary Perry were ``establishing the policies and guidance for our
commanders, including the policy and guidance for force protection.''
I asked General Downing:

. . . Was there an adequate policy and guidance on force
protection?

General Downing's response:

No, there was not, Senator.

Then I asked about Secretary Perry's second criterion, organizing and
structuring the Department of Defense in such a way that force
protection is optimal. Then the question was:

So did they meet the second criterion which stated
``organizing and structuring the Department of Defense in
such a way that force protection is optimal?''

General Downing:

The answer is no.

I ask unanimous consent, Mr. President, that at the conclusion of my
remarks this extract from the hearings before the Intelligence
Committee be printed in the Record.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, in sequence, the committee then learned
that there had been a report on the force protection issue, ``Force
Protection in Southwest Asia, An Air Force Perspective,'' dated
September 17. Our committee learned about this as a result of a report
in the press, the Washington Post specifically, on October 10, 1996. So
by letter dated October 17, 1996, Senator Robert Kerrey, vice chairman
of the Intelligence Committee, and I, in my capacity as chairman, wrote
to Secretary of the Air Force, Sheila Widnall, asking for a copy of
that report.
I ask unanimous consent that the letter dated October 17, 1996, be
printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 2.)
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, the next sequence of events was a letter
which I sent to Secretary Perry, with a copy to Air Force Secretary
Widnall, dated November 5, 1996, which reads as follows:

This letter constitutes a formal complaint on the
obstruction by you, others and the Department of Defense on
the inquiry by the Intelligence Committee to determine
whether there was an intelligence failure relating to the
terrorist attack in Dhahran on June 25, 1996 on the
following:
1. Prohibiting key witnesses from being interviewed by this
Committee (Brigadier General Terryl Schwalier, Colonel Gary
Boyle, Lt. Colonel James Traister).

Notwithstanding our efforts to interview these key personnel, the
Department of Defense precluded the Intelligence Committee from
conducting those interviews.
Second, in my letter to Secretary Perry, I pointed out the concerns
we had on prohibiting General Downing from testifying before the
Intelligence Committee except on the terms set forth by the Secretary
of Defense with that questioning only being in closed session. With our
interest in having an open session, with General Downing having told
the Intelligence Committee that he was employed by the Department of
Defense and had to comply with instructions not to testify in open
session, the impact of that was obvious. When General Downing testified
in closed session that Secretary Perry had not even followed the
Secretary's own criteria for force protection, it was not much of an
impact contrasted to what it would have been had it been in open
session.
The third item:

Refusing to give this committee access to an Air Force
report which, as reported in the Washington Post on October
10.

Then, finally, on November 6, after this letter was faxed on November
5, we received a response from General Trapp dated November 6, 1996,
which I ask unanimous consent be printed in the Record at the
conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 3.)
Mr. SPECTER. Then there is my reply dated December 5 stating that
that reply was insufficient, and referring to other letters. I ask
unanimous consent that my letter of December 5 be printed in the Record
at the conclusion of my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 4.)
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I then note an article in the New York
Times dated December 12, 1996, which discussed release of another
report which apparently had been leaked to the New York Times for
reasons set forth in the New York Times article, which said:

Officials sympathetic to the Air Force position made
available Wednesday selected parts of a classified review the
Air Force conducted into the bombing. The review, written by
Lt. Gen. James F. Record, commander of the 12th Air Force,
cites, for example, the assessment of a senior U.S.
intelligence official in Riyadh, the Saudi capital, that the
intelligence reports given to General Schwalier ``did not
give a target'' for the terrorist attack.

So, by this time, some of the Air Force were dissatisfied with
General Downing's report and wanted a report

[[Page S6902]]

which would satisfy them. So another report had been commissioned, this
time to be written by Lt. Gen. James F. Record.
On seeing that additional news leak of the report, which the
Intelligence Committee did not have a copy of, Mr. President, I then
wrote to Secretary Widnall on the same day, December 12, noting the
access by the New York Times but no access by the Senate Intelligence
Committee.
Again, I ask unanimous consent that the New York Times article of
December 12, and my letter to Secretary Widnall dated December 12 be
printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibits 5 and 6.)
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, in the next series of events, I note a
story in the New York Times which, again, makes reference to these
reports which the Intelligence Committee never had access to, quoting
``Gen. Ronald Fogleman, the Air Force Chief of Staff, arguing that the
case for accountability is nothing more than a Washington scalp hunt.''
I then wrote, again, to Secretary of the Air Force, Sheila Widnall,
on April 25, 1997, noting the comments by General Fogleman and again
asking that these reports be made available to the Senate, to me, and
to the Senate Intelligence Committee.
I again ask unanimous consent that at the conclusion of my remarks
copies of the New York Times article dated April 15, 1997, together
with my letter dated April 25, 1997, be printed in the Record.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibits 7 and 8.)
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, all of these letters to Secretary of the
Air Force went unanswered. Then, on May 21 of this year, the Air Force
had the responsibility of coming to the Defense Appropriations
Subcommittee. I had an opportunity, finally, to ask Secretary Widnall
these questions and why there had not been any response to any of these
letters of inquiry and the question of General Fogleman on this
subject.
Finally, subsequent to that meeting, I received a very brief letter
from Secretary Widnall, in fact, after I had bumped into her in the
hallway on the 7th floor of the Hart Building and said to her, ``Madam
Secretary, why don't you at least respond to the letters saying that
you can't respond if that is your point because there is an inquiry
underway?''
In the context of all the letters which had been written and that
conversation, I finally received a letter saying she could not respond,
the matter was being reviewed now by the new Secretary of Defense, and
that, in due course, a copy of the report would be obtained by
Senators.

Here we are on July 7, 1997 and still no copy of the report has been
made available to this Senator or, to the best of my knowledge, to
other Senators, but copies of the report were made available to the
news media as it suits the purposes of the Department of the Air Force
and the Department of Defense.
Mr. President, in offering this amendment, it is my hope we will have
a statement of law requiring a report so we know what action is being
considered in the future to protect personnel of the Department of
Defense from terrorist attacks. News reports of the past week, an
article in the Washington Post a week ago yesterday, reported the
Secretary of Defense expected to make a finding sometime during the
month of July. It is my hope that when the Secretary of Defense speaks
on the subject, that he will go beyond the conduct of General
Schwalier, which was criticized in the early report, and will pick up
the issues of the conduct of the Department of Defense generally.
Brigadier General Schwalier's conduct was criticized in the Downing
report, but, to my way of thinking, that is not nearly enough of an
answer as to the conduct beyond Brigadier General Schwalier, moving to
a four-star general, moving to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, General Shalikashvili, and moving to the Secretary of Defense
himself, William J. Perry.
In this context, it is my judgment that the record shows forcefully
and conclusively that there were warnings all along the line; that when
you have a fence 80 feet from living quarters of hundreds of Air Force
personnel within easy distance of a large bomb, a bomb, according to
defense estimates, the Secretary of Defense, of 3,000 to 5,000 pounds,
substantially smaller than the experience of the 12,000-pound bomb in
Beirut in 1983, that there was forceful, obvious, and conclusive
neglect of duty. It goes beyond the brigadier general on the scene. It
goes to the commanding four star general, it goes to the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and it goes to the Secretary of Defense.
If we are to have confidence in what the Secretary of Defense does in
putting young men and women in harm's way, then there has to be
accountability for the 19 airmen who died on June 25 in Khobar Towers
and for the 400 who were wounded. That, Mr. President, is what I hope
will come from the findings of the Secretary of Defense.
In the meantime, this requirement for a report will be some help to
the future. But if we permit on this record those responsible, those in
the chain of command to go by unscathed, unreprimanded, unaccounted
for, then it is a blank check and open invitation for this kind of
conduct to be repeated in the future.
The problems of terrorism are too serious to turn our back on what
happened at Dhahran on June 25, 1996. I personally consider inexcusable
that we have had more than a year pass and nothing has been said in an
official way by the Department of Defense, the Department of the Air
Force, and all of the components, this is to say nothing about who the
terrorists are who have escaped punishment, and that is a matter which
yet has to be reckoned with.
But within our own Department of Defense, we have a right to expect
better, and I, for one, am awaiting the report of the Secretary of
Defense to see what the position of the Department of Defense is. But
at least as to the future, we will have some indication as to what
precautionary measures will be taken for the future, but there also has
to be an answer for the past. I thank the Chair. I yield the floor.

Exhibit 1

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Closed Hearing: The Downing
Report on Khobor Towers, September 19, 1996

Chairman Specter. I am going to try to finish up in the
course of the next few minutes. It's been a long morning for
you, I know, gentlemen.
I want to go to Secretary Perry's testimony on his
articulation of the responsibility of the Secretary of
Defense, and what I want to try to do is get your insights,
your judgment, General Downing, having headed the task force
and having done the investigation, having a lot of experience
in the military, from 1962 when you graduated from West
Point, to 1996, when you had retired, this is what Secretary
Perry said as to his responsibility.
I manifest this responsibility in four important ways.
First of all, by establishing the policies and guidance for
our commanders, including the policy and guidance for force
protection.
I think I already know your answer from your report, but
was there an adequate policy and guidance on force
protection?
General Downing. No, there was not, Senator.
Chairman Specter. Secondly, by organizing and structuring
the Department of Defense in such a way that force protection
is optimal. And I would include in that his testimony later
where he said, quote, ``But General Downing is correct in
saying that we do not have a budgetary focus on force
protection, nor do we have a budgetary focus in our resource
allocation process, in the institutional process by which we
decide how to pass funds out to different programs.'' So did
they meet the, quote, ``organizing and structuring the
Department of Defense in such a way that force protection is
optimal.''
General Downing. The answer is no. We gave them some
recommendations on how to do that better.
Chairman Specter. And third, and I guess this is included
in what I just said, by allocating resources to our
commanders, including resources for force protection.
General Downing. Sir, we--that was one where we did not
find--we found that--there was not a good structure for it,
but that they had not been denied funds for force protection.
The field had not been denied funds for force protection.
Chairman Specter. And finally, by carefully selecting and
supervising the military and civilian leadership in the
Department of Defense--and I asked you if that was meant,
first as to the Secretary, and then as to the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, who have these reports up from General Peay's unit as
to delegation of authority and guidance, etc. Was that
criterion met?
General Downing. Senator, I believe that the Secretary met
that and that the inherent responsibility of commanders for
force

[[Page S6903]]

protection is something I don't believe the Secretary of
Defense has to tell a commander he needs to do.
Chairman Specter. How about as to the Joint Chiefs of
Staff?
General Downing. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, we felt and we
recommended that they change those command relationships.

Exhibit 2

U.S. Senate,

Select Committee on Intelligence,

Washington, DC, October 17, 1996.
Hon. Sheila E. Widnall,
Secretary of the Air Force,
The Pentagon, Washington, DC.
Dear Secretary Widnall: As you know, the Committee is
reviewing the adequacy of intelligence support and its use by
consumers in the context of the recent terrorism incidents
affecting your forces in Saudi Arabia. Recently it came to
our attention that the Air Force completed a report entitled
``Force Protection in Southwest Asia, An Air Force
Perspective,'' dated 17 September 1996. This report was
quoted in Washington Post article appearing October 10, 1996.
Since we have been unable to obtain a copy of the report
through your legislative liaison office, we are forwarding
our request for a copy of this report directly to you and ask
for your assistance. Given the widespread coverage of the
report in the media and its importance to our ongoing
oversight responsibilities, there can be little justification
for not promptly providing a copy to the Committee.
Sincerely,
Arlen Specter,
Chairman.
J. Robert Kerrey,
Vice Chairman.

Exhibit 3

Department of the Air Force,

Washington, DC, November 6, 1996.
Hon. Arlen Specter,
Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: This is in response to your joint letter
of October 17, 1996, regarding what you describe as a
document concerning force protection in Southwest Asia that
was referred to in a Washington Post article on October 10,
1996.
Contrary to the implications in the article, the Air Force
has not issued a report entitled ``Force Protection in
Southwest Asia, An Air Force Perspective.'' Rather, a
preliminary briefing was prepared by the Office of the Deputy
Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations, for internal use on the
consideration and evaluation of the protection of our forces
against terrorism following the bombing of Khobar Towers in
Saudi Arabia. That preliminary briefing has now been given to
Lieutenant General Record for his use in reviewing this
matter and considering issues of accountability. When
Lieutenant General Record's process is complete, we will be
glad to provide the Committee with the results of his review
and related official documents.
A similar letter is being provided to Vice Chairman Kerrey
who joined you in your letter.
Sincerely,
Lansford E. Trapp, Jr.,
Director, Legislative Liaison.

Exhibit 4

U.S. Senate,

Select Committee on Intelligence,

Washington, DC, December 5, 1996.
Hon. Sheila E. Widnall,
Secretary of the Air Force,
The Pentagon, Washington, DC.
Dear Secretary Widnall: I want you to know that I consider
the letter from Brig. Gen. Lansford E. Trapp, Jr., of
November 6, 1996, totally insufficient in response to the
letter from Senator Kerrey and me to you dated October 17,
1996, and the copy of the letter which I sent to you dated
November 5, 1996, with the original going to Secretary Perry.
Sincerely,

Arlen Specter.

Exhibit 5

[From the New York Times, Dec. 12, 1996]

Air Force Inquiry Clears General in Saudi Bombing That Killed 19

(By Eric Schmitt)

Washington.--The Air Force has concluded that the general
in charge of a military housing complex in Saudi Arabia where
19 Americans were killed and 500 wounded in a terrorist
truck-bombing last June took reasonable steps to protect
against attack and should not be punished in any way.
The finding contradicts a major conclusion of a separate
Pentagon investigation in September that singled out the Air
Force officer, Brig. Gen. Terryl Schwalier, for failing to
adequately safeguard the Khobar Towers complex in Dhahran,
where the blast occurred.
Senior Pentagon officials, who described the results of the
Air Force inquiry Wednesday on condition of anonymity, said
the Air Force found the deaths a terrible tragedy, but not
the fault of Schwalier.
The officials said the inquiry concludes that none of the
10 officers responsible for the safety of the troops in
Dhahran violated any laws, Air Force regulations or codes of
conduct.
Under military law, the Air Force decides who, if anyone,
should be held accountable for a disaster like the Dhahran
bombing. The punishments range from mild reprimands to court-
martial proceedings that can lead to prison terms. In this
case, the Air Force recommended that no punishment of any
kind was warranted.
Officials said Air Force Secretary Sheila Widnall and Gen.
Ronald Fogleman, the Air Force chief of staff, had approved
the decision to exonerate the officers. They said that the
finding was expected to be announced later this month.
Defense Secretary William Perry has the authority to overrule
the Air Force decision, but Pentagon officials said that he
would be unlikely to do so.
``Surely there is a desire to hang somebody for this,''
said a senior Pentagon official who supports the Air Force
decision. ``But as you look back over the evidence it's
pretty hard without 20-20 hindsight to say, `I'd have done
that.' ''
The truck bomb exploded on Schwalier's last day as
commander of the air base and housing complex in Dhahran. He
is now in a Pentagon job overseeing Air Force operations and
is awaiting a promotion to major general.
``It's the wrong call,'' one official involved in the
initial Pentagon investigation said of the Air Force's
decision to exonerate the general. ``It just bothers me from
standpoint of the families. It's not right.''
The question of responsibility in the bombing has caused
deep strains among the armed services.
While some senior officers have been reprimanded for their
roles in recent military disasters, it is rare for a general
to face court-martial.
When two Air Force F-15 fighters flying over northern Iraq
mistakenly shot down two U.S. Army helicopters in 1994,
killing all 26 people aboard, only a captain serving as a
weapons-control officer in an AWACS control place went to
trial. He was acquitted.
Similarly, none of the 16 officers, including two generals,
who were disciplined in connection with the crash in April in
Croatia that killed Commerce Secretary Ron Brown and 34
others, were court-martialed.
But a Defense Department investigation, headed by a retired
Army officer, Gen. Wayne A. Downing, issued a scathing report
that said Schwalier ``did not protect his forces from a
terrorist attack.''
The Pentagon report said Schwalier did not heed
intelligence reports that Khobar Towers was highly vulnerable
to terrorist attack, even though there had already been one
deadly terrorist bombing against U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia.
Among a number of warnings was one eerily prescient. A
security officer wrote that the tightened security on the
base could lead terrorists to strike with a truck bomb at the
base's fence.
Air Force officials said they weighed the same evidence
that Downing's commission examined, but came to very
different conclusions about culpability.
Officials sympathetic to the Air Force position made
available Wednesday selected parts of a classified review the
Air Force conducted into the bombing. The review, written by
Lt. Gen. James F. Record, commander of the 12th Air Force,
cites, for example, the assessment of a senior U.S.
intelligence official in Riyadh, the Saudi capital, that the
intelligence reports given to Schwalier ``did not give a
target'' for a terrorist attack.
In addition, Record's review quotes the U.S. consul general
in Dhahran, David Winn, saying, ``No one really thought that
anything would happen in Dhahran.''
Air Force officials also said Schwalier took several steps
to protect the housing complex, from increasing the number of
guard posts to installing a double row of concrete highway
barriers around the fence-line.
Air Force officials acknowledged that those measures were
inadequate. ``There's no disagreement there,'' said the
senior Pentagon official who supports the Air Force decision.
``The fact is, 19 people were killed. But then the issue
becomes, was there dereliction of duty?''
Record, who had the power to recommend Schwalier face
court-martial, concluded there was no such neglect of duty.
Widnall and Fogleman concurred.
``People need to understand that accountability is a two-
edged sword,'' said the senior Pentagon official who supports
the Air Force decision. ``If you examine someone's actions
and you find them wanting, you hold them accountable. But if
you define that as court-martialing everyone, I can't live by
your definition.
``At the same time, if you believe that person is not
culpable,'' the Pentagon official continued, ``then it's
every bit your obligation to stand up and defend that person.
If you don't do that, you'll erode the fighting spirit of
commanders. You'll have people looking over their shoulders.
They'll always know they'll be second-guessed by people in
Washington.''
The attack in Saudi Arabia continues to create thorny
problems for the Clinton administration. In response to FBI
complaints that Saudi officials had been uncooperative in
what was to have been a joint inquiry, Riyadh has recently
turned over information to support its contention that the
bombing plot was heavily supported by Iran.
The information included videotaped interviews with some of
the several dozens suspects arrested after the bombing. But
some law enforcement officials expressed skepticism over the
interviews, saying they lacked credibility because the
confessions may have been obtained under duress.

[[Page S6904]]

The Air Force signaled months ago it did not believe
Schwalier was to blame. In an internal review that paralleled
Downing's inquiry, Air Force officials said Schwalier's
responsibility extended only to the fenced perimeter of the
base.
Beyond that, the responsibility for security belonged to
the Saudis. The truck bomb exploded in a parking lot just
outside the base's property.

Exhibit 6

U.S. Senate,

Select Committee on Intelligence,

Washington, DC, December 12, 1996.
Hon. Sheila E. Widnall,
Secretary of the Air Force, The Pentagon, Washington, DC.
Dear Secretary Widnall: Please reference my letters to you
of October 17, November 5, and December 5, 1996.
According to The New York Times today, selected portions of
the Air Force report on Dhahran have already been made
available to the news media by representatives of the Air
Force who are favorably disposed to the Air Force report.
I would like your prompt advice as to whether that news
report is accurate.
In any event, this is a formal demand that the report be
turned over to the Intelligence Committee forthwith.
Sincerely,
Arlen Specter.

Exhibit 7

[From the New York Times, Apr. 15, 1997]

Secretary Cohen's Call

It will be interesting to see if Defense Secretary William
Cohen has the moxie to hold the Air Force accountable for
security failures in Saudi Arabia last year. So far the
Pentagon's handling of the terrorist bombing in Dhahran that
killed 19 American airmen and wounded 500 has followed a
dismally familiar script. The Air force high command has
sloughed off responsibility, betting that top civilians will
once again bow to the shopworn argument that punishing
individual commanders is unfair and would damage morale.
Mr. Cohen, who knew how to cut through thicker Pentagon
smokescreens as a Senator, can set an admirably exacting
standard for his stewardship as Defense Secretary by
overturning the Air Force decision. The principle of civilian
leadership of the military requires the application of
independent judgment in cases like this. Since Air Force
Secretary Sheila Widnall seems a willing captive of her
service, Mr. Cohen must show that accountability in the
American military is not governed by the protective instincts
of the officer corps.
The security breakdown at the Khobar Towers apartment
complex in Dhahran last June is beyond dispute. Though
safeguards were enforced to prevent a suicide truck bomber
from entering the compound, the towers were left exposed to
attack from a nearby parking area. When a large truck bomb
was detonated there last June, the explosion sheared off the
northern facade of two towers.
The perimeter security fence was barely 35 yards from the
buildings. Despite intelligence warnings about a possible
terrorist attack, Air Force commanders made only a feeble
effort to extend the perimeter. Even the most elementary and
inexpensive defense--covering windows with a plastic film to
prevent shattering--was not used. Many of the deaths and
injuries were caused by flying glass.
These and other lapses were made plain in a Pentagon
investigation conducted by a retired Army general, Wayne
Downing. The Downing report concluded that Brig. Gen. Terryl
Schwalier, the Air Force commander in Dhahran, ``did not
adequately protect his forces from a terrorist attack.''
General Schwalier did not even bother to make security a
primary concern on his watch.
Now comes Gen. Ronald Fogleman, the Air Force Chief of
Staff, arguing that the case for accountability is nothing
more than a Washington scalp hunt. His view, in essence, is
that General Schwalier and his staff did everything they
reasonably could to secure the compound and that the method
and explosive power of the bombing exceeded any threat that
could have been anticipated.
Yet the destruction of the Alfred Murrah Federal Building
in Oklahoma City 14 months before the Dhahran attack showed
the power of a large truck bomb placed near but not inside a
high-rise building. It was lesson enough for the Secret
Service, which quickly closed a stretch of Pennsylvania
Avenue to expand the security perimeter around the White
House.
General Fogleman mistakes his own blind loyalty for
leadership. Morale is not served by dodging responsibility
and circling the wagons around a fellow officer. Perhaps
honor and duty are just quaint notions these days, but Mr.
Cohen might actually do wonders for the morale of Americans
in uniform if he rules that the Air Force cannot escape
responsibility for its failures in Dhahran.

Exhibit 8

U.S. Senate,

Committee on Veterans' Affairs,

Washington, DC, April 25, 1997.
Hon. Sheila Widnall,
Secretary, Department of the Air Force, Washington, DC.
Dear Secretary Widnall: I have noted repeated press
accounts on an Air Force report on the responsibility, if
any, for the terrorist attack at Dhahran on June 25, 1996.
As you know, I have made repeated requests for copies of
all DoD, including Air Force, reports on this incident.
According to press reports, Secretary of Defense William
Cohen is personally reviewing this matter.
I would very much appreciate it if you would promptly
provide to me a copy of any report on assessing
responsibility for the Dhahran terrorist attack of June 25,
1996.
Sincerely,
Arlen Specter.

Mr. SPECTER. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. President, I would like to take just a few minutes to
discuss an amendment I am offering to this year's DOD authorization
bill that will make a real difference in the lives of all members of
the naval service--and eventually all members of our Armed Forces. It
will eliminate many long lines and hours of frustration, it will
substantially reduce recordkeeping errors and it will save the DOD and
the taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars. And it represents the
next phase of the effective utilization of smart card technology--a
technology I have been encouraging and working on for many years.
Mr. President, when a new recruit joins the service today, he or she
faces a long and tedious registration process. A typical new recruit
faces hours of waiting in line to fill out forms with his or her name,
date of birth, rank, military I.D. number, and so forth, only to be
sent over to another line to fill out another form with much of the
same information again. Not only is this process aggravating for our
new recruits--it is a waste of the Armed Service's time and personnel.
It takes dozens of people countless hours to process in each new
recruit through this inefficient system, costing the service valuable
time and money, that it could be putting to better use elsewhere.
Once registered, a new recruit is issued a handful of ID's and cards
to carry. A typical service member today might be required to carry a
general ID card, an immunization card, a meal card, an equipment card,
a weapons card, a military driver's license, a vehicle registration, a
card to pick up mail, a card to carry if staying as a guest at another
base, and if lucky enough to be stationed near some good fishing, a
fishing permit. With so much clutter, it is not uncommon for a service
member to misplace one of their cards, which wastes even more of the
military's time and resources replacing them.
For years, I have been looking at ways that the military could
streamline the methods it uses for its registration and recordkeeping,
looking for a way to improve what I saw as an outdated and inefficient
system of issuing multiple cards containing duplicate information.
The Government and the private sector have been using cards for years
as a means of information storage. Many of the earliest cards had just
a name and number much like the Social Security card that is still in
use today. As the need for increased security and efficiency in the
transfer of information from a card grew however, we saw the
introduction of cards that relied on new information storage systems
like bar codes and magnetic stripes, much like the kind found on
today's credit cards, ATM cards, telephone calling cards, and in dozens
of other card-based applications. And as the technological capabilities
of cards have increased, so has the number of cards that each of us
carries every time we leave our residence.
Mr. President, we now stand on the brink of a new explosion in card
technology, one that promises to offer us even greater convenience and
efficiency in everyday life, saving money and time while increasing our
control over the information we provide to others. After years of
research and development, I am pleased to report that a new user-
friendly card technology will soon allow us to replace the handful of
cards now used in the DOD with a single, multiapplication ``smart''
card.
Mr. President, with the amendment that I am offering today, next
year,

[[Page S6905]]

under a pilot program that I have been working closely with the
Department of Defense and the Department of the Navy to develop, a new
recruit will not face the long and wasteful lines, the duplication of
information or the cumbersome bundles of cards that many of us
remember. Instead, upon arriving at boot camp, each new sailor and
marine will be issued a single card: the MARC card. Short for
Multitechnology Automated Reader Card this card will be used across the
entire Navy and Marine Corps next year, and if it works as well as some
of us believe it will, we will then extend it to all of the Armed
Forces.
The MARC card is a remarkable achievement. The MARC card can carry
your security clearance. The MARC card can carry your meal information.
The MARC card can hold your immunization records. The MARC card can
serve as your room key.
Mr. President, the long-term savings that will result from this
program will be substantial; the improvements in the increased speed
and quality of services will be enormous. With the MARC card, we can
reduce support infrastructure, thereby improving our tooth-to-tail
ratio while making our sailors' and marines' lives easier.
The MARC card is one of the first widespread applications of the most
exciting new card technology on the market today: the smart card. Smart
cards, like the MARC card, rely on an integrated circuit chip--a
microchip--to store more information and data than was ever before
possible on a single card. Within each card is a small microprocessor
along with a sizable memory capacity, which gives each smart card the
capabilities of a small microcomputer.
The capabilities of the smart card are so great that a single card
can perform all of the functions that this entire stack of cards that I
am holding up right here used to perform of still perform today, for
that matter, and will perform dozens of new time-saving applications as
well. Unlike older cards, the smart card is easily updatable, and has
the capability to constantly take on new information.
Yet the real strength of smart cards, like the MARC card lies not in
the convenience of carrying so much information on a single card, but
in the money that we can save as a result. By harnessing the strength
and memory of a small computer inside of a portable plastic card, a
multitude of new applications can be offered that will increase the
efficiency of Government, cutting down expensive and unnecessary
administrative costs while reducing waste, fraud, and abuse at all
levels of government.
Mr. President, I have seen this card in action, and the savings and
increased efficiency it can offer the members of our Armed Forces are
really impressive.
In the past, when our sailors would dock at a naval base upon their
return from sea they faced a long and tedious process of waiting in
line after line to check in to their shore station. Often taking up to
a week a sailor would need to fill out countless forms to register for
quarters, for medical treatment, for security clearance, for his next
assignment, for the mess hall et cetera.
But today at the Smart Base in Pascagoula, MS, the first naval base
to automate its operations using the MARC card, a sailor who arrives
off of the U.S.S. Yorktown faces a check-in time of just a few
minutes. By simply walking up to a kiosk, he can insert his MARC card
into a reader not unlike an automatic teller machine, and within
seconds be assigned his quarters and other necessary information, while
personal data needed by the command is simultaneously zipped
electronically around the rest of the base. His MARC card even serves
as his room key.

Not only does this process save sailors a lot of wasted time, but it
reduces the number of administrative staff needed to check in an entire
ship. To process every sailor from an arriving ship, a base need only
have a handful of staff on hand and a few kiosks that interact with the
MARC card.
Mr. President, the MARC card can improve the efficiency of every
operation across the military. Let me give you an example. Today, when
a sailor or marine heads to a mess hall to eat, he has to show his ID
card, as well as his meal card to one of the duty personnel, who
tediously records the information from both cards by hand into a
ledger. After each meal another officer must spend hours reconciling
who ate what on that particular day, at a great expense both in the
time involved and the money it costs. On average, it takes a mess hall
4 to 6 hours a day to account for all the meals that are eaten.
With the MARC card, however, sailors and marines will simply swipe
their cards through a reader as they enter the mess hall and be
automatically accounted for by a computer. Anyone who tries to sneak an
extra meal without paying is caught in the act, which helps the Navy
reduce fraud. After each meal, the officer in charge of the mess hall
will only need to call up a file on their computer to account for the
meals served. The total time involved is reduced from several hours to
just a few minutes.
Not only will this project save the Navy time and money--the food
service savings alone will save over $2 million in the first year, a
savings of 49 percent--it will also allow our Armed Forces to allocate
more resources to the duties they most need to focus on. From security
access to dining hall access, from checking out weapons to checking out
library books, the MARC card can save the Armed Forces thousands of
hours a year in wasted administrative costs.
The $36 million I am asking for in this amendment does not authorize
any new spending--it only redirects the use of $36 million within the
Navy and Marines O&M account that has already been authorized by the
committee. Because the MARC card program has been so effective in
reducing the costs of general administration in the military, our
investment of $36 million in an expansion of the MARC program will save
the Navy and Marines O&M account many millions more in fiscal year 1998
and beyond.
By investing $36 million, in the MARC program, the Navy's project
manager, estimates that the savings to O&M from using the three MARC
applications, already in place across the Navy and Marines will top
$134 million in FY 98.
Now that's just the savings from using the MARC card in three
applications--Food Service, Security Access, and Clearance
Verification.
As other applications are deployed, the savings may top $200 million
in just FY 98, and well over $500 million over the next 5 years.
Mr. President, with the budget situation, that we face today we are
compelled to look to all areas of the government to eliminate needless
administrative services and streamline the many duties that our
government performs.
In this era of reinventing government, smart card technology has
potential applications not just in the military but all across the
government.
By eliminating long waits in lines at government agencies, by
eliminating the manual entry of data all across government agencies, by
doing away with duplication of data across the government by
eliminating fraud, smart cards can slash the administrative costs of
government while improving the quality and speed with which many
government services are delivered.
Mr. President, the technology is here, in our hands, and the savings
to be had are real, immediate, and substantial. I firmly believe that
we should move forward with applying smart card technology, not only in
the military, but all across the government.
Mr. President, I realize that smart cards are still a new technology
right now, and that they're unfamiliar to many potential users.
I am aware that some people are uncomfortable with the idea of having
a single card for everything they need.
Placing so much information on a single card raises more than a few
eyebrows over privacy and security concerns.
And I know that a lot of people are concerned that by placing so much
personal information on a single card an employer might have access to
medical records, or a librarian might be able to find out what you ate
for lunch that day.
Let me say that I share these concerns.
But in fact, Mr. President, while all this information may be carried
on a

[[Page S6906]]

single card, powerful encryption technology ensures that personal
information is seen only by those who the individual wants to see it.
The technology available today allows us to select what information
is carried on our smart card and guarantees that we are the only ones
who can grant access to that information.
Even though we can store our financial and medical records on the
same smart card the card's microchip is divided into separate
compartments that make it impossible for our bank to see our medical
records and our doctor to see our last bank deposit.
And if we should lose our card, anybody who finds it will discover
that it's useless to them.
Because without the proper authorization code that only the
individual knows--and with more sensitive applications, without
biometric authentication like hand geometry scanners--the card won't
work in the hands of anybody but its owner.
Just as our ATM card is useless to a thief without the proper PIN
number, a thief will find that, without authentication by its owner, a
stolen smart card is a worthless piece of plastic.
In an era where our personal information is becoming increasingly
easier for others to access, where our very personal and private
activities can be electronically tracked, smart cards are a way to
return control over this information where it belongs: in the hands of
the individual.
And with modern-day encryption and other security measures built into
the chip on a smart card, the information on this card is more secure
from theft or fraud than any credit card or ATM card in use today.
Mr. President, there is no doubt of the need for increased
efficiency, security, and portability of information across all sectors
of our Government.
We have the technology, literally, in our hands to make it happen.
Already, several other Government agencies have begun to implement
this technology in a variety of applications across Government.
Today, for example, smart cards are used as identification and
security badges in Government buildings.
In States like Wyoming, pilot programs are underway to use smart
cards to electronically disburse WIC and food stamp benefits.
In several western States, a smart card called the health passport is
being used to increase the portability and accessibility of an
individual's medical records while safeguarding their confidentiality.
At colleges like the University of Michigan, a single smart card can
call up a student's financial aid records, buy her books, and open the
door of her dorm.
On our subways, and our military bases, in our hospitals, and our
schools, across the public and private sector, smart cards can cut down
the time we spend on burdensome administrative work and save us
valuable time and resources.
But the reason I'm so enthusiastic about this new technology, Mr.
President, is not just because smart cards can eliminate waste.
I'm not here speaking today simply because smart cards can save us
time and money.
I'm strongly supportive of this new technology because smart cards
can make our lives better and easier.
Whether it's reducing the time we wait in line at a government office
or providing a doctor the information needed to save a life smart cards
can make our entire infrastructure more user-friendly and efficient;
smart cards make technology work better for us.
I am confident that pilot smart card programs, like the MARC program,
will demonstrate the effectiveness of smart cards and the need for this
technology across government, and will lead to increased use of this
technology in our future.
That's why I'm so excited about it, and that's why I'm so pleased the
managers seem willing to include this provision in their manager's
amendment.
With that, Mr. President, I thank the chair, and I yield the floor.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I just want to commend the Senator from
Virginia on his amendment. It is a very thoughtful amendment, the
product of months, and, indeed, years of work by Senator Robb. I hope
that in the next day or two we will be able to work with the majority
to see this amendment is adopted.
I want to commend the Senator on his constant attack on waste and his
constant effort to achieve efficiency, not just in the military, but
all branches of Government.
Mr. ROBB. I thank the distinguished Senator from Michigan. I did not
display my own MARC card here, but it is my hope that in the not-too-
distant future not only will all members of the Armed Services, but all
members who interact or interface with our Federal Government will have
one of these and be able to use them in the same efficient way that the
MARC card is being used today, and is being used in this particular
experiment.
I yield the floor.
Mr. THURMOND. I want to say to the able Senator from Virginia,
Senator Robb, that you made a very interesting discourse here. What the
Senator is recommending appears to deserve serious consideration. That
consideration, I am sure, will be given by the committee.
Mr. ROBB. I thank the distinguished chairman of the committee and the
senior Senator from South Carolina.

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