[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 89 (Monday, June 23, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S6056-S6058]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                  THE PROBLEM OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE

  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, on Thursday, June 19, I appeared before the 
Subcommittee on International Economic Policy, Export and Trade 
Promotion to testify on Global warming and on behalf of my sense-of-
the-Senate resolution on the same matter which now has 61 cosponsors 
including myself.
  I was pleased to appear on the same panel with my good friend, 
Congressman John Dingell. I ask unanimous consent that my testimony and 
that of Congressman Dingell on that occasion be printed in the Record 
at this point.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:


                  Statement of Senator Robert C. Byrd

       Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the opportunity to appear 
     before the subcommittee to discuss the critically important 
     issue of the negotiations aimed at signing a protocol during 
     the third session of the Conference of the Parties to the 
     United Nations (UN) Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
     which is scheduled to be held in December in Kyoto, Japan. I 
     am concerned that the protocol that results from these 
     negotiations could have a serious impact on American industry 
     and on our economy, while at the same time failing to address 
     a looming threat to the global environment.
       On June 12, I introduced a Sense of the Senate Resolution, 
     together with Senator Hagel and a bipartisan group of my 
     colleagues, which addresses the conditions for U.S. agreement 
     to revisions to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
     Climate Change. The resolution has been cosponsored by 60 
     Senators from both sides of the aisle. This resolution states 
     the Sense of the Senate that the developing world must fully 
     participate in the treaty negotiations and commitments and 
     play a meaningful role in effectively addressing the problem 
     of global climate change.
       In essence, the resolution accepts the thesis, which is 
     still the subject of some dispute, that the increasing 
     release of carbon dioxide (CO2) and its 
     accumulation in our atmosphere are causing a very gradual 
     heating of the globe, which has many adverse consequences for 
     us all. I believe the Administration should be commended for 
     its efforts on this issue, and I commend this subcommittee 
     for its attention to this matter. If substantial steps are 
     going to be taken to influence carbon dioxide and other 
     greenhouse gas emissions, we need to accelerate new 
     technologies, anticipate new developments, and encourage 
     public/private sector participation.
       President Bush signed the United Nations Framework 
     Convention on Climate Change, the so-called Rio Pact, in 
     1992, which was subsequently approved by the Senate, and 
     calls on the industrialized nations to aim to reduce their 
     greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to their 1990 levels by the 
     year 2000, a goal which will not be achieved by the U.S. nor 
     by the vast majority of the industrialized nations unless 
     further steps are taken.
       The parties to the Framework Convention met in Berlin in 
     1995 to discuss the future direction of the treaty in light 
     of this projected failure to meet the voluntary objectives, 
     agreeing that any new commitments would be binding upon the 
     signatories. Specifically excluded from any new commitments, 
     however, would be the countries that comprise the developing 
     world. The rationale for the so-called Berlin Mandate was 
     that it is the industrialized OECD (Organization for Economic 
     Cooperation and Development) nations that have been the major 
     emitters of greenhouse gases in the past, and will continue 
     to be in the next decade.
       There are two intrinsic problems with the Berlin Mandate. 
     First, while the industrialized world is the primary 
     contributor to the current problem, that will not be the case 
     in only a few years. As this chart demonstrates, the 
     emissions of the developing world are rapidly increasing on a 
     sharp, upward slope. These emissions will actually surpass 
     those of the industrialized OECD nations by the year 2015. In 
     short, the developing world is rapidly becoming a clone of 
     the OECD nations.
       Let us assume that the current negotiations for a new 
     protocol, which are to be concluded in Kyoto this December, 
     result in a binding commitment that the OECD nations must 
     reduce their emissions to 1990 levels by 2010. This chart 
     demonstrates that under such a scenario the OECD nations will 
     sharply reduce our emissions of greenhouse gases. The price 
     we will pay in order to achieve these reductions is open to 
     debate, as estimates differ. Nonetheless, the key point is 
     that this responsibility will not be shared because of the 
     Berlin Mandate, for the chart clearly shows that the 
     emissions of the developing world continue on their 
     inexorable upward track, even as we in the OECD group make 
     the painful and costly adjustments necessary to force down 
     our emissions.
       This demonstrates the second problem with the Berlin 
     Mandate, which is that we gave away the store, and we 
     received nothing in return. Many of the biggest emitters of 
     greenhouse gases in the developing world have refused to even 
     discuss, let alone seriously consider, taking any emissions 
     limitations commitments upon themselves. In what can only be 
     viewed as an act of environmental irresponsibility, the 
     developing nations have adamantly refused to recognize that 
     they will, over the next two decades, become the primary 
     cause of the problem, in terms of annual emissions.
       The refusal of the developing world to discuss any future 
     emissions limitations commitments has become a central issue, 
     for any attempt to bring them into the process is labeled by 
     some as a ``treaty killer.'' I have a different perspective. 
     My resolution is not a treaty killer. It is, in fact, a 
     treaty enhancer. It calls upon the Administration not to 
     agree to a protocol, unless it includes new commitments to 
     limit or reduce greenhouse gases emissions for developing 
     country parties within  the same compliance period. My 
     resolution improves the treaty. For any treaty that does 
     not include emissions limitations provisions for the 
     developing world is inherently unsound and ineffectual on 
     its face. Environmentally, we are all in the same global 
     boat. What good does it do for the United States and other 
     developed nations to work feverishly to plug the holes in 
     the boat, if the developing nations are drilling holes at 
     the other end just as fast as we plug them? Be assured 
     that the global boat will sink just as rapidly and we are 
     all going to be in for a long, long swim.
       Bringing the developing world in under the climate change 
     tent, as part of any future treaty, will not only increase 
     the prospects of Senate ratification, it will also be 
     enormously beneficial for the international environment. Let 
     me further clarify that point. This chart shows the world of 
     1995, in terms of world carbon emissions in millions of 
     metric tons of carbon. The United States and OECD nations, 
     shown in red, are responsible for a little over half of that 
     total. The next chart projects the world as it might be after 
     the currently proposed treaty is adopted, with only the 
     developed world taking action to reduce greenhouse gas 
     emissions. The difference is startling. The developing world, 
     shown in purple, has assumed the U.S. and OECD nations' place 
     as the biggest global polluters. The problem remains the 
     same, only the names have changed. And again, because of the 
     flawed Berlin Mandate, all of these emissions from the 
     developing world will be completely uncontrolled, and free to 
     increase even further. From this perspective, it is the 
     Berlin Mandate--and the fact that it lets the developing 
     world off the hook scott-free--that will seriously harm the 
     global environment in future years.
       Finally, let us examine the role of China. Despite 
     possessing a strong and growing economic and industrial base, 
     despite possessing the ability to launch satellites into 
     orbit, China is still counted among the family of developing 
     nations. But its industrial growth is matched by its growing 
     contribution to global pollution. This chart compares China's 
     contribution to global carbon emissions to the contribution 
     made by the United States. On the left, we can see that based 
     upon current trends, China will surpass the

[[Page S6057]]

     United States in carbon emissions by 2015. On the right, we 
     can see that if current proposals are adopted, under which we 
     would reduce our carbon emissions to 1990 levels, while 
     imposing no requirements upon the developing world and China, 
     China all by itself will greatly exceed the United States in 
     metric tons of carbon emitted.
       I find it disturbing that despite its future role as the 
     world's leading contributor to the problem of carbon 
     emissions, China has indicated steadfast refusal to apply any 
     type of binding obligations upon its own economy and 
     industries. I believe that if the treaty we are negotiating 
     today does not equally commit developing nations like China 
     to binding commitments, there will be no incentive for China 
     and the other nations of the developing  world to make 
     responsible and environmentally sound choices as they 
     develop. You can be sure that after China assumes its role 
     as a leading carbon emitter, she will not be very eager to 
     make the tough and costly corrections to retrofit her 
     industries to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. 
     Indeed, she may expect to benefit from a treaty in which 
     she escapes binding commitments, because it may allow her 
     to import industries from OECD nations that would choose 
     to relocate there rather than change their ways and clean 
     up their acts at home.
       My message to U.S. negotiators is that all nations, but 
     particularly those that are making and will make a 
     significant contribution to greenhouse gas emissions, need to 
     (1) make commitments at Kyoto that unequivocally demonstrate 
     an action program to tackle this problem, and (2) to start 
     with aggressive efforts to act on those commitments 
     immediately and not settle for vague promises to return to a 
     future negotiation to get serious. Finally, while countries 
     have different levels of development, each must make unique 
     and binding contributions of a pace and kind consistent with 
     their industrialization. The developing world must agree in 
     Kyoto to some manner of binding targets and commitments which 
     would begin at the same time as the developed world in as 
     aggressive and effective a schedule as possible given the 
     gravity of the problem and the need for a fair sharing of the 
     burden.
       In closing, I note that my resolution states than any 
     treaty presented to the Senate be accompanied by a ``detailed 
     explanation of any legislation or regulatory actions that may 
     be required to implement the protocol or other agreement and 
     should also be accompanied by an analysis of the detailed 
     financial costs and other impacts on the economy of the 
     United States which would be incurred by the implementation 
     of the agreement.'' There surely will be costs if the United 
     States is to make the changes to our existing industrial base 
     and to our existing lifestyle necessary to meet the goals of 
     this treaty. Our smokestacks must be cleaner and our 
     automobiles more efficient. There are many ways to achieve 
     these goals. We must be able to tell the American people what 
     will be required to meet any proposed commitment.
       Politically, I believe that there needs to be a strong 
     consensus between the President and Congress about any plan 
     of action. The Administration's policy of follow-on 
     multilateral negotiations to deepen the impact of the Rio 
     Pact requires very substantial consensus-building with the 
     Congress, and broad educational activities to bring the 
     American public along. To impose effective, legally-binding 
     measures on the U.S. economy, will mean having the strong 
     support of the Senate. We Senators need to be deeply 
     concerned over the alarm that has been expressed to us by a 
     very broad range of American industry and labor over the 
     impacts on our economy of a treaty which commits the United 
     States to deep emission reductions, and which does not spread 
     the burden of responsibility equitably across the globe. 
     These assessments by bedrock American industry must be taken 
     seriously. I hope that this hearing will result in new Senate 
     attention to the progress of these negotiations, and that 
     this Committee will serve to interact regularly with the 
     State Department and Administration policy-makers as our 
     negotiating strategy is developed and refined.
       The resolution that Senator Hagel and I introduced, and 
     which has won the support of a majority of sixty Senators, is 
     aimed at that negotiation, and beyond. Since carbon and other 
     greenhouse gases can accumulate in the atmosphere and persist 
     for long periods, we will not as a community of nations get a 
     handle on these threats to our global climate unless everyone 
     participates and does their share to solve the problem. We 
     all share our earth in common. We breath the same air, and we 
     are exposed to the same global climate system. We must all 
     accept our share of the responsibility for the global 
     climate. We must keep this fragile boat afloat, together, and 
     the sooner we have commitments from all its passengers to 
     work together in that effort, the better.

 Testimony of the Honorable John D. Dingell, Senate Foreign Relations 
 Committee, Subcommittee on International Economic Policy, Export and 
                     Trade Promotion, June 19, 1997

       Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your holding this hearing. I 
     consider it a great honor to testify beside my good friend 
     and highly respected colleague from West Virginia, Senator 
     Byrd.
       I do not appear before this Subcommittee as a critic of the 
     idea that we are engaged in climate change negotiations and 
     that we are moving forward. I'm critical of the idea that we 
     are negotiating without the full and proper information that 
     we need.
       With respect to the climate change negotiations, I have 
     several questions to which I have yet to receive satisfactory 
     answers.
       One: Have we overreached on the science?
       The State Department has concluded that current science 
     proves that global warming is ``dangerous'' and requires 
     immediate emissions reductions. But the official U.N. 
     scientific body has gone only so far as to identify a link 
     between human activity and warming, but their own document on 
     the science states, and I quote, ``our ability to quantify 
     the human influence on global climate is currently limited.'' 
     In other words, we don't know with any degree of precision 
     how big the problem is, we don't know how fast it's moving, 
     or how it can be mitigated.
       My friend and former colleague Tim Wirth, who will testify 
     later this morning, agrees on this point. At a public forum 
     this February he said there is ``no doubt about the theory'' 
     of climate change and that ``we don't know where, how much or 
     how fast.''
       Two: Is what we're seeing here a classic example of mission 
     creep?
       We've seen a shift from voluntary to mandatory policies. 
     Initially, the Administration's policy was based on voluntary 
     agreements with industry and reliance on ``joint 
     implementation'' of mutually beneficial partnerships between 
     U.S. industry and developing countries. For instance, U.S. 
     companies would get credit for helping developing countries 
     build clean power plants. But sometime early in 1996, the 
     tone changed. Mandatory emissions reduction became the goal.
       Three: Who is representing America's interests? Are we 
     setting ourselves up for an economic fiasco?
       In a letter to me in 1995, President Clinton promised not 
     to agree to anything which would adversely affect U.S. 
     competitiveness. But the State Department has signed onto 
     agreements that are procedurally and substantively 
     disadvantageous. The outcome may be an agreement late in 1997 
     in Kyoto imposing mandatory emissions reductions on developed 
     countries, and at best only voluntary steps for developing 
     nations.
       We've already committed ourselves to steps to control 
     emissions and potentially harm our competitiveness. The 
     developing countries are scot-free. We've gotten not a 
     single, solid, binding commitment from them.
       My friends in the Administration argue that they are being 
     hard-nosed because they have rejected the more extreme 
     proposals advanced by groups such as the Association of Small 
     Island States, or AOSIS. But I find scant reason to 
     congratulate our negotiators for refusing the chance to 
     submit our unconditional surrender.
       Four: Even if you disagree that climate change is a 
     problem, is the Administration really doing anything to 
     protect the environment?
       The theory of global warming holds that greenhouse gases 
     have an effect no matter where in the world they are emitted. 
     This is not like the debate over acid rain or ozone, where 
     emissions from one part of the country were thought to cause 
     problems in another, identifiable region. China will surpass 
     us in terms of emissions early in the next century. If you 
     accept the theory of global warming, those emissions will 
     cause as much harm to the climate as emissions from the 
     developed countries today.
       Five: How is all this going to work?
       I've yet to see a proposed negotiating text that includes 
     specific dates and numbers. Those are important matters, but 
     there are some other fundamental issues at hand: Who will 
     have to do what? Who will enforce the agreement, and how 
     timely would enforcement be? If we establish a trading 
     system, is China or any other developing country going to be 
     allowed to keep credits for themselves as a country? Or will 
     companies be allowed to use them to offset operations 
     elsewhere in the world? Does anyone seriously believe China, 
     or any other country for that matter, will act on altruistic 
     motives?
       This leads me to my sixth and final question. Why are we 
     doing this before we have the most basic information about 
     how climate change policies will affect our economy? In 
     short, has the Administration bothered to do its homework?
       We were supposed to have the vaunted analysis and 
     assessment of the impact of climate change policies on the 
     U.S. economy by the end of last year. It has not been 
     completed yet, despite repeated promises to Congress and 
     industry that it would be available before important policy 
     decisions are made. But the State Department formally 
     proposed a cap-and-trade negotiating position in January. In 
     short, the analysis is self-evidently too late to inform the 
     process, and likely will be used to justify what the 
     Administration has already decided to do. Just as clearly, 
     public participation and comment on the analysis and 
     assessment is irrelevant. And the Department of Commerce 
     official in charge of the analysis and assessment has moved 
     on to pursue other career opportunities.
       I have asked the Administration whether, when they go to 
     Kyoto next December, they will refuse to sign any agreement 
     that binds the U.S. to new emissions obligations unless it 
     holds our economic competitors in the developing world to 
     equivalent obligations. I cannot in all truth say that I have 
     received a reassuring answer.
       My concerns very closely parallel those of American labor, 
     and I am delighted that you

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     will be hearing from Secretary-Treasurer Trumka of the AFL-
     CIO. I commend to you the resolution on climate change 
     adopted by the AFL-CIO Executive Council, as well as the 
     Senate resolution offered by Senator Byrd.
       Let me close by noting again that I am not opposed to our 
     being part of international negotiations on climate change. 
     But I would approach those negotiations the way I would 
     approach a high-stake poker game: with an open mind, but not 
     with a blank check.

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