[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 89 (Monday, June 23, 1997)]
[House]
[Pages H4169-H4212]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
Personal Explanation
Mr. LaFALCE. Mr. Chairman, on the night of June 19 when the House
held a series of votes in succession on the DOD authorization bill, I
was given incorrect information and mistakenly voted ``yes'' on
rollcall No. 217. I had intended to vote ``no.''
personal explanation
Mr. COX of California. Mr. Chairman, I was necessarily absent for
this vote for medical reasons.
personal explanation
Mr. BARRETT of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, on rollcall No. 225, the
Bachus amendment, had I been present I would have voted ``aye.''
Mr. Chairman, on rollcall No. 226, the Talent amendment, had I been
present I would have voted ``aye.''
Mr. Chairman, on rollcall No. 227, the Buyer-Kennedy of Rhode Island
amendment, had I been present I would have voted ``aye.''
PERSONAL EXPLANATION
Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, earlier today I was unavoidably out of the
Chamber when three rollcalls occurred, and I want to ask that it would
be reflected in the Record that had I been present I would have voted
in the affirmative. I would have voted ``aye'' on rollcall No. 225, and
``aye'' on rollcall No. 226, and ``aye'' on rollcall No. 227.
Personal Explanation
Ms. ESHOO. Mr. Chairman, I was unavoidably detained on rollcall votes
225, 226 and 227. Had I been present, I would have voted ``aye'' on
each one of the three. I ask that the statement be included in the
Record immediately following the votes.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to section 5 of House Resolution 169, it is
now in
[[Page H4170]]
order to consider amendment No. 7 printed in part 1 of House Report
105-137, as modified by section 8(a) of House Resolution 169.
Amendment No. 7 Offered by Mr. Dellums
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 7 offered by Mr. Dellums:
At the end of title I (page 23, before line 7), insert the
following new sections:
SEC. 123. B-2. AIRCRAFT PROGRAM.
(a) Prohibition of Additional Aircraft.--None of the amount
appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations
in section 103(1) may be obligated for advanced procurement
of B-2 aircraft beyond the 21 deployable aircraft authorized
by law before the date of the enactment of this Act.
(b) Production Line Curtailment.--None of the amount
appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations
in section 103(1) may be obligated for reestablishment of the
production line for B-2 aircraft. The Secretary of the Air
Force may use up to $21,800,000 of funds available for the B-
2 aircraft program for curtailment of the B-2 production
line.
(c) Funding Reduction.--The amount provided in section
103(1) for procurement of aircraft for the Air Force is
hereby reduced by $331,200,000.
SEC. 124. INCREASE IN AMOUNT FOR GUARD AND RESERVE EQUIPMENT.
The amount provided in section 105 for procurement of
equipment for the reserve components is hereby increased by
$331,200,000.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from California
[Mr. Dellums] and a Member opposed, the gentleman from South Carolina
[Mr. Spence] each will control 45 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums].
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 22\1/2\ minutes of the 45 minutes
allocated to this gentleman for the purposes of debate to the
distinguished gentleman from Florida [Mr. Foley] and I ask unanimous
consent that he be permitted to control that time.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from
California?
There was no objection.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, this is perhaps the most significant vote that Members
will make on the Department of Defense authorization bill for this
fiscal year. Contained in this budget is $331,200,000 to begin advance
procurement for 9 additional B-2 bombers. That is what is in the bill.
What this amendment does is to strike that $331,200,000 from the B-2
account and places it in another account that I will discuss a little
later.
What is clearly before us, Mr. Chairman, is whether or not we ought
to go forward with the B-2 bomber. The debate is not about having B-2
bombers. We already have 21 of them that we have paid for, that we have
either developed, or are in the final stages of development. It is not
about do we have B-2's. It is about spending $27 billion to restart
production for an additional 9 B-2's for which significant authorities
have not asked for, stated that they do not want, and stated that they
do not need. A $27 billion program that nobody has asked for, no one
wants, except the contractor and the subcontractors.
This is a weapons system that no one wants. Where do we get this $27
billion figure? From the Congressional Budget Office, the people with
figures so accurate that a number of my colleagues in these Chambers
were prepared to shut down the Government if the CBO was not part of
providing the statistical basis, the budgetary basis for what we have
done. That means that people have great faith in their figures. $27
billion, $13.6 billion that will be spent in the 5 years of the so-
called budget agreement, $13.2 billion beyond the 5 years for
maintenance and operation, to a tune of nearly $27 billion.
Mr. Chairman, there is a point that I will make throughout this
debate that the world has now significantly changed. It is no longer
the same. This is a zero sum game.
You cannot have a 5-year balanced budget, strap on your back a $27
billion program and try to force it into the budget unless you force
something out. You do not have to be too smart to realize that. Just
plain old mother whip helps you understand that.
Balanced budget. You did not budget for this program because somebody
wants to push it in. You push in $27 billion, you push out something. I
am going to keep repeating that. This is a new day, it is a different
world, it is a zero sum game.
The budget resolution, Mr. Chairman, that Members went home and
lauded as they voted for this 5-year budget agreement adds over and
above the President's request $17.5 billion. The Quadrennial Defense
Review sweeps up all of that $17.5 billion for their 5-year defense
plan. Now here comes a program that will spend $13.6 billion on a new
weapons system that nobody budgeted for.
What about unbudgeted and unforeseen circumstances, like pay raises
for the military, not budgeted? Mr. Chairman, my colleagues may not
know this, but 3 years ago when I was the chairman of this committee,
my colleagues submitted letters requesting $10 billion for programs
above and beyond the budget request. This year my colleagues sent
letters to the distinguished chair and the ranking member totaling $20
billion, add-ons, above and beyond what the Pentagon requested, what
the administration requested, what Members wanted. In the real world,
those add-ons and those Members' requests are going to keep on coming.
Emergency crises are going to keep coming. Desire for pay raises and
other things are going to keep coming.
{time} 1830
I would assert aggressively, Mr. Chairman, that the $17.5 billion is
already overly subscribed. Colleagues already competed for this money
two or three times. They can only spend a buck in one place, they
cannot spend the same dollar in three different places. Now only a fool
can accept that argument.
This is real, Mr. Chairman. As I said, the world is changed. This is
different. We cannot cram $27 billion.
Now, Mr. Chairman, I want to come directly on this budget issue to a
number of my colleagues here.
To those who have said in the past I am going to give my vote on the
B-2 to a friend of mine, that charge is going to cost $27 billion. It
cannot be given away any more because in the context of a balanced
budget, we push something in, we push something out. We cannot just
turn our vote over for $27 billion for a friend, my colleagues handicap
their own constituents, and I am going to argue that point aggressively
before I finish.
For those of my colleagues who said, well, I am doing a Member a
favor; they came to me first, and I am just going to give them my vote.
Twenty-seven billion dollars; we cannot just give away our vote. My
colleagues are in a balanced budget environment; push something in,
push something out.
For those of my colleagues who have interests in military affairs and
who have interests in other weapons system and other programs, they
cannot just give away their vote.
I served on the Committee on Armed Services. I have watched the horse
trading and the dealing for years. When Members did not have any
problem: ``I'll buy your B-2, you buy my F-16, my F-22,'' ad infinitum.
That day is over, it is dead, it is gone. My colleagues are in a
balanced budget environment. Colleagues push $27 billion in, colleagues
push something out.
And then there are Members who want the B-2, the F-22, they want the
joint strike fighter, they want every weapon system on the face of the
Earth, but they do not want to make a decision as to which one they had
rather have as opposed to something else. The balanced budget now
forces them into this. This is now a tradeoff, my colleagues, no more
skinning and grinning, no more smiling, my colleagues have got to make
a serious decision.
For those Members in these Chambers who represent the poorest
constituency in America, how do they then go home in the context of a
balanced budget and say they took welfare reform, they reduced welfare,
they reduced education, they reduced housing, they reduced jobs, when
somebody can march into the well and say, ``But you voted for a $27
billion budget program that ripped across a 5-year budget plan. How can
you argue on both sides?''
For those who represent constituents who have thousands and thousands
of
[[Page H4171]]
young people at risk, who need the right to a good education, good
training, good employment and living in a good environment, how do they
then say in the context of a 5-year budget agreement that they embraced
a $27 billion weapon system that is going to come out?
Mr. Chairman, my colleagues have two options. Adding B-2's will force
tradeoff of higher priority programs in the Defense Department. I have
already tried to make that argument. The Department of Defense makes
this argument. But I also want to talk to those people who are really
not interested that much in all these things. They say, ``Ron, you take
care of the military budget. I'm interested in domestic programs.''
Remember this: We are in a 5-year budget agreement where there are so-
called fire walls for the first 2 years. That means there is a wall
between defense spending and nondefense discretionary spending. My
colleagues cannot take money out of the military budget and put it in
domestic programs or vice versa for 2 years.
Now this is a 5-year budget deal. My colleagues, I just said this is
a $27 billion program. Wake up. Where do my colleagues think this $27
billion is going to come on the other side of those 2-year budget
walls? Out of education, out of housing, out of the programs to serve
our rural Americans, suburban Americans, and urban Americans.
My colleagues have got to be smart enough to understand this is a
zero sum game. They may not like it because they think I am the skunk
at the party raising these issues, but, my colleagues, I have got to
put it in their face because that is the reality. We have got to wake
up. There is no more dreaming any more. When my colleagues decided to
go into a balanced budget environment, they put themselves there.
Dignity and integrity and honesty require that they step up to that.
If my colleagues want this B-2, then it is so that they do not want
other systems. If they want this B-2, absorb that we may not have other
programs. For those of my colleagues who are concerned about the
fragile nature of our ecological system and the environment, understand
that in this bill we took $2.6 billion out of the Department of
Energy's budget, a lot of it to clean up the environment where we have
a responsibility to clean up some of the worst waste in America on
these military reservations and bases, to buy more weapon systems.
This is a big one, my colleagues. It is coming out of our hide one
place or the other.
So if my colleagues got these poor people, if they got these children
at risk, if they have got people who are concerned about their health
and their welfare, if they got people who are concerned about the
environment, if they have got in their district other weapons systems,
if they are committed to other policies, understand that my colleagues
are jamming a $27 billion weapon system into a budget that cannot stand
it.
Now, Mr. Chairman, let me go further. On the B-2 program itself there
were five, not four, not three, not two, not one, five independent
studies that all said we cannot make a case for more B-2 bombers. We
had one study in 1995, the heavy bomber force study by the Institute
for Defense Analysis. It said, quickly, did not make the case for more
B-2's, additional quantities of precision-guided standoff munitions are
more cost effective than additional B-2's, planned upgrades to the B-1
are more cost effective than additional B-2's, planned bomber force
with precision-guided standoff munitions can meet the requirements of
the two major regional contingencies.
Second study, 1995, Commission on Roads and Missions, did not make a
case for more B-2's. Additional B-2's are less cost effective than
additional precision-guided munitions, on and on.
Third study, heavy bomber industrial capability study, because many
Members said, gee, we have got to build B-2's because we are going to
lose the industrial base. Do my colleagues know what the study pointed
out? There is no such thing as a bomber industrial base. If someone can
build a plane, they can build a bomber. The people that built the B-2
did not build the B-1. The people that built the B-1 did not build the
B-2. There is no such thing as a bomber base.
Finally, from 1962 to 1986, from 1962 to 1982 we never built a
bomber, 20 years. But do my colleagues know what? When we needed to
build one, we built one. A bomber is just a plane, bigger, longer, or
whatever. But it is just a plane. So that argument about bomber base
does not make sense.
Now the question of the technology, we need stealth. Well, that
stealth technology that we learned out of the B-2 is going into the F-
22, the joint strike fighter, and it is also in our technology base.
Third study is the quadrennial defense review. They came up with the
same notion. Forces with more B-2's cost more than currently planned
forces, et cetera, et cetera, and then the deep strike weapons mix
study also this year concluded, 1997, same thing. Forces with more B-
2's were less capable in strike warfare than those traded off, et
cetera. Forces traded off perform roles the B-2 cannot.
My colleagues will argue that, well, we can trade off some of these
other weapons systems for B-2's because we urgently need them. Mr.
Chairman, we are not going to have these nine B-2's for 10 years. So if
it is all that important for us to have them, then what about these 10
years, what do we do? Do we go in a closet because we are fighting to
death that we do not have these nine additional B-2's? We got 21. We
have a silver bullet.
And remember, when we flew in the Persian Gulf, Mr. Chairman, we
fought what President Bush said was the fourth largest army in the
world. We never flew one B-2, we never flew one B-1, and within 24
hours we had air superiority; within 72 hours, diminish.
My colleagues may not know this; I think you do, Mr. Chairman,
because I know of your position: We have greater accuracy in our
standoff capability, more of that accuracy and more of it deployed than
when we were in the Persian Gulf. Five studies.
Now one thing: When I was chairman of the committee 3 years ago, I
walked in a room with Sam Nunn. He is the most articulate supporter of
the B-2. They thought I was the most articulate opponent. They said if
Sam Nunn and Ron Dellums can walk in a room and work something out,
everybody can live with it on a bipartisan, bicameral basis. We walked
in, I shook hands with Sam and said, ``Let's do it fair, let's have an
honest study, Mr. Chairman, an independent study. If you win, you
win.''
Guess what? A lot of my colleagues, including the gentleman from
Ohio, said ``Ron, you just bought into a sucker bet. That study is
going to come out, it is going to blow you away.''
Do my colleagues know what happened? The study came out and supported
me, and that ended it for the most part, and Sam Nunn supported it at
that point. He said, well, if the administration does not want it, the
study does not support it, he started to walk away.
I put all my chips on the table with honesty and integrity, Mr.
Chairman, and I said let the study determine it. If my arguments do not
make sense, if no one else carries my argument, then maybe I am talking
to myself.
But I was not. Five additional, five independent, studies pointed
this out.
Now I could talk about the B-1. I hope someone else does. The B-1
carries more of these weapons, flies the same distance, but let us come
down to the last point: Jobs.
Some people have argued that this is going to keep more people
employed in these communities that are presently building B-2. Not
true, Mr. Chairman. This is a restart, not industrial-based
preservation. Air Force sources have estimated that the production
capability for the B-2 right now as we speak is no more than 30
percent, 30 percent. Only 6 percent of the personnel required to
produce nine B-2's are currently on the program. Not according to Ron
Dellums, not according to Mr. Foley, or Mr. Kasich or the Pentagon. Do
my colleagues know whose data? The contractor's data.
Mr. Chairman, I am sorry, 16 percent.
Many vendors and suppliers began exiting the program early in 1992.
When we make a contribution and have done it, we exit. People have been
walking away from this program since 1992.
Summarize, Mr. Chairman. This is not an argument about B-2. We have
21 of them. We have got 95 brandnew shiny B-1's converted with the
capability to destroy life beyond comprehension.
[[Page H4172]]
Mr. Chairman, this is a budget buster. Mr. Chairman, we cannot sell,
we cannot rope-a-dope people, we cannot push $27 billion into a weapons
system, into a budget and assume that it is not going to come out
hurting somewhere, and if the people on the committee work it out and
manage to buy each others B-2's and F-22's and joint strike fighters, I
say to the gentleman from New York, ``Who do you think they are coming
after after the end of 2 years?'' He knows. Jump on the other side of
those fire walls and come after domestic programs, hurt us, hit us
where we hurt across the board, and that is what this whole thing is
about.
We cannot push this forward. No one wants this program except a few
Members pushing it, the contractor and the subcontractor. Two
Presidents did not want it, two Secretaries of Defense did not want it,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs did not want it, the CINC's do not want
it. Who wants it? Why would we push a $27 billion program? If our
warriors do not want it and we are not out there fighting wars, what
makes us think we want to supplant them? We all know what this is
about.
But the day is different now. This is a zero sum game. Make a deal,
pay for it. Make a deal, the community pays for it. Make a deal, the
constituency pays for it.
Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support this amendment. It is
the right thing to do, it is the intelligent thing to do. It is
assuming our fiduciary responsibilities. It is the economical thing to
do.
Mr. Chairman, with those arguments I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I might
consume.
(Mr. SPENCE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, as a famous commentator recently said,
``Now it is time for the other side of the story.''
Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment to strike the B-2
funding from the bill. I oppose efforts to terminate the B-2 program as
I did 2 years ago when the House twice rejected similar amendments.
Although buying an additional nine B-2 bombers will not come
inexpensively, the case for another squadron of these stealthy bombers
that the Nation will rely on for the next 40 years is compelling.
This debate reminds me, I just listened to the gentleman refer to the
fact that the President, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the
Secretary of Defense, all these people in the Pentagon do not want the
B-2 bomber. Reminds me of another President, Jimmy Carter. We were
debating this B-1 bomber the gentleman referred to at that time. And
the same situation prevailed. The President, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs, the Secretary of Defense all of them were opposed to the B-1
bomber, and the Congress voted for it.
{time} 1845
It was overturned by the President. He vetoed the bill and we did not
get it. Then, later on, President Reagan was elected, and the same
question came back up, and President Reagan held over the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs at that time, General David Jones, who sat down before
the committee and said we do not want this B-1 bomber. But guess what?
Under President Reagan, that same man who said we did not want it then
said he wanted it, because President Reagan wanted it.
I have to make the point that these people in the administration have
to carry water for the administration. They cannot very well take the
opposing view from the President on matters of this kind.
As a supporter of the B-2, I would like to quote from a letter that
retired Senator Sam Nunn wrote to the Committee on National Security
earlier this year. Senator Nunn's letter stated, and I quote, ``I
continue to believe that the 21 B-2 bombers will not constitute an
adequate force level to deal with many likely future contingencies and
crises, and that no other military systems in existence or on the
drawing boards can adequately substitute for the capabilities that the
B-2 bomber offers.''
While many share this view, unfortunately, as I said earlier, most
current and former Clinton administration Secretaries of Defense do
not. Consequently, the fate of the B-2 bomber, like the fate of the
nuclear submarine, the conventional cruise missile, the F-117, and the
V-22 before it, rests with Congress, for only Congress can intervene in
these matters and has in the past.
It intervened, for instance, with Admiral Rickover, the father of the
nuclear Navy, able to build the nuclear submarine because Congress
dictated it; were options to build the conventional cruise missiles not
negotiated away, thus protecting Tomahawk cruise missiles, whose
performance in Desert Storm and in Bosnia were exceptional; a second
squadron of F-117 Stealth fighters procured. The cancellation of the V-
22 tiltrotor, the Marine Corps' future air transport, all of these
things overturned because of Congress when the administrations were
opposed to it.
Mr. Chairman, I only hope that the wisdom of Congress today and the
wisdom Congress exhibited in reaching these historic decisions on these
weapon systems will prevail here today on the B-2.
We will hear a lot of stories in this debate about the expense of
buying more B-2's. We will hear that procuring nine more aircraft will
cost $10 billion or $15 billion and that operating them for the next 20
years will cost another $10 billion to $15 billion. Even if these
figures are correct, they need to be put in proper context.
Consider the capability the B-2 will provide this Nation well into
the next century, and then consider the cost in the context of the
funding that our country will spend on just three tactical aircraft
programs: The F-22, the F/A-18E/F, and the Joint Strike Fighter. These
three programs are slated to cost $350 billion, a figure which is not
even adjusted for inflation, just to procure in the decades ahead. And
they will probably cost a like amount to operate over their 20 or so
year life spans. In this context, $20 billion to $25 billion to buy and
operate another squadron of B-2's over the next 20 years seems small.
So while cost should be a critical variable in any debate over a
major weapons system, I urge my colleagues to consider first the
capability. If the B-2 provides a capability that the Nation needs, and
I believe that it will for decades to come, we ought to be able to find
the money in an annual defense budget of $250 billion to do it. If we
do not believe that the Nation will want a more robust B-2 capability
than the currently planned 21 aircraft in the decades ahead, then my
colleagues should vote for this amendment.
I believe that another squadron of B-2's represents a prudent
investment in our future, and therefore, I urge all of my colleagues to
vote no on the amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from
California [Mr. Hunter], the chairman of our Subcommittee on
Procurement, control the remainder of the time in opposition to this
amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from
South Carolina?
There was no objection.
Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, this issue is not about simply the defense of our
country. This is not about short-changing the men and women who serve
our military. This is not about military preparedness. This is about a
discussion that needs to go forward on a weapons program, the B-2
bomber, that is clearly a very, very expensive budgetary item.
There will be a lot of rhetoric about the pros and cons of the B-2
bomber, and there is divided opinion. We read the editorial papers, we
listen to defense experts, we listen to our colleagues, and one can
come to the conclusion that the B-2 is the best thing we have ever
invented, or that it is an extreme waste of money.
We have to start talking about the budget of this Nation like we talk
to our families at home, about making priorities fit within the
confines of money available.
Now, clearly, if we have an unlimited Treasury, which we have proven
we do not, in fact, my side of the aisle has been one of the strongest
proponents of balancing the Federal budget and saying no to other
things that we cannot afford. Well, I think clearly, if we want to put
something right on the table as
[[Page H4173]]
a meaningful attempt to save the taxpayers' dollars, the B-2 comes to
the top of the list.
According to the Pentagon, again, I have to suggest that many in this
body suggest let the experts decide, let sound science rule the day,
and let those charged with determining the future success of our
military operations be brought into the discussion and make
recommendations. The current fleet of 21 B-2 bombers, according to the
Pentagon, is sufficient to meet the two-war scenario, the ability to
fight and win two wars at the same time.
The B-1 bomber was mentioned earlier, which offers a greater payload
and essentially the same range and weapons suite as the B-2. It is a
logical complement to the 21 B-2 bombers authorized under current law.
Again, we have 21 B-2 bombers. It is not as if we are on the floor
today to determine should we get a B-2 bomber. We have 21 B-2 bombers
that we paid for.
Now, we received a letter. The gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Kasich] asked
the Congressional Budget Office that was referred to by my colleague:
At your request, the Congressional Budget Office has
estimated the cost to acquire and operate nine additional B-2
bombers. CBO estimates that adding nine bombers to the
currently-planned fleet and operating each of them for 20
years would cost about $27 billion.
Some may assume that today's budget item of $331 million is what we
are talking about. We are not talking about $331 million; we are
talking about a total outlay over 20 years of $27 billion.
Most importantly, we have to discuss the fact that there are 95 B-1's
in the fleet already bought and paid for by the U.S. taxpayer. The
massive deep-attack weapons mix study conducted by the Pentagon
concluded that it would not be cost effective, not be cost effective,
to buy more B-2 bombers.
The Dellums-Kasich-Foley amendment is important because it eliminates
the $331.2 million in B-2 funding that would be allocated this year,
but again, that figure is a mere fraction of the real cost. No money is
programmed in any balanced budget plan to pay for the outyear cost, as
was mentioned by the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] that would
be forced by authorization of nine additional B-2's. Small down payment
today, folks, to keep the line operating; the big ticket comes in the
outyears. Can we face the taxpayers to tell them the bill is in the
mail and it is on its way?
If Congress allows this fiscally imprudent spending to occur, we will
be forced to confront untold trade-offs in the future. Balancing the
budget is a very difficult task. We have seen it on the floor, we have
read about it in the newspapers, we have heard from our constituents,
so yes, we do have to make some spending decisions now, not later.
Let me tell my colleagues what we could buy for one B-2 bomber. One
B-2 bomber costs about $1.5 billion. Now, the proponents of the B-2 say
that is because we are not ordering enough of them and we can get the
cost down on a relative per-unit cost if we can just buy a lot more of
them. The argument is not about buying efficiency in weapons system, it
is about do we even need them to begin with.
But let us go over what a B-2 bomber will provide the United States
of America taxpayers as a trade-off for something else. Fifty-six
thousand, six hundred and four elementary school teachers at $26,000 a
year, that is what one B-2 bomber buys; 86,108 deputy sheriffs to
patrol our streets at $17,420 per year; 57,692 clergymen to go out and
spread the message of the Bible in our communities at $26,000 per year;
46,000 firemen to protect our buildings and our public safety. Here is
one some may not agree with, but 47,928 newspaper reporters. We may not
agree that we need that many, but they are there at $31,297 per year.
Thirty-six thousand, five hundred eighty six new prison beds to lock
up our most violent offenders in prisons with the price of 1 B-2
bomber; not the fleet, one. Take those numbers forward and see what
they will do for us. Buy 188,372 brand-new GEO economy cars. Buy
groceries for 1 full year for 360,577 families. For one B-2 bomber, I
am going to tell 360,577 families, no groceries for a year. Now, we can
go to public education, 224,000 students for 1 full academic year at a
public 4-year college.
Why do I mention these figures? Because it is about choices. It is
about a parent sitting down with their children and saying yes, I want
to take you to Disney World this summer, and yes, we are going to try
hard, but, kids, if we do that, we are going to sacrifice a little bit
this year. Maybe not go to the movies during the weekend, maybe not
order the pizza from the delivery man, maybe sacrifice a few items in
order to do what we would like to do as a family, go to Disney World.
Now, maybe this is a simple analogy, but I got elected to Congress
from a small town in Florida. I used to drive a tow truck, I worked at
a gas station pumping gas, I opened my own restaurant at the age of 20.
I found that every cent mattered in my life, because for me to open up
the following Monday my restaurant caused me to be economical in my
pursuit of excellence in that restaurant, and I could not waste money.
I got to Washington, DC, and people talk about billions as if we are
talking about somebody's walking around money. It is only $27 billion,
or maybe less, maybe $20 billion. CBO says 27 billion, the proponents
of the program may say it is only a couple billion dollars. Members
decide. Members decide. Because April 15 every year when I ask people
to send their money to the IRS to run this Government, part of those
dollars they are sending, Mr. Chairman, is for things like the B-2
bomber.
Now, we can spend billions of dollars to build up our society in
public education, in housing, in infrastructure. Imagine that, building
and creating our roads in America, strengthening our bridges, fixing
the potholes in Washington, DC. What a novel thought, to think the
American taxpayers will actually see some of their dollars at work
domestically rather than flying planes we cannot see over in the Middle
East somewhere.
Let us talk about our personnel. I was on the floor proudly
supporting the flag burning amendment, because our veterans, our
military personnel, went to war and died for the symbol of our
democracy, the flag. I went home and they said, that is just rhetoric.
The Constitution gives us the right of free speech, so putting a
constitutional amendment about flag burning is just a gesture. Men and
women died for that flag, and the debate today is about do we treat
them as human beings.
{time} 1900
Do we give them the housing they so richly deserve for protecting our
Nation? Do we get our own personnel off of food stamps so they can
proudly raise their own children? Do we give them the flight training
and equipment up to standards that they desperately need? Or do we go
off on a tangent and buy more weapons that the President and others
have clearly said we do not need?
The Boston Globe, Pentagon's high tech delusions. The Pentagon
insists on purchasing weapons systems that have little utility in a
real crisis because they either are irrelevant to the threat or
technologically wholly disproportionate to the threat or so costly that
commanders are inhibited from using them. The B-2 stealth bomber is the
obvious and controversial case in point.
Kansas City Star, hardware versus troops. Pentagon continues against
all logic to insist no tough choices be made between the two.
Kansas City Star, again, with the cold war over, the need does not
exist for all three fighters.
I can read from almost every editorial regarding this expenditure.
Defense Secretary William Cohen, a Republican, is constantly being
urged to kill sacred cows and must do so. Our own recommendation for
cuts, including dropping the joint strike fighter and the B-2 bomber
and cutting back the Marine Corps to free money for urgent needs
particularly airlift and sea transportation.
Mr. Chairman, if we look at the facts, look at the groups supporting
the Dellums-Kasich amendment, we will clearly come to the conclusion
that while the B-2 is a very valuable weapons system, the fact remains
we have 21. The fact remains we are equipped. The fact remains we have
not shirked our duty to protect our Nation. The fact remains we are
advancing technologically to develop weapons systems
[[Page H4174]]
that are more adequate for today's needs. We are looking at conflicts
that are arising around the globe.
I just got back from Asia with the Speaker of the House. We talked to
people in China about their defense capabilities. The average pilot in
China trains 2 hours a month. Their equipment is antiquated. Their
resources are limited. So who is the threat? I am not suggesting China
is not a threat. Understand, there are components within China that
could operate to our detriment. Russia is broke. Boris Yeltsin was at
the summit. He is broke. They are broke. They do not have the money to
put toward weapons systems. They are no longer a threat.
There are threats, I recognize that. I am not so naive to suggest
that this is a perfect world. Iran, Iraq, other nations pose threats to
us. But is the B-2 going to be called into service for those nations
that may be hostile to us or will it be an F-22, which I do support?
Will it be a more versatile, more mobile force?
Let me read a letter that went to the gentleman from South Carolina
[Mr. Spence] from the Secretary of Defense on June 18, 1997. Let me
just underscore one statement: The loss in combat capabilities from
retiring current weapons systems to pay for additional B-2's, the loss
due to forgoing investment in other needed capabilities and the
additional cost of the B-2 far outweigh the benefits from adding more
B-2 aircraft to the fleet.
I will read that once more. Bill Cohen, appointed by President
Clinton, Republican Senator from Maine, a thought conscious, strong
individual who has supported our military. The loss in combat
capabilities, our young men and women on the front line, from retiring
current weapons systems to pay for additional B-2's, the loss due to
forgoing investment in other needed capabilities and the additional
cost of the B-2 far outweigh the benefits from adding more B-2 aircraft
to the fleet.
The only former Defense Secretary that I think they could find to
sign the letter of support was Cap Weinberger under the Reagan
administration. I may stand corrected and I would look forward to it if
I am.
Mr. Chairman, the debate is significant. The debate is about
providing moneys, supplies, necessary weapons to our troops to defend
America's interests both here and abroad. We are going down a path of
spending billions of dollars on a weapons system that we clearly do not
need by most all recognizable experts.
I hope my colleagues will join on the side of the righteous, if you
will, and support the Dellums-Kasich-Foley amendment. It is a
financially significant opportunity to show both our support for the
defense of this Nation and for the conservative principle of saving
money in a time when our budget is extremely stressed.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, let us start with stealth because, that is an important
part of the B-2 story. In Vietnam, we lost 2,300 aircraft. In fact, in
the last phases of the war, when we threw B-52's against surface-to-air
missile systems from Russia, then the Soviet Union, we lost 10 percent
of our B-52 force that was used in that theater in 11 days. And America
turned to her scientists and said, we may be on the verge of having our
Air Force become obsolete if you do not figure out a way to beat those
Soviet-made radar systems and surface-to-air missile systems.
And our scientists, the great scientists that we have in this
country, responded. They came up with something developed by Democrat
and Republican administrations, announced first by President Jimmy
Carter, with what was known as stealth. Stealth is the ability to avoid
enemy radar. That means very simply that a guy like the gentleman from
Texas, Mr. Sam Johnson, who is sitting right here, who was a POW for a
number of years in Hanoi, could fly an aircraft through a SAM missile
battery without it acquiring him, without it seeing him and shooting
him down. It gave survivability to American pilots. So we started
developing stealth. And that is what the B-2 is.
My colleagues have talked about these wonderful ways to give quality
of life to the people who serve in the Armed Forces. The way to give
quality of life to the people who serve in the Armed Forces is to bring
them back. And the way you bring them back is by letting them fly the
best equipment.
Let me just put this argument in perspective in terms of cost.
President Clinton has a program to buy short range aircraft over the
next 20 years for $350 billion. Many Members here who are arguing on
the other side have signed on at least initially to that program. We
need those aircraft. That is short range theater aircraft.
President Clinton says we need $35 billion for short range aircraft
and for long range aircraft, for bomber aircraft that can go from the
United States to stop an armored invasion in another country thousands
of miles away. He put down zero. Not a dime for long range aircraft.
That is why the study that I think is the best study, the independent
study, not a budget-driven study but the independent study by General
Scowcroft recommends that we continue to build the B-2 line.
So here is what we are recommending today, what is in our budget, one
thirty-fifth of the amount of money that is spent on short range
aircraft of that $350 billion, that is about $12 billion for the
construction, according to CBO, of B-2 bombers, one thirty-fifth of
what we are spending for short range aircraft, let us spend it for long
range aircraft so you have the ability to move from the United States
to stop an armor attack halfway around the world.
I am a Navy guy. I come from a Navy town, San Diego. I am an advocate
of carrier air power. However, it takes a long time to steam a carrier
someplace. You cannot count on an enemy like Saddam Hussein being right
out of central casting and waiting for you to build up in theater with
these 200- and 300 mile airfields that are just a couple hundred miles
away from your targets. You have to stop armor early.
Does the military want it? My colleagues, the gentleman from
California [Mr. Dellums] and the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Foley],
have said the military does not want that. Here is what President
Clinton's chief of staff, General Fogleman says, at a hearing just a
few weeks ago: More B-2's would be extremely valuable in the halt
phase, that is when you stop his armor attack, and in fact in all
phases, as we would go.
My question back, and would they save lives? General Fogleman, yes.
So to my friend the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Foley], if we want to
give the best quality of life to a person in uniform, that is, to save
his life, then you want to have B-2's.
Let us go back to the Clinton administration's proposal if this
Congress does not act, does not keep our package intact. President
Clinton had a problem. The problem is, how are we going to maintain our
long range bomber force if we are spending $350 billion for short range
aircraft and not a dime over the next 20, 30 years for long range
aircraft. The answer was, we are going to fly B-52's. Those are the
planes that were shot down easily by SAM batteries in 1968. We are
going to fly them for 80 years. So the pilot that the gentleman from
Florida [Mr. Foley] cares so much about is going to be flying an
airplane that is older than his great grandfather.
We have talked about cost a little bit. Let us talk about bases. We
had 81 bases for our short range aircraft in 1961. As the years went
by, we lost those bases, sometimes because of political action,
sometimes because we just could not afford to operate them.
We have gone from 81 major overseas U.S. air bases to 14. Let me tell
you what is going to happen on the Korean peninsula. We all know this.
It is in all the open reports. The North Koreans have the capability to
put nerve gas on every single short range airfield on the Korean
peninsula. Limited detoxification capability. The first crew that dies
because of nerve gas on the runway at one of those tactical air bases
is going to eliminate us as a tactical presence on the Korean
peninsula.
Last week the Japanese started to hedge on our ability to base our
fighter aircraft in Japan in a second Korean war. We Americans have to
be able to rely on our technology to stop an enemy, to deter an enemy
with a flight that comes out of the United States and goes to that
particular area, wherever it is around the world.
[[Page H4175]]
So the Air Force does not want it. That is not what the Air Force
says. General Fogleman says, more B-2's would be extremely valuable in
the halt phase and in fact in all phases as we would go.
Last part of the cost argument, every Member of this House has voted
just a few days ago on the reform package that reforms the Pentagon,
that cuts the bureaucracy. CBO's estimate of that reform package is
that we save in 5 years $15 billion. That means in 5 years we have
saved $3 billion more than CBO says we would need to build this entire
tranche of nine B-2's.
So, no, we are not going to take it out of Geo sales in America. We
are not going to take it out of pay. We can afford to get by spending
one thirty-fifth of what we are spending on short range aircraft by
spending that $12 billion on long range aircraft and taking that from
the reform package.
Mr. Chairman, let me just say that this will be the first time, if we
do not keep the B-2 in the budget, this is going to be the first time
that this Nation has had the technology to allow our pilots to survive
in an adverse environment and we have not given it to them. Let us give
it to them. Let us give them the very best.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. HUNTER. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I want to commend the gentleman from
California. I think it was a very thoughtful statement. I think all the
statements this evening have been very well thought out.
I happen to agree with his statement. Let me also make another point.
In the gulf war, for the first time we used the F-117. The Air Force
wanted 27. Congress said no. We think you should buy more. You need 54.
We are going to make you buy two squadrons. The Chairman tonight was
one of the leading figures in that decision, and we went out and we
bought 54.
In the first 14 days of the gulf war, they represented 2 percent of
the assets, but because they were stealthy, because, as the gentleman
pointed out, they could go into the target and come back out without
that large package of aircraft, they destroyed 40 percent of the
targets and all the most difficult ones. It proved that stealth works.
And what the B-2 gives us is a plane that goes five times as far,
carries eight times as many weapons, and weapons, by the way, that are
$13,000 apiece. JDAM's are $13,000. Sixteen of them are $208,000. That
is one-sixth the cost of a cruise missile. What the gentleman from
California suggests is that we rely on the old bombers that are not
stealthy. That means we have to use these very expensive weapons.
But what would it allow us to do? Saddam stopped himself. He gave us
the time to build up our forces and then we destroyed him with air
power.
{time} 1915
They came out and surrendered to a Marine Corps RPV. What the B-2
does is allow us to hit those same tanks, that same army that Saddam
had from 41,000 feet, day and night, no matter what circumstances, no
matter what the weather is. This is a revolutionary military
capability. We can destroy a country, and we can destroy the army that
it sends in the field by air power. We have never been able to do this
before. What that does, to make this point, what that does is to allow
us to save American lives.
To my friends on the Democratic side, what I believe this gives us is
the potential of having a conventional deterrent. Think if we had had
the B-2, which we did not have in the gulf war, and the President could
have deployed it to the Gulf and said, Saddam, if you come south, I
will destroy your division before you get into Kuwait; and we now have
the military capability with centrifuged weapons to do just that. We
could have not had to fight the war. We would not have had to send
500,000 kids to the Gulf. We could have saved $10 billion it cost us to
move them out there and $60 billion to fight the war.
The B-2 gives us the potential, a revolutionary conventional
potential, to have a deterrent; and that is a capability worth having.
Yes, it is expensive. But it is not as expensive as losing American
lives. I would guarantee my colleagues today that at some future date,
if the proponents win this amendment tonight, there will be a
circumstance in which we will not have the capability that we needed,
and that will mean that we will lose more lives than had to be lost and
that would be a tragedy.
The gentleman from California [Mr. Hunter] is right; let us send them
in our best. Stealth means survival. Stealth means survival.
And I will just tell my colleagues this. I have studied this issue. I
was there when Harold Brown, a Democrat, came up. By the way, there is
a letter here signed by Mel Laird, Jim Schlesinger, Donald Rumsfeld,
Harold Brown, Cap Weinberger, Frank Carlucci and Dick Cheney saying,
keep the B-2 program going. That is seven Secretaries of Defense, not
one.
This is an important issue that demands the attention of this House.
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield, along with
seven Secretaries of Defense, Gen. Chuck Horner, who ran the air war,
if we are going to listen to the war fighters, to the warriors, who now
is free to speak his mind because he does not have to do what the
President tells him to do, has said very strongly that the B-2 should
be supported. That is the guy who ran the air war in Iraq.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman would yield, and 50 former
generals of the Strategic Air Command also wrote the President saying,
keep this capability alive, keep this line open. And they talk about
building stealth bombers like it is just a piece of cake. I want my
colleagues to know something. That is not true. I went to my friends at
Boeing and they said it is very difficult, putting stealth into an
aircraft is enormously difficult.
When we shut this down, we would have shut down the ability to build
these kind of bombers, which is worth saving. This is something we
need. What if a crisis occurs over the next 10 years? Then we have to
come back to this. It will cost us $40 billion to pay for the R&D to do
a B-3. So get the right number while the production line is open and it
will save us money in terms of avoiding taxpayer cost.
So we save money that way, we save American lives, and we do the
right thing. This is the most important conventional weapon that has
ever been developed by any country anywhere, and it gives America an
enormous advantage.
What we are going to do is not get the right number. The studies that
were done by Rand, the studies that were done by Gen. Jasper Welch, say
that the right number is significantly more than 21. We are here saying
let us do at least three squadrons, three squadrons so that we could
have 20 for the first major regional contingency and 10 for the second.
This a very reasonable proposal. And the gentleman mentions the
numbers. The contractor says we can do it for about $9 billion. The
Defense Department I think says $12 billion. And I think over a period
of years, that is affordable. Any plane we buy has to have life cycle
cost. And we may take out some of the older planes to offset and make
room for it.
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman would yield, even if we
take the highest number, even if we take the CBO number, we are asking
in the committee's package to spend \1/35\, that is 3 percent, for
long-range aircraft, that is our B-2, of what we are spending for
short-range aircraft. At a time when our overseas bases have shrunk
from 81 overseas bases to 14, that makes sense.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from California mentioned
something else called lockout. What if the enemy uses chemical and
biological weapons on those tactical airfields so we cannot get the
airlift in to set up the TAC air? Then we bought the wrong weapon
system. We need something that can come from outside the theatre,
assuredly, to be able to protect and stop the enemy before he gets
there.
I think the possibility of lockout is something that we need to
study, that the National Defense Policy Panel needs to study, because
that is a very real potential. By the way, in the deep attacks weapons
mix study, in every scenario in which there was lockout or very little
warning, the B-2 was better than any other conventional weapon. And we
lost some of the wars because we did not have enough B-2's.
[[Page H4176]]
So let us, at least, buy the nine additional we are talking about
here. It will save lives and save money. I support the chairman in
this. We need to keep this money in the budget. We need to keep this
option alive.
Mr. Chairman, I include the following for the Record:
Congressman Duncan Hunter,
Chairman, Military Procurement Subcommittee,
House National Security Committee.
Dear Mr. Chairman: You requested that my colleagues and I
provide your committee with an independent look at the
adequacy of the nation's heavy bomber force. This is an
important issue as we move into the new security era and we
greatly appreciate the opportunity to offer our counsel to
you and your committee.
In our review, we first examined the planned future of the
bomber force, its role in supporting U.S. national security,
and the potential offered by the B-2. We then examined the
sources of Pentagon opposition to additional B-2 production
and the recent series of studies the Department of Defense
has sent to the Congress regarding the bomber force.
We reached two fundamental conclusions. First, long-range
air power will be more important than ever in the decades
ahead. Consequently, we do not believe that the planned force
of 21 B-2s will satisfy foreseeable U.S. military
requirements. Second, Pentagon opposition to further B-2
production is shortsighted and parochial. It reflects a
consensus across the services that long-range air power can
be safely abandoned in the long-run--a view with which we
strongly disagree.
Based on these conclusions we offer a set of legislative
recommendations regarding the bomber force.
The following contains an executive summary and the overall
report.
Sincerely,
Brent Scowcroft.
Independent Bomber Force Review
i. introduction
Whether the United States should retain enough modern,
heavy bombers to support U.S. national security strategy is,
foremost, a strategic choice. We believe strongly that the
future of America's long-range bomber force should be decided
fundamentally on the basis of what best serves the national
defense. Unfortunately, the Department of Defense (DoD) has
made this strategic choice on a de facto basis in light of
short-term funding and force structure preferences. If this
decision is allowed to stand, the end result will be a force
structure that relies almost entirely on short-range air
power.
Pentagon preferences for short-range instead of long-range
air power raises a puzzling contradiction. The long-range
bomber fleet is an element of the force structure that
appears ideally suited to the demands of the new security
environment and national military strategy. We also have a
weapon system--the B-2--which is now in production and if
produced in substantial quantities, could revitalize and
sustain that force. Yet the DoD has consistently opposed
continued B-2 production.
Our analysis addresses this contradiction to help the
Congress make a vital decision over the future of the bomber
force. We first examine the planned future of the bomber
force, its role in supporting U.S. national security, and the
revolutionary potential offered by the B-2. We then examine
the sources of Pentagon opposition and how this opposition
has manifested itself in the recent series of studies the DoD
has put forth to the Congress. We then offer a set of
recommendations regarding legislation.
ii. the future of the bomber force
To put the matter simply, under current plans the bomber
has no future. A de facto strategic choice has been made to
rest the future of American air power on short-range
fighters. Unless immediate corrective action is taken, the
long-range heavy bomber will gradually disappear as a
meaningful element of America's armed forces.
The clearest evidence of the bomber fleet's condition is
its size and age. Since the late 1950s, the general trend has
been for U.S. force structure to shrink, with capability
sustained or improved with advancing technology. But in
recent years, bombers have been reduced more than any other
major force element (such as army divisions, aircraft
carriers, and USAF fighters). There were 360 active bombers
in 1980. The force dropped to about 300 in 1990. Under
current plans, the operational bomber force in the year 2001
will consist of 130 aircraft: 44 B-52s, 70 B-1Bs, and 16 B-
2s.
Unlike the fighter force, bomber force shrinkage is not
being offset by substantial deployments of new planes and new
models. So as the fighter force is improved, bomber force
capabilities will inevitably decline over the long-term. The
average bomber is already roughly twice the age of the
average fighter, and current USAF plans are to maintain the
remaining B-52s in service until they are at least 60
years old, and possibly as old as 100. We may soon be in
the extraordinary circumstance where America's bombers
will be older than America's oldest aircraft carriers.
The bomber's loss has been the fighter's gain. Although in
Congressional testimony the distribution of Air Force
procurement is frequently portrayed as a cycling among
transports, bombers, and fighters, in reality fighters have
consistently maintained a plurality of the budget, and will
overwhelmingly dominate the budget over the next two decades.
TABLE 1: APPROXIMATE SHARE OF USAF PROCUREMENT BUDGET
[In percentages]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Airlifters Bombers Fighters
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1970's................................... <5 5 95
1980's................................... 10 40 50
1990's................................... 30 35 35
2000-2020................................ <5 <5 95
------------------------------------------------------------------------
A corresponding indicator of fighter dominance is the
steadily growing ratio of fighters to bombers in the USAF
operational inventory. This ratio increases from about 4-1 in
the 1950's, to 6-1 in the 1970's, to 10-1 in the 1990's, and
trending toward about 14-1 in the near future.
With rare exceptions, Air Force actions on existing bomber
programs illustrate an underwhelming amount of concern about
the bomber's future. The B-1B bomber, which entered service
in 1986, was not used in the Gulf War because of conventional
mission deficiencies. Moreover, its upgrade program has been
so stretched out that a 20-year gap between deployment and
conventional upgrade is entirely likely (leaving only 10
years of expected system life until planned retirement). The
B-2 fleet, which had been planned for 132 aircraft as late as
1990, was capped at 20 planes in 1992, with little Air Force
dissent. Even more remarkable, the Air Force has actively
resisted efforts by Congress to authorize production of
additional B-2s. USAF leaders have even gone so far as to
exclude bombers from their ``wish list'' of desired but
unbudgeted items supplied to Congress every year. In 1996,
for example, the Air Force included requests for re-
engineering the RC-135 and the AWACS, and production of
additional F-16 fighters, on the same wish list that omitted
production of more B-2s.
The DoD has no plan to keep the bomber force viable in the
long run. Every other major weapon system--fighter,
submarine, destroyer, carrier, tank, etc.--has either a
system in continuing production or a planned, programmed
replacement. JSF will replace F-16. The New Attack Submarine
will replace the Los Angeles (688) class attack submarine.
But no new bomber model is planned in the numbers required to
replace the B-52 or B-1B. The current, uncontested DoD plan
will inexorably vitiate the bomber force through age,
attrition, and obsolescence.
Furthermore, recent congressional testimony by Air Force
Chief of Staff General Ronald Fogleman revealed that the Air
Force has no plan for replacing the mission capabilities lost
as the bomber force disintegrates. When questioned about
bomber replacement General Fogleman said, ``between now and
2020, we have lots of things we're going to look at.'' But
the General concurred that no replacement was actually in the
Air Force plan--meaning no funding in either the Five Year
Defense Plan (FYDP) or the Ten Year Plan. With no planned
funding there will no more B-2s, and almost certainly no B-3.
In sum, all evidence indicates that bombers have no future:
The bomber force structure has been cut disproportionately.
Budgetary investment in bombers has shrunk almost beyond
visibility.
All bomber production programs have been capped and
terminated.
All Congressional efforts to initiate new bomber production
programs have been actively opposed.
The Air Force has consciously excluded any new, future
bomber type from both the FYDP and the ten year plan.
There is no plan of any kind to replace the bomber
capabilities being lost by any other means.
The bomber force is aging, shrinking from attrition, and
glaringly absent from future R&D and procurement plans. With
no funding, no modernization plan, and no evident concern for
their absence, the bomber force faces inevitable extinction.
Whether by active choice or default, this evidence means that
the DoD has indeed made the fundamental strategic choice to
rely in the future almost exclusively on short-range fighter
aviation. Unfortunately, emerging trends in the security
environment identified by the Pentagon would seem to call for
a renewed emphasis on long-range air power.
III. The Bomber Force in the New Security Environment
During the Cold War, long-range heavy bombers proved to be
vitally important assets to U.S. national security. Not only
did these aircraft support nuclear deterrence as part of the
``triad'' of nuclear forces, but their flexibility also
allowed them to also conduct conventional bombing missions in
three separate conflicts (Korea, Vietnam, and Desert Storm).
We believe that modern long-range bombers will be of
increasing value in the coming decades. Many of the reasons
are spelled out in the recent Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR), which provides a useful overview of the future
security environment and national military strategy.
Through 2015, the QDR postulates that the United States
will face a variety of regional dangers and ``foremost
amongst these is the threat of coercion and largescale, cross
border aggression against U.S. allies and friends in key
regions by hostile states with significant military power.''
Beyond 2015, a ``near-peer'' global competitor could also
emerge.
[[Page H4177]]
The QDR posits that three elements--shaping, responding,
and preparing--define U.S. defense strategy. But boiled down
to essentials, the QDR observed that the ``primary purpose of
U.S. forces is to deter and defeat the threat of organized
violence against the United States and its interests.'' If
deterrence fails, ``the high end of the crisis continuum is
fighting and winning major theater wars. This mission is the
most stressing requirement for the U.S. military.''
The QDR offered a strong rationale for the need to deal
with two near simultaneous regional conflicts. And in
fighting such wars, the QDR strategy stated that two aspects
deserved special attention--(1) stopping the enemy advance as
quickly as possible; and (2) dealing with the ``likely
conditions'' that future wars will involve ``the threat or
use of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) * * * including
in the early stages of war to disrupt U.S. operations and
logistics.'' \1\ Forces best able to halt aggressors armed
with weapons of mass destruction, then, should logically
enjoy highest priority.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Footnotes at end.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We would add that forces capable of executing this
operation independent of theater bases and under conditions
of surprise would be of even greater value. A range of
powerful foreign and economic pressures will inevitably cause
a further contraction in the U.S. overseas basing
infrastructure and forward-based force levels. Indeed,
planners should also assume that we will be taken by surprise
in future conflicts; this was highlighted in the 1993 Bottom
Up Review and is the recommendation of all analysts who have
studied surprise attack in any detail. The wisdom of such a
policy can be seen in the 1990 invasion of Kuwait and the two
recent crises with Iraq (October 1994 and September 1996),
all of which took us by surprise. The lessons from the two
more recent crises are particularly relevant.
In 1994, Iraq rapidly mobilized forces near the frontier
with Kuwait. Despite intensive intelligence focus on Iraq
since the Gulf War, we not only failed to recognize this
buildup early on, but also were unable to deploy sufficient
forces until well after Iraq was in a strong position to
attack. According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the United
States and its allies faced at least a 2-3 day ``window of
vulnerability'' through which Iraq could have invaded Kuwait
and possibly threatened the Saudi oil fields.
In September of 1996, Iraq mobilized forces in its northern
areas and pressed an attack into the Kurdish ``safe haven.''
Once again we were taken by surprise. Worse yet, for various
reasons all members of the Gulf War Coalition denied
immediate access to their bases for combat operations against
Iraq, leaving our land-based fighters on the scene without
suitable bases from which to strike the invading force.
Carrier-based fighters located in the Gulf apparently did not
possess the range to reach the scene of combat and the lack
of stealthy carrier-based assets raised survivability
concerns. In the end, we were reduced to largely symbolic
strikes against Iraqi air defenses in the south using ill-
suited cruise missiles launched from ships and B-52 bombers.
Iraq was free to do as it wished in the north.
The lessons of these two crises in combination with the
evolving security context reveal that bombers are ideally
suited for the new era. They are the only force element
capable of stopping surprise enemy aggression while operating
outside the range of theater weapons of mass destruction.
They do not require bases in the immediate combat theater
(which also has the benefit of minimizing the number of
Americans placed at risk). Finally, as explained below,
bombers, though expensive when viewed on a per-unit basis,
are extremely cost-effective compared to other force
elements.
Bombers like the B-52, B-1B, and B-2 typically feature
unrefueled ranges and payloads 5-10 times greater than
fighters. Long range is a vital attribute for the new
security era. Long range allows bombers to respond more
rapidly than any other force element--from the CONUS if
necessary--in the case of surprise aggression. Long range
provides strategic agility; bombers can shift firepower from
one theater to another. Long range also allows bombers to
fight from beyond the range of adversary weapons, which will
be of increasing importance as weapons of mass destruction
proliferate. In the Gulf War, for example, Iraqi missiles in
development or service outranged all of our land-based and
sea-based fighter aircraft (whose operating locations were
thus at risk). And just as long range provides a sanctuary to
the bomber force, it denies any sanctuary to the enemy, who
cannot base assets outside the reach of bombers. Finally,
long range also greatly expands the number of basing options
available to the force should we wish to deploy the bomber
force forward to signal resolve (and increase sortie rates).
The longer the range, the greater the number of potential
bases that are available, and the greater the number of
countries available for negotiating access to bases.
The large payload of bombers allows a small number of
aircraft to assume a disproportionate amount of the
warfighting burden. In Vietnam, for example, the bomber force
comprised on average only 7 percent of the force and
delivered 44% of the bomb tonnage. In the Gulf War, the B-52
force only represented 4% of the force, but delivered 32% of
the bomb tonnage (more than twice as much as the entire
carrier force combined).
Previously, a primary virtue of these massive bomber
payloads was their shattering psychological effect on enemy
forces; in the Gulf War, for example, General Schwarzkopf
drew on his Vietnam experience with B-52 strikes to demand
that Iraqi forces be exposed to the same kinds of heavy
bombardments which had proven so devastating to North
Vietnamese forces. In future wars, the advent of precision
weapons will allow bombers to accurately strike many
different targets on a single sortie, which dramatically
increases the bomber's value to the warfighting commander.
The Gulf War illustrated the revolution afforded by
precision, which increases air power's lethality by several
orders of magnitude compared to unguided weapons.
In an era of declining budgets, the nation must procure the
most cost-effective weapons possible. The ability to deliver
large payloads of precision weapons makes each bomber sortie
extremely effective; the low life-cycle cost of bombers
(compared to other force elements) makes them extremely cost-
effective. Bombers are very expensive weapon systems;
producing a new B-2 costs about $1 billion, roughly the cost
of a DDG-51 destroyer. But like warships, bombers enjoy long
useful service lives and can operate effectively for three
decades or more; the initial investment in the force is thus
spread over many more years than most other systems. In
addition, bombers are not people-intensive to operate.
Personnel costs are typically a driving force in determining
life-cycle costs for military forces. The annual personnel
costs of a B-2 wing are about half that of a fighter wing and
substantially less than that of an aircraft carrier or
division. Overall, a B-2 wing's 35 year life-cycle cost (that
is, total personnel, operations, and procurement cost)
is about the same as a fighter wing; about \1/3\ that of
an aircraft carrier battle group; and about \1/4\ that of
a heavy division.\2\
Personnel issues are related to casualty considerations,
which typically play a critical role in crisis decision-
making (and accordingly should also play an equally important
role in determining what sorts of forces the nation should
invest in). Bombers from this standpoint also are very
attractive assets, since they only place a small number of
people in harm's way. For example, deploying a wing of
fighters to a theater base can put 2,500 people or more at
risk; a carrier battle group up to 10,000 people; a division
15,000 or more. Each member of these units is at risk to
attack by enemy weapons. A chemical warhead delivered by a
ballistic missile against a theater airbase or deployed
division has the potential to kill thousands; as would a
strike by a sea-skimming cruise missile against an aircraft
carrier. In contrast, the 1,300 personnel associated with a
bomber wing would typically be operating from bases well
beyond the strike range of an adversary, thus exposing the
lives of the aircrew only.
In this same light we should also recognize the nuclear
capability of the bomber force. If American theater forces
were to be attacked by weapons of mass destruction--and
particularly if they were attacked by nuclear weapons--there
are compelling reasons why the United States might have to
reply in kind. Bombers are the weapon of choice for nuclear
response because the weapons remain under strict human
control up to the very moment of launch near the target, and
because the variable payload of the bomber gives it the
widest possible variety of weapon delivery options. Moreover,
since strategic arms control with the former Soviet Union and
with Russia strictly limits the size of our nuclear arsenal,
bombers could be used in counter-strikes without depleting
our far more limited, single-use ICBM and SLBM assets.
Inasmuch as our plans must hedge against the eventual
emergence of a ``near-peer'' competitor, preservation of our
remaining nuclear forces is a relevant consideration. Looking
to the longer term, and understanding that no other nuclear-
capable delivery systems are in production or planned, the
bomber's dual capability (both conventional and nuclear)
would allow a strengthened bomber force to sustain the
nation's nuclear capability as other nuclear force elements
inevitably age and retire.\3\
Overall, bombers appear uniquely well-suited to satisfy
America's strategic requirements in the future security
environment.
iv. specific advantages of the b-2
In looking at the bomber force, we need to discuss one
additional, but revolutionary characteristic that the B-2
brings to the bomber force: stealth. Stealth shrinks the
effective detection distance of a variety of sensors,
particularly radar, and the basic physics involved in this
set of technologies argues against the development of
effective affordable counters. The B-2 thus combines four key
characteristics--range, payload, stealth, and precision--in
one platform. Range, payload, and precision allow a single B-
2 sortie to strike with the effectiveness of multiple fighter
sorties; stealth opens the door to a military revolution.
The traditional operational style that we have developed
for the employment of air power relies upon large force
packages to suppress enemy air defenses and shoot down enemy
fighters. Stealth reduces the need for such support packages,
which has a number of important effects. First, it greatly
increases the cost-effectiveness of stealth platforms.
Analysis conducted for the Commission on Roles and Missions
(CORM) showed that the 42 F-117 sorties (which combined
[[Page H4178]]
both stealth and precision capabilities) flown on the opening
night of the Gulf War were almost equivalent in terms of
target coverage to the rest of the land-based air-strike
forces combined.\4\ Another way to look at this is that each
F-117 sortie was worth 16 non-stealth sorties.\5\ The Air
Force illustrated this same point after the Gulf War by
showing that one or two B-2s can do the job of 60 fighters
and 15 tankers.\6\ This greatly reduces the costs of
executing the mission; according to CORM analysis of the Air
Force data, a B-2 would be seven times more cost-effective
than the 75-aircraft force package.\7\
Stealth enables appropriately configured B-2s the potential
to operate autonomously, which places this aircraft in a
totally different category than the B-52 and B-1B. These
older bombers must be supported with theater-based fighters
until enemy air defenses are eliminated or equipped with
expensive cruise missiles that can be fired from outside the
range of enemy air defenses. Dependence on land-based
fighters makes the non-stealthy bombers dependent on the
United States gaining base access in a timely manner and
raises a whole host of political and operational constraints.
Cruise missiles, though valuable, suffer from a variety of
operational constraints (targeting flexibility, ability to
deal with relocatable targets, warhead size, etc.) and are
too expensive to rely on to fight a sustained conflict (the
conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile carried by the B-52
force, for example, is over 100 time more expensive than a
Joint Direct Attack Munition delivered by a B-2).
This autonomous capability puts the B-2 in an entirely new
class as of weapon system. It is truly the nation's only
``modern'' bomber and the nation's only global precision
strike asset. Indeed, we believe that the B-2 has the
potential to revolutionize this nation's very approach to
strategy making and force structuring. As General Michael
Loh, then the commander of Air Combat Command, stated in late
1994: ``I see the B-2 as the centerpiece of an emerging
national security strategy that places increasing importance
on projecting immediate, responsive power from the U.S. to a
regional crisis anywhere in the world. The B-2's qualities of
range, payload, stealth, and sense of immediacy are uniquely
applicable to be the centerpiece of this strategy.''
A substantial force of B-2s would allow the United States
to project overwhelming and decisive power against any
adversary anywhere on the planet. To put matters in
perspective, the addition of one more B-2 squadron (8
operational aircraft) would give the B-2 force sufficient
punch to strike the same number of aimpoints as those
targeted by over 1,200 combat aircraft over the first 24
hours of the Gulf War. Clearly, procuring even greater
numbers would open up new strategic avenues. As former Air
Force Secretary Dr. Donald Rice has written, such a force
would ``allow the nation to seize this rarest of
opportunities: a revolutionary leap in military
capability, and with it, long term global military pre-
eminence--American style.'' \8\ No nation could
confidently launch an armored assault on its neighbors. No
dictator could think that his most prized strategic assets
were immune to attack. No target would be more than a few
hours away from attack. No defense could be counted on to
protect key targets. In response to heightened tensions,
the mere possession of a substantial force of B-2s could
provide a new way to manage crises. Instead of going
through the complex and risky steps of gaining base
access, deploying forces, and escalating tensions, the
President could simply order B-2s in the United States to
be placed on higher alert. Even under the prevailing
conditions of surprise and base access denial, a
substantial force of B-2s could have made an enormous
difference in the Iraq crisis of 1994 and 1996.
The first job of the American military is to provide our
political leadership with tools for deterrence and coercion
so the nation does not need for fight wars. Preventing wars
is far superior to fighting wars. A substantial force of B-2s
would have a unique conventional deterrent capability. As two
noted scholars of deterrence have written:
``If U.S. national military strategy is designed with
regional deterrence in mind, forward presence and/or rapid
crisis response become key elements in this strategy. . . .
Optimally, this . . . means stationing all the forces
necessary between the adversary and his objective, but even
the United States lacks the resources to meet such a
requirement in more than a few cases simultaneously.
Therefore, strong incentive exists for the United States to
explore capabilities that . . . are so rapidly deployable
into an area as to be `virtually' stationed there. \9\
This is the potential capability offered by the B-2. And
that is the potential vision that the Pentagon is turning its
back on my making the fundamental strategic choice to rely on
short-range fighter aviation.
v. why does the Pentagon oppose Additional B-2s?
If additional B-2 bombers could make a revolutionary
contribution, why does the Pentagon oppose them? Basic
principles of bureaucratic politics go far in explaining the
Pentagon's position. We believe there is such strong
opposition to the B-2 precisely because it is so
revolutionary--because supporting the B-2 would imply far
reaching changes in core organizational interests, such as
manpower, budget roles, missions, and autonomy. It is helpful
to begin with the perspective of the service that develops
the B-2.
The B-2 is an Air Force system and one might imagine that
the Air Force would be predisposed to support is continued
production and improvement. The oppose is true. In any large
bureaucracy, interests and programs tend to be identified
with a particular organizational entity or bureaucracy.
Historically, Strategic Air Command (SAC) was the heart and
strength of bomber advocacy in the Air Force. Through the
1960s and into the 1970s, SAC influence in the Air Force R&D
and procurement budgets. Accordingly, ``bomber generals''
often held top service positions.
When SAC and Tactical Air Command (TAC) were nominally
``merged'' into Air Combat Command in 1992, it was in reality
much more akin to a hostile corporate takeover: TAC absorbed
SAC. With the dissolution of SAC, the institutional
foundation for bombers disintegrated. Consequently, bomber
advocacy within the Air Force has virtually collapsed, and no
funds have been budgeted to support any major new bomber
program. Furthermore, as in the corporate world, management
personnel from the leasing entity discovered that they had
little power. In the words of retired Air Force General Chuck
Horner, bomber-oriented officers have been ``funneled out of
the Air Force. \10\ Today the top service positions are
typically held by ``fighter generals,'' with hardly a bomber
general to be found.
The roots of ``fighter'' opposition to the bomber force are
complex. First, many officers with predominantly fighter
backgrounds simply do not believe that the B-2 can perform as
advertised. Having served all their lives in an Air Force
where bombers were basically old, vulnerable and obsolete,
they find it difficult to accept that the B-2 is different--
that it can truly penetrate safety through defenses, or that
it can strike targets at least as accurately as fighters.
Their skepticism is reinforced by intense personal attachment
to fighters and fighter operations. At a time when the Air
Force budget has been in decline for more than a decade and
so many fighters are on the verge of retirement, accepting
the B-2 revolution might in their minds mean cutting fighter
procurement programs. It might also mean accepting an
entirely new approach to warfare in which the fighter
sometimes might not even be relevant, let alone the dominant
air instrument. Thus the number of fighter aircraft, fighter
squadrons and wings--ultimately fighter pilots could be
substantially reduced.
It is crucial to understand the USAF ``fighter opposition''
to the B-2 is well meaning. Everyone, Air Force officers
included, have a powerful human tendency to trust in what
they know, in what they have invested their careers, and in
what has worked in the past. For the current Air Force
leadership, this means a strong predisposition to trust in
fighters.
The failure of the bomber revolution to succeed in the Air
Force precluded any possibility of wider acceptance in the
Pentagon. The inevitable consequence of an expanded role for
bombers is an expanded bomber budget, and the new funds could
come only by diversion from other existing military accounts.
More bluntly, for bombers to receive increased funding, the
non-bomber Air Force, the Army, the Navy, and Marines
believes they may have to accept less. If the Air Force has
not yet accepted changes in air power strategy implicit in
the B-2, how much more would the Navy and Army refuse the
even greater changes which a revolutionary bomber force would
mean for broader national military strategy, and hence for
their budgets?
The Army continues to maintain its traditional view that
the decisive battles of any war are fought on the ground.
Victory is achieved through mass troop deployments and close-
in engagements, with the Air Force providing ``support.'' If
the Air Force doesn't believe in long-range strike, arguing
instead for the importance of air superiority and the primacy
of air-to-air platforms, one certainly can not expect the
Army to believe that air power has become the decisive combat
arm (with the army providing ``support'' in consolidating the
victory). An Air Force dedicated to air superiority and
strikes near the forward edge of battle will remain dedicated
to supporting the army.
In like manner, the Navy continues to believe that
``presence'' in an irreducible Navy mission, and that
carriers will generally be first on the scene and first to
fight in any theater conflict. The Navy has no reason to
relinquish this view so long as the Air Force insists on
making war with fighter assets that take weeks to months to
deploy, and so long as the bomber force is so small and
feeble that it provides no meaningful alternative for
performing ``carrier missions.'' And the Navy is right.
Unless the Air Force builds more bombers and changes its
strategy, the Navy must continue to have full responsibility
for fulfilling all of its traditional missions.
Seen from this perspective there is in fact an inter-
service consensus on which to resist the B-2 revolution. An
Air Force that believes in applying air power using short-
range fighters must have forward access, forward basing, and
extensive logistical support. This in turn requires a massive
ground presence, and inherently perpetuates a ground-warfare
strategy. It also requires a massive sea-borne logistical
tail, inherently perpetuating traditional navy views on sea
control and sea power.
[[Page H4179]]
Overall the bomber force and the B-2 in particular has
suffered from two major problems. First, it has lost any
institutional, bureaucratic advocate with the demise of
Strategic Air Command. Support for the B-2 means that
something else must suffer--and no institutional champion or
leader has emerged to lead that struggle. Second, support for
the B-2 inherently means recognition of a revolutionary new
form of warfare which threatens all other services and non-
bomber interest groups. Affirming the B-2 ultimately implies
major changes in strategy, in service budget shares, in
service size and manpower, and in strongly held personal
convictions. United Pentagon opposition to the B-2 is thus
perfectly understandable.
vi. the pentagon studies
Understanding the institutional resistance to the B-2
within the Pentagon helps shed light on the recommendations
of three studies recently conducted by the DoD on the B-2.
These studies were not done willingly. The triggering event
was congressional legislation in 1994 mandating that the
Pentagon prepare an evaluation of the adequacy of the
nation's bomber force. This action resulted in the three DoD
studies that are evaluated below: (1) the DoD's 1995 Heavy
Bomber Force Study; (2) the 1995 Heavy Bomber Industrial
Capabilities Study; and (3) the 1997 Quadrennial Defense
Review's study of the B-2 issue. In addition, we examined one
additional study conducted by the staff of the Commission on
Roles and Missions (CORM), entitled Future Bomber Force.
In examining the DoD studies, we would like to emphasize
two points. First, the studies studiously ignored the
fundamental strategic choice at hand: should we maintain a
bomber force or go to a force structure based primarily on
short-range air power? Second, in formulating scenario and
modeling assumptions (which inherently drive study outcomes)
the analysts had to go to extreme lengths to ensure that
study results supported the status quo and recommend against
additional B-2s.
Our overall assessment of the DoD studies is that Pentagon
politics took precedence over analytical objectivity and
national security concerns. The basic problem with the
Pentagon studies is that they fly in the face of common
sense. The following seems to be an appropriate analogy for
the current situation. We must plan to face an adversary
armed with a sawed off shotgun (a metaphor for weapons of
mass destruction). Given a choice between short-range pistols
and long-range rifles, the Pentagon studies try to argue that
pistols are preferable, even though this choice requires that
we move within shotgun range to shoot the adversary. We
believe that striking the enemy promptly and accurately from
a distance is the better choice in many scenarios,
particularly since it appears the long-range option is
cheaper over the long term.
The 1995 Heavy Bomber Force Study and its industrial base
counterpart were carefully constructed to come up with the
desired answer (no additional B-2s required). The CORM bomber
study came up with the wrong answer (additional B-2s are very
attractive) and was quietly shuffled aside. The 1997 study
initially came up with the wrong answer (additional B-2s was
the most cost-effective option available), and was reshaped
to provide the desired answer (no more B-2s required).
the 1995 heavy bomber study
The 1995 Heavy Bomber Study was conducted by the OSD, the
Joint Staff, and the Institute for Defense Analyses.\11\
Following its chilly reception in Congress, the Department
has so far proven reluctant to publish a final scripted
report of the study. As noted by Dr. Glenn Buchan, a
distinguished and experienced bomber analyst at the RAND
Corporation,
``The fundamental problem with the heavy bomber study is .
. . whoever framed the study cooked the books. They allowed a
set of assumptions that led to a preordained outcome by
essentially ruling out all the things that would have led
them to other results.'' \12\
Buchan also noted that once the assumptions were laid out,
``one could have concluded in somewhere between 30 seconds
and, perhaps if one were very careful and thoughtful, two or
three minutes, how this was going to come out, not
necessarily having to go through all the computer runs and
all the analysis.'' \13\
The Heavy Bomber Study assumed the following scenario as
its base case. The United States would receive approximately
two weeks of strategic warning. Acting immediately on this
warning, the United States would have these two weeks to
deploy large numbers of fighters and aircraft carriers to the
theater (without encountering any base access or logistical
support problems). The enemy, having watched and waited as
the U.S. deployed overwhelming force into the theater (at
unprecedented rates) would then attack anyway. American
fighters would then fly at sortie rates far beyond those
achieved during the Gulf War to defeat these enemy forces.
To the thousands of fighters in combat, the analysts then
added 20 additional B-2s to planned bomber force (for a total
of 40 B-2s). Using a land war simulation, the analysts then
assessed the impact of the additional B-2s (which were flown
at lower sortie rates than that achieved by B-52s in the Gulf
War) on the overall campaign. In other words, the
capabilities of 20 B-2s, an approximately $25 billion
investment over the next two decades, were compared to those
of a force structure costing about $5 trillion over the same
period. As Dr. Paul Kaminski, the study leader, observed in
his briefing: ``. . . we have ten times more tactical
aircraft than bombers. . . . After everything has arrived,
the bomber results get lost in the overall aggregate.'' \14\
The conclusion of the study was that the planned bomber
force could meet all demands ``for anticipated scenarios and
reasonable excursions.'' But testimony revealed that the
excursions were carefully scripted. For example, one scenario
was supposed to look at the effects of a no tactical air
power case--that is, if we encountered difficulties in
deploying fighters or were concerned that an adversary might
strike our bases or carriers with weapons of mass
destruction. But it was revealed in testimony that through
some unexplained development, a wing of fighters were always
assumed present to support B-52 and B-1B bombers. What would
happen if those fighters weren't there? This case, dismissed
as ``unreasonable'', was never considered.
Moreover, results that showed the B-2 in a favorable light
were never considered in the decision-making process. For
example, in testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee,
Senator Sam Nunn asked Dr. Kaminski about the likely results
if the U.S. was taken by surprise and theater access was a
problem. Kaminski replied: ``Then I am going to need a lot
more bombers than I have in the current force.'' But this
conclusion was never incorporated into the study
recommendations.
The second major conclusion of the study was that it would
be more cost-effective to invest in additional munitions, not
additional B-2s, since additional weapons increased overall
force effectiveness. This is an odd argument. By the same
logic, one could argue that it would make more sense to
invest in jet fuel stocks rather than fighter aircraft, since
sufficient jet fuel is needed to make the force more
effective.
What the study should have looked at was how an additional
buy of B-2s compared to buys of other planned force elements.
But this is something the Pentagon resisted. Simply
discussing the tradeoffs ended up causing such internal
friction in the Pentagon that the topic was removed from the
study. An unbiased analysis would quickly illustrate the B-
2's superior cost-effectiveness compared to other planned
(and preferred) force elements--and thus would throw the
careful balance of interests in the Department into disarray.
the 1995 bomber industrial capabilities study
The Bomber Industrial Capabilities Study was directed by
Congress, chartered by the DOD, and conducted by The Analytic
Sciences Corporation (TASC). The study concluded that
additional B-2 production was not necessary to maintain the
bomber industrial base because, with enough time and money,
we could eventually recreate the capability to build B-2s in
the future.
Eliminating time and money from consideration avoids the
dominant real world issues. Obviously, with enough time and
money, we can recreate anything. The real question is: how
much time and money compared to the option under
consideration by Congress--continued production. On that
question, the industrial base study was entirely silent.
Although used to validate the decision against more B-2s,
the TASC industrial study provides critical strategic data.
The dominant Pentagon argument against the B-2 is
affordability. Yet their own industrial study estimates that
building a new bomber type, a B-3, could easily cost in
excess of $35 billion for research and development alone
(with unit flyaway costs about the same as a B-2) and raised
questions about the affordability of such a program. If
building more B-2s--with research and design already
complete--is too expensive, then certainly the cost of a B-3
is prohibitive. Deciding against B-2 production is therefore
a de facto decision against any future bomber production. It
is a strategic decision to abandon the bomber force.
the quadrennial defense review and the 1997 b-2 study
Congress clearly had little confidence in the preceding
Pentagon analyses, and in 1995 appropriated funds to resume
B-2 production. In February 1996, President Clinton ordered
these funds spent on bringing the original test B-2 (Air
Vehicle 1) up to operational configuration. In addition, and
at Congress' behest, he ordered the Pentagon to once again
re-examine the B-2 issue. This time, the Pentagon was to
compare the B-2's cost-effectiveness to that of other deep
attack systems. The absence of such a cost-effectiveness
comparison was widely viewed by critics as one of the 1995
Heavy Bomber Study's major failings.
The Pentagon, though receiving this direction in February
1996, conducted no specific B-2 analysis until March 1997.
Over the space of several weeks, analysts from the Joint
Staff, OSD, and the Institute for Defense Analyses--the same
group that conducted the 1995 bomber force study--ran their
computer models and developed a summary briefing. The
analytic results of this study obviously caused alarm
bells among the Pentagon hierarchy. Simply put, the
results showed that B-2s were more cost-effective than any
other force element.
Before proceeding further, let us examine the analysis.
Four scenarios were developed:
[[Page H4180]]
a two conflict scenario with warning (allowing time for
deployment), a similar scenario with short warning, a similar
scenario with short warning and base-access problems; and a
two conflict scenario with warning where one of the conflicts
featured a ``near peer'' competitor.
The Pentagon then assumed the immediate retirement of the
following forces: 2 fighter wings (plus 10 percent of Marine
air); 4 fighter wings (plus 20 percent respectively of Marine
air); 2 carriers and their air wings (though not the entire
battle group); 3 carriers and their air wings; and all the B-
1Bs.
With the funds freed up by these individual retirements
over the next 20 years, the study then looked at how many B-
2s could be purchased. In general, retiring a carrier would
allow the purchase of 12-14 B-2s; a fighter wing about 8-12
B-2s.
Using a complex computer simulation, the analysts then
looked at how many B-2s were needed to replace the various
retired force elements in each of the four scenarios. In
almost every case, savings enabled more B-2s to be purchased
than were required to replace the retired systems' military
capability in the conflict scenarios. In other words, B-2s
proved more cost-effective than the planned forces.
These were not the desired answers. What the analysis
showed in general was that very small numbers of B-2s could
potentially replace large groups of planned--and thus
preferred--forces (such as the entire B-1B fleet). And the
cost of those B-2s was substantially less than the forces
they were replacing. In the wrong hands, these results could
be used to argue that a B-2-based force structure could
support U.S. national security at lower budget levels--
exactly what had been predicted by B-2 supporters in Congress
after the Heavy Bomber Study debacle. Accordingly, arguments
were developed to counter these results.
One tactic was to break up the warfighting results into two
phases: (1) the halt phase; and (2) the counter-offensive.
The halt phase--the period during which U.S. forces would
stop an enemy offensive--was highlighted by the QDR strategy
as being extremely crucial and the results once again showed
the B-2s cost-effectiveness; very few B-2s were needed to
replace carriers, fighters, or B-1Bs. For the counter-
offensive (that is, the period when our ground forces had
built up and had launched an offensive after months of aerial
bombardment), the analysts calculated the number of weapons
each force element could deliver compared to a cost-
equivalent number of B-2s. These results showed that the
other forces would be able to deliver more weapons in a given
period of time (unlike the fighter forces, however, the B-2s
were not allowed to deploy forward to increase their sortie
rates).
But the counter-offensive results really showed how
carefully the metrics had to be arranged to achieve the
desired outcome. Weapons delivery potential after we have
stopped the enemy advance, destroyed his army, ripped apart
his strategic infrastructure, chopped up his lines of
communication, attacked his leadership, and destroyed his air
force and air defenses, hardly matters. The issue of winning
or losing is no longer in doubt. Assuming performance in the
counter-offensive to be as important as in the halt phase
contradicts the QDR strategy that presents the halt phase as
being absolutely vital to meeting national security
objectives. In addition, if the analysis had used ton-miles
as a metric instead of just tons, the B-2 would have proven
superior. Ton-miles, which is calculated by taking tons of
weapons delivered times miles flown, is a useful measure
because it incorporates the important metric of range.
However, the most revealing illustration of the Pentagon's
orchestration of the results was found in the ``capability
gap'' charts, which emerged as the centerpiece of the
arguments used against the B-2 since the quantitative results
had proven so problematic. Here, the Pentagon claimed that
retiring a single aircraft carrier, for example, would
greatly reduce the nation's capability to do drug
interdiction, peace enforcement, anti-ship warfare, the sea
control, among others. Similar claims were made for the
retirement of fighter wings. This line of argument raises
more questions than it answers. First, the ``capabilities''
were completely undefined and the B-2s unjustifiably excluded
as potential contributors. Why couldn't the B-2s contribute
to some of these missions? For example, B-2s could destroy
drug manufacturing facilities with precision bombs, provide
sea surveillance, or fire anti-shipping missiles to assist in
sea control. Second, it is unclear that a small reduction in
the total force would have any effect on these missions.
Indeed, but a small fraction of the force would be required
to fly a few ``drug interdiction'' missions. Third, and most
important, the missions selected are hardly core missions.
What is more important, conducting drug interdiction or
preventing the seizure of the Persian Gulf oil fields? What
the Pentagon was trying to obfuscate was the fact that the B-
2 was more cost-effective than the planned forces in fighting
major theater wars. And that was an unacceptable answer.
The clearest illustration of the bias inherent in the 1997
study can be found in a closer examination of the
``capability gap'' issue. Specifically, not a single chart
was dedicated to highlighting the capabilities currently
missing from the current and planned force that would be
generated by expanding the B-2 fleet. For example, we
currently cannot halt a large-scale armored assault without
tactical air forces in-theater prior to the outbreak of
hostilities. How do we plan to do so in the case of a
surprise attack? How do we plan on conducting a large-scale
pre-emptive strike against an adversary's facilities for
producing weapons of mass destruction? How do we plan on
deploying forces in the face of chemical and biological
attack--something the QDR says should be assumed? How do we
plan on conducting a large-scale pre-emptive strike against
an adversary's facilities for producing weapons of mass
destruction? How do we plan on striking facilities that lie
outside fighter range, such as terrorist camps in
northwestern Iran? Nowhere in the briefing are the advantages
of an expanded B-2 fleet articulated, much less highlighted.
How could the Pentagon advertise this as an unbiased analysis
if no consideration was ever given to the formidable
advantages offered by the B-2? The lack of such consideration
is the clearest evidence that the Pentagon planners preferred
to stay rooted in the concepts and force structures of the
past--and not consider the future.
the 1995 corm bomber study
In 1994 legislation, the Congress also appointed a
Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM). As one of their
tasks, the CORM was asked to provide an opinion on the size
of the B-2 force. The CORM sidestepped this issue in their
final report--only stating that if one believed the
assumptions of the Heavy Bomber Force Study study, one could
believe its conclusions. But what the CORM staff did conduct
was a most interesting study--primarily, it seems, because it
was performed outside of the DOD's influence. Future Bomber
Force, however, was filed away until published by the Air
Force Association in 1996.
Future Bomber Force offered a fresh view of the B-2 issue.
It was the only government study to provide empirical
insights into the value of stealth technology. Like the QDR's
quantitative results, it showed that B-2s were the most cost-
effective weapon system available when compared to other
preferred forces. However, it did so using simple
``spreadsheet'' calculations instead of complex computer
simulations. Most significantly, Future Bomber Force was the
only bomber study to show a grasp of the revolutionary
potential offered by the B-2. Listed below is its ``Summary
of Findings'':
``The synergy of advanced munitions with the range and
payload of long-range bombers may be more important to the
Department of Defense in the years ahead than at any time
during the Cold War. Combined with the stealth of the B-2,
precision munitions with long-range bombers have the
potential to provide key capabilities not available from any
other forces to meet critical future national security
requirements. Specifically, these capabilities include:
``The potential to halt an armored force in a matter of
days from long-range; the ability to survivably operate
against an enemy from beyond reach of enemy weapons
(particularly missiles armed with weapons of mass
destruction); guaranteed responsiveness--independent from
forward basing or carrier prepositioning; the ability to
achieve strategic or operational surprise quickly, imposing
wide-spread attack and paralysis upon an aggressor with
minimum exposure of friendly personnel; the ability to swing
survivable and effective force from one MRC to another
rapidly; the psychological impact of strike without notice;
the ability to induce enough uncertainty in a potential
aggressor to deter hostile activity conventionally while the
U.S. is militarily engaged elsewhere; and greatly reduced
support assets, personnel, and basing requirements to achieve
equivalent effects with non-stealth and/or smaller payload,
shorter range aircraft.''
vii. conclusions and recommendations
Our review of the bomber issue concludes that current plans
for the long-range air power force are woefully deficient. We
believe that the nation's long-range air power capabilities
will be more important in the future than they have been in
the past. Indeed, the changing shape of the security
environment makes long-range air power ideally suited to the
protection of American security interests in the decades
ahead. Moreover, we believe that proper exploitation of the
B-2 could radically change the way in which we think about
and employ military power, leading ultimately to a much more
affordable and effective military posture.
The only option for maintaining the viability of the bomber
force over the long term is to continue production of the B-2
stealth bomber. Our review of the DoD's studies indicates
that the B-2 issue has become so captive to Pentagon
bureaucratic politics that the Department has made the wrong
strategic choice. By following the DoD's recommendations, the
bomber force itself becomes a wasted asset. The nation will
be abandoning a weapon system that is becoming very cost-
effective as precision weapons are introduced. This
capability will become increasingly vital to supporting U.S.
national security in this very challenging new era. This is
not the way to conduct rational national security decision-
making. By allowing organizational politics and short-term
affordability concerns to dominate the B-2 debate, we will
turn our backs on the future. Moreover, we will risk U.S.
national security interests and the lives of thousands of
young Americans.
We believe Pentagon opposition will eventually ameliorate
once military planners gain greater appreciation of the
advantages offered by the B-2. But until that time, the
future of the bomber force and this revolutionary weapon
system lies with Congress.
[[Page H4181]]
The situation is similar to that of the F-117 in the 1980s.
The Air Force insisted that a single squadron of these
revolutionary aircraft was all that was needed; Congress
directed a doubling of the buy, an action that saved many
American and allied lives in the Gulf War. Today, once again,
only Congress can set in motion the steps needed to maintain
production of the B-2.
Additional B-2s are affordable within planned budgets. The
Pentagon plans to increase procurement spending approximately
50% by 2001 and those funds should be spent on the most cost-
effective systems, such as additional B-2s. We make the
following recommendations:
Fund at a minimum one additional B-2 squadron (9 aircraft),
but keep open the possibility of increasing the production
rate and planned force size;
Direct the Department of Defense to develop and provide to
the Congress a five-year procurement plan that contains a
full funding plan for one additional squadron of B-2s; and
Hold a hearing to assess whether to re-establish an
operational command in the Air Force dedicated to long-range
strike, headed by a four star general, who can ensure that
bomber issues are given appropriate consideration in national
security decision-making.
The fundamental strategic choice is up to you in Congress.
An enhanced bomber force centered on a larger B-2 fleet could
make revolutionary contributions to our national security. We
urge you to take the steps necessary to make sure that the
opportunity afforded by the B-2--a better, more effective,
and more affordable military--becomes reality.
FOOTNOTES
\1\ William S. Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense
Review, May 1997, p. 13.
\2\ See Charles Perry, et. al, Long-Range Bombers and the
Role of Airpower in the New Century, Institute for Foreign
Policy Analysis, 1995, p. 57.
\3\ An expanded version of the ``nuclear argument for
bombers'' can be found in Stephen Cambone and Colin S. Gray,
``The Role of Nuclear Forces in U.S. National Security
Strategy: Implications of the B-2 Bomber,'' Comparative
Strategy, 15:207-231, 1996.
\4\ Future Bomber Force, Commission on Roles and Missions,
1995, p. 3.
\5\ Ibid.
\6\ ``The Value of Stealth,'' Headquarters, United States Air
Force, 1991.
\7\ See Future Bomber Force, Commission on Roles and
Missions, 1995, p. 11.
\8\ Donald B. Rice, ``To B-2 or not B-2, That is the
Question,'' The Washington Times, November 5, 1995.
\9\ Ken Watman and Dean Wilkening, Regional Deterrence
Strategies, RAND, 1995.
\10\ Charles Horner, ``Unmatched Survivability,'' The
Washington Times, June 13, 1995.
\11\ For a detailed assessment, see Kurt Guthe, A Precisely
Guided Analytic Bomb: The Defense Department's Heavy Bomber
Study, National Institute for Public Policy, September 1996.
\12\ Testimony to Military Procurement Subcommittee, House
National Security Committee, September 12, 1996.
\13\ Cited in Kurt Guthe, A Precisely Guided Analytic Bomb:
The Defense Department's Heavy Bomber Study, National
Institute for Public Policy, September 1996, p. 41.
\14\ DoD Special Briefing, May 1995.
\15\ Donald B. Rice, ``To B-2 or not B-2, That is the
Question ``The Washington Times, November 5, 1995.
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, how much time do we have remaining?
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] has 4\1/2\
minutes remaining, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Foley] has 7\1/2\
minutes remaining, and the gentleman from California [Mr. Hunter] has
23\1/2\ minutes remaining.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 30 seconds to make a
response to the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks], who just spoke.
Mr. Chairman, when the gentleman talked about conventional
deterrents, it is not in the platform, it is in the weapons. And the
weapons are standoff smart bombs and precision-guided missiles. Second,
remember, we do not have zero, we have 21 of these planes. I think it
is a flight into fantasy, it is a bit of hyperbole to think if we jump
from 21 to 30, the world will tremble. If that is the case and we
cannot see the Stealth bomber, tell the world we have a thousand of
them. They cannot see it. How would they know? That would really be a
deterrent and we would save a whole lot of money.
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 30 seconds to respond to the
comments of the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums].
The standoff weapons, Mr. Chairman, are extremely expensive. They are
over $1 million apiece. That is our air launch cruise missiles. In
fact, closer to a million and a half apiece. That is compared to
$23,000 for the short-range weapons once your bomber has penetrated.
Mr. Chairman, we are sending out our Navy ships that have missile
tubes with no missiles in them because the Navy and the other services
have not bought enough missiles. It is difficult to get these very
expensive standoff weapons that the gentleman says we are going to be
buying. The smart buy is the B-2 bomber.
Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman
from Missouri [Mr. Skelton], the ranking member of the subcommittee.
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I was sorry to hear a few moments ago the
gentleman from Florida [Mr. Foley] say this is not about the defense of
our country. It is about the defense of the young men and young women
in uniform, those who are on the firing line, those who are nearing
battle, those who may be called upon unless we have a weapons system
that slows down or stops the enemy. The question is asked by my friend
from California, who wants it? The young men and young women on the
ground want it. Talk to the young soldiers who saw the bombardment and
what the F-117's did to help them win in the Persian Gulf war.
Mr. Chairman, this is an important decision. It is not something we
should take lightly. We should also be very careful in what we do this
evening and not do something against the interest of America. Often,
historically, this Congress has done that. We should not step into that
hole once begin.
It is rather interesting that the replay of something back in 1925, a
courageous Brigadier General by the name of Billy Mitchell spoke openly
and forcefully for a bomber force. And here we are again, in 1997,
saying the same thing, only with a more sophisticated bomber force that
has stealth, that has long range, that can save American lives.
It is interesting that the second part of this amendment has not been
alluded to, the $331 million that goes elsewhere. I say to my
colleagues that the Senate in conference I think will invade this
budget for $331 million for their programs because not one helicopter,
not one truck, not one artillery piece is singled out for these
dollars.
This Stealth B-2 bomber has a mission, it has an important mission to
fulfill the strategy set forth in the recent quadrennial defense review
of shaping, responding and preparing. Insofar as shaping the
battlefield, the F-117, the Stealth, did work. It had short range. We
had several air bases nearby. And as time goes by, as already has been
mentioned, those will be fewer and fewer. This allows us to respond
within hours rather than the days and the weeks it takes to get fighter
bombers, to get aircraft carriers into position. We cannot count on
local host airfields.
Mr. Chairman, long-range air power will be more important than ever
in the decades ahead. Consequently, we do not believe that a mere force
of 21 B-2's will satisfy foreseeable U.S. military requirements. The
changing shape, the security environment makes long-range stealthy
precision strike power ideally suited to the protection of American
security interest in the decades ahead and that the Nation's long-range
air power capabilities will be more important in the future than they
have been in the past.
The B-2's ability to strike independently within hours anywhere in
the globe from bases in the United States leaves it uniquely well-
suited among all U.S. force elements for dealing with unexpected
challenges. And we have had those in our history: Pearl Harbor, Kuwait.
They are there.
The only realistic option for maintaining the viability of the long-
range stealthy precision strike force over the long-term is to continue
production of the B-2. The B-2 is there for a critical national asset
which is uniquely capable of performing these vital missions. That is
reality. That is reality, Mr. Chairman. Being able to strike the enemy
promptly and accurately from a distance is the best choice in many
scenarios, particularly since it is more effective and less costly than
other options when all costs are considered.
Mr. Chairman, I urge a no vote on this amendment.
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
California [Mr. Cunningham], Navy top gun, my seat mate from San Diego.
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, Shoeless John Kasich, tell me it is not
so. Tell me an individual who is a caring individual would send our men
and women off to combat. In Vietnam, we lost 10 percent of our bomber
force in 11 days, B-52s. And that is what we are asking our kids to go
forward in. Not with standoff weapons, like the gentleman says, but our
kids are going to die.
[[Page H4182]]
Shoeless John Kasich, put yourself in an airplane that is on fire,
coming down, not knowing if you are going to die or you are going to be
a prisoner of war. I cannot tell my colleague, I have been through
that. And there is no Benson and Hedges in white scarf. When they told
my mom I was shot down, they had to take her to the hospital; she had a
nervous breakdown.
That is what we are talking about in these families. And why, why the
B-52 in the first place? You take an F-22 which the Air Force is going
to escort a bomber in, the SU-27, the SU-35, and the SU-37, which
Russia is shipping all over the country today, with its big radar, can
knock down our airplanes. That puts us inside the envelope when they
shoot their AA-12, which outranks and outflies our RAM. Our kids are
going to make it because the F-22 and the B-2 get in undetected before
the MIG's, and they are going to die instead of ours.
{time} 1930
But put them there with a B-52 and that thing is going to illuminate
the whole sky. Everybody is going to know where your force is and they
are going to attack it, and our kids are going to die.
Shoeless John Kasich, tell me it ain't so. Tell me that you would not
put our kids in harm's way and put them out there where they are not
going to come back.
The gentleman from Florida says he supports the flag. I appreciate
that. But we damn near died for the flag, and I do not want our kids to
die coming back in B-52's and antiquated B-51's, or B-1's. Give us a
chance, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 7\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from
Ohio [Mr. Kasich], the chairman of the Committee on the Budget.
Mr. KASICH. Mr. Chairman, let me just suggest to all the people that
talk about the fact that people's lives are being put at risk, I do not
know whether my colleagues know it or not, but the military does not
want this plane. They do not want it. If they wanted it, they would ask
for it and they would make space for it. Why? Because they think there
are other priorities that are going to protect people's lives, that
there are other requests that ought to be honored, that are going to
work to save people in time of conflict.
By attacking the people who do not support buying more planes, and to
somehow bring into question the fact that there is some question about
our commitment to the ability of the United States to succeed in war,
is not just to attack us but to attack the military, the Pentagon, the
ones that fight the war. They do not want the plane. They do not want
it because they do not believe we can afford it and, frankly, a number
of them believe that it is a cold war relic.
The B-2 was built. Its purpose was to fly inside the Soviet Union in
the middle of a nuclear war to hunt down mobile targets. We could not
find mobile targets in Iraq. Here we were to fly into the middle of the
Soviet Union, in the middle of a nuclear war. That is why the plane was
designed. That was its purpose. I was there when we first heard about
what its purpose was. Any other new mission is a mission that was
created here, in this House, by some people who were concerned about
national security and some people who were concerned about jobs. I
respect that, but I do not support jobs bills coming out of the Federal
Government. I used to fight them up here. Jobs are to be created in the
private sector. That is why we are trying to balance the budget and get
lower interest rates.
The simple fact of the matter is it does not have a mission anymore.
I will suggest to Members that I was engaged in the negotiations with
our Secretary of Defense and with the people at the Pentagon and we
signed up to an agreement, 20 planes. That is what they said they
needed. I talked with our former Secretary of Defense, Mr. Cheney, who
said, contrary to any letter he signed, ``I want 20.'' We made an
agreement to build 20. We are going to spend $44 billion to buy 21 B-
2's. Every time I look at the math, the math gets creative. We get
creative math. ``Well, the next set is going to cost less.'' I know
this. Show me the money. The money is, for 21 planes, we spent $44
billion, and we will have 21 of these planes that will function.
Second, the bombers. The last time I checked, the bombers worked
pretty good in Iraq. In fact, the statement was it made the rubble
bounce. They worked well.
We need standoff weapons. If we want to talk about putting people at
risk, why would we want to develop a system where you fly over the
enemy if you can actually stand outside, away from the enemy, and
destroy the same targets? The response to that is, ``We can't afford
those standoff weapons.''
Well, if we did not spend another $27 billion on a plane that the
Pentagon does not want, maybe we could buy the standoff weapons. The
last time I checked, there was a big report that came out that said we
had a severe readiness problem that jeopardized the ability of the
military to function effectively. In this bill, we have not
significantly increased the amount of money for readiness. Some people
argue we cut it. There was a study that just came out and said we were
not ready.
I would suggest we take the $351 million we have and put it into
readiness, help the guard, the reserve. Help them. Give them the money
they need. The fact is, is that passing more B-2 bombers in my judgment
undermines the ability to have a strong national defense because it
puts our money in the wrong priority items.
I am a supporter of the F-22 for one reason: Air superiority. We need
it. I am for it. I believe in it. I believe in the F-16. Did my
colleagues see the number of F-16's that would have to be canceled over
the lifetime of this to buy a weapon the Pentagon does not want? I know
this in my career around here. When the Pentagon wants something, we
give it to them. And when the Pentagon does not want something, we give
it to them.
The simple fact is, is that my friend, the gentleman from California,
I hold in the highest regard. He is absolutely committed to a strong
national defense and I salute him for it. And I salute a lot of my
opponents on this issue. I really do. I have high regard for the work
that they do in the House. But this is really a matter of judgments and
a matter of priorities, not a matter of who is more for us to win and
be effective and provide for the security of our people.
We firmly believe that with the B-1's, with the 21 B-2's, and with B-
52's that have not flown, that in fact there are appropriate missions
for all of those bombers. Just this last week we defeated additional D-
5 missiles that go in the submarines, that are another standoff weapon.
The age of the future is about technology, and it is about air
superiority, and it is about mobility. But not necessarily mobility as
it relates to a plane like the B-2, which the military itself says does
not fit in their plans for mobility. The fact is we are going to move
into the next century. The cold war is over, and the cold war relics
that are associated with the cold war have to be put in their place.
Do we have a hedge? Do we have a hedge against some potential threats
out in the future? The answer is yes. But what we should not do is
undermine our ability to allow the Department of Defense in working
with the Congress to set the right priorities for the next century, to
have a military budget that right now cannot all be funded and not to
stick another program in that costs $27 billion, that will in fact
undermine our ability to have effective conventional weapons and our
ability to have a high state of readiness for the American soldier and
sailor and airman.
I would say to my colleagues, the debate is not over the 21 bombers.
Mr. Chairman, I am not asking the House to kill the 21 B-2's that cost
the $44 billion. I am asking the House to stay with the agreement. I am
asking the House to reject the idea that we can afford another $27
billion to buy additional B-2's.
I am asking the House to cast a vote for national security, for
national defense, and for the fighting men and women, so that in fact
we can be more effective. Let us not undermine the ability to win the
wars and to pursue a good national security strategy by putting too
many things in a bill that the military itself says we do not need.
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume,
just to respond briefly to the remarks of the gentleman from Ohio [Mr.
Kasich].
[[Page H4183]]
Mr. Chairman, first, the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Kasich], for whom I
have great respect, said the cold war is over and the B-2 is a cold war
relic.
The problem with the Soviet Union dissolving is they did not dissolve
their SAM production. That is surface-to-air missiles. They are
designed to do one thing, and that is kill American aircraft. That is
how they shot down Scott O'Grady over Bosnia. Basically a little batch
of teenagers in uniform with 3 weeks' training time in SAM missiles
delivered from the Soviet Union, now Russia, were able to shoot down an
American high-performance aircraft.
Mr. Chairman, the red on this map of the world denotes all of the
nations that have SAM sites: Libya, Syria, North Korea, and China have
lots of SAM sites. That means that if Americans drive nonstealth
aircraft into those SAM sites as the gentleman from California [Mr.
Cunningham] said, a number of them are going to die. Second, the
gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Kasich] should be happy to know that we have
saved in the reform part of this budget according to CBO $15 billion
over the next 5 years. That is enough according to CBO to purchase the
$12 billion buy of B-2's and, once more, it is 1/35th of what we are
going to spend for short-range aircraft.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. HUNTER. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.
Mr. DICKS. The gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Kasich] says stealth does not
matter. Stealth helped us win the gulf war. But this was after Saddam
had already grabbed Kuwait. We then blew him out of the ground, in
essence, with the F-117. What we are saying is with the B-2, we can
stop him from getting Kuwait. That is the big difference.
Mr. HUNTER. The gentleman makes a good point. Saddam Hussein gave us
6 months to build airfields and acquire airfields. We cannot guarantee
that in every situation.
Mr. DICKS. If we could stop him before he gets there, we could save
billions of dollars and save many, many lives.
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from
California [Ms. Harman], a very articulate member of the committee.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Kasich] was
talking about priorities. I rise in support of the B-2 and its priority
role in American military strategy. This amendment offers us the wrong
choices. This issue is not about the reserve components or about
whether the B-2 is capable of doing what it is advertised to do. In
future warfare, technology will be more important than manpower. Using
large forces, whether for combat or to support forces engaged in
combat, will be very risky given the lucrative target they present for
weapons of mass destruction.
The reserve components are being drawn down, and that is an
appropriate course of action given likely warfare scenarios. Trading
the B-2, a vital asset for all parts of our strategy, to fund reserve
component accounts that will be substantially reduced in the future
does not make much sense. The question is not whether the B-2 does what
is promised, as some would have us believe, or whether other platforms
can do the same job, because B-2 performance exceeds standards. We have
heard about its stealth, we have heard about how it can meet the QDR
requirements of shape, respond and prepare. It is the only system that
can fly great distances, penetrate hostile airspace and deliver massive
amounts of munitions on key targets with acceptable, even minimal,
risks.
During last week's debate on the defense authorization bill, I
repeatedly stated my view that we can buy a better defense for less
money. We can. We can and we must fund essential weapons systems
including long-lead funding for 9 more B-2s. We can and we must cut
outmoded weapons systems and excess infrastructure. That is the right
trade. The trade in this amendment is the wrong trade.
I urge a ``no'' vote.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Obey].
Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, this amendment cuts $331 million, a down
payment on 9 B-2 bombers that we do not need, and it moves the money to
the guard and reserve. It is simply that simple. But this is not about
just $330 million. This will remove a $27 billion time bomb from the
budget.
{time} 1945
In my view, this provision represents Congress at its very worst. It
jams more weapons into this bill without having any way to pay for
those weapons over the long term, it gives the contractors the goodies
that they have lobbied for for so hard and long, but it does not cut
out other low-priority items in order to pay for the long-term costs of
the system, and we are not talking about loose change.
For the cost of just one of these bombers, we could pay for the
undergraduate tuition for every single student at the University of
Wisconsin for the next 11 years. Now that is not small potatoes. For
the cost of just two of these bombers, we could double the cost of
cancer research in this country.
Which investment do my colleagues think will protect more families
from the threat that they really face? An investment in two more B-2
bombers or a doubling of cancer research in this country?
There have been five studies that have indicated that this weapon is
not needed in preference to other weapons. There have been five studies
which say do not go ahead with it. Secretary Cohen's quarterly defense
review or quadrennial defense review said this in part in opposing the
B-2: It said existing forces would have to be retired immediately to
pay for the additional B-2's. Even then the savings from retiring the
forces are not enough to offset the large upfront investment for the B-
2's, and there would be a loss in war-fighting capacity during the
decade or more between when the outgoing forces were retired and all
the B-2's were delivered.
Mr. Chairman, that alone ought to tell my colleagues vote for this
amendment.
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Texas, Mr. Sam Johnson, former POW, great Thunderbird driver, and great
pilot.
Mr. SAM JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. Chairman, as my colleagues know, we
forgot what we are here for, and that is to protect the United States
of America. The B-2 is expensive, but we know it is the only available
system that can directly attack heavily defended areas anywhere in the
world from the United States within hours. We do not have to deploy, we
do not have to escort, we do not have to create a big force. It means
that B-2 is likely to carry most of the burden in any war.
To say that we have 21 and that should be enough is naive and
dangerous. That number was kind of pulled out of the air anyway, I
think. The gentleman from California, Mr. Duncan Hunter, mentioned
earlier that 10 percent of our B-52's missions were destroyed in
Vietnam.
I was in Vietnam. I was a POW there for nearly 7 years, and let me
tell my colleagues something. I watched the missiles fired around us
until we thought the sky was going to be like daylight. It was night. I
watched three B-52's get hit in the air. Do my colleagues know what?
That airplane is old. It cannot get in anywhere without getting hit.
They exploded right there in the air, right in front of my eyes, and I
saw some of our countrymen die on the spot, burn to death, and those
that got out, bailed out, got to Earth, and do my colleagues know what?
They got imprisoned just like I was, and one of the tail gunners had
his leg cut off by a Vietnamese because they were mad at him.
Do we want that? I do not think so. I think we want to protect our
men. We need to provide the equipment, the military equipment, the most
modern equipment that we can provide for them so that if we ever get
into any situation like that again, and it does not have to be like
Vietnam, it can be as was stated before, a mission to destroy the tanks
in a place like Iraq before they get moving.
We must protect our troops. Give them the airplane. Vote against this
amendment.
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
California [Mr. McKeon] a very articulate Member.
Mr. McKEON. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the gentleman for all the
work he has done on this bill. As my colleagues know, I had a speech
prepared, but I think we are to the point
[[Page H4184]]
on this debate after many years, that everything has been said and
everyone has not said it yet, so I would like to say something a little
different.
I had a new grandson born today, John Wells Morrison III, and as my
colleagues know, my big concern is that when he is my age he is still
here, and I am really concerned that when we determine that we can
foresee 20 and 30 years out into the future and say that we no longer
need this kind of equipment, I have real concern because it is not
going to matter to me, I am not going to be here. But I am concerned
about my 15 grandchildren, and I think that I have been where this
plane is built, I have seen the capability of this plane. And then when
we hear like the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Sam Johnson, who had to go
to war, fly a mission that he was ill-equipped to fly, the plane was
not the right plane for the mission, and yet he had to fly into harm's
way and then spend 7 years in a prisoner-of-war camp, I think it is
criminal that we would send our young people out with equipment that is
not the best that we can provide them with.
Mr. Chairman, we need this plane, and we are talking about nine, nine
planes. How many planes did we have flying in World War II? And in
Vietnam? And in Desert Storm? We are talking nine planes to give us
three wings, three divisions, that we can place around the world that
would be a strong deterrent, strong help.
We need this. Defeat this amendment.
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Kansas [Mr. Tiahrt] a B-2 proponent and expert.
Mr. TIAHRT. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity because I have
kind of a unique perspective. I am probably the only Member in
Congress, I believe I am the only Member in Congress, that actually
came out of aerospace, and I worked on some of the specifications for
the B-2 so I know that the mission was not just to fly over Russia. It
was to fly anywhere globally and attack any target that was protected
by surface-to-air missiles.
But the reason I support the B-2 is really twofold. No. 1, it is
economical in terms of human risk. If my colleagues look at the initial
strike in Desert Storm, there were in excess of a dozen targets. It
took 75 aircraft, placing more than 140 servicemen at risk by those
initial strikes, and yet that same group of tasks, those same targets,
could have been accomplished by just two B-2's, placing only four
pilots at risk. So in human terms of human risk, this is a very
economical weapon to have in our inventory.
And the second one is just the pure cost of maintaining the 75-plus
aircraft, the procurement, the maintenance, the keeping them up. If we
balance that with the cost of B-2's, it is more economical.
So it may be costly, but yet it is economical, and vote no on the
amendment.
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
California [Mr. Rohrabacher], my friend.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, first of all let me say I respect my
colleagues, the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] and the
gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Kasich] but I disagree with them on this
issue.
We are making a decision today of what options our leaders will have
20 years from now. That is what is important when the gentleman from
California's, Mr. McKeon's, grandson is around and we are not. Twenty
years from now we do not want the option of our American political
leaders just to be to go nuclear or to put hundreds of thousands of
Americans at risk on the ground or to send in aircraft carriers with
thousands of Americans on those and putting those people at risk.
I was in the White House when President Reagan was forced to bomb
Libya. We put thousands of Americans on American aircraft carriers at
risk. We had to fly out of American bases in England. We are not going
to have those American bases in England throughout the world 20 years
from now. We need weapon systems today for our leaders 20 years from
now that will project power from the United States of America and put
the fewest Americans at risk that can possibly be put at risk.
This is a cost-effective weapon when we look at the cost of this as
compared to thousands of American lives in an aircraft carrier. We want
to give future American leaders the option. I ask to defeat this
amendment.
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to my friend, the
gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Traficant].
Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I did not originally support the B-2. I
once made a statement, ``Why build them? Tell the Soviets we have 500.
They can't see them, they can't hear them; how are they going to
know?''
The wisdom of this House built the B-2. B-2 is an advantage. B-2
gives us the edge. Yes, it is costly, but how do you quantify the value
of the lives of our troops? How many more Scot O'Gradys, America, might
experience those types of disasters?
But there is one other thing today because today's debate is not
about money, it is maintaining the position of strength to negotiate.
Ronald Reagan said America must always negotiate from a position of
strength. The B-2 maintains America's position of strength. That is the
greatest deterrent we have in international possible conflict.
Now, yes, we must balance the budget, but our major job here is to
protect the national security. And, my colleagues, America cannot do it
with the Neighborhood Crime Watch. We have got to step up.
The time to kill B-2 was at the beginning. Congress went ahead. Now
to kill the B-2 is not cost effective. The major production costs have
already taken place. Now the copies can come forward.
We cannot protect America with the Neighborhood Crime Watch. We must
negotiate from a position of strength. Ronald Reagan was right about
that. B-2 gives us the edge. Take the edge.
I oppose the amendment.
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 45 seconds to my friend, the
gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon].
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, I do not think I need 45 seconds to tell
everybody to come over here and vote for this vital piece of weaponry
that we need desperately in this country.
I associate my remarks with the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Traficant].
He makes more sense every day. I hope he does not run for Governor, I
hope he stays here. But let me tell my colleagues something.
For those like my good friend from Florida, Mr. Foley, who sat in my
office listening a few minutes ago, as my colleagues know, if they
wonder, I suggest they put on a uniform every week and go and fly on
those B-52 bombers that are in such bad condition that we do not know
whether they are going to stay in the air from one day to the next. And
my colleagues talk about young men and women serving in the military
and giving the best money can buy. That is what we need to do right now
is to come over here and vote for this B-2 piece of legislation.
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Texas [Mr. DeLay], the majority whip.
Mr. DeLAY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding this time
to me.
Mr. Chairman, we do have a very important choice to make tonight, and
it is a choice between a policy that shortchanges the men and women
that risk their lives in defense of our Nation or it is a policy that
will provide those men and women with equipment and the tools that they
need to ensure that our Nation remains the protector of democracy and
freedom around the world.
Now we live in an age where when dictators are alive and well, they
are busy stockpiling nuclear biological chemical weapons; and as
leaders, we have to make sure that we send American soldiers into
combat against these tyrants with the best possible chance of success.
And as Cap Weinberger noted, the Air Force has estimated that a B-2
with two crewmembers could conduct an attack normally involving 75
tactical aircraft and 147 crewmembers. The procurement and lifecycle
costs of 75 tactical aircraft approaches $7.5 billion and the
comparable costs for one B-2 is $1.1 billion.
Now clearly the B-2 provides us with the best opportunity to protect
U.S. interests at the lowest costs with the best possible technology,
and I just hope that my colleagues will make the
[[Page H4185]]
right choice tonight. A vote against keeping the B-2 line open and
operational is a very shortsighted vote, and in this dangerous day and
age we cannot afford to make such ill-considered and shortsighted
choices. We need to make the right choice for our service men and women
and for the future of this country.
So, Mr. Chairman, I urge a ``no'' vote on this amendment.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Virginia [Mr. Sisisky].
{time} 2000
Mr. SISISKY. Mr. Chairman, I do not have much time. I do not think I
have to apologize to anybody for supporting weapons systems that
protect our young men and women.
It is amazing what we are arguing about. Like we do not have any
sophisticated weapons in our arsenal, that we do not have any plans to
build any sophisticated weapons in our arsenal. I cannot believe what
is going on. I have heard somebody say, and I do not know who it is,
that we are going to pay for this by the reform package of $15 billion
that we are going to save. My friends, that is why we are in trouble
today. That is why we are in trouble today. We are already spending the
money that we might save.
I want to tell my colleagues something. I thought that this weapons
system saw its end. I am going to tell my colleagues what is at stake
tonight. Either we stop it now, we stop it now, or we are not going to
stop at 9, we are going to have 60 and we are going to be talking about
$100 billion.
Vote ``aye.''
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Maine [Mr. Allen].
Mr. ALLEN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this
time.
Mr. Chairman, during the course of this debate there have been times
when it seemed if the question was whether the B-2 was a valuable
plane, whether stealth technology was a valuable technology. That is
not the issue. Stealth technology proved itself during the gulf war. We
have 21 B-2 bombers. We do not need more. We cannot afford anymore than
we have right now. We have difficult choices to make here today and
that is why we are here. Mr. Chairman, $27 billion we are looking at,
not $331 million; $27 billion needed just for nine planes.
An earlier speaker said we need 20 B-2's for 1 major regional
conflict and 10 for another. I submit that 20 is enough, it will do the
job, it is a good technology, we do not need more, and what we need to
do is make sure that we are investing in our training and equipment for
our troops, that we are providing the other alternatives that will keep
our forces strong, and that we are not robbing domestic programs to buy
nine more B-2's.
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the last 2 minutes of my
time.
Mr. Chairman, let me just answer my friend that there are a number of
experts who disagree that 20 B-2's is enough. Brent Scowcroft with the
Scowcroft Study that the gentleman has a copy of is one of those
leaders who believes that. General Chuck Horner who ran the air war in
the Persian Gulf, who utilized stealth and utilized precision-guided
munitions, is on the Hill visiting Members' offices because he believes
very strongly in having enough B-2's.
Let us get straight what we are talking about because Members have
gone over a lot of things. We are talking about maybe 2 months worth of
Wal-Mart sales. We are talking about one thirty-fifth of the amount of
money that we are spending on short-range aircraft.
Interestingly, we are moving to short-range aircraft as we lose our
bases around the world. We are down to 14 bases. Nobody has an idea as
to whether or not we are going to be guaranteed those bases in Japan,
for example, in a second Korean conflict. Nobody knows exactly how we
are going to detox the airfields because we do not have enough
detoxification equipment.
This is going to be the first time in our modern history when we have
had the ability to make our pilots survivable and we told them no, and
ironically, we said we do not want a relic flying, so we are going to
fly 80-year-old B-52's, older than the great-grandparents of the pilots
who wear the uniform of the United States of America.
We have the money. We saved $15 billion in the reform bill. I know
that the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] will be pleased with
that, over 5 years. That more than pays for the entire B-2 program.
Finally, the National Guard, which was supposed to benefit by the
money that would be cut out of the B-2, says that they have an
excellent modification program because of what the committee and the
Congress has given them. We have messages there from the National Guard
for every Member if we want to look at that. There is no problem there.
Let us give our pilots the very, very best because we care about them.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman, as the ranking
minority member, is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from
Massachusetts [Mr. Olver].
(Mr. OLVER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. OLVER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding. I rise
in favor of the Dellums-Kasich-Foley amendment.
Mr. Chairman, restarting the B-2 bomber production line cannot be
justified on any known grounds. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have
testified that more B-2's are unnecessary.
Just last week, Defense Secretary William Cohen told us he opposes
this astronomically expensive project. Further, the price tag for the
B-2's in this bill is misleading.
The $331 million is just a small downpayment for nine additional
bombers.
The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the cost of this
project will explode to $27 billion in inflation adjusted dollars over
20 years--for each of those nine bombers, $1.5 billion for procurement
and $1.5 billion for maintenance. We are told the CBO is a highly
reliable unbiased body or is that only when CBO tells us what we want
to hear?
For each additional B-2, we could fund prenatal care for 1\1/2\
million women or immunizations for nearly 10 million babies, or Head
Start for 330,000 students or health care for \1/2\ million children or
summer jobs for more than a million teenagers.
If we cannot afford to give the proposed child tax credit to millions
of poor working families who need help buying food, housing, and
medical care, then how can we afford to waste $27 billion on B-2
bombers.
I urge my colleagues to save our limited resources for something of
value--something we need.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from
Massachusetts [Mr. Kennedy].
Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, first of all, let me
thank my friend from California, Mr. Dellums, for the marvelous job he
has done on this bill not only this year, but in years in the past, and
I hope tonight he is successful for all the efforts that he has made
almost single-handedly at one time on this House floor to defeat the B-
2, and we ought to acknowledge his efforts. I say to my friend, he has
done a great job.
I come here as a strong supporter of domestic spending. We stood up
this year and watched our housing cuts go by 25 percent. We have seen
billions of dollars cut out of health care, WIC Program cuts, and fuel
assistance cuts.
I am here to tell my colleagues that I believe that I would withstand
all of those cuts and I would stand by the people that are in those
programs who they themselves would give up those funds if they thought
the national security of this country was at risk. If they thought we
needed the B-2 bomber, they would vote for the B-2 bomber and they
would be willing to spend the taxes to pay for it.
But this is not about the B-2 bomber, this is about a symbol. It is
about a symbol of American might and freedom, it is about a symbol that
is plain wrong. All we have to do is look at the Pentagon studies
themselves to determine that the Pentagon is opposed to this. We ought
to defeat the B-2 bomber and stand with the people of our country.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I rarely walk into the well; I generally
speak from where the ranking member and the chair speak, but I choose
to speak from the well because I want to speak to each and every one of
my colleagues face-to-face.
[[Page H4186]]
First of all, for those of my colleagues who are the freshmen and the
sophomore Members, that is half of this Congress, I would remind each
and every one of them that they campaigned diligently on the integrity
of balancing the budget. My colleagues were elected, Republican and
Democrat, freshman and sophomore, on that basis.
This was not contemplated in the 5-year balanced budget agreement.
This is not about B-2's. We have 21. All of this hyperbole, as if some
way we are this Third World country technologically, is bizarre,
extreme, absurd and ridiculous. We have 21 B-2 bombers. My colleagues
leap quickly from the B-2 to the B-52, but they do not pause at the 95
B-1B bombers that you spent $20.5 billion building and billions of
additional dollars giving them conventional capability.
Someone said the B-2 is the only long-range bomber. They know that is
not true. The B-1 can fly as far as the B-2 flies. Both of them need
tankers to refill them.
What is this about? It is not even about the $331 million that I
transferred. I just made a transfer. It could have been transferred
anyplace. The point I am making is that this is not about transfer. It
is about trade-off. It is about $27 billion. We cannot go home saying
we embrace a 5-year budget agreement that did not contemplate a $27
billion weapons system and push it into that budget and assume that we
cannot push something out. We have to. We are going to have to push out
other military priorities, and my colleagues know that is true.
Integrity and truth demands that my colleagues answer yes to that.
For those of us who are not keenly interested in all of these issues,
but are interested in domestic programs, with impoverished communities,
at-risk children, undereducated people, underemployed, underhoused,
inadequately fed, how can we say I voted for a $27 billion weapons
system that no one wanted and 2 years down the road when the fire walls
go down and they start raiding these budget programs, I hope someone
gets up in the floor and points a finger and says how can we have that
kind of hypocrisy.
We have to face it now. I am not coming back to the floor next year
on this amendment, because this is it, folks. We have to stop it right
now if we are going to stop it. I tell my colleagues, I bet every
single thing that I have, and I am broke, that this will not come to
just 30 planes. They will nickel and dime us to death and billion-
dollar us to death. There will be 40 and 50 and 60, because once you
start building these planes, the places where they get built, people do
not want to stop them getting built. This is a $27 billion program.
Now, if we want to employ people, then let us go in the back room and
dream up a $27 billion jobs program. I will show my colleagues how we
can certainly put many more people to work than are presently working
on these handful of B-2's. This is inappropriate, my colleagues, those
of us who voted for a balanced budget, stand up with dignity and
integrity and oppose this.
Mr. Chairman, no one wants it except the contractors and a handful of
people. This is not about the balanced budget. That day is now over.
There are no free rides. If we buy this, we are not going to buy
something else, and it is either domestic or it is some of our other
weapons systems. But the day of scratching each other's backs is over.
I have lived long enough to see us being forced to the hard choices.
Make me believe in this institution, make me believe in the integrity
of the balanced budget. Oppose this B-2 and support this amendment.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from South
Carolina, as chairman of the Committee on National Security, is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from California
[Mr. Hunter].
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding. Let me
just say to all Members of the House, sure, after the Air Force Chief
of Staff and the Joint Chiefs were told by the President that they
would not support a B-2, they saluted and they came down and they sat
before us and said, we do not have the B-2 in our budget. Then we asked
the Air Force Chief of Staff, in the words that are over on the side of
the room here, would B-2's be valuable in war, and he said, B-2's would
be extremely valuable in the Hawk phase; that is, when we stop the
enemy tanks from rolling. Then he hesitated and he said, and in all
other phases. I asked him the question, would the B-2's save lives, and
he said yes, they would save lives.
My friends, we are going through really what is kind of a microcosm
of defense itself. We had the war to end all wars, I guess that is the
post-cold-war world that my friend from California refers to in the
early 1900's. We called it the war to end all wars, and we were
unprepared for the Second World War, where we did not get the 2-week
warning time that the study that he refers to says we should have. Then
we threw away our weapons after World War II, went from a military of 9
million people to a group that could not hold a third-rate military as
it pushed us down the Korean peninsula. And we were not able to stop
those tanks. After the world war was over, we cut again.
We have cut and we have cut the defense budget on an annual basis by
$140 billion, from $404 billion in 1985, real money, to about $268
billion today.
Within those confines of the $268 billion, with the reform package we
put together, a real reform package, we have enough money, $15 billion
over 5 years, to buy all of those B-2's. We are asking for basically
Wal-Mart sales for 2 months so that our pilots do not have to fly under
the Bill Clinton scenario, 80-year-old B-52's, older than their great-
grandfathers. Vote ``no'' on this amendment.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the distinguished gentleman from
Georgia [Mr. Gingrich], the Speaker of the House.
Mr. GINGRICH. Mr. Chairman, I thank my friend from South Carolina for
yielding, and I thank my friend from California for the dignity and the
way in which he has conducted this entire debate and the issue he is
raising.
Mr. Chairman, I would like all of my colleagues to ask themselves a
very basic question: Why do we buy weapons? In the end, as my friend
said, it is not for pork, it is not for jobs; we have lots of ways to
create jobs, and certainly the Congress, in its ingenuity over 200
years, has found many ways to do that.
Why do we buy weapons? We buy weapons to defend America. We buy
weapons to prevent wars, when possible. We buy weapons to win wars,
when necessary. We buy weapons to save American lives.
Now, in the 1920's and 1930's the Congress was antitechnology,
antimilitary, consistently cheap, self-righteously certain; saw the
world as one where there was no danger, and in 1941, 1942 at Pearl
Harbor, Wake Island, Guam, the Philippines, Guadalcanal, we paid in
blood, the blood of young Americans, because we were not ready.
{time} 2015
Then immediately after World War II, this Congress forgot every
lesson. We stripped the military. We cut out procurement. We weakened
the system. And in 1950, a bunch of young kids in a thing called Task
Force Smith were put on the Korean peninsula in an emergency, and they
were slaughtered. And we paid in blood.
But in 1990, with an appropriate military investment, with adequate
military forces, we put the finest professional military in the world
with the finest technology on the field. We won a decisive victory with
100,000 casualties on the enemy side and less than 200 Americans dying.
And we won decisively.
Why would you build a B-2? Not for today, but for tomorrow. For a
time not very many years from now when a B-1B is going to be in
desperate trouble trying to penetrate a sophisticated ground-to-air
system. By 2010, you are going to have to suppress that system with
enormous firepower for a B-1B to be there. And the weapon you are going
to use to suppress that system is either going to be a missile or a B-
2.
What if we are not based in the region? Many of my friends who are
going to vote yes on this amendment do not want us to be in the regions
that they want a short-legged aircraft to defend in. What if we do not
have time to
[[Page H4187]]
build up our force? We had from Labor Day until the spring of 1991,
Labor Day of 1990 to the spring of 1991 to build up Desert Storm. But
what if we have an opponent that studies our model and does not give us
the time? What if we need to move decisively, quickly and win in a
controlled manner? What if the President has the kind of threat that he
says, I need something now, not in three months?
Here is the advantages of the B-2. It threatens a lot of current
systems. The B-2 does not need a carrier battle group. It is less
expensive per bomb delivered by any standard. The B-2 does not need an
airfield close to the enemy. And it is less expensive than moving an
airwing to the region by any standard. The B-2 does not need a huge
complex air armada to surround it, to protect it, to suppress the
ground-to-air missiles.
But finally, I would say to all of my friends, there is a good
argument for voting yes for this amendment. There is a rational
argument. I respect those who make it. If they are wrong and 10, 15, 20
years from now we do not have the weapons, we do not have the
capability, we cannot project the power, either our allies could lose,
we could lose, or the price of victory could be the blood of a lot of
young Americans. If those of us who want to build a few extra aircraft
are right, we will have saved those lives.
If we are wrong the truth is we will have wasted the money.
Consistently in the history of this Congress, it is cheaper in the long
run to build one more weapon and save American lives than it is to
build too few weapons and run the risk. You decide which responsibility
you want to answer. I would rather be wrong in favor of too good a
defense with too good an airplane saving too many Americans, and I
would rather vote in favor of giving our kids the best possible
equipment.
Ms. FURSE. Mr. Chairman, I wish to insert into the Record an article
that appeared in the May 27 edition of Defense Week. It details a new
problem the $2.4 billion B-2 bomber is experiencing in actually being
stealthy. Last October, Air Force officials ordered 6 days of repair
time be performed for every flying day. In addition, 8 years of test
data accumulated at Edwards Air Force Base indicates that it took at
least 50 hours of maintenance for every flying hour.
Author Tony Capaccio serves the defense industry, as well as
policymakers well in his investigative reporting work. This is a vital
role we all count on members of the fourth estate to provide.
[From the Defense Week, May 27, 1997]
The B-2's Stealthy Skins Need Tender, Lengthy Care
(By Tony Capaccio)
Maintaining the $2.4 billion B-2 bomber's stealthy skins
has proven so difficult that Air Force officials last
October, directed six days of repair time be performed for
every flying day, accordingly to test data made available to
Defense Week.
The order was mandated to reduce a mounting backlog of low
observable, or LO, repairs, at the 509th Bomb Wing, Whiteman
AFB, Mo., the unit that earned worldwide publicity last month
after its first six B-2s were declared ready for combat.
The extent of the B-2 maintenance problems went
unpublicized. It could not be learned to what extent. if any,
the LO maintenance problems have hampered the wing's current
training operations.
``Maintenance is a concern due to both the time to repair
LO discrepancies and the manpower required to effect LO
repairs,'' The Pentagon's operational testing office said in
a detailed May 13 statement.
The mounting backlog at Whiteman was in addition to eight
years of test data accumulated at Edwards AFB, Calif.,
indicating that it took at least 50 hours of maintenance for
every flying hour. The number seems high, but is within Air
Force expectations at this stage of the program, said a
Pentagon official.
About 19 of those hours were consumed making repairs to the
aircraft's sensitive skin necessary to meet its military
stealth, or LO low observable, requirements--the largest
repair category, according to Air Force figures.
The data did not, however, indicate if the LO repair hours
met or exceeded expectations. But the figure has been
improved, according to a Pentagon official. He was not,
however, aware of the current time to repair figure.
The data, which is the most current available, was based on
2,601 flight hours accumulated at Edwards when the first B-2
was delivered for development testing in July 1989 through
May 1996.
the price of stealth
The data indicates not a serious, unexpected design problem
but more intense than expected efforts to maintain the $2.4
billion bomber's most relevant feature. To date, the most
widely known fact about B-2 maintenance was that it is
performed in special hangars.
[The price tag quoted here is the 20-year program life
cycle cost. It includes everything from early development
through two decades of operations, maintenance, support and
eventual disposal.]
The U.S. will buy 21 bombers for about $44 billion.
Thirteen should be delivered by year's end. The Quadrennial
Defense Review last week reaffirmed the Pentagon's position
that it cannot afford more than 21.
Aside from the LO repair problems, the aircraft has
demonstrated good to exceptional reliability with
electronics, its landing gear and door, the data shows.
The B-2 needs a baby-smooth skin to maintain its stringent,
bumble-bee sized radar profile. A major driver of B-2 LO
maintenance is the curve time for materials, including
sealants used to fill gaps between panels, adhesives and
tapes to cover joints.
Cure times for some materials exceed 72 hours. If
successive layers of material are applied, cure times can
take several hundred hours, according to test data.
solutions in the works
Both the Air Force and Northrop Grumman Corp. are crafting
solutions, such as a faster curing time for radar absorbing
tapes and chalking. And Northrop recently delivered to
Whiteman a maintenance management system called a Low
Observable Combat Readiness computer program for evaluating
radar cross section degradation.
``The MC rate at Whiteman has improved as a result'' of
introducing the computer program, said the Pentagon test
office. ``In spite of the MC improvement resulting from [the
computer program], the backlog of LO discrepancies at
Whiteman is increasing.''
Asked to outline the backlog's extent and its operational
significance, citing classification issues, the Air Combat
Command declined May 16 to specify.
``However, let us say that as with any emerging weapon
system, ACC is gaining experience as we field the Air Force's
newest technology bomber,'' it said in a statement to Defense
Week.
``We feel the B-2, which is on the leading edge of low
observable technology, has not presented maintenance
challenges beyond those associated with fielding any new
system. The knowledge we've gained from fielding the B-2 has
adjusted our maintenance approach accordingly and will
continue to do so,'' said the ACC.
The Air Force wrote Sen. Dale Bumpers (D-Ark.) in March
when he asked about maintenance problems that ``although low
observable systems maintenance has affected mission capable
rates, recent trends show an overall increase. The latest
mission capable rate as of January is much greater than 20
percent.''
It also told Bumpers the 509th BW was flying low altitude
B-2 missions but failed to note that six days of repairs were
being executed for every flying day.
The planes' high-tech terrain following radar allows it to
go that low. Given that capability and 6,000-mile unrefueled
range, a B-2 can strike heavily defended Libyan, Iraqi and
North Korean targets.
But the low flight profile also is exacerbating the LO
maintenance woes, the testers said. ``Flight experience has
shown that the durability of the LO is also related to the
environment the B-2 is flown in,'' said the testers. ``Low
level flight places the most demand on the LO materials.''
According to data compiled by Pentagon testers, during one
snapshot, between December 1995 and February 1996, Whiteman
B-2 mission capable rates was at a low 37 percent. If LO
system readiness was not included, the readiness rates were a
more acceptable 73 percent, the data showed. Acceptable B-52
and B-1B mission capable rates are over 80 percent.
maintenance and readiness
ACC claims notwithstanding, the test figures and detailed
statement from the Pentagon's operational test office
indicate that the upkeep of the B-2's primary selling point--
its stealth--is proving difficult and has affected readiness.
``LO maintenance problems are the primary factors affecting
B-2 readiness. The materials used are sensitive to the
methods of application and to the temperature and humidity
when applying them,'' said the May 13 Pentagon statement
prepared in response to Defense Week questions.
``The high LO system failure rate indicates that material
durability could be improved''. Concern has also recently
arisen over the quality of the LO repairs that can be
accomplished in the operational environment,'' the test
office wrote.
``The large number of B-2 LO system unscheduled maintenance
events, combined with LO maintenance difficulties,
significantly reduce aircraft availability,'' the testers
said.
Seven second-generation bombers are at Whiteman AFB. They
can fly down to 600 feet above ground, pop up and drop a
family of 500- to 2,000-pound satellite-guided bombs. Those
bombs can fall within 20 feet of their intended aimpoints.
Concerning the October 1996 policy change directing six
days of repair for one flying day, the statement noted ``as a
result of LO maintenance difficulties and backlog, the 509th
BW in the fall of 1996 had limited the sortie rates on its
aircraft to permit more time for repairs.
``This reversed a previous policy aimed at maintaining high
[pilot training] sortie rates
[[Page H4188]]
at the expense of deferring LO repairs,'' said the statement.
``To alleviate manpower problems, the Air Force has brought
18 Northrop Grumman workers to Whiteman to augment the Air
Force LO maintenance personnel.'' the statement said.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the Dellums
amendment to eliminate further production of the B-2 bomber. I believe
this is the most important defense procurement vote of the decade.
The B-2 with smart conventional weapons gives us the potential for a
conventional deterrent. The B-2 when fully equipped with smart
conventional weapons will be able to devastate a country and an
advancing army at the same time.
This bomber will give us a war-stopping capability. The war-stopping
or preventing capability will save American lives. The B-2 can give us
a huge technological advantage over potential enemies.
Twenty-one B-2 bombers is not enough. We need to keep the production
line open to build nine additional B-2's. Every independent study
indicates that additional B-2's are needed.
The Dellums amendment stops the production line, which is in
California. We would need to spend billions to re-open this line once
it is closed.
Gen. Brent Scowcroft, National Security Adviser to Presidents Ford
and Bush, has written a devastating report on the lack of a bomber
policy on the part of this administration. Let me quote from General
Scowcroft's report:
The B-2's ability to strike independently within hours
anywhere on the globe from bases in the United States leaves
it uniquely well-suited among all U.S. force elements for
dealing with unexpected challenges. The need for such a
capability is basic to the national 2 Military Regional
Conflict [MRC] strategy.
The only realistic option for maintaining the viability of
the long range, stealthy, precision strike force over the
long term is to continue production of the B-2. The B-2 is
therefore a critical national asset, which is uniquely
capable of performing these vital missions.
Under the U.S. Constitution, the Congress has the ultimate
responsibility to fund and govern the military. Under article I,
section 8, the Congress shall have power ``To raise and support Armies
* * * To provide and maintain a Navy; To make Rules for the Government
and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.''
In closing, I again want to quote from General Scowcroft's report:
Additional B-2s are fully affordable within planned
budgets. The Pentagon plans to increase procurement spending
approximately 50 percent by 2001. Those funds should be
allocated to and spent on the most cost-effective systems,
such as additional B-2's. The situation is similar to that of
the F-117 in the 1980's. The Air Force insisted that a single
squadron of these revolutionary aircraft was all that was
needed; Congress directed a doubling of the buy, an action
that saved many American and allied lives in the gulf war.
Today, once again, only Congress can set in motion the steps
needed to maintain production of the B-2.
Help us today and defeat the Dellums amendment.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in opposition to the amendment
brought to the floor by the honorable gentlemen from California, Ohio,
and Florida. This amendment would eliminate $331.2 million from the B-2
Stealth Bomber Program and additionally would prohibit other funds from
being used for advanced procurement or production line expenses for
more aircraft beyond the 21 aircraft previously authorized.
The cost of this program as outlined in the National Defense
Authorization Act for fiscal year 1998 would authorize $505.3 million
to reestablish elements of the B-2 production line that have been shut
down, for advance procurement, and for various support, training, and
management costs. I believe that the cost of reestablishing these
programs is justified in light of the military advantages the aircraft
provides to our men and women in the Armed Forces.
The B-2 is the only heavy bomber currently in production or
development. In fact, the Pentagon has no other plans for modernizing
or supplementing our existing and aged bomber fleet of B-52's and B-
1's. With the youngest B-52 bomber being 33 years old, many U.S. pilots
are flying aircraft that are older than they are. Due to the time and
extreme costs associated with designing another bomber, it is important
that we retain our capability to produce bombers should events require
them.
In addition, the stealth capabilities of the B-2 are unmatched,
allowing this two person plane to operate without fighter or enemy air-
defense suppression escorts, thereby limiting the total number of
airmen placed in harm's way. The B-2 can also strike multiple targets
from heights out of range of anti-aircraft weapons with precision and
accuracy. This combination of features will also minimize the risks
both to noncombatants and to American bomber crews in the air.
Finally, some argue that in the post-cold war era, we no longer need
aircraft of this kind. However, the U.S. cannot afford to let its guard
down. The world is still a dangerous place, as Saddam Hussein proved a
few years ago and as North Korea, in its quest for nuclear weapons,
reminds us today. By introducing additional B-2s now, we are preparing
ourselves for the next threat that we unfortunately are likely to face.
Accordingly, I strongly urge my colleagues to rise in opposition to the
Dellums, Kasich, and Foley amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums].
The question was taken; and the chairman announced that the noes
appeared to have it.
Recorded Vote
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 209,
noes 216, not voting 10, as follows:
[Roll No. 228]
AYES--209
Abercrombie
Allen
Andrews
Archer
Baesler
Baldacci
Ballenger
Barrett (WI)
Barton
Bass
Becerra
Bereuter
Berry
Blagojevich
Blumenauer
Boehlert
Bonior
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd
Brown (CA)
Brown (OH)
Burr
Camp
Capps
Cardin
Carson
Castle
Chabot
Christensen
Clay
Clayton
Clement
Coble
Coburn
Combest
Condit
Conyers
Costello
Coyne
Cummings
Danner
Davis (FL)
Davis (IL)
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
Dellums
Deutsch
Dingell
Doggett
Doyle
Duncan
Edwards
Ehlers
Engel
Eshoo
Evans
Farr
Fattah
Flake
Foglietta
Foley
Ford
Frank (MA)
Franks (NJ)
Furse
Ganske
Gejdenson
Gephardt
Goode
Goodlatte
Goodling
Greenwood
Gutierrez
Gutknecht
Hall (OH)
Hamilton
Hastings (FL)
Hilliard
Hoekstra
Hooley
Houghton
Jackson (IL)
Johnson (WI)
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kasich
Kennedy (MA)
Kennedy (RI)
Kennelly
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kind (WI)
Kleczka
Klink
Klug
Kolbe
Kucinich
LaFalce
Lampson
Lantos
Largent
Latham
LaTourette
Lazio
Leach
Levin
Lewis (GA)
LoBiondo
Lofgren
Lowey
Luther
Markey
Mascara
McCarthy (MO)
McCarthy (NY)
McDermott
McGovern
McHale
McKinney
McNulty
Meehan
Menendez
Miller (CA)
Miller (FL)
Minge
Mink
Moakley
Molinari
Moran (VA)
Morella
Nadler
Neal
Ney
Nussle
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Owens
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Paul
Payne
Pelosi
Peterson (MN)
Petri
Pickett
Pomeroy
Porter
Portman
Poshard
Price (NC)
Pryce (OH)
Quinn
Rahall
Ramstad
Rangel
Regula
Rivers
Roemer
Ros-Lehtinen
Rothman
Roukema
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sabo
Sanders
Sanford
Sawyer
Scott
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Shays
Shuster
Sisisky
Skaggs
Slaughter
Smith (MI)
Smith, Adam
Smith, Linda
Snyder
Spratt
Stabenow
Stark
Stenholm
Stokes
Strickland
Stupak
Sununu
Tanner
Tauscher
Tierney
Towns
Upton
Velazquez
Vento
Wamp
Watt (NC)
Waxman
Weldon (PA)
Wexler
Weygand
White
Wise
Woolsey
Wynn
NOES--216
Ackerman
Aderholt
Armey
Bachus
Baker
Barcia
Barr
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Bateman
Bentsen
Berman
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop
Bliley
Boehner
Bonilla
Bono
Borski
Brady
Brown (FL)
Bryant
Bunning
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Calvert
Campbell
Canady
Cannon
Chambliss
Chenoweth
Clyburn
Collins
Cook
Cooksey
Cramer
Crane
Crapo
Cubin
Cunningham
Davis (VA)
Deal
DeLay
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Dicks
Dixon
Dooley
Doolittle
Dreier
Dunn
Ehrlich
Emerson
English
Ensign
Etheridge
Everett
Ewing
Fawell
Fazio
Filner
Forbes
Fowler
Fox
Frelinghuysen
Frost
Gallegly
Gekas
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Gingrich
Gonzalez
Goss
Graham
Granger
Green
Hall (TX)
Hansen
Harman
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Hayworth
Hefley
Hefner
Herger
Hill
Hilleary
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hobson
Holden
Horn
Hostettler
Hoyer
Hulshof
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hyde
Inglis
Istook
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
Jenkins
John
Johnson (CT)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnson, Sam
Jones
Kelly
Kim
King (NY)
Kingston
[[Page H4189]]
Knollenberg
LaHood
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
Livingston
Lucas
Maloney (CT)
Manton
Manzullo
Martinez
Matsui
McCollum
McCrery
McDade
McHugh
McInnis
McIntyre
McKeon
Meek
Metcalf
Mica
Millender-McDonald
Mollohan
Moran (KS)
Murtha
Myrick
Nethercutt
Neumann
Northup
Norwood
Ortiz
Oxley
Packard
Pappas
Parker
Pease
Peterson (PA)
Pickering
Pitts
Pombo
Radanovich
Redmond
Reyes
Riggs
Riley
Rodriguez
Rogan
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Royce
Ryun
Salmon
Sanchez
Sandlin
Saxton
Scarborough
Schaefer, Dan
Schaffer, Bob
Sessions
Shadegg
Shaw
Sherman
Shimkus
Skeen
Skelton
Smith (NJ)
Smith (OR)
Smith (TX)
Snowbarger
Solomon
Souder
Spence
Stearns
Stump
Talent
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Thomas
Thompson
Thornberry
Thune
Thurman
Tiahrt
Torres
Traficant
Turner
Visclosky
Walsh
Waters
Watkins
Watts (OK)
Weldon (FL)
Weller
Whitfield
Wicker
Wolf
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
NOT VOTING--10
Blunt
Cox
Gordon
Lipinski
Maloney (NY)
McIntosh
Paxon
Schiff
Schumer
Yates
{time} 2037
Mr. ORTIZ and Mr. CALLAHAN changed their vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
Mr. ARCHER and Mr. COBLE changed their vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
So the amendment was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
personal explanation
Mr. COX of California. Mr. Chairman, I was necessarily absent for
this vote for medical reasons.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to section 5 of House Resolution 169, it is
now in order to consider the amendment by the gentleman from Alabama
[Mr. Everett] printed in section 8(c) of House Resolution 169.
Amendment Offered by Mr. Everett
Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment printed in section 8(c) of House Resolution 169
offered by Mr. Everett:
Strike out sections 332 through 335 (page 68, line 10
through page 77, line 21).
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Alabama [Mr.
Everett] and a Member opposed, the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr.
Spence] each will control 30 minutes.
Modification to Amendment Offered by Mr. Everett
Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment
be modified to correct the drafting error. The modification is at the
desk.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the modification.
The Clerk read as follows:
Modification to amendment offered by Mr. Everett:
The amendment as modified is as follows:
Strike out sections 333 through 335 (page 69, line 3
through page 77, line 21).
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from
Alabama?
There was no objection.
Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that 15 minutes of
my time be controlled by the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. Sabo].
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from
Alabama?
There was no objection.
Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 2\1/2\ minutes.
Mr. Chairman, my amendment, cosponsored by the gentleman from
California [Mr. Fazio], the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Klug], and
the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. Sabo], relates to DOD's depot
maintenance policy. This amendment simply strikes the depot maintenance
provisions that were added to the bill by the depot caucus members in
subcommittee.
{time} 2045
Mr. Chairman, the result of the amendment will leave intact the
current 60/40 policy that splits repair work between the public and
private sectors.
Let me say in the beginning that those of us who opposed the language
as reported out by the subcommittee come from differing viewpoints. My
objection is to what I see as the vastly expansive new definition of
``core logistics capability'' and the redefining of ``workload,'' to
name but a few.
The Depot Caucus says that their provisions simply block the
President's disregard of the 1995 Base Closure Act at Kelly and
McClellan Air Force Bases. I am in agreement with the caucus that the
President violated at least the intent of BRAC 1995. However, the
provisions go much further than Kelly and McClellan.
The bill redefines ``depot level maintenance'' to include ``interim
contractor support'' and ``contractor logistics support'' and software
maintenance which has principally been performed by contractors. The
bill further defines ``core logistics activities'' to include all new
weapons systems within 4 years of reaching their initial operating
capability.
These provisions clearly go beyond the scope of Kelly and McClellan,
and are not based on military requirements set out by the war fighter.
These provisions will force DOD to place more repair and maintenance
work in the public depot system without regard for military necessity
or cost to the government. In other words, by forcing DOD to place more
repair work in the public depots without regard to military
requirements, DOD will be forced to take deeper cuts in personnel and
training and in modernization of our weapons systems.
I support the need for an in-house public depot system to support the
core repair and maintenance needs established by the military. However,
if this work is not core and can be performed by the private sector, we
should at least give the military leadership the ability to compete the
work for best value and best price. The current provisions of this bill
work against that philosophy.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
(Mr. SPENCE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment
offered by the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. Everett].
The supporters of this amendment will argue that by striking the
provisions in the bill relating to depot policy, the amendment would
merely ensure the continuation of current law under which the Nation's
depot system would continue to be managed within the framework of the
so-called 60/40 policy. The problem, however, which continues to
preclude a meaningful discussion about the role and future of our
public depots, remains the administration's politicization of the base
closing process of 2 years ago.
Thus, the fundamental issue before the House is not the appropriate
ratio of public to private workloads. Instead, the issue is the
determined effort of the administration to politicize the base closure
process for its own political benefit. If the President had not
injected himself very directly into the BRAC process, it is unlikely
the House would even be debating this amendment today.
The 1995 Base Closure Commission considered the question of the Air
Force public depot system and came to a determination that 2 of the 5
Air Force depots should close. Those 2 depots were located at Kelly Air
Force Base in Texas and McClellan Air Force Base in California. The
Commission's recommendations were very clear: close the depots and
consolidate their workloads at other public depots or at private sector
commercial activities as determined by the Defense Depot Maintenance
Council.
Contrary to the President's assertions during his campaign for a
second term, the Commission did not recommend privatization-in-place
and it certainly did not attempt to guarantee the jobs of thousands of
workers at these 2 depots, depots located in 2 States with substantial
numbers of electoral votes. Privatization-in-place was not an unknown
concept to the Commission. In fact, the Commission recommended it in a
limited number of instances, but those instances did not include Air
Force depots.
The President's transparent attempt to circumvent the intent of the
1995 BRAC process for political reasons has caused grave harm to what
had been essentially a nonpolitical process. By his actions, the
President has undermined support in Congress for future
[[Page H4190]]
base closures and caused the committee to overwhelmingly recommend the
provisions which the Everett amendment proposes to strike.
Congress has resisted all attempts over the years to overturn
legislatively the results of the BRAC process. The President had a
similar obligation to carry out faithfully the decisions of the BRAC
Commission which are now the law. Depot workloads at these two
facilities may be competed in the private marketplace, but the
President cannot, I repeat, cannot rig the competition to ensure
electoral political advantage.
I urge my colleagues to support the committee and oppose the Everett
amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SABO. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment. I am not one who
automatically supports privatization. In some cases it does not make
sense. In other cases it does. If it involves trying to switch jobs
from people who have benefits to people who do not have benefits, I
have deep concern.
However, here we are talking about competition between the private
and public sector, where both have highly skilled, well paid employees
with decent benefits, health and pension benefits. As we try to squeeze
ever-increasing demands into restricted dollars, this is a case where
competition between private and public sector clearly makes sense. I
hope my colleagues vote ``yes'' on the Everett amendment.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Virginia [Mr. Bateman].
Mr. BATEMAN. I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.
Mr. Chairman, this language which is in the bill and which the
amendment would remove was placed in the bill in the Subcommittee on
Military Readiness of which I am the chairman. I cannot tell my
colleagues that this is the provision that I would have written had I
been given the grace to have articulated the best, wisest policy with
reference to depot maintenance. This provision in the bill is not, in
my view, the wisest and the best. It does reflect the will of the
subcommittee by an overwhelming vote. It also reflects changes from the
original proposal of the Depot Caucus which they made, at my request,
in order to improve what is in the bill. Looking at this very difficult
issue in balance, I would ask the committee to support the bill as it
comes to the floor and to reject the amendment that has been offered.
This issue is one of the most contentious issues which will be dealt
with in the conference that is coming between this body and the other
body. Certainly I hope and believe that this will be improved upon as
we go through that process. I can assure my colleagues that I will be
working to do that but in a way which protects the legitimate concerns
of those who represent areas which have government-owned and operated
maintenance depots. I do not represent such a depot, but I can tell my
colleagues that it is my very firm belief that the national security
interests of this country require a robust capability in the
government-owned and operated depots, and that ability to serve our
national security must be safeguarded. It must be met. For those
reasons, I would urge a ``no" vote on the amendment.
Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Texas [Mr. Bonilla].
(Mr. BONILLA asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. BONILLA. Mr. Chairman, everyone in this Chamber should understand
that this has absolutely nothing to do with the base closing process.
In Texas, we are willing to take our medicine. We felt that our depot
should stay open at Kelly Air Force Base, but we were chosen to be
closed and we must now face the music and deal with reality.
But what is wrong, and I appeal to the people in this body who have
any sense of fiscal conservatism, or any sense of competition and
supporting private sector involvement in government contracts, what is
wrong with having us set up shop at the former base, to invite private
contractors to come in and bid for business? What is wrong with that?
And if the depots that are surviving this process do indeed come
forward with a lower bid, then they win. What is more American than
having competition out there to bid for business in this country? That
is what we are talking about.
I can appreciate the parochial interest of the States that have the
remaining depots. They want it all. And they want the law to say they
will get it all without any competition. But I say to any Member in
this body who believes in fiscal conservatism, fiscal responsibility,
free enterprise or competition, they must see our plan on this and
support what we are trying to do.
If Members stand with those who want to save money for the Air Force,
with those who believe in free enterprise, with those who believe in
competition, with those who stand with the United States Air Force at
trying to control costs, they will support, as I will, the Everett
amendment. I thank the gentleman from Alabama for offering this
amendment, and we certainly hope it succeeds.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Utah [Mr. Hansen].
(Mr. HANSEN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. HANSEN. Mr. Chairman, I hope my colleagues here will realize that
what we are looking at is the integrity of BRAC that was passed by the
gentleman from Texas [Mr. Armey], now our majority leader. The law is
very clear of what we can and cannot do. The President of the United
States had 15 days, an up or down. There was no privatization in place.
The idea that Members can find themselves in a position to say that we
are saving money here is amazing to me. I cannot imagine anyone saying
that.
Here is something called the GAO report. The Air Force by their own
admission says the amendment by the gentleman from Alabama would cost
$689 million a year. It is impossible to accept that.
Mr. Chairman, let me point out, the issue before us today comes down
to this: Can the President hide his politically motivated job program
behind the shield of privatization and trick enough of us to look the
other way? Each side is going to have their share of letters and quotes
to support their argument. I would ask my colleagues all to stay
focused on the central question: Does it make sense for the Air Force
to continue to operate 5 depots at under 50 percent capacity when the
closure and consolidation of the 2 least efficient will save over $689
million per year?
I would hope that each and every one of us would give some real
thought to what this really does and does not do. I wrote this
language. I think I can speak with authority on this thing. It does not
prevent anyone from bidding on non-core work.
Do you want to bid on all the core work? What do we tell the big
companies of the world when we have another Persian Gulf? Get into a C-
141 and go over there? Hey, if you want to privatize everything, there
are a whole bunch of Soviet pilots that do not have jobs anymore. Let
us see if we can get them to fly our F-22s for us. We have got to get
down to the point where we draw the line between core and non-core and
talk about privatization. Everyone can bid on it. All we are doing is
distinguishing between the two issues. I would hope my colleagues would
vote ``no'' on the Everett amendment and save the taxpayers a whole
bunch of money.
{time} 2100
Mr. SABO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas
[Mr. Gonzalez].
Mr. GONZALEZ. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for this time.
The Secretary of Defense has made it very clear that the
modernization and the readiness of our Armed Forces will be paid for by
base restructuring. So the realignment process must be conducted in a
way that will save the most money, and the best way to do this is
through the public-private competition that is currently under way.
History has shown that competition saves money. The ongoing public-
private competition will guarantee the best defense for the dollar.
And so, Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support the military,
support the taxpayer and support the Everett-Sabo amendment.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to my good friend, the
gentleman from Texas [Mr. Ortiz].
[[Page H4191]]
(Mr. ORTIZ asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Chairman, let me say that I have a lot of respect for
the Members who happen to be on the other side of this issue, but I
would just like to tell my colleagues something on these two charts
that I have. Do my colleagues see these 2 charts here? It has got the
names of all the bases that were shut down by the BRAC Commission
during the past 4 years.
And my question is this: ``Did some of your bases that you had, did
they get a second chance to keep those jobs open?'' I am not against
contracting out when it makes sense. But what we are seeing here
debated does not make sense.
As my colleagues know, what about the workers at these facilities?
Did they get a second chance? No, they did not. Will this amendment
save money? No, this amendment will not save any money.
Now let us look and see as to how much money this amendment will cost
the taxpayers. The Air Force estimates that the Everett amendment will
cost the taxpayers $689 million annually. The GAO estimates that it
will cost $468 million. In Ohio, at a base where privatization in place
is occurring, the Air Force estimated that it will cost $40 million
more annually, same work, same place, same equipment.
We cannot afford the Everett amendment.
What about the workers of both bases? Kelly? What about Sacramento? I
have letters to show my colleagues that they do not support this
amendment. These are workers who at one time or another served our
country in the front lines. They know the kind of equipment that is
needed. They know that they need well-maintained equipment. What better
than to have these veterans to work on this maintenance that is
required?
Vote against the Everett amendment. It will be a great vote.
Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Chairman I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman
from Texas [Mr. Smith].
Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I thank my colleague for yielding
this time to me.
Mr. Chairman, this amendment is about competition. It is about saving
American taxpayers billions of dollars. Language currently contained in
the defense authorization bill is anti-competition. It would prohibit
any military facility that was closed by BRAC in 1995 from entering
into any private contract for depot level work. This wastes taxpayers'
money.
Fiscal responsibility requires that we allow the competitive process
to determine the most effective and efficient depot while maintaining
the highest level of national security. Should the American taxpayer
pay for maintenance work at one depot when the work can be done at
another for 20 to 30 percent less?
Mr. Chairman, competition saves money. In the next 5 years the Air
Force alone will need almost $97 billion to modernize its equipment and
force structure. Where is that money going to come from? This amendment
savings will help pay for future military modernization.
Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to vote for competition and
savings. Vote yes on this much needed amendment.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from
Jacksonville Florida [Mrs. Fowler].
(Mrs. FOWLER asked and was given permission to revise and extend her
remarks.)
Mrs. FOWLER. Mr. Chairman, I rise to strongly oppose the Everett-
Fazio amendment.
The 1995 Base Closure Commission voted to close the depots at
Sacramento and San Antonio. As their report noted, the commission found
that the significant excess capacity and infrastructure in the Air
Force depot system requires closure of both Sacramento and San Antonio.
But President Clinton, concerned about the impact of these closures on
his 1996 campaign, instead sought privatization in place at these 2
bases. By his actions he undercut the integrity of the BRAC process to
achieve political gain.
Was privatization in place a valid option for these bases? The BRAC
report specifically did not authorize this approach for San Antonio or
Sacramento despite doing so for two other bases. No commission vote was
held, and when the GAO looked at this issue, it concluded that
privatizing these operations would cost the Air Force $468 million a
year more than transferring this work to other depots or privatizing it
elsewhere. Subsequently, the Air Force's own Materiel Command projected
that the cost of privatizing these facilities in place would actually
be $689 million a year.
Now, Mr. Chairman, the language adopted by the Committee on National
Security would require the President to abide by the BRAC. I do not
support Secretary Cohen's call for additional BRAC rounds, but if we
are going to have them, we must first restore integrity to the BRAC
process.
The proponents of this amendment are asking us to flush $689 million
a year of hard earned taxpayer money down the drain rather than
spending it to modernize our forces or to provide better family housing
for our military dependents. Oppose the Everett-Fazio amendment.
Mr. SABO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from
California [Ms. Sanchez].
Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this
time.
Mr. Chairman, as many of my colleagues will tell us, it is rare that
I rise to talk in this House, but I felt a need to do that today to
express my strong support for the Fazio-Everett amendment.
This amendment simply strikes the unprecedented and reaching Hansen
language that was adopted during the markup of the defense
authorization bill. I join with the distinguished ranking member of the
full committee, as well as Secretary of Defense William Cohen, in
supporting this amendment.
If we approve the current language in the defense bill, it would
allow a government monopoly on depot maintenance work. It would also
require the government to make overwhelming new capital investments in
government facilities which would simply duplicate what exists in the
private sector today.
Now, I am on the Committee on National Security, and I have been
looking and listening to the testimony. I have looked at the
discussions that have gone on before. I end by saying that I urge my
colleagues to join me in voting in favor of this amendment.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Virginia [Mr. Sisisky].
Mr. SISISKY. Mr. Chairman, I am the ranking member of the
Subcommittee on Military Readiness, and I work with the gentleman from
Virginia [Mr. Bateman] and those that represent depots for 3 years. We
have tried to maintain a balance between public and private depots and
at the same time to protect our national security industrial base.
I am from Hampton Roads, Virginia, the largest naval base in the
whole world. I have the largest public yard in the country, I have the
largest private shipyard in the country, so I think I understand the
public-private competition.
And the word is competition. In 1993, 4500 Americans were told at the
Naval Air at Norfolk that they were out of a job, the BRAC commission,
we could not save them. We tried valiantly to save them.
Now I am a little sensitive about that because of what happened in
the BRAC committee. Why did we privatize? A million and a half square
feet right in the middle of the Norfolk Naval Base, which by the way is
still empty and we did not privatize. But let me tell my colleagues
what we did privatize. Very interesting enough, last year the 2 depots
that they do, and by the way it does not take a rocket scientist to
understand instead of 2 overheads you got 4 overheads, but they
privatize Louisville. In Louisville, privatization in place took place
at the Naval Surface Waterfront Depot in Louisville, where they work on
five-inch guns.
Now BRAC said the exact same thing about Louisville and guess what?
They offered a contract with no competition, no cost data, and I hate
to tell my colleagues what they are losing now. I had to stop them
almost, threatened to go to court to do it, but they stopped it. In
two-three weeks they got some cost data that they brought back.
This is about competition. I implore my colleagues to vote against
this
[[Page H4192]]
amendment and keep the BRAC commission from politicization as it is.
Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
California [Mr. Doolittle].
(Mr. DOOLITTLE asked and was given permission to revise and extend
his remarks.)
Mr. DOOLITTLE. Mr. Chairman, I listened. I have friends on both sides
of this debate, and I happen to be on one of the sides, but it is
almost as if we were debating two completely different sets or had two
different sets of facts because the representations are so dramatically
opposite.
I would just observe, if my colleagues think about it, when has not
privatization resulted, or competition, in a lowering of costs? I mean,
we know that has been the case in the electricity industry. We know it
has been the case in a number of other industries, transportation. We
have seen it dramatically displayed, and countries all across this
world are racing toward competition and privatization.
But I am reminded when I hear the opponents oppose this amendment,
all this amendment does is strike out some bad language that was
inserted in the underlying bill. We know that privatization and
competition result in a lowering of costs. Indeed, the Pentagon's own
Defense Science Board has estimated that public-private competition
will produce taxpayer savings of 20 to 30 percent regardless of whether
public depots or private industry win the competition.
McClellan and Kelly have already been slated for closure. The vote
has been taken, they are in the process of closing. So they will not be
Federal depots, but they are vast reservoirs of technology and of
technological expertise in the employees that work there. Contractors
can come in; we can have competition, and the Pentagon's own Defense
Science Board says we will cut costs 20 to 30 percent. Why is that
important? It is important obviously for the Federal Treasury, but
specifically for defense it is important because the defense sector of
the Federal budget is shrinking and has been for some time.
So we will have to do more with less. How do we do that? Competition.
Privatization. That is what the Everett amendment represents.
I would just like to point out the Governor of our State which
represents areas with closed depots like Sacramento and areas with
healthy vibrant depots like San Diego and Twenty-nine Palms. He has
just sent out in a letter dated June 19 his support for this amendment.
He is the Governor of the whole State. Populationwise, it is probably
greater than the existing depot areas and in the Sacramento area, but
the fact of the matter he points out that this is important. He also
observes, ``The existing bill may also involve hundreds of millions of
dollars in hidden costs to the taxpayers because the 3 installations
targeted for growth would have to undergo military construction
upgrades to meet the 80 percent goal that is in this legislation.''
{time} 2115
So, Mr. Chairman, this is a very important amendment. It is an
amendment that will lower our costs, that will be for the benefit of
the military and the benefit of the taxpayers, and I urge people to
approve it.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Oklahoma [Mr. Watts].
Mr. WATTS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, on Thursday of last week, the
White House threatened to veto H.R. 1119, the defense authorization
bill, if it included language that will force the President to obey the
Base Realignment and Closure Commission, the BRAC law. This law
mandates the closure of Kelly Air Force Base in Texas and McClellan Air
Force Base in California, mandates the closure of those two facilities.
Now, according to the GAO, their reports say that the continued
operation of these two bases will cost us around $468 million. Now, the
Air Force's very own internal report said that the continued operation
of these two bases will cost us about $689 million.
At the same time, the President maintains that the defense budget and
the number of soldiers must be reduced in size beyond the hollow force
that he is currently creating, but President Clinton offers no
explanation, none, for this obvious contradiction, and he denies that
he is in violation of the law.
The President is wrong on both counts. Congress must vote to preserve
the fairness and nonpartisanship inherent in the BRAC process that the
President would destroy. The only way to preserve the fairness of the
BRAC process is to vote against the Everett-Fazio amendment to H.R.
1119.
I ask my colleagues to vote for fairness in the base closing process,
vote to preserve our national security, and vote no on the Everett-
Fazio amendment.
Mr. SABO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
California [Mr. Matsui].
Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Chairman, the question before us is quite simple. It
is whether we will allow the Department of Defense to implement a base
closure recommendation in the manner it deems most effective. Opponents
of the Everett amendment claim it will undermine the BRAC process, but
the recommendations of the Commission regarding both McClellan and
Kelly Air Force Bases is absolutely clear.
In calling for the closure of these facilities, the Commission
directed the DOD to either consolidate the workloads of other DOD
depots or to allow private sector commercial activities. It is very
clear what the language says.
Let no one in this Chamber be misled. As the gentleman from
California [Mr. Doolittle] said, McClellan and Kelly Air Force Bases
will be closed as of July 2001, and they will no longer be Air Force
facilities. Nothing in the Everett amendment will change that.
What this amendment will do, however, is to strike a provision in the
underlying bill that disallows the conducting of competition for some
of the work now at Kelly and McClellan Air Force Bases.
Let me just respond, if I may, to the GAO study that has been talked
about time and time again by the opposition. In fact, the last speaker
from Oklahoma talked about the $468 million that will be lost if, in
fact, these bases do not close. These bases will close. The issue is
whether or not to allow competition.
This will save money. The GAO study is totally irrelevant to this
discussion, because these bases will close. In fact, it will cost more
if we disallow private competition in this situation, because these
employees, the mission, will have to be moved to these other bases,
whereas if, in fact, we allow private competition, many of these
employees that have the technical skills that go back 20, 30 years will
be able to stay at these particular bases in a private sector capacity,
not in a public sector capacity. These bases are in fact going to
close. We all know that.
Mr. Chairman, I urge support of the Everett amendment.
Mr. Chairman, the question before us is quite simple. It is whether
we will allow the Department of Defense to implement a base closure
recommendation in the manner it deems most effective.
Opponents of the Everett amendment claim it will undermine the BRAC
process. However, the recommendations of the Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Commission regarding both McClellan and Kelly Air Force
Bases are absolutely clear. In calling for closure of these facilities,
the Commission directed DOD to either ``[c]onsolidate the remaining
workloads to other DoD depots or to private sector commercial
activities as determined by the Defense Depot Maintenance Council.''
Let no one in this Chamber be misled. McClellan and Kelly Air Force
Bases will close. As of July 2001, they will no longer be Air Force
facilities. Nothing in the Everett amendment will alter that fact in
any way.
What this amendment will do, however, is strike provisions of the
underlying bill that prevent the Department of Defense from conducting
competitions for some work now performed at McClellan and Kelly. The
Air Force is currently seeking detailed bids from public depots and
private industry for this work. Public-private competition will allow
the Air Force to accurately determine which of its options under the
1995 BRAC law makes the most sense for our national security.
Without the Everett amendment, the DOD would be barred from
privatizing, even if that course proves to be the best value for the
taxpayer. Ironically, while the opponents of this amendment accuse us
of subverting the BRAC process, it is the language of this bill itself
that does so. Despite the clear direction of the Commission that
privatization was an acceptable course of action for McClellan and
Kelly workloads, the Congress would be effectively foreclosing this
option. We must not take
[[Page H4193]]
the precedent-setting step of limiting DOD flexibility in its
implementation of a BRAC recommendation.
Many experts--including the 1995 BRAC Commission itself--have
concluded that our national security would be best served by allowing
the private sector a larger role in defense industrial activities. The
Commission's Report to the President noted: ``Privatization of [DoD
industrial and commercial] functions would reduce operating costs,
eliminate excess infrastructure, and allow uniformed personnel to focus
on skills and activities directly related to their military missions.''
Yet the Department is not moving blindly to privatization based on
the many voices that have called for it in the past. It will take that
step only if competition proves that the private sector will produce
savings and protect readiness for the workload in question. Even the
December 1996 General Accounting Office report, so often cited by
opponents of the Everett amendment during this debate, concluded by
calling for the use of ``competitive procedures, where applicable, for
determining the most cost-effective source of repair for workloads at
the closing Air Force depots.''
In a recent letter to Speaker Gingrich on this issue, Secretary of
Defense William Cohen wrote, ``Our initiatives to increase competition
and free funds for modernization are vital to our national security.''
If we do not pass the Everett amendment, we will be denying DOD a
critical tool in controlling its costs. This body would be taking the
untenable position of commanding our armed forces to manage their
assets with complete disregard for the national interest. I urge my
colleagues to reject that course and to support this important
amendment.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
North Carolina [Mr. Jones].
Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to the Everett
amendment. Let there be no mistake, this vote is on the integrity of
the BRAC process. A vote for the Everett amendment will only serve to
improve the profits of the defense industrial base at the expense of
military readiness.
As a Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Krulak has said time and
again, depots are a critical element in Marine Corps combat readiness.
The depots are the Nation's only ready and controlled source providing
our war fighters with the highest quality maintenance and repair, on
time and at least cost, wherever and whenever needed.
Let us not forget that the defense contractors who have come to us
asking to get more of the workload now done by the depots are the same
defense contractors that say that cost should not be an issue when it
comes to providing their product. Why would their way of doing business
change now? Can we afford this way of doing business?
A vote for the Everett amendment will destroy the BRAC process. It
would cost the taxpayers millions of dollars each year, and it will
cost the United States their national security.
Please vote ``no'' on the Everett amendment.
Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
California [Mr. Pombo].
Mr. POMBO. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this
time.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Everett amendment. This
amendment embodies many of the ideas that we all claim to stand for:
open competition and smaller government. While this amendment does not
require privatization, it merely ensures that the competition process
remains on a level playing field between private industry and public
military depots.
I believe the provisions of this bill specifically target
Sacramento's McClellan Air Force Base in my home State of California
and Kelly Air Force Base in Texas. As currently drafted, this bill
prevents the public-private competitions that are now taking place at
McClellan and Kelly.
Secretary of Defense Cohen has stated unequivocally that the
significance of privatization is part of DOD's efforts to save taxpayer
dollars. In addition, these provisions would be anticompetitive and
would frustrate the integrity of the BRAC process. Furthermore,
privatization at McClellan and Kelly is fully consistent with the BRAC
recommendations.
I urge the support of the Everett amendment.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Georgia [Mr. Chambliss].
(Mr. CHAMBLISS asked and was given permission to revise and extend
his remarks.)
Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me
this time.
Unlike my friend from Minnesota for whom I have such great respect, I
do support privatization. I think we have got to look for areas of our
operation of the Federal Government to seek to privatize in ways that
we can save money. But I do not support privatization when it affects
the readiness of our military might, nor when it injects politics into
an issue which must not be political if it is going to work, such as
the BRAC process.
Now, the Everett amendment is about two issues. The first issue is
whether or not privatization in place should be allowed at Kelly Air
Force Base and McClellan Air Force Base, and whether or not that was
provided for in the BRAC process.
Last year, during the defense authorization bill, the current
Secretary of Defense, the Honorable William Cohen, who was a Senator at
that point in time, a gentleman who was a great Senator and who is
doing an excellent job as Secretary of Defense, stated the following in
the Record, and I quote. ``The BRAC did not recommend or authorize
privatization in place at Kelly or McClellan.'' He is right. He is
absolutely right. It is not authorized.
Second, this amendment is about one other issue: Does privatization
in place save the taxpayers money?
In December 1996, the General Accounting Office did a report; this is
it right here. In this report it cites the Air Force's own numbers
wherein the Air Force has stated itself that the privatization in place
initiative that the administration supports at Kelly and McClellan will
cost the American taxpayers $700 million a year.
Folks, we are in tight, tight times with respect to budgets. We have
been arguing about balancing the budget around here for the 2\1/2\
years that I have been here. We cannot afford to spend $700 million on
politics. $700 million will buy us somewhere around 8, 9, or 10 F-22's.
$700 million will add a lot of pay increases for our military
personnel. That is where the money should be spent. I ask my colleagues
to vote ``no'' on this amendment.
Mr. SABO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Texas
[Mr. Rodriguez].
Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me
the time.
We have before us an amendment, and basically one of the things that
it does is it allows to preserve the existing law. There are some
discussions that are out there regarding the privatization in place,
but let me set my colleagues straight. The bids are out in San Antonio.
We have both the private and the public sector participating, and I ask
my colleagues, why are they afraid of that? We have the bids that are
out there and it does not call for privatization in place; it just asks
to see what the best bid is. Why are my colleagues so afraid of doing
that? So what we have before us is an attempt to get the language and
clean up the language.
There is some discussion by some of the Members regarding the
integrity of the BRAC process. The chairman, when he first started,
read out what the process said, and I am going to read it to my
colleagues again. It said, consolidate the workloads to other DOD
depots or to private sector commercial activities as determined by the
Defense Department.
We have both options of doing the private sector or the depot,
whichever is the most cost effective. It is pretty straightforward and
pretty democratic. But now we come through the legislative process and
since we have the bids that are out there, we want to say no, we do not
want to play that game, we want to get the contract without having to
go out for the bids.
Well, I say to my colleagues, we have an opportunity to vote for the
Everett amendment and we have the opportunity to withhold the integrity
of the BRAC process by voting ``no'' on the Everett amendment.
I also want to share with my colleagues that in the process, the
discussions about Kelly and about San Antonio and Sacramento, they have
been closed, and in some cases in San Antonio some of the projects have
been realigned. That is going to happen. That
[[Page H4194]]
is going to occur. Out of the five depots, there are only three left.
San Antonio is closed and Sacramento is closed. What we have before us
is an opportunity to make sure that the integrity of BRAC is taking
place by voting for the Everett amendment; No. 2, by assuring that we
have the most cost-effective method of making sure that we put that
into effect.
Secretary Cohen has talked about the importance of readiness, as some
of the Members have mentioned here, and he has talked about the fact
that some of the existing laws like this one is detrimental for the
process of readiness and to assure that our troops have the resources.
So it becomes really important that my colleagues vote, and I would ask
my colleagues to vote in favor of the amendment.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Alabama [Mr. Riley], a new and very able member of our committee.
Mr. RILEY. Mr. Chairman, this debate is not about depots, it is not
about 60/40, it is not about privatization, it is not about
competition. This debate is a debate on fairness. This is a vote on
restoring the integrity to the BRAC process. This is a vote on taking
politics out of the BRAC process.
Mr. Chairman, our national defense is too important to trust the
politicians. That was the very reason we set up the BRAC process in the
first place.
Mr. Chairman, a few minutes ago, the ranking minority member, before
the B-2 vote, asked us to vote for integrity, to vote for trust, and
vote for fairness. That is what this debate is about, returning trust,
integrity, fairness to the process. I agree with the ranking minority
member, and that is the very reason I will vote ``no'' on the Everett
amendment.
{time} 2130
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Florida [Mr. Stearns].
(Mr. STEARNS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. STEARNS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished chairman for
yielding me the time.
To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of
preserving peace. These words were uttered some 200 years ago by George
Washington. They are just as poignant today as they were then. The
issue is one of national security. In other words, regardless of the
rhetoric that we are going to hear, the truth of the matter is that
America simply cannot afford this amendment. Here is why.
Under current law, all core duties and no less than 60 percent of the
annual depot maintenance workload must be performed by Federal
employees. This amendment proposes elimination of this requirement so
that more maintenance work can be contracted out to private firms. It
sounds like a good idea. However, the 60-40 rule ensures that the
Department of Defense has an in-house capability to maintain America's
readiness, crucial in times of national emergency. Our security cannot
depend on private companies subject to the whims of the market. This is
an extremely important point, and a point that cannot be forgotten.
Doing away with the 60-40 rule is a misguided proposal which could
adversely affect the abilities of the Naval Aviation Depot in
Jacksonville, the employer in my home district of 3,900 Floridians. I
am opposed to this amendment not just because I am worried about local
jobs, but as a veteran I am concerned about our national security.
Mr. Chairman, here we are debating tonight an amendment offering a
solution to a problem that does not exist. It sounds neat, sounds
plausible, but it is wrong. I urge my colleagues to oppose this
amendment.
Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 15 seconds to remind my
friend from Florida that this does not, my amendment does not repeal
60-40, reverse the current law.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr.
Klug].
Mr. KLUG. Mr. Chairman, let us try to put this all in perspective for
a minute, if we can, because I think if we are listening to the debate
in this Chamber, it is a little hard exactly to figure out what is at
issue. Opponents of this amendment, I think, have quite correctly
characterized the President interfered in the BRAC Commission situation
and essentially tried to keep open two bases for political reasons.
I will concede that. But let me argue that I think what opponents of
this amendment are trying to do is to simply close down two bases in
the country so that we can then ship work to other bases to keep those
depots open. This is in its fundamental perspective, I think, a battle
over not whether we are going to privatize work done by the United
States armed forces or whether we are going to create and guarantee
make-work in order to keep government jobs working.
I am astonished to hear my good friend from Florida talk about the
idea of exposing the Defense Department to the whims of the
marketplace. That is what Republicans are supposed to argue for, that
we think we can save money. And the gentleman from California [Mr.
Doolittle] is exactly right that privatization always does save money.
Now, if we do not strike this language that is in the report done by
the committee, what it will essentially say is that a billion and a
half dollars worth of work is off the table. One cannot compete for it.
One cannot privatize it. It is government workers who have to do it.
If we continue to follow this line of thought, we are going to take
$15 billion in depot work and essentially say it is off limits; it is
only government workers who can get it done, which I think is an
absolutely astonishing position for members of the Republican Party to
argue.
Who supports this idea of what we are talking about? Here is what the
United States Chamber of Commerce said in sending a letter to the other
body: As a matter of policy, the U.S. Chamber favors privatization of
tasks performed by the Government in order to provide new business
opportunities to the private sector and to take advantage of cost
efficiencies afforded through modern business practices.
In brief, the U.S. Chamber thinks privatizing depot operations will
save United States taxpayers money.
Here is what the BRAC Commission said: This Commission believes
reducing infrastructure by extending privatization to other DOD
industrial and commercial activities will reduce the cost of
maintaining and operating a ready military force.
Those are dollars that can be saved for the United States taxpayers.
Those are dollars that can be spent on other weapons systems, on other
kinds of training programs for our troops on readiness. In short, we
save money and make the United States military even better prepared in
the event of war, which is what the gentleman from Florida [Mr.
Stearns] was arguing about.
This I think is an extraordinarily bad precedent because, if the
President made a mistake, we in this body are going to repeat a mistake
tonight if we do not follow forward and pass the Everett amendment
because what we are going to say is that $15 billion in potential
privatization contracts are off the board. Make no mistake about it.
This is not about trying to save two places last year and whether the
President made a mistake. I think he did make a mistake. But what we
are going to do with this amendment is to set the hurdle so high that
we will protect other bases and guarantee that privatization will never
ever happen.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
California [Mr. Cunningham].
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I have got friends on both sides of
this issue. I am a Californian. Let me tell Members why I am opposed to
this amendment.
First of all, remember that every BRACC base closed is for
privatization. Every one closed. That is what we are saying. We are
closing them. We do not want the Federal Government to take care of
them. We initially had six Air Force and six Navy depots. In the first
BRACC round the Navy closed down three. The Air Force did not close
any. So there was three and six in the next round, the Air Force closed
three. So there was three and three. And yet there is still a 50
percent overhead or excess, so that we are operating at only 50 percent
capacity. And now we want two other depots to come in and privatize.
That is going to cost $700 million a year to compete against the ones
[[Page H4195]]
that have and that is core military. Let me tell my colleagues why from
personal experience.
During the Vietnam war, we privatized because we could not do the
work to build F-14 or FB4's to F-4N's. Six months before we got ready
to go, four airwings of Phantoms could not go to Vietnam because they
found wing cracks. If we would have flown those airplanes, our pilots
would have been killed. That never would have happened in a depot. Not
in a military depot. It would not have got through.
So it is not only readiness, the core capability that we need to
fight the war, and this is wrong. It is just as wrong to privatize this
as it is to give the Communist Chinese Long Beach Naval Shipyard to
control. That is privatization but it is wrong. It is bad policy. It is
bad economics. And it is bad for national security. I would ask my
colleagues on both sides of the aisle and, yes, those from California,
my colleagues, oppose this amendment.
Mr. SABO. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would advise that the gentleman from
Minnesota [Mr. Sabo] has 7 minutes remaining, the gentleman from
Alabama [Mr. Everett] has 2 minutes remaining, and gentleman from South
Carolina [Mr. Spence] has 5 minutes remaining and has the right to
close.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Oklahoma [Mr. Istook].
Mr. ISTOOK. Mr. Chairman, I rise to oppose this amendment.
As a member of the Subcommittee on National Security of the Committee
on Appropriations, I know firsthand our defense budget is inadequate.
Training for our men and women in uniform, purchase of modern weapons
systems, research and development to hold our technological knowledge
in the military, proper facilities for our troops, all these and more
are underfunded.
Every dollar for defense is precious. So when the General Accounting
Office reports that we will pay an extra $468 million each year if we
fail to do both of two things, if we fail both to close those depots in
Texas and in California and also transfer the work to the surviving
three depots, if we do not do both of them, we lose the $468 million a
year.
The work has to be shifted. Why? Very simple: Three overheads are
cheaper than five. And if we do not transfer the work, we are paying
for more overhead multiple times. If we pass this amendment, we are
playing politics and more, wasting 468 million badly needed dollars for
defense.
What does it mean? For example, each year it is 18 F-16 fighters we
cannot buy. Each year it is 58 M-1 main battle tanks that we cannot
upgrade. Each year we cannot get the upgrades of 56 Kiowa Warrior
helicopters. We cannot buy those. We cannot upgrade other military
facilities. We cannot take care of the troops. We cannot supply proper
facilities, all because people wanted excess overhead and undercut our
military's ability to get the most bang for our buck.
Mr. Chairman, it also means less training, less preparedness and less
readiness for national defense. A vote for the amendment is a vote to
waste this money. I ask my colleagues to join me and vote no.
Mr. SABO. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the
gentleman from California [Mr. Fazio].
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California [Mr. Fazio] is recognized
for 7 minutes.
Mr. FAZIO of California. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong support
for the Everett-Sabo amendment. I want to go right to the heart of the
matter, because I know that many of my friends and colleagues on the
floor here are torn over the facts of this case.
McClellan and Kelly Air Force Bases are closing. Nothing we do in
this bill is going to change that. It is a done deal. As McClellan
closes, 15,000 jobs will disappear from the Sacramento economy. That is
on top of thousands of other jobs we have lost from two prior Base
Closing Rounds, recent BRACC rounds.
I think it is safe to say that no community has been more adversely
impacted by the Base Closing Commission than Sacramento has. But that
is not why we are offering this bipartisan amendment. It is more than
that, and I would say much more than that.
The reason Republicans and Democrats, liberals and conservatives are
joining here is to restore competition and preserve the integrity of
the Base Closing Commission and, at the same time, ensure that the
Department of Defense saves millions of taxpayers' dollars and protects
our Nation's military readiness through competition.
There has been a lot of misinformation tossed around about the
politics of the Base Closing Commission in the past hour. But the facts
are indisputable.
This amendment is explicitly following the Commission's
recommendation. Read Chairman Dixon's letter to Secretary White. It
expressly says, BRACC gave DOD the flexibility to privatize at
McClellan and Kelly.
Also look at what the experts say. It is overwhelming. The list is
endless. Make no mistake about it. Our amendment simply maintains the
status quo. Unlike the language put forth by the depot caucus in this
bill, our amendment does not affect the 60-40 calculation that is so
important to so many of our colleagues in this body.
Contrary to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Stearns], the committee
language changes the 60-40, we do not. The depot caucus language, if
adopted, would eliminate public-private competition, sole source
billions of dollars worth of contracts to public depots without the
benefits of competition and, finally, force the military to pay huge
construction costs to accommodate the workload from the closing
installations.
Let me give my colleagues an example of what I mean. For Warner
Robbins Air Logistics Center in Georgia to take away the C-5 work at
Kelly without competition, as this amendment would have it, more than
$100 million worth of new military construction will have to be
undertaken at the Georgia facility. That is right. The American
taxpayer will have to pick up a multimillion dollar tab for a new
hanger and a paint shop. It seems to me that is a colossal waste of
money.
Let us put it into modernizing weapons systems, increasing military
readiness or some other pressing needs.
There are two other issues I want to address. Labor: Some Members on
my side of the aisle have made much of the AFG's opposition to this
amendment. They of course, the union, are interested in not just
preserving but expanding government jobs. But when Newark Air Force
Base in Ohio and the Naval Air Warfare Center at Indianapolis were
privatized in 1995, AFG organized the workers there. No union jobs were
lost.
And while we are on the subject of labor, the Hansen language in the
bill will pull jobs from the private sector and put them in a
government-run facility. Jobs that are being held by aerospace workers,
machinists, for example, would be in jeopardy. And that is why the
machinists union supports the Everett-Sabo amendment. That is another
reason why both the minority leader, the gentleman from Missouri [Mr.
Gephardt], and the ranking member of the Committee on National
Security, the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] oppose this
amendment offered by the committee and support the Everett amendment.
{time} 2145
I also want to know, why is it okay to privatize the House beauty
salon but no non-corps depot work done by defense contractors that
build the same weapons system? They simply want to maintain it after it
is procured. I will tell my colleagues why.
One example is because the Speaker, the gentleman from Georgia [Mr.
Gingrich], who almost succeeded in precluding us from having this
debate, is against this amendment. He is really, frankly, against
privatization in Georgia, his home State.
The Speaker, the most prominent member of the privatization task
force, is for competition and privatization, but not when it comes to
his region. If there was an issue that I thought the House leadership
would be for, it would be for competition, privatization, and saving
American taxpayers millions of dollars. But pork barrel politics seem
to be paramount whenever this issue comes up.
In the next several days, we will be debating how to achieve a
balanced budget. With defense dollars being severely constrained for at
least the next
[[Page H4196]]
several years, it is critical we spend every dollar prudently. And that
is why the Secretary of Defense, William Cohen, and all defense sector
organizations strongly support our amendment to strike this onerous and
harmful language in this bill.
They know the GAO report is erroneous because they know these bases
will not be open, as the GAO assumes, but will be closed. And all this
rhetoric about the cost according to the GAO is not even on target. The
question they answered was not even relevant. Do not put our military
readiness at risk. Do not let a parochial issue take priority over our
national defense.
Support the Nation's military leaders who made the tough choice.
Support 60/40 as it has always been. And keep a decent balance of the
workload between the private sector, that might yet have to ramp up in
procurement, and also give those in the public facility their chance to
live in the future. Let us not bias the decision by taking action on a
bill like this. Let us leave it up to the Defense Department and
commissions that have been assigned the role of making these judgments.
Join us and support the Everett-Sabo-Klug-Fazio amendment. Make sure
you stand up for a BRACC process that has not been adulterated. And in
more important terms, do not bias how work gets done. Let competition
prevail. Let those who can do it for least cost and best quality
benefit by getting the workload of the defense establishment in the
future.
I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself my final 2 minutes.
Mr. Chairman, my colleagues heard my colleague, the gentleman from
Wisconsin [Mr. Klug], say the U.S. Chamber of Commerce supports
privatization between private sector and depot level maintenance.
Let me tell my colleagues who supports this amendment. Aerospace
Industries Association, American Defense Preparedness Association of
National Security, the Industrial Association, American Electronics
Association, American Shipbuilding Association, Business Executives of
National Security, Contract Services Association, Electronic Industries
Association, Professional Services Council, and Shipbuilders Council of
America.
Mr. Chairman, the last two amendments, without question, are truly
the two hardest amendments this body has to debate. The debate on this
amendment has moved across party lines, it has moved across
philosophical views, and it has moved across lines of friendship. It is
not easy to be on different sides of an issue with friends you trust
and admire and who you know debate our true convictions.
Yet, my colleagues, I suggest that that is what this House is all
about, a place where sincere people can hold different views and
express them openly and freely. I offered this amendment not to get
even with anyone; I offered this amendment because of what I see to be
serious problems contained in the language of this bill. I have tried
to make it clear to my colleagues on both sides of this issue that if
this language simply calls for the closing of two of our Air Force
bases, I would not be standing here tonight. But, in my opinion, it
goes much farther than that.
I could ask no more than each Member to vote his conscience.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as she may consume to the
gentlewoman from Florida [Ms. Brown].
(Ms. BROWN of Florida asked and was given permission to revise and
extend her remarks.)
Ms. BROWN of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I would like to enter my
objection to this amendment, this provision, which is the beginning of
the end of 60/40.
Mr. Chairman, this amendment is the beginning of the end for the 60/
40 provision which protects national security interests by ensuring the
majority of mission critical maintenance is conducted by government
employees. Further privatization of depot work would restrict the
maintenance capability available to our forces in times of crisis.
60/40 is an excellent example of private and public partnerships.
Contractors benefit by being allowed to perform core work where they
have a comparative advantage, and government employees offer their own
acquired learning curve in addition to reliability in times of crisis.
If the Everett amendment passes it will open the door to full
privatization in the military. Most of us know that privatization
rarely benefits the middle class working family. Additionally, there is
no evidence that shows that this type of privatization saves any money.
I urge you to support the BRAC process, national security, and our hard
working constituents and oppose the Everett amendment.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the
gentleman from Texas [Mr. Armey].
Mr. ARMEY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from South Carolina
[Mr. Spence] for yielding me the time.
Mr. Chairman, this is a debate that I would much rather not find
myself participating in. Any of my colleagues that were here in the
legislative years of 1987 and 1988 will recall that I spent almost my
entire time during those two years working on the base-closing
legislation that resulted in the BRAC Commission. And I recall vividly
that I spoke to every Member of the House during that period of time
many times. And in each and every case, in each and every conversation,
my job, as an advocate of base closures, was to convince the Members
that the process would be apolitical, that nobody, no President would
have the ability to intercede in the process on behalf of a base to be
closed as a punishment against a Member or a base to be left open as a
reward against a Member. No politics.
We had three rounds of base closing, and we are all very proud of the
process because politics never intruded into the process. That ended in
round four. And all of my colleagues knew at the time, and we know now,
that the special conditions for McClellan and Kelly, California and my
own State of Texas, where you might think I have a parochial interest,
were in a political invention.
We talk about this being privatization. No, it is not. It is a new
concept. It is privatization in place, created specifically for these
two bases in an election year for no purpose other than politics. And
that is an intrusion against the process that, if we allow to stand,
might put in jeopardy any future base closures through a lack of
confidence on the Members of Congress that it will be as it was
intended to be, politically aloof and out of the control of people for
politics, rewards, or punishments.
This amendment that is offered, that was put into the mark by the
members of the committee, is the necessary response to that
politicization of the process in the last round. It is not a perfect
response and a response that we intend to work on to fix and repair.
Because in another time and another part of my service here, I had the
great honor of creating the privatization caucus.
I believe in privatization. I believe in full, objective, competitive
privatization, not some creation that has a clear, precise, and
mandatory geographic locale called privatization in place. So, on
behalf of both the concept of privatization and the integrity of the
base-closing process, I ask my colleagues to please vote no on the
Everett amendment. Let the committee mark stand.
I have been assured by the members of the committee and each of those
that wrote the amendment that we can do a perfecting of that language
so that we can simultaneously preserve the integrity of base closing
for future base-closing efforts and the integrity of the concept of
privatization.
This is not a matter of what is best or desire for each and every one
of us from a parochial point of view. This is certainly not a matter of
me, as a Texan, taking care of my Texan interests. It is a matter of
demonstrating that this Congress can build a process with integrity
and, against even the most powerful influences in our government, can
stand to preserve the integrity of that process for our children's
future, for safer defense, for cost-ready defense, and a defense that
will in fact will meet the needs of our Nation.
We have overcome old legislative barriers. We have overcome old
politics to do what is right in the allocation of scarce defense
dollars. Let us not lose that game now. Vote no on the Everett
amendment. Let us fix the committee language in conference, and let us
save this process for another round or two.
Mrs. CLAYTON. Mr. Chairman, I recognize that there are good people on
both sides of this issue.
[[Page H4197]]
However, I rise in strong opposition to this amendment which would
strike the bipartisan bill language on depot maintenance regulations.
As written the bill's language would:
Ensure that efficient capacity exists in both the public and the
private sector to meet our depot maintenance needs,
Restore the integrity of the Base Realignment and Closure process,
Support the independent Base Realignment and Closure process.
The current provision of 60/40 has worked well during the harsh
economic environment we experienced during the years of BRAC closure
years.
The Everett amendment would erode the 60/40 provision and will only
benefit private contractors and two Air Force bases.
The BRAC Commission found that closure of these two Air Force Bases
would significantly improved utilization of the remaining depots and
reduce DOD operating costs.
We must respect and abide by the BRAC process we cannot allow it to
become corrupted. The BRAC closure process was meant to be insulated
from political influence.
If you support the non-politicized, nonpartisan BRAC process vote no
on this amendment.
[From the Wall Street Journal, June 20, 1997]
U.S. Trade Deficit Widened in April, As Gap With China Continued to
Grow
(By Christina Duff)
Washington.--American businesses imported lots of clothing,
toys and sporting goods in April--mostly from China--which
helped to expand modestly the U.S. trade deficit to a
seasonally adjusted $8.36 billion from $7.76 billion in
March.
The deficit with China was 41% higher in the first four
months of this year than it was in the year-earlier period;
in April, tat gap widened to $3.45 billion from $2.41 billion
the year before. The year-earlier comparison is a more
accurate gauge than month-to-month figures because country
breakdowns aren't seasonally adjusted.
As Congress gets set to debate the extension of normal
trade relations with Beijing, the widening trade gap with
China is sure to incite the measure's opponents, such as
organized labor. ``This will make the fight a little more
fierce on the floor,'' said economist Brian Horrigan of
Loomis Sayles & Co., Boston.
gap with japan widens
The China gap is expected sometime this year to surpass the
trade deficit with Japan, which swelled in April to $4.84
billion, the highest since last October. It widened even
further in May, based on figures released earlier this week
by the Japanese government. The once-contentious trade gap
with Tokyo has begun widening again, after narrowing over the
past few years mainly because a strong yen made U.S. exports
to Japan more competitive and raised prices of goods Japan
sells here. But the rise of the dollar against the yen, until
two months ago, altered that balance.
Total imports increased 0.9% in April to a record $86.72
billion, following a 2% jump in March. Since consumer demand
looks to have slowed in the second quarter, many of these
imported goods may be ``winding up in inventory,'' said
economist Mark Vitner of First Union Corp., Charlotte, N.C.
As a result, retailers may have to cut back their orders.
Imports would have been stronger if not for a sharp drop in
oil prices. In April, the average price per barrel of
imported oil fell to $16.78 and is down $5.97 since January.
The Labor Department reported yesterday, however, that
petroleum prices climbed back up 1.2% in May. Excluding fuel,
import prices slipped 0.1% in May, the fifth consecutive
monthly drop, led by declining prices for capital goods and
cars. Overall import prices were unchanged.
exports also set record
Total exports, meanwhile, rose a slight 0.2% in April to
$78.36 billion, also a record, after surging 5.1% in March.
April's gain was driven by shipments of capital goods,
including telecommunications equipment and industrial
machinery.
All told, the April deficit was 14% below the first-quarter
average of $9.7 billion. The better-than-expected rise in
exports suggests that trade should add to second-quarter
economic growth, after subtracting from it in the first
quarter, said economist Cheryl Katz of Merrill Lynch & Co.,
New York. Ms. Katz is looking for growth this quarter of
about 2% at an annual rate; in the first, the economy soared
at a 5.8% rate.
Also yesterday, the Commerce Department said the deficit in
the broadest measure of U.S. foreign trade totaled $40.97
billion in the first quarter, compared with a revised $36.87
billion in the final quarter of 1996. The quarterly current-
account deficit is considered the most comprehensive gauge of
trade performance because it measures not only trade in goods
and services, but also investment flows between nations, as
well as foreign aid.
ten-year revision
The first-quarter report included annual data revisions
that show the U.S. current-account deficit was substantially
smaller during the past 10 years than previously reported.
The government revised the current-account deficit downward
by $72.59 billion for the 10-year period. For all of 1996,
the U.S. registered a revised $148.18 billion current-account
deficit, down from the $165.10 billion shortfall previously
reported.
Meanwhile, other sectors of the economy are easing. The
Labor Department reported yesterday that the number of
Americans applying for state unemployment insurance rose
8,000 last week to a seasonally adjusted 347,000, reflecting
some slackening in the labor market.
The four-week moving average of jobless claims, considered
a better gauge of labor-market conditions because it adjusts
for weekly fluctuations, rose 6,250 in the latest week to
335,500, the highest level since early May.
PARTNERS IN TRADE
[U.S. merchandise trade balances by region; in billions of dollars, not
seasonally adjusted]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
April, April
1997 1996
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Japan............................................. -$4.84 -$4.47
China............................................. -3.45 -2.41
Mexico............................................ -1.40 -1.64
Canada............................................ -0.97 -1.55
NICs \1\.......................................... -0.81 -0.37
So./Central America............................... -0.80 -0.09
W. Europe......................................... -0.49 -0.69
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Newly industrialized countries: Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South
Korea.
Source: Commerce Department.
Mr. LUCAS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I am concerned with the
ramifications of this amendment. If this is approved, we will be
endorsing the President's decision to contravene the 1995 BRAC law and
giving the green light to future administrations to do the same thing
in subsequent rounds of base closings.
We are engaged today in a regional battle because the President
refused to implement the very law he signed. Congress must have the
fortitude to stand up and force the President to abide by the law and
not give special treatment to two bases which were to be closed under
the last BRAC.
There is a lot of talk these days about forming BRAC-like commissions
on a whole host of topics. The reason is that BRAC worked, or at least
it used to work. Independent, objective, fair--these are words that
were used to describe BRAC. Can we really apply these terms anymore?
I urge my colleagues not to give the President a free ride on this
matter. You had to vote yes or no on BRAC without conditions. Don't
hold the President to a lower standard. Vote No!
Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to the Everett
amendment and urge my colleagues to support the depot maintenance
provisions included in this bill. This amendment is an attempt to
circumvent the independent BRAC process and put in place a
privatization-in-place plan for two bases ordered closed by the BRAC.
If we allow these bases to privatize-in-place rather than close, we
will sustain a costly excess capacity within our depot system.
There has been a great deal of misinformation circulated about the
language in the bill. I'll take this opportunity to make a few points
of clarification for the body. This bill does not affect any current
private contracts and does not require any work to be moved into the
public sector; it does not increase the percentage of depot workload
performed by the public sector; it does not require all maintenance on
all new weapons systems to be performed in public depots; nor does it
preclude the further downsizing of the government owned depots for
future BRAC rounds.
The bill does allow us to move forward with the intentions and
recommendations of the BRAC regarding excess capacity in the depot
system. By complying with recommendations of BRAC, it also enables us
to save the taxpayer's over $689 million a year. In tough budgetary
times, we must act to achieve savings where we can.
Additionally, the bill clarifies what operations are included in the
``term depot maintenance'' and offers new flexibility by allowing core
workload requirements to be performed by private sector employees in
partnership with organic depots. It also restricts the Secretary of
Defense's ability to privatize any workload currently performed in
depots closed or realigned by BRAC at those depots unless the Secretary
certifies that, at the time the contract is signed, each of the
services depots is operating at an efficiency level of 80 percent, that
the total cost to Government is less than continuing to consolidate the
workload in existing depots, and that none of the workload is core.
Finally, it directs the Secretary to establish policies to enable
public private partnerships at our depots.
I urge my colleague to support the provisions of the bill. They
provide much needed capabilities and enhance our military readiness
while saving the money for the American taxpayer. Please vote no on the
Everett amendment:
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment, as modified, offered
by the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. Everett].
[[Page H4198]]
The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes
appeared to have it.
Recorded Vote
Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 145,
noes 278, not voting 11, as follows:
[Roll No. 229]
AYES--145
Andrews
Baldacci
Barrett (WI)
Barton
Becerra
Bentsen
Berman
Berry
Blagojevich
Blumenauer
Boehlert
Bonilla
Boyd
Brady
Brown (CA)
Brown (OH)
Burton
Campbell
Capps
Cardin
Clay
Clyburn
Combest
Condit
Costello
Cramer
Davis (FL)
DeFazio
DeLauro
Dellums
Dingell
Dixon
Doggett
Dooley
Doolittle
Duncan
Edwards
Eshoo
Everett
Farr
Fattah
Fazio
Foglietta
Frank (MA)
Frost
Furse
Gejdenson
Gephardt
Gonzalez
Granger
Hamilton
Harman
Herger
Hilleary
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hooley
Hoyer
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
John
Johnson (WI)
Johnson, Sam
Kennedy (RI)
Kennelly
Kilpatrick
Kim
Kind (WI)
Kleczka
Klug
LaFalce
Lampson
Lantos
Levin
Lofgren
Lowey
Luther
Maloney (CT)
Manton
Matsui
McCarthy (MO)
McDermott
McHale
McKeon
Meehan
Millender-McDonald
Miller (CA)
Minge
Moakley
Mollohan
Moran (VA)
Nadler
Oberstar
Obey
Owens
Pascrell
Pastor
Paul
Pelosi
Peterson (MN)
Pombo
Pomeroy
Radanovich
Rangel
Reyes
Riggs
Rodriguez
Roemer
Rogan
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Sabo
Sanchez
Sanders
Sandlin
Sawyer
Serrano
Sessions
Sherman
Skaggs
Slaughter
Smith (TX)
Smith, Adam
Snyder
Spratt
Stabenow
Stark
Strickland
Stupak
Tanner
Tauscher
Thompson
Thornberry
Thurman
Tierney
Torres
Turner
Velazquez
Vento
Visclosky
Waxman
Wexler
Weygand
Wise
Woolsey
NOES--278
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Aderholt
Allen
Archer
Armey
Bachus
Baesler
Baker
Ballenger
Barcia
Barr
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Bass
Bateman
Bereuter
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop
Bliley
Boehner
Bonior
Bono
Borski
Boswell
Boucher
Brown (FL)
Bryant
Bunning
Burr
Buyer
Callahan
Calvert
Camp
Canady
Cannon
Carson
Castle
Chabot
Chambliss
Chenoweth
Christensen
Clayton
Clement
Coble
Coburn
Collins
Conyers
Cook
Cooksey
Coyne
Crane
Crapo
Cubin
Cummings
Cunningham
Danner
Davis (IL)
Davis (VA)
Deal
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLay
Deutsch
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Dicks
Doyle
Dreier
Dunn
Ehlers
Ehrlich
Emerson
Engel
English
Ensign
Etheridge
Evans
Ewing
Fawell
Filner
Flake
Foley
Forbes
Ford
Fowler
Fox
Franks (NJ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Ganske
Gekas
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Goode
Goodlatte
Goodling
Goss
Graham
Green
Greenwood
Gutierrez
Gutknecht
Hall (OH)
Hall (TX)
Hansen
Hastert
Hastings (FL)
Hastings (WA)
Hayworth
Hefley
Hefner
Hill
Hilliard
Hobson
Hoekstra
Holden
Horn
Hostettler
Hulshof
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hyde
Inglis
Istook
Jefferson
Jenkins
Johnson (CT)
Johnson, E.B.
Jones
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kasich
Kelly
Kennedy (MA)
Kildee
King (NY)
Kingston
Klink
Knollenberg
Kolbe
Kucinich
LaHood
Largent
Latham
LaTourette
Lazio
Leach
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (GA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
Livingston
LoBiondo
Lucas
Manzullo
Markey
Martinez
Mascara
McCarthy (NY)
McCollum
McCrery
McDade
McGovern
McHugh
McInnis
McIntyre
McKinney
McNulty
Meek
Menendez
Metcalf
Mica
Miller (FL)
Mink
Molinari
Moran (KS)
Morella
Murtha
Myrick
Neal
Nethercutt
Neumann
Ney
Northup
Norwood
Nussle
Olver
Ortiz
Oxley
Packard
Pallone
Pappas
Parker
Paxon
Payne
Pease
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pickering
Pickett
Pitts
Porter
Portman
Poshard
Price (NC)
Pryce (OH)
Quinn
Rahall
Ramstad
Redmond
Regula
Riley
Rivers
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Roukema
Royce
Rush
Ryun
Salmon
Sanford
Saxton
Scarborough
Schaefer, Dan
Schaffer, Bob
Scott
Sensenbrenner
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Shimkus
Shuster
Sisisky
Skeen
Skelton
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (OR)
Smith, Linda
Snowbarger
Solomon
Souder
Spence
Stearns
Stenholm
Stokes
Stump
Sununu
Talent
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Thomas
Thune
Tiahrt
Traficant
Upton
Walsh
Wamp
Waters
Watkins
Watt (NC)
Watts (OK)
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
White
Whitfield
Wicker
Wolf
Wynn
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
NOT VOTING--11
Blunt
Cox
Gordon
Houghton
Lipinski
Maloney (NY)
McIntosh
Schiff
Schumer
Towns
Yates
{time} 2214
The Clerk announced the following pair:
On this vote:
Mr. McIntosh for, with Mr. Blunt against.
Mr. Ford and Mr. Gutierrez changed their vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
Messrs. Brown of Ohio, Stark, and Sessions changed their vote from
``no'' to ``aye.''
So the amendment was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
personal explanation
Mr. COX of California. Mr. Chairman, I was necessarily absent for
this vote for medical reasons.
{time} 2215
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to section 5 of House Resolution 169, it is
now in order to consider amendment No. 35 printed in part 2 of House
Report 105-137.
Amendment Offered by Mr. Rohrabacher
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, as the designee of the gentleman from
New York [Mr. Solomon] I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Rohrabacher: At the end of title
XI (page 371, after line 18), insert the following new
section:
SEC. 1112. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR CERTAIN PURPOSES
IN CASE OF TRANSFER OF MISSILE SYSTEM BY
RUSSIA.
(a) In General.--No fiscal year 1998 Cooperative Threat
Reduction funds may, notwithstanding any other provision of
law, be obligated or expended to carry out a Cooperative
Threat Reduction program in Russia after the date on which it
is made known to the Secretary of Defense that Russia has
transferred to the People's Republic of China an SS-N-22
missile system.
(b) Applicability.--This section shall apply with respect
to any transfer by Russia of an SS-N-22 missile system to the
People's Republic of China that occurs on or after the date
of the enactment of this Act.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from California,
Mr. Rohrabacher, and a Member opposed Mr. Dellums, each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California [Mr. Rohrabacher].
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to
the distinguished gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence] for the
purpose of an announcement.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to inform the House that
this vote on this amendment, I would just like to announce that after
this amendment, a 10-minute amendment, there will be a vote, if called
for, and that will be the last vote for the evening. Even though we
will be considering the en bloc amendments, that would be the last vote
after this one.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Chairman, the SS-N-22 missile known as the Sunburn was created by
the Soviet Union to attack American warships that are equipped with
Aegis cruiser radar and battle management systems.
This missile system, the Sunburn system, is a system designed to kill
American sailors. The supersonic sea skimming missile is extremely
difficult to defend against, and a long-range version of the missile is
a dangerous threat to our military personnel, especially those on
aircraft carriers and other naval personnel.
In December 1996 a secret agreement was made between what was the
Soviet Union, now it is Russia, and China to transfer from Russia to
China this deadly American-killing weapon system. Basically, if the
Chinese deploy this in the Straits of Taiwan, it will put our naval
personnel in danger. Then if it is put in place to threaten our people
in the Straits of Hormuz,
[[Page H4199]]
American naval operations there will be threatened because China is
itself a supplier of weapons to the Iranians.
This deadly weapon system, if it is transferred from Russia to China,
will have horrible implications for the safety of our naval personnel
all over the world and terrible implications for the peace of mankind.
The amendment being offered by my friend, the gentleman from New York
[Mr. Solomon] and I does not cut off the Nunn-Lugar funding. I want to
stress that the GAO tells us that there is still more than $1 billion
in the Nunn-Lugar pipeline. At current spending rates, that should
cover the program for the next 4 years.
If this amendment is adopted, it will not affect in the slightest the
number of Russian nuclear weapons that will be dismantled in 1998; but
what this amendment does do, it says that we will not add another $200
million to the pipeline if this deadly weapon system that the Russians
now possess is transferred to the Chinese. We are basically saying that
the Russians cannot expect to sell deadly weapons, high-technology
weapon systems, aimed at killing Americans and expect us to add another
$200 billion to the foreign aid pipe line.
I would ask my colleagues to vote ``yes'' on the Solomon-Rohrabacher
amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to my distinguished
colleague, the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spratt].
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to the
gentleman's amendment. This amendment would stop, stop any funds for
the so-called Nunn-Lugar program from being spent if the Russians dare
to sell the SS-N-22 antiship cruise missile to China. The Nunn-Lugar
program, sometimes known as cooperative threat reduction, helps the
Russians to smile at ballistic weapons and store their deadly
components. Nunn-Lugar is not foreign aid, it is not a gratuity. Nunn-
Lugar helps U.S. national security in very direct and substantial ways.
Listen to this list. So far Nunn-Lugar has helped deactivate 4,500
nuclear warheads, put over 200 ICBM silos out of operation, destroyed
20 heavy bombers, eliminated 64 submarine-launched ballistic missiles
and sealed 58 nuclear testing tunnels. Nunn-Lugar has helped the three
former nations of the Soviet Union, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan
totally denuclearize.
This is really one of the crowning successes of the post-cold-war
world. It has not gotten nearly the attention and acclaim that it
deserves, and there is much more that Nunn-Lugar has to do.
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. SPRATT. I yield to the gentleman from Missouri.
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I think it is important to point out there
is a difference between this and just general foreign aid. I am not
sure that is clear.
Mr. SPRATT. This is not foreign aid. This is an investment in our own
national security.
Here is what is left on the agenda. These are Nunn-Lugar projects on
the agenda.
Dismantle 130 SS-19 heavy throw-weight ICBM's, dismantle 54 SS-24
mobile ICBM's, fill in 148 SS-18 silos in Kazakhstan, eliminate 492
SLBM silos, destroy 10 more heavy bombers, complete the construction of
a facility in Siberia to safely store over 12,000 nuclear warheads,
dispose of 100,000 metric tons of liquid propellants, scrap 916
ballistic rocket motors.
That is a concrete list, that is the work order.
Mr. SKELTON. If the gentleman would yield one more time, in other
words this is in our national interests to do this.
Mr. SPRATT. These are the accumulated work orders for the Nunn-Lugar
program ready to be executed if the gentleman does not stop the funds
with this ill-considered amendment. For somewhere between $300 and $400
million a year we can destroy nuclear missiles that were targeted to us
and could have destroyed us throughout 50 years of the cold war. That
in my book is money well spent.
This amendment would have us cut off an investment in our own
security if the Russians were to sell to the Chinese, listen to this, a
cruise missile with a range of 60 nautical miles. This type of missile
is already deployed by the Indian Navy. It cannot be ignored or
dismissed. It is not state-of-the-art, however, by any means, and
though it can be tipped with a small nuclear warhead, it more often
carries a conventional warhead, and it does not constitute by any
stretch of the imagination a strategic threat to the United States.
Russian ICBM's, however, and Russian SLBM's and the fissile materials
that must be secured from nations hostile to the United States are a
strategic threat. This is not a good amendment, it is not a good idea.
I urge all Members to vote against the Solomon amendment. It is not in
our national security interests.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Chairman, let me just state for the record this does not cut off
Nunn-Lugar funds. There are over a billion dollars of American taxpayer
funds in the Nunn-Lugar channel in the pipeline. It does not touch that
billion dollars. It simply says that if they sell this missile aimed at
killing American sailors to the Chinese in order to kill American
sailors, we will not add another $200 million to that fund.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Parliamentary Inquiry
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state his inquiry.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, as I understand the rule because we are
standing in defense of the committee position, that we on this side,
have the opportunity to close debate.
Is that not correct?
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman is correct.
Mr. DELLUMS. Then I would suggest that the gentleman use the balance
of his time. I have one more speaker.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the
gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon].
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, if I heard the last speaker correctly, he
said that the sale of this kind of missile, the SS-N-22, poses no
threat to American strategic concerns. I think that is what the
gentleman just said.
Let me just say this. Remember the U.S.S. Stark. Ask any of the 37
dead sailors that were killed by a missile just like this.
Mr. Chairman, any Member around here who is concerned about missile
proliferation should support this.
{time} 2230
I want my colleagues to make no mistake about it. China wants these
missiles to intimidate and possibly sink American ships or kill
American sailors. America is engaged in an extraordinary act of
generosity, giving American taxpayers' dollars, and in spite of
repeated anti-American Russian activities like this too numerous to
mention, the Clinton administration has opted to maintain an
uninterrupted flow of taxpayer money to Russia.
This time, the Russians have gone too far in selling this kind of
deadly weapon to the Chinese, and if our aid cannot induce the Russian
government to refrain from making this kind of a sale which is such a
direct threat to American citizens, we obviously are getting nowhere.
Let me make the point clear. There is $1 billion in the pipeline.
This does not cut that off; this simply says to Russia, sends them a
message, $180 million more is not going to be forthcoming if you
directly intimidate the United States and sell this kind of missile to
China.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, I yield the final 30 seconds to the
gentleman from California [Mr. Cunningham].
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I have the utmost respect for the
gentleman from North Carolina and the gentleman from Missouri. I think
it has been a good debate. But I want my colleagues to remember last
year when China had missiles at Taiwan. Remember the minister when he
said, you prefer Los Angeles or Taiwan when our ships start going
through the straits? They can use this missile. It is very difficult to
intercept a terminal supersonic missile coming inbound at a ship,
[[Page H4200]]
and our Air Force and Navy pilots have to intercept these and it cuts
down their orders of doing that.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to my distinguished
colleague, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Thornberry] to close debate on
this issue.
Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Chairman, I voted for the Rohrabacher amendment
to the foreign affairs authorization bill a week or so ago. I think it
is appropriate to use foreign aid as a carrot to try to get Russia to
do what we want them to do. But the most important thing Members have
to know about this amendment is it is not foreign aid. It is spending
that is in our best national security interests. It is not a gift. It
is money spent that will reduce the threat of nuclear weapons which
could be used against us.
As the gentleman has already let us know, it has been used to
eliminate missiles and silos and bombers and submarines aimed against
us. It is being used to tighten security on nuclear warheads which
could be used against us. It tightens security on nuclear materials
which could be sent to other countries, which could also be used
against us. It is used to help make sure the expertise on how to build
these nuclear weapons is not spread throughout the world and could be
used against us.
Now, which of those things is not in the national security interests
of the United States? This money is spent for us, and it does not
matter where else Russia sends missiles, this money is still spent for
us.
It is cheaper and wiser to spend money now to prevent nuclear
materials from spreading throughout the world and to keep them out of
the hands of terrorists and rogue nations than to deal with the
consequences after they already get them.
Of course there is no guarantee the Russians are not going to waste
some of the money. Of course there is no guarantee they are not going
to modernize their submarines at the same time, but there is a
guarantee that if we do not do everything we possibly can now to
contain the nuclear weapons and the nuclear materials that one day we
will regret it.
I think this is a big mistake to cut off the money that needs to be
done to do that, and I urge my colleagues to vote against the
amendment.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the gentleman from California [Mr.
Dellums] is recognized for 5 minutes as the ranking minority member.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield to my distinguished colleague from
California [Mr. Farr].
Mr. FARR of California. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for
yielding. We have a clear choice tonight. We have a clear choice to
continue along with cutting out the nuclear arsenal that the Soviet
Union has built up. It would be foolish not to continue dismantling
that.
This program is the cooperative threat for reduction. It funds
support of physical elimination of hundreds of nuclear weapons and
silos and bombers and submarines from which weapons can be launched. If
we do not dismantle them, they stay there, and if they stay there, what
can they be used for? This is an easy vote. It is a vote against this
amendment to support the dismantling. If they are there, they can be
sold and used for purposes that would not be in our national interests.
Continue our national interests by opposing this amendment.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, in the remaining time that I have, and I
will move very quickly, first, a letter to the Speaker of the House
from the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Cohen, I read in part:
One of the administration's highest priorities is to
prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
particularly from Russia and other states of the former
Soviet Union. The CTR program is one of the most critical
parts of that effort. Congress would do serious harm to our
counter-proliferation programs if it denied DOD the use of
CTR funds to reduce weapons of mass destruction in Russia
that stem the threat of their proliferation because of
Russia's short-range transfers. This does not mean that the
administration condones such transfers. On the contrary, we
are waging a vigorous campaign on all fronts to prevent
weapons proliferation. However, it would be folly to respond
to an instance of proliferation by removing an essential
counter-proliferation tool.
Secondly, just to reiterate a point made by my distinguished
colleague from South Carolina, nuclear warheads deactivated, 4,500;
ICBMs destroyed, 81; ICBM silos eliminated, 125; bombers destroyed, 20;
SLBM launchers eliminated, 64; nuclear warhead test terminals sealed,
58. Three states of the former Soviet Union denuclearized, Mr.
Chairman. In 1991 the four states, nuclear states in the former Soviet
Union had a total of 10,910 missiles. Today, there are 6,705.
Finally, the United States has a direct and powerful and urgent
interest in assisting the Russians in continuing to dismantle their
nuclear weapons and contain their nuclear materials. The CTR investment
is a pennies on the dollar investment in enhancing U.S. national
security.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, whatever policy objections we may have to the
Russian PCR technical weapons transfers, it does not justify, nor
warrant, terminating a successful program calculated to meet U.S.
strategic objectives.
For all of those reasons and those enunciated by my distinguished
colleagues who have spoken in opposition to this amendment, I urge my
colleagues to oppose the amendment.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr.
Spence], as chairman of the committee, is entitled to 5 minutes.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I will not use the whole 5 minutes. I yield
to the gentleman from California [Mr. Hunter].
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I rise on behalf of the Solomon-Rohrabacher
amendment. Let me just remind my colleagues, the reason why this is a
reasonable amendment is simply this: All of the reductions in Soviet
weaponry that the gentleman enumerated have been agreed to by the
Soviet Union as part of our arms reductions talks. The Soviets agreed
to do those reductions on their own with their own taxpayer dollars.
They do not necessarily have a right to our money; we are giving them a
great deal of money, which is perhaps a good thing, to effectuate these
reductions.
In light of the money that we are giving the Soviet Union, the
hundreds of millions of dollars, is it reasonable for us to ask them at
the same time to refrain from giving a very effective ship-killing
capability to China? I think, in light of the enormous dollars we have
given them, this is a reasonable request to make to the Russians. And
because of that, I strongly support the Solomon-Rohrabacher amendment.
This is reasonable; this is judicious, let us do it.
The CHAIRMAN. All time has expired.
The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from
California [Mr. Rohrabacher].
The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes
appeared to have it.
recorded vote
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 215,
noes 206, not voting 13, as follows:
[Roll No 230]
AYES--215
Aderholt
Archer
Armey
Bachus
Baker
Ballenger
Barcia
Barr
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Barton
Bass
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop
Bliley
Boehner
Bonilla
Bono
Brady
Bryant
Bunning
Burr
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Calvert
Camp
Campbell
Canady
Cannon
Carson
Castle
Chabot
Chambliss
Chenoweth
Christensen
Coble
Coburn
Collins
Combest
Condit
Cook
Cooksey
Costello
Crane
Crapo
Cubin
Cunningham
Danner
Davis (VA)
Deal
DeLay
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Doolittle
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Ehlers
Ehrlich
Emerson
English
Ensign
Everett
Ewing
Fawell
Foley
Forbes
Fowler
Fox
Franks (NJ)
Gallegly
Ganske
Gekas
Gibbons
Gillmor
Gilman
Goode
Goodlatte
Goodling
Goss
Granger
Greenwood
Gutknecht
Hall (OH)
Hall (TX)
Hansen
Hastings (WA)
Hayworth
Hefley
Herger
Hill
Hilleary
Hobson
Hoekstra
Hostettler
Hulshof
Hunter
Hutchinson
Inglis
Istook
Jenkins
Johnson, Sam
Jones
Kaptur
Kasich
Kelly
Kim
Kingston
Klug
Knollenberg
LaHood
Largent
Latham
LaTourette
Lazio
[[Page H4201]]
Leach
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Livingston
LoBiondo
Lucas
Manzullo
McCollum
McCrery
McHugh
McInnis
McIntyre
McKeon
McNulty
Metcalf
Mica
Miller (FL)
Molinari
Moran (KS)
Myrick
Nethercutt
Neumann
Ney
Northup
Norwood
Nussle
Packard
Pappas
Parker
Pascrell
Pastor
Paul
Paxon
Pease
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pickering
Pitts
Pombo
Portman
Poshard
Pryce (OH)
Quinn
Radanovich
Ramstad
Redmond
Regula
Riggs
Riley
Rogan
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Roukema
Royce
Ryun
Salmon
Sanford
Saxton
Scarborough
Schaefer, Dan
Schaffer, Bob
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shadegg
Shaw
Shimkus
Skeen
Smith (MI)
Smith (OR)
Smith (TX)
Smith, Linda
Snowbarger
Solomon
Souder
Spence
Stearns
Stenholm
Stump
Sununu
Talent
Tauzin
Taylor (NC)
Thomas
Thune
Tiahrt
Traficant
Upton
Walsh
Wamp
Watkins
Watts (OK)
Weldon (FL)
Weller
Wicker
Wolf
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
NOES--206
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allen
Andrews
Baesler
Baldacci
Barrett (WI)
Bateman
Becerra
Bentsen
Bereuter
Berman
Berry
Blagojevich
Blumenauer
Boehlert
Bonior
Borski
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd
Brown (CA)
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Capps
Cardin
Clay
Clayton
Clement
Clyburn
Conyers
Coyne
Cramer
Cummings
Davis (IL)
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
Dellums
Deutsch
Dicks
Dingell
Dixon
Doggett
Dooley
Doyle
Edwards
Engel
Eshoo
Etheridge
Evans
Farr
Fattah
Fazio
Filner
Flake
Foglietta
Ford
Frank (MA)
Frelinghuysen
Frost
Furse
Gejdenson
Gephardt
Gilchrest
Gonzalez
Graham
Green
Gutierrez
Hamilton
Harman
Hastert
Hastings (FL)
Hefner
Hilliard
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Holden
Hooley
Horn
Hoyer
Hyde
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
John
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (WI)
Johnson, E.B.
Kanjorski
Kennedy (MA)
Kennedy (RI)
Kennelly
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kind (WI)
King (NY)
Kleczka
Klink
Kolbe
Kucinich
LaFalce
Lampson
Lantos
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Linder
Lofgren
Lowey
Luther
Maloney (CT)
Manton
Markey
Martinez
Mascara
Matsui
McCarthy (MO)
McCarthy (NY)
McDade
McDermott
McGovern
McHale
McKinney
Meehan
Meek
Menendez
Millender-McDonald
Miller (CA)
Minge
Mink
Moakley
Mollohan
Moran (VA)
Morella
Murtha
Nadler
Neal
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Owens
Oxley
Pallone
Payne
Pelosi
Peterson (MN)
Pickett
Pomeroy
Porter
Price (NC)
Rahall
Rangel
Reyes
Rivers
Rodriguez
Roemer
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sabo
Sanchez
Sanders
Sandlin
Sawyer
Scott
Serrano
Shays
Sherman
Sisisky
Skaggs
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (NJ)
Smith, Adam
Snyder
Spratt
Stabenow
Stark
Stokes
Strickland
Stupak
Tanner
Tauscher
Taylor (MS)
Thompson
Thornberry
Thurman
Tierney
Torres
Turner
Velazquez
Vento
Visclosky
Waters
Watt (NC)
Waxman
Weldon (PA)
Wexler
Weygand
White
Whitfield
Wise
Woolsey
Wynn
NOT VOTING--13
Blunt
Cox
Davis (FL)
Gordon
Houghton
Lipinski
Maloney (NY)
McIntosh
Schiff
Schumer
Shuster
Towns
Yates
{time} 1057
So the amendment was agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
PERSONAL EXPLANATION
Mr. COX of California. Mr. Chairman, I was necessarily absent for
this vote for medical reasons.
Amendments En Bloc Offered by Mr. Spence
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, pursuant to section 3 of House Resolution
169, I offer an en bloc amendment consisting of the following
amendments printed in part 2 of House Report 105-137:
Amendments 2 and 3; Amendments 4 and 5 each as modified; Amendments
6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13; Amendment 14, as modified; Amendment 16
and 17; Amendment 18, as modified; Amendment 19; Amendment 20, as
modified; Amendments 21 and 23; Amendment 24, as modified; Amendments
25 and 26; Amendment 27, as modified; Amendments 28, 29, 30; Amendment
31, as modified; Amendment 32; Amendment 33, as modified; Amendments
36, 37 and 38; Amendment 39, as modified; Amendment 40; and the
Amendment printed in section 8(d) of House Resolution 169, as modified;
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendments en bloc and
report the modifications.
The Clerk designated the amendments and reported the modifications,
as follows:
Amendments en bloc offered by Mr. Spence of South Carolina consisting
of the following amendments in part 2 of House Report 105-137:
Amendment 2, 3; 4, as modified; 5, as modified; 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12,
13; 14, as modified; 16, 17; 18, as modified; 19; 20, as modified; 21,
23; 24, as modified; 25, 26; 27, as modified; 28, 29, 30; 31, as
modified; 32; 33 as modified; 36, 37, 38; 39, as modified; 40; and the
amendment in order under section 8(d) of House Resolution 169, as
modified.
Amendments En Bloc to H.R. 1119, as Reported
Offered by Mr. Spence
of South Carolina
(Amdts in Part 2 of House Report 105-137)
Amendment #2
Amendment #3
Amendment #4, as modified
Amendment #5, as modified
Amendment #6
Amendment #7
Amendment #8
Amendment #9
Amendment #10
Amendment #11
Amendment #12
Amendment #13
Amendment #14, as modified
Amendment #16
Amendment #17
Amendment #18, as modified
Amendment #19
Amendment #20, as modified
Amendment #21
Amendment #23
Amendment #24, as modified
Amendment #25
Amendment #26
Amendment #27, as modified
Amendment #28
Amendment #29
Amendment #30
Amendment #31, as modified
Amendment #32
Amendment #33, as modified
Amendment #36
Amendment #37
Amendment #38
Amendment #39, as modified
Amendment #40
Amendment in order under section 8(d) of H.Res. 169, as modified
Amendment to H.R. 1119, as Reported
Offered by Mr. Barrett of Nebraska
(Amdt #2 in Part 2 of House Report 105-137)
At the end of title X (page 360, after line 8) insert the
following new section:
SEC. 1060. STUDY OF UNITED STATES CAPACITOR AND RESISTOR
INDUSTRIES.
The Secretary of Defense shall conduct a study to assess
the capacitor and resistor industries in the United States in
order to determine--
(1) the importance of such industries to the national
defense and the defense mobilization base; and
(2) whether such industries are in danger of being
critically weakened because of the removal of tariffs on
imports under the Information Technology Agreement.
Amendment to H.R. 1119, as Reported
Offered by Mr. Bartlett of Maryland
(Amdt #3 in part 2 of House Report 105-137)
Strike out section 217 (page 33, lines 13 through 23).
Modification to the Amendment Offered by Mr. Bereuter of Nebraska
(Amdt #4 in Part 2 of House Report 105-137)
The amendment as modified is as follows:
At the end of title XII (page 379, after line 19), insert
the following new section:
SEC. 1205. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS RELATING TO LEVEL OF UNITED
STATES MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE ASIA AND
PACIFIC REGION.
(a) Findings.--The Congress finds the following:
(1) The stability of the Asia-Pacific region is a matter of
vital national interest affecting the well-being of all
Americans.
(2) The nations of the Pacific Rim collectively represent
the United States largest trading partner and are expected to
account for almost one-third of the world's economic activity
by the start of the next century.
(3) The increased reliance by the United States on trade
and Middle East oil sources has reinforced United States
security interests in the Southeast Asia shipping lanes
through the South China Sea and the key straits of Malacca,
Sunda, Lombok, and Makassar.
(4) The South China Sea is a vital conduit for United
States Navy ships passing from the Pacific to the Indian
Ocean and the Persian Gulf.
(5) Maintaining freedom of navigation in the South China
Sea is a fundamental interest of the United States.
(6) The threats of proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, the emerging nationalism amidst long-standing
ethnic and national rivalries, and the unresolved territorial
disputes combine to create a political
[[Page H4202]]
landscape of potential instability and conflict in this
region that would jeopardize the interests of the United
States and the safety of United States nationals.
(7) A critical component of the East Asia strategy of the
United States is maintaining forward deployed forces in Asia
to ensure broad regional stability, to help to deter
aggression, to lessen the pressure for arms races, and to
contribute to the political and economic advances of the
region from which the United States benefits.
(8) The forward presence of the United States in Northeast
Asia enables the United States to respond to regional
contingencies, to protect sea lines of communication, to
sustain influence, and to support operations as distant as
operations in the Persian Gulf.
(9) The military forces of the United States serve to
prevent the political or economic control of the Asia-Pacific
region by a rival, hostile power or coalition of such powers,
thus preventing any such group from obtaining control over
the vast resources, enormous wealth, and advanced technology
of the region.
(10) Allies of the United States in the region can base
their defense planning on a reliable American security
commitment, a reduction of which could stimulate an arms
buildup in the region.
(11) The Joint Announcement of the United States-Japan
Security Consultative Committee of December 1996,
acknowledged that ``the forward presence of U.S. forces
continues to be an essential element for pursuing our common
security objectives''.
(12) The administration has committed itself on numerous
occasions to maintain approximately 100,000 troops in the
region, most recently by the President in Australia, the
Secretary of Defense in the Quadrennial Defense Review, and
the Secretary of State in the Republic of Korea.
(13) The United States and Japan signed the United States-
Japan Security Declaration in April 1996, in which the United
States reaffirmed its commitment to maintain this level of
100,000 United States military personnel in the region.
(14) The United States military presence is recognized by
the nations of the region as serving stability and signaling
United States engagement.
(15) The nations of East Asia and the Pacific consider the
commitment of the forces of the United States to be so vital
to their future that they scrutinize actions of the United
States for any sign of weakened commitment to the security of
the region.
(16) The reduction of forward-based military forces could
negatively affect the ability of the United States to
contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability of the
Asia and Pacific region.
(17) Recognizing that while the United States must consider
the overall capabilities of its forces in its decisions to
deploy troops, nevertheless any reduction in the number of
forward-based troops may reduce the perception of American
capability and commitment in the region that cannot be
completely offset by modernization of the remaining forces.
(18) During time of crisis, redeployment of forces
previously removed from the area might itself be deemed an
act of provocation that could be used as a pretext by a
hostile power for armed aggression within the region, and the
existence of that possibility might hinder such a deployment.
(19) Proposals to reduce the forward presence of the United
States in Asia or drastically subordinate security interests
to United States domestic budgetary concerns can erode the
perception of the commitment of the United States to its
alliances and interests in the region.
(b) Sense of the Congress.--It is the sense of the Congress
that the United States should maintain approximately 100,000
United States military personnel in the Asia and Pacific
region until such time as there is a peaceful and permanent
resolution to the major security and political conflicts in
the region.
Modification to the Amendment Offered by Mr. Brady of Texas
(Amdt #5 in Part 2 of House Report 105-137)
The amendment as modified is as follows:
At the end of title X (page 360, after line 8), insert the
following new section:
SEC. __. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES
ARMED FORCES ABROAD FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
PRESERVATION ACTIVITIES.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
United States Armed Forces should not be deployed outside the
United States to provide assistance to another nation in
connection with environmental preservation activities in that
nation.
(b) Scope of Section.--For purposes of this section,
environmental preservation activities do not include
activities undertaken for humanitarian purposes, disaster
relief activities, peacekeeping activities, or operational
training activities.
Amendment to H.R. 1119, as Reported
Offered by Mr. Buyer of Indiana
(Amdt #6 in Part 2 of House Report 105-137)
At the end of subtitle B of title VI (page 247, after line
13), insert the following new section:
SEC. 623. EXPANSION OF RESERVE AFFILIATION BONUS TO INCLUDE
COAST GUARD RESERVE.
Section 308e of title 37, United States Code, is amended--
(1) in subsection (a), by striking out ``Under regulations
prescribed by the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of a
military department'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``The
Secretary concerned'';
(2) in subsection (b)(3), by striking out ``designated by
the Secretary of Defense for the purposes of this section''
and inserting in lieu thereof ``designated for purposes of
this section in the regulations prescribed under subsection
(f)'';
(3) in subsection (c)(3), by striking out ``regulations
prescribed by the Secretary of Defense'' and inserting in
lieu thereof ``the regulations prescribed under subsection
(f)''; and
(4) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(f) This section shall be administered under regulations
prescribed by the Secretary of Defense for the armed forces
under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Defense and by the
Secretary of Transportation for the Coast Guard when the
Coast Guard is not operating as a service in the Navy.''.
Amendment to H.R. 1119, As Reported
Offered by Mr. Coburn of Oklahoma
(Amdt #7 in Part 2 of House Report 105-137)
At the end of subtitle A of title X (page 320, after line
12), add the following new section:
SEC. 1008. UNITED STATES MAN AND THE BIOSPHERE PROGRAM
LIMITATION.
No funds appropriated pursuant to this Act shall be used
for the United States Man and Biosphere Program, or related
projects.
Amendment to H.R. 1119, as Reported
Offered by Mr. Everett of Alabama
(Amdt #8 in part 2 of House Report 105-137)
At the end of subtitle B of title II (page 34, after line
7) insert the following new section:
SEC. 219. COMANCHE PROGRAM.
The Congress supports the Army in its Comanche program
technology transfer and acquisition efforts, which--
(1) offer potential RAH-66 Air Vehicle and T800 engine
cost, schedule, and technical risk reduction; and
(2) include cooperative efforts with other Government
agencies such as the National Guard (UH-1H engine technology
insertion), the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency,
and other research and development programs of the military
departments.
Amendment to H.R. 1119, as Reported
Offered by Mr. Faleomavaega of American Samoa
(Amdt #9 in Part 2 of House Report 105-137)
At the end of title V (page 204, after line 16), insert the
following new section:
SEC. 572. REPORT ON MAKING UNITED STATES NATIONALS ELIGIBLE
FOR PARTICIPATION IN SENIOR RESERVE OFFICERS'
TRAINING CORPS.
(a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit
to the Committee on National Security of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Armed Services of the
Senate a report on the utility of permitting United States
nationals to participate in the Senior Reserve Officers'
Training Corps program.
(b) Required Information.--The Secretary shall include in
the report the following information:
(1) A brief history of the prior admission of United States
nationals to the Senior Reserve Officers' Training Corps,
including the success rate of these cadets and midshipmen and
how that rate compared to the average success rate of cadets
and midshipmen during that same period.
(2) The advantages of permitting United States nationals to
participate in the Senior Reserve Officers' Training Corps
program.
(3) The disadvantages of permitting United States nationals
to participate in the Senior Reserve Officers' Training Corps
program.
(4) The incremental cost of including United States
nationals in the Senior Reserve Officers' Training Corps.
(5) Methods of minimizing the risk that United States
nationals admitted to the Senior Reserve Officers' Training
Corps would be later disqualified because of ineligibility
for United States citizenship.
(6) The recommendations of the Secretary on whether United
States nationals should be eligible to participate in the
Senior Reserve Officers' Training Corps program, and if so, a
legislative proposal which would, if enacted, achieve that
result.
Amendment to H.R. 1119, as Reported
Offered by Mr. Frelinghuysen of New Jersey
(Amdt #10 in Part 2 of House Report 105-137)
At the end of title XXXVI (page 540, after line 3), insert
the following new section:
SEC. __. DETERMINATION OF GROSS TONNAGE FOR PURPOSES OF TANK
VESSEL DOUBLE HULL REQUIREMENTS.
Section 3703a of title 46, United States Code, is amended
by adding at the end the following:
``(e) For purposes of this section, the gross tonnage of a
vessel for which a tonnage certificate was issued or accepted
by the Secretary under this title before July 1, 1997, shall
be the gross tonnage of the vessel stated on the most recent
such certificate.''.
Amendment to H.R. 1119, as Reported
Offered by Mr. Farr of California
(Amdt #11 in Part 2 of House Report 105-137)
Page 411, in the table in section 2702(b) relating to
extension of Army National Guard project authorizations, add
an item, in the amount of $3,910,000, for the modify record
fire range/maintenance shop construction project at Camp
Roberts, California.
[[Page H4203]]
Amendment to H.R. 1119, as Reported
Offered by Mrs. Fowler of Florida
(Amdt #12 in Part 2 of House Report 105-137)
Page 377, after line 4, insert the following:
(4) Efforts by the People's Republic of China to enhance
its capabilities in the area nuclear weapons development.
Page 377, after line 16, insert the following:
(7) Development by the People's Republic of China of
capabilities in the area of electronic warfare.
Page 378, after line 12, insert the following:
(12) Efforts by the People's Republic of China in the area
of telecommunications, including common channel signaling and
synchronous digital hierarchy technologies.
(13) Development by People's Republic of China of advanced
aerospace technologies with military applications (including
gas turbine ``hot section'' technologies).
Page 379, after line 3, insert the following:
(17) Efforts by the People's Republic of China to develop
its anti-submarine warfare capabilities.
Page 379, after line 6, insert the following:
(19) Efforts by the People's Republic of China to enhance
its capabilities in such additional areas of strategic
concern as the Secretary identifies.
(c) Analysis of Implications of Sales of Products and
Technologies to Entities in China.--The report under
subsection (a) shall include, with respect to each area for
analyses and forecasts specified in subsection (b)--
(1) an assessment of the implications of sales of United
States and foreign products and technologies to entities in
the People's Republic of China; and
(2) the potential threat of developments in that area to
United States strategic interests.
Redesignate the paragraphs of section 1203(b) accordingly.
Page 379, line 7, strike out ``(c)'' and insert in lieu
thereof ``(d)''.
Amendment to H.R. 1119, as Reported
Offered by Mr. Fox of Pennsylvania
(Amdt #13 in Part 2 of House Report 105-137)
At the end of section 1054 (page 348, after line 18),
insert the following new subsection:
(j) Daily Display of Flag at Department of Veterans Affairs
Medical Centers.--In addition to the display required by
subsection (a), the POW/MIA flag shall be displayed on, or on
the grounds of, each Department of Veterans Affairs medical
center on every day on which the flag of the United States is
displayed.
Modification to the Amendment Offered by Mr. Fox of Pennsylvania
(Amdt #14 in Part 2 of House Report 105-137)
The amendment as modified is as follows:
At the end of subtitle C of title III (page 67, after line
19), insert the following new section:
SEC. 323. VETERANS' PREFERENCE STATUS FOR CERTAIN VETERANS
WHO SERVED ON ACTIVE DUTY DURING THE PERSIAN
GULF WAR.
(a) Definition of Veteran for Purposes of Preference
Eligible Status.--Section 2108 of title 5, United States
Code, is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1)--
(A) by striking ``or'' at the end of subparagraph (A);
(B) by inserting ``or'' at the end of subparagraph (B); and
(C) by inserting after subparagraph (B) the following new
subparagraph:
``(C) served on active duty as defined by section 101(21)
of title 38 in the armed forces during the period beginning
on August 2, 1990, and ending on January 2, 1992;''; and
(2) in paragraph (3)(B), by inserting ``or (C)'' after
``paragraph (1)(B)''.
(b) Additional Points.--Section 3309(2) of such title is
amended by striking ``2108(3)(A)'' and inserting
``2108(3)(A)-(B)''.
(c) Technical Amendments.--Section 2108(1)(B) of such title
is further amended--
(1) by striking ``the date of enactment of the Veterans'
Education and Employment Assistance Act of 1976,'' and
inserting ``October 15, 1976,''; and
(2) by striking ``511(d) of title 10'' and inserting
``12103(d) of title 10''.
Amendment to H.R. 1119, as Reported
Offered by Mr. Gallegly of California
(Amdt #16 in Part 2 of House Report 105-137)
At the end of title X (page 360, after line 8), insert the
following new section:
SEC. __. STUDY OF TRANSFER OF MODULAR AIRBORNE FIRE FIGHTING
SYSTEM.
Not later than six months after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with
the Secretary of Agriculture, shall submit to Congress a
report evaluating the feasibility of transferring
jurisdiction over units of the Modular Airborne Fire Fighting
System from the Department of Agriculture to the Department
of Defense.
Amendment to H.R. 1119, as Reported
Offered by Mr. Gekas of Pennsylvania
(Amdt #17 in Part 2 of House Report 105-137)
Page 411, in the table in section 2702(b) relating to
extension of Army National Guard project authorizations, add
an item, in the amount of $6,200,000, for a barracks
construction project at Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania.
Modification to the Amendment Offered by Mr. Hall of Ohio
(Amdt #18 in Part 2 of House Report 105-137)
The amendment as modified is as follows:
At the end of title XXXI (page 493, after line 17), add the
following new section:
SEC. 3152. TRANSFERS OF REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY AT CERTAIN
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY FACILITIES.
(a) Transfer Guidelines.--(1) The Secretary of Energy shall
issue guidelines for the transfer by sale or lease of real
and personal property at Department of Energy defense nuclear
facilities in consultation with the community reuse
organizations associated with the facilities and the local
governments within whose jurisdiction the facilities are
located. The Secretary shall issue the guidelines not later
than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(2)(A) The Secretary of Energy may not transfer real or
personal property under the guidelines issued under paragraph
(1) until--
(i) the Secretary submits a notification of the proposed
transfer to the congressional defense committees; and
(ii) a period of 30 days of continuous session of Congress
has expired following the date on which the notification is
submitted.
(B) For purposes of subparagraph (A)(ii), the continuity of
a session of Congress is broken only by an adjournment of the
Congress sine die, and the days on which either House is not
in session because of an adjournment of more than three days
to a day certain are excluded in the computation of such 30-
day period.
(b) Indemnification.--(1) In the sale or lease of real or
personal property pursuant to the guidelines issued under
subsection (a), the Secretary of Energy may indemnify a
transferee against an action for injury to person or property
resulting from the release or threatened release of a
hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant as a result
of Department of Energy activities. Before such a sale or
lease, the Secretary shall notify the transferee that the
Secretary has authority to provide indemnification to the
transferee under this subsection. The Secretary shall include
in an agreement for such a sale or lease a provision
addressing indemnification for such an action.
(2) Nothing in this section shall be construed as affecting
or modifying in any way section 120(h) of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980 (42 U.S.C. 9620(h)).
(c) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) The term ``Department of Energy defense nuclear
facility'' has the meaning provided by section 318 of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2286g).
(2) The term ``transferee'' means a person to which real
property is transferred pursuant to the guidelines issued
under subsection (a).
(3) The terms ``hazardous substance'', ``release'', and
``pollutant or contaminant'' have the meanings provided by
section 101 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. 9601).
Amendment to H.R. 1119, as Reported
Offered by Mr. Hastert of Illinois
(Amdt #19 in Part 2 of House Report 105-137)
At the end of subtitle C of title X (page 326, after line
6), insert the following new section:
SEC. 1032. ANNUAL REPORT ON DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF
NARCOTICS DETECTION TECHNOLOGIES.
(a) Report Requirement.--Not later than December 1st of
each year, the Director of the Office of National Drug
Control Policy shall submit to Congress and the President a
report on the development and deployment of narcotics
detection technologies by Federal agencies. Each such report
shall be prepared in consultation with the Secretary of
Defense, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of
Transportation, and the Secretary of the Treasury.
(b) Matters To Be Included.--Each report under subsection
(a) shall include--
(1) a description of each project implemented by a Federal
agency relating to the development or deployment of narcotics
detection technology;
(2) the agency responsible for each project described in
paragraph (1);
(3) the amount of funds obligated or expended to carry out
each project described in paragraph (1) during the fiscal
year in which the report is submitted or during any fiscal
year preceding the fiscal year in which the report is
submitted;
(4) the amount of funds estimated to be obligated or
expended for each project described in paragraph (1) during
any fiscal year after the fiscal year in which the report is
submitted to Congress; and
(5) a detailed timeline for implementation of each project
described in paragraph (1).
Modification to the Amendment Offered by Mr. Hastings of Washington
(Amdt #20 in Part 2 of House Report 105-137)
The amendment as modified is as follows:
At the end of title XXXI (page 493, after line 17), insert
the following new section:
SEC. 3152. REQUIREMENT TO DELEGATE CERTAIN AUTHORITIES TO
SITE MANAGER OF HANFORD RESERVATION.
Section 3173(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104-201; 110 Stat. 2848; 42
U.S.C. 7274k) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking out ``In addition'' and
inserting in lieu thereof ``Except as provided in paragraph
(5), in addition''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(5) In the case of the Hanford Reservation, Richland,
Washington, the Secretary
[[Page H4204]]
shall delegate to the Site Manager the authority described in
paragraph (1). The Secretary may withdraw the delegated
authority if the Secretary--
``(A) determines that the Site Manager of the Hanford
Reservation has misused or misapplied that authority; and
``(B) the Secretary submits to Congress a notification of
the Secretary's intent to withdraw the authority.''.
Amendment to H.R. 1119, as Reported
Offered by Mr. Hastings of Washington
(Amdt #21 in Part 2 of House Report 105-137)
Strike out section 3143 (page 484, line 10 through page
485, line 16) and insert in lieu thereof the following:
SEC. 3143. STUDY AND FUNDING RELATING TO IMPLEMENTATION OF
WORKFORCE RESTRUCTURING PLANS.
(a) Study Requirement.--The Secretary of Energy shall
conduct a study on the effects of workforce restructuring
plans for defense nuclear facilities developed pursuant to
section 3161 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1993 (42 U.S.C. 7274h).
(b) Matters Covered by Study.-- The study shall cover the
four-year period preceding the date of the enactment of this
Act and shall include the following:
(1) An analysis of the number of jobs created under
workforce restructuring plans developed pursuant to section
3161 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1993 (42 U.S.C. 7274h).
(2) An analysis of other benefits provided pursuant to such
plans and through community reuse organizations.
(3) A description of the funds expended, and the funds
obligated but not expended, pursuant to such plans as of the
date of the report.
(4) A description of the criteria used since October 23,
1992, in providing assistance pursuant to such plans.
(5) A comparison of the benefits provided pursuant to such
plans--
(A) to employees whose employment at facilities covered by
such plans is terminated; and
(B) to employees whose employment at facilities where more
than 50 percent of the revenues are derived from contracts
with the Department of Defense is terminated.
(c) Conduct of Study.--(1) The study shall be conducted
through a contract with a private auditing firm with which
the Department of Energy has no other auditing contracts.
(2)(A) The Secretary of Energy may not enter into the
contract for the conduct of the study until--
(i) the Secretary submits a notification of the proposed
contract award to the congressional defense committees; and
(ii) a period of 30 days of continuous session of Congress
has expired following the date on which the notification is
submitted.
(B) For purposes of subparagraph (A)(ii), the continuity of
a session of Congress is broken only by an adjournment of the
Congress sine die, and the days on which either House is not
in session because of an adjournment of more than three days
to a day certain are excluded in the computation of such 30-
day period.
(3) The Secretary of Energy shall ensure that the firm
conducting the study is provided access to all documents in
the possession of the Department of Energy that are relevant
to the study, including documents in the possession of the
Inspector General of the Department of Energy.
(d) Report on Study.--The Secretary of Energy shall submit
a report to Congress on the results of the study not later
than January 30, 1998.
(e) Funding.--In addition to amounts available pursuant to
the authorization of appropriations in section 3103(6), the
Secretary of Energy may use an amount not exceeding
$44,000,000 for implementation of the workforce restructuring
plans for contractor employees, to be derived from excess
unobligated and available funds.
(f) Revisions to Defense Nuclear Facilities Workforce
Restructuring Plan Requirements.--
(1) Revision of period for notification of changes in
workforce.--Section 3161(c)(1)(B) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 (42 U.S.C.
7274h(c)(1)(B)) is amended by striking out ``120'' and
inserting in lieu thereof ``90''.
(2) Repeal of requirement for submission to congress.--
Subsection (f) of section 3161 of such Act is repealed.
(3) Prohibition on use of funds for local impact
assistance.--None of the funds authorized to be appropriated
to the Department of Energy pursuant to section 3103(6) may
be used for local impact assistance from the Department of
Energy under section 3161(c)(6) of such Act (42 U.S.C.
7274h(c)(6)) until--
(A) with respect to assistance referred to in section
3161(c)(6)(A) of such Act, the Secretary of Energy
coordinates with and obtains approval of the Secretary of
Labor; and
(B) with respect to assistance referred to in section
3161(c)(6)(C) of such Act, the Secretary of Energy
coordinates with and obtains approval of the Secretary of
Commerce.
(4) Semiannual report to congress of local impact
assistance.--Every six months the Secretary of Energy shall
submit to Congress a report setting forth a description of,
and the value of, all local impact assistance provided under
section 3161(c)(6) of such Act.
(g) Effect on USEC Privatization Act.--Nothing in this
section shall be construed as diminishing the obligations of
the Secretary of Energy under section 3110(a)(5) of the USEC
Privatization Act (Public Law 104-134; 110 Stat. 1321-341; 42
U.S.C. 2297h-8(a)(5)).
(h) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) The term ``defense nuclear facility'' has the meaning
provided the term ``Department of Energy defense nuclear
facility'' in section 3163 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 ( Public Law 102-484;
42 U.S.C. 7274j).
(2) The term ``contractor employee'' means an employee of a
contractor or subcontractor of the Department of Energy at a
defense nuclear facility.
Amendment to H.R. 1119, as Reported
Offered by Ms. Eddie Bernice Johnson of Texas
(Amdt #23 in Part 2 of House Report 105-137)
At the end of subtitle C of title V (page 142, after line
3), insert the following new section:
SEC. 524. REPORT ON FEASIBILITY AND DESIRABILITY OF
CONVERSION OF AGR PERSONNEL TO MILITARY
TECHNICIANS (DUAL-STATUS).
(a) Report Required.--Not later than January 1, 1998, the
Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report on the
feasibility and desirability of conversion of AGR personnel
to military technicians (dual-status). The report shall--
(1) identify advantages and disadvantages of such a
conversion;
(2) identify possible savings if such a conversion were to
be carried out; and
(3) set forth the recommendation of the Secretary as to
whether such a conversion should be made.
(b) AGR Personnel Defined.--For purposes of subsection (a),
the term ``AGR personnel'' means members of the Army or Air
Force reserve components who are on active duty (other than
for training) in connection with organizing, administering,
recruiting, instructing, or training their respective reserve
components.
Modification to the Amendment Offered by Mr. Metcalf of Washington
(Amdt #24 in Part 2 of House Report 105-137)
The amendment as modified is as follows:
At the end of title VII (page 288, after line 21), insert
the following new section:
SEC. __. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONCERNING GULF WAR ILLNESS.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Americans served in the Persian Gulf Conflict of 1991
in defense of vital national security interests of the United
States.
(2) It was known to United States intelligence and military
commanders that biological and chemical agents were in
theater throughout the conflict.
(3) An undetermined amount of these agents were released
into theater.
(4) A large number of United States military veterans and
allied veterans who served in the Southwest Asia theater of
operations have been stricken with a variety of severe
illnesses.
(5) Previous efforts to discern the causes of those
illnesses have been inadequate, and those illnesses are
affecting the health of both veterans and their families.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
all promising technology and treatments relating to Gulf War
illnesses should be fully explored and tested to facilitate
treatment for members of the Armed Forces and veterans who
served the United States in the Persian Gulf conflict and are
stricken with unexplainable illness.
Amendment to H.R. 1119, as Reported
Offered by Mr. Pickett of Virginia
(Amdt #25 in part 2 of House Report 105-137)
At the end of subtitle B of title II (page 34, after line
7), insert the following new section:
SEC. 219. LAND ATTACK STANDARD MISSILE.
Of the amount provided in section 201(2) for research,
development, test, and evaluation for the Navy--
(1) the amount available for program element 63695N for the
Land Attack Technology program is increased by $10,000,000,
to be available for flight test demonstration and risk
reduction activities for the Land Attack Standard Missile;
(2) the amount available for program element 62317N (Air
Systems and Weapons Advance Technology) is reduced by
$5,000,000; and
(3) the amount available for program element 63508N (Ship
Hull Mechanical and Electrical Technology) is reduced by
$5,000,000.
Amendment to H.R. 1119, as Reported
Offered by Mr. Pickett of Virginia
(Amdt #26 in part 2 of House Report 105-137)
At the end of title VIII (page 303, after line 2) insert
the following new section:
SEC. 824. ALLOWABILITY OF COSTS OF EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP
PLANS.
(a) Prohibition.--Under section 2324 of title 10, United
States Code, the Secretary of Defense may not determine the
allowability of costs of employee stock ownership plans under
contracts with the Department of Defense in accordance with
the rule described in subsection (b).
(b) Rule.--The rule referred to in subsection (a) is the
rule that was--
(1) proposed by the Civilian Agency Acquisition Council and
the Defense Acquisition Regulations Council on November 7,
1995, and referred to as FAR Case 92-024, Employee Stock
Ownership Plans (60 Federal Register 56216); and
(2) withdrawn by such Councils on April 3, 1996 (61 Federal
Register 14944).
[[Page H4205]]
Modification
to the Amendment to H.R. 1119, as Reported
Offered by Mr. Riley of Alabama
(Amdt #27 in part 2 of House Report 105-137)
The amendment as modified is as follows:
At the end of subtitle B of title II (page 34, after line
7) insert the following new section:
SEC. 219. REPORT ON OPERATIONAL FIELD ASSESSMENTS PROGRAM.
(a) Finding.--Congress recognizes the potential value that
the Department of Defense Operational Field Assessments
program, which is managed by the Director of Operational Test
and Evaluation, provides to the commanders of the Unified
Combatant Commands with respect to assessment of the
effectiveness of near-term operational concepts and critical
operational issues in quick-response operational tests and
evaluations.
(b) Report.--Not later than March 30, 1998, the Secretary
of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense
committees a report on the Operational Field Assessments
program.
(c) Content of Report.--The report shall contain the
following:
(1) A review of the Operational Field Assessments program
which describes the goals and objectives of the program,
assessments by the program conducted as of the date of the
submission of the report, and the results of those
assessments.
(2) A description of the current management and support
structure of the program within the Department of Defense,
including a description of how program responsibilities are
assigned within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and a
description of the roles of the Joint Staff, the commanders
of the Unified Combatant Commands, and the military
departments.
(3) A description of future plans for the program and
funding requirements for those plans.
(4) Recommendations regarding additional statutory
authority that may be required for the program.
Amendment to H.R. 1119, as Reported
Offered by Mr. Saxton of New Jersey
(Amdt #28 in Part 2 of House Report 105-137)
Strike out title XXIX (page 442, line 15, through page 457,
line 13), and insert in lieu thereof the following new title:
TITLE XXIX--SIKES ACT IMPROVEMENT
SEC. 2901. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the ``Sikes Act Improvement
Amendments of 1997''.
SEC. 2902. DEFINITION OF SIKES ACT FOR PURPOSES OF
AMENDMENTS.
In this title, the term ``Sikes Act'' means the Act
entitled ``An Act to promote effectual planning, development,
maintenance, and coordination of wildlife, fish, and game
conservation and rehabilitation in military reservations'',
approved September 15, 1960 (16 U.S.C. 670a et seq.),
commonly referred to as the ``Sikes Act''.
SEC. 2903. CODIFICATION OF SHORT TITLE OF ACT.
The Sikes Act (16 U.S.C. 670a et seq.) is amended by
inserting before title I the following new section:
``SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
``This Act may be cited as the `Sikes Act'.''.
SEC. 2904. INTEGRATED NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PLANS.
(a) Plans Required.--Subsection (a) of section 101 of the
Sikes Act (16 U.S.C. 670a) is amended to read as follows:
``(a) Integrated Natural Resources Management Plans.--
``(1) Plans required.--The Secretary of Defense shall carry
out a program to provide for the conservation and
rehabilitation of natural resources on military
installations. To facilitate the program, the Secretary of
each military department shall prepare and implement an
integrated natural resources management plan for each
military installation in the United States under the
jurisdiction of the Secretary, unless the Secretary
determines that the absence of significant natural resources
on a particular installation makes preparation of such a plan
inappropriate.
``(2) Cooperative preparation.--The Secretary of a military
department shall prepare the integrated natural resources
management plans for which the Secretary is responsible in
cooperation with the Secretary of the Interior, acting
through the Director of the Fish and Wildlife Service, and
the head of the appropriate State fish and wildlife agency or
agencies for the State in which the military installation
involved is located. The resulting plan for a military
installation consistent with paragraph (4) shall reflect the
mutual agreement of the parties concerning conservation,
protection, and management of fish and wildlife resources.
``(3) Purpose of plans.--Consistent with the use of
military installations to ensure the preparedness of the
Armed Forces, the Secretaries of the military departments
shall carry out the program required by this subsection to
provide for--
``(A) the conservation and rehabilitation of natural
resources on military installations;
``(B) the sustained multipurpose use of these resources, to
include hunting, fishing, trapping, and nonconsumptive uses;
and
``(C) subject to safety requirements and military security,
public access to military installations to facilitate these
uses.
``(4) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this Act shall be
construed as modifying or repealing the provisions of any
Federal law governing the conservation or protection of fish
and wildlife resources, nor as enlarging or diminishing the
responsibility and authority of the States for the protection
and management of fish and resident wildlife. Except as
elsewhere specifically provided in this section and section
102, nothing in this Act shall be construed as authorizing
the Secretary of a military department to require a Federal
license or permit to hunt, fish, or trap on a military
installation.
(b) Conforming Amendments.--Title I of the Sikes Act is
amended--
(1) in section 101(b)(4) (16 U.S.C. 670a(b)(4)), by
striking out ``cooperative plan'' each place it appears and
inserting in lieu thereof ``integrated natural resource
management plan'';
(2) in section 101(c) (16 U.S.C. 670a(c)), in the matter
preceding paragraph (1) by striking out ``a cooperative
plan'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``an integrated natural
resource management plan'';
(3) in section 101(d) (16 U.S.C. 670a(d)), in the matter
preceding paragraph (1) by striking out ``cooperative plans''
and inserting in lieu thereof ``integrated natural resource
management plans'';
(4) in section 101(e) (16 U.S.C. 670a(e)), by striking out
``Cooperative plans'' and inserting in lieu thereof
``Integrated natural resource management plans'';
(5) in section 102 (16 U.S.C. 670b), by striking out ``a
cooperative plan'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``an
integrated natural resource management plan'';
(6) in section 103 (16 U.S.C. 670c), by striking out ``a
cooperative plan'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``an
integrated natural resource management plan'';
(7) in section 106(a) (16 U.S.C. 670f(a)), by striking out
``cooperative plans'' and inserting in lieu thereof
``integrated natural resource management plans''; and
(8) in section 106(c) (16 U.S.C. 670f(c)), by striking out
``cooperative plans'' and inserting in lieu thereof
``integrated natural resource management plans''.
(c) Contents of Plans.--Section 101(b) of the Sikes Act (16
U.S.C. 670a(b)) is amended--
(1) by striking out ``Each cooperative plan'' and all that
follows through paragraph (1) and inserting in lieu thereof
the following:
``(b) Required Elements of Plans.--Consistent with the use
of military installations to ensure the preparedness of the
Armed Forces, each integrated natural resources management
plan prepared under subsection (a)--
``(1) shall, where appropriate and applicable, provide
for--
``(A) fish and wildlife management, land management, forest
management, and fish and wildlife-oriented recreation;
``(B) fish and wildlife habitat enhancement or
modifications;
``(C) wetland protection, enhancement, and restoration,
where necessary for support of fish or wildlife;
``(D) integration of, and consistency among, the various
activities conducted under the plan;
``(E) establishment of specific natural resource management
objectives and time frames for proposed action;
``(F) sustained use by the public of natural resources to
the extent such use is not inconsistent with the needs of
fish and wildlife resources management;
``(G) public access to the military installation that is
necessary or appropriate for the use described in
subparagraph (F), subject to requirements necessary to ensure
safety and military security;
``(H) enforcement of natural resource laws and regulations;
``(I) no net loss in the capability of military
installation lands to support the military mission of the
installation; and
``(J) such other activities as the Secretary of the
military department considers appropriate;''
(2) by striking out paragraph (3);
(3) by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (3); and
(4) in paragraph (3)(A) (as so redesignated), by striking
out ``collect the fees therefor,'' and inserting in lieu
thereof ``collect, spend, administer, and account for fees
therefor,''.
SEC. 2905. REVIEW FOR PREPARATION OF INTEGRATED NATURAL
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PLANS.
(a) Review of Military Installations.--
(1) Review.--The Secretary of each military department
shall, by not later than nine months after the date of the
enactment of this Act--
(A) review each military installation in the United States
that is under the jurisdiction of that Secretary to determine
the military installations for which the preparation of an
integrated natural resource management plan under section 101
of the Sikes Act, as amended by this title, is appropriate;
and
(B) submit to the Secretary of Defense a report on those
determinations.
(2) Report to congress.--The Secretary of Defense shall, by
not later than 12 months after the date of the enactment of
this Act, submit to the Congress a report on the reviews
conducted under paragraph (1). The report shall include--
(A) a list of those military installations reviewed under
paragraph (1) for which the Secretary of the military
department concerned determines the preparation of an
integrated natural resource management plan is not
appropriate; and
[[Page H4206]]
(B) for each of the military installations listed under
subparagraph (A), an explanation of the reasons such a plan
is not appropriate.
(b) Deadline for Integrated Natural Resource Management
Plans.--Not later than two years after the date of the
submission of the report required under subsection (a)(2),
the Secretary of each military department shall, for each
military installation for which the Secretary has not
determined under subsection (a)(2)(A) that preparation of an
integrated natural resource management plan is not
appropriate--
(1) prepare and begin implementing such a plan in
accordance with section 101(a) of the Sikes Act, as amended
by section 2904; or
(2) in the case of a military installation for which there
is in effect a cooperative plan under section 101(a) of the
Sikes Act on the day before the date of the enactment of this
Act, complete negotiations with the Secretary of the Interior
and the heads of the appropriate State agencies regarding
changes to that plan that are necessary for the plan to
constitute an integrated natural resource plan that complies
with that section, as amended by section 2904.
(c) Public Comment.--The Secretary of each military
department shall provide an opportunity for the submission of
public comments on--
(1) integrated natural resource management plans proposed
pursuant to subsection (b)(1); and
(2) changes to cooperative plans proposed pursuant to
subsection (b)(2).
SEC. 2906. ANNUAL REVIEWS AND REPORTS.
Section 101 of the Sikes Act (16 U.S.C. 670a) is amended by
adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(f) Reviews and Reports.--
``(1) Secretary of defense.--The Secretary of Defense
shall, by not later than March 1 of each year, review the
extent to which integrated natural resource management plans
were prepared or in effect and implemented in accordance with
this Act in the preceding year, and submit a report on the
findings of that review to the committees. Each report shall
include--
``(A) the number of integrated natural resource management
plans in effect in the year covered by the report, including
the date on which each plan was issued in final form or most
recently revised;
``(B) the amount of moneys expended on conservation
activities conducted pursuant to those plans in the year
covered by the report; and
``(C) an assessment of the extent to which the plans comply
with the requirements of this Act.
``(2) Secretary of the interior.--The Secretary of the
Interior, by not later than March 1 of each year and in
consultation with State agencies responsible for conservation
or management of fish or wildlife, shall submit a report to
the committees on the amount of moneys expended by the
Department of the Interior and those State agencies in the
year covered by the report on conservation activities
conducted pursuant to integrated natural resource management
plans.
``(3) Committees defined.--For purposes of this subsection,
the term `committees' means the Committee on Resources and
the Committee on National Security of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Armed Services and the
Committee on Environment and Public Works of the Senate.''.
SEC. 2907. TRANSFER OF WILDLIFE CONSERVATION FEES FROM CLOSED
MILITARY INSTALLATIONS.
Subsection (b)(3)(B) of section 101(b) of the Sikes Act (16
U.S.C. 670a(b)), as redesignated and amended by section 2904,
is further amended by inserting before the period at the end
the following: ``, unless that military installation is
subsequently closed, in which case the fees may be
transferred to another military installation to be used for
the same purposes''.
SEC. 2908. FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT.
Title I of the Sikes Act (16 U.S.C. 670a et seq.) is
amended--
(1) by redesignating section 106, as amended by section
2904(b), as section 109; and
(2) by inserting after section 105 the following new
section:
``SEC. 106. FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT OF OTHER LAWS.
``All Federal laws relating to the conservation of natural
resources on Federal lands may be enforced by the Secretary
of Defense with respect to violations of those laws that
occur on military installations within the United States.''.
SEC. 2909. NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT SERVICES.
Title I of the Sikes Act (16 U.S.C. 670a et seq.) is
amended by inserting after section 106 (as added by section
2908) the following new section:
``SEC. 107. NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT SERVICES.
``The Secretary of each military department shall ensure,
within available resources, that sufficient numbers of
professionally trained natural resource management personnel
and natural resource law enforcement personnel are available
and assigned responsibility to perform tasks necessary to
comply with this Act, including the preparation and
implementation of integrated natural resource management
plans.''.
SEC. 2910. DEFINITIONS.
Title I of the Sikes Act (16 U.S.C. 670a et seq.) is
amended by inserting after section 107 (as added by section
2909) the following new section:
``SEC. 108. DEFINITIONS.
``In this title:
``(1) Military installation.--(A) The term `military
installation' means any land or interest in land owned by the
United States and administered by the Secretary of Defense or
the Secretary of a military department (except civil works
lands). The term includes all public lands withdrawn from all
forms of appropriation under public land laws and reserved
for use by the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of a
military department.
``(B) The term does not include any lands otherwise covered
by subparagraph (A) that are subject to an approved
recommendation for closure under the Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Act of 1990 (part A of title XXIX of Public Law
101-510; 10 U.S.C. 2687 note).
``(2) State fish and wildlife agency.--The term `State fish
and wildlife agency' means an agency or agencies of State
government that is responsible under State law for managing
fish or wildlife resources.
``(3) United states.--The term `United States' means the
States, the District of Columbia, and the territories and
possessions of the United States.''.
SEC. 2911. COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS.
Section 103a of the Sikes Act (16 U.S.C. 670c-1) is
amended--
(1) in subsection (a) by striking out ``Secretary of
Defense'' and inserting ``Secretary of a military
department'';
(2) by striking out subsection (b) and inserting in lieu
thereof the following new subsection:
``(b) Funds appropriated to the Department of Defense for a
fiscal year may be obligated to cover the cost of goods and
services provided either under a cooperative agreement
entered into under subsection (a) or through an agency
agreement under section 1535 of title 31, United States Code,
during any 18-month period beginning in that fiscal year,
without regard to whether the agreement crosses fiscal
years.''.
SEC. 2912. REPEAL OF SUPERSEDED PROVISION.
Section 2 of the Act of October 27, 1986 (Public Law 99-
651; 16 U.S.C. 670a-1), is repealed.
SEC. 2913. CLERICAL AMENDMENTS.
Title I of the Sikes Act, as amended by this title, is
amended--
(1) in the heading for the title by striking out ``military
reservations'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``military
installations'';
(2) in section 101(b)(3) (16 U.S.C. 670a(b)(3)), as
redesignated and amended by section 2904--
(A) in subparagraph (A), by striking out ``the
reservation'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``the
installation''; and
(B) in subparagraph (B), by striking out ``the military
reservation'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``the military
installation'';
(4) in section 101(c) (16 U.S.C. 670a(c))--
(A) in paragraph (1), by striking out ``a military
reservation'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``a military
installation''; and
(B) in paragraph (2), by striking out ``the reservation''
and inserting in lieu thereof ``the installation'';
(5) in section 102 (16 U.S.C. 670b), by striking out
``military reservations'' and inserting in lieu thereof
``military installations''; and
(6) in section 103 (16 U.S.C. 670c)--
(A) by striking out ``military reservations'' and inserting
in lieu thereof ``military installations''; and
(B) by striking out ``such reservations'' and inserting in
lieu thereof ``such installations''.
SEC. 2914. AUTHORIZATIONS OF APPROPRIATIONS.
(a) Programs on Military Installations.--Subsections (b)
and (c) of section 109 of the Sikes Act (as redesignated by
section 1408) are each amended by striking out ``1983'' and
all that follows through ``1993,'' and inserting in lieu
thereof ``1983 through 2000,''.
(b) Programs on Public Lands.--Section 209 of the Sikes Act
(16 U.S.C. 670o) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a), by striking out ``the sum of
$10,000,000'' and all that follows through ``to enable the
Secretary of the Interior'' and inserting in lieu thereof
``$4,000,000 for each of fiscal years 1998 through 2003, to
enable the Secretary of the Interior''; and
(2) in subsection (b), by striking out ``the sum of
$12,000,000'' and all that follows through ``to enable the
Secretary of Agriculture'' and inserting in lieu thereof
``$5,000,000 for each of fiscal years 1998 through 2003, to
enable the Secretary of Agriculture''.
Amendment to H.R. 1119, as Reported
Offered by Mr. Saxton of New Jersey
(Amdt #29 in Part 2 of House Report 105-137)
Strike out section 2839 (page 434, line 9, through page
435, line 3) and insert in lieu thereof the following new
section:
SEC. 2839. LAND CONVEYANCES, FORT DIX, NEW JERSEY.
(a) Conveyances Authorized.--(1) The Secretary of the Army
may convey, without consideration, to the Borough of
Wrightstown, New Jersey (in this section referred to as the
``Borough''), all right, title, and interest of the United
States in and to a parcel of real property (including
improvements thereon) consisting of approximately
[[Page H4207]]
39.69 acres located at Fort Dix, New Jersey, for the purpose
of permitting the Borough to develop the parcel for economic
purposes.
(2) The Secretary may convey, without consideration, to the
New Hanover Board of Education (in this section referred to
as the ``Board''), all right, title, and interest of the
United States in and to an additional parcel of real property
(including improvements thereon) at Fort Dix consisting of
approximately five acres for the purpose of permitting the
Board to develop the parcel for educational purposes.
(b) Description of Property.--The exact acreage and legal
description of the real property to be conveyed under
subsection (a) shall be determined by surveys satisfactory to
the Secretary. The cost of the survey in connection with the
conveyance under subsection (a)(1) shall be borne by the
Borough, and the cost of the survey in connection with the
conveyance under subsection (a)(2) shall be borne by the
Board.
(c) Additional Terms and Conditions.--The Secretary may
require such additional terms and conditions in connection
with the conveyances under subsection (a) as the Secretary
considers appropriate to protect the interests of the United
States.
Amendment to H.R. 1119, as Reported
Offered by Mr. Sisisky of Virginia
(Amdt #30 in Part 2 of House Report 105-137)
At the end of title VII (page 288, after line 21), insert
the following new section:
SEC. 747. COMPTROLLER GENERAL STUDY OF REQUIREMENT FOR
MILITARY MEDICAL FACILITIES IN NATIONAL CAPITAL
REGION.
(a) Study Required.--The Comptroller General shall conduct
a study to evaluate the requirement for Army, Navy, and Air
Force medical facilities in the National Capital Region (as
defined in section 2674(f)(2) of title 10, United States
Code). The study shall--
(1) specifically address requirements with respect to
geography, facilities, integrated residencies, and medical
environments; and
(2) provide specific recommendations with respect to how
medical and health care provided by these facilities may be
better coordinated to more efficiently serve, throughout the
National Capital Region, members of the Armed Forces on
active duty and covered beneficiaries under chapter 55 of
title 10, United States Code.
(b) Submission of Report.--Not later than six months after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Comptroller
General shall submit to Congress and the Secretary of Defense
a report containing the results of the study required by
subsection (a).
Modification to the Amendment Offered by Mr. Skelton of Missouri
(Amdt #31 in Part 2 of House Report 105-137)
The amendment as modified is as follows:
At the end of subtitle D of title X (page 327, after line
6), insert the following new section:
SEC. 1043. REPORT ON ANTI-TERRORISM ACTIVITIES.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a
report, in classified and unclassified form, describing--
(1) the programs designed to carry out anti-terrorism
activities of the Department of Defense;
(2) any deficiencies in those programs; and
(3) any actions taken by the Secretary to improve
implementation of such programs.
Amendment to H.R. 1119, as Reported
Offered by Mr. Skelton of Missouri
(Amdt #32 in Part 2 of House Report 105-137)
At the end of title V (page 204, after line 16), insert the
following new section:
SEC. 572. COMMUNITY COLLEGE OF THE AIR FORCE.
(a) Limited Expansion.--Paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of
section 9315 of title 10, United States Code, is amended to
read as follows:
``(1) prescribe programs of higher education for enlisted
members described in subsection (d) designed to improve the
technical, managerial, and related skills of those members
and to prepare them for military jobs which require the use
of those skills; and ''.
(b) Eligible Members.--Such section is further amended by
adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(d) Subsection (a)(1) applies to the following members:
``(1) Enlisted members of the Air Force.
``(2) Enlisted members of other armed forces attending Air
Force training schools whose jobs are closely related to Air
Force jobs.
``(3) Enlisted members of other armed forces who are
serving as instructors at Air Force training schools.''.
(c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsections (a)
and (b) shall apply with respect to enrollments in the
Community College of the Air Force after March 31, 1996.
Modification to the Amendment Offered by Mr. Skelton of Missouri
(Amdt #33 in Part 2 of House Report 105-137)
The amendment as modified is as follows:
At the end of title X (page 360, after line 8), insert the
following new section:
SEC. 1060. OVERSIGHT OF COUNTER-TERRORISM AND ANTI-TERRORISM
PROGRAMS AND ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED STATES.
(a) In General.--Not later than 120 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget shall--
(1) establish a Government-wide reporting system with
respect to the budget and expenditure of funds by executive
departments and agencies for the purpose of carrying out
counter-terrorism and anti-terrorism programs and activities;
and
(2) collect information on--
(A) the budget and expenditure of funds by executive
departments and agencies during fiscal years 1995 through
1997 for purposes of carrying out counter-terrorism and anti-
terrorism programs and activities; and
(B) the specific programs and activities for which such
funds were expended.
(b) Report Requirement.--Not later than March 1st of each
year, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget
shall submit to the President and to Congress a report, in
classified and unclassified form, describing, for each
executive department and agency and for the executive branch
as whole--
(1) the amounts proposed to be expended directly for
counter-terrorism and anti-terrorism programs and activities
for the fiscal year beginning in the calendar year in which
the report is submitted;
(2) the amounts proposed to be expended directly for
counter-terrorism and anti-terrorism programs and activities
for the fiscal year in which the report is submitted and the
amounts that have already been expended for such programs and
activities for that fiscal year;
(3) the amounts proposed to be expended directly and the
amounts actually expended directly for counter-terrorism and
anti-terrorism programs and activities for the three fiscal
years preceding the fiscal year in which the report is
submitted; and
(4) the specific counter-terrorism and anti-terrorism
programs and activities being implemented, any priorities
with respect to such programs and activities, and whether
there has been any duplication of efforts in implementing
such programs and activities.
Amendment to H.R. 1119
Offered by Mr. Spratt of South Carolina
(Amdt #36 in Part 2 of House Report 105-137)
At the end of title VIII (page 303, after line 2), insert
the following new section:
SEC. 8__. EXPANSION OF PERSONNEL ELIGIBLE TO PARTICIPATE IN
DEMONSTRATION PROJECT RELATING TO ACQUISITION
WORKFORCE.
(a) Amendment to Purpose of Project.--Section 4308(a) of
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996
(Public Law 104-106; 10 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended by
adding before the period at the end the following: ``and
supporting personnel assigned to work directly with the
acquisition workforce''.
(b) Amendment to Eligible Workforce.--Section 4308(b)(3)(A)
of such Act is amended by inserting before the semicolon the
following: ``or involves a team of personnel more than half
of which consists of members of the acquisition workforce and
the remainder of which consists of supporting personnel
assigned to work directly with the acquisition workforce''.
(c) Commencement of Project.--Section 4308(b)(3)(C) of such
Act, as redesignated by subsection (b)(2), is amended by
striking out ``this Act'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998''.
(d) Limitation on Number of Participants.--Section 4308 of
such Act is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(d) Limitation on Number of Participants.--The total
number of persons who may participate in the demonstration
project under this section may not exceed the number that is
equal to the total number of persons who are members of the
acquisition workforce.''.
Amendment to H.R. 1119, as Reported
Offered by Mr. Thune of South Dakota
(Amdt #37 Part 2 of House Report 105-137)
At the end of part III of subtitle D of title XXVIII (page
439, after line 6) add the following new section:
SEC. 2864. LAND CONVEYANCE, ELLSWORTH AIR FORCE BASE, SOUTH
DAKOTA.
(a) Conveyance Required.--The Secretary of the Air Force
may convey, without consideration, to the Greater Box Elder
Area Economic Development Corporation, Box Elder, South
Dakota (in this section referred to as the ``Corporation''),
all right, title, and interest of the United States in and to
the parcels of real property located at Ellsworth Air Force
Base, South Dakota, referred to in subsection (b).
(b) Covered Property.--(1) Subject to paragraph (2), the
real property referred to in subsection (a) is the following:
(A) A parcel of real property, together with any
improvements thereon, consisting of approximately 53.32 acres
and comprising the Skyway Military Family Housing Area.
(B) A parcel of real property, together with any
improvements thereon, consisting of approximately 137.56
acres and comprising the Renal Heights Military Family
Housing Area.
(C) A parcel of real property, together with any
improvements thereon, consisting of approximately 14.92 acres
and comprising the East Nike Military Family Housing Area.
(D) A parcel of real property, together with any
improvements thereon, consisting of approximately 14.69 acres
and comprising the South Nike Military Family Housing Area.
(E) A parcel of real property, together with any
improvements thereon, consisting of approximately 14.85 acres
and comprising the West Nike Military Family Housing Area.
[[Page H4208]]
(2) The real property referred to in subsection (a) does
not include the portion of real property referred to in
paragraph (1)(B) that the Secretary determines to be required
for the construction of an access road between the main gate
of Ellsworth Air Force Base and an interchange on Interstate
Route 90 located in the vicinity of mile marker 67 in South
Dakota.
(c) Conditions of Conveyance.--The conveyance of the real
property referred to in subsection (b) shall be subject to
the following conditions:
(1) That the Corporation, and any person or entity to which
the Corporation transfers the property, comply in the use of
the property with the applicable provisions of the Ellsworth
Air Force Base Air Installation Compatible Use Zone Study.
(2) That the Corporation convey a portion of the real
property referred to in paragraph (1)(A) of that subsection,
together with any improvements thereon, consisting of
approximately 20 acres to the Douglas School District, South
Dakota, for use for education purposes.
(d) Reversionary Interest.--If the Secretary determines
that any portion of the real property conveyed under
subsection (a) is not being utilized in accordance with the
applicable provision of subsection (c), all right, title, and
interest in and to that portion of the real property shall
revert to the United States, and the United States shall have
the right of immediate entry thereon.
(e) Legal Description.--The exact acreage and legal
description of the property conveyed under subsection (a)
shall be determined by a survey satisfactory to the
Secretary. The cost of the survey shall be borne by the
Corporation.
(f) Additional Terms and Conditions.--The Secretary may
require such additional terms and conditions in connection
with the conveyance under subsection (a) as the Secretary
considers appropriate to protect the interests of the United
States.
Amendment to H.R. 1119, as Reported
Offered by Mr. Traficant of Ohio
(Amdt #38 in Part 2 of House Report 105-137)
At the end of subtitle A of title VIII (page 299, after
line 16) add the following new section:
SEC. 810. AUDIT OF PROCUREMENT OF GOODS BY MILITARY
INSTALLATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES.
(a) Audit Requirement.--Not later than September 30, 1998,
the Inspector General of the Department of Defense shall
perform a random audit of the procurement of goods by
military installations during fiscal years 1996 and 1997 to
determine the extent to which such installations procured
goods made in a country other than the United States during
those fiscal years.
(b) Definition.--For purposes of this section, the term
``random audit of the procurement of goods by military
installations''--
(1) means an audit of the procurement of goods (not
including goods obtained from the Defense Logistics Agency)
by not less than four and not more than twelve military
installations in the United States;
(2) shall include an audit of the procurement of goods by a
military installation of each of the Army, Navy, Air Force,
and Marine Corps.
(c) Report.--Not later than October 31, 1998, the Inspector
General of the Department of Defense shall submit to Congress
a report on the results of the audit performed under
subsection (a).
Modification to the Amendment Offered by Mr. Traficant of Ohio
(Amdt #39 in Part 2 of House Report 105-137)
The amendment as modified is as follows:
At the end of title VIII (page 303, after line 2), insert
the following new section:
SEC. __. TIME FOR SUBMISSION OF ANNUAL REPORT RELATING TO BUY
AMERICAN ACT.
Section 827 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104-201; 41 U.S.C. 10b-3) is
amended by striking out ``120 days'' and inserting in lieu
thereof ``60 days''.
Amendment to H.R. 1119, as Reported
Offered by Mr. Wamp of Tennessee
(Amdt #40 in Part 2 of House Report 105-137)
At the end of subtitle E of title X (page 360, after line
8), insert the following new section:
SEC. 1060. ARMAMENT RETOOLING AND MANUFACTURING SUPPORT
INITIATIVE.
(a) Expansion of Purposes of Initiative.--Section 193(b) of
the Armament Retooling and Manufacturing Support Act of 1992
(subtitle H of title I of Public Law 102-484; 10 U.S.C. 2501
note) is amended by adding at the end the following new
paragraph:
``(10) To allow for the use of ammunition manufacturing
facilities by other entities for the purpose of
modernization, development, and restoration of the
facilities.''.
(b) Authority to Enter Into Agreements.--Section 194(a) of
such Act is amended--
(1) by striking out ``and'' at the end of paragraph (1);
(2) by striking out the period at the end of paragraph (2)
and inserting in lieu thereof ``; and''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(3) to enter into agreements (which may include
contracts, leases, or other arrangements for a period of not
more than 99 years) with other entities with respect to the
ammunition manufacturing facility, or a part of such
facility.''.
(c) Reporting Requirement.--Not later than January 1, 1998,
the Secretary of the Army shall submit to Congress a report
on progress with respect to the implementation of the
amendments made to the Armament Retooling and Manufacturing
Support Act of 1992 by this section.
Modification to the Amendment Offered by Mr. Weldon of Pennsylvania
(Amdt in order under sec. 8(d) of H. Res. 169)
The amendment as modified is as follows:
At the end of title XII (page 379, after line 19), insert
the following new section:
SEC. __. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON NEED FOR RUSSIAN OPENNESS ON
THE YAMANTAU MOUNTAIN PROJECT.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds as follows:
(1) The United States and Russia have been working in the
post-Cold War era to establish a new strategic relationship
based on cooperation and openness between the two nations.
(2) This effort to establish a new strategic relationship
has resulted in the conclusion or agreement in principle on a
number of far-reaching agreements, including START I, II, and
III, a revision in the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty,
and a series of other agreements (such as the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention),
designed to further reduce bilateral threats and limit the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
(3) These far-reaching agreements were based on the
understanding between the United States and Russia that there
would be a good faith effort on both sides to comply with the
letter and spirit of the agreements, that both sides would
end their Cold War competition, and that neither side would
seek to gain or maintain unilateral strategic advantage over
the other.
(4) Reports indicate that Russia has been pursuing
construction of a massive underground facility of unknown
purpose at Yamantau Mountain and the city of Mezhgorye
(formerly the settlements of Beloretsk-15 and Beloretsk-16)
that is designed to survive a nuclear war and appears to
exceed reasonable defense requirements.
(5) The Yamantau Mountain project does not appear to be
consistent with the lowering of strategic threats, openness,
and cooperation that is the basis of the post-Cold War
strategic partnership between the United States and Russia.
(6) Russia appears to have engaged in a campaign to
deliberately conceal and mislead the United States about the
purpose of the Yamantau Mountain project, as shown by the
following:
(A) General and Bashkortostan, People's Deputy Leonid
Akimovich Tsirkunov, commandant of Beloretsk-15 and
Beloretsk-16, stated in 1991 and 1992 that the purpose of the
construction there was to build a mining and ore-processing
complex, but later claimed that it was an underground
warehouse for food and clothing.
(B) M.Z. Shakiorov, a former communist official in the
region, alleged in 1992 that the Yamantau Mountain facility
was to become a shelter for the Russian national leadership
in case of nuclear war.
(C) Sources of the Segodnya newspaper in 1996 claimed that
the Yamantau Mountain project was associated with the so-
called ``Dead Hand'' nuclear retaliatory command and control
system for strategic missiles.
(D) Then Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces
General Igor Sergeyev denied that the facility was associated
with nuclear forces.
(E) R. Zhukov, a Deputy in the State Assembly, in 1996
claimed that the Yamantau Mountain facility belonged to
``atomic scientists'' and posed a serious environmental
hazard.
(F) Russia's 1997 federal budget lists the project as a
closed territory containing installations of the Ministry of
Defense, while First Deputy Defense Minister Andrey Kokoshin
recently stated that the Ministry of Defense has nothing to
do with the project.
(7) Continued cooperation and progress on forging a new
strategic relationship between the United States and Russia
requires that both nations make transparent to one another
major projects underway or plans under consideration that
could alter the strategic balance sought in arms control
agreements or otherwise be construed by the other side as an
important new potential threat.
(8) The United States has allowed senior Russian military
and government officials to have access to key strategic
facilities of the United States by providing tours of the
North American Air Defense (NORAD) command at Cheyenne
Mountain and the United States Strategic Command (STRACOM)
headquarters in Omaha, Nebraska, among other sites, and by
providing extensive briefings on the operations of those
facilities.
(b) Sense of Congress.--In light of the findings in
subsection (a), it is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the Russian government should provide to the United
States a written explanation on the principal and secondary
purposes of the Yamantau Mountain project, specifically
identifying the intended end user and explaining the heavy
investment in that project;
(2) the Russian government should allow a United States
delegation, including officials of the executive branch,
Members of Congress, and United States experts on underground
facilities, to have access to the
[[Page H4209]]
Yamantau Mountain project to inspect the facility and all
rail-served buildings in the southern and northern
settlements located near Yamantau; and
(3) the Russian government should direct senior officials
responsible for the Yamantau Mountain project to explain to
such a United States delegation the purpose and operational
concept of all completed and planned underground facilities
at Yamantau Mountain in sufficient detail (including through
the use of drawings and diagrams) to support a high-
confidence judgment by the United States delegation that the
design is consistent with the official explanations.
Mr. SPENCE (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous
consent that the modifications be considered as read and printed in the
Record.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from
South Carolina?
There was no objection.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from South Carolina
[Mr. Spence] and the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] each will
control 10 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence].
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from
Idaho [Mrs. Chenoweth] for the purpose of a colloquy.
Mrs. CHENOWETH. Mr. Chairman, I rise to engage the chairman of the
Committee on National Security in a colloquy. Our soldiers need
dependable, high resolution flat panel technology in order to display
the rapidly growing quantity of battlefield information. These displays
are an essential interface between man and machine to permit rapid,
efficient transfer of information. Without adequate displays, the
objective of digitization will never be achieved.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
Mrs. CHENOWETH. I yield to the gentleman from South Carolina.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, the gentlewoman is correct.
Mrs. CHENOWETH. Mr. Chairman, H.R. 1119 provides funding to continue
the development of field emission, full color, high resolution flat
panel display technology for military applications. It also provides
funding to the Army for integration of that technology into the Abrams
tank and other Army ground combat vehicles. The Armed Services
recognize that this technology holds the promise of providing
significantly improved displays that are less expensive than current
military models. As the committee report noted, ``Field emission flat
panel display technology is of increasing importance as the Army
incorporates digitization technology into its fleet of vehicles. The
committee strongly supports development of this technology.
I firmly believe that it is critical for us to provide funding for
this technology that will allow development to be completed and will
permit testing of these displays for the Abrams tank in fiscal year
1999. I would urge the distinguished gentleman from South Carolina [Mr.
Spence] to help ensure that this program is appropriately funded during
the conference process.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman from Idaho [Mrs.
Chenoweth] for her observations and agree that this technology is of
great importance to the success of defense modernization. I will
continue to work to ensure that the appropriate level of funding is
provided for these efforts.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to my distinguished
colleague, the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. Skelton].
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I at this time wish to discuss very
briefly amendments 32, 32 and 33. The first: In an effort to collect,
evaluate, and assess the efforts of the U.S. Government to combat
international terrorism, the amendment requires the director of the
Office of Management and Budget to submit to Congress an appropriate
report regarding the programs and funding levels throughout the Federal
system. The full report, due no later than 120 days from the date of
enactment, should assess the amount of duplication or gaps in the
overall effort. The amendment would also establish an annual reporting
requirement.
Regarding the second amendment, it is aimed at ensuring the safety
and security of our personnel. It directs the Secretary of Defense to
report to Congress about achievements and findings to date regarding
our effort to protect our forces abroad and our anti-terrorism
initiatives therefor.
My third amendment deals with the authority of granting degrees to
individuals participating in the programs of the community college of
the Air Force. With this language, all participants can receive an
associate degree.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Pennsylvania [Mr. Weldon].
(Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania asked and was given permission to revise
and extend his remarks.)
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I simply want to rise to
commend the full committee chairman and the ranking member for this en
bloc amendment. There are a number of very significant and important
items that are covered. I would like to comment on a number of them,
but we do not have the time. But I would like to single out one that
was accepted through a bipartisan agreement on the floor, and that
deals with a project in the Ural Mountains in Russia.
Mr. Chairman, as most of my colleagues know, I take great effort at
working with the Russian Government and, in fact, under some serious
pressure, voted against two recent amendments, one which was just voted
on, that I felt went too far with Russia; and proactively, my goal is
to foster a better relationship with the Russian Government and the
Russian military and the Russian people.
However, Mr. Chairman, it has come to my attention over the past 5
years that a major project is underway in the Ural Mountains that we
need to have more transparency on. This project is one that has been
very secretive. There have been hundreds of millions, if not billions,
of dollars spent mining out a huge operation in Yamantau Mountain,
formerly known as Beleretz 15 and 16.
As recently as a month ago, I was in Moscow and met with the Minister
of Natural Resources, Orlov; the Minister of Atomic Energy, Mikhaylov;
the Deputy Defense Minister, Mikoshin; and number two Chief of the
General Staff, General Melov. And I expressed to them our concern about
what is happening in this project.
They all encouraged me to proceed to President Yeltsin to get more
transparency on this initiative. I have since written to him and asked
for him to allow a bipartisan delegation to visit this site to better
understand what Russia is, in fact, accomplishing.
One of the amendments in this en bloc series which I introduced, in
fact, calls for Russia to be more transparent. As a sense of the House
resolution, it says that we need to understand more clearly what Russia
is doing in Yamantau Mountain to make sure it is not a destabilizing
project and one that will not upset the balance of our relationship.
So I thank both the chairman and ranking member for accepting this
amendment and the spirit that I bring to the floor of one of
cooperation with Russia. I hope that Russia will respond positively and
allow our people and our leaders to better understand what their
ultimate objectives are at Yamantau Mountain.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to my distinguished
colleague, the gentleman from Samoa [Mr. Faleomavaega].
(Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA asked and was given permission to revise and extend
his remarks.)
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Chairman, I certainly want to commend the
gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence], the chairman of the
Committee on National Security, and my good friend, the gentleman from
California [Mr. Dellums], the ranking Democrat, for their support and
endorsement of this Amendment No. 9.
I also want to thank my good friend, the chairman of the Subcommittee
on Military Personnel of the Committee on National Security, the
gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Buyer], and the ranking Democrat of that
subcommittee, the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. Taylor] for their
endorsement and bipartisan support of this amendment.
Mr. Chairman, American Samoa over the years has established a very
active Junior Officer Reserve Training Corps program among our high
schools. Many thousands of high school students have had the
opportunity to experience a facet of military training early enough in
their lives to enable them to make informed decisions on whether to
pursue the armed services as a career.
[[Page H4210]]
Thousands of American Samoans have gone through the junior ROTC
program in Samoa, and some of these have gone on to a senior ROTC
program in the United States and then on to become excellent military
officers.
Mr. Chairman, most of my colleagues know that the U.S. territories
have consistently had very high rates of enlistment in our Armed
Forces. I know of at least 10 Samoans who should achieve the rank of E-
9, command sergeant majors, the highest enlisted rank in all of our
armed services. I am also very aware of a couple recipients of the
Silver Star for valor and bravery in the Korean and Vietnam conflicts.
Mr. Chairman, my amendment is very simple. It directs the Secretary
of Defense to study again the issue of making U.S. nationals. We have
the distinction of being the only people under the American flag that
are classified as U.S. nationals. It means that we owe permanent
allegiance to the United States but we are neither citizens nor aliens.
Congress has not yet established a law to allow us to become U.S.
citizens. I do not know when, if ever, that is going to happen, Mr.
Chairman. But at this point, this time, this amendment just simply
allows the Secretary of Defense to study the issue again, making U.S.
nationals eligible for the senior ROTC program, and then issuing a
report and recommendation to the Congress. I thank both the chairman
and the senior ranking member for allowing me to speak on this issue.
Mr. Chairman, as most of my colleagues know, the U.S. territories
have consistently had very high rates of enlistment in our armed
forces, and many of these service members have served with distinction
over a period of decades including in all of our major conflicts since
World War I.
I know of at least ten Samoans from American Samoa who have achieved
the rank of E-9, the highest enlisted rank in either the Army, Navy,
Air Force, or Marine Corps. I am also aware of a couple of recipients
of the Silver Star for valor and bravery in the Korean and Vietnam
conflicts.
Mr. Chairman, among those who have served with distinction from the
Island of Guam is retired Gen. Ben Blaz, who received his commission in
the U.S. Army upon graduation from the ROTC program at Notre Dame, and
rose to the rank of Brigadier General. General Blaz also served as
Guam's delegate to this House from 1985-1992.
Mr. Chairman, until 1996 the residents of all the insular areas were
eligible to participate in the Senior ROTC program, but in that year a
judge advocate in the U.S. Army issued an opinion that resulted in U.S.
nationals no longer being considered as eligible for scholarships in
the program. This determination is based on statutes which appear to
limit eligibility to U.S. citizens. Persons born in American Samoa
whose parents are not U.S. citizens are given U.S. national status by
our government, and American Samoans are the only persons given this
status. Persons born in all the other U.S. insular areas are U.S.
citizens. I believe that the status of U.S. nationals was not
considered when the laws governing the ROTC program were drafted.
This amendment would direct the Secretary of Defense to study the
issue of again making U.S. nationals eligible for the Senior ROTC
program and then issue a report, with recommendations to Congress
within 180 days.
Mr. Chairman, this is a compromise from my original amendment which
would have changed the law to make it clear that U.S. nationals are
eligible to participate in the Senior ROTC program.
Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Pennsylvania [Mr. Gekas].
(Mr. GEKAS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman for yielding. It is
with gratitude to the chairman and to the ranking member for inclusion
of my specific amendment in the en bloc amendments that I rise on this
occasion.
Fort Indiantown Gap, in Pennsylvania, has an ongoing academic complex
program whereby about 4,000 soldiers are trained and educated every
year in every aspect of our military defense. There is an authorization
that ends on September 30 for completion of the barracks complex to
house these individuals who receive this special training.
What my amendment does, and which the chairman and the ranking member
have graciously accepted, would extend the authorization to permit the
completion of the barracks complex, thus ensuring that the trainees
will have the adequate billeting space and quality to pursue the
studies.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Ohio [Mr. Strickland], my distinguished colleague.
Mr. STRICKLAND. Mr. Chairman, I rise to engage the chairman of the
Committee on National Security in a colloquy.
Mr. Chairman, our military vehicles need dependable, high-powered
economical engines to support the increasing requirements for mobility
on the modern digitized battlefield.
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. STRICKLAND. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, as the chairman of the
Subcommittee on Research and Development of the Committee on National
Security, I agree with the gentleman.
Mr. STRICKLAND. H.R. 1119 provides funding to support a unified
effort by academic, commercial, and governmental entities administered
by the National Automobile Center to develop and assess promising
alternative vehicle propulsion technologies that provide innovative
improvement for military applications.
The Army has recognized that Giesel technology holds the promise of
significantly improved propulsion. I firmly believe it is critical for
us to provide funding for this technology that will allow development
to be completed and will permit testing of these engines.
I would urge that an appropriate portion of these funds be used for
further development of the Giesel.
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. STRICKLAND. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. I thank the gentleman from Ohio [Mr.
Strickland] for his observations and for his leadership and agree that
improved engines are of great importance to the success of defense
modernization. And I promise that I will continue to work to ensure
that appropriate level of funding is provided for such efforts in the
future.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Pennsylvania [Mr. Fox].
Mr. FOX of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman of the
Committee on National Security, Mr. Spence, and also the gentleman from
California, Mr. Dellums, for their leadership in bringing this
important defense authorization bill to the floor.
I also would like to say a few words on behalf of my amendments that
I have included in the manager's en bloc amendments. My first amendment
would call for the POW/MIA flag to be flown in all Departments of
Veterans Affairs medical centers. This flag, as my colleagues know,
serves as a reminder. We have yet to receive a full accounting of our
all of our Nation's prisoner-of-war and missing-in-action soldiers.
There are currently 2,123 Americans still unaccounted for from the
Vietnam War. The flag also represents our commitment to obtaining that
full accounting of the whereabouts of our missing soldiers.
{time} 2315
I believe that we owe it not only to them but to our veterans who did
return home safely, to reaffirm that commitment. The POW/MIA flag
already flies above the VA Medical Center in Coatesville, PA. I believe
that it has a positive impact on the veterans who are treated there. I
am proud to fly the flag outside my own office here on Capitol Hill.
The second amendment, Mr. Chairman, would extend veterans preference
points to reservists who served on active duty during Operation Desert
Storm. There are many fine men and women who were a large part of the
success of the overall operation that did not receive veterans
preference points because they were not in the theater of operation
through no fault of their own. To exclude them from the benefits of
service is an injustice, and this amendment will address that in a
positive way. There is precedence, I would remind my colleagues, for
this extension from the Vietnam era.
In the 102d Congress, this measure was introduced by Representative
Tim Penny, and we are proud to move forward on this legislation to make
sure that it becomes accomplished.
[[Page H4211]]
I want to thank the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Mica] and the
gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Buyer] for their assistance with this
particular amendment. I believe it is in the best interests of our
veterans.
I want to again thank the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence],
the chairman, and the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] for all
their work for our House and for this defense authorization bill which
is definitely in the public interest and in the interest of defense in
our country.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Texas [Mr. Brady], a new Member of this body.
Mr. BRADY. Mr. Chairman, should America further weaken its national
defense strategy by deploying our military to guard rain forests and
endangered species in foreign countries as the State Department
recently proposed? The answer is clearly no. At a time when our defense
forces are being reduced, when we lack the resources to protect our
service men and women from terrorist attacks abroad, as our military
bases close while those remaining face shortages in everything from
base housing to training ammunition, at a time when our armed forces
are called upon to keep peace throughout the world and to help fight
the war on international drug trafficking, we cannot afford to divert
our precious military resources for frivolous environmental crusades in
foreign countries.
The environment is important, but the unique mission of America's
armed forces, first and foremost, must always be military readiness
dedicated to protect the freedom and security of our Nation. The
amendment by the gentleman from California [Mr. Pombo] and myself
included in the amendments en bloc preserves that priority. I thank the
chairman and the ranking member for its inclusion and I urge its
passage.
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding
and for including my amendment as part of his en bloc amendment.
Mr. Chairman, my amendment closes an unintended loophole in the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990 big enough to sail an oil tanker through. After
the Valdez oil spill, Congress passed comprehensive oil spill
legislation requiring that single-hull tankers, based on their age and
tonnage, be phased out of operation in U.S. waters. That law required
the construction of new environmentally safe double-hulled tankers.
Since enactment of the double-hull requirement, some ship owners and
operators have searched for ways to get around this existing
requirement.
One method being used to extend the life of a single-hull tanker is
to adjust the vessel's gross tonnage allowing it to fall under a lower
size category and be able to operate past its scheduled phase-out date.
For example, some vessel owners have had their vessels remeasured to
exclude certain spaces originally included in the vessels existing
measurement--such as water ballast tanks, certain machinery spaces, and
spacing between frames of the hull. Once a vessel is measured by a
classification society, that measurement is submitted to the Department
of Transportation for a new tonnage certificate.
My amendment requires that an existing tank vessel's gross tonnage is
that listed on its tonnage certificate as of July 1, 1997, for purposes
of the double-hull phase-out date. This amendment would uphold the
integrity of the double-hull law, protect our environment, and ensure
that those owners who have complied with the law by building doubled-
hulled tankers are not placed at a competitive disadvantage.
I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
Ms. McCARTHY. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of the amendment
to the Defense Authorization bill which I am offering with Mr.
Hastings, Mr. Crapo, Mr. Skaggs, and Mr. Hall, and which was included
in the set of en bloc amendments from National Security Committee
Chairman Spence. The Hastings amendment will reinstate the funds which
were cut for the operation of the Department of Energy's Office for
Worker and Community Transition. This amendment will restore much of
the funding requested by the President, while requiring the Department
of Defense to employ a private contractor to examine the impact of the
program and to suggest changes which will make the program more
efficient. The funding from the program will come from excess
administrative funds which the Secretary will set aside for this use
instead of being taken from military procurement.
This essential program provides workers who have been displaced by
military downsizing with the training that they will need to make the
transition to the private sector. In Kansas City, Allied Signal has
downsized early 3,000 positions in the span of the last few years and
later this year will be required to lay off up to 700 additional
workers. Those who will lose their jobs are more than just statistics,
they are men and women with families who have dutifully served our
Nation.
The men and women who work at the Kansas City plant in my district
ensure that the United States utilizes the most advanced technology on
the planet. They are a highly skilled, award-winning, quality
workforce. The quality assurance program consistently ranks the Kansas
City plant at the top of the Department of Energy's operation. Years of
training and investment have helped produce the quality and experience
that exists there, and it would be wasteful to ignore the valuable
contributions that this special workforce could make. In these ever-
changing economic times, we must recognize the opportunities to direct
our human resources through a smooth transition to the most productive
and appropriate use. Not only am I confident that their skills could be
used elsewhere within the Department, but feel certain that, with the
proper assistance, they will be a productive part of the private sector
economy in my District, and to the Nation as well.
Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this important
amendment. We must carefully prioritize our funding decisions and guard
against sacrificing these individuals in our quest to achieve a budget
target.
Mr. CRAPO. Mr. Chairman, today, I rise in support of Worker and
Community Transition Program language contained in the en bloc
amendment. The amendment would change the language pertaining to the
Worker and Community Transition program in the National Defense
Authorization Act for fiscal year 1998. The amendment restores $44
million to this program, keeping a commitment to help the workers and
communities who sacrificed to produce our nuclear arsenal during the
cold war.
Mr. Chairman, the Worker and Community Transition Program, commonly
called 3161, provides former Department of Energy nuclear weapons
production workers preference for new Department of Energy cleanup
jobs. It is important to recognize the contribution that these workers
have made in defeating our enemies during the cold war and provide them
with job preference protection during the transition of the Department
of Energy mission from bomb-making to nuclear waste cleanup.
Over the last 5 years, the Department of Energy has reduced its prime
contractor work force by more than 40,000 employees, from about 150,000
to less than 110,000. These reductions save taxpayers approximately
$2.5 billion each year. While this is good, we must not forget the
human impact that restructuring is having on real people.
The Worker and Community Transition Program has assisted
approximately 15,000 workers directly affected by changes in the
nuclear weapons production mission. In addition, the program has been
very helpful in assisting communities, including my home town of Idaho
Falls, in reducing their economic dependence on Department of Energy
work by moving toward a more diversified economic base.
In its current form, the National Defense Authorization Act for
fiscal year 1998 would reduce the Worker and Community Transition
Program by nearly $50 million from the President's request. The bill
would also terminate the program effective September 1999, and would
also prohibit the use of worker and community transition funds for
local economic impact assistance.
It is upon this last provision that I want to focus the remainder of
my remarks. Under the landmark nuclear waste agreement between the
State of Idaho and the Department of Energy, $30 million dollars is to
be spent for community transition purposes. These funds have in the
past come from the worker and community transition program by way of
payment from the Department of Energy to the State of Idaho. This money
is currently being paid to the State of Idaho in annual installments of
$6 million. The Department of Energy is contractually obligated to make
these payments. Both the Governor of the State of Idaho and I expect
the Department of Energy to continue making these payments--either
through the 3161 funds or by other means. If the Department of Energy
decides to continue making these payments through 3161, the language
contained in H.R. 1119 must be changed to reflect the Worker and
Community Transition language contained in this amendment.
Mr. Chairman, since the Department of Energy has not clarified their
intent as to which budget area they intend to make these payments
through, I ask your support for this amendment which simply provides
another avenue by which the Department of Energy can meet its
contractual agreements.
Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support the workers and the
communities who
[[Page H4212]]
helped the United States win the cold war by supporting this amendment.
Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the en bloc amendment
which includes my amendment relating to the Comanche helicopter
program. This should have been included in the report accompanying the
bill, but the language did not fit neatly within the parameters of one
subcommittee since it involves procurement, R&D, and National Guard
issues.
By way of background, the Army's Comanche program has been
restructured four times over the past 10 years purely for budgetary
considerations. As a result of pushing the program off to the right,
the development of the T-800/801 engine has outpaced that of the
airframe. This production gap will give the Army a unique opportunity
to initiate a number of risk reduction and cost avoidance initiatives.
By placing the Comanche engine into Army Guard Huey's (UH-1's), the
Army can validate logistics support and operational data of the engine.
This effort will also sustain the T-800/801 industrial base until the
Comanche comes on line, which is estimated to save $107 million. The
second feature of this effort is that it provides the National Guard
with the ability to procure a light utility helicopter [LUH] that is
far superior to the current Huey's in range, payload, and performance.
My amendment is very straight forward and involves no additional
funding; it merely states support of the Army's efforts to minimize
costs and technical risks of the very important Comanche program.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I have no further requests for time, and I
yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I have no further requests for time, and I
yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendments en bloc offered by
the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence].
The amendments en bloc were agreed to.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.
The motion was agreed to.
Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr.
Taylor of North Carolina) having assumed the chair, Mr. Young of
Florida, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of
the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration
the bill (H.R. 1119) to authorize appropriations for fiscal years 1998
and 1999 for military activities of the Department of Defense, to
prescribe military personnel strengths for fiscal years 1998 and 1999,
and for other purposes, had come to no resolution thereon.
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