[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 89 (Monday, June 23, 1997)]
[House]
[Pages H4169-H4212]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]





                          Personal Explanation

  Mr. LaFALCE. Mr. Chairman, on the night of June 19 when the House 
held a series of votes in succession on the DOD authorization bill, I 
was given incorrect information and mistakenly voted ``yes'' on 
rollcall No. 217. I had intended to vote ``no.''


                          personal explanation

  Mr. COX of California. Mr. Chairman, I was necessarily absent for 
this vote for medical reasons.


                          personal explanation

  Mr. BARRETT of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, on rollcall No. 225, the 
Bachus amendment, had I been present I would have voted ``aye.''
  Mr. Chairman, on rollcall No. 226, the Talent amendment, had I been 
present I would have voted ``aye.''
  Mr. Chairman, on rollcall No. 227, the Buyer-Kennedy of Rhode Island 
amendment, had I been present I would have voted ``aye.''


                          PERSONAL EXPLANATION

  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, earlier today I was unavoidably out of the 
Chamber when three rollcalls occurred, and I want to ask that it would 
be reflected in the Record that had I been present I would have voted 
in the affirmative. I would have voted ``aye'' on rollcall No. 225, and 
``aye'' on rollcall No. 226, and ``aye'' on rollcall No. 227.


                          Personal Explanation

  Ms. ESHOO. Mr. Chairman, I was unavoidably detained on rollcall votes 
225, 226 and 227. Had I been present, I would have voted ``aye'' on 
each one of the three. I ask that the statement be included in the 
Record immediately following the votes.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to section 5 of House Resolution 169, it is 
now in

[[Page H4170]]

order to consider amendment No. 7 printed in part 1 of House Report 
105-137, as modified by section 8(a) of House Resolution 169.


                 Amendment No. 7 Offered by Mr. Dellums

  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 7 offered by Mr. Dellums:
       At the end of title I (page 23, before line 7), insert the 
     following new sections:

     SEC. 123. B-2. AIRCRAFT PROGRAM.

       (a) Prohibition of Additional Aircraft.--None of the amount 
     appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations 
     in section 103(1) may be obligated for advanced procurement 
     of B-2 aircraft beyond the 21 deployable aircraft authorized 
     by law before the date of the enactment of this Act.
       (b) Production Line Curtailment.--None of the amount 
     appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations 
     in section 103(1) may be obligated for reestablishment of the 
     production line for B-2 aircraft. The Secretary of the Air 
     Force may use up to $21,800,000 of funds available for the B-
     2 aircraft program for curtailment of the B-2 production 
     line.
       (c) Funding Reduction.--The amount provided in section 
     103(1) for procurement of aircraft for the Air Force is 
     hereby reduced by $331,200,000.

     SEC. 124. INCREASE IN AMOUNT FOR GUARD AND RESERVE EQUIPMENT.

       The amount provided in section 105 for procurement of 
     equipment for the reserve components is hereby increased by 
     $331,200,000.

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from California 
[Mr. Dellums] and a Member opposed, the gentleman from South Carolina 
[Mr. Spence] each will control 45 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums].
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 22\1/2\ minutes of the 45 minutes 
allocated to this gentleman for the purposes of debate to the 
distinguished gentleman from Florida [Mr. Foley] and I ask unanimous 
consent that he be permitted to control that time.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
California?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, this is perhaps the most significant vote that Members 
will make on the Department of Defense authorization bill for this 
fiscal year. Contained in this budget is $331,200,000 to begin advance 
procurement for 9 additional B-2 bombers. That is what is in the bill. 
What this amendment does is to strike that $331,200,000 from the B-2 
account and places it in another account that I will discuss a little 
later.
  What is clearly before us, Mr. Chairman, is whether or not we ought 
to go forward with the B-2 bomber. The debate is not about having B-2 
bombers. We already have 21 of them that we have paid for, that we have 
either developed, or are in the final stages of development. It is not 
about do we have B-2's. It is about spending $27 billion to restart 
production for an additional 9 B-2's for which significant authorities 
have not asked for, stated that they do not want, and stated that they 
do not need. A $27 billion program that nobody has asked for, no one 
wants, except the contractor and the subcontractors.
  This is a weapons system that no one wants. Where do we get this $27 
billion figure? From the Congressional Budget Office, the people with 
figures so accurate that a number of my colleagues in these Chambers 
were prepared to shut down the Government if the CBO was not part of 
providing the statistical basis, the budgetary basis for what we have 
done. That means that people have great faith in their figures. $27 
billion, $13.6 billion that will be spent in the 5 years of the so-
called budget agreement, $13.2 billion beyond the 5 years for 
maintenance and operation, to a tune of nearly $27 billion.
  Mr. Chairman, there is a point that I will make throughout this 
debate that the world has now significantly changed. It is no longer 
the same. This is a zero sum game.
  You cannot have a 5-year balanced budget, strap on your back a $27 
billion program and try to force it into the budget unless you force 
something out. You do not have to be too smart to realize that. Just 
plain old mother whip helps you understand that.
  Balanced budget. You did not budget for this program because somebody 
wants to push it in. You push in $27 billion, you push out something. I 
am going to keep repeating that. This is a new day, it is a different 
world, it is a zero sum game.
  The budget resolution, Mr. Chairman, that Members went home and 
lauded as they voted for this 5-year budget agreement adds over and 
above the President's request $17.5 billion. The Quadrennial Defense 
Review sweeps up all of that $17.5 billion for their 5-year defense 
plan. Now here comes a program that will spend $13.6 billion on a new 
weapons system that nobody budgeted for.
  What about unbudgeted and unforeseen circumstances, like pay raises 
for the military, not budgeted? Mr. Chairman, my colleagues may not 
know this, but 3 years ago when I was the chairman of this committee, 
my colleagues submitted letters requesting $10 billion for programs 
above and beyond the budget request. This year my colleagues sent 
letters to the distinguished chair and the ranking member totaling $20 
billion, add-ons, above and beyond what the Pentagon requested, what 
the administration requested, what Members wanted. In the real world, 
those add-ons and those Members' requests are going to keep on coming. 
Emergency crises are going to keep coming. Desire for pay raises and 
other things are going to keep coming.

                              {time}  1830

  I would assert aggressively, Mr. Chairman, that the $17.5 billion is 
already overly subscribed. Colleagues already competed for this money 
two or three times. They can only spend a buck in one place, they 
cannot spend the same dollar in three different places. Now only a fool 
can accept that argument.
  This is real, Mr. Chairman. As I said, the world is changed. This is 
different. We cannot cram $27 billion.
  Now, Mr. Chairman, I want to come directly on this budget issue to a 
number of my colleagues here.
  To those who have said in the past I am going to give my vote on the 
B-2 to a friend of mine, that charge is going to cost $27 billion. It 
cannot be given away any more because in the context of a balanced 
budget, we push something in, we push something out. We cannot just 
turn our vote over for $27 billion for a friend, my colleagues handicap 
their own constituents, and I am going to argue that point aggressively 
before I finish.
  For those of my colleagues who said, well, I am doing a Member a 
favor; they came to me first, and I am just going to give them my vote. 
Twenty-seven billion dollars; we cannot just give away our vote. My 
colleagues are in a balanced budget environment; push something in, 
push something out.
  For those of my colleagues who have interests in military affairs and 
who have interests in other weapons system and other programs, they 
cannot just give away their vote.
  I served on the Committee on Armed Services. I have watched the horse 
trading and the dealing for years. When Members did not have any 
problem: ``I'll buy your B-2, you buy my F-16, my F-22,'' ad infinitum. 
That day is over, it is dead, it is gone. My colleagues are in a 
balanced budget environment. Colleagues push $27 billion in, colleagues 
push something out.
  And then there are Members who want the B-2, the F-22, they want the 
joint strike fighter, they want every weapon system on the face of the 
Earth, but they do not want to make a decision as to which one they had 
rather have as opposed to something else. The balanced budget now 
forces them into this. This is now a tradeoff, my colleagues, no more 
skinning and grinning, no more smiling, my colleagues have got to make 
a serious decision.
  For those Members in these Chambers who represent the poorest 
constituency in America, how do they then go home in the context of a 
balanced budget and say they took welfare reform, they reduced welfare, 
they reduced education, they reduced housing, they reduced jobs, when 
somebody can march into the well and say, ``But you voted for a $27 
billion budget program that ripped across a 5-year budget plan. How can 
you argue on both sides?''
  For those who represent constituents who have thousands and thousands 
of

[[Page H4171]]

young people at risk, who need the right to a good education, good 
training, good employment and living in a good environment, how do they 
then say in the context of a 5-year budget agreement that they embraced 
a $27 billion weapon system that is going to come out?
  Mr. Chairman, my colleagues have two options. Adding B-2's will force 
tradeoff of higher priority programs in the Defense Department. I have 
already tried to make that argument. The Department of Defense makes 
this argument. But I also want to talk to those people who are really 
not interested that much in all these things. They say, ``Ron, you take 
care of the military budget. I'm interested in domestic programs.'' 
Remember this: We are in a 5-year budget agreement where there are so-
called fire walls for the first 2 years. That means there is a wall 
between defense spending and nondefense discretionary spending. My 
colleagues cannot take money out of the military budget and put it in 
domestic programs or vice versa for 2 years.
  Now this is a 5-year budget deal. My colleagues, I just said this is 
a $27 billion program. Wake up. Where do my colleagues think this $27 
billion is going to come on the other side of those 2-year budget 
walls? Out of education, out of housing, out of the programs to serve 
our rural Americans, suburban Americans, and urban Americans.
  My colleagues have got to be smart enough to understand this is a 
zero sum game. They may not like it because they think I am the skunk 
at the party raising these issues, but, my colleagues, I have got to 
put it in their face because that is the reality. We have got to wake 
up. There is no more dreaming any more. When my colleagues decided to 
go into a balanced budget environment, they put themselves there. 
Dignity and integrity and honesty require that they step up to that.
  If my colleagues want this B-2, then it is so that they do not want 
other systems. If they want this B-2, absorb that we may not have other 
programs. For those of my colleagues who are concerned about the 
fragile nature of our ecological system and the environment, understand 
that in this bill we took $2.6 billion out of the Department of 
Energy's budget, a lot of it to clean up the environment where we have 
a responsibility to clean up some of the worst waste in America on 
these military reservations and bases, to buy more weapon systems.
  This is a big one, my colleagues. It is coming out of our hide one 
place or the other.
  So if my colleagues got these poor people, if they got these children 
at risk, if they have got people who are concerned about their health 
and their welfare, if they got people who are concerned about the 
environment, if they have got in their district other weapons systems, 
if they are committed to other policies, understand that my colleagues 
are jamming a $27 billion weapon system into a budget that cannot stand 
it.
  Now, Mr. Chairman, let me go further. On the B-2 program itself there 
were five, not four, not three, not two, not one, five independent 
studies that all said we cannot make a case for more B-2 bombers. We 
had one study in 1995, the heavy bomber force study by the Institute 
for Defense Analysis. It said, quickly, did not make the case for more 
B-2's, additional quantities of precision-guided standoff munitions are 
more cost effective than additional B-2's, planned upgrades to the B-1 
are more cost effective than additional B-2's, planned bomber force 
with precision-guided standoff munitions can meet the requirements of 
the two major regional contingencies.
  Second study, 1995, Commission on Roads and Missions, did not make a 
case for more B-2's. Additional B-2's are less cost effective than 
additional precision-guided munitions, on and on.
  Third study, heavy bomber industrial capability study, because many 
Members said, gee, we have got to build B-2's because we are going to 
lose the industrial base. Do my colleagues know what the study pointed 
out? There is no such thing as a bomber industrial base. If someone can 
build a plane, they can build a bomber. The people that built the B-2 
did not build the B-1. The people that built the B-1 did not build the 
B-2. There is no such thing as a bomber base.
  Finally, from 1962 to 1986, from 1962 to 1982 we never built a 
bomber, 20 years. But do my colleagues know what? When we needed to 
build one, we built one. A bomber is just a plane, bigger, longer, or 
whatever. But it is just a plane. So that argument about bomber base 
does not make sense.
  Now the question of the technology, we need stealth. Well, that 
stealth technology that we learned out of the B-2 is going into the F-
22, the joint strike fighter, and it is also in our technology base.
  Third study is the quadrennial defense review. They came up with the 
same notion. Forces with more B-2's cost more than currently planned 
forces, et cetera, et cetera, and then the deep strike weapons mix 
study also this year concluded, 1997, same thing. Forces with more B-
2's were less capable in strike warfare than those traded off, et 
cetera. Forces traded off perform roles the B-2 cannot.
  My colleagues will argue that, well, we can trade off some of these 
other weapons systems for B-2's because we urgently need them. Mr. 
Chairman, we are not going to have these nine B-2's for 10 years. So if 
it is all that important for us to have them, then what about these 10 
years, what do we do? Do we go in a closet because we are fighting to 
death that we do not have these nine additional B-2's? We got 21. We 
have a silver bullet.
  And remember, when we flew in the Persian Gulf, Mr. Chairman, we 
fought what President Bush said was the fourth largest army in the 
world. We never flew one B-2, we never flew one B-1, and within 24 
hours we had air superiority; within 72 hours, diminish.
  My colleagues may not know this; I think you do, Mr. Chairman, 
because I know of your position: We have greater accuracy in our 
standoff capability, more of that accuracy and more of it deployed than 
when we were in the Persian Gulf. Five studies.
  Now one thing: When I was chairman of the committee 3 years ago, I 
walked in a room with Sam Nunn. He is the most articulate supporter of 
the B-2. They thought I was the most articulate opponent. They said if 
Sam Nunn and Ron Dellums can walk in a room and work something out, 
everybody can live with it on a bipartisan, bicameral basis. We walked 
in, I shook hands with Sam and said, ``Let's do it fair, let's have an 
honest study, Mr. Chairman, an independent study. If you win, you 
win.''
  Guess what? A lot of my colleagues, including the gentleman from 
Ohio, said ``Ron, you just bought into a sucker bet. That study is 
going to come out, it is going to blow you away.''
  Do my colleagues know what happened? The study came out and supported 
me, and that ended it for the most part, and Sam Nunn supported it at 
that point. He said, well, if the administration does not want it, the 
study does not support it, he started to walk away.
  I put all my chips on the table with honesty and integrity, Mr. 
Chairman, and I said let the study determine it. If my arguments do not 
make sense, if no one else carries my argument, then maybe I am talking 
to myself.
  But I was not. Five additional, five independent, studies pointed 
this out.
  Now I could talk about the B-1. I hope someone else does. The B-1 
carries more of these weapons, flies the same distance, but let us come 
down to the last point: Jobs.
  Some people have argued that this is going to keep more people 
employed in these communities that are presently building B-2. Not 
true, Mr. Chairman. This is a restart, not industrial-based 
preservation. Air Force sources have estimated that the production 
capability for the B-2 right now as we speak is no more than 30 
percent, 30 percent. Only 6 percent of the personnel required to 
produce nine B-2's are currently on the program. Not according to Ron 
Dellums, not according to Mr. Foley, or Mr. Kasich or the Pentagon. Do 
my colleagues know whose data? The contractor's data.
  Mr. Chairman, I am sorry, 16 percent.
  Many vendors and suppliers began exiting the program early in 1992. 
When we make a contribution and have done it, we exit. People have been 
walking away from this program since 1992.
  Summarize, Mr. Chairman. This is not an argument about B-2. We have 
21 of them. We have got 95 brandnew shiny B-1's converted with the 
capability to destroy life beyond comprehension.

[[Page H4172]]

  Mr. Chairman, this is a budget buster. Mr. Chairman, we cannot sell, 
we cannot rope-a-dope people, we cannot push $27 billion into a weapons 
system, into a budget and assume that it is not going to come out 
hurting somewhere, and if the people on the committee work it out and 
manage to buy each others B-2's and F-22's and joint strike fighters, I 
say to the gentleman from New York, ``Who do you think they are coming 
after after the end of 2 years?'' He knows. Jump on the other side of 
those fire walls and come after domestic programs, hurt us, hit us 
where we hurt across the board, and that is what this whole thing is 
about.
  We cannot push this forward. No one wants this program except a few 
Members pushing it, the contractor and the subcontractor. Two 
Presidents did not want it, two Secretaries of Defense did not want it, 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs did not want it, the CINC's do not want 
it. Who wants it? Why would we push a $27 billion program? If our 
warriors do not want it and we are not out there fighting wars, what 
makes us think we want to supplant them? We all know what this is 
about.
  But the day is different now. This is a zero sum game. Make a deal, 
pay for it. Make a deal, the community pays for it. Make a deal, the 
constituency pays for it.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support this amendment. It is 
the right thing to do, it is the intelligent thing to do. It is 
assuming our fiduciary responsibilities. It is the economical thing to 
do.
  Mr. Chairman, with those arguments I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I might 
consume.
  (Mr. SPENCE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, as a famous commentator recently said, 
``Now it is time for the other side of the story.''
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment to strike the B-2 
funding from the bill. I oppose efforts to terminate the B-2 program as 
I did 2 years ago when the House twice rejected similar amendments. 
Although buying an additional nine B-2 bombers will not come 
inexpensively, the case for another squadron of these stealthy bombers 
that the Nation will rely on for the next 40 years is compelling.
  This debate reminds me, I just listened to the gentleman refer to the 
fact that the President, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the 
Secretary of Defense, all these people in the Pentagon do not want the 
B-2 bomber. Reminds me of another President, Jimmy Carter. We were 
debating this B-1 bomber the gentleman referred to at that time. And 
the same situation prevailed. The President, Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs, the Secretary of Defense all of them were opposed to the B-1 
bomber, and the Congress voted for it.

                              {time}  1845

  It was overturned by the President. He vetoed the bill and we did not 
get it. Then, later on, President Reagan was elected, and the same 
question came back up, and President Reagan held over the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs at that time, General David Jones, who sat down before 
the committee and said we do not want this B-1 bomber. But guess what? 
Under President Reagan, that same man who said we did not want it then 
said he wanted it, because President Reagan wanted it.
  I have to make the point that these people in the administration have 
to carry water for the administration. They cannot very well take the 
opposing view from the President on matters of this kind.
  As a supporter of the B-2, I would like to quote from a letter that 
retired Senator Sam Nunn wrote to the Committee on National Security 
earlier this year. Senator Nunn's letter stated, and I quote, ``I 
continue to believe that the 21 B-2 bombers will not constitute an 
adequate force level to deal with many likely future contingencies and 
crises, and that no other military systems in existence or on the 
drawing boards can adequately substitute for the capabilities that the 
B-2 bomber offers.''
  While many share this view, unfortunately, as I said earlier, most 
current and former Clinton administration Secretaries of Defense do 
not. Consequently, the fate of the B-2 bomber, like the fate of the 
nuclear submarine, the conventional cruise missile, the F-117, and the 
V-22 before it, rests with Congress, for only Congress can intervene in 
these matters and has in the past.
  It intervened, for instance, with Admiral Rickover, the father of the 
nuclear Navy, able to build the nuclear submarine because Congress 
dictated it; were options to build the conventional cruise missiles not 
negotiated away, thus protecting Tomahawk cruise missiles, whose 
performance in Desert Storm and in Bosnia were exceptional; a second 
squadron of F-117 Stealth fighters procured. The cancellation of the V-
22 tiltrotor, the Marine Corps' future air transport, all of these 
things overturned because of Congress when the administrations were 
opposed to it.
  Mr. Chairman, I only hope that the wisdom of Congress today and the 
wisdom Congress exhibited in reaching these historic decisions on these 
weapon systems will prevail here today on the B-2.
  We will hear a lot of stories in this debate about the expense of 
buying more B-2's. We will hear that procuring nine more aircraft will 
cost $10 billion or $15 billion and that operating them for the next 20 
years will cost another $10 billion to $15 billion. Even if these 
figures are correct, they need to be put in proper context.
  Consider the capability the B-2 will provide this Nation well into 
the next century, and then consider the cost in the context of the 
funding that our country will spend on just three tactical aircraft 
programs: The F-22, the F/A-18E/F, and the Joint Strike Fighter. These 
three programs are slated to cost $350 billion, a figure which is not 
even adjusted for inflation, just to procure in the decades ahead. And 
they will probably cost a like amount to operate over their 20 or so 
year life spans. In this context, $20 billion to $25 billion to buy and 
operate another squadron of B-2's over the next 20 years seems small.
  So while cost should be a critical variable in any debate over a 
major weapons system, I urge my colleagues to consider first the 
capability. If the B-2 provides a capability that the Nation needs, and 
I believe that it will for decades to come, we ought to be able to find 
the money in an annual defense budget of $250 billion to do it. If we 
do not believe that the Nation will want a more robust B-2 capability 
than the currently planned 21 aircraft in the decades ahead, then my 
colleagues should vote for this amendment.
  I believe that another squadron of B-2's represents a prudent 
investment in our future, and therefore, I urge all of my colleagues to 
vote no on the amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Hunter], the chairman of our Subcommittee on 
Procurement, control the remainder of the time in opposition to this 
amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
South Carolina?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, this issue is not about simply the defense of our 
country. This is not about short-changing the men and women who serve 
our military. This is not about military preparedness. This is about a 
discussion that needs to go forward on a weapons program, the B-2 
bomber, that is clearly a very, very expensive budgetary item.
  There will be a lot of rhetoric about the pros and cons of the B-2 
bomber, and there is divided opinion. We read the editorial papers, we 
listen to defense experts, we listen to our colleagues, and one can 
come to the conclusion that the B-2 is the best thing we have ever 
invented, or that it is an extreme waste of money.
  We have to start talking about the budget of this Nation like we talk 
to our families at home, about making priorities fit within the 
confines of money available.
  Now, clearly, if we have an unlimited Treasury, which we have proven 
we do not, in fact, my side of the aisle has been one of the strongest 
proponents of balancing the Federal budget and saying no to other 
things that we cannot afford. Well, I think clearly, if we want to put 
something right on the table as

[[Page H4173]]

a meaningful attempt to save the taxpayers' dollars, the B-2 comes to 
the top of the list.
  According to the Pentagon, again, I have to suggest that many in this 
body suggest let the experts decide, let sound science rule the day, 
and let those charged with determining the future success of our 
military operations be brought into the discussion and make 
recommendations. The current fleet of 21 B-2 bombers, according to the 
Pentagon, is sufficient to meet the two-war scenario, the ability to 
fight and win two wars at the same time.
  The B-1 bomber was mentioned earlier, which offers a greater payload 
and essentially the same range and weapons suite as the B-2. It is a 
logical complement to the 21 B-2 bombers authorized under current law. 
Again, we have 21 B-2 bombers. It is not as if we are on the floor 
today to determine should we get a B-2 bomber. We have 21 B-2 bombers 
that we paid for.
  Now, we received a letter. The gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Kasich] asked 
the Congressional Budget Office that was referred to by my colleague:

       At your request, the Congressional Budget Office has 
     estimated the cost to acquire and operate nine additional B-2 
     bombers. CBO estimates that adding nine bombers to the 
     currently-planned fleet and operating each of them for 20 
     years would cost about $27 billion.

  Some may assume that today's budget item of $331 million is what we 
are talking about. We are not talking about $331 million; we are 
talking about a total outlay over 20 years of $27 billion.
  Most importantly, we have to discuss the fact that there are 95 B-1's 
in the fleet already bought and paid for by the U.S. taxpayer. The 
massive deep-attack weapons mix study conducted by the Pentagon 
concluded that it would not be cost effective, not be cost effective, 
to buy more B-2 bombers.
  The Dellums-Kasich-Foley amendment is important because it eliminates 
the $331.2 million in B-2 funding that would be allocated this year, 
but again, that figure is a mere fraction of the real cost. No money is 
programmed in any balanced budget plan to pay for the outyear cost, as 
was mentioned by the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] that would 
be forced by authorization of nine additional B-2's. Small down payment 
today, folks, to keep the line operating; the big ticket comes in the 
outyears. Can we face the taxpayers to tell them the bill is in the 
mail and it is on its way?
  If Congress allows this fiscally imprudent spending to occur, we will 
be forced to confront untold trade-offs in the future. Balancing the 
budget is a very difficult task. We have seen it on the floor, we have 
read about it in the newspapers, we have heard from our constituents, 
so yes, we do have to make some spending decisions now, not later.
  Let me tell my colleagues what we could buy for one B-2 bomber. One 
B-2 bomber costs about $1.5 billion. Now, the proponents of the B-2 say 
that is because we are not ordering enough of them and we can get the 
cost down on a relative per-unit cost if we can just buy a lot more of 
them. The argument is not about buying efficiency in weapons system, it 
is about do we even need them to begin with.
  But let us go over what a B-2 bomber will provide the United States 
of America taxpayers as a trade-off for something else. Fifty-six 
thousand, six hundred and four elementary school teachers at $26,000 a 
year, that is what one B-2 bomber buys; 86,108 deputy sheriffs to 
patrol our streets at $17,420 per year; 57,692 clergymen to go out and 
spread the message of the Bible in our communities at $26,000 per year; 
46,000 firemen to protect our buildings and our public safety. Here is 
one some may not agree with, but 47,928 newspaper reporters. We may not 
agree that we need that many, but they are there at $31,297 per year.
  Thirty-six thousand, five hundred eighty six new prison beds to lock 
up our most violent offenders in prisons with the price of 1 B-2 
bomber; not the fleet, one. Take those numbers forward and see what 
they will do for us. Buy 188,372 brand-new GEO economy cars. Buy 
groceries for 1 full year for 360,577 families. For one B-2 bomber, I 
am going to tell 360,577 families, no groceries for a year. Now, we can 
go to public education, 224,000 students for 1 full academic year at a 
public 4-year college.
  Why do I mention these figures? Because it is about choices. It is 
about a parent sitting down with their children and saying yes, I want 
to take you to Disney World this summer, and yes, we are going to try 
hard, but, kids, if we do that, we are going to sacrifice a little bit 
this year. Maybe not go to the movies during the weekend, maybe not 
order the pizza from the delivery man, maybe sacrifice a few items in 
order to do what we would like to do as a family, go to Disney World.
  Now, maybe this is a simple analogy, but I got elected to Congress 
from a small town in Florida. I used to drive a tow truck, I worked at 
a gas station pumping gas, I opened my own restaurant at the age of 20. 
I found that every cent mattered in my life, because for me to open up 
the following Monday my restaurant caused me to be economical in my 
pursuit of excellence in that restaurant, and I could not waste money.
  I got to Washington, DC, and people talk about billions as if we are 
talking about somebody's walking around money. It is only $27 billion, 
or maybe less, maybe $20 billion. CBO says 27 billion, the proponents 
of the program may say it is only a couple billion dollars. Members 
decide. Members decide. Because April 15 every year when I ask people 
to send their money to the IRS to run this Government, part of those 
dollars they are sending, Mr. Chairman, is for things like the B-2 
bomber.
  Now, we can spend billions of dollars to build up our society in 
public education, in housing, in infrastructure. Imagine that, building 
and creating our roads in America, strengthening our bridges, fixing 
the potholes in Washington, DC. What a novel thought, to think the 
American taxpayers will actually see some of their dollars at work 
domestically rather than flying planes we cannot see over in the Middle 
East somewhere.
  Let us talk about our personnel. I was on the floor proudly 
supporting the flag burning amendment, because our veterans, our 
military personnel, went to war and died for the symbol of our 
democracy, the flag. I went home and they said, that is just rhetoric. 
The Constitution gives us the right of free speech, so putting a 
constitutional amendment about flag burning is just a gesture. Men and 
women died for that flag, and the debate today is about do we treat 
them as human beings.

                              {time}  1900

  Do we give them the housing they so richly deserve for protecting our 
Nation? Do we get our own personnel off of food stamps so they can 
proudly raise their own children? Do we give them the flight training 
and equipment up to standards that they desperately need? Or do we go 
off on a tangent and buy more weapons that the President and others 
have clearly said we do not need?
  The Boston Globe, Pentagon's high tech delusions. The Pentagon 
insists on purchasing weapons systems that have little utility in a 
real crisis because they either are irrelevant to the threat or 
technologically wholly disproportionate to the threat or so costly that 
commanders are inhibited from using them. The B-2 stealth bomber is the 
obvious and controversial case in point.
  Kansas City Star, hardware versus troops. Pentagon continues against 
all logic to insist no tough choices be made between the two.
  Kansas City Star, again, with the cold war over, the need does not 
exist for all three fighters.
  I can read from almost every editorial regarding this expenditure. 
Defense Secretary William Cohen, a Republican, is constantly being 
urged to kill sacred cows and must do so. Our own recommendation for 
cuts, including dropping the joint strike fighter and the B-2 bomber 
and cutting back the Marine Corps to free money for urgent needs 
particularly airlift and sea transportation.
  Mr. Chairman, if we look at the facts, look at the groups supporting 
the Dellums-Kasich amendment, we will clearly come to the conclusion 
that while the B-2 is a very valuable weapons system, the fact remains 
we have 21. The fact remains we are equipped. The fact remains we have 
not shirked our duty to protect our Nation. The fact remains we are 
advancing technologically to develop weapons systems

[[Page H4174]]

that are more adequate for today's needs. We are looking at conflicts 
that are arising around the globe.
  I just got back from Asia with the Speaker of the House. We talked to 
people in China about their defense capabilities. The average pilot in 
China trains 2 hours a month. Their equipment is antiquated. Their 
resources are limited. So who is the threat? I am not suggesting China 
is not a threat. Understand, there are components within China that 
could operate to our detriment. Russia is broke. Boris Yeltsin was at 
the summit. He is broke. They are broke. They do not have the money to 
put toward weapons systems. They are no longer a threat.
  There are threats, I recognize that. I am not so naive to suggest 
that this is a perfect world. Iran, Iraq, other nations pose threats to 
us. But is the B-2 going to be called into service for those nations 
that may be hostile to us or will it be an F-22, which I do support? 
Will it be a more versatile, more mobile force?
  Let me read a letter that went to the gentleman from South Carolina 
[Mr. Spence] from the Secretary of Defense on June 18, 1997. Let me 
just underscore one statement: The loss in combat capabilities from 
retiring current weapons systems to pay for additional B-2's, the loss 
due to forgoing investment in other needed capabilities and the 
additional cost of the B-2 far outweigh the benefits from adding more 
B-2 aircraft to the fleet.
  I will read that once more. Bill Cohen, appointed by President 
Clinton, Republican Senator from Maine, a thought conscious, strong 
individual who has supported our military. The loss in combat 
capabilities, our young men and women on the front line, from retiring 
current weapons systems to pay for additional B-2's, the loss due to 
forgoing investment in other needed capabilities and the additional 
cost of the B-2 far outweigh the benefits from adding more B-2 aircraft 
to the fleet.
  The only former Defense Secretary that I think they could find to 
sign the letter of support was Cap Weinberger under the Reagan 
administration. I may stand corrected and I would look forward to it if 
I am.
  Mr. Chairman, the debate is significant. The debate is about 
providing moneys, supplies, necessary weapons to our troops to defend 
America's interests both here and abroad. We are going down a path of 
spending billions of dollars on a weapons system that we clearly do not 
need by most all recognizable experts.
  I hope my colleagues will join on the side of the righteous, if you 
will, and support the Dellums-Kasich-Foley amendment. It is a 
financially significant opportunity to show both our support for the 
defense of this Nation and for the conservative principle of saving 
money in a time when our budget is extremely stressed.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, let us start with stealth because, that is an important 
part of the B-2 story. In Vietnam, we lost 2,300 aircraft. In fact, in 
the last phases of the war, when we threw B-52's against surface-to-air 
missile systems from Russia, then the Soviet Union, we lost 10 percent 
of our B-52 force that was used in that theater in 11 days. And America 
turned to her scientists and said, we may be on the verge of having our 
Air Force become obsolete if you do not figure out a way to beat those 
Soviet-made radar systems and surface-to-air missile systems.
  And our scientists, the great scientists that we have in this 
country, responded. They came up with something developed by Democrat 
and Republican administrations, announced first by President Jimmy 
Carter, with what was known as stealth. Stealth is the ability to avoid 
enemy radar. That means very simply that a guy like the gentleman from 
Texas, Mr. Sam Johnson, who is sitting right here, who was a POW for a 
number of years in Hanoi, could fly an aircraft through a SAM missile 
battery without it acquiring him, without it seeing him and shooting 
him down. It gave survivability to American pilots. So we started 
developing stealth. And that is what the B-2 is.
  My colleagues have talked about these wonderful ways to give quality 
of life to the people who serve in the Armed Forces. The way to give 
quality of life to the people who serve in the Armed Forces is to bring 
them back. And the way you bring them back is by letting them fly the 
best equipment.
  Let me just put this argument in perspective in terms of cost. 
President Clinton has a program to buy short range aircraft over the 
next 20 years for $350 billion. Many Members here who are arguing on 
the other side have signed on at least initially to that program. We 
need those aircraft. That is short range theater aircraft.
  President Clinton says we need $35 billion for short range aircraft 
and for long range aircraft, for bomber aircraft that can go from the 
United States to stop an armored invasion in another country thousands 
of miles away. He put down zero. Not a dime for long range aircraft. 
That is why the study that I think is the best study, the independent 
study, not a budget-driven study but the independent study by General 
Scowcroft recommends that we continue to build the B-2 line.

  So here is what we are recommending today, what is in our budget, one 
thirty-fifth of the amount of money that is spent on short range 
aircraft of that $350 billion, that is about $12 billion for the 
construction, according to CBO, of B-2 bombers, one thirty-fifth of 
what we are spending for short range aircraft, let us spend it for long 
range aircraft so you have the ability to move from the United States 
to stop an armor attack halfway around the world.
  I am a Navy guy. I come from a Navy town, San Diego. I am an advocate 
of carrier air power. However, it takes a long time to steam a carrier 
someplace. You cannot count on an enemy like Saddam Hussein being right 
out of central casting and waiting for you to build up in theater with 
these 200- and 300 mile airfields that are just a couple hundred miles 
away from your targets. You have to stop armor early.
  Does the military want it? My colleagues, the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Dellums] and the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Foley], 
have said the military does not want that. Here is what President 
Clinton's chief of staff, General Fogleman says, at a hearing just a 
few weeks ago: More B-2's would be extremely valuable in the halt 
phase, that is when you stop his armor attack, and in fact in all 
phases, as we would go.
  My question back, and would they save lives? General Fogleman, yes.
  So to my friend the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Foley], if we want to 
give the best quality of life to a person in uniform, that is, to save 
his life, then you want to have B-2's.
  Let us go back to the Clinton administration's proposal if this 
Congress does not act, does not keep our package intact. President 
Clinton had a problem. The problem is, how are we going to maintain our 
long range bomber force if we are spending $350 billion for short range 
aircraft and not a dime over the next 20, 30 years for long range 
aircraft. The answer was, we are going to fly B-52's. Those are the 
planes that were shot down easily by SAM batteries in 1968. We are 
going to fly them for 80 years. So the pilot that the gentleman from 
Florida [Mr. Foley] cares so much about is going to be flying an 
airplane that is older than his great grandfather.
  We have talked about cost a little bit. Let us talk about bases. We 
had 81 bases for our short range aircraft in 1961. As the years went 
by, we lost those bases, sometimes because of political action, 
sometimes because we just could not afford to operate them.
  We have gone from 81 major overseas U.S. air bases to 14. Let me tell 
you what is going to happen on the Korean peninsula. We all know this. 
It is in all the open reports. The North Koreans have the capability to 
put nerve gas on every single short range airfield on the Korean 
peninsula. Limited detoxification capability. The first crew that dies 
because of nerve gas on the runway at one of those tactical air bases 
is going to eliminate us as a tactical presence on the Korean 
peninsula.
  Last week the Japanese started to hedge on our ability to base our 
fighter aircraft in Japan in a second Korean war. We Americans have to 
be able to rely on our technology to stop an enemy, to deter an enemy 
with a flight that comes out of the United States and goes to that 
particular area, wherever it is around the world.

[[Page H4175]]

  So the Air Force does not want it. That is not what the Air Force 
says. General Fogleman says, more B-2's would be extremely valuable in 
the halt phase and in fact in all phases as we would go.
  Last part of the cost argument, every Member of this House has voted 
just a few days ago on the reform package that reforms the Pentagon, 
that cuts the bureaucracy. CBO's estimate of that reform package is 
that we save in 5 years $15 billion. That means in 5 years we have 
saved $3 billion more than CBO says we would need to build this entire 
tranche of nine B-2's.
  So, no, we are not going to take it out of Geo sales in America. We 
are not going to take it out of pay. We can afford to get by spending 
one thirty-fifth of what we are spending on short range aircraft by 
spending that $12 billion on long range aircraft and taking that from 
the reform package.
  Mr. Chairman, let me just say that this will be the first time, if we 
do not keep the B-2 in the budget, this is going to be the first time 
that this Nation has had the technology to allow our pilots to survive 
in an adverse environment and we have not given it to them. Let us give 
it to them. Let us give them the very best.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. HUNTER. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I want to commend the gentleman from 
California. I think it was a very thoughtful statement. I think all the 
statements this evening have been very well thought out.
  I happen to agree with his statement. Let me also make another point. 
In the gulf war, for the first time we used the F-117. The Air Force 
wanted 27. Congress said no. We think you should buy more. You need 54. 
We are going to make you buy two squadrons. The Chairman tonight was 
one of the leading figures in that decision, and we went out and we 
bought 54.
  In the first 14 days of the gulf war, they represented 2 percent of 
the assets, but because they were stealthy, because, as the gentleman 
pointed out, they could go into the target and come back out without 
that large package of aircraft, they destroyed 40 percent of the 
targets and all the most difficult ones. It proved that stealth works.
  And what the B-2 gives us is a plane that goes five times as far, 
carries eight times as many weapons, and weapons, by the way, that are 
$13,000 apiece. JDAM's are $13,000. Sixteen of them are $208,000. That 
is one-sixth the cost of a cruise missile. What the gentleman from 
California suggests is that we rely on the old bombers that are not 
stealthy. That means we have to use these very expensive weapons.
  But what would it allow us to do? Saddam stopped himself. He gave us 
the time to build up our forces and then we destroyed him with air 
power.

                              {time}  1915

  They came out and surrendered to a Marine Corps RPV. What the B-2 
does is allow us to hit those same tanks, that same army that Saddam 
had from 41,000 feet, day and night, no matter what circumstances, no 
matter what the weather is. This is a revolutionary military 
capability. We can destroy a country, and we can destroy the army that 
it sends in the field by air power. We have never been able to do this 
before. What that does, to make this point, what that does is to allow 
us to save American lives.
  To my friends on the Democratic side, what I believe this gives us is 
the potential of having a conventional deterrent. Think if we had had 
the B-2, which we did not have in the gulf war, and the President could 
have deployed it to the Gulf and said, Saddam, if you come south, I 
will destroy your division before you get into Kuwait; and we now have 
the military capability with centrifuged weapons to do just that. We 
could have not had to fight the war. We would not have had to send 
500,000 kids to the Gulf. We could have saved $10 billion it cost us to 
move them out there and $60 billion to fight the war.
  The B-2 gives us the potential, a revolutionary conventional 
potential, to have a deterrent; and that is a capability worth having. 
Yes, it is expensive. But it is not as expensive as losing American 
lives. I would guarantee my colleagues today that at some future date, 
if the proponents win this amendment tonight, there will be a 
circumstance in which we will not have the capability that we needed, 
and that will mean that we will lose more lives than had to be lost and 
that would be a tragedy.
  The gentleman from California [Mr. Hunter] is right; let us send them 
in our best. Stealth means survival. Stealth means survival.
  And I will just tell my colleagues this. I have studied this issue. I 
was there when Harold Brown, a Democrat, came up. By the way, there is 
a letter here signed by Mel Laird, Jim Schlesinger, Donald Rumsfeld, 
Harold Brown, Cap Weinberger, Frank Carlucci and Dick Cheney saying, 
keep the B-2 program going. That is seven Secretaries of Defense, not 
one.
  This is an important issue that demands the attention of this House.
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield, along with 
seven Secretaries of Defense, Gen. Chuck Horner, who ran the air war, 
if we are going to listen to the war fighters, to the warriors, who now 
is free to speak his mind because he does not have to do what the 
President tells him to do, has said very strongly that the B-2 should 
be supported. That is the guy who ran the air war in Iraq.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman would yield, and 50 former 
generals of the Strategic Air Command also wrote the President saying, 
keep this capability alive, keep this line open. And they talk about 
building stealth bombers like it is just a piece of cake. I want my 
colleagues to know something. That is not true. I went to my friends at 
Boeing and they said it is very difficult, putting stealth into an 
aircraft is enormously difficult.
  When we shut this down, we would have shut down the ability to build 
these kind of bombers, which is worth saving. This is something we 
need. What if a crisis occurs over the next 10 years? Then we have to 
come back to this. It will cost us $40 billion to pay for the R&D to do 
a B-3. So get the right number while the production line is open and it 
will save us money in terms of avoiding taxpayer cost.
  So we save money that way, we save American lives, and we do the 
right thing. This is the most important conventional weapon that has 
ever been developed by any country anywhere, and it gives America an 
enormous advantage.
  What we are going to do is not get the right number. The studies that 
were done by Rand, the studies that were done by Gen. Jasper Welch, say 
that the right number is significantly more than 21. We are here saying 
let us do at least three squadrons, three squadrons so that we could 
have 20 for the first major regional contingency and 10 for the second.
  This a very reasonable proposal. And the gentleman mentions the 
numbers. The contractor says we can do it for about $9 billion. The 
Defense Department I think says $12 billion. And I think over a period 
of years, that is affordable. Any plane we buy has to have life cycle 
cost. And we may take out some of the older planes to offset and make 
room for it.
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman would yield, even if we 
take the highest number, even if we take the CBO number, we are asking 
in the committee's package to spend \1/35\, that is 3 percent, for 
long-range aircraft, that is our B-2, of what we are spending for 
short-range aircraft. At a time when our overseas bases have shrunk 
from 81 overseas bases to 14, that makes sense.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from California mentioned 
something else called lockout. What if the enemy uses chemical and 
biological weapons on those tactical airfields so we cannot get the 
airlift in to set up the TAC air? Then we bought the wrong weapon 
system. We need something that can come from outside the theatre, 
assuredly, to be able to protect and stop the enemy before he gets 
there.
  I think the possibility of lockout is something that we need to 
study, that the National Defense Policy Panel needs to study, because 
that is a very real potential. By the way, in the deep attacks weapons 
mix study, in every scenario in which there was lockout or very little 
warning, the B-2 was better than any other conventional weapon. And we 
lost some of the wars because we did not have enough B-2's.

[[Page H4176]]

  So let us, at least, buy the nine additional we are talking about 
here. It will save lives and save money. I support the chairman in 
this. We need to keep this money in the budget. We need to keep this 
option alive.
  Mr. Chairman, I include the following for the Record:

     Congressman Duncan Hunter,
     Chairman, Military Procurement Subcommittee,
     House National Security Committee.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: You requested that my colleagues and I 
     provide your committee with an independent look at the 
     adequacy of the nation's heavy bomber force. This is an 
     important issue as we move into the new security era and we 
     greatly appreciate the opportunity to offer our counsel to 
     you and your committee.
       In our review, we first examined the planned future of the 
     bomber force, its role in supporting U.S. national security, 
     and the potential offered by the B-2. We then examined the 
     sources of Pentagon opposition to additional B-2 production 
     and the recent series of studies the Department of Defense 
     has sent to the Congress regarding the bomber force.
       We reached two fundamental conclusions. First, long-range 
     air power will be more important than ever in the decades 
     ahead. Consequently, we do not believe that the planned force 
     of 21 B-2s will satisfy foreseeable U.S. military 
     requirements. Second, Pentagon opposition to further B-2 
     production is shortsighted and parochial. It reflects a 
     consensus across the services that long-range air power can 
     be safely abandoned in the long-run--a view with which we 
     strongly disagree.
       Based on these conclusions we offer a set of legislative 
     recommendations regarding the bomber force.
       The following contains an executive summary and the overall 
     report.
           Sincerely,
                                                  Brent Scowcroft.

                    Independent Bomber Force Review


                            i. introduction

       Whether the United States should retain enough modern, 
     heavy bombers to support U.S. national security strategy is, 
     foremost, a strategic choice. We believe strongly that the 
     future of America's long-range bomber force should be decided 
     fundamentally on the basis of what best serves the national 
     defense. Unfortunately, the Department of Defense (DoD) has 
     made this strategic choice on a de facto basis in light of 
     short-term funding and force structure preferences. If this 
     decision is allowed to stand, the end result will be a force 
     structure that relies almost entirely on short-range air 
     power.
       Pentagon preferences for short-range instead of long-range 
     air power raises a puzzling contradiction. The long-range 
     bomber fleet is an element of the force structure that 
     appears ideally suited to the demands of the new security 
     environment and national military strategy. We also have a 
     weapon system--the B-2--which is now in production and if 
     produced in substantial quantities, could revitalize and 
     sustain that force. Yet the DoD has consistently opposed 
     continued B-2 production.
       Our analysis addresses this contradiction to help the 
     Congress make a vital decision over the future of the bomber 
     force. We first examine the planned future of the bomber 
     force, its role in supporting U.S. national security, and the 
     revolutionary potential offered by the B-2. We then examine 
     the sources of Pentagon opposition and how this opposition 
     has manifested itself in the recent series of studies the DoD 
     has put forth to the Congress. We then offer a set of 
     recommendations regarding legislation.


                   ii. the future of the bomber force

       To put the matter simply, under current plans the bomber 
     has no future. A de facto strategic choice has been made to 
     rest the future of American air power on short-range 
     fighters. Unless immediate corrective action is taken, the 
     long-range heavy bomber will gradually disappear as a 
     meaningful element of America's armed forces.
       The clearest evidence of the bomber fleet's condition is 
     its size and age. Since the late 1950s, the general trend has 
     been for U.S. force structure to shrink, with capability 
     sustained or improved with advancing technology. But in 
     recent years, bombers have been reduced more than any other 
     major force element (such as army divisions, aircraft 
     carriers, and USAF fighters). There were 360 active bombers 
     in 1980. The force dropped to about 300 in 1990. Under 
     current plans, the operational bomber force in the year 2001 
     will consist of 130 aircraft: 44 B-52s, 70 B-1Bs, and 16 B-
     2s.
       Unlike the fighter force, bomber force shrinkage is not 
     being offset by substantial deployments of new planes and new 
     models. So as the fighter force is improved, bomber force 
     capabilities will inevitably decline over the long-term. The 
     average bomber is already roughly twice the age of the 
     average fighter, and current USAF plans are to maintain the 
     remaining B-52s in service until they are at least 60 
     years old, and possibly as old as 100. We may soon be in 
     the extraordinary circumstance where America's bombers 
     will be older than America's oldest aircraft carriers.
       The bomber's loss has been the fighter's gain. Although in 
     Congressional testimony the distribution of Air Force 
     procurement is frequently portrayed as a cycling among 
     transports, bombers, and fighters, in reality fighters have 
     consistently maintained a plurality of the budget, and will 
     overwhelmingly dominate the budget over the next two decades.

          TABLE 1: APPROXIMATE SHARE OF USAF PROCUREMENT BUDGET
                            [In percentages]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                           Airlifters  Bombers  Fighters
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1970's...................................        <5         5        95
1980's...................................        10        40        50
1990's...................................        30        35        35
2000-2020................................        <5        <5        95
------------------------------------------------------------------------

       A corresponding indicator of fighter dominance is the 
     steadily growing ratio of fighters to bombers in the USAF 
     operational inventory. This ratio increases from about 4-1 in 
     the 1950's, to 6-1 in the 1970's, to 10-1 in the 1990's, and 
     trending toward about 14-1 in the near future.
       With rare exceptions, Air Force actions on existing bomber 
     programs illustrate an underwhelming amount of concern about 
     the bomber's future. The B-1B bomber, which entered service 
     in 1986, was not used in the Gulf War because of conventional 
     mission deficiencies. Moreover, its upgrade program has been 
     so stretched out that a 20-year gap between deployment and 
     conventional upgrade is entirely likely (leaving only 10 
     years of expected system life until planned retirement). The 
     B-2 fleet, which had been planned for 132 aircraft as late as 
     1990, was capped at 20 planes in 1992, with little Air Force 
     dissent. Even more remarkable, the Air Force has actively 
     resisted efforts by Congress to authorize production of 
     additional B-2s. USAF leaders have even gone so far as to 
     exclude bombers from their ``wish list'' of desired but 
     unbudgeted items supplied to Congress every year. In 1996, 
     for example, the Air Force included requests for re-
     engineering the RC-135 and the AWACS, and production of 
     additional F-16 fighters, on the same wish list that omitted 
     production of more B-2s.
       The DoD has no plan to keep the bomber force viable in the 
     long run. Every other major weapon system--fighter, 
     submarine, destroyer, carrier, tank, etc.--has either a 
     system in continuing production or a planned, programmed 
     replacement. JSF will replace F-16. The New Attack Submarine 
     will replace the Los Angeles (688) class attack submarine. 
     But no new bomber model is planned in the numbers required to 
     replace the B-52 or B-1B. The current, uncontested DoD plan 
     will inexorably vitiate the bomber force through age, 
     attrition, and obsolescence.
       Furthermore, recent congressional testimony by Air Force 
     Chief of Staff General Ronald Fogleman revealed that the Air 
     Force has no plan for replacing the mission capabilities lost 
     as the bomber force disintegrates. When questioned about 
     bomber replacement General Fogleman said, ``between now and 
     2020, we have lots of things we're going to look at.'' But 
     the General concurred that no replacement was actually in the 
     Air Force plan--meaning no funding in either the Five Year 
     Defense Plan (FYDP) or the Ten Year Plan. With no planned 
     funding there will no more B-2s, and almost certainly no B-3.
       In sum, all evidence indicates that bombers have no future:
       The bomber force structure has been cut disproportionately.
       Budgetary investment in bombers has shrunk almost beyond 
     visibility.
       All bomber production programs have been capped and 
     terminated.
       All Congressional efforts to initiate new bomber production 
     programs have been actively opposed.
       The Air Force has consciously excluded any new, future 
     bomber type from both the FYDP and the ten year plan.
       There is no plan of any kind to replace the bomber 
     capabilities being lost by any other means.
       The bomber force is aging, shrinking from attrition, and 
     glaringly absent from future R&D and procurement plans. With 
     no funding, no modernization plan, and no evident concern for 
     their absence, the bomber force faces inevitable extinction. 
     Whether by active choice or default, this evidence means that 
     the DoD has indeed made the fundamental strategic choice to 
     rely in the future almost exclusively on short-range fighter 
     aviation. Unfortunately, emerging trends in the security 
     environment identified by the Pentagon would seem to call for 
     a renewed emphasis on long-range air power.


         III. The Bomber Force in the New Security Environment

       During the Cold War, long-range heavy bombers proved to be 
     vitally important assets to U.S. national security. Not only 
     did these aircraft support nuclear deterrence as part of the 
     ``triad'' of nuclear forces, but their flexibility also 
     allowed them to also conduct conventional bombing missions in 
     three separate conflicts (Korea, Vietnam, and Desert Storm). 
     We believe that modern long-range bombers will be of 
     increasing value in the coming decades. Many of the reasons 
     are spelled out in the recent Quadrennial Defense Review 
     (QDR), which provides a useful overview of the future 
     security environment and national military strategy.
       Through 2015, the QDR postulates that the United States 
     will face a variety of regional dangers and ``foremost 
     amongst these is the threat of coercion and largescale, cross 
     border aggression against U.S. allies and friends in key 
     regions by hostile states with significant military power.'' 
     Beyond 2015, a ``near-peer'' global competitor could also 
     emerge.

[[Page H4177]]

       The QDR posits that three elements--shaping, responding, 
     and preparing--define U.S. defense strategy. But boiled down 
     to essentials, the QDR observed that the ``primary purpose of 
     U.S. forces is to deter and defeat the threat of organized 
     violence against the United States and its interests.'' If 
     deterrence fails, ``the high end of the crisis continuum is 
     fighting and winning major theater wars. This mission is the 
     most stressing requirement for the U.S. military.''
       The QDR offered a strong rationale for the need to deal 
     with two near simultaneous regional conflicts. And in 
     fighting such wars, the QDR strategy stated that two aspects 
     deserved special attention--(1) stopping the enemy advance as 
     quickly as possible; and (2) dealing with the ``likely 
     conditions'' that future wars will involve ``the threat or 
     use of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) * * * including 
     in the early stages of war to disrupt U.S. operations and 
     logistics.'' \1\ Forces best able to halt aggressors armed 
     with weapons of mass destruction, then, should logically 
     enjoy highest priority.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     Footnotes at end.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       We would add that forces capable of executing this 
     operation independent of theater bases and under conditions 
     of surprise would be of even greater value. A range of 
     powerful foreign and economic pressures will inevitably cause 
     a further contraction in the U.S. overseas basing 
     infrastructure and forward-based force levels. Indeed, 
     planners should also assume that we will be taken by surprise 
     in future conflicts; this was highlighted in the 1993 Bottom 
     Up Review and is the recommendation of all analysts who have 
     studied surprise attack in any detail. The wisdom of such a 
     policy can be seen in the 1990 invasion of Kuwait and the two 
     recent crises with Iraq (October 1994 and September 1996), 
     all of which took us by surprise. The lessons from the two 
     more recent crises are particularly relevant.
       In 1994, Iraq rapidly mobilized forces near the frontier 
     with Kuwait. Despite intensive intelligence focus on Iraq 
     since the Gulf War, we not only failed to recognize this 
     buildup early on, but also were unable to deploy sufficient 
     forces until well after Iraq was in a strong position to 
     attack. According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the United 
     States and its allies faced at least a 2-3 day ``window of 
     vulnerability'' through which Iraq could have invaded Kuwait 
     and possibly threatened the Saudi oil fields.
       In September of 1996, Iraq mobilized forces in its northern 
     areas and pressed an attack into the Kurdish ``safe haven.'' 
     Once again we were taken by surprise. Worse yet, for various 
     reasons all members of the Gulf War Coalition denied 
     immediate access to their bases for combat operations against 
     Iraq, leaving our land-based fighters on the scene without 
     suitable bases from which to strike the invading force. 
     Carrier-based fighters located in the Gulf apparently did not 
     possess the range to reach the scene of combat and the lack 
     of stealthy carrier-based assets raised survivability 
     concerns. In the end, we were reduced to largely symbolic 
     strikes against Iraqi air defenses in the south using ill-
     suited cruise missiles launched from ships and B-52 bombers. 
     Iraq was free to do as it wished in the north.
       The lessons of these two crises in combination with the 
     evolving security context reveal that bombers are ideally 
     suited for the new era. They are the only force element 
     capable of stopping surprise enemy aggression while operating 
     outside the range of theater weapons of mass destruction. 
     They do not require bases in the immediate combat theater 
     (which also has the benefit of minimizing the number of 
     Americans placed at risk). Finally, as explained below, 
     bombers, though expensive when viewed on a per-unit basis, 
     are extremely cost-effective compared to other force 
     elements.
       Bombers like the B-52, B-1B, and B-2 typically feature 
     unrefueled ranges and payloads 5-10 times greater than 
     fighters. Long range is a vital attribute for the new 
     security era. Long range allows bombers to respond more 
     rapidly than any other force element--from the CONUS if 
     necessary--in the case of surprise aggression. Long range 
     provides strategic agility; bombers can shift firepower from 
     one theater to another. Long range also allows bombers to 
     fight from beyond the range of adversary weapons, which will 
     be of increasing importance as weapons of mass destruction 
     proliferate. In the Gulf War, for example, Iraqi missiles in 
     development or service outranged all of our land-based and 
     sea-based fighter aircraft (whose operating locations were 
     thus at risk). And just as long range provides a sanctuary to 
     the bomber force, it denies any sanctuary to the enemy, who 
     cannot base assets outside the reach of bombers. Finally, 
     long range also greatly expands the number of basing options 
     available to the force should we wish to deploy the bomber 
     force forward to signal resolve (and increase sortie rates). 
     The longer the range, the greater the number of potential 
     bases that are available, and the greater the number of 
     countries available for negotiating access to bases.
       The large payload of bombers allows a small number of 
     aircraft to assume a disproportionate amount of the 
     warfighting burden. In Vietnam, for example, the bomber force 
     comprised on average only 7 percent of the force and 
     delivered 44% of the bomb tonnage. In the Gulf War, the B-52 
     force only represented 4% of the force, but delivered 32% of 
     the bomb tonnage (more than twice as much as the entire 
     carrier force combined).
       Previously, a primary virtue of these massive bomber 
     payloads was their shattering psychological effect on enemy 
     forces; in the Gulf War, for example, General Schwarzkopf 
     drew on his Vietnam experience with B-52 strikes to demand 
     that Iraqi forces be exposed to the same kinds of heavy 
     bombardments which had proven so devastating to North 
     Vietnamese forces. In future wars, the advent of precision 
     weapons will allow bombers to accurately strike many 
     different targets on a single sortie, which dramatically 
     increases the bomber's value to the warfighting commander. 
     The Gulf War illustrated the revolution afforded by 
     precision, which increases air power's lethality by several 
     orders of magnitude compared to unguided weapons.
       In an era of declining budgets, the nation must procure the 
     most cost-effective weapons possible. The ability to deliver 
     large payloads of precision weapons makes each bomber sortie 
     extremely effective; the low life-cycle cost of bombers 
     (compared to other force elements) makes them extremely cost-
     effective. Bombers are very expensive weapon systems; 
     producing a new B-2 costs about $1 billion, roughly the cost 
     of a DDG-51 destroyer. But like warships, bombers enjoy long 
     useful service lives and can operate effectively for three 
     decades or more; the initial investment in the force is thus 
     spread over many more years than most other systems. In 
     addition, bombers are not people-intensive to operate. 
     Personnel costs are typically a driving force in determining 
     life-cycle costs for military forces. The annual personnel 
     costs of a B-2 wing are about half that of a fighter wing and 
     substantially less than that of an aircraft carrier or 
     division. Overall, a B-2 wing's 35 year life-cycle cost (that 
     is, total personnel, operations, and procurement cost) 
     is about the same as a fighter wing; about \1/3\ that of 
     an aircraft carrier battle group; and about \1/4\ that of 
     a heavy division.\2\
       Personnel issues are related to casualty considerations, 
     which typically play a critical role in crisis decision-
     making (and accordingly should also play an equally important 
     role in determining what sorts of forces the nation should 
     invest in). Bombers from this standpoint also are very 
     attractive assets, since they only place a small number of 
     people in harm's way. For example, deploying a wing of 
     fighters to a theater base can put 2,500 people or more at 
     risk; a carrier battle group up to 10,000 people; a division 
     15,000 or more. Each member of these units is at risk to 
     attack by enemy weapons. A chemical warhead delivered by a 
     ballistic missile against a theater airbase or deployed 
     division has the potential to kill thousands; as would a 
     strike by a sea-skimming cruise missile against an aircraft 
     carrier. In contrast, the 1,300 personnel associated with a 
     bomber wing would typically be operating from bases well 
     beyond the strike range of an adversary, thus exposing the 
     lives of the aircrew only.
       In this same light we should also recognize the nuclear 
     capability of the bomber force. If American theater forces 
     were to be attacked by weapons of mass destruction--and 
     particularly if they were attacked by nuclear weapons--there 
     are compelling reasons why the United States might have to 
     reply in kind. Bombers are the weapon of choice for nuclear 
     response because the weapons remain under strict human 
     control up to the very moment of launch near the target, and 
     because the variable payload of the bomber gives it the 
     widest possible variety of weapon delivery options. Moreover, 
     since strategic arms control with the former Soviet Union and 
     with Russia strictly limits the size of our nuclear arsenal, 
     bombers could be used in counter-strikes without depleting 
     our far more limited, single-use ICBM and SLBM assets. 
     Inasmuch as our plans must hedge against the eventual 
     emergence of a ``near-peer'' competitor, preservation of our 
     remaining nuclear forces is a relevant consideration. Looking 
     to the longer term, and understanding that no other nuclear-
     capable delivery systems are in production or planned, the 
     bomber's dual capability (both conventional and nuclear) 
     would allow a strengthened bomber force to sustain the 
     nation's nuclear capability as other nuclear force elements 
     inevitably age and retire.\3\
       Overall, bombers appear uniquely well-suited to satisfy 
     America's strategic requirements in the future security 
     environment.


                   iv. specific advantages of the b-2

       In looking at the bomber force, we need to discuss one 
     additional, but revolutionary characteristic that the B-2 
     brings to the bomber force: stealth. Stealth shrinks the 
     effective detection distance of a variety of sensors, 
     particularly radar, and the basic physics involved in this 
     set of technologies argues against the development of 
     effective affordable counters. The B-2 thus combines four key 
     characteristics--range, payload, stealth, and precision--in 
     one platform. Range, payload, and precision allow a single B-
     2 sortie to strike with the effectiveness of multiple fighter 
     sorties; stealth opens the door to a military revolution.
       The traditional operational style that we have developed 
     for the employment of air power relies upon large force 
     packages to suppress enemy air defenses and shoot down enemy 
     fighters. Stealth reduces the need for such support packages, 
     which has a number of important effects. First, it greatly 
     increases the cost-effectiveness of stealth platforms. 
     Analysis conducted for the Commission on Roles and Missions 
     (CORM) showed that the 42 F-117 sorties (which combined

[[Page H4178]]

     both stealth and precision capabilities) flown on the opening 
     night of the Gulf War were almost equivalent in terms of 
     target coverage to the rest of the land-based air-strike 
     forces combined.\4\ Another way to look at this is that each 
     F-117 sortie was worth 16 non-stealth sorties.\5\ The Air 
     Force illustrated this same point after the Gulf War by 
     showing that one or two B-2s can do the job of 60 fighters 
     and 15 tankers.\6\ This greatly reduces the costs of 
     executing the mission; according to CORM analysis of the Air 
     Force data, a B-2 would be seven times more cost-effective 
     than the 75-aircraft force package.\7\
       Stealth enables appropriately configured B-2s the potential 
     to operate autonomously, which places this aircraft in a 
     totally different category than the B-52 and B-1B. These 
     older bombers must be supported with theater-based fighters 
     until enemy air defenses are eliminated or equipped with 
     expensive cruise missiles that can be fired from outside the 
     range of enemy air defenses. Dependence on land-based 
     fighters makes the non-stealthy bombers dependent on the 
     United States gaining base access in a timely manner and 
     raises a whole host of political and operational constraints. 
     Cruise missiles, though valuable, suffer from a variety of 
     operational constraints (targeting flexibility, ability to 
     deal with relocatable targets, warhead size, etc.) and are 
     too expensive to rely on to fight a sustained conflict (the 
     conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile carried by the B-52 
     force, for example, is over 100 time more expensive than a 
     Joint Direct Attack Munition delivered by a B-2).
       This autonomous capability puts the B-2 in an entirely new 
     class as of weapon system. It is truly the nation's only 
     ``modern'' bomber and the nation's only global precision 
     strike asset. Indeed, we believe that the B-2 has the 
     potential to revolutionize this nation's very approach to 
     strategy making and force structuring. As General Michael 
     Loh, then the commander of Air Combat Command, stated in late 
     1994: ``I see the B-2 as the centerpiece of an emerging 
     national security strategy that places increasing importance 
     on projecting immediate, responsive power from the U.S. to a 
     regional crisis anywhere in the world. The B-2's qualities of 
     range, payload, stealth, and sense of immediacy are uniquely 
     applicable to be the centerpiece of this strategy.''
       A substantial force of B-2s would allow the United States 
     to project overwhelming and decisive power against any 
     adversary anywhere on the planet. To put matters in 
     perspective, the addition of one more B-2 squadron (8 
     operational aircraft) would give the B-2 force sufficient 
     punch to strike the same number of aimpoints as those 
     targeted by over 1,200 combat aircraft over the first 24 
     hours of the Gulf War. Clearly, procuring even greater 
     numbers would open up new strategic avenues. As former Air 
     Force Secretary Dr. Donald Rice has written, such a force 
     would ``allow the nation to seize this rarest of 
     opportunities: a revolutionary leap in military 
     capability, and with it, long term global military pre-
     eminence--American style.'' \8\ No nation could 
     confidently launch an armored assault on its neighbors. No 
     dictator could think that his most prized strategic assets 
     were immune to attack. No target would be more than a few 
     hours away from attack. No defense could be counted on to 
     protect key targets. In response to heightened tensions, 
     the mere possession of a substantial force of B-2s could 
     provide a new way to manage crises. Instead of going 
     through the complex and risky steps of gaining base 
     access, deploying forces, and escalating tensions, the 
     President could simply order B-2s in the United States to 
     be placed on higher alert. Even under the prevailing 
     conditions of surprise and base access denial, a 
     substantial force of B-2s could have made an enormous 
     difference in the Iraq crisis of 1994 and 1996.
       The first job of the American military is to provide our 
     political leadership with tools for deterrence and coercion 
     so the nation does not need for fight wars. Preventing wars 
     is far superior to fighting wars. A substantial force of B-2s 
     would have a unique conventional deterrent capability. As two 
     noted scholars of deterrence have written:
       ``If U.S. national military strategy is designed with 
     regional deterrence in mind, forward presence and/or rapid 
     crisis response become key elements in this strategy. . . . 
     Optimally, this . . . means stationing all the forces 
     necessary between the adversary and his objective, but even 
     the United States lacks the resources to meet such a 
     requirement in more than a few cases simultaneously. 
     Therefore, strong incentive exists for the United States to 
     explore capabilities that . . . are so rapidly deployable 
     into an area as to be `virtually' stationed there. \9\
       This is the potential capability offered by the B-2. And 
     that is the potential vision that the Pentagon is turning its 
     back on my making the fundamental strategic choice to rely on 
     short-range fighter aviation.


            v. why does the Pentagon oppose Additional B-2s?

       If additional B-2 bombers could make a revolutionary 
     contribution, why does the Pentagon oppose them? Basic 
     principles of bureaucratic politics go far in explaining the 
     Pentagon's position. We believe there is such strong 
     opposition to the B-2 precisely because it is so 
     revolutionary--because supporting the B-2 would imply far 
     reaching changes in core organizational interests, such as 
     manpower, budget roles, missions, and autonomy. It is helpful 
     to begin with the perspective of the service that develops 
     the B-2.
       The B-2 is an Air Force system and one might imagine that 
     the Air Force would be predisposed to support is continued 
     production and improvement. The oppose is true. In any large 
     bureaucracy, interests and programs tend to be identified 
     with a particular organizational entity or bureaucracy. 
     Historically, Strategic Air Command (SAC) was the heart and 
     strength of bomber advocacy in the Air Force. Through the 
     1960s and into the 1970s, SAC influence in the Air Force R&D 
     and procurement budgets. Accordingly, ``bomber generals'' 
     often held top service positions.
       When SAC and Tactical Air Command (TAC) were nominally 
     ``merged'' into Air Combat Command in 1992, it was in reality 
     much more akin to a hostile corporate takeover: TAC absorbed 
     SAC. With the dissolution of SAC, the institutional 
     foundation for bombers disintegrated. Consequently, bomber 
     advocacy within the Air Force has virtually collapsed, and no 
     funds have been budgeted to support any major new bomber 
     program. Furthermore, as in the corporate world, management 
     personnel from the leasing entity discovered that they had 
     little power. In the words of retired Air Force General Chuck 
     Horner, bomber-oriented officers have been ``funneled out of 
     the Air Force. \10\ Today the top service positions are 
     typically held by ``fighter generals,'' with hardly a bomber 
     general to be found.
       The roots of ``fighter'' opposition to the bomber force are 
     complex. First, many officers with predominantly fighter 
     backgrounds simply do not believe that the B-2 can perform as 
     advertised. Having served all their lives in an Air Force 
     where bombers were basically old, vulnerable and obsolete, 
     they find it difficult to accept that the B-2 is different--
     that it can truly penetrate safety through defenses, or that 
     it can strike targets at least as accurately as fighters. 
     Their skepticism is reinforced by intense personal attachment 
     to fighters and fighter operations. At a time when the Air 
     Force budget has been in decline for more than a decade and 
     so many fighters are on the verge of retirement, accepting 
     the B-2 revolution might in their minds mean cutting fighter 
     procurement programs. It might also mean accepting an 
     entirely new approach to warfare in which the fighter 
     sometimes might not even be relevant, let alone the dominant 
     air instrument. Thus the number of fighter aircraft, fighter 
     squadrons and wings--ultimately fighter pilots could be 
     substantially reduced.
       It is crucial to understand the USAF ``fighter opposition'' 
     to the B-2 is well meaning. Everyone, Air Force officers 
     included, have a powerful human tendency to trust in what 
     they know, in what they have invested their careers, and in 
     what has worked in the past. For the current Air Force 
     leadership, this means a strong predisposition to trust in 
     fighters.
       The failure of the bomber revolution to succeed in the Air 
     Force precluded any possibility of wider acceptance in the 
     Pentagon. The inevitable consequence of an expanded role for 
     bombers is an expanded bomber budget, and the new funds could 
     come only by diversion from other existing military accounts. 
     More bluntly, for bombers to receive increased funding, the 
     non-bomber Air Force, the Army, the Navy, and Marines 
     believes they may have to accept less. If the Air Force has 
     not yet accepted changes in air power strategy implicit in 
     the B-2, how much more would the Navy and Army refuse the 
     even greater changes which a revolutionary bomber force would 
     mean for broader national military strategy, and hence for 
     their budgets?
       The Army continues to maintain its traditional view that 
     the decisive battles of any war are fought on the ground. 
     Victory is achieved through mass troop deployments and close-
     in engagements, with the Air Force providing ``support.'' If 
     the Air Force doesn't believe in long-range strike, arguing 
     instead for the importance of air superiority and the primacy 
     of air-to-air platforms, one certainly can not expect the 
     Army to believe that air power has become the decisive combat 
     arm (with the army providing ``support'' in consolidating the 
     victory). An Air Force dedicated to air superiority and 
     strikes near the forward edge of battle will remain dedicated 
     to supporting the army.
       In like manner, the Navy continues to believe that 
     ``presence'' in an irreducible Navy mission, and that 
     carriers will generally be first on the scene and first to 
     fight in any theater conflict. The Navy has no reason to 
     relinquish this view so long as the Air Force insists on 
     making war with fighter assets that take weeks to months to 
     deploy, and so long as the bomber force is so small and 
     feeble that it provides no meaningful alternative for 
     performing ``carrier missions.'' And the Navy is right. 
     Unless the Air Force builds more bombers and changes its 
     strategy, the Navy must continue to have full responsibility 
     for fulfilling all of its traditional missions.
       Seen from this perspective there is in fact an inter-
     service consensus on which to resist the B-2 revolution. An 
     Air Force that believes in applying air power using short-
     range fighters must have forward access, forward basing, and 
     extensive logistical support. This in turn requires a massive 
     ground presence, and inherently perpetuates a ground-warfare 
     strategy. It also requires a massive sea-borne logistical 
     tail, inherently perpetuating traditional navy views on sea 
     control and sea power.

[[Page H4179]]

       Overall the bomber force and the B-2 in particular has 
     suffered from two major problems. First, it has lost any 
     institutional, bureaucratic advocate with the demise of 
     Strategic Air Command. Support for the B-2 means that 
     something else must suffer--and no institutional champion or 
     leader has emerged to lead that struggle. Second, support for 
     the B-2 inherently means recognition of a revolutionary new 
     form of warfare which threatens all other services and non-
     bomber interest groups. Affirming the B-2 ultimately implies 
     major changes in strategy, in service budget shares, in 
     service size and manpower, and in strongly held personal 
     convictions. United Pentagon opposition to the B-2 is thus 
     perfectly understandable.


                        vi. the pentagon studies

       Understanding the institutional resistance to the B-2 
     within the Pentagon helps shed light on the recommendations 
     of three studies recently conducted by the DoD on the B-2. 
     These studies were not done willingly. The triggering event 
     was congressional legislation in 1994 mandating that the 
     Pentagon prepare an evaluation of the adequacy of the 
     nation's bomber force. This action resulted in the three DoD 
     studies that are evaluated below: (1) the DoD's 1995 Heavy 
     Bomber Force Study; (2) the 1995 Heavy Bomber Industrial 
     Capabilities Study; and (3) the 1997 Quadrennial Defense 
     Review's study of the B-2 issue. In addition, we examined one 
     additional study conducted by the staff of the Commission on 
     Roles and Missions (CORM), entitled Future Bomber Force.
       In examining the DoD studies, we would like to emphasize 
     two points. First, the studies studiously ignored the 
     fundamental strategic choice at hand: should we maintain a 
     bomber force or go to a force structure based primarily on 
     short-range air power? Second, in formulating scenario and 
     modeling assumptions (which inherently drive study outcomes) 
     the analysts had to go to extreme lengths to ensure that 
     study results supported the status quo and recommend against 
     additional B-2s.
       Our overall assessment of the DoD studies is that Pentagon 
     politics took precedence over analytical objectivity and 
     national security concerns. The basic problem with the 
     Pentagon studies is that they fly in the face of common 
     sense. The following seems to be an appropriate analogy for 
     the current situation. We must plan to face an adversary 
     armed with a sawed off shotgun (a metaphor for weapons of 
     mass destruction). Given a choice between short-range pistols 
     and long-range rifles, the Pentagon studies try to argue that 
     pistols are preferable, even though this choice requires that 
     we move within shotgun range to shoot the adversary. We 
     believe that striking the enemy promptly and accurately from 
     a distance is the better choice in many scenarios, 
     particularly since it appears the long-range option is 
     cheaper over the long term.
       The 1995 Heavy Bomber Force Study and its industrial base 
     counterpart were carefully constructed to come up with the 
     desired answer (no additional B-2s required). The CORM bomber 
     study came up with the wrong answer (additional B-2s are very 
     attractive) and was quietly shuffled aside. The 1997 study 
     initially came up with the wrong answer (additional B-2s was 
     the most cost-effective option available), and was reshaped 
     to provide the desired answer (no more B-2s required).


                      the 1995 heavy bomber study

       The 1995 Heavy Bomber Study was conducted by the OSD, the 
     Joint Staff, and the Institute for Defense Analyses.\11\ 
     Following its chilly reception in Congress, the Department 
     has so far proven reluctant to publish a final scripted 
     report of the study. As noted by Dr. Glenn Buchan, a 
     distinguished and experienced bomber analyst at the RAND 
     Corporation,
       ``The fundamental problem with the heavy bomber study is . 
     . . whoever framed the study cooked the books. They allowed a 
     set of assumptions that led to a preordained outcome by 
     essentially ruling out all the things that would have led 
     them to other results.'' \12\
       Buchan also noted that once the assumptions were laid out,
       ``one could have concluded in somewhere between 30 seconds 
     and, perhaps if one were very careful and thoughtful, two or 
     three minutes, how this was going to come out, not 
     necessarily having to go through all the computer runs and 
     all the analysis.'' \13\
       The Heavy Bomber Study assumed the following scenario as 
     its base case. The United States would receive approximately 
     two weeks of strategic warning. Acting immediately on this 
     warning, the United States would have these two weeks to 
     deploy large numbers of fighters and aircraft carriers to the 
     theater (without encountering any base access or logistical 
     support problems). The enemy, having watched and waited as 
     the U.S. deployed overwhelming force into the theater (at 
     unprecedented rates) would then attack anyway. American 
     fighters would then fly at sortie rates far beyond those 
     achieved during the Gulf War to defeat these enemy forces.
       To the thousands of fighters in combat, the analysts then 
     added 20 additional B-2s to planned bomber force (for a total 
     of 40 B-2s). Using a land war simulation, the analysts then 
     assessed the impact of the additional B-2s (which were flown 
     at lower sortie rates than that achieved by B-52s in the Gulf 
     War) on the overall campaign. In other words, the 
     capabilities of 20 B-2s, an approximately $25 billion 
     investment over the next two decades, were compared to those 
     of a force structure costing about $5 trillion over the same 
     period. As Dr. Paul Kaminski, the study leader, observed in 
     his briefing: ``. . . we have ten times more tactical 
     aircraft than bombers. . . . After everything has arrived, 
     the bomber results get lost in the overall aggregate.'' \14\
       The conclusion of the study was that the planned bomber 
     force could meet all demands ``for anticipated scenarios and 
     reasonable excursions.'' But testimony revealed that the 
     excursions were carefully scripted. For example, one scenario 
     was supposed to look at the effects of a no tactical air 
     power case--that is, if we encountered difficulties in 
     deploying fighters or were concerned that an adversary might 
     strike our bases or carriers with weapons of mass 
     destruction. But it was revealed in testimony that through 
     some unexplained development, a wing of fighters were always 
     assumed present to support B-52 and B-1B bombers. What would 
     happen if those fighters weren't there? This case, dismissed 
     as ``unreasonable'', was never considered.
       Moreover, results that showed the B-2 in a favorable light 
     were never considered in the decision-making process. For 
     example, in testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, 
     Senator Sam Nunn asked Dr. Kaminski about the likely results 
     if the U.S. was taken by surprise and theater access was a 
     problem. Kaminski replied: ``Then I am going to need a lot 
     more bombers than I have in the current force.'' But this 
     conclusion was never incorporated into the study 
     recommendations.
       The second major conclusion of the study was that it would 
     be more cost-effective to invest in additional munitions, not 
     additional B-2s, since additional weapons increased overall 
     force effectiveness. This is an odd argument. By the same 
     logic, one could argue that it would make more sense to 
     invest in jet fuel stocks rather than fighter aircraft, since 
     sufficient jet fuel is needed to make the force more 
     effective.
       What the study should have looked at was how an additional 
     buy of B-2s compared to buys of other planned force elements. 
     But this is something the Pentagon resisted. Simply 
     discussing the tradeoffs ended up causing such internal 
     friction in the Pentagon that the topic was removed from the 
     study. An unbiased analysis would quickly illustrate the B-
     2's superior cost-effectiveness compared to other planned 
     (and preferred) force elements--and thus would throw the 
     careful balance of interests in the Department into disarray.


             the 1995 bomber industrial capabilities study

       The Bomber Industrial Capabilities Study was directed by 
     Congress, chartered by the DOD, and conducted by The Analytic 
     Sciences Corporation (TASC). The study concluded that 
     additional B-2 production was not necessary to maintain the 
     bomber industrial base because, with enough time and money, 
     we could eventually recreate the capability to build B-2s in 
     the future.
       Eliminating time and money from consideration avoids the 
     dominant real world issues. Obviously, with enough time and 
     money, we can recreate anything. The real question is: how 
     much time and money compared to the option under 
     consideration by Congress--continued production. On that 
     question, the industrial base study was entirely silent.
       Although used to validate the decision against more B-2s, 
     the TASC industrial study provides critical strategic data. 
     The dominant Pentagon argument against the B-2 is 
     affordability. Yet their own industrial study estimates that 
     building a new bomber type, a B-3, could easily cost in 
     excess of $35 billion for research and development alone 
     (with unit flyaway costs about the same as a B-2) and raised 
     questions about the affordability of such a program. If 
     building more B-2s--with research and design already 
     complete--is too expensive, then certainly the cost of a B-3 
     is prohibitive. Deciding against B-2 production is therefore 
     a de facto decision against any future bomber production. It 
     is a strategic decision to abandon the bomber force.


         the quadrennial defense review and the 1997 b-2 study

       Congress clearly had little confidence in the preceding 
     Pentagon analyses, and in 1995 appropriated funds to resume 
     B-2 production. In February 1996, President Clinton ordered 
     these funds spent on bringing the original test B-2 (Air 
     Vehicle 1) up to operational configuration. In addition, and 
     at Congress' behest, he ordered the Pentagon to once again 
     re-examine the B-2 issue. This time, the Pentagon was to 
     compare the B-2's cost-effectiveness to that of other deep 
     attack systems. The absence of such a cost-effectiveness 
     comparison was widely viewed by critics as one of the 1995 
     Heavy Bomber Study's major failings.
       The Pentagon, though receiving this direction in February 
     1996, conducted no specific B-2 analysis until March 1997. 
     Over the space of several weeks, analysts from the Joint 
     Staff, OSD, and the Institute for Defense Analyses--the same 
     group that conducted the 1995 bomber force study--ran their 
     computer models and developed a summary briefing. The 
     analytic results of this study obviously caused alarm 
     bells among the Pentagon hierarchy. Simply put, the 
     results showed that B-2s were more cost-effective than any 
     other force element.
       Before proceeding further, let us examine the analysis. 
     Four scenarios were developed:

[[Page H4180]]

     a two conflict scenario with warning (allowing time for 
     deployment), a similar scenario with short warning, a similar 
     scenario with short warning and base-access problems; and a 
     two conflict scenario with warning where one of the conflicts 
     featured a ``near peer'' competitor.
       The Pentagon then assumed the immediate retirement of the 
     following forces: 2 fighter wings (plus 10 percent of Marine 
     air); 4 fighter wings (plus 20 percent respectively of Marine 
     air); 2 carriers and their air wings (though not the entire 
     battle group); 3 carriers and their air wings; and all the B-
     1Bs.
       With the funds freed up by these individual retirements 
     over the next 20 years, the study then looked at how many B-
     2s could be purchased. In general, retiring a carrier would 
     allow the purchase of 12-14 B-2s; a fighter wing about 8-12 
     B-2s.
       Using a complex computer simulation, the analysts then 
     looked at how many B-2s were needed to replace the various 
     retired force elements in each of the four scenarios. In 
     almost every case, savings enabled more B-2s to be purchased 
     than were required to replace the retired systems' military 
     capability in the conflict scenarios. In other words, B-2s 
     proved more cost-effective than the planned forces.
       These were not the desired answers. What the analysis 
     showed in general was that very small numbers of B-2s could 
     potentially replace large groups of planned--and thus 
     preferred--forces (such as the entire B-1B fleet). And the 
     cost of those B-2s was substantially less than the forces 
     they were replacing. In the wrong hands, these results could 
     be used to argue that a B-2-based force structure could 
     support U.S. national security at lower budget levels--
     exactly what had been predicted by B-2 supporters in Congress 
     after the Heavy Bomber Study debacle. Accordingly, arguments 
     were developed to counter these results.
       One tactic was to break up the warfighting results into two 
     phases: (1) the halt phase; and (2) the counter-offensive. 
     The halt phase--the period during which U.S. forces would 
     stop an enemy offensive--was highlighted by the QDR strategy 
     as being extremely crucial and the results once again showed 
     the B-2s cost-effectiveness; very few B-2s were needed to 
     replace carriers, fighters, or B-1Bs. For the counter-
     offensive (that is, the period when our ground forces had 
     built up and had launched an offensive after months of aerial 
     bombardment), the analysts calculated the number of weapons 
     each force element could deliver compared to a cost-
     equivalent number of B-2s. These results showed that the 
     other forces would be able to deliver more weapons in a given 
     period of time (unlike the fighter forces, however, the B-2s 
     were not allowed to deploy forward to increase their sortie 
     rates).
       But the counter-offensive results really showed how 
     carefully the metrics had to be arranged to achieve the 
     desired outcome. Weapons delivery potential after we have 
     stopped the enemy advance, destroyed his army, ripped apart 
     his strategic infrastructure, chopped up his lines of 
     communication, attacked his leadership, and destroyed his air 
     force and air defenses, hardly matters. The issue of winning 
     or losing is no longer in doubt. Assuming performance in the 
     counter-offensive to be as important as in the halt phase 
     contradicts the QDR strategy that presents the halt phase as 
     being absolutely vital to meeting national security 
     objectives. In addition, if the analysis had used ton-miles 
     as a metric instead of just tons, the B-2 would have proven 
     superior. Ton-miles, which is calculated by taking tons of 
     weapons delivered times miles flown, is a useful measure 
     because it incorporates the important metric of range.
       However, the most revealing illustration of the Pentagon's 
     orchestration of the results was found in the ``capability 
     gap'' charts, which emerged as the centerpiece of the 
     arguments used against the B-2 since the quantitative results 
     had proven so problematic. Here, the Pentagon claimed that 
     retiring a single aircraft carrier, for example, would 
     greatly reduce the nation's capability to do drug 
     interdiction, peace enforcement, anti-ship warfare, the sea 
     control, among others. Similar claims were made for the 
     retirement of fighter wings. This line of argument raises 
     more questions than it answers. First, the ``capabilities'' 
     were completely undefined and the B-2s unjustifiably excluded 
     as potential contributors. Why couldn't the B-2s contribute 
     to some of these missions? For example, B-2s could destroy 
     drug manufacturing facilities with precision bombs, provide 
     sea surveillance, or fire anti-shipping missiles to assist in 
     sea control. Second, it is unclear that a small reduction in 
     the total force would have any effect on these missions. 
     Indeed, but a small fraction of the force would be required 
     to fly a few ``drug interdiction'' missions. Third, and most 
     important, the missions selected are hardly core missions. 
     What is more important, conducting drug interdiction or 
     preventing the seizure of the Persian Gulf oil fields? What 
     the Pentagon was trying to obfuscate was the fact that the B-
     2 was more cost-effective than the planned forces in fighting 
     major theater wars. And that was an unacceptable answer.
       The clearest illustration of the bias inherent in the 1997 
     study can be found in a closer examination of the 
     ``capability gap'' issue. Specifically, not a single chart 
     was dedicated to highlighting the capabilities currently 
     missing from the current and planned force that would be 
     generated by expanding the B-2 fleet. For example, we 
     currently cannot halt a large-scale armored assault without 
     tactical air forces in-theater prior to the outbreak of 
     hostilities. How do we plan to do so in the case of a 
     surprise attack? How do we plan on conducting a large-scale 
     pre-emptive strike against an adversary's facilities for 
     producing weapons of mass destruction? How do we plan on 
     deploying forces in the face of chemical and biological 
     attack--something the QDR says should be assumed? How do we 
     plan on conducting a large-scale pre-emptive strike against 
     an adversary's facilities for producing weapons of mass 
     destruction? How do we plan on striking facilities that lie 
     outside fighter range, such as terrorist camps in 
     northwestern Iran? Nowhere in the briefing are the advantages 
     of an expanded B-2 fleet articulated, much less highlighted. 
     How could the Pentagon advertise this as an unbiased analysis 
     if no consideration was ever given to the formidable 
     advantages offered by the B-2? The lack of such consideration 
     is the clearest evidence that the Pentagon planners preferred 
     to stay rooted in the concepts and force structures of the 
     past--and not consider the future.


                       the 1995 corm bomber study

       In 1994 legislation, the Congress also appointed a 
     Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM). As one of their 
     tasks, the CORM was asked to provide an opinion on the size 
     of the B-2 force. The CORM sidestepped this issue in their 
     final report--only stating that if one believed the 
     assumptions of the Heavy Bomber Force Study study, one could 
     believe its conclusions. But what the CORM staff did conduct 
     was a most interesting study--primarily, it seems, because it 
     was performed outside of the DOD's influence. Future Bomber 
     Force, however, was filed away until published by the Air 
     Force Association in 1996.
       Future Bomber Force offered a fresh view of the B-2 issue. 
     It was the only government study to provide empirical 
     insights into the value of stealth technology. Like the QDR's 
     quantitative results, it showed that B-2s were the most cost-
     effective weapon system available when compared to other 
     preferred forces. However, it did so using simple 
     ``spreadsheet'' calculations instead of complex computer 
     simulations. Most significantly, Future Bomber Force was the 
     only bomber study to show a grasp of the revolutionary 
     potential offered by the B-2. Listed below is its ``Summary 
     of Findings'':
       ``The synergy of advanced munitions with the range and 
     payload of long-range bombers may be more important to the 
     Department of Defense in the years ahead than at any time 
     during the Cold War. Combined with the stealth of the B-2, 
     precision munitions with long-range bombers have the 
     potential to provide key capabilities not available from any 
     other forces to meet critical future national security 
     requirements. Specifically, these capabilities include:
       ``The potential to halt an armored force in a matter of 
     days from long-range; the ability to survivably operate 
     against an enemy from beyond reach of enemy weapons 
     (particularly missiles armed with weapons of mass 
     destruction); guaranteed responsiveness--independent from 
     forward basing or carrier prepositioning; the ability to 
     achieve strategic or operational surprise quickly, imposing 
     wide-spread attack and paralysis upon an aggressor with 
     minimum exposure of friendly personnel; the ability to swing 
     survivable and effective force from one MRC to another 
     rapidly; the psychological impact of strike without notice; 
     the ability to induce enough uncertainty in a potential 
     aggressor to deter hostile activity conventionally while the 
     U.S. is militarily engaged elsewhere; and greatly reduced 
     support assets, personnel, and basing requirements to achieve 
     equivalent effects with non-stealth and/or smaller payload, 
     shorter range aircraft.''


                  vii. conclusions and recommendations

       Our review of the bomber issue concludes that current plans 
     for the long-range air power force are woefully deficient. We 
     believe that the nation's long-range air power capabilities 
     will be more important in the future than they have been in 
     the past. Indeed, the changing shape of the security 
     environment makes long-range air power ideally suited to the 
     protection of American security interests in the decades 
     ahead. Moreover, we believe that proper exploitation of the 
     B-2 could radically change the way in which we think about 
     and employ military power, leading ultimately to a much more 
     affordable and effective military posture.
       The only option for maintaining the viability of the bomber 
     force over the long term is to continue production of the B-2 
     stealth bomber. Our review of the DoD's studies indicates 
     that the B-2 issue has become so captive to Pentagon 
     bureaucratic politics that the Department has made the wrong 
     strategic choice. By following the DoD's recommendations, the 
     bomber force itself becomes a wasted asset. The nation will 
     be abandoning a weapon system that is becoming very cost-
     effective as precision weapons are introduced. This 
     capability will become increasingly vital to supporting U.S. 
     national security in this very challenging new era. This is 
     not the way to conduct rational national security decision-
     making. By allowing organizational politics and short-term 
     affordability concerns to dominate the B-2 debate, we will 
     turn our backs on the future. Moreover, we will risk U.S. 
     national security interests and the lives of thousands of 
     young Americans.
       We believe Pentagon opposition will eventually ameliorate 
     once military planners gain greater appreciation of the 
     advantages offered by the B-2. But until that time, the 
     future of the bomber force and this revolutionary weapon 
     system lies with Congress.

[[Page H4181]]

     The situation is similar to that of the F-117 in the 1980s. 
     The Air Force insisted that a single squadron of these 
     revolutionary aircraft was all that was needed; Congress 
     directed a doubling of the buy, an action that saved many 
     American and allied lives in the Gulf War. Today, once again, 
     only Congress can set in motion the steps needed to maintain 
     production of the B-2.
       Additional B-2s are affordable within planned budgets. The 
     Pentagon plans to increase procurement spending approximately 
     50% by 2001 and those funds should be spent on the most cost-
     effective systems, such as additional B-2s. We make the 
     following recommendations:
       Fund at a minimum one additional B-2 squadron (9 aircraft), 
     but keep open the possibility of increasing the production 
     rate and planned force size;
       Direct the Department of Defense to develop and provide to 
     the Congress a five-year procurement plan that contains a 
     full funding plan for one additional squadron of B-2s; and
       Hold a hearing to assess whether to re-establish an 
     operational command in the Air Force dedicated to long-range 
     strike, headed by a four star general, who can ensure that 
     bomber issues are given appropriate consideration in national 
     security decision-making.
       The fundamental strategic choice is up to you in Congress. 
     An enhanced bomber force centered on a larger B-2 fleet could 
     make revolutionary contributions to our national security. We 
     urge you to take the steps necessary to make sure that the 
     opportunity afforded by the B-2--a better, more effective, 
     and more affordable military--becomes reality.

                               FOOTNOTES

     \1\ William S. Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense 
     Review, May 1997, p. 13.
     \2\ See Charles Perry, et. al, Long-Range Bombers and the 
     Role of Airpower in the New Century, Institute for Foreign 
     Policy Analysis, 1995, p. 57.
     \3\ An expanded version of the ``nuclear argument for 
     bombers'' can be found in Stephen Cambone and Colin S. Gray, 
     ``The Role of Nuclear Forces in U.S. National Security 
     Strategy: Implications of the B-2 Bomber,'' Comparative 
     Strategy, 15:207-231, 1996.
     \4\ Future Bomber Force, Commission on Roles and Missions, 
     1995, p. 3.
     \5\ Ibid.
     \6\ ``The Value of Stealth,'' Headquarters, United States Air 
     Force, 1991.
     \7\ See Future Bomber Force, Commission on Roles and 
     Missions, 1995, p. 11.
     \8\ Donald B. Rice, ``To B-2 or not B-2, That is the 
     Question,'' The Washington Times, November 5, 1995.
     \9\ Ken Watman and Dean Wilkening, Regional Deterrence 
     Strategies, RAND, 1995.
     \10\ Charles Horner, ``Unmatched Survivability,'' The 
     Washington Times, June 13, 1995.
     \11\ For a detailed assessment, see Kurt Guthe, A Precisely 
     Guided Analytic Bomb: The Defense Department's Heavy Bomber 
     Study, National Institute for Public Policy, September 1996.
     \12\ Testimony to Military Procurement Subcommittee, House 
     National Security Committee, September 12, 1996.
     \13\ Cited in Kurt Guthe, A Precisely Guided Analytic Bomb: 
     The Defense Department's Heavy Bomber Study, National 
     Institute for Public Policy, September 1996, p. 41.
     \14\ DoD Special Briefing, May 1995.
     \15\ Donald B. Rice, ``To B-2 or not B-2, That is the 
     Question ``The Washington Times, November 5, 1995.
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, how much time do we have remaining?
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] has 4\1/2\ 
minutes remaining, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Foley] has 7\1/2\ 
minutes remaining, and the gentleman from California [Mr. Hunter] has 
23\1/2\ minutes remaining.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 30 seconds to make a 
response to the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks], who just spoke.
  Mr. Chairman, when the gentleman talked about conventional 
deterrents, it is not in the platform, it is in the weapons. And the 
weapons are standoff smart bombs and precision-guided missiles. Second, 
remember, we do not have zero, we have 21 of these planes. I think it 
is a flight into fantasy, it is a bit of hyperbole to think if we jump 
from 21 to 30, the world will tremble. If that is the case and we 
cannot see the Stealth bomber, tell the world we have a thousand of 
them. They cannot see it. How would they know? That would really be a 
deterrent and we would save a whole lot of money.
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 30 seconds to respond to the 
comments of the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums].
  The standoff weapons, Mr. Chairman, are extremely expensive. They are 
over $1 million apiece. That is our air launch cruise missiles. In 
fact, closer to a million and a half apiece. That is compared to 
$23,000 for the short-range weapons once your bomber has penetrated.
  Mr. Chairman, we are sending out our Navy ships that have missile 
tubes with no missiles in them because the Navy and the other services 
have not bought enough missiles. It is difficult to get these very 
expensive standoff weapons that the gentleman says we are going to be 
buying. The smart buy is the B-2 bomber.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman 
from Missouri [Mr. Skelton], the ranking member of the subcommittee.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I was sorry to hear a few moments ago the 
gentleman from Florida [Mr. Foley] say this is not about the defense of 
our country. It is about the defense of the young men and young women 
in uniform, those who are on the firing line, those who are nearing 
battle, those who may be called upon unless we have a weapons system 
that slows down or stops the enemy. The question is asked by my friend 
from California, who wants it? The young men and young women on the 
ground want it. Talk to the young soldiers who saw the bombardment and 
what the F-117's did to help them win in the Persian Gulf war.
  Mr. Chairman, this is an important decision. It is not something we 
should take lightly. We should also be very careful in what we do this 
evening and not do something against the interest of America. Often, 
historically, this Congress has done that. We should not step into that 
hole once begin.
  It is rather interesting that the replay of something back in 1925, a 
courageous Brigadier General by the name of Billy Mitchell spoke openly 
and forcefully for a bomber force. And here we are again, in 1997, 
saying the same thing, only with a more sophisticated bomber force that 
has stealth, that has long range, that can save American lives.
  It is interesting that the second part of this amendment has not been 
alluded to, the $331 million that goes elsewhere. I say to my 
colleagues that the Senate in conference I think will invade this 
budget for $331 million for their programs because not one helicopter, 
not one truck, not one artillery piece is singled out for these 
dollars.
  This Stealth B-2 bomber has a mission, it has an important mission to 
fulfill the strategy set forth in the recent quadrennial defense review 
of shaping, responding and preparing. Insofar as shaping the 
battlefield, the F-117, the Stealth, did work. It had short range. We 
had several air bases nearby. And as time goes by, as already has been 
mentioned, those will be fewer and fewer. This allows us to respond 
within hours rather than the days and the weeks it takes to get fighter 
bombers, to get aircraft carriers into position. We cannot count on 
local host airfields.
  Mr. Chairman, long-range air power will be more important than ever 
in the decades ahead. Consequently, we do not believe that a mere force 
of 21 B-2's will satisfy foreseeable U.S. military requirements. The 
changing shape, the security environment makes long-range stealthy 
precision strike power ideally suited to the protection of American 
security interest in the decades ahead and that the Nation's long-range 
air power capabilities will be more important in the future than they 
have been in the past.
  The B-2's ability to strike independently within hours anywhere in 
the globe from bases in the United States leaves it uniquely well-
suited among all U.S. force elements for dealing with unexpected 
challenges. And we have had those in our history: Pearl Harbor, Kuwait. 
They are there.
  The only realistic option for maintaining the viability of the long-
range stealthy precision strike force over the long-term is to continue 
production of the B-2. The B-2 is there for a critical national asset 
which is uniquely capable of performing these vital missions. That is 
reality. That is reality, Mr. Chairman. Being able to strike the enemy 
promptly and accurately from a distance is the best choice in many 
scenarios, particularly since it is more effective and less costly than 
other options when all costs are considered.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge a no vote on this amendment.
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Cunningham], Navy top gun, my seat mate from San Diego.
  Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, Shoeless John Kasich, tell me it is not 
so. Tell me an individual who is a caring individual would send our men 
and women off to combat. In Vietnam, we lost 10 percent of our bomber 
force in 11 days, B-52s. And that is what we are asking our kids to go 
forward in. Not with standoff weapons, like the gentleman says, but our 
kids are going to die.

[[Page H4182]]

  Shoeless John Kasich, put yourself in an airplane that is on fire, 
coming down, not knowing if you are going to die or you are going to be 
a prisoner of war. I cannot tell my colleague, I have been through 
that. And there is no Benson and Hedges in white scarf. When they told 
my mom I was shot down, they had to take her to the hospital; she had a 
nervous breakdown.
  That is what we are talking about in these families. And why, why the 
B-52 in the first place? You take an F-22 which the Air Force is going 
to escort a bomber in, the SU-27, the SU-35, and the SU-37, which 
Russia is shipping all over the country today, with its big radar, can 
knock down our airplanes. That puts us inside the envelope when they 
shoot their AA-12, which outranks and outflies our RAM. Our kids are 
going to make it because the F-22 and the B-2 get in undetected before 
the MIG's, and they are going to die instead of ours.

                              {time}  1930

  But put them there with a B-52 and that thing is going to illuminate 
the whole sky. Everybody is going to know where your force is and they 
are going to attack it, and our kids are going to die.
  Shoeless John Kasich, tell me it ain't so. Tell me that you would not 
put our kids in harm's way and put them out there where they are not 
going to come back.
  The gentleman from Florida says he supports the flag. I appreciate 
that. But we damn near died for the flag, and I do not want our kids to 
die coming back in B-52's and antiquated B-51's, or B-1's. Give us a 
chance, Mr. Chairman.
  Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 7\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from 
Ohio [Mr. Kasich], the chairman of the Committee on the Budget.
  Mr. KASICH. Mr. Chairman, let me just suggest to all the people that 
talk about the fact that people's lives are being put at risk, I do not 
know whether my colleagues know it or not, but the military does not 
want this plane. They do not want it. If they wanted it, they would ask 
for it and they would make space for it. Why? Because they think there 
are other priorities that are going to protect people's lives, that 
there are other requests that ought to be honored, that are going to 
work to save people in time of conflict.
  By attacking the people who do not support buying more planes, and to 
somehow bring into question the fact that there is some question about 
our commitment to the ability of the United States to succeed in war, 
is not just to attack us but to attack the military, the Pentagon, the 
ones that fight the war. They do not want the plane. They do not want 
it because they do not believe we can afford it and, frankly, a number 
of them believe that it is a cold war relic.
  The B-2 was built. Its purpose was to fly inside the Soviet Union in 
the middle of a nuclear war to hunt down mobile targets. We could not 
find mobile targets in Iraq. Here we were to fly into the middle of the 
Soviet Union, in the middle of a nuclear war. That is why the plane was 
designed. That was its purpose. I was there when we first heard about 
what its purpose was. Any other new mission is a mission that was 
created here, in this House, by some people who were concerned about 
national security and some people who were concerned about jobs. I 
respect that, but I do not support jobs bills coming out of the Federal 
Government. I used to fight them up here. Jobs are to be created in the 
private sector. That is why we are trying to balance the budget and get 
lower interest rates.
  The simple fact of the matter is it does not have a mission anymore. 
I will suggest to Members that I was engaged in the negotiations with 
our Secretary of Defense and with the people at the Pentagon and we 
signed up to an agreement, 20 planes. That is what they said they 
needed. I talked with our former Secretary of Defense, Mr. Cheney, who 
said, contrary to any letter he signed, ``I want 20.'' We made an 
agreement to build 20. We are going to spend $44 billion to buy 21 B-
2's. Every time I look at the math, the math gets creative. We get 
creative math. ``Well, the next set is going to cost less.'' I know 
this. Show me the money. The money is, for 21 planes, we spent $44 
billion, and we will have 21 of these planes that will function.
  Second, the bombers. The last time I checked, the bombers worked 
pretty good in Iraq. In fact, the statement was it made the rubble 
bounce. They worked well.
  We need standoff weapons. If we want to talk about putting people at 
risk, why would we want to develop a system where you fly over the 
enemy if you can actually stand outside, away from the enemy, and 
destroy the same targets? The response to that is, ``We can't afford 
those standoff weapons.''
  Well, if we did not spend another $27 billion on a plane that the 
Pentagon does not want, maybe we could buy the standoff weapons. The 
last time I checked, there was a big report that came out that said we 
had a severe readiness problem that jeopardized the ability of the 
military to function effectively. In this bill, we have not 
significantly increased the amount of money for readiness. Some people 
argue we cut it. There was a study that just came out and said we were 
not ready.
  I would suggest we take the $351 million we have and put it into 
readiness, help the guard, the reserve. Help them. Give them the money 
they need. The fact is, is that passing more B-2 bombers in my judgment 
undermines the ability to have a strong national defense because it 
puts our money in the wrong priority items.
  I am a supporter of the F-22 for one reason: Air superiority. We need 
it. I am for it. I believe in it. I believe in the F-16. Did my 
colleagues see the number of F-16's that would have to be canceled over 
the lifetime of this to buy a weapon the Pentagon does not want? I know 
this in my career around here. When the Pentagon wants something, we 
give it to them. And when the Pentagon does not want something, we give 
it to them.
  The simple fact is, is that my friend, the gentleman from California, 
I hold in the highest regard. He is absolutely committed to a strong 
national defense and I salute him for it. And I salute a lot of my 
opponents on this issue. I really do. I have high regard for the work 
that they do in the House. But this is really a matter of judgments and 
a matter of priorities, not a matter of who is more for us to win and 
be effective and provide for the security of our people.
  We firmly believe that with the B-1's, with the 21 B-2's, and with B-
52's that have not flown, that in fact there are appropriate missions 
for all of those bombers. Just this last week we defeated additional D-
5 missiles that go in the submarines, that are another standoff weapon.
  The age of the future is about technology, and it is about air 
superiority, and it is about mobility. But not necessarily mobility as 
it relates to a plane like the B-2, which the military itself says does 
not fit in their plans for mobility. The fact is we are going to move 
into the next century. The cold war is over, and the cold war relics 
that are associated with the cold war have to be put in their place.
  Do we have a hedge? Do we have a hedge against some potential threats 
out in the future? The answer is yes. But what we should not do is 
undermine our ability to allow the Department of Defense in working 
with the Congress to set the right priorities for the next century, to 
have a military budget that right now cannot all be funded and not to 
stick another program in that costs $27 billion, that will in fact 
undermine our ability to have effective conventional weapons and our 
ability to have a high state of readiness for the American soldier and 
sailor and airman.
  I would say to my colleagues, the debate is not over the 21 bombers. 
Mr. Chairman, I am not asking the House to kill the 21 B-2's that cost 
the $44 billion. I am asking the House to stay with the agreement. I am 
asking the House to reject the idea that we can afford another $27 
billion to buy additional B-2's.
  I am asking the House to cast a vote for national security, for 
national defense, and for the fighting men and women, so that in fact 
we can be more effective. Let us not undermine the ability to win the 
wars and to pursue a good national security strategy by putting too 
many things in a bill that the military itself says we do not need.
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume, 
just to respond briefly to the remarks of the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. 
Kasich].

[[Page H4183]]

  Mr. Chairman, first, the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Kasich], for whom I 
have great respect, said the cold war is over and the B-2 is a cold war 
relic.
  The problem with the Soviet Union dissolving is they did not dissolve 
their SAM production. That is surface-to-air missiles. They are 
designed to do one thing, and that is kill American aircraft. That is 
how they shot down Scott O'Grady over Bosnia. Basically a little batch 
of teenagers in uniform with 3 weeks' training time in SAM missiles 
delivered from the Soviet Union, now Russia, were able to shoot down an 
American high-performance aircraft.
  Mr. Chairman, the red on this map of the world denotes all of the 
nations that have SAM sites: Libya, Syria, North Korea, and China have 
lots of SAM sites. That means that if Americans drive nonstealth 
aircraft into those SAM sites as the gentleman from California [Mr. 
Cunningham] said, a number of them are going to die. Second, the 
gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Kasich] should be happy to know that we have 
saved in the reform part of this budget according to CBO $15 billion 
over the next 5 years. That is enough according to CBO to purchase the 
$12 billion buy of B-2's and, once more, it is 1/35th of what we are 
going to spend for short-range aircraft.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. HUNTER. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.
  Mr. DICKS. The gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Kasich] says stealth does not 
matter. Stealth helped us win the gulf war. But this was after Saddam 
had already grabbed Kuwait. We then blew him out of the ground, in 
essence, with the F-117. What we are saying is with the B-2, we can 
stop him from getting Kuwait. That is the big difference.
  Mr. HUNTER. The gentleman makes a good point. Saddam Hussein gave us 
6 months to build airfields and acquire airfields. We cannot guarantee 
that in every situation.
  Mr. DICKS. If we could stop him before he gets there, we could save 
billions of dollars and save many, many lives.
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
California [Ms. Harman], a very articulate member of the committee.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Kasich] was 
talking about priorities. I rise in support of the B-2 and its priority 
role in American military strategy. This amendment offers us the wrong 
choices. This issue is not about the reserve components or about 
whether the B-2 is capable of doing what it is advertised to do. In 
future warfare, technology will be more important than manpower. Using 
large forces, whether for combat or to support forces engaged in 
combat, will be very risky given the lucrative target they present for 
weapons of mass destruction.
  The reserve components are being drawn down, and that is an 
appropriate course of action given likely warfare scenarios. Trading 
the B-2, a vital asset for all parts of our strategy, to fund reserve 
component accounts that will be substantially reduced in the future 
does not make much sense. The question is not whether the B-2 does what 
is promised, as some would have us believe, or whether other platforms 
can do the same job, because B-2 performance exceeds standards. We have 
heard about its stealth, we have heard about how it can meet the QDR 
requirements of shape, respond and prepare. It is the only system that 
can fly great distances, penetrate hostile airspace and deliver massive 
amounts of munitions on key targets with acceptable, even minimal, 
risks.
  During last week's debate on the defense authorization bill, I 
repeatedly stated my view that we can buy a better defense for less 
money. We can. We can and we must fund essential weapons systems 
including long-lead funding for 9 more B-2s. We can and we must cut 
outmoded weapons systems and excess infrastructure. That is the right 
trade. The trade in this amendment is the wrong trade.
  I urge a ``no'' vote.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Obey].
  Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, this amendment cuts $331 million, a down 
payment on 9 B-2 bombers that we do not need, and it moves the money to 
the guard and reserve. It is simply that simple. But this is not about 
just $330 million. This will remove a $27 billion time bomb from the 
budget.

                              {time}  1945

  In my view, this provision represents Congress at its very worst. It 
jams more weapons into this bill without having any way to pay for 
those weapons over the long term, it gives the contractors the goodies 
that they have lobbied for for so hard and long, but it does not cut 
out other low-priority items in order to pay for the long-term costs of 
the system, and we are not talking about loose change.
  For the cost of just one of these bombers, we could pay for the 
undergraduate tuition for every single student at the University of 
Wisconsin for the next 11 years. Now that is not small potatoes. For 
the cost of just two of these bombers, we could double the cost of 
cancer research in this country.
  Which investment do my colleagues think will protect more families 
from the threat that they really face? An investment in two more B-2 
bombers or a doubling of cancer research in this country?
  There have been five studies that have indicated that this weapon is 
not needed in preference to other weapons. There have been five studies 
which say do not go ahead with it. Secretary Cohen's quarterly defense 
review or quadrennial defense review said this in part in opposing the 
B-2: It said existing forces would have to be retired immediately to 
pay for the additional B-2's. Even then the savings from retiring the 
forces are not enough to offset the large upfront investment for the B-
2's, and there would be a loss in war-fighting capacity during the 
decade or more between when the outgoing forces were retired and all 
the B-2's were delivered.
  Mr. Chairman, that alone ought to tell my colleagues vote for this 
amendment.
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Texas, Mr. Sam Johnson, former POW, great Thunderbird driver, and great 
pilot.
  Mr. SAM JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. Chairman, as my colleagues know, we 
forgot what we are here for, and that is to protect the United States 
of America. The B-2 is expensive, but we know it is the only available 
system that can directly attack heavily defended areas anywhere in the 
world from the United States within hours. We do not have to deploy, we 
do not have to escort, we do not have to create a big force. It means 
that B-2 is likely to carry most of the burden in any war.
  To say that we have 21 and that should be enough is naive and 
dangerous. That number was kind of pulled out of the air anyway, I 
think. The gentleman from California, Mr. Duncan Hunter, mentioned 
earlier that 10 percent of our B-52's missions were destroyed in 
Vietnam.
  I was in Vietnam. I was a POW there for nearly 7 years, and let me 
tell my colleagues something. I watched the missiles fired around us 
until we thought the sky was going to be like daylight. It was night. I 
watched three B-52's get hit in the air. Do my colleagues know what? 
That airplane is old. It cannot get in anywhere without getting hit. 
They exploded right there in the air, right in front of my eyes, and I 
saw some of our countrymen die on the spot, burn to death, and those 
that got out, bailed out, got to Earth, and do my colleagues know what? 
They got imprisoned just like I was, and one of the tail gunners had 
his leg cut off by a Vietnamese because they were mad at him.
  Do we want that? I do not think so. I think we want to protect our 
men. We need to provide the equipment, the military equipment, the most 
modern equipment that we can provide for them so that if we ever get 
into any situation like that again, and it does not have to be like 
Vietnam, it can be as was stated before, a mission to destroy the tanks 
in a place like Iraq before they get moving.
  We must protect our troops. Give them the airplane. Vote against this 
amendment.
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. McKeon] a very articulate Member.
  Mr. McKEON. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the gentleman for all the 
work he has done on this bill. As my colleagues know, I had a speech 
prepared, but I think we are to the point

[[Page H4184]]

on this debate after many years, that everything has been said and 
everyone has not said it yet, so I would like to say something a little 
different.
  I had a new grandson born today, John Wells Morrison III, and as my 
colleagues know, my big concern is that when he is my age he is still 
here, and I am really concerned that when we determine that we can 
foresee 20 and 30 years out into the future and say that we no longer 
need this kind of equipment, I have real concern because it is not 
going to matter to me, I am not going to be here. But I am concerned 
about my 15 grandchildren, and I think that I have been where this 
plane is built, I have seen the capability of this plane. And then when 
we hear like the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Sam Johnson, who had to go 
to war, fly a mission that he was ill-equipped to fly, the plane was 
not the right plane for the mission, and yet he had to fly into harm's 
way and then spend 7 years in a prisoner-of-war camp, I think it is 
criminal that we would send our young people out with equipment that is 
not the best that we can provide them with.
  Mr. Chairman, we need this plane, and we are talking about nine, nine 
planes. How many planes did we have flying in World War II? And in 
Vietnam? And in Desert Storm? We are talking nine planes to give us 
three wings, three divisions, that we can place around the world that 
would be a strong deterrent, strong help.
  We need this. Defeat this amendment.
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Kansas [Mr. Tiahrt] a B-2 proponent and expert.
  Mr. TIAHRT. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity because I have 
kind of a unique perspective. I am probably the only Member in 
Congress, I believe I am the only Member in Congress, that actually 
came out of aerospace, and I worked on some of the specifications for 
the B-2 so I know that the mission was not just to fly over Russia. It 
was to fly anywhere globally and attack any target that was protected 
by surface-to-air missiles.
  But the reason I support the B-2 is really twofold. No. 1, it is 
economical in terms of human risk. If my colleagues look at the initial 
strike in Desert Storm, there were in excess of a dozen targets. It 
took 75 aircraft, placing more than 140 servicemen at risk by those 
initial strikes, and yet that same group of tasks, those same targets, 
could have been accomplished by just two B-2's, placing only four 
pilots at risk. So in human terms of human risk, this is a very 
economical weapon to have in our inventory.
  And the second one is just the pure cost of maintaining the 75-plus 
aircraft, the procurement, the maintenance, the keeping them up. If we 
balance that with the cost of B-2's, it is more economical.
  So it may be costly, but yet it is economical, and vote no on the 
amendment.
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Rohrabacher], my friend.
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, first of all let me say I respect my 
colleagues, the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] and the 
gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Kasich] but I disagree with them on this 
issue.
  We are making a decision today of what options our leaders will have 
20 years from now. That is what is important when the gentleman from 
California's, Mr. McKeon's, grandson is around and we are not. Twenty 
years from now we do not want the option of our American political 
leaders just to be to go nuclear or to put hundreds of thousands of 
Americans at risk on the ground or to send in aircraft carriers with 
thousands of Americans on those and putting those people at risk.
  I was in the White House when President Reagan was forced to bomb 
Libya. We put thousands of Americans on American aircraft carriers at 
risk. We had to fly out of American bases in England. We are not going 
to have those American bases in England throughout the world 20 years 
from now. We need weapon systems today for our leaders 20 years from 
now that will project power from the United States of America and put 
the fewest Americans at risk that can possibly be put at risk.
  This is a cost-effective weapon when we look at the cost of this as 
compared to thousands of American lives in an aircraft carrier. We want 
to give future American leaders the option. I ask to defeat this 
amendment.
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to my friend, the 
gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Traficant].
  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I did not originally support the B-2. I 
once made a statement, ``Why build them? Tell the Soviets we have 500. 
They can't see them, they can't hear them; how are they going to 
know?''
  The wisdom of this House built the B-2. B-2 is an advantage. B-2 
gives us the edge. Yes, it is costly, but how do you quantify the value 
of the lives of our troops? How many more Scot O'Gradys, America, might 
experience those types of disasters?
  But there is one other thing today because today's debate is not 
about money, it is maintaining the position of strength to negotiate.
  Ronald Reagan said America must always negotiate from a position of 
strength. The B-2 maintains America's position of strength. That is the 
greatest deterrent we have in international possible conflict.
  Now, yes, we must balance the budget, but our major job here is to 
protect the national security. And, my colleagues, America cannot do it 
with the Neighborhood Crime Watch. We have got to step up.
  The time to kill B-2 was at the beginning. Congress went ahead. Now 
to kill the B-2 is not cost effective. The major production costs have 
already taken place. Now the copies can come forward.
  We cannot protect America with the Neighborhood Crime Watch. We must 
negotiate from a position of strength. Ronald Reagan was right about 
that. B-2 gives us the edge. Take the edge.
  I oppose the amendment.
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 45 seconds to my friend, the 
gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon].
  Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, I do not think I need 45 seconds to tell 
everybody to come over here and vote for this vital piece of weaponry 
that we need desperately in this country.
  I associate my remarks with the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Traficant]. 
He makes more sense every day. I hope he does not run for Governor, I 
hope he stays here. But let me tell my colleagues something.
  For those like my good friend from Florida, Mr. Foley, who sat in my 
office listening a few minutes ago, as my colleagues know, if they 
wonder, I suggest they put on a uniform every week and go and fly on 
those B-52 bombers that are in such bad condition that we do not know 
whether they are going to stay in the air from one day to the next. And 
my colleagues talk about young men and women serving in the military 
and giving the best money can buy. That is what we need to do right now 
is to come over here and vote for this B-2 piece of legislation.
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Texas [Mr. DeLay], the majority whip.
  Mr. DeLAY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding this time 
to me.
  Mr. Chairman, we do have a very important choice to make tonight, and 
it is a choice between a policy that shortchanges the men and women 
that risk their lives in defense of our Nation or it is a policy that 
will provide those men and women with equipment and the tools that they 
need to ensure that our Nation remains the protector of democracy and 
freedom around the world.
  Now we live in an age where when dictators are alive and well, they 
are busy stockpiling nuclear biological chemical weapons; and as 
leaders, we have to make sure that we send American soldiers into 
combat against these tyrants with the best possible chance of success.
  And as Cap Weinberger noted, the Air Force has estimated that a B-2 
with two crewmembers could conduct an attack normally involving 75 
tactical aircraft and 147 crewmembers. The procurement and lifecycle 
costs of 75 tactical aircraft approaches $7.5 billion and the 
comparable costs for one B-2 is $1.1 billion.
  Now clearly the B-2 provides us with the best opportunity to protect 
U.S. interests at the lowest costs with the best possible technology, 
and I just hope that my colleagues will make the

[[Page H4185]]

right choice tonight. A vote against keeping the B-2 line open and 
operational is a very shortsighted vote, and in this dangerous day and 
age we cannot afford to make such ill-considered and shortsighted 
choices. We need to make the right choice for our service men and women 
and for the future of this country.
  So, Mr. Chairman, I urge a ``no'' vote on this amendment.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Virginia [Mr. Sisisky].

                              {time}  2000

  Mr. SISISKY. Mr. Chairman, I do not have much time. I do not think I 
have to apologize to anybody for supporting weapons systems that 
protect our young men and women.
  It is amazing what we are arguing about. Like we do not have any 
sophisticated weapons in our arsenal, that we do not have any plans to 
build any sophisticated weapons in our arsenal. I cannot believe what 
is going on. I have heard somebody say, and I do not know who it is, 
that we are going to pay for this by the reform package of $15 billion 
that we are going to save. My friends, that is why we are in trouble 
today. That is why we are in trouble today. We are already spending the 
money that we might save.
  I want to tell my colleagues something. I thought that this weapons 
system saw its end. I am going to tell my colleagues what is at stake 
tonight. Either we stop it now, we stop it now, or we are not going to 
stop at 9, we are going to have 60 and we are going to be talking about 
$100 billion.
  Vote ``aye.''
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Maine [Mr. Allen].
  Mr. ALLEN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time.
  Mr. Chairman, during the course of this debate there have been times 
when it seemed if the question was whether the B-2 was a valuable 
plane, whether stealth technology was a valuable technology. That is 
not the issue. Stealth technology proved itself during the gulf war. We 
have 21 B-2 bombers. We do not need more. We cannot afford anymore than 
we have right now. We have difficult choices to make here today and 
that is why we are here. Mr. Chairman, $27 billion we are looking at, 
not $331 million; $27 billion needed just for nine planes.
  An earlier speaker said we need 20 B-2's for 1 major regional 
conflict and 10 for another. I submit that 20 is enough, it will do the 
job, it is a good technology, we do not need more, and what we need to 
do is make sure that we are investing in our training and equipment for 
our troops, that we are providing the other alternatives that will keep 
our forces strong, and that we are not robbing domestic programs to buy 
nine more B-2's.
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the last 2 minutes of my 
time.
  Mr. Chairman, let me just answer my friend that there are a number of 
experts who disagree that 20 B-2's is enough. Brent Scowcroft with the 
Scowcroft Study that the gentleman has a copy of is one of those 
leaders who believes that. General Chuck Horner who ran the air war in 
the Persian Gulf, who utilized stealth and utilized precision-guided 
munitions, is on the Hill visiting Members' offices because he believes 
very strongly in having enough B-2's.
  Let us get straight what we are talking about because Members have 
gone over a lot of things. We are talking about maybe 2 months worth of 
Wal-Mart sales. We are talking about one thirty-fifth of the amount of 
money that we are spending on short-range aircraft.
  Interestingly, we are moving to short-range aircraft as we lose our 
bases around the world. We are down to 14 bases. Nobody has an idea as 
to whether or not we are going to be guaranteed those bases in Japan, 
for example, in a second Korean conflict. Nobody knows exactly how we 
are going to detox the airfields because we do not have enough 
detoxification equipment.
  This is going to be the first time in our modern history when we have 
had the ability to make our pilots survivable and we told them no, and 
ironically, we said we do not want a relic flying, so we are going to 
fly 80-year-old B-52's, older than the great-grandparents of the pilots 
who wear the uniform of the United States of America.
  We have the money. We saved $15 billion in the reform bill. I know 
that the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] will be pleased with 
that, over 5 years. That more than pays for the entire B-2 program.
  Finally, the National Guard, which was supposed to benefit by the 
money that would be cut out of the B-2, says that they have an 
excellent modification program because of what the committee and the 
Congress has given them. We have messages there from the National Guard 
for every Member if we want to look at that. There is no problem there. 
Let us give our pilots the very, very best because we care about them.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman, as the ranking 
minority member, is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from 
Massachusetts [Mr. Olver].
  (Mr. OLVER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. OLVER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding. I rise 
in favor of the Dellums-Kasich-Foley amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, restarting the B-2 bomber production line cannot be 
justified on any known grounds. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have 
testified that more B-2's are unnecessary.
  Just last week, Defense Secretary William Cohen told us he opposes 
this astronomically expensive project. Further, the price tag for the 
B-2's in this bill is misleading.
  The $331 million is just a small downpayment for nine additional 
bombers.
  The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the cost of this 
project will explode to $27 billion in inflation adjusted dollars over 
20 years--for each of those nine bombers, $1.5 billion for procurement 
and $1.5 billion for maintenance. We are told the CBO is a highly 
reliable unbiased body or is that only when CBO tells us what we want 
to hear?
  For each additional B-2, we could fund prenatal care for 1\1/2\ 
million women or immunizations for nearly 10 million babies, or Head 
Start for 330,000 students or health care for \1/2\ million children or 
summer jobs for more than a million teenagers.
  If we cannot afford to give the proposed child tax credit to millions 
of poor working families who need help buying food, housing, and 
medical care, then how can we afford to waste $27 billion on B-2 
bombers.
  I urge my colleagues to save our limited resources for something of 
value--something we need.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from 
Massachusetts [Mr. Kennedy].
  Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, first of all, let me 
thank my friend from California, Mr. Dellums, for the marvelous job he 
has done on this bill not only this year, but in years in the past, and 
I hope tonight he is successful for all the efforts that he has made 
almost single-handedly at one time on this House floor to defeat the B-
2, and we ought to acknowledge his efforts. I say to my friend, he has 
done a great job.
  I come here as a strong supporter of domestic spending. We stood up 
this year and watched our housing cuts go by 25 percent. We have seen 
billions of dollars cut out of health care, WIC Program cuts, and fuel 
assistance cuts.
  I am here to tell my colleagues that I believe that I would withstand 
all of those cuts and I would stand by the people that are in those 
programs who they themselves would give up those funds if they thought 
the national security of this country was at risk. If they thought we 
needed the B-2 bomber, they would vote for the B-2 bomber and they 
would be willing to spend the taxes to pay for it.
  But this is not about the B-2 bomber, this is about a symbol. It is 
about a symbol of American might and freedom, it is about a symbol that 
is plain wrong. All we have to do is look at the Pentagon studies 
themselves to determine that the Pentagon is opposed to this. We ought 
to defeat the B-2 bomber and stand with the people of our country.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I rarely walk into the well; I generally 
speak from where the ranking member and the chair speak, but I choose 
to speak from the well because I want to speak to each and every one of 
my colleagues face-to-face.

[[Page H4186]]

  First of all, for those of my colleagues who are the freshmen and the 
sophomore Members, that is half of this Congress, I would remind each 
and every one of them that they campaigned diligently on the integrity 
of balancing the budget. My colleagues were elected, Republican and 
Democrat, freshman and sophomore, on that basis.
  This was not contemplated in the 5-year balanced budget agreement. 
This is not about B-2's. We have 21. All of this hyperbole, as if some 
way we are this Third World country technologically, is bizarre, 
extreme, absurd and ridiculous. We have 21 B-2 bombers. My colleagues 
leap quickly from the B-2 to the B-52, but they do not pause at the 95 
B-1B bombers that you spent $20.5 billion building and billions of 
additional dollars giving them conventional capability.
  Someone said the B-2 is the only long-range bomber. They know that is 
not true. The B-1 can fly as far as the B-2 flies. Both of them need 
tankers to refill them.
  What is this about? It is not even about the $331 million that I 
transferred. I just made a transfer. It could have been transferred 
anyplace. The point I am making is that this is not about transfer. It 
is about trade-off. It is about $27 billion. We cannot go home saying 
we embrace a 5-year budget agreement that did not contemplate a $27 
billion weapons system and push it into that budget and assume that we 
cannot push something out. We have to. We are going to have to push out 
other military priorities, and my colleagues know that is true. 
Integrity and truth demands that my colleagues answer yes to that.
  For those of us who are not keenly interested in all of these issues, 
but are interested in domestic programs, with impoverished communities, 
at-risk children, undereducated people, underemployed, underhoused, 
inadequately fed, how can we say I voted for a $27 billion weapons 
system that no one wanted and 2 years down the road when the fire walls 
go down and they start raiding these budget programs, I hope someone 
gets up in the floor and points a finger and says how can we have that 
kind of hypocrisy.
  We have to face it now. I am not coming back to the floor next year 
on this amendment, because this is it, folks. We have to stop it right 
now if we are going to stop it. I tell my colleagues, I bet every 
single thing that I have, and I am broke, that this will not come to 
just 30 planes. They will nickel and dime us to death and billion-
dollar us to death. There will be 40 and 50 and 60, because once you 
start building these planes, the places where they get built, people do 
not want to stop them getting built. This is a $27 billion program.
  Now, if we want to employ people, then let us go in the back room and 
dream up a $27 billion jobs program. I will show my colleagues how we 
can certainly put many more people to work than are presently working 
on these handful of B-2's. This is inappropriate, my colleagues, those 
of us who voted for a balanced budget, stand up with dignity and 
integrity and oppose this.
  Mr. Chairman, no one wants it except the contractors and a handful of 
people. This is not about the balanced budget. That day is now over. 
There are no free rides. If we buy this, we are not going to buy 
something else, and it is either domestic or it is some of our other 
weapons systems. But the day of scratching each other's backs is over. 
I have lived long enough to see us being forced to the hard choices. 
Make me believe in this institution, make me believe in the integrity 
of the balanced budget. Oppose this B-2 and support this amendment.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from South 
Carolina, as chairman of the Committee on National Security, is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from California 
[Mr. Hunter].
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding. Let me 
just say to all Members of the House, sure, after the Air Force Chief 
of Staff and the Joint Chiefs were told by the President that they 
would not support a B-2, they saluted and they came down and they sat 
before us and said, we do not have the B-2 in our budget. Then we asked 
the Air Force Chief of Staff, in the words that are over on the side of 
the room here, would B-2's be valuable in war, and he said, B-2's would 
be extremely valuable in the Hawk phase; that is, when we stop the 
enemy tanks from rolling. Then he hesitated and he said, and in all 
other phases. I asked him the question, would the B-2's save lives, and 
he said yes, they would save lives.
  My friends, we are going through really what is kind of a microcosm 
of defense itself. We had the war to end all wars, I guess that is the 
post-cold-war world that my friend from California refers to in the 
early 1900's. We called it the war to end all wars, and we were 
unprepared for the Second World War, where we did not get the 2-week 
warning time that the study that he refers to says we should have. Then 
we threw away our weapons after World War II, went from a military of 9 
million people to a group that could not hold a third-rate military as 
it pushed us down the Korean peninsula. And we were not able to stop 
those tanks. After the world war was over, we cut again.
  We have cut and we have cut the defense budget on an annual basis by 
$140 billion, from $404 billion in 1985, real money, to about $268 
billion today.
  Within those confines of the $268 billion, with the reform package we 
put together, a real reform package, we have enough money, $15 billion 
over 5 years, to buy all of those B-2's. We are asking for basically 
Wal-Mart sales for 2 months so that our pilots do not have to fly under 
the Bill Clinton scenario, 80-year-old B-52's, older than their great-
grandfathers. Vote ``no'' on this amendment.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the distinguished gentleman from 
Georgia [Mr. Gingrich], the Speaker of the House.
  Mr. GINGRICH. Mr. Chairman, I thank my friend from South Carolina for 
yielding, and I thank my friend from California for the dignity and the 
way in which he has conducted this entire debate and the issue he is 
raising.
  Mr. Chairman, I would like all of my colleagues to ask themselves a 
very basic question: Why do we buy weapons? In the end, as my friend 
said, it is not for pork, it is not for jobs; we have lots of ways to 
create jobs, and certainly the Congress, in its ingenuity over 200 
years, has found many ways to do that.
  Why do we buy weapons? We buy weapons to defend America. We buy 
weapons to prevent wars, when possible. We buy weapons to win wars, 
when necessary. We buy weapons to save American lives.
  Now, in the 1920's and 1930's the Congress was antitechnology, 
antimilitary, consistently cheap, self-righteously certain; saw the 
world as one where there was no danger, and in 1941, 1942 at Pearl 
Harbor, Wake Island, Guam, the Philippines, Guadalcanal, we paid in 
blood, the blood of young Americans, because we were not ready.

                              {time}  2015

  Then immediately after World War II, this Congress forgot every 
lesson. We stripped the military. We cut out procurement. We weakened 
the system. And in 1950, a bunch of young kids in a thing called Task 
Force Smith were put on the Korean peninsula in an emergency, and they 
were slaughtered. And we paid in blood.
  But in 1990, with an appropriate military investment, with adequate 
military forces, we put the finest professional military in the world 
with the finest technology on the field. We won a decisive victory with 
100,000 casualties on the enemy side and less than 200 Americans dying. 
And we won decisively.
  Why would you build a B-2? Not for today, but for tomorrow. For a 
time not very many years from now when a B-1B is going to be in 
desperate trouble trying to penetrate a sophisticated ground-to-air 
system. By 2010, you are going to have to suppress that system with 
enormous firepower for a B-1B to be there. And the weapon you are going 
to use to suppress that system is either going to be a missile or a B-
2.
  What if we are not based in the region? Many of my friends who are 
going to vote yes on this amendment do not want us to be in the regions 
that they want a short-legged aircraft to defend in. What if we do not 
have time to

[[Page H4187]]

build up our force? We had from Labor Day until the spring of 1991, 
Labor Day of 1990 to the spring of 1991 to build up Desert Storm. But 
what if we have an opponent that studies our model and does not give us 
the time? What if we need to move decisively, quickly and win in a 
controlled manner? What if the President has the kind of threat that he 
says, I need something now, not in three months?
  Here is the advantages of the B-2. It threatens a lot of current 
systems. The B-2 does not need a carrier battle group. It is less 
expensive per bomb delivered by any standard. The B-2 does not need an 
airfield close to the enemy. And it is less expensive than moving an 
airwing to the region by any standard. The B-2 does not need a huge 
complex air armada to surround it, to protect it, to suppress the 
ground-to-air missiles.
  But finally, I would say to all of my friends, there is a good 
argument for voting yes for this amendment. There is a rational 
argument. I respect those who make it. If they are wrong and 10, 15, 20 
years from now we do not have the weapons, we do not have the 
capability, we cannot project the power, either our allies could lose, 
we could lose, or the price of victory could be the blood of a lot of 
young Americans. If those of us who want to build a few extra aircraft 
are right, we will have saved those lives.
  If we are wrong the truth is we will have wasted the money. 
Consistently in the history of this Congress, it is cheaper in the long 
run to build one more weapon and save American lives than it is to 
build too few weapons and run the risk. You decide which responsibility 
you want to answer. I would rather be wrong in favor of too good a 
defense with too good an airplane saving too many Americans, and I 
would rather vote in favor of giving our kids the best possible 
equipment.
  Ms. FURSE. Mr. Chairman, I wish to insert into the Record an article 
that appeared in the May 27 edition of Defense Week. It details a new 
problem the $2.4 billion B-2 bomber is experiencing in actually being 
stealthy. Last October, Air Force officials ordered 6 days of repair 
time be performed for every flying day. In addition, 8 years of test 
data accumulated at Edwards Air Force Base indicates that it took at 
least 50 hours of maintenance for every flying hour.
  Author Tony Capaccio serves the defense industry, as well as 
policymakers well in his investigative reporting work. This is a vital 
role we all count on members of the fourth estate to provide.

                 [From the Defense Week, May 27, 1997]

           The B-2's Stealthy Skins Need Tender, Lengthy Care

                           (By Tony Capaccio)

       Maintaining the $2.4 billion B-2 bomber's stealthy skins 
     has proven so difficult that Air Force officials last 
     October, directed six days of repair time be performed for 
     every flying day, accordingly to test data made available to 
     Defense Week.
       The order was mandated to reduce a mounting backlog of low 
     observable, or LO, repairs, at the 509th Bomb Wing, Whiteman 
     AFB, Mo., the unit that earned worldwide publicity last month 
     after its first six B-2s were declared ready for combat.
       The extent of the B-2 maintenance problems went 
     unpublicized. It could not be learned to what extent. if any, 
     the LO maintenance problems have hampered the wing's current 
     training operations.
       ``Maintenance is a concern due to both the time to repair 
     LO discrepancies and the manpower required to effect LO 
     repairs,'' The Pentagon's operational testing office said in 
     a detailed May 13 statement.
       The mounting backlog at Whiteman was in addition to eight 
     years of test data accumulated at Edwards AFB, Calif., 
     indicating that it took at least 50 hours of maintenance for 
     every flying hour. The number seems high, but is within Air 
     Force expectations at this stage of the program, said a 
     Pentagon official.
       About 19 of those hours were consumed making repairs to the 
     aircraft's sensitive skin necessary to meet its military 
     stealth, or LO low observable, requirements--the largest 
     repair category, according to Air Force figures.
       The data did not, however, indicate if the LO repair hours 
     met or exceeded expectations. But the figure has been 
     improved, according to a Pentagon official. He was not, 
     however, aware of the current time to repair figure.
       The data, which is the most current available, was based on 
     2,601 flight hours accumulated at Edwards when the first B-2 
     was delivered for development testing in July 1989 through 
     May 1996.


                          the price of stealth

       The data indicates not a serious, unexpected design problem 
     but more intense than expected efforts to maintain the $2.4 
     billion bomber's most relevant feature. To date, the most 
     widely known fact about B-2 maintenance was that it is 
     performed in special hangars.
       [The price tag quoted here is the 20-year program life 
     cycle cost. It includes everything from early development 
     through two decades of operations, maintenance, support and 
     eventual disposal.]
       The U.S. will buy 21 bombers for about $44 billion. 
     Thirteen should be delivered by year's end. The Quadrennial 
     Defense Review last week reaffirmed the Pentagon's position 
     that it cannot afford more than 21.
       Aside from the LO repair problems, the aircraft has 
     demonstrated good to exceptional reliability with 
     electronics, its landing gear and door, the data shows.
       The B-2 needs a baby-smooth skin to maintain its stringent, 
     bumble-bee sized radar profile. A major driver of B-2 LO 
     maintenance is the curve time for materials, including 
     sealants used to fill gaps between panels, adhesives and 
     tapes to cover joints.
       Cure times for some materials exceed 72 hours. If 
     successive layers of material are applied, cure times can 
     take several hundred hours, according to test data.


                         solutions in the works

       Both the Air Force and Northrop Grumman Corp. are crafting 
     solutions, such as a faster curing time for radar absorbing 
     tapes and chalking. And Northrop recently delivered to 
     Whiteman a maintenance management system called a Low 
     Observable Combat Readiness computer program for evaluating 
     radar cross section degradation.
       ``The MC rate at Whiteman has improved as a result'' of 
     introducing the computer program, said the Pentagon test 
     office. ``In spite of the MC improvement resulting from [the 
     computer program], the backlog of LO discrepancies at 
     Whiteman is increasing.''
       Asked to outline the backlog's extent and its operational 
     significance, citing classification issues, the Air Combat 
     Command declined May 16 to specify.
       ``However, let us say that as with any emerging weapon 
     system, ACC is gaining experience as we field the Air Force's 
     newest technology bomber,'' it said in a statement to Defense 
     Week.
       ``We feel the B-2, which is on the leading edge of low 
     observable technology, has not presented maintenance 
     challenges beyond those associated with fielding any new 
     system. The knowledge we've gained from fielding the B-2 has 
     adjusted our maintenance approach accordingly and will 
     continue to do so,'' said the ACC.
       The Air Force wrote Sen. Dale Bumpers (D-Ark.) in March 
     when he asked about maintenance problems that ``although low 
     observable systems maintenance has affected mission capable 
     rates, recent trends show an overall increase. The latest 
     mission capable rate as of January is much greater than 20 
     percent.''
       It also told Bumpers the 509th BW was flying low altitude 
     B-2 missions but failed to note that six days of repairs were 
     being executed for every flying day.
       The planes' high-tech terrain following radar allows it to 
     go that low. Given that capability and 6,000-mile unrefueled 
     range, a B-2 can strike heavily defended Libyan, Iraqi and 
     North Korean targets.
       But the low flight profile also is exacerbating the LO 
     maintenance woes, the testers said. ``Flight experience has 
     shown that the durability of the LO is also related to the 
     environment the B-2 is flown in,'' said the testers. ``Low 
     level flight places the most demand on the LO materials.''
       According to data compiled by Pentagon testers, during one 
     snapshot, between December 1995 and February 1996, Whiteman 
     B-2 mission capable rates was at a low 37 percent. If LO 
     system readiness was not included, the readiness rates were a 
     more acceptable 73 percent, the data showed. Acceptable B-52 
     and B-1B mission capable rates are over 80 percent.


                       maintenance and readiness

       ACC claims notwithstanding, the test figures and detailed 
     statement from the Pentagon's operational test office 
     indicate that the upkeep of the B-2's primary selling point--
     its stealth--is proving difficult and has affected readiness.
       ``LO maintenance problems are the primary factors affecting 
     B-2 readiness. The materials used are sensitive to the 
     methods of application and to the temperature and humidity 
     when applying them,'' said the May 13 Pentagon statement 
     prepared in response to Defense Week questions.
       ``The high LO system failure rate indicates that material 
     durability could be improved''. Concern has also recently 
     arisen over the quality of the LO repairs that can be 
     accomplished in the operational environment,'' the test 
     office wrote.
       ``The large number of B-2 LO system unscheduled maintenance 
     events, combined with LO maintenance difficulties, 
     significantly reduce aircraft availability,'' the testers 
     said.
       Seven second-generation bombers are at Whiteman AFB. They 
     can fly down to 600 feet above ground, pop up and drop a 
     family of 500- to 2,000-pound satellite-guided bombs. Those 
     bombs can fall within 20 feet of their intended aimpoints.
       Concerning the October 1996 policy change directing six 
     days of repair for one flying day, the statement noted ``as a 
     result of LO maintenance difficulties and backlog, the 509th 
     BW in the fall of 1996 had limited the sortie rates on its 
     aircraft to permit more time for repairs.
       ``This reversed a previous policy aimed at maintaining high 
     [pilot training] sortie rates

[[Page H4188]]

     at the expense of deferring LO repairs,'' said the statement.
       ``To alleviate manpower problems, the Air Force has brought 
     18 Northrop Grumman workers to Whiteman to augment the Air 
     Force LO maintenance personnel.'' the statement said.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the Dellums 
amendment to eliminate further production of the B-2 bomber. I believe 
this is the most important defense procurement vote of the decade.
  The B-2 with smart conventional weapons gives us the potential for a 
conventional deterrent. The B-2 when fully equipped with smart 
conventional weapons will be able to devastate a country and an 
advancing army at the same time.
  This bomber will give us a war-stopping capability. The war-stopping 
or preventing capability will save American lives. The B-2 can give us 
a huge technological advantage over potential enemies.
  Twenty-one B-2 bombers is not enough. We need to keep the production 
line open to build nine additional B-2's. Every independent study 
indicates that additional B-2's are needed.
  The Dellums amendment stops the production line, which is in 
California. We would need to spend billions to re-open this line once 
it is closed.
  Gen. Brent Scowcroft, National Security Adviser to Presidents Ford 
and Bush, has written a devastating report on the lack of a bomber 
policy on the part of this administration. Let me quote from General 
Scowcroft's report:

       The B-2's ability to strike independently within hours 
     anywhere on the globe from bases in the United States leaves 
     it uniquely well-suited among all U.S. force elements for 
     dealing with unexpected challenges. The need for such a 
     capability is basic to the national 2 Military Regional 
     Conflict [MRC] strategy.
       The only realistic option for maintaining the viability of 
     the long range, stealthy, precision strike force over the 
     long term is to continue production of the B-2. The B-2 is 
     therefore a critical national asset, which is uniquely 
     capable of performing these vital missions.

  Under the U.S. Constitution, the Congress has the ultimate 
responsibility to fund and govern the military. Under article I, 
section 8, the Congress shall have power ``To raise and support Armies 
* * * To provide and maintain a Navy; To make Rules for the Government 
and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.''
  In closing, I again want to quote from General Scowcroft's report:

       Additional B-2s are fully affordable within planned 
     budgets. The Pentagon plans to increase procurement spending 
     approximately 50 percent by 2001. Those funds should be 
     allocated to and spent on the most cost-effective systems, 
     such as additional B-2's. The situation is similar to that of 
     the F-117 in the 1980's. The Air Force insisted that a single 
     squadron of these revolutionary aircraft was all that was 
     needed; Congress directed a doubling of the buy, an action 
     that saved many American and allied lives in the gulf war. 
     Today, once again, only Congress can set in motion the steps 
     needed to maintain production of the B-2.

  Help us today and defeat the Dellums amendment.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in opposition to the amendment 
brought to the floor by the honorable gentlemen from California, Ohio, 
and Florida. This amendment would eliminate $331.2 million from the B-2 
Stealth Bomber Program and additionally would prohibit other funds from 
being used for advanced procurement or production line expenses for 
more aircraft beyond the 21 aircraft previously authorized.
  The cost of this program as outlined in the National Defense 
Authorization Act for fiscal year 1998 would authorize $505.3 million 
to reestablish elements of the B-2 production line that have been shut 
down, for advance procurement, and for various support, training, and 
management costs. I believe that the cost of reestablishing these 
programs is justified in light of the military advantages the aircraft 
provides to our men and women in the Armed Forces.
  The B-2 is the only heavy bomber currently in production or 
development. In fact, the Pentagon has no other plans for modernizing 
or supplementing our existing and aged bomber fleet of B-52's and B-
1's. With the youngest B-52 bomber being 33 years old, many U.S. pilots 
are flying aircraft that are older than they are. Due to the time and 
extreme costs associated with designing another bomber, it is important 
that we retain our capability to produce bombers should events require 
them.
  In addition, the stealth capabilities of the B-2 are unmatched, 
allowing this two person plane to operate without fighter or enemy air-
defense suppression escorts, thereby limiting the total number of 
airmen placed in harm's way. The B-2 can also strike multiple targets 
from heights out of range of anti-aircraft weapons with precision and 
accuracy. This combination of features will also minimize the risks 
both to noncombatants and to American bomber crews in the air.
  Finally, some argue that in the post-cold war era, we no longer need 
aircraft of this kind. However, the U.S. cannot afford to let its guard 
down. The world is still a dangerous place, as Saddam Hussein proved a 
few years ago and as North Korea, in its quest for nuclear weapons, 
reminds us today. By introducing additional B-2s now, we are preparing 
ourselves for the next threat that we unfortunately are likely to face. 
Accordingly, I strongly urge my colleagues to rise in opposition to the 
Dellums, Kasich, and Foley amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums].
  The question was taken; and the chairman announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.


                             Recorded Vote

  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 209, 
noes 216, not voting 10, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 228]

                               AYES--209

     Abercrombie
     Allen
     Andrews
     Archer
     Baesler
     Baldacci
     Ballenger
     Barrett (WI)
     Barton
     Bass
     Becerra
     Bereuter
     Berry
     Blagojevich
     Blumenauer
     Boehlert
     Bonior
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (OH)
     Burr
     Camp
     Capps
     Cardin
     Carson
     Castle
     Chabot
     Christensen
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Coble
     Coburn
     Combest
     Condit
     Conyers
     Costello
     Coyne
     Cummings
     Danner
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (IL)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Dellums
     Deutsch
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Doyle
     Duncan
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Flake
     Foglietta
     Foley
     Ford
     Frank (MA)
     Franks (NJ)
     Furse
     Ganske
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Greenwood
     Gutierrez
     Gutknecht
     Hall (OH)
     Hamilton
     Hastings (FL)
     Hilliard
     Hoekstra
     Hooley
     Houghton
     Jackson (IL)
     Johnson (WI)
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kasich
     Kennedy (MA)
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kennelly
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind (WI)
     Kleczka
     Klink
     Klug
     Kolbe
     Kucinich
     LaFalce
     Lampson
     Lantos
     Largent
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lazio
     Leach
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     LoBiondo
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Luther
     Markey
     Mascara
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McHale
     McKinney
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Menendez
     Miller (CA)
     Miller (FL)
     Minge
     Mink
     Moakley
     Molinari
     Moran (VA)
     Morella
     Nadler
     Neal
     Ney
     Nussle
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Paul
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Peterson (MN)
     Petri
     Pickett
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Portman
     Poshard
     Price (NC)
     Pryce (OH)
     Quinn
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Rangel
     Regula
     Rivers
     Roemer
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Rothman
     Roukema
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanders
     Sanford
     Sawyer
     Scott
     Sensenbrenner
     Serrano
     Shays
     Shuster
     Sisisky
     Skaggs
     Slaughter
     Smith (MI)
     Smith, Adam
     Smith, Linda
     Snyder
     Spratt
     Stabenow
     Stark
     Stenholm
     Stokes
     Strickland
     Stupak
     Sununu
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Tierney
     Towns
     Upton
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Wamp
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Weldon (PA)
     Wexler
     Weygand
     White
     Wise
     Woolsey
     Wynn

                               NOES--216

     Ackerman
     Aderholt
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baker
     Barcia
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Bateman
     Bentsen
     Berman
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop
     Bliley
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Borski
     Brady
     Brown (FL)
     Bryant
     Bunning
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Campbell
     Canady
     Cannon
     Chambliss
     Chenoweth
     Clyburn
     Collins
     Cook
     Cooksey
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cubin
     Cunningham
     Davis (VA)
     Deal
     DeLay
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Dicks
     Dixon
     Dooley
     Doolittle
     Dreier
     Dunn
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     English
     Ensign
     Etheridge
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fawell
     Fazio
     Filner
     Forbes
     Fowler
     Fox
     Frelinghuysen
     Frost
     Gallegly
     Gekas
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Gingrich
     Gonzalez
     Goss
     Graham
     Granger
     Green
     Hall (TX)
     Hansen
     Harman
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Hefner
     Herger
     Hill
     Hilleary
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hobson
     Holden
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Hoyer
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Inglis
     Istook
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     Jenkins
     John
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones
     Kelly
     Kim
     King (NY)
     Kingston

[[Page H4189]]


     Knollenberg
     LaHood
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     Livingston
     Lucas
     Maloney (CT)
     Manton
     Manzullo
     Martinez
     Matsui
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McDade
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     Meek
     Metcalf
     Mica
     Millender-McDonald
     Mollohan
     Moran (KS)
     Murtha
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Neumann
     Northup
     Norwood
     Ortiz
     Oxley
     Packard
     Pappas
     Parker
     Pease
     Peterson (PA)
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Pombo
     Radanovich
     Redmond
     Reyes
     Riggs
     Riley
     Rodriguez
     Rogan
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Royce
     Ryun
     Salmon
     Sanchez
     Sandlin
     Saxton
     Scarborough
     Schaefer, Dan
     Schaffer, Bob
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Sherman
     Shimkus
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (OR)
     Smith (TX)
     Snowbarger
     Solomon
     Souder
     Spence
     Stearns
     Stump
     Talent
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thornberry
     Thune
     Thurman
     Tiahrt
     Torres
     Traficant
     Turner
     Visclosky
     Walsh
     Waters
     Watkins
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weller
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                             NOT VOTING--10

     Blunt
     Cox
     Gordon
     Lipinski
     Maloney (NY)
     McIntosh
     Paxon
     Schiff
     Schumer
     Yates

                              {time}  2037

  Mr. ORTIZ and Mr. CALLAHAN changed their vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
  Mr. ARCHER and Mr. COBLE changed their vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the amendment was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.


                          personal explanation

  Mr. COX of California. Mr. Chairman, I was necessarily absent for 
this vote for medical reasons.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to section 5 of House Resolution 169, it is 
now in order to consider the amendment by the gentleman from Alabama 
[Mr. Everett] printed in section 8(c) of House Resolution 169.


                    Amendment Offered by Mr. Everett

  Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment printed in section 8(c) of House Resolution 169 
     offered by Mr. Everett:
       Strike out sections 332 through 335 (page 68, line 10 
     through page 77, line 21).

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. 
Everett] and a Member opposed, the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. 
Spence] each will control 30 minutes.


            Modification to Amendment Offered by Mr. Everett

  Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment 
be modified to correct the drafting error. The modification is at the 
desk.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the modification.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Modification to amendment offered by Mr. Everett:
       The amendment as modified is as follows:
       Strike out sections 333 through 335 (page 69, line 3 
     through page 77, line 21).

  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Alabama?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that 15 minutes of 
my time be controlled by the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. Sabo].
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Alabama?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 2\1/2\ minutes.
  Mr. Chairman, my amendment, cosponsored by the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Fazio], the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Klug], and 
the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. Sabo], relates to DOD's depot 
maintenance policy. This amendment simply strikes the depot maintenance 
provisions that were added to the bill by the depot caucus members in 
subcommittee.

                              {time}  2045

  Mr. Chairman, the result of the amendment will leave intact the 
current 60/40 policy that splits repair work between the public and 
private sectors.
  Let me say in the beginning that those of us who opposed the language 
as reported out by the subcommittee come from differing viewpoints. My 
objection is to what I see as the vastly expansive new definition of 
``core logistics capability'' and the redefining of ``workload,'' to 
name but a few.
  The Depot Caucus says that their provisions simply block the 
President's disregard of the 1995 Base Closure Act at Kelly and 
McClellan Air Force Bases. I am in agreement with the caucus that the 
President violated at least the intent of BRAC 1995. However, the 
provisions go much further than Kelly and McClellan.
  The bill redefines ``depot level maintenance'' to include ``interim 
contractor support'' and ``contractor logistics support'' and software 
maintenance which has principally been performed by contractors. The 
bill further defines ``core logistics activities'' to include all new 
weapons systems within 4 years of reaching their initial operating 
capability.
  These provisions clearly go beyond the scope of Kelly and McClellan, 
and are not based on military requirements set out by the war fighter. 
These provisions will force DOD to place more repair and maintenance 
work in the public depot system without regard for military necessity 
or cost to the government. In other words, by forcing DOD to place more 
repair work in the public depots without regard to military 
requirements, DOD will be forced to take deeper cuts in personnel and 
training and in modernization of our weapons systems.
  I support the need for an in-house public depot system to support the 
core repair and maintenance needs established by the military. However, 
if this work is not core and can be performed by the private sector, we 
should at least give the military leadership the ability to compete the 
work for best value and best price. The current provisions of this bill 
work against that philosophy.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  (Mr. SPENCE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment 
offered by the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. Everett].
  The supporters of this amendment will argue that by striking the 
provisions in the bill relating to depot policy, the amendment would 
merely ensure the continuation of current law under which the Nation's 
depot system would continue to be managed within the framework of the 
so-called 60/40 policy. The problem, however, which continues to 
preclude a meaningful discussion about the role and future of our 
public depots, remains the administration's politicization of the base 
closing process of 2 years ago.
  Thus, the fundamental issue before the House is not the appropriate 
ratio of public to private workloads. Instead, the issue is the 
determined effort of the administration to politicize the base closure 
process for its own political benefit. If the President had not 
injected himself very directly into the BRAC process, it is unlikely 
the House would even be debating this amendment today.
  The 1995 Base Closure Commission considered the question of the Air 
Force public depot system and came to a determination that 2 of the 5 
Air Force depots should close. Those 2 depots were located at Kelly Air 
Force Base in Texas and McClellan Air Force Base in California. The 
Commission's recommendations were very clear: close the depots and 
consolidate their workloads at other public depots or at private sector 
commercial activities as determined by the Defense Depot Maintenance 
Council.
  Contrary to the President's assertions during his campaign for a 
second term, the Commission did not recommend privatization-in-place 
and it certainly did not attempt to guarantee the jobs of thousands of 
workers at these 2 depots, depots located in 2 States with substantial 
numbers of electoral votes. Privatization-in-place was not an unknown 
concept to the Commission. In fact, the Commission recommended it in a 
limited number of instances, but those instances did not include Air 
Force depots.
  The President's transparent attempt to circumvent the intent of the 
1995 BRAC process for political reasons has caused grave harm to what 
had been essentially a nonpolitical process. By his actions, the 
President has undermined support in Congress for future

[[Page H4190]]

base closures and caused the committee to overwhelmingly recommend the 
provisions which the Everett amendment proposes to strike.
  Congress has resisted all attempts over the years to overturn 
legislatively the results of the BRAC process. The President had a 
similar obligation to carry out faithfully the decisions of the BRAC 
Commission which are now the law. Depot workloads at these two 
facilities may be competed in the private marketplace, but the 
President cannot, I repeat, cannot rig the competition to ensure 
electoral political advantage.
  I urge my colleagues to support the committee and oppose the Everett 
amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SABO. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment. I am not one who 
automatically supports privatization. In some cases it does not make 
sense. In other cases it does. If it involves trying to switch jobs 
from people who have benefits to people who do not have benefits, I 
have deep concern.
  However, here we are talking about competition between the private 
and public sector, where both have highly skilled, well paid employees 
with decent benefits, health and pension benefits. As we try to squeeze 
ever-increasing demands into restricted dollars, this is a case where 
competition between private and public sector clearly makes sense. I 
hope my colleagues vote ``yes'' on the Everett amendment.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Virginia [Mr. Bateman].
  Mr. BATEMAN. I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.
  Mr. Chairman, this language which is in the bill and which the 
amendment would remove was placed in the bill in the Subcommittee on 
Military Readiness of which I am the chairman. I cannot tell my 
colleagues that this is the provision that I would have written had I 
been given the grace to have articulated the best, wisest policy with 
reference to depot maintenance. This provision in the bill is not, in 
my view, the wisest and the best. It does reflect the will of the 
subcommittee by an overwhelming vote. It also reflects changes from the 
original proposal of the Depot Caucus which they made, at my request, 
in order to improve what is in the bill. Looking at this very difficult 
issue in balance, I would ask the committee to support the bill as it 
comes to the floor and to reject the amendment that has been offered.
  This issue is one of the most contentious issues which will be dealt 
with in the conference that is coming between this body and the other 
body. Certainly I hope and believe that this will be improved upon as 
we go through that process. I can assure my colleagues that I will be 
working to do that but in a way which protects the legitimate concerns 
of those who represent areas which have government-owned and operated 
maintenance depots. I do not represent such a depot, but I can tell my 
colleagues that it is my very firm belief that the national security 
interests of this country require a robust capability in the 
government-owned and operated depots, and that ability to serve our 
national security must be safeguarded. It must be met. For those 
reasons, I would urge a ``no" vote on the amendment.
  Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Texas [Mr. Bonilla].
  (Mr. BONILLA asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. BONILLA. Mr. Chairman, everyone in this Chamber should understand 
that this has absolutely nothing to do with the base closing process. 
In Texas, we are willing to take our medicine. We felt that our depot 
should stay open at Kelly Air Force Base, but we were chosen to be 
closed and we must now face the music and deal with reality.
  But what is wrong, and I appeal to the people in this body who have 
any sense of fiscal conservatism, or any sense of competition and 
supporting private sector involvement in government contracts, what is 
wrong with having us set up shop at the former base, to invite private 
contractors to come in and bid for business? What is wrong with that? 
And if the depots that are surviving this process do indeed come 
forward with a lower bid, then they win. What is more American than 
having competition out there to bid for business in this country? That 
is what we are talking about.
  I can appreciate the parochial interest of the States that have the 
remaining depots. They want it all. And they want the law to say they 
will get it all without any competition. But I say to any Member in 
this body who believes in fiscal conservatism, fiscal responsibility, 
free enterprise or competition, they must see our plan on this and 
support what we are trying to do.
  If Members stand with those who want to save money for the Air Force, 
with those who believe in free enterprise, with those who believe in 
competition, with those who stand with the United States Air Force at 
trying to control costs, they will support, as I will, the Everett 
amendment. I thank the gentleman from Alabama for offering this 
amendment, and we certainly hope it succeeds.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Utah [Mr. Hansen].
  (Mr. HANSEN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. HANSEN. Mr. Chairman, I hope my colleagues here will realize that 
what we are looking at is the integrity of BRAC that was passed by the 
gentleman from Texas [Mr. Armey], now our majority leader. The law is 
very clear of what we can and cannot do. The President of the United 
States had 15 days, an up or down. There was no privatization in place. 
The idea that Members can find themselves in a position to say that we 
are saving money here is amazing to me. I cannot imagine anyone saying 
that.
  Here is something called the GAO report. The Air Force by their own 
admission says the amendment by the gentleman from Alabama would cost 
$689 million a year. It is impossible to accept that.
  Mr. Chairman, let me point out, the issue before us today comes down 
to this: Can the President hide his politically motivated job program 
behind the shield of privatization and trick enough of us to look the 
other way? Each side is going to have their share of letters and quotes 
to support their argument. I would ask my colleagues all to stay 
focused on the central question: Does it make sense for the Air Force 
to continue to operate 5 depots at under 50 percent capacity when the 
closure and consolidation of the 2 least efficient will save over $689 
million per year?
  I would hope that each and every one of us would give some real 
thought to what this really does and does not do. I wrote this 
language. I think I can speak with authority on this thing. It does not 
prevent anyone from bidding on non-core work.
  Do you want to bid on all the core work? What do we tell the big 
companies of the world when we have another Persian Gulf? Get into a C-
141 and go over there? Hey, if you want to privatize everything, there 
are a whole bunch of Soviet pilots that do not have jobs anymore. Let 
us see if we can get them to fly our F-22s for us. We have got to get 
down to the point where we draw the line between core and non-core and 
talk about privatization. Everyone can bid on it. All we are doing is 
distinguishing between the two issues. I would hope my colleagues would 
vote ``no'' on the Everett amendment and save the taxpayers a whole 
bunch of money.

                              {time}  2100

  Mr. SABO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas 
[Mr. Gonzalez].
  Mr. GONZALEZ. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for this time.
  The Secretary of Defense has made it very clear that the 
modernization and the readiness of our Armed Forces will be paid for by 
base restructuring. So the realignment process must be conducted in a 
way that will save the most money, and the best way to do this is 
through the public-private competition that is currently under way.
  History has shown that competition saves money. The ongoing public-
private competition will guarantee the best defense for the dollar.
  And so, Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support the military, 
support the taxpayer and support the Everett-Sabo amendment.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to my good friend, the 
gentleman from Texas [Mr. Ortiz].

[[Page H4191]]

  (Mr. ORTIZ asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Chairman, let me say that I have a lot of respect for 
the Members who happen to be on the other side of this issue, but I 
would just like to tell my colleagues something on these two charts 
that I have. Do my colleagues see these 2 charts here? It has got the 
names of all the bases that were shut down by the BRAC Commission 
during the past 4 years.
  And my question is this: ``Did some of your bases that you had, did 
they get a second chance to keep those jobs open?'' I am not against 
contracting out when it makes sense. But what we are seeing here 
debated does not make sense.
  As my colleagues know, what about the workers at these facilities? 
Did they get a second chance? No, they did not. Will this amendment 
save money? No, this amendment will not save any money.
  Now let us look and see as to how much money this amendment will cost 
the taxpayers. The Air Force estimates that the Everett amendment will 
cost the taxpayers $689 million annually. The GAO estimates that it 
will cost $468 million. In Ohio, at a base where privatization in place 
is occurring, the Air Force estimated that it will cost $40 million 
more annually, same work, same place, same equipment.
  We cannot afford the Everett amendment.
  What about the workers of both bases? Kelly? What about Sacramento? I 
have letters to show my colleagues that they do not support this 
amendment. These are workers who at one time or another served our 
country in the front lines. They know the kind of equipment that is 
needed. They know that they need well-maintained equipment. What better 
than to have these veterans to work on this maintenance that is 
required?
  Vote against the Everett amendment. It will be a great vote.
  Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Chairman I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman 
from Texas [Mr. Smith].
  Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I thank my colleague for yielding 
this time to me.
  Mr. Chairman, this amendment is about competition. It is about saving 
American taxpayers billions of dollars. Language currently contained in 
the defense authorization bill is anti-competition. It would prohibit 
any military facility that was closed by BRAC in 1995 from entering 
into any private contract for depot level work. This wastes taxpayers' 
money.
  Fiscal responsibility requires that we allow the competitive process 
to determine the most effective and efficient depot while maintaining 
the highest level of national security. Should the American taxpayer 
pay for maintenance work at one depot when the work can be done at 
another for 20 to 30 percent less?
  Mr. Chairman, competition saves money. In the next 5 years the Air 
Force alone will need almost $97 billion to modernize its equipment and 
force structure. Where is that money going to come from? This amendment 
savings will help pay for future military modernization.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to vote for competition and 
savings. Vote yes on this much needed amendment.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
Jacksonville Florida [Mrs. Fowler].
  (Mrs. FOWLER asked and was given permission to revise and extend her 
remarks.)
  Mrs. FOWLER. Mr. Chairman, I rise to strongly oppose the Everett-
Fazio amendment.
  The 1995 Base Closure Commission voted to close the depots at 
Sacramento and San Antonio. As their report noted, the commission found 
that the significant excess capacity and infrastructure in the Air 
Force depot system requires closure of both Sacramento and San Antonio. 
But President Clinton, concerned about the impact of these closures on 
his 1996 campaign, instead sought privatization in place at these 2 
bases. By his actions he undercut the integrity of the BRAC process to 
achieve political gain.
  Was privatization in place a valid option for these bases? The BRAC 
report specifically did not authorize this approach for San Antonio or 
Sacramento despite doing so for two other bases. No commission vote was 
held, and when the GAO looked at this issue, it concluded that 
privatizing these operations would cost the Air Force $468 million a 
year more than transferring this work to other depots or privatizing it 
elsewhere. Subsequently, the Air Force's own Materiel Command projected 
that the cost of privatizing these facilities in place would actually 
be $689 million a year.
  Now, Mr. Chairman, the language adopted by the Committee on National 
Security would require the President to abide by the BRAC. I do not 
support Secretary Cohen's call for additional BRAC rounds, but if we 
are going to have them, we must first restore integrity to the BRAC 
process.
  The proponents of this amendment are asking us to flush $689 million 
a year of hard earned taxpayer money down the drain rather than 
spending it to modernize our forces or to provide better family housing 
for our military dependents. Oppose the Everett-Fazio amendment.
  Mr. SABO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from 
California [Ms. Sanchez].
  Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time.
  Mr. Chairman, as many of my colleagues will tell us, it is rare that 
I rise to talk in this House, but I felt a need to do that today to 
express my strong support for the Fazio-Everett amendment.
  This amendment simply strikes the unprecedented and reaching Hansen 
language that was adopted during the markup of the defense 
authorization bill. I join with the distinguished ranking member of the 
full committee, as well as Secretary of Defense William Cohen, in 
supporting this amendment.
  If we approve the current language in the defense bill, it would 
allow a government monopoly on depot maintenance work. It would also 
require the government to make overwhelming new capital investments in 
government facilities which would simply duplicate what exists in the 
private sector today.
  Now, I am on the Committee on National Security, and I have been 
looking and listening to the testimony. I have looked at the 
discussions that have gone on before. I end by saying that I urge my 
colleagues to join me in voting in favor of this amendment.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Virginia [Mr. Sisisky].
  Mr. SISISKY. Mr. Chairman, I am the ranking member of the 
Subcommittee on Military Readiness, and I work with the gentleman from 
Virginia [Mr. Bateman] and those that represent depots for 3 years. We 
have tried to maintain a balance between public and private depots and 
at the same time to protect our national security industrial base.
  I am from Hampton Roads, Virginia, the largest naval base in the 
whole world. I have the largest public yard in the country, I have the 
largest private shipyard in the country, so I think I understand the 
public-private competition.
  And the word is competition. In 1993, 4500 Americans were told at the 
Naval Air at Norfolk that they were out of a job, the BRAC commission, 
we could not save them. We tried valiantly to save them.
  Now I am a little sensitive about that because of what happened in 
the BRAC committee. Why did we privatize? A million and a half square 
feet right in the middle of the Norfolk Naval Base, which by the way is 
still empty and we did not privatize. But let me tell my colleagues 
what we did privatize. Very interesting enough, last year the 2 depots 
that they do, and by the way it does not take a rocket scientist to 
understand instead of 2 overheads you got 4 overheads, but they 
privatize Louisville. In Louisville, privatization in place took place 
at the Naval Surface Waterfront Depot in Louisville, where they work on 
five-inch guns.
  Now BRAC said the exact same thing about Louisville and guess what? 
They offered a contract with no competition, no cost data, and I hate 
to tell my colleagues what they are losing now. I had to stop them 
almost, threatened to go to court to do it, but they stopped it. In 
two-three weeks they got some cost data that they brought back.
  This is about competition. I implore my colleagues to vote against 
this

[[Page H4192]]

amendment and keep the BRAC commission from politicization as it is.
  Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Doolittle].
  (Mr. DOOLITTLE asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
his remarks.)
  Mr. DOOLITTLE. Mr. Chairman, I listened. I have friends on both sides 
of this debate, and I happen to be on one of the sides, but it is 
almost as if we were debating two completely different sets or had two 
different sets of facts because the representations are so dramatically 
opposite.
  I would just observe, if my colleagues think about it, when has not 
privatization resulted, or competition, in a lowering of costs? I mean, 
we know that has been the case in the electricity industry. We know it 
has been the case in a number of other industries, transportation. We 
have seen it dramatically displayed, and countries all across this 
world are racing toward competition and privatization.
  But I am reminded when I hear the opponents oppose this amendment, 
all this amendment does is strike out some bad language that was 
inserted in the underlying bill. We know that privatization and 
competition result in a lowering of costs. Indeed, the Pentagon's own 
Defense Science Board has estimated that public-private competition 
will produce taxpayer savings of 20 to 30 percent regardless of whether 
public depots or private industry win the competition.
  McClellan and Kelly have already been slated for closure. The vote 
has been taken, they are in the process of closing. So they will not be 
Federal depots, but they are vast reservoirs of technology and of 
technological expertise in the employees that work there. Contractors 
can come in; we can have competition, and the Pentagon's own Defense 
Science Board says we will cut costs 20 to 30 percent. Why is that 
important? It is important obviously for the Federal Treasury, but 
specifically for defense it is important because the defense sector of 
the Federal budget is shrinking and has been for some time.
  So we will have to do more with less. How do we do that? Competition. 
Privatization. That is what the Everett amendment represents.
  I would just like to point out the Governor of our State which 
represents areas with closed depots like Sacramento and areas with 
healthy vibrant depots like San Diego and Twenty-nine Palms. He has 
just sent out in a letter dated June 19 his support for this amendment. 
He is the Governor of the whole State. Populationwise, it is probably 
greater than the existing depot areas and in the Sacramento area, but 
the fact of the matter he points out that this is important. He also 
observes, ``The existing bill may also involve hundreds of millions of 
dollars in hidden costs to the taxpayers because the 3 installations 
targeted for growth would have to undergo military construction 
upgrades to meet the 80 percent goal that is in this legislation.''

                              {time}  2115

  So, Mr. Chairman, this is a very important amendment. It is an 
amendment that will lower our costs, that will be for the benefit of 
the military and the benefit of the taxpayers, and I urge people to 
approve it.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Oklahoma [Mr. Watts].
  Mr. WATTS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, on Thursday of last week, the 
White House threatened to veto H.R. 1119, the defense authorization 
bill, if it included language that will force the President to obey the 
Base Realignment and Closure Commission, the BRAC law. This law 
mandates the closure of Kelly Air Force Base in Texas and McClellan Air 
Force Base in California, mandates the closure of those two facilities.
  Now, according to the GAO, their reports say that the continued 
operation of these two bases will cost us around $468 million. Now, the 
Air Force's very own internal report said that the continued operation 
of these two bases will cost us about $689 million.
  At the same time, the President maintains that the defense budget and 
the number of soldiers must be reduced in size beyond the hollow force 
that he is currently creating, but President Clinton offers no 
explanation, none, for this obvious contradiction, and he denies that 
he is in violation of the law.
  The President is wrong on both counts. Congress must vote to preserve 
the fairness and nonpartisanship inherent in the BRAC process that the 
President would destroy. The only way to preserve the fairness of the 
BRAC process is to vote against the Everett-Fazio amendment to H.R. 
1119.
  I ask my colleagues to vote for fairness in the base closing process, 
vote to preserve our national security, and vote no on the Everett-
Fazio amendment.
  Mr. SABO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Matsui].
  Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Chairman, the question before us is quite simple. It 
is whether we will allow the Department of Defense to implement a base 
closure recommendation in the manner it deems most effective. Opponents 
of the Everett amendment claim it will undermine the BRAC process, but 
the recommendations of the Commission regarding both McClellan and 
Kelly Air Force Bases is absolutely clear.
  In calling for the closure of these facilities, the Commission 
directed the DOD to either consolidate the workloads of other DOD 
depots or to allow private sector commercial activities. It is very 
clear what the language says.
  Let no one in this Chamber be misled. As the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Doolittle] said, McClellan and Kelly Air Force Bases 
will be closed as of July 2001, and they will no longer be Air Force 
facilities. Nothing in the Everett amendment will change that.
  What this amendment will do, however, is to strike a provision in the 
underlying bill that disallows the conducting of competition for some 
of the work now at Kelly and McClellan Air Force Bases.
  Let me just respond, if I may, to the GAO study that has been talked 
about time and time again by the opposition. In fact, the last speaker 
from Oklahoma talked about the $468 million that will be lost if, in 
fact, these bases do not close. These bases will close. The issue is 
whether or not to allow competition.
  This will save money. The GAO study is totally irrelevant to this 
discussion, because these bases will close. In fact, it will cost more 
if we disallow private competition in this situation, because these 
employees, the mission, will have to be moved to these other bases, 
whereas if, in fact, we allow private competition, many of these 
employees that have the technical skills that go back 20, 30 years will 
be able to stay at these particular bases in a private sector capacity, 
not in a public sector capacity. These bases are in fact going to 
close. We all know that.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge support of the Everett amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, the question before us is quite simple. It is whether 
we will allow the Department of Defense to implement a base closure 
recommendation in the manner it deems most effective.
  Opponents of the Everett amendment claim it will undermine the BRAC 
process. However, the recommendations of the Defense Base Closure and 
Realignment Commission regarding both McClellan and Kelly Air Force 
Bases are absolutely clear. In calling for closure of these facilities, 
the Commission directed DOD to either ``[c]onsolidate the remaining 
workloads to other DoD depots or to private sector commercial 
activities as determined by the Defense Depot Maintenance Council.''
  Let no one in this Chamber be misled. McClellan and Kelly Air Force 
Bases will close. As of July 2001, they will no longer be Air Force 
facilities. Nothing in the Everett amendment will alter that fact in 
any way.
  What this amendment will do, however, is strike provisions of the 
underlying bill that prevent the Department of Defense from conducting 
competitions for some work now performed at McClellan and Kelly. The 
Air Force is currently seeking detailed bids from public depots and 
private industry for this work. Public-private competition will allow 
the Air Force to accurately determine which of its options under the 
1995 BRAC law makes the most sense for our national security.
  Without the Everett amendment, the DOD would be barred from 
privatizing, even if that course proves to be the best value for the 
taxpayer. Ironically, while the opponents of this amendment accuse us 
of subverting the BRAC process, it is the language of this bill itself 
that does so. Despite the clear direction of the Commission that 
privatization was an acceptable course of action for McClellan and 
Kelly workloads, the Congress would be effectively foreclosing this 
option. We must not take

[[Page H4193]]

the precedent-setting step of limiting DOD flexibility in its 
implementation of a BRAC recommendation.
  Many experts--including the 1995 BRAC Commission itself--have 
concluded that our national security would be best served by allowing 
the private sector a larger role in defense industrial activities. The 
Commission's Report to the President noted: ``Privatization of [DoD 
industrial and commercial] functions would reduce operating costs, 
eliminate excess infrastructure, and allow uniformed personnel to focus 
on skills and activities directly related to their military missions.''
  Yet the Department is not moving blindly to privatization based on 
the many voices that have called for it in the past. It will take that 
step only if competition proves that the private sector will produce 
savings and protect readiness for the workload in question. Even the 
December 1996 General Accounting Office report, so often cited by 
opponents of the Everett amendment during this debate, concluded by 
calling for the use of ``competitive procedures, where applicable, for 
determining the most cost-effective source of repair for workloads at 
the closing Air Force depots.''
  In a recent letter to Speaker Gingrich on this issue, Secretary of 
Defense William Cohen wrote, ``Our initiatives to increase competition 
and free funds for modernization are vital to our national security.'' 
If we do not pass the Everett amendment, we will be denying DOD a 
critical tool in controlling its costs. This body would be taking the 
untenable position of commanding our armed forces to manage their 
assets with complete disregard for the national interest. I urge my 
colleagues to reject that course and to support this important 
amendment.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
North Carolina [Mr. Jones].
  Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to the Everett 
amendment. Let there be no mistake, this vote is on the integrity of 
the BRAC process. A vote for the Everett amendment will only serve to 
improve the profits of the defense industrial base at the expense of 
military readiness.
  As a Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Krulak has said time and 
again, depots are a critical element in Marine Corps combat readiness. 
The depots are the Nation's only ready and controlled source providing 
our war fighters with the highest quality maintenance and repair, on 
time and at least cost, wherever and whenever needed.
  Let us not forget that the defense contractors who have come to us 
asking to get more of the workload now done by the depots are the same 
defense contractors that say that cost should not be an issue when it 
comes to providing their product. Why would their way of doing business 
change now? Can we afford this way of doing business?
  A vote for the Everett amendment will destroy the BRAC process. It 
would cost the taxpayers millions of dollars each year, and it will 
cost the United States their national security.
  Please vote ``no'' on the Everett amendment.
  Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Pombo].
  Mr. POMBO. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Everett amendment. This 
amendment embodies many of the ideas that we all claim to stand for: 
open competition and smaller government. While this amendment does not 
require privatization, it merely ensures that the competition process 
remains on a level playing field between private industry and public 
military depots.
  I believe the provisions of this bill specifically target 
Sacramento's McClellan Air Force Base in my home State of California 
and Kelly Air Force Base in Texas. As currently drafted, this bill 
prevents the public-private competitions that are now taking place at 
McClellan and Kelly.
  Secretary of Defense Cohen has stated unequivocally that the 
significance of privatization is part of DOD's efforts to save taxpayer 
dollars. In addition, these provisions would be anticompetitive and 
would frustrate the integrity of the BRAC process. Furthermore, 
privatization at McClellan and Kelly is fully consistent with the BRAC 
recommendations.
  I urge the support of the Everett amendment.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Georgia [Mr. Chambliss].
  (Mr. CHAMBLISS asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
his remarks.)
  Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me 
this time.
  Unlike my friend from Minnesota for whom I have such great respect, I 
do support privatization. I think we have got to look for areas of our 
operation of the Federal Government to seek to privatize in ways that 
we can save money. But I do not support privatization when it affects 
the readiness of our military might, nor when it injects politics into 
an issue which must not be political if it is going to work, such as 
the BRAC process.
  Now, the Everett amendment is about two issues. The first issue is 
whether or not privatization in place should be allowed at Kelly Air 
Force Base and McClellan Air Force Base, and whether or not that was 
provided for in the BRAC process.
  Last year, during the defense authorization bill, the current 
Secretary of Defense, the Honorable William Cohen, who was a Senator at 
that point in time, a gentleman who was a great Senator and who is 
doing an excellent job as Secretary of Defense, stated the following in 
the Record, and I quote. ``The BRAC did not recommend or authorize 
privatization in place at Kelly or McClellan.'' He is right. He is 
absolutely right. It is not authorized.
  Second, this amendment is about one other issue: Does privatization 
in place save the taxpayers money?
  In December 1996, the General Accounting Office did a report; this is 
it right here. In this report it cites the Air Force's own numbers 
wherein the Air Force has stated itself that the privatization in place 
initiative that the administration supports at Kelly and McClellan will 
cost the American taxpayers $700 million a year.
  Folks, we are in tight, tight times with respect to budgets. We have 
been arguing about balancing the budget around here for the 2\1/2\ 
years that I have been here. We cannot afford to spend $700 million on 
politics. $700 million will buy us somewhere around 8, 9, or 10 F-22's. 
$700 million will add a lot of pay increases for our military 
personnel. That is where the money should be spent. I ask my colleagues 
to vote ``no'' on this amendment.
  Mr. SABO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Texas 
[Mr. Rodriguez].
  Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me 
the time.
  We have before us an amendment, and basically one of the things that 
it does is it allows to preserve the existing law. There are some 
discussions that are out there regarding the privatization in place, 
but let me set my colleagues straight. The bids are out in San Antonio. 
We have both the private and the public sector participating, and I ask 
my colleagues, why are they afraid of that? We have the bids that are 
out there and it does not call for privatization in place; it just asks 
to see what the best bid is. Why are my colleagues so afraid of doing 
that? So what we have before us is an attempt to get the language and 
clean up the language.
  There is some discussion by some of the Members regarding the 
integrity of the BRAC process. The chairman, when he first started, 
read out what the process said, and I am going to read it to my 
colleagues again. It said, consolidate the workloads to other DOD 
depots or to private sector commercial activities as determined by the 
Defense Department.
  We have both options of doing the private sector or the depot, 
whichever is the most cost effective. It is pretty straightforward and 
pretty democratic. But now we come through the legislative process and 
since we have the bids that are out there, we want to say no, we do not 
want to play that game, we want to get the contract without having to 
go out for the bids.
  Well, I say to my colleagues, we have an opportunity to vote for the 
Everett amendment and we have the opportunity to withhold the integrity 
of the BRAC process by voting ``no'' on the Everett amendment.
  I also want to share with my colleagues that in the process, the 
discussions about Kelly and about San Antonio and Sacramento, they have 
been closed, and in some cases in San Antonio some of the projects have 
been realigned. That is going to happen. That

[[Page H4194]]

is going to occur. Out of the five depots, there are only three left. 
San Antonio is closed and Sacramento is closed. What we have before us 
is an opportunity to make sure that the integrity of BRAC is taking 
place by voting for the Everett amendment; No. 2, by assuring that we 
have the most cost-effective method of making sure that we put that 
into effect.
  Secretary Cohen has talked about the importance of readiness, as some 
of the Members have mentioned here, and he has talked about the fact 
that some of the existing laws like this one is detrimental for the 
process of readiness and to assure that our troops have the resources. 
So it becomes really important that my colleagues vote, and I would ask 
my colleagues to vote in favor of the amendment.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Alabama [Mr. Riley], a new and very able member of our committee.
  Mr. RILEY. Mr. Chairman, this debate is not about depots, it is not 
about 60/40, it is not about privatization, it is not about 
competition. This debate is a debate on fairness. This is a vote on 
restoring the integrity to the BRAC process. This is a vote on taking 
politics out of the BRAC process.
  Mr. Chairman, our national defense is too important to trust the 
politicians. That was the very reason we set up the BRAC process in the 
first place.
  Mr. Chairman, a few minutes ago, the ranking minority member, before 
the B-2 vote, asked us to vote for integrity, to vote for trust, and 
vote for fairness. That is what this debate is about, returning trust, 
integrity, fairness to the process. I agree with the ranking minority 
member, and that is the very reason I will vote ``no'' on the Everett 
amendment.

                              {time}  2130

  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Florida [Mr. Stearns].
  (Mr. STEARNS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. STEARNS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished chairman for 
yielding me the time.
  To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of 
preserving peace. These words were uttered some 200 years ago by George 
Washington. They are just as poignant today as they were then. The 
issue is one of national security. In other words, regardless of the 
rhetoric that we are going to hear, the truth of the matter is that 
America simply cannot afford this amendment. Here is why.
  Under current law, all core duties and no less than 60 percent of the 
annual depot maintenance workload must be performed by Federal 
employees. This amendment proposes elimination of this requirement so 
that more maintenance work can be contracted out to private firms. It 
sounds like a good idea. However, the 60-40 rule ensures that the 
Department of Defense has an in-house capability to maintain America's 
readiness, crucial in times of national emergency. Our security cannot 
depend on private companies subject to the whims of the market. This is 
an extremely important point, and a point that cannot be forgotten.
  Doing away with the 60-40 rule is a misguided proposal which could 
adversely affect the abilities of the Naval Aviation Depot in 
Jacksonville, the employer in my home district of 3,900 Floridians. I 
am opposed to this amendment not just because I am worried about local 
jobs, but as a veteran I am concerned about our national security.
  Mr. Chairman, here we are debating tonight an amendment offering a 
solution to a problem that does not exist. It sounds neat, sounds 
plausible, but it is wrong. I urge my colleagues to oppose this 
amendment.
  Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 15 seconds to remind my 
friend from Florida that this does not, my amendment does not repeal 
60-40, reverse the current law.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. 
Klug].
  Mr. KLUG. Mr. Chairman, let us try to put this all in perspective for 
a minute, if we can, because I think if we are listening to the debate 
in this Chamber, it is a little hard exactly to figure out what is at 
issue. Opponents of this amendment, I think, have quite correctly 
characterized the President interfered in the BRAC Commission situation 
and essentially tried to keep open two bases for political reasons.
  I will concede that. But let me argue that I think what opponents of 
this amendment are trying to do is to simply close down two bases in 
the country so that we can then ship work to other bases to keep those 
depots open. This is in its fundamental perspective, I think, a battle 
over not whether we are going to privatize work done by the United 
States armed forces or whether we are going to create and guarantee 
make-work in order to keep government jobs working.
  I am astonished to hear my good friend from Florida talk about the 
idea of exposing the Defense Department to the whims of the 
marketplace. That is what Republicans are supposed to argue for, that 
we think we can save money. And the gentleman from California [Mr. 
Doolittle] is exactly right that privatization always does save money. 
Now, if we do not strike this language that is in the report done by 
the committee, what it will essentially say is that a billion and a 
half dollars worth of work is off the table. One cannot compete for it. 
One cannot privatize it. It is government workers who have to do it.
  If we continue to follow this line of thought, we are going to take 
$15 billion in depot work and essentially say it is off limits; it is 
only government workers who can get it done, which I think is an 
absolutely astonishing position for members of the Republican Party to 
argue.
  Who supports this idea of what we are talking about? Here is what the 
United States Chamber of Commerce said in sending a letter to the other 
body: As a matter of policy, the U.S. Chamber favors privatization of 
tasks performed by the Government in order to provide new business 
opportunities to the private sector and to take advantage of cost 
efficiencies afforded through modern business practices.
  In brief, the U.S. Chamber thinks privatizing depot operations will 
save United States taxpayers money.
  Here is what the BRAC Commission said: This Commission believes 
reducing infrastructure by extending privatization to other DOD 
industrial and commercial activities will reduce the cost of 
maintaining and operating a ready military force.
  Those are dollars that can be saved for the United States taxpayers. 
Those are dollars that can be spent on other weapons systems, on other 
kinds of training programs for our troops on readiness. In short, we 
save money and make the United States military even better prepared in 
the event of war, which is what the gentleman from Florida [Mr. 
Stearns] was arguing about.
  This I think is an extraordinarily bad precedent because, if the 
President made a mistake, we in this body are going to repeat a mistake 
tonight if we do not follow forward and pass the Everett amendment 
because what we are going to say is that $15 billion in potential 
privatization contracts are off the board. Make no mistake about it. 
This is not about trying to save two places last year and whether the 
President made a mistake. I think he did make a mistake. But what we 
are going to do with this amendment is to set the hurdle so high that 
we will protect other bases and guarantee that privatization will never 
ever happen.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Cunningham].
  Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I have got friends on both sides of 
this issue. I am a Californian. Let me tell Members why I am opposed to 
this amendment.
  First of all, remember that every BRACC base closed is for 
privatization. Every one closed. That is what we are saying. We are 
closing them. We do not want the Federal Government to take care of 
them. We initially had six Air Force and six Navy depots. In the first 
BRACC round the Navy closed down three. The Air Force did not close 
any. So there was three and six in the next round, the Air Force closed 
three. So there was three and three. And yet there is still a 50 
percent overhead or excess, so that we are operating at only 50 percent 
capacity. And now we want two other depots to come in and privatize. 
That is going to cost $700 million a year to compete against the ones

[[Page H4195]]

that have and that is core military. Let me tell my colleagues why from 
personal experience.
  During the Vietnam war, we privatized because we could not do the 
work to build F-14 or FB4's to F-4N's. Six months before we got ready 
to go, four airwings of Phantoms could not go to Vietnam because they 
found wing cracks. If we would have flown those airplanes, our pilots 
would have been killed. That never would have happened in a depot. Not 
in a military depot. It would not have got through.
  So it is not only readiness, the core capability that we need to 
fight the war, and this is wrong. It is just as wrong to privatize this 
as it is to give the Communist Chinese Long Beach Naval Shipyard to 
control. That is privatization but it is wrong. It is bad policy. It is 
bad economics. And it is bad for national security. I would ask my 
colleagues on both sides of the aisle and, yes, those from California, 
my colleagues, oppose this amendment.
  Mr. SABO. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would advise that the gentleman from 
Minnesota [Mr. Sabo] has 7 minutes remaining, the gentleman from 
Alabama [Mr. Everett] has 2 minutes remaining, and gentleman from South 
Carolina [Mr. Spence] has 5 minutes remaining and has the right to 
close.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Oklahoma [Mr. Istook].
  Mr. ISTOOK. Mr. Chairman, I rise to oppose this amendment.
  As a member of the Subcommittee on National Security of the Committee 
on Appropriations, I know firsthand our defense budget is inadequate. 
Training for our men and women in uniform, purchase of modern weapons 
systems, research and development to hold our technological knowledge 
in the military, proper facilities for our troops, all these and more 
are underfunded.
  Every dollar for defense is precious. So when the General Accounting 
Office reports that we will pay an extra $468 million each year if we 
fail to do both of two things, if we fail both to close those depots in 
Texas and in California and also transfer the work to the surviving 
three depots, if we do not do both of them, we lose the $468 million a 
year.
  The work has to be shifted. Why? Very simple: Three overheads are 
cheaper than five. And if we do not transfer the work, we are paying 
for more overhead multiple times. If we pass this amendment, we are 
playing politics and more, wasting 468 million badly needed dollars for 
defense.
  What does it mean? For example, each year it is 18 F-16 fighters we 
cannot buy. Each year it is 58 M-1 main battle tanks that we cannot 
upgrade. Each year we cannot get the upgrades of 56 Kiowa Warrior 
helicopters. We cannot buy those. We cannot upgrade other military 
facilities. We cannot take care of the troops. We cannot supply proper 
facilities, all because people wanted excess overhead and undercut our 
military's ability to get the most bang for our buck.
  Mr. Chairman, it also means less training, less preparedness and less 
readiness for national defense. A vote for the amendment is a vote to 
waste this money. I ask my colleagues to join me and vote no.
  Mr. SABO. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the 
gentleman from California [Mr. Fazio].
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California [Mr. Fazio] is recognized 
for 7 minutes.
  Mr. FAZIO of California. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong support 
for the Everett-Sabo amendment. I want to go right to the heart of the 
matter, because I know that many of my friends and colleagues on the 
floor here are torn over the facts of this case.
  McClellan and Kelly Air Force Bases are closing. Nothing we do in 
this bill is going to change that. It is a done deal. As McClellan 
closes, 15,000 jobs will disappear from the Sacramento economy. That is 
on top of thousands of other jobs we have lost from two prior Base 
Closing Rounds, recent BRACC rounds.
  I think it is safe to say that no community has been more adversely 
impacted by the Base Closing Commission than Sacramento has. But that 
is not why we are offering this bipartisan amendment. It is more than 
that, and I would say much more than that.
  The reason Republicans and Democrats, liberals and conservatives are 
joining here is to restore competition and preserve the integrity of 
the Base Closing Commission and, at the same time, ensure that the 
Department of Defense saves millions of taxpayers' dollars and protects 
our Nation's military readiness through competition.
  There has been a lot of misinformation tossed around about the 
politics of the Base Closing Commission in the past hour. But the facts 
are indisputable.
  This amendment is explicitly following the Commission's 
recommendation. Read Chairman Dixon's letter to Secretary White. It 
expressly says, BRACC gave DOD the flexibility to privatize at 
McClellan and Kelly.
  Also look at what the experts say. It is overwhelming. The list is 
endless. Make no mistake about it. Our amendment simply maintains the 
status quo. Unlike the language put forth by the depot caucus in this 
bill, our amendment does not affect the 60-40 calculation that is so 
important to so many of our colleagues in this body.
  Contrary to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Stearns], the committee 
language changes the 60-40, we do not. The depot caucus language, if 
adopted, would eliminate public-private competition, sole source 
billions of dollars worth of contracts to public depots without the 
benefits of competition and, finally, force the military to pay huge 
construction costs to accommodate the workload from the closing 
installations.
  Let me give my colleagues an example of what I mean. For Warner 
Robbins Air Logistics Center in Georgia to take away the C-5 work at 
Kelly without competition, as this amendment would have it, more than 
$100 million worth of new military construction will have to be 
undertaken at the Georgia facility. That is right. The American 
taxpayer will have to pick up a multimillion dollar tab for a new 
hanger and a paint shop. It seems to me that is a colossal waste of 
money.
  Let us put it into modernizing weapons systems, increasing military 
readiness or some other pressing needs.
  There are two other issues I want to address. Labor: Some Members on 
my side of the aisle have made much of the AFG's opposition to this 
amendment. They of course, the union, are interested in not just 
preserving but expanding government jobs. But when Newark Air Force 
Base in Ohio and the Naval Air Warfare Center at Indianapolis were 
privatized in 1995, AFG organized the workers there. No union jobs were 
lost.
  And while we are on the subject of labor, the Hansen language in the 
bill will pull jobs from the private sector and put them in a 
government-run facility. Jobs that are being held by aerospace workers, 
machinists, for example, would be in jeopardy. And that is why the 
machinists union supports the Everett-Sabo amendment. That is another 
reason why both the minority leader, the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. 
Gephardt], and the ranking member of the Committee on National 
Security, the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] oppose this 
amendment offered by the committee and support the Everett amendment.

                              {time}  2145

  I also want to know, why is it okay to privatize the House beauty 
salon but no non-corps depot work done by defense contractors that 
build the same weapons system? They simply want to maintain it after it 
is procured. I will tell my colleagues why.
  One example is because the Speaker, the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. 
Gingrich], who almost succeeded in precluding us from having this 
debate, is against this amendment. He is really, frankly, against 
privatization in Georgia, his home State.
  The Speaker, the most prominent member of the privatization task 
force, is for competition and privatization, but not when it comes to 
his region. If there was an issue that I thought the House leadership 
would be for, it would be for competition, privatization, and saving 
American taxpayers millions of dollars. But pork barrel politics seem 
to be paramount whenever this issue comes up.
  In the next several days, we will be debating how to achieve a 
balanced budget. With defense dollars being severely constrained for at 
least the next

[[Page H4196]]

several years, it is critical we spend every dollar prudently. And that 
is why the Secretary of Defense, William Cohen, and all defense sector 
organizations strongly support our amendment to strike this onerous and 
harmful language in this bill.
  They know the GAO report is erroneous because they know these bases 
will not be open, as the GAO assumes, but will be closed. And all this 
rhetoric about the cost according to the GAO is not even on target. The 
question they answered was not even relevant. Do not put our military 
readiness at risk. Do not let a parochial issue take priority over our 
national defense.
  Support the Nation's military leaders who made the tough choice. 
Support 60/40 as it has always been. And keep a decent balance of the 
workload between the private sector, that might yet have to ramp up in 
procurement, and also give those in the public facility their chance to 
live in the future. Let us not bias the decision by taking action on a 
bill like this. Let us leave it up to the Defense Department and 
commissions that have been assigned the role of making these judgments.
  Join us and support the Everett-Sabo-Klug-Fazio amendment. Make sure 
you stand up for a BRACC process that has not been adulterated. And in 
more important terms, do not bias how work gets done. Let competition 
prevail. Let those who can do it for least cost and best quality 
benefit by getting the workload of the defense establishment in the 
future.
  I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
  Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself my final 2 minutes.
  Mr. Chairman, my colleagues heard my colleague, the gentleman from 
Wisconsin [Mr. Klug], say the U.S. Chamber of Commerce supports 
privatization between private sector and depot level maintenance.
  Let me tell my colleagues who supports this amendment. Aerospace 
Industries Association, American Defense Preparedness Association of 
National Security, the Industrial Association, American Electronics 
Association, American Shipbuilding Association, Business Executives of 
National Security, Contract Services Association, Electronic Industries 
Association, Professional Services Council, and Shipbuilders Council of 
America.
  Mr. Chairman, the last two amendments, without question, are truly 
the two hardest amendments this body has to debate. The debate on this 
amendment has moved across party lines, it has moved across 
philosophical views, and it has moved across lines of friendship. It is 
not easy to be on different sides of an issue with friends you trust 
and admire and who you know debate our true convictions.
  Yet, my colleagues, I suggest that that is what this House is all 
about, a place where sincere people can hold different views and 
express them openly and freely. I offered this amendment not to get 
even with anyone; I offered this amendment because of what I see to be 
serious problems contained in the language of this bill. I have tried 
to make it clear to my colleagues on both sides of this issue that if 
this language simply calls for the closing of two of our Air Force 
bases, I would not be standing here tonight. But, in my opinion, it 
goes much farther than that.
  I could ask no more than each Member to vote his conscience.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as she may consume to the 
gentlewoman from Florida [Ms. Brown].
  (Ms. BROWN of Florida asked and was given permission to revise and 
extend her remarks.)
  Ms. BROWN of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I would like to enter my 
objection to this amendment, this provision, which is the beginning of 
the end of 60/40.
  Mr. Chairman, this amendment is the beginning of the end for the 60/
40 provision which protects national security interests by ensuring the 
majority of mission critical maintenance is conducted by government 
employees. Further privatization of depot work would restrict the 
maintenance capability available to our forces in times of crisis.
  60/40 is an excellent example of private and public partnerships. 
Contractors benefit by being allowed to perform core work where they 
have a comparative advantage, and government employees offer their own 
acquired learning curve in addition to reliability in times of crisis.
  If the Everett amendment passes it will open the door to full 
privatization in the military. Most of us know that privatization 
rarely benefits the middle class working family. Additionally, there is 
no evidence that shows that this type of privatization saves any money. 
I urge you to support the BRAC process, national security, and our hard 
working constituents and oppose the Everett amendment.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the 
gentleman from Texas [Mr. Armey].
  Mr. ARMEY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from South Carolina 
[Mr. Spence] for yielding me the time.
  Mr. Chairman, this is a debate that I would much rather not find 
myself participating in. Any of my colleagues that were here in the 
legislative years of 1987 and 1988 will recall that I spent almost my 
entire time during those two years working on the base-closing 
legislation that resulted in the BRAC Commission. And I recall vividly 
that I spoke to every Member of the House during that period of time 
many times. And in each and every case, in each and every conversation, 
my job, as an advocate of base closures, was to convince the Members 
that the process would be apolitical, that nobody, no President would 
have the ability to intercede in the process on behalf of a base to be 
closed as a punishment against a Member or a base to be left open as a 
reward against a Member. No politics.
  We had three rounds of base closing, and we are all very proud of the 
process because politics never intruded into the process. That ended in 
round four. And all of my colleagues knew at the time, and we know now, 
that the special conditions for McClellan and Kelly, California and my 
own State of Texas, where you might think I have a parochial interest, 
were in a political invention.
  We talk about this being privatization. No, it is not. It is a new 
concept. It is privatization in place, created specifically for these 
two bases in an election year for no purpose other than politics. And 
that is an intrusion against the process that, if we allow to stand, 
might put in jeopardy any future base closures through a lack of 
confidence on the Members of Congress that it will be as it was 
intended to be, politically aloof and out of the control of people for 
politics, rewards, or punishments.
  This amendment that is offered, that was put into the mark by the 
members of the committee, is the necessary response to that 
politicization of the process in the last round. It is not a perfect 
response and a response that we intend to work on to fix and repair. 
Because in another time and another part of my service here, I had the 
great honor of creating the privatization caucus.
  I believe in privatization. I believe in full, objective, competitive 
privatization, not some creation that has a clear, precise, and 
mandatory geographic locale called privatization in place. So, on 
behalf of both the concept of privatization and the integrity of the 
base-closing process, I ask my colleagues to please vote no on the 
Everett amendment. Let the committee mark stand.
  I have been assured by the members of the committee and each of those 
that wrote the amendment that we can do a perfecting of that language 
so that we can simultaneously preserve the integrity of base closing 
for future base-closing efforts and the integrity of the concept of 
privatization.
  This is not a matter of what is best or desire for each and every one 
of us from a parochial point of view. This is certainly not a matter of 
me, as a Texan, taking care of my Texan interests. It is a matter of 
demonstrating that this Congress can build a process with integrity 
and, against even the most powerful influences in our government, can 
stand to preserve the integrity of that process for our children's 
future, for safer defense, for cost-ready defense, and a defense that 
will in fact will meet the needs of our Nation.
  We have overcome old legislative barriers. We have overcome old 
politics to do what is right in the allocation of scarce defense 
dollars. Let us not lose that game now. Vote no on the Everett 
amendment. Let us fix the committee language in conference, and let us 
save this process for another round or two.
  Mrs. CLAYTON. Mr. Chairman, I recognize that there are good people on 
both sides of this issue.

[[Page H4197]]

  However, I rise in strong opposition to this amendment which would 
strike the bipartisan bill language on depot maintenance regulations.
  As written the bill's language would:
  Ensure that efficient capacity exists in both the public and the 
private sector to meet our depot maintenance needs,
  Restore the integrity of the Base Realignment and Closure process,
  Support the independent Base Realignment and Closure process.
  The current provision of 60/40 has worked well during the harsh 
economic environment we experienced during the years of BRAC closure 
years.
  The Everett amendment would erode the 60/40 provision and will only 
benefit private contractors and two Air Force bases.
  The BRAC Commission found that closure of these two Air Force Bases 
would significantly improved utilization of the remaining depots and 
reduce DOD operating costs.
  We must respect and abide by the BRAC process we cannot allow it to 
become corrupted. The BRAC closure process was meant to be insulated 
from political influence.
  If you support the non-politicized, nonpartisan BRAC process vote no 
on this amendment.

             [From the Wall Street Journal, June 20, 1997]

  U.S. Trade Deficit Widened in April, As Gap With China Continued to 
                                  Grow

                          (By Christina Duff)

       Washington.--American businesses imported lots of clothing, 
     toys and sporting goods in April--mostly from China--which 
     helped to expand modestly the U.S. trade deficit to a 
     seasonally adjusted $8.36 billion from $7.76 billion in 
     March.
       The deficit with China was 41% higher in the first four 
     months of this year than it was in the year-earlier period; 
     in April, tat gap widened to $3.45 billion from $2.41 billion 
     the year before. The year-earlier comparison is a more 
     accurate gauge than month-to-month figures because country 
     breakdowns aren't seasonally adjusted.
       As Congress gets set to debate the extension of normal 
     trade relations with Beijing, the widening trade gap with 
     China is sure to incite the measure's opponents, such as 
     organized labor. ``This will make the fight a little more 
     fierce on the floor,'' said economist Brian Horrigan of 
     Loomis Sayles & Co., Boston.


                         gap with japan widens

       The China gap is expected sometime this year to surpass the 
     trade deficit with Japan, which swelled in April to $4.84 
     billion, the highest since last October. It widened even 
     further in May, based on figures released earlier this week 
     by the Japanese government. The once-contentious trade gap 
     with Tokyo has begun widening again, after narrowing over the 
     past few years mainly because a strong yen made U.S. exports 
     to Japan more competitive and raised prices of goods Japan 
     sells here. But the rise of the dollar against the yen, until 
     two months ago, altered that balance.
       Total imports increased 0.9% in April to a record $86.72 
     billion, following a 2% jump in March. Since consumer demand 
     looks to have slowed in the second quarter, many of these 
     imported goods may be ``winding up in inventory,'' said 
     economist Mark Vitner of First Union Corp., Charlotte, N.C. 
     As a result, retailers may have to cut back their orders.
       Imports would have been stronger if not for a sharp drop in 
     oil prices. In April, the average price per barrel of 
     imported oil fell to $16.78 and is down $5.97 since January. 
     The Labor Department reported yesterday, however, that 
     petroleum prices climbed back up 1.2% in May. Excluding fuel, 
     import prices slipped 0.1% in May, the fifth consecutive 
     monthly drop, led by declining prices for capital goods and 
     cars. Overall import prices were unchanged.


                        exports also set record

       Total exports, meanwhile, rose a slight 0.2% in April to 
     $78.36 billion, also a record, after surging 5.1% in March. 
     April's gain was driven by shipments of capital goods, 
     including telecommunications equipment and industrial 
     machinery.
       All told, the April deficit was 14% below the first-quarter 
     average of $9.7 billion. The better-than-expected rise in 
     exports suggests that trade should add to second-quarter 
     economic growth, after subtracting from it in the first 
     quarter, said economist Cheryl Katz of Merrill Lynch & Co., 
     New York. Ms. Katz is looking for growth this quarter of 
     about 2% at an annual rate; in the first, the economy soared 
     at a 5.8% rate.
       Also yesterday, the Commerce Department said the deficit in 
     the broadest measure of U.S. foreign trade totaled $40.97 
     billion in the first quarter, compared with a revised $36.87 
     billion in the final quarter of 1996. The quarterly current-
     account deficit is considered the most comprehensive gauge of 
     trade performance because it measures not only trade in goods 
     and services, but also investment flows between nations, as 
     well as foreign aid.


                           ten-year revision

       The first-quarter report included annual data revisions 
     that show the U.S. current-account deficit was substantially 
     smaller during the past 10 years than previously reported. 
     The government revised the current-account deficit downward 
     by $72.59 billion for the 10-year period. For all of 1996, 
     the U.S. registered a revised $148.18 billion current-account 
     deficit, down from the $165.10 billion shortfall previously 
     reported.
       Meanwhile, other sectors of the economy are easing. The 
     Labor Department reported yesterday that the number of 
     Americans applying for state unemployment insurance rose 
     8,000 last week to a seasonally adjusted 347,000, reflecting 
     some slackening in the labor market.
       The four-week moving average of jobless claims, considered 
     a better gauge of labor-market conditions because it adjusts 
     for weekly fluctuations, rose 6,250 in the latest week to 
     335,500, the highest level since early May.

                            PARTNERS IN TRADE
 [U.S. merchandise trade balances by region; in billions of dollars, not
                          seasonally adjusted]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                      April,     April
                                                       1997       1996
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Japan.............................................     -$4.84     -$4.47
China.............................................      -3.45      -2.41
Mexico............................................      -1.40      -1.64
Canada............................................      -0.97      -1.55
NICs \1\..........................................      -0.81      -0.37
So./Central America...............................      -0.80      -0.09
W. Europe.........................................      -0.49      -0.69
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Newly industrialized countries: Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South
  Korea.
 
Source: Commerce Department.

  Mr. LUCAS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I am concerned with the 
ramifications of this amendment. If this is approved, we will be 
endorsing the President's decision to contravene the 1995 BRAC law and 
giving the green light to future administrations to do the same thing 
in subsequent rounds of base closings.
  We are engaged today in a regional battle because the President 
refused to implement the very law he signed. Congress must have the 
fortitude to stand up and force the President to abide by the law and 
not give special treatment to two bases which were to be closed under 
the last BRAC.
  There is a lot of talk these days about forming BRAC-like commissions 
on a whole host of topics. The reason is that BRAC worked, or at least 
it used to work. Independent, objective, fair--these are words that 
were used to describe BRAC. Can we really apply these terms anymore?
  I urge my colleagues not to give the President a free ride on this 
matter. You had to vote yes or no on BRAC without conditions. Don't 
hold the President to a lower standard. Vote No!
  Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to the Everett 
amendment and urge my colleagues to support the depot maintenance 
provisions included in this bill. This amendment is an attempt to 
circumvent the independent BRAC process and put in place a 
privatization-in-place plan for two bases ordered closed by the BRAC. 
If we allow these bases to privatize-in-place rather than close, we 
will sustain a costly excess capacity within our depot system.
  There has been a great deal of misinformation circulated about the 
language in the bill. I'll take this opportunity to make a few points 
of clarification for the body. This bill does not affect any current 
private contracts and does not require any work to be moved into the 
public sector; it does not increase the percentage of depot workload 
performed by the public sector; it does not require all maintenance on 
all new weapons systems to be performed in public depots; nor does it 
preclude the further downsizing of the government owned depots for 
future BRAC rounds.
  The bill does allow us to move forward with the intentions and 
recommendations of the BRAC regarding excess capacity in the depot 
system. By complying with recommendations of BRAC, it also enables us 
to save the taxpayer's over $689 million a year. In tough budgetary 
times, we must act to achieve savings where we can.
  Additionally, the bill clarifies what operations are included in the 
``term depot maintenance'' and offers new flexibility by allowing core 
workload requirements to be performed by private sector employees in 
partnership with organic depots. It also restricts the Secretary of 
Defense's ability to privatize any workload currently performed in 
depots closed or realigned by BRAC at those depots unless the Secretary 
certifies that, at the time the contract is signed, each of the 
services depots is operating at an efficiency level of 80 percent, that 
the total cost to Government is less than continuing to consolidate the 
workload in existing depots, and that none of the workload is core. 
Finally, it directs the Secretary to establish policies to enable 
public private partnerships at our depots.
  I urge my colleague to support the provisions of the bill. They 
provide much needed capabilities and enhance our military readiness 
while saving the money for the American taxpayer. Please vote no on the 
Everett amendment:
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment, as modified, offered 
by the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. Everett].

[[Page H4198]]

  The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.


                             Recorded Vote

  Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 145, 
noes 278, not voting 11, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 229]

                               AYES--145

     Andrews
     Baldacci
     Barrett (WI)
     Barton
     Becerra
     Bentsen
     Berman
     Berry
     Blagojevich
     Blumenauer
     Boehlert
     Bonilla
     Boyd
     Brady
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (OH)
     Burton
     Campbell
     Capps
     Cardin
     Clay
     Clyburn
     Combest
     Condit
     Costello
     Cramer
     Davis (FL)
     DeFazio
     DeLauro
     Dellums
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Doggett
     Dooley
     Doolittle
     Duncan
     Edwards
     Eshoo
     Everett
     Farr
     Fattah
     Fazio
     Foglietta
     Frank (MA)
     Frost
     Furse
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Gonzalez
     Granger
     Hamilton
     Harman
     Herger
     Hilleary
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hooley
     Hoyer
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     John
     Johnson (WI)
     Johnson, Sam
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kennelly
     Kilpatrick
     Kim
     Kind (WI)
     Kleczka
     Klug
     LaFalce
     Lampson
     Lantos
     Levin
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Luther
     Maloney (CT)
     Manton
     Matsui
     McCarthy (MO)
     McDermott
     McHale
     McKeon
     Meehan
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller (CA)
     Minge
     Moakley
     Mollohan
     Moran (VA)
     Nadler
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Owens
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Paul
     Pelosi
     Peterson (MN)
     Pombo
     Pomeroy
     Radanovich
     Rangel
     Reyes
     Riggs
     Rodriguez
     Roemer
     Rogan
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Sabo
     Sanchez
     Sanders
     Sandlin
     Sawyer
     Serrano
     Sessions
     Sherman
     Skaggs
     Slaughter
     Smith (TX)
     Smith, Adam
     Snyder
     Spratt
     Stabenow
     Stark
     Strickland
     Stupak
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Thompson
     Thornberry
     Thurman
     Tierney
     Torres
     Turner
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Waxman
     Wexler
     Weygand
     Wise
     Woolsey

                               NOES--278

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Aderholt
     Allen
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baesler
     Baker
     Ballenger
     Barcia
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Bass
     Bateman
     Bereuter
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop
     Bliley
     Boehner
     Bonior
     Bono
     Borski
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Brown (FL)
     Bryant
     Bunning
     Burr
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Canady
     Cannon
     Carson
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Chenoweth
     Christensen
     Clayton
     Clement
     Coble
     Coburn
     Collins
     Conyers
     Cook
     Cooksey
     Coyne
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cubin
     Cummings
     Cunningham
     Danner
     Davis (IL)
     Davis (VA)
     Deal
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLay
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Dicks
     Doyle
     Dreier
     Dunn
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     Engel
     English
     Ensign
     Etheridge
     Evans
     Ewing
     Fawell
     Filner
     Flake
     Foley
     Forbes
     Ford
     Fowler
     Fox
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gekas
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Goss
     Graham
     Green
     Greenwood
     Gutierrez
     Gutknecht
     Hall (OH)
     Hall (TX)
     Hansen
     Hastert
     Hastings (FL)
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Hefner
     Hill
     Hilliard
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Holden
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Inglis
     Istook
     Jefferson
     Jenkins
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, E.B.
     Jones
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kasich
     Kelly
     Kennedy (MA)
     Kildee
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Klink
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Kucinich
     LaHood
     Largent
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lazio
     Leach
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (GA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     Livingston
     LoBiondo
     Lucas
     Manzullo
     Markey
     Martinez
     Mascara
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McDade
     McGovern
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntyre
     McKinney
     McNulty
     Meek
     Menendez
     Metcalf
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Mink
     Molinari
     Moran (KS)
     Morella
     Murtha
     Myrick
     Neal
     Nethercutt
     Neumann
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Oxley
     Packard
     Pallone
     Pappas
     Parker
     Paxon
     Payne
     Pease
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pickett
     Pitts
     Porter
     Portman
     Poshard
     Price (NC)
     Pryce (OH)
     Quinn
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Redmond
     Regula
     Riley
     Rivers
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roukema
     Royce
     Rush
     Ryun
     Salmon
     Sanford
     Saxton
     Scarborough
     Schaefer, Dan
     Schaffer, Bob
     Scott
     Sensenbrenner
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Sisisky
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (OR)
     Smith, Linda
     Snowbarger
     Solomon
     Souder
     Spence
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Stokes
     Stump
     Sununu
     Talent
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Thomas
     Thune
     Tiahrt
     Traficant
     Upton
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Waters
     Watkins
     Watt (NC)
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     White
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wolf
     Wynn
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                             NOT VOTING--11

     Blunt
     Cox
     Gordon
     Houghton
     Lipinski
     Maloney (NY)
     McIntosh
     Schiff
     Schumer
     Towns
     Yates

                              {time}  2214

  The Clerk announced the following pair:
  On this vote:

       Mr. McIntosh for, with Mr. Blunt against.

  Mr. Ford and Mr. Gutierrez changed their vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
  Messrs. Brown of Ohio, Stark, and Sessions changed their vote from 
``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the amendment was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.


                          personal explanation

  Mr. COX of California. Mr. Chairman, I was necessarily absent for 
this vote for medical reasons.

                              {time}  2215

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to section 5 of House Resolution 169, it is 
now in order to consider amendment No. 35 printed in part 2 of House 
Report 105-137.


                  Amendment Offered by Mr. Rohrabacher

  Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, as the designee of the gentleman from 
New York [Mr. Solomon] I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Rohrabacher: At the end of title 
     XI (page 371, after line 18), insert the following new 
     section:

     SEC. 1112. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR CERTAIN PURPOSES 
                   IN CASE OF TRANSFER OF MISSILE SYSTEM BY 
                   RUSSIA.

       (a) In General.--No fiscal year 1998 Cooperative Threat 
     Reduction funds may, notwithstanding any other provision of 
     law, be obligated or expended to carry out a Cooperative 
     Threat Reduction program in Russia after the date on which it 
     is made known to the Secretary of Defense that Russia has 
     transferred to the People's Republic of China an SS-N-22 
     missile system.
       (b) Applicability.--This section shall apply with respect 
     to any transfer by Russia of an SS-N-22 missile system to the 
     People's Republic of China that occurs on or after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act.

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from California, 
Mr. Rohrabacher, and a Member opposed Mr. Dellums, each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California [Mr. Rohrabacher].
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to 
the distinguished gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence] for the 
purpose of an announcement.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to inform the House that 
this vote on this amendment, I would just like to announce that after 
this amendment, a 10-minute amendment, there will be a vote, if called 
for, and that will be the last vote for the evening. Even though we 
will be considering the en bloc amendments, that would be the last vote 
after this one.
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Chairman, the SS-N-22 missile known as the Sunburn was created by 
the Soviet Union to attack American warships that are equipped with 
Aegis cruiser radar and battle management systems.
  This missile system, the Sunburn system, is a system designed to kill 
American sailors. The supersonic sea skimming missile is extremely 
difficult to defend against, and a long-range version of the missile is 
a dangerous threat to our military personnel, especially those on 
aircraft carriers and other naval personnel.
  In December 1996 a secret agreement was made between what was the 
Soviet Union, now it is Russia, and China to transfer from Russia to 
China this deadly American-killing weapon system. Basically, if the 
Chinese deploy this in the Straits of Taiwan, it will put our naval 
personnel in danger. Then if it is put in place to threaten our people 
in the Straits of Hormuz,

[[Page H4199]]

American naval operations there will be threatened because China is 
itself a supplier of weapons to the Iranians.
  This deadly weapon system, if it is transferred from Russia to China, 
will have horrible implications for the safety of our naval personnel 
all over the world and terrible implications for the peace of mankind.
  The amendment being offered by my friend, the gentleman from New York 
[Mr. Solomon] and I does not cut off the Nunn-Lugar funding. I want to 
stress that the GAO tells us that there is still more than $1 billion 
in the Nunn-Lugar pipeline. At current spending rates, that should 
cover the program for the next 4 years.
  If this amendment is adopted, it will not affect in the slightest the 
number of Russian nuclear weapons that will be dismantled in 1998; but 
what this amendment does do, it says that we will not add another $200 
million to the pipeline if this deadly weapon system that the Russians 
now possess is transferred to the Chinese. We are basically saying that 
the Russians cannot expect to sell deadly weapons, high-technology 
weapon systems, aimed at killing Americans and expect us to add another 
$200 billion to the foreign aid pipe line.
  I would ask my colleagues to vote ``yes'' on the Solomon-Rohrabacher 
amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to my distinguished 
colleague, the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spratt].
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to the 
gentleman's amendment. This amendment would stop, stop any funds for 
the so-called Nunn-Lugar program from being spent if the Russians dare 
to sell the SS-N-22 antiship cruise missile to China. The Nunn-Lugar 
program, sometimes known as cooperative threat reduction, helps the 
Russians to smile at ballistic weapons and store their deadly 
components. Nunn-Lugar is not foreign aid, it is not a gratuity. Nunn-
Lugar helps U.S. national security in very direct and substantial ways.
  Listen to this list. So far Nunn-Lugar has helped deactivate 4,500 
nuclear warheads, put over 200 ICBM silos out of operation, destroyed 
20 heavy bombers, eliminated 64 submarine-launched ballistic missiles 
and sealed 58 nuclear testing tunnels. Nunn-Lugar has helped the three 
former nations of the Soviet Union, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan 
totally denuclearize.
  This is really one of the crowning successes of the post-cold-war 
world. It has not gotten nearly the attention and acclaim that it 
deserves, and there is much more that Nunn-Lugar has to do.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. SPRATT. I yield to the gentleman from Missouri.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I think it is important to point out there 
is a difference between this and just general foreign aid. I am not 
sure that is clear.
  Mr. SPRATT. This is not foreign aid. This is an investment in our own 
national security.
  Here is what is left on the agenda. These are Nunn-Lugar projects on 
the agenda.
  Dismantle 130 SS-19 heavy throw-weight ICBM's, dismantle 54 SS-24 
mobile ICBM's, fill in 148 SS-18 silos in Kazakhstan, eliminate 492 
SLBM silos, destroy 10 more heavy bombers, complete the construction of 
a facility in Siberia to safely store over 12,000 nuclear warheads, 
dispose of 100,000 metric tons of liquid propellants, scrap 916 
ballistic rocket motors.
  That is a concrete list, that is the work order.
  Mr. SKELTON. If the gentleman would yield one more time, in other 
words this is in our national interests to do this.
  Mr. SPRATT. These are the accumulated work orders for the Nunn-Lugar 
program ready to be executed if the gentleman does not stop the funds 
with this ill-considered amendment. For somewhere between $300 and $400 
million a year we can destroy nuclear missiles that were targeted to us 
and could have destroyed us throughout 50 years of the cold war. That 
in my book is money well spent.
  This amendment would have us cut off an investment in our own 
security if the Russians were to sell to the Chinese, listen to this, a 
cruise missile with a range of 60 nautical miles. This type of missile 
is already deployed by the Indian Navy. It cannot be ignored or 
dismissed. It is not state-of-the-art, however, by any means, and 
though it can be tipped with a small nuclear warhead, it more often 
carries a conventional warhead, and it does not constitute by any 
stretch of the imagination a strategic threat to the United States.
  Russian ICBM's, however, and Russian SLBM's and the fissile materials 
that must be secured from nations hostile to the United States are a 
strategic threat. This is not a good amendment, it is not a good idea. 
I urge all Members to vote against the Solomon amendment. It is not in 
our national security interests.
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Chairman, let me just state for the record this does not cut off 
Nunn-Lugar funds. There are over a billion dollars of American taxpayer 
funds in the Nunn-Lugar channel in the pipeline. It does not touch that 
billion dollars. It simply says that if they sell this missile aimed at 
killing American sailors to the Chinese in order to kill American 
sailors, we will not add another $200 million to that fund.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.


                         Parliamentary Inquiry

  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state his inquiry.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, as I understand the rule because we are 
standing in defense of the committee position, that we on this side, 
have the opportunity to close debate.
  Is that not correct?
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman is correct.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Then I would suggest that the gentleman use the balance 
of his time. I have one more speaker.
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the 
gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon].
  Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, if I heard the last speaker correctly, he 
said that the sale of this kind of missile, the SS-N-22, poses no 
threat to American strategic concerns. I think that is what the 
gentleman just said.
  Let me just say this. Remember the U.S.S. Stark. Ask any of the 37 
dead sailors that were killed by a missile just like this.
  Mr. Chairman, any Member around here who is concerned about missile 
proliferation should support this.

                              {time}  2230

  I want my colleagues to make no mistake about it. China wants these 
missiles to intimidate and possibly sink American ships or kill 
American sailors. America is engaged in an extraordinary act of 
generosity, giving American taxpayers' dollars, and in spite of 
repeated anti-American Russian activities like this too numerous to 
mention, the Clinton administration has opted to maintain an 
uninterrupted flow of taxpayer money to Russia.
  This time, the Russians have gone too far in selling this kind of 
deadly weapon to the Chinese, and if our aid cannot induce the Russian 
government to refrain from making this kind of a sale which is such a 
direct threat to American citizens, we obviously are getting nowhere.
  Let me make the point clear. There is $1 billion in the pipeline. 
This does not cut that off; this simply says to Russia, sends them a 
message, $180 million more is not going to be forthcoming if you 
directly intimidate the United States and sell this kind of missile to 
China.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, I yield the final 30 seconds to the 
gentleman from California [Mr. Cunningham].
  Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I have the utmost respect for the 
gentleman from North Carolina and the gentleman from Missouri. I think 
it has been a good debate. But I want my colleagues to remember last 
year when China had missiles at Taiwan. Remember the minister when he 
said, you prefer Los Angeles or Taiwan when our ships start going 
through the straits? They can use this missile. It is very difficult to 
intercept a terminal supersonic missile coming inbound at a ship,

[[Page H4200]]

and our Air Force and Navy pilots have to intercept these and it cuts 
down their orders of doing that.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to my distinguished 
colleague, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Thornberry] to close debate on 
this issue.
  Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Chairman, I voted for the Rohrabacher amendment 
to the foreign affairs authorization bill a week or so ago. I think it 
is appropriate to use foreign aid as a carrot to try to get Russia to 
do what we want them to do. But the most important thing Members have 
to know about this amendment is it is not foreign aid. It is spending 
that is in our best national security interests. It is not a gift. It 
is money spent that will reduce the threat of nuclear weapons which 
could be used against us.
  As the gentleman has already let us know, it has been used to 
eliminate missiles and silos and bombers and submarines aimed against 
us. It is being used to tighten security on nuclear warheads which 
could be used against us. It tightens security on nuclear materials 
which could be sent to other countries, which could also be used 
against us. It is used to help make sure the expertise on how to build 
these nuclear weapons is not spread throughout the world and could be 
used against us.
  Now, which of those things is not in the national security interests 
of the United States? This money is spent for us, and it does not 
matter where else Russia sends missiles, this money is still spent for 
us.
  It is cheaper and wiser to spend money now to prevent nuclear 
materials from spreading throughout the world and to keep them out of 
the hands of terrorists and rogue nations than to deal with the 
consequences after they already get them.
  Of course there is no guarantee the Russians are not going to waste 
some of the money. Of course there is no guarantee they are not going 
to modernize their submarines at the same time, but there is a 
guarantee that if we do not do everything we possibly can now to 
contain the nuclear weapons and the nuclear materials that one day we 
will regret it.
  I think this is a big mistake to cut off the money that needs to be 
done to do that, and I urge my colleagues to vote against the 
amendment.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the gentleman from California [Mr. 
Dellums] is recognized for 5 minutes as the ranking minority member.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield to my distinguished colleague from 
California [Mr. Farr].
  Mr. FARR of California. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for 
yielding. We have a clear choice tonight. We have a clear choice to 
continue along with cutting out the nuclear arsenal that the Soviet 
Union has built up. It would be foolish not to continue dismantling 
that.
  This program is the cooperative threat for reduction. It funds 
support of physical elimination of hundreds of nuclear weapons and 
silos and bombers and submarines from which weapons can be launched. If 
we do not dismantle them, they stay there, and if they stay there, what 
can they be used for? This is an easy vote. It is a vote against this 
amendment to support the dismantling. If they are there, they can be 
sold and used for purposes that would not be in our national interests. 
Continue our national interests by opposing this amendment.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, in the remaining time that I have, and I 
will move very quickly, first, a letter to the Speaker of the House 
from the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Cohen, I read in part:

       One of the administration's highest priorities is to 
     prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
     particularly from Russia and other states of the former 
     Soviet Union. The CTR program is one of the most critical 
     parts of that effort. Congress would do serious harm to our 
     counter-proliferation programs if it denied DOD the use of 
     CTR funds to reduce weapons of mass destruction in Russia 
     that stem the threat of their proliferation because of 
     Russia's short-range transfers. This does not mean that the 
     administration condones such transfers. On the contrary, we 
     are waging a vigorous campaign on all fronts to prevent 
     weapons proliferation. However, it would be folly to respond 
     to an instance of proliferation by removing an essential 
     counter-proliferation tool.

  Secondly, just to reiterate a point made by my distinguished 
colleague from South Carolina, nuclear warheads deactivated, 4,500; 
ICBMs destroyed, 81; ICBM silos eliminated, 125; bombers destroyed, 20; 
SLBM launchers eliminated, 64; nuclear warhead test terminals sealed, 
58. Three states of the former Soviet Union denuclearized, Mr. 
Chairman. In 1991 the four states, nuclear states in the former Soviet 
Union had a total of 10,910 missiles. Today, there are 6,705.
  Finally, the United States has a direct and powerful and urgent 
interest in assisting the Russians in continuing to dismantle their 
nuclear weapons and contain their nuclear materials. The CTR investment 
is a pennies on the dollar investment in enhancing U.S. national 
security.
  Finally, Mr. Chairman, whatever policy objections we may have to the 
Russian PCR technical weapons transfers, it does not justify, nor 
warrant, terminating a successful program calculated to meet U.S. 
strategic objectives.
  For all of those reasons and those enunciated by my distinguished 
colleagues who have spoken in opposition to this amendment, I urge my 
colleagues to oppose the amendment.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. 
Spence], as chairman of the committee, is entitled to 5 minutes.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I will not use the whole 5 minutes. I yield 
to the gentleman from California [Mr. Hunter].
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I rise on behalf of the Solomon-Rohrabacher 
amendment. Let me just remind my colleagues, the reason why this is a 
reasonable amendment is simply this: All of the reductions in Soviet 
weaponry that the gentleman enumerated have been agreed to by the 
Soviet Union as part of our arms reductions talks. The Soviets agreed 
to do those reductions on their own with their own taxpayer dollars. 
They do not necessarily have a right to our money; we are giving them a 
great deal of money, which is perhaps a good thing, to effectuate these 
reductions.
  In light of the money that we are giving the Soviet Union, the 
hundreds of millions of dollars, is it reasonable for us to ask them at 
the same time to refrain from giving a very effective ship-killing 
capability to China? I think, in light of the enormous dollars we have 
given them, this is a reasonable request to make to the Russians. And 
because of that, I strongly support the Solomon-Rohrabacher amendment. 
This is reasonable; this is judicious, let us do it.
  The CHAIRMAN. All time has expired.
  The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Rohrabacher].
  The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.


                             recorded vote

  Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 215, 
noes 206, not voting 13, as follows:

                             [Roll No 230]

                               AYES--215

     Aderholt
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baker
     Ballenger
     Barcia
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop
     Bliley
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Brady
     Bryant
     Bunning
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Campbell
     Canady
     Cannon
     Carson
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Chenoweth
     Christensen
     Coble
     Coburn
     Collins
     Combest
     Condit
     Cook
     Cooksey
     Costello
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cubin
     Cunningham
     Danner
     Davis (VA)
     Deal
     DeLay
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Doolittle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     English
     Ensign
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fawell
     Foley
     Forbes
     Fowler
     Fox
     Franks (NJ)
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gekas
     Gibbons
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Goss
     Granger
     Greenwood
     Gutknecht
     Hall (OH)
     Hall (TX)
     Hansen
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hill
     Hilleary
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hostettler
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Inglis
     Istook
     Jenkins
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones
     Kaptur
     Kasich
     Kelly
     Kim
     Kingston
     Klug
     Knollenberg
     LaHood
     Largent
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lazio

[[Page H4201]]


     Leach
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Livingston
     LoBiondo
     Lucas
     Manzullo
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     McNulty
     Metcalf
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Molinari
     Moran (KS)
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Neumann
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Packard
     Pappas
     Parker
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Paul
     Paxon
     Pease
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Pombo
     Portman
     Poshard
     Pryce (OH)
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Redmond
     Regula
     Riggs
     Riley
     Rogan
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roukema
     Royce
     Ryun
     Salmon
     Sanford
     Saxton
     Scarborough
     Schaefer, Dan
     Schaffer, Bob
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shimkus
     Skeen
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (OR)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith, Linda
     Snowbarger
     Solomon
     Souder
     Spence
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Stump
     Sununu
     Talent
     Tauzin
     Taylor (NC)
     Thomas
     Thune
     Tiahrt
     Traficant
     Upton
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Watkins
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weller
     Wicker
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                               NOES--206

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allen
     Andrews
     Baesler
     Baldacci
     Barrett (WI)
     Bateman
     Becerra
     Bentsen
     Bereuter
     Berman
     Berry
     Blagojevich
     Blumenauer
     Boehlert
     Bonior
     Borski
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Capps
     Cardin
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Conyers
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Cummings
     Davis (IL)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Dellums
     Deutsch
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Doggett
     Dooley
     Doyle
     Edwards
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Fazio
     Filner
     Flake
     Foglietta
     Ford
     Frank (MA)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frost
     Furse
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Gilchrest
     Gonzalez
     Graham
     Green
     Gutierrez
     Hamilton
     Harman
     Hastert
     Hastings (FL)
     Hefner
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Holden
     Hooley
     Horn
     Hoyer
     Hyde
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     John
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (WI)
     Johnson, E.B.
     Kanjorski
     Kennedy (MA)
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kennelly
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind (WI)
     King (NY)
     Kleczka
     Klink
     Kolbe
     Kucinich
     LaFalce
     Lampson
     Lantos
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Linder
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Luther
     Maloney (CT)
     Manton
     Markey
     Martinez
     Mascara
     Matsui
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McDade
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McHale
     McKinney
     Meehan
     Meek
     Menendez
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller (CA)
     Minge
     Mink
     Moakley
     Mollohan
     Moran (VA)
     Morella
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Neal
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Owens
     Oxley
     Pallone
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Peterson (MN)
     Pickett
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Price (NC)
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Reyes
     Rivers
     Rodriguez
     Roemer
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanchez
     Sanders
     Sandlin
     Sawyer
     Scott
     Serrano
     Shays
     Sherman
     Sisisky
     Skaggs
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith, Adam
     Snyder
     Spratt
     Stabenow
     Stark
     Stokes
     Strickland
     Stupak
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Taylor (MS)
     Thompson
     Thornberry
     Thurman
     Tierney
     Torres
     Turner
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Waters
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Weldon (PA)
     Wexler
     Weygand
     White
     Whitfield
     Wise
     Woolsey
     Wynn

                             NOT VOTING--13

     Blunt
     Cox
     Davis (FL)
     Gordon
     Houghton
     Lipinski
     Maloney (NY)
     McIntosh
     Schiff
     Schumer
     Shuster
     Towns
     Yates

                              {time}  1057

  So the amendment was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.


                          PERSONAL EXPLANATION

  Mr. COX of California. Mr. Chairman, I was necessarily absent for 
this vote for medical reasons.


                Amendments En Bloc Offered by Mr. Spence

  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, pursuant to section 3 of House Resolution 
169, I offer an en bloc amendment consisting of the following 
amendments printed in part 2 of House Report 105-137:
  Amendments 2 and 3; Amendments 4 and 5 each as modified; Amendments 
6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13; Amendment 14, as modified; Amendment 16 
and 17; Amendment 18, as modified; Amendment 19; Amendment 20, as 
modified; Amendments 21 and 23; Amendment 24, as modified; Amendments 
25 and 26; Amendment 27, as modified; Amendments 28, 29, 30; Amendment 
31, as modified; Amendment 32; Amendment 33, as modified; Amendments 
36, 37 and 38; Amendment 39, as modified; Amendment 40; and the 
Amendment printed in section 8(d) of House Resolution 169, as modified;
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendments en bloc and 
report the modifications.
  The Clerk designated the amendments and reported the modifications, 
as follows:
  Amendments en bloc offered by Mr. Spence of South Carolina consisting 
of the following amendments in part 2 of House Report 105-137: 
Amendment 2, 3; 4, as modified; 5, as modified; 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 
13; 14, as modified; 16, 17; 18, as modified; 19; 20, as modified; 21, 
23; 24, as modified; 25, 26; 27, as modified; 28, 29, 30; 31, as 
modified; 32; 33 as modified; 36, 37, 38; 39, as modified; 40; and the 
amendment in order under section 8(d) of House Resolution 169, as 
modified.
              Amendments En Bloc to H.R. 1119, as Reported
                         Offered by Mr. Spence
                           of South Carolina

               (Amdts in Part 2 of House Report 105-137)

Amendment #2
Amendment #3
Amendment #4, as modified
Amendment #5, as modified
Amendment #6
Amendment #7
Amendment #8
Amendment #9
Amendment #10
Amendment #11
Amendment #12
Amendment #13
Amendment #14, as modified
Amendment #16
Amendment #17
Amendment #18, as modified
Amendment #19
Amendment #20, as modified
Amendment #21
Amendment #23
Amendment #24, as modified
Amendment #25
Amendment #26
Amendment #27, as modified
Amendment #28
Amendment #29
Amendment #30
Amendment #31, as modified
Amendment #32
Amendment #33, as modified
Amendment #36
Amendment #37
Amendment #38
Amendment #39, as modified
Amendment #40
Amendment in order under section 8(d) of H.Res. 169, as modified

                  Amendment to H.R. 1119, as Reported

                   Offered by Mr. Barrett of Nebraska

              (Amdt #2 in Part 2 of House Report 105-137)

       At the end of title X (page 360, after line 8) insert the 
     following new section:

     SEC. 1060. STUDY OF UNITED STATES CAPACITOR AND RESISTOR 
                   INDUSTRIES.

       The Secretary of Defense shall conduct a study to assess 
     the capacitor and resistor industries in the United States in 
     order to determine--
       (1) the importance of such industries to the national 
     defense and the defense mobilization base; and
       (2) whether such industries are in danger of being 
     critically weakened because of the removal of tariffs on 
     imports under the Information Technology Agreement.

                  Amendment to H.R. 1119, as Reported

                  Offered by Mr. Bartlett of Maryland

              (Amdt #3 in part 2 of House Report 105-137)

       Strike out section 217 (page 33, lines 13 through 23).

   Modification to the Amendment Offered by Mr. Bereuter of Nebraska

              (Amdt #4 in Part 2 of House Report 105-137)

       The amendment as modified is as follows:
       At the end of title XII (page 379, after line 19), insert 
     the following new section:

     SEC. 1205. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS RELATING TO LEVEL OF UNITED 
                   STATES MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE ASIA AND 
                   PACIFIC REGION.

       (a) Findings.--The Congress finds the following:
       (1) The stability of the Asia-Pacific region is a matter of 
     vital national interest affecting the well-being of all 
     Americans.
       (2) The nations of the Pacific Rim collectively represent 
     the United States largest trading partner and are expected to 
     account for almost one-third of the world's economic activity 
     by the start of the next century.
       (3) The increased reliance by the United States on trade 
     and Middle East oil sources has reinforced United States 
     security interests in the Southeast Asia shipping lanes 
     through the South China Sea and the key straits of Malacca, 
     Sunda, Lombok, and Makassar.
       (4) The South China Sea is a vital conduit for United 
     States Navy ships passing from the Pacific to the Indian 
     Ocean and the Persian Gulf.
       (5) Maintaining freedom of navigation in the South China 
     Sea is a fundamental interest of the United States.
       (6) The threats of proliferation of weapons of mass 
     destruction, the emerging nationalism amidst long-standing 
     ethnic and national rivalries, and the unresolved territorial 
     disputes combine to create a political

[[Page H4202]]

     landscape of potential instability and conflict in this 
     region that would jeopardize the interests of the United 
     States and the safety of United States nationals.
       (7) A critical component of the East Asia strategy of the 
     United States is maintaining forward deployed forces in Asia 
     to ensure broad regional stability, to help to deter 
     aggression, to lessen the pressure for arms races, and to 
     contribute to the political and economic advances of the 
     region from which the United States benefits.
       (8) The forward presence of the United States in Northeast 
     Asia enables the United States to respond to regional 
     contingencies, to protect sea lines of communication, to 
     sustain influence, and to support operations as distant as 
     operations in the Persian Gulf.
       (9) The military forces of the United States serve to 
     prevent the political or economic control of the Asia-Pacific 
     region by a rival, hostile power or coalition of such powers, 
     thus preventing any such group from obtaining control over 
     the vast resources, enormous wealth, and advanced technology 
     of the region.
       (10) Allies of the United States in the region can base 
     their defense planning on a reliable American security 
     commitment, a reduction of which could stimulate an arms 
     buildup in the region.
       (11) The Joint Announcement of the United States-Japan 
     Security Consultative Committee of December 1996, 
     acknowledged that ``the forward presence of U.S. forces 
     continues to be an essential element for pursuing our common 
     security objectives''.
       (12) The administration has committed itself on numerous 
     occasions to maintain approximately 100,000 troops in the 
     region, most recently by the President in Australia, the 
     Secretary of Defense in the Quadrennial Defense Review, and 
     the Secretary of State in the Republic of Korea.
       (13) The United States and Japan signed the United States-
     Japan Security Declaration in April 1996, in which the United 
     States reaffirmed its commitment to maintain this level of 
     100,000 United States military personnel in the region.
       (14) The United States military presence is recognized by 
     the nations of the region as serving stability and signaling 
     United States engagement.
       (15) The nations of East Asia and the Pacific consider the 
     commitment of the forces of the United States to be so vital 
     to their future that they scrutinize actions of the United 
     States for any sign of weakened commitment to the security of 
     the region.
       (16) The reduction of forward-based military forces could 
     negatively affect the ability of the United States to 
     contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability of the 
     Asia and Pacific region.
       (17) Recognizing that while the United States must consider 
     the overall capabilities of its forces in its decisions to 
     deploy troops, nevertheless any reduction in the number of 
     forward-based troops may reduce the perception of American 
     capability and commitment in the region that cannot be 
     completely offset by modernization of the remaining forces.
       (18) During time of crisis, redeployment of forces 
     previously removed from the area might itself be deemed an 
     act of provocation that could be used as a pretext by a 
     hostile power for armed aggression within the region, and the 
     existence of that possibility might hinder such a deployment.
       (19) Proposals to reduce the forward presence of the United 
     States in Asia or drastically subordinate security interests 
     to United States domestic budgetary concerns can erode the 
     perception of the commitment of the United States to its 
     alliances and interests in the region.
       (b) Sense of the Congress.--It is the sense of the Congress 
     that the United States should maintain approximately 100,000 
     United States military personnel in the Asia and Pacific 
     region until such time as there is a peaceful and permanent 
     resolution to the major security and political conflicts in 
     the region.

      Modification to the Amendment Offered by Mr. Brady of Texas

              (Amdt #5 in Part 2 of House Report 105-137)

       The amendment as modified is as follows:
       At the end of title X (page 360, after line 8), insert the 
     following new section:

     SEC. __. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES 
                   ARMED FORCES ABROAD FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 
                   PRESERVATION ACTIVITIES.

       (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     United States Armed Forces should not be deployed outside the 
     United States to provide assistance to another nation in 
     connection with environmental preservation activities in that 
     nation.
       (b) Scope of Section.--For purposes of this section, 
     environmental preservation activities do not include 
     activities undertaken for humanitarian purposes, disaster 
     relief activities, peacekeeping activities, or operational 
     training activities.

                  Amendment to H.R. 1119, as Reported

                    Offered by Mr. Buyer of Indiana

              (Amdt #6 in Part 2 of House Report 105-137)

       At the end of subtitle B of title VI (page 247, after line 
     13), insert the following new section:

     SEC. 623. EXPANSION OF RESERVE AFFILIATION BONUS TO INCLUDE 
                   COAST GUARD RESERVE.

       Section 308e of title 37, United States Code, is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a), by striking out ``Under regulations 
     prescribed by the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of a 
     military department'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``The 
     Secretary concerned'';
       (2) in subsection (b)(3), by striking out ``designated by 
     the Secretary of Defense for the purposes of this section'' 
     and inserting in lieu thereof ``designated for purposes of 
     this section in the regulations prescribed under subsection 
     (f)'';
       (3) in subsection (c)(3), by striking out ``regulations 
     prescribed by the Secretary of Defense'' and inserting in 
     lieu thereof ``the regulations prescribed under subsection 
     (f)''; and
       (4) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(f) This section shall be administered under regulations 
     prescribed by the Secretary of Defense for the armed forces 
     under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Defense and by the 
     Secretary of Transportation for the Coast Guard when the 
     Coast Guard is not operating as a service in the Navy.''.

                  Amendment to H.R. 1119, As Reported

                   Offered by Mr. Coburn of Oklahoma

              (Amdt #7 in Part 2 of House Report 105-137)

       At the end of subtitle A of title X (page 320, after line 
     12), add the following new section:

     SEC. 1008. UNITED STATES MAN AND THE BIOSPHERE PROGRAM 
                   LIMITATION.

       No funds appropriated pursuant to this Act shall be used 
     for the United States Man and Biosphere Program, or related 
     projects.

                  Amendment to H.R. 1119, as Reported

                   Offered by Mr. Everett of Alabama

              (Amdt #8 in part 2 of House Report 105-137)

       At the end of subtitle B of title II (page 34, after line 
     7) insert the following new section:

     SEC. 219. COMANCHE PROGRAM.

       The Congress supports the Army in its Comanche program 
     technology transfer and acquisition efforts, which--
       (1) offer potential RAH-66 Air Vehicle and T800 engine 
     cost, schedule, and technical risk reduction; and
       (2) include cooperative efforts with other Government 
     agencies such as the National Guard (UH-1H engine technology 
     insertion), the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, 
     and other research and development programs of the military 
     departments.

                  Amendment to H.R. 1119, as Reported

             Offered by Mr. Faleomavaega of American Samoa

              (Amdt #9 in Part 2 of House Report 105-137)

       At the end of title V (page 204, after line 16), insert the 
     following new section:

     SEC. 572. REPORT ON MAKING UNITED STATES NATIONALS ELIGIBLE 
                   FOR PARTICIPATION IN SENIOR RESERVE OFFICERS' 
                   TRAINING CORPS.

       (a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit 
     to the Committee on National Security of the House of 
     Representatives and the Committee on Armed Services of the 
     Senate a report on the utility of permitting United States 
     nationals to participate in the Senior Reserve Officers' 
     Training Corps program.
       (b) Required Information.--The Secretary shall include in 
     the report the following information:
       (1) A brief history of the prior admission of United States 
     nationals to the Senior Reserve Officers' Training Corps, 
     including the success rate of these cadets and midshipmen and 
     how that rate compared to the average success rate of cadets 
     and midshipmen during that same period.
       (2) The advantages of permitting United States nationals to 
     participate in the Senior Reserve Officers' Training Corps 
     program.
       (3) The disadvantages of permitting United States nationals 
     to participate in the Senior Reserve Officers' Training Corps 
     program.
       (4) The incremental cost of including United States 
     nationals in the Senior Reserve Officers' Training Corps.
       (5) Methods of minimizing the risk that United States 
     nationals admitted to the Senior Reserve Officers' Training 
     Corps would be later disqualified because of ineligibility 
     for United States citizenship.
       (6) The recommendations of the Secretary on whether United 
     States nationals should be eligible to participate in the 
     Senior Reserve Officers' Training Corps program, and if so, a 
     legislative proposal which would, if enacted, achieve that 
     result.

                  Amendment to H.R. 1119, as Reported

               Offered by Mr. Frelinghuysen of New Jersey

              (Amdt #10 in Part 2 of House Report 105-137)

       At the end of title XXXVI (page 540, after line 3), insert 
     the following new section:

     SEC. __. DETERMINATION OF GROSS TONNAGE FOR PURPOSES OF TANK 
                   VESSEL DOUBLE HULL REQUIREMENTS.

       Section 3703a of title 46, United States Code, is amended 
     by adding at the end the following:
       ``(e) For purposes of this section, the gross tonnage of a 
     vessel for which a tonnage certificate was issued or accepted 
     by the Secretary under this title before July 1, 1997, shall 
     be the gross tonnage of the vessel stated on the most recent 
     such certificate.''.

                  Amendment to H.R. 1119, as Reported

                   Offered by Mr. Farr of California

              (Amdt #11 in Part 2 of House Report 105-137)

       Page 411, in the table in section 2702(b) relating to 
     extension of Army National Guard project authorizations, add 
     an item, in the amount of $3,910,000, for the modify record 
     fire range/maintenance shop construction project at Camp 
     Roberts, California.

[[Page H4203]]

                  Amendment to H.R. 1119, as Reported

                   Offered by Mrs. Fowler of Florida

              (Amdt #12 in Part 2 of House Report 105-137)

       Page 377, after line 4, insert the following:
       (4) Efforts by the People's Republic of China to enhance 
     its capabilities in the area nuclear weapons development.
       Page 377, after line 16, insert the following:
       (7) Development by the People's Republic of China of 
     capabilities in the area of electronic warfare.
       Page 378, after line 12, insert the following:
       (12) Efforts by the People's Republic of China in the area 
     of telecommunications, including common channel signaling and 
     synchronous digital hierarchy technologies.
       (13) Development by People's Republic of China of advanced 
     aerospace technologies with military applications (including 
     gas turbine ``hot section'' technologies).
       Page 379, after line 3, insert the following:
       (17) Efforts by the People's Republic of China to develop 
     its anti-submarine warfare capabilities.
       Page 379, after line 6, insert the following:
       (19) Efforts by the People's Republic of China to enhance 
     its capabilities in such additional areas of strategic 
     concern as the Secretary identifies.
       (c) Analysis of Implications of Sales of Products and 
     Technologies to Entities in China.--The report under 
     subsection (a) shall include, with respect to each area for 
     analyses and forecasts specified in subsection (b)--
       (1) an assessment of the implications of sales of United 
     States and foreign products and technologies to entities in 
     the People's Republic of China; and
       (2) the potential threat of developments in that area to 
     United States strategic interests.
       Redesignate the paragraphs of section 1203(b) accordingly.
       Page 379, line 7, strike out ``(c)'' and insert in lieu 
     thereof ``(d)''.

                  Amendment to H.R. 1119, as Reported

                   Offered by Mr. Fox of Pennsylvania

              (Amdt #13 in Part 2 of House Report 105-137)

       At the end of section 1054 (page 348, after line 18), 
     insert the following new subsection:
       (j) Daily Display of Flag at Department of Veterans Affairs 
     Medical Centers.--In addition to the display required by 
     subsection (a), the POW/MIA flag shall be displayed on, or on 
     the grounds of, each Department of Veterans Affairs medical 
     center on every day on which the flag of the United States is 
     displayed.

    Modification to the Amendment Offered by Mr. Fox of Pennsylvania

              (Amdt #14 in Part 2 of House Report 105-137)

       The amendment as modified is as follows:
       At the end of subtitle C of title III (page 67, after line 
     19), insert the following new section:

     SEC. 323. VETERANS' PREFERENCE STATUS FOR CERTAIN VETERANS 
                   WHO SERVED ON ACTIVE DUTY DURING THE PERSIAN 
                   GULF WAR.

       (a) Definition of Veteran for Purposes of Preference 
     Eligible Status.--Section 2108 of title 5, United States 
     Code, is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1)--
       (A) by striking ``or'' at the end of subparagraph (A);
       (B) by inserting ``or'' at the end of subparagraph (B); and
       (C) by inserting after subparagraph (B) the following new 
     subparagraph:
       ``(C) served on active duty as defined by section 101(21) 
     of title 38 in the armed forces during the period beginning 
     on August 2, 1990, and ending on January 2, 1992;''; and
       (2) in paragraph (3)(B), by inserting ``or (C)'' after 
     ``paragraph (1)(B)''.
       (b) Additional Points.--Section 3309(2) of such title is 
     amended by striking ``2108(3)(A)'' and inserting 
     ``2108(3)(A)-(B)''.
       (c) Technical Amendments.--Section 2108(1)(B) of such title 
     is further amended--
       (1) by striking ``the date of enactment of the Veterans' 
     Education and Employment Assistance Act of 1976,'' and 
     inserting ``October 15, 1976,''; and
       (2) by striking ``511(d) of title 10'' and inserting 
     ``12103(d) of title 10''.

                  Amendment to H.R. 1119, as Reported

                 Offered by Mr. Gallegly of California

              (Amdt #16 in Part 2 of House Report 105-137)

       At the end of title X (page 360, after line 8), insert the 
     following new section:

     SEC. __. STUDY OF TRANSFER OF MODULAR AIRBORNE FIRE FIGHTING 
                   SYSTEM.

       Not later than six months after the date of the enactment 
     of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with 
     the Secretary of Agriculture, shall submit to Congress a 
     report evaluating the feasibility of transferring 
     jurisdiction over units of the Modular Airborne Fire Fighting 
     System from the Department of Agriculture to the Department 
     of Defense.

                  Amendment to H.R. 1119, as Reported

                  Offered by Mr. Gekas of Pennsylvania

              (Amdt #17 in Part 2 of House Report 105-137)

       Page 411, in the table in section 2702(b) relating to 
     extension of Army National Guard project authorizations, add 
     an item, in the amount of $6,200,000, for a barracks 
     construction project at Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania.

       Modification to the Amendment Offered by Mr. Hall of Ohio

              (Amdt #18 in Part 2 of House Report 105-137)

       The amendment as modified is as follows:
       At the end of title XXXI (page 493, after line 17), add the 
     following new section:

     SEC. 3152. TRANSFERS OF REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY AT CERTAIN 
                   DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY FACILITIES.

       (a) Transfer Guidelines.--(1) The Secretary of Energy shall 
     issue guidelines for the transfer by sale or lease of real 
     and personal property at Department of Energy defense nuclear 
     facilities in consultation with the community reuse 
     organizations associated with the facilities and the local 
     governments within whose jurisdiction the facilities are 
     located. The Secretary shall issue the guidelines not later 
     than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
       (2)(A) The Secretary of Energy may not transfer real or 
     personal property under the guidelines issued under paragraph 
     (1) until--
       (i) the Secretary submits a notification of the proposed 
     transfer to the congressional defense committees; and
       (ii) a period of 30 days of continuous session of Congress 
     has expired following the date on which the notification is 
     submitted.
       (B) For purposes of subparagraph (A)(ii), the continuity of 
     a session of Congress is broken only by an adjournment of the 
     Congress sine die, and the days on which either House is not 
     in session because of an adjournment of more than three days 
     to a day certain are excluded in the computation of such 30-
     day period.
       (b) Indemnification.--(1) In the sale or lease of real or 
     personal property pursuant to the guidelines issued under 
     subsection (a), the Secretary of Energy may indemnify a 
     transferee against an action for injury to person or property 
     resulting from the release or threatened release of a 
     hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant as a result 
     of Department of Energy activities. Before such a sale or 
     lease, the Secretary shall notify the transferee that the 
     Secretary has authority to provide indemnification to the 
     transferee under this subsection. The Secretary shall include 
     in an agreement for such a sale or lease a provision 
     addressing indemnification for such an action.
       (2) Nothing in this section shall be construed as affecting 
     or modifying in any way section 120(h) of the Comprehensive 
     Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 
     1980 (42 U.S.C. 9620(h)).
       (c) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) The term ``Department of Energy defense nuclear 
     facility'' has the meaning provided by section 318 of the 
     Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2286g).
       (2) The term ``transferee'' means a person to which real 
     property is transferred pursuant to the guidelines issued 
     under subsection (a).
       (3) The terms ``hazardous substance'', ``release'', and 
     ``pollutant or contaminant'' have the meanings provided by 
     section 101 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
     Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. 9601).

                  Amendment to H.R. 1119, as Reported

                   Offered by Mr. Hastert of Illinois

              (Amdt #19 in Part 2 of House Report 105-137)

       At the end of subtitle C of title X (page 326, after line 
     6), insert the following new section:

     SEC. 1032. ANNUAL REPORT ON DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF 
                   NARCOTICS DETECTION TECHNOLOGIES.

       (a) Report Requirement.--Not later than December 1st of 
     each year, the Director of the Office of National Drug 
     Control Policy shall submit to Congress and the President a 
     report on the development and deployment of narcotics 
     detection technologies by Federal agencies. Each such report 
     shall be prepared in consultation with the Secretary of 
     Defense, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of 
     Transportation, and the Secretary of the Treasury.
       (b) Matters To Be Included.--Each report under subsection 
     (a) shall include--
       (1) a description of each project implemented by a Federal 
     agency relating to the development or deployment of narcotics 
     detection technology;
       (2) the agency responsible for each project described in 
     paragraph (1);
       (3) the amount of funds obligated or expended to carry out 
     each project described in paragraph (1) during the fiscal 
     year in which the report is submitted or during any fiscal 
     year preceding the fiscal year in which the report is 
     submitted;
       (4) the amount of funds estimated to be obligated or 
     expended for each project described in paragraph (1) during 
     any fiscal year after the fiscal year in which the report is 
     submitted to Congress; and
       (5) a detailed timeline for implementation of each project 
     described in paragraph (1).

  Modification to the Amendment Offered by Mr. Hastings of Washington

              (Amdt #20 in Part 2 of House Report 105-137)

       The amendment as modified is as follows:
       At the end of title XXXI (page 493, after line 17), insert 
     the following new section:

     SEC. 3152. REQUIREMENT TO DELEGATE CERTAIN AUTHORITIES TO 
                   SITE MANAGER OF HANFORD RESERVATION.

       Section 3173(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act 
     for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104-201; 110 Stat. 2848; 42 
     U.S.C. 7274k) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1), by striking out ``In addition'' and 
     inserting in lieu thereof ``Except as provided in paragraph 
     (5), in addition''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(5) In the case of the Hanford Reservation, Richland, 
     Washington, the Secretary

[[Page H4204]]

     shall delegate to the Site Manager the authority described in 
     paragraph (1). The Secretary may withdraw the delegated 
     authority if the Secretary--
       ``(A) determines that the Site Manager of the Hanford 
     Reservation has misused or misapplied that authority; and
       ``(B) the Secretary submits to Congress a notification of 
     the Secretary's intent to withdraw the authority.''.

                  Amendment to H.R. 1119, as Reported

                 Offered by Mr. Hastings of Washington

              (Amdt #21 in Part 2 of House Report 105-137)

       Strike out section 3143 (page 484, line 10 through page 
     485, line 16) and insert in lieu thereof the following:

     SEC. 3143. STUDY AND FUNDING RELATING TO IMPLEMENTATION OF 
                   WORKFORCE RESTRUCTURING PLANS.

       (a) Study Requirement.--The Secretary of Energy shall 
     conduct a study on the effects of workforce restructuring 
     plans for defense nuclear facilities developed pursuant to 
     section 3161 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 1993 (42 U.S.C. 7274h).
       (b) Matters Covered by Study.-- The study shall cover the 
     four-year period preceding the date of the enactment of this 
     Act and shall include the following:
       (1) An analysis of the number of jobs created under 
     workforce restructuring plans developed pursuant to section 
     3161 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
     Year 1993 (42 U.S.C. 7274h).
       (2) An analysis of other benefits provided pursuant to such 
     plans and through community reuse organizations.
       (3) A description of the funds expended, and the funds 
     obligated but not expended, pursuant to such plans as of the 
     date of the report.
       (4) A description of the criteria used since October 23, 
     1992, in providing assistance pursuant to such plans.
       (5) A comparison of the benefits provided pursuant to such 
     plans--
       (A) to employees whose employment at facilities covered by 
     such plans is terminated; and
       (B) to employees whose employment at facilities where more 
     than 50 percent of the revenues are derived from contracts 
     with the Department of Defense is terminated.
       (c) Conduct of Study.--(1) The study shall be conducted 
     through a contract with a private auditing firm with which 
     the Department of Energy has no other auditing contracts.
       (2)(A) The Secretary of Energy may not enter into the 
     contract for the conduct of the study until--
       (i) the Secretary submits a notification of the proposed 
     contract award to the congressional defense committees; and
       (ii) a period of 30 days of continuous session of Congress 
     has expired following the date on which the notification is 
     submitted.
       (B) For purposes of subparagraph (A)(ii), the continuity of 
     a session of Congress is broken only by an adjournment of the 
     Congress sine die, and the days on which either House is not 
     in session because of an adjournment of more than three days 
     to a day certain are excluded in the computation of such 30-
     day period.
       (3) The Secretary of Energy shall ensure that the firm 
     conducting the study is provided access to all documents in 
     the possession of the Department of Energy that are relevant 
     to the study, including documents in the possession of the 
     Inspector General of the Department of Energy.
       (d) Report on Study.--The Secretary of Energy shall submit 
     a report to Congress on the results of the study not later 
     than January 30, 1998.
       (e) Funding.--In addition to amounts available pursuant to 
     the authorization of appropriations in section 3103(6), the 
     Secretary of Energy may use an amount not exceeding 
     $44,000,000 for implementation of the workforce restructuring 
     plans for contractor employees, to be derived from excess 
     unobligated and available funds.
       (f) Revisions to Defense Nuclear Facilities Workforce 
     Restructuring Plan Requirements.--
       (1) Revision of period for notification of changes in 
     workforce.--Section 3161(c)(1)(B) of the National Defense 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 (42 U.S.C. 
     7274h(c)(1)(B)) is amended by striking out ``120'' and 
     inserting in lieu thereof ``90''.
       (2) Repeal of requirement for submission to congress.--
     Subsection (f) of section 3161 of such Act is repealed.
       (3) Prohibition on use of funds for local impact 
     assistance.--None of the funds authorized to be appropriated 
     to the Department of Energy pursuant to section 3103(6) may 
     be used for local impact assistance from the Department of 
     Energy under section 3161(c)(6) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 
     7274h(c)(6)) until--
       (A) with respect to assistance referred to in section 
     3161(c)(6)(A) of such Act, the Secretary of Energy 
     coordinates with and obtains approval of the Secretary of 
     Labor; and
       (B) with respect to assistance referred to in section 
     3161(c)(6)(C) of such Act, the Secretary of Energy 
     coordinates with and obtains approval of the Secretary of 
     Commerce.
       (4) Semiannual report to congress of local impact 
     assistance.--Every six months the Secretary of Energy shall 
     submit to Congress a report setting forth a description of, 
     and the value of, all local impact assistance provided under 
     section 3161(c)(6) of such Act.
       (g) Effect on USEC Privatization Act.--Nothing in this 
     section shall be construed as diminishing the obligations of 
     the Secretary of Energy under section 3110(a)(5) of the USEC 
     Privatization Act (Public Law 104-134; 110 Stat. 1321-341; 42 
     U.S.C. 2297h-8(a)(5)).
       (h) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) The term ``defense nuclear facility'' has the meaning 
     provided the term ``Department of Energy defense nuclear 
     facility'' in section 3163 of the National Defense 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 ( Public Law 102-484; 
     42 U.S.C. 7274j).
       (2) The term ``contractor employee'' means an employee of a 
     contractor or subcontractor of the Department of Energy at a 
     defense nuclear facility.

                  Amendment to H.R. 1119, as Reported

             Offered by Ms. Eddie Bernice Johnson of Texas

              (Amdt #23 in Part 2 of House Report 105-137)

       At the end of subtitle C of title V (page 142, after line 
     3), insert the following new section:

     SEC. 524. REPORT ON FEASIBILITY AND DESIRABILITY OF 
                   CONVERSION OF AGR PERSONNEL TO MILITARY 
                   TECHNICIANS (DUAL-STATUS).

       (a) Report Required.--Not later than January 1, 1998, the 
     Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report on the 
     feasibility and desirability of conversion of AGR personnel 
     to military technicians (dual-status). The report shall--
       (1) identify advantages and disadvantages of such a 
     conversion;
       (2) identify possible savings if such a conversion were to 
     be carried out; and
       (3) set forth the recommendation of the Secretary as to 
     whether such a conversion should be made.
       (b) AGR Personnel Defined.--For purposes of subsection (a), 
     the term ``AGR personnel'' means members of the Army or Air 
     Force reserve components who are on active duty (other than 
     for training) in connection with organizing, administering, 
     recruiting, instructing, or training their respective reserve 
     components.

   Modification to the Amendment Offered by Mr. Metcalf of Washington

              (Amdt #24 in Part 2 of House Report 105-137)

       The amendment as modified is as follows:
       At the end of title VII (page 288, after line 21), insert 
     the following new section:

     SEC. __. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONCERNING GULF WAR ILLNESS.

       (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) Americans served in the Persian Gulf Conflict of 1991 
     in defense of vital national security interests of the United 
     States.
       (2) It was known to United States intelligence and military 
     commanders that biological and chemical agents were in 
     theater throughout the conflict.
       (3) An undetermined amount of these agents were released 
     into theater.
       (4) A large number of United States military veterans and 
     allied veterans who served in the Southwest Asia theater of 
     operations have been stricken with a variety of severe 
     illnesses.
       (5) Previous efforts to discern the causes of those 
     illnesses have been inadequate, and those illnesses are 
     affecting the health of both veterans and their families.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     all promising technology and treatments relating to Gulf War 
     illnesses should be fully explored and tested to facilitate 
     treatment for members of the Armed Forces and veterans who 
     served the United States in the Persian Gulf conflict and are 
     stricken with unexplainable illness.

                  Amendment to H.R. 1119, as Reported

                   Offered by Mr. Pickett of Virginia

              (Amdt #25 in part 2 of House Report 105-137)

       At the end of subtitle B of title II (page 34, after line 
     7), insert the following new section:

     SEC. 219. LAND ATTACK STANDARD MISSILE.

       Of the amount provided in section 201(2) for research, 
     development, test, and evaluation for the Navy--
       (1) the amount available for program element 63695N for the 
     Land Attack Technology program is increased by $10,000,000, 
     to be available for flight test demonstration and risk 
     reduction activities for the Land Attack Standard Missile;
       (2) the amount available for program element 62317N (Air 
     Systems and Weapons Advance Technology) is reduced by 
     $5,000,000; and
       (3) the amount available for program element 63508N (Ship 
     Hull Mechanical and Electrical Technology) is reduced by 
     $5,000,000.

                  Amendment to H.R. 1119, as Reported

                   Offered by Mr. Pickett of Virginia

              (Amdt #26 in part 2 of House Report 105-137)

       At the end of title VIII (page 303, after line 2) insert 
     the following new section:

     SEC. 824. ALLOWABILITY OF COSTS OF EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP 
                   PLANS.

       (a) Prohibition.--Under section 2324 of title 10, United 
     States Code, the Secretary of Defense may not determine the 
     allowability of costs of employee stock ownership plans under 
     contracts with the Department of Defense in accordance with 
     the rule described in subsection (b).
       (b) Rule.--The rule referred to in subsection (a) is the 
     rule that was--
       (1) proposed by the Civilian Agency Acquisition Council and 
     the Defense Acquisition Regulations Council on November 7, 
     1995, and referred to as FAR Case 92-024, Employee Stock 
     Ownership Plans (60 Federal Register 56216); and
       (2) withdrawn by such Councils on April 3, 1996 (61 Federal 
     Register 14944).

[[Page H4205]]

                              Modification

               to the Amendment to H.R. 1119, as Reported

                    Offered by Mr. Riley of Alabama

              (Amdt #27 in part 2 of House Report 105-137)

       The amendment as modified is as follows:
       At the end of subtitle B of title II (page 34, after line 
     7) insert the following new section:

     SEC. 219. REPORT ON OPERATIONAL FIELD ASSESSMENTS PROGRAM.

       (a) Finding.--Congress recognizes the potential value that 
     the Department of Defense Operational Field Assessments 
     program, which is managed by the Director of Operational Test 
     and Evaluation, provides to the commanders of the Unified 
     Combatant Commands with respect to assessment of the 
     effectiveness of near-term operational concepts and critical 
     operational issues in quick-response operational tests and 
     evaluations.
       (b) Report.--Not later than March 30, 1998, the Secretary 
     of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense 
     committees a report on the Operational Field Assessments 
     program.
       (c) Content of Report.--The report shall contain the 
     following:
       (1) A review of the Operational Field Assessments program 
     which describes the goals and objectives of the program, 
     assessments by the program conducted as of the date of the 
     submission of the report, and the results of those 
     assessments.
       (2) A description of the current management and support 
     structure of the program within the Department of Defense, 
     including a description of how program responsibilities are 
     assigned within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and a 
     description of the roles of the Joint Staff, the commanders 
     of the Unified Combatant Commands, and the military 
     departments.
       (3) A description of future plans for the program and 
     funding requirements for those plans.
       (4) Recommendations regarding additional statutory 
     authority that may be required for the program.

                  Amendment to H.R. 1119, as Reported

                  Offered by Mr. Saxton of New Jersey

              (Amdt #28 in Part 2 of House Report 105-137)

       Strike out title XXIX (page 442, line 15, through page 457, 
     line 13), and insert in lieu thereof the following new title:
                   TITLE XXIX--SIKES ACT IMPROVEMENT

     SEC. 2901. SHORT TITLE.

       This title may be cited as the ``Sikes Act Improvement 
     Amendments of 1997''.

     SEC. 2902. DEFINITION OF SIKES ACT FOR PURPOSES OF 
                   AMENDMENTS.

       In this title, the term ``Sikes Act'' means the Act 
     entitled ``An Act to promote effectual planning, development, 
     maintenance, and coordination of wildlife, fish, and game 
     conservation and rehabilitation in military reservations'', 
     approved September 15, 1960 (16 U.S.C. 670a et seq.), 
     commonly referred to as the ``Sikes Act''.

     SEC. 2903. CODIFICATION OF SHORT TITLE OF ACT.

       The Sikes Act (16 U.S.C. 670a et seq.) is amended by 
     inserting before title I the following new section:

     ``SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       ``This Act may be cited as the `Sikes Act'.''.

     SEC. 2904. INTEGRATED NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PLANS.

       (a) Plans Required.--Subsection (a) of section 101 of the 
     Sikes Act (16 U.S.C. 670a) is amended to read as follows:
       ``(a) Integrated Natural Resources Management Plans.--
       ``(1) Plans required.--The Secretary of Defense shall carry 
     out a program to provide for the conservation and 
     rehabilitation of natural resources on military 
     installations. To facilitate the program, the Secretary of 
     each military department shall prepare and implement an 
     integrated natural resources management plan for each 
     military installation in the United States under the 
     jurisdiction of the Secretary, unless the Secretary 
     determines that the absence of significant natural resources 
     on a particular installation makes preparation of such a plan 
     inappropriate.
       ``(2) Cooperative preparation.--The Secretary of a military 
     department shall prepare the integrated natural resources 
     management plans for which the Secretary is responsible in 
     cooperation with the Secretary of the Interior, acting 
     through the Director of the Fish and Wildlife Service, and 
     the head of the appropriate State fish and wildlife agency or 
     agencies for the State in which the military installation 
     involved is located. The resulting plan for a military 
     installation consistent with paragraph (4) shall reflect the 
     mutual agreement of the parties concerning conservation, 
     protection, and management of fish and wildlife resources.
       ``(3) Purpose of plans.--Consistent with the use of 
     military installations to ensure the preparedness of the 
     Armed Forces, the Secretaries of the military departments 
     shall carry out the program required by this subsection to 
     provide for--
       ``(A) the conservation and rehabilitation of natural 
     resources on military installations;
       ``(B) the sustained multipurpose use of these resources, to 
     include hunting, fishing, trapping, and nonconsumptive uses; 
     and
       ``(C) subject to safety requirements and military security, 
     public access to military installations to facilitate these 
     uses.
       ``(4) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this Act shall be 
     construed as modifying or repealing the provisions of any 
     Federal law governing the conservation or protection of fish 
     and wildlife resources, nor as enlarging or diminishing the 
     responsibility and authority of the States for the protection 
     and management of fish and resident wildlife. Except as 
     elsewhere specifically provided in this section and section 
     102, nothing in this Act shall be construed as authorizing 
     the Secretary of a military department to require a Federal 
     license or permit to hunt, fish, or trap on a military 
     installation.
       (b) Conforming Amendments.--Title I of the Sikes Act is 
     amended--
       (1) in section 101(b)(4) (16 U.S.C. 670a(b)(4)), by 
     striking out ``cooperative plan'' each place it appears and 
     inserting in lieu thereof ``integrated natural resource 
     management plan'';
       (2) in section 101(c) (16 U.S.C. 670a(c)), in the matter 
     preceding paragraph (1) by striking out ``a cooperative 
     plan'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``an integrated natural 
     resource management plan'';
       (3) in section 101(d) (16 U.S.C. 670a(d)), in the matter 
     preceding paragraph (1) by striking out ``cooperative plans'' 
     and inserting in lieu thereof ``integrated natural resource 
     management plans'';
       (4) in section 101(e) (16 U.S.C. 670a(e)), by striking out 
     ``Cooperative plans'' and inserting in lieu thereof 
     ``Integrated natural resource management plans'';
       (5) in section 102 (16 U.S.C. 670b), by striking out ``a 
     cooperative plan'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``an 
     integrated natural resource management plan'';
       (6) in section 103 (16 U.S.C. 670c), by striking out ``a 
     cooperative plan'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``an 
     integrated natural resource management plan'';
       (7) in section 106(a) (16 U.S.C. 670f(a)), by striking out 
     ``cooperative plans'' and inserting in lieu thereof 
     ``integrated natural resource management plans''; and
       (8) in section 106(c) (16 U.S.C. 670f(c)), by striking out 
     ``cooperative plans'' and inserting in lieu thereof 
     ``integrated natural resource management plans''.
       (c) Contents of Plans.--Section 101(b) of the Sikes Act (16 
     U.S.C. 670a(b)) is amended--
       (1) by striking out ``Each cooperative plan'' and all that 
     follows through paragraph (1) and inserting in lieu thereof 
     the following:
       ``(b) Required Elements of Plans.--Consistent with the use 
     of military installations to ensure the preparedness of the 
     Armed Forces, each integrated natural resources management 
     plan prepared under subsection (a)--
       ``(1) shall, where appropriate and applicable, provide 
     for--
       ``(A) fish and wildlife management, land management, forest 
     management, and fish and wildlife-oriented recreation;
       ``(B) fish and wildlife habitat enhancement or 
     modifications;
       ``(C) wetland protection, enhancement, and restoration, 
     where necessary for support of fish or wildlife;
       ``(D) integration of, and consistency among, the various 
     activities conducted under the plan;
       ``(E) establishment of specific natural resource management 
     objectives and time frames for proposed action;
       ``(F) sustained use by the public of natural resources to 
     the extent such use is not inconsistent with the needs of 
     fish and wildlife resources management;
       ``(G) public access to the military installation that is 
     necessary or appropriate for the use described in 
     subparagraph (F), subject to requirements necessary to ensure 
     safety and military security;
       ``(H) enforcement of natural resource laws and regulations;
       ``(I) no net loss in the capability of military 
     installation lands to support the military mission of the 
     installation; and
       ``(J) such other activities as the Secretary of the 
     military department considers appropriate;''
       (2) by striking out paragraph (3);
       (3) by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (3); and
       (4) in paragraph (3)(A) (as so redesignated), by striking 
     out ``collect the fees therefor,'' and inserting in lieu 
     thereof ``collect, spend, administer, and account for fees 
     therefor,''.

     SEC. 2905. REVIEW FOR PREPARATION OF INTEGRATED NATURAL 
                   RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PLANS.

       (a) Review of Military Installations.--
       (1) Review.--The Secretary of each military department 
     shall, by not later than nine months after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act--
       (A) review each military installation in the United States 
     that is under the jurisdiction of that Secretary to determine 
     the military installations for which the preparation of an 
     integrated natural resource management plan under section 101 
     of the Sikes Act, as amended by this title, is appropriate; 
     and
       (B) submit to the Secretary of Defense a report on those 
     determinations.
       (2) Report to congress.--The Secretary of Defense shall, by 
     not later than 12 months after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, submit to the Congress a report on the reviews 
     conducted under paragraph (1). The report shall include--
       (A) a list of those military installations reviewed under 
     paragraph (1) for which the Secretary of the military 
     department concerned determines the preparation of an 
     integrated natural resource management plan is not 
     appropriate; and

[[Page H4206]]

       (B) for each of the military installations listed under 
     subparagraph (A), an explanation of the reasons such a plan 
     is not appropriate.
       (b) Deadline for Integrated Natural Resource Management 
     Plans.--Not later than two years after the date of the 
     submission of the report required under subsection (a)(2), 
     the Secretary of each military department shall, for each 
     military installation for which the Secretary has not 
     determined under subsection (a)(2)(A) that preparation of an 
     integrated natural resource management plan is not 
     appropriate--
       (1) prepare and begin implementing such a plan in 
     accordance with section 101(a) of the Sikes Act, as amended 
     by section 2904; or
       (2) in the case of a military installation for which there 
     is in effect a cooperative plan under section 101(a) of the 
     Sikes Act on the day before the date of the enactment of this 
     Act, complete negotiations with the Secretary of the Interior 
     and the heads of the appropriate State agencies regarding 
     changes to that plan that are necessary for the plan to 
     constitute an integrated natural resource plan that complies 
     with that section, as amended by section 2904.
       (c) Public Comment.--The Secretary of each military 
     department shall provide an opportunity for the submission of 
     public comments on--
       (1) integrated natural resource management plans proposed 
     pursuant to subsection (b)(1); and
       (2) changes to cooperative plans proposed pursuant to 
     subsection (b)(2).

     SEC. 2906. ANNUAL REVIEWS AND REPORTS.

       Section 101 of the Sikes Act (16 U.S.C. 670a) is amended by 
     adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(f) Reviews and Reports.--
       ``(1) Secretary of defense.--The Secretary of Defense 
     shall, by not later than March 1 of each year, review the 
     extent to which integrated natural resource management plans 
     were prepared or in effect and implemented in accordance with 
     this Act in the preceding year, and submit a report on the 
     findings of that review to the committees. Each report shall 
     include--
       ``(A) the number of integrated natural resource management 
     plans in effect in the year covered by the report, including 
     the date on which each plan was issued in final form or most 
     recently revised;
       ``(B) the amount of moneys expended on conservation 
     activities conducted pursuant to those plans in the year 
     covered by the report; and
       ``(C) an assessment of the extent to which the plans comply 
     with the requirements of this Act.
       ``(2) Secretary of the interior.--The Secretary of the 
     Interior, by not later than March 1 of each year and in 
     consultation with State agencies responsible for conservation 
     or management of fish or wildlife, shall submit a report to 
     the committees on the amount of moneys expended by the 
     Department of the Interior and those State agencies in the 
     year covered by the report on conservation activities 
     conducted pursuant to integrated natural resource management 
     plans.
       ``(3) Committees defined.--For purposes of this subsection, 
     the term `committees' means the Committee on Resources and 
     the Committee on National Security of the House of 
     Representatives and the Committee on Armed Services and the 
     Committee on Environment and Public Works of the Senate.''.

     SEC. 2907. TRANSFER OF WILDLIFE CONSERVATION FEES FROM CLOSED 
                   MILITARY INSTALLATIONS.

       Subsection (b)(3)(B) of section 101(b) of the Sikes Act (16 
     U.S.C. 670a(b)), as redesignated and amended by section 2904, 
     is further amended by inserting before the period at the end 
     the following: ``, unless that military installation is 
     subsequently closed, in which case the fees may be 
     transferred to another military installation to be used for 
     the same purposes''.

     SEC. 2908. FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT.

       Title I of the Sikes Act (16 U.S.C. 670a et seq.) is 
     amended--
       (1) by redesignating section 106, as amended by section 
     2904(b), as section 109; and
       (2) by inserting after section 105 the following new 
     section:

     ``SEC. 106. FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT OF OTHER LAWS.

       ``All Federal laws relating to the conservation of natural 
     resources on Federal lands may be enforced by the Secretary 
     of Defense with respect to violations of those laws that 
     occur on military installations within the United States.''.

     SEC. 2909. NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT SERVICES.

       Title I of the Sikes Act (16 U.S.C. 670a et seq.) is 
     amended by inserting after section 106 (as added by section 
     2908) the following new section:

     ``SEC. 107. NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT SERVICES.

       ``The Secretary of each military department shall ensure, 
     within available resources, that sufficient numbers of 
     professionally trained natural resource management personnel 
     and natural resource law enforcement personnel are available 
     and assigned responsibility to perform tasks necessary to 
     comply with this Act, including the preparation and 
     implementation of integrated natural resource management 
     plans.''.

     SEC. 2910. DEFINITIONS.

       Title I of the Sikes Act (16 U.S.C. 670a et seq.) is 
     amended by inserting after section 107 (as added by section 
     2909) the following new section:

     ``SEC. 108. DEFINITIONS.

       ``In this title:
       ``(1) Military installation.--(A) The term `military 
     installation' means any land or interest in land owned by the 
     United States and administered by the Secretary of Defense or 
     the Secretary of a military department (except civil works 
     lands). The term includes all public lands withdrawn from all 
     forms of appropriation under public land laws and reserved 
     for use by the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of a 
     military department.
       ``(B) The term does not include any lands otherwise covered 
     by subparagraph (A) that are subject to an approved 
     recommendation for closure under the Defense Base Closure and 
     Realignment Act of 1990 (part A of title XXIX of Public Law 
     101-510; 10 U.S.C. 2687 note).
       ``(2) State fish and wildlife agency.--The term `State fish 
     and wildlife agency' means an agency or agencies of State 
     government that is responsible under State law for managing 
     fish or wildlife resources.
       ``(3) United states.--The term `United States' means the 
     States, the District of Columbia, and the territories and 
     possessions of the United States.''.

     SEC. 2911. COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS.

       Section 103a of the Sikes Act (16 U.S.C. 670c-1) is 
     amended--
       (1) in subsection (a) by striking out ``Secretary of 
     Defense'' and inserting ``Secretary of a military 
     department'';
       (2) by striking out subsection (b) and inserting in lieu 
     thereof the following new subsection:
       ``(b) Funds appropriated to the Department of Defense for a 
     fiscal year may be obligated to cover the cost of goods and 
     services provided either under a cooperative agreement 
     entered into under subsection (a) or through an agency 
     agreement under section 1535 of title 31, United States Code, 
     during any 18-month period beginning in that fiscal year, 
     without regard to whether the agreement crosses fiscal 
     years.''.

     SEC. 2912. REPEAL OF SUPERSEDED PROVISION.

       Section 2 of the Act of October 27, 1986 (Public Law 99-
     651; 16 U.S.C. 670a-1), is repealed.

     SEC. 2913. CLERICAL AMENDMENTS.

       Title I of the Sikes Act, as amended by this title, is 
     amended--
       (1) in the heading for the title by striking out ``military 
     reservations'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``military 
     installations'';
       (2) in section 101(b)(3) (16 U.S.C. 670a(b)(3)), as 
     redesignated and amended by section 2904--
       (A) in subparagraph (A), by striking out ``the 
     reservation'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``the 
     installation''; and
       (B) in subparagraph (B), by striking out ``the military 
     reservation'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``the military 
     installation'';
       (4) in section 101(c) (16 U.S.C. 670a(c))--
       (A) in paragraph (1), by striking out ``a military 
     reservation'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``a military 
     installation''; and
       (B) in paragraph (2), by striking out ``the reservation'' 
     and inserting in lieu thereof ``the installation'';
       (5) in section 102 (16 U.S.C. 670b), by striking out 
     ``military reservations'' and inserting in lieu thereof 
     ``military installations''; and
       (6) in section 103 (16 U.S.C. 670c)--
       (A) by striking out ``military reservations'' and inserting 
     in lieu thereof ``military installations''; and
       (B) by striking out ``such reservations'' and inserting in 
     lieu thereof ``such installations''.

     SEC. 2914. AUTHORIZATIONS OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       (a) Programs on Military Installations.--Subsections (b) 
     and (c) of section 109 of the Sikes Act (as redesignated by 
     section 1408) are each amended by striking out ``1983'' and 
     all that follows through ``1993,'' and inserting in lieu 
     thereof ``1983 through 2000,''.
       (b) Programs on Public Lands.--Section 209 of the Sikes Act 
     (16 U.S.C. 670o) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a), by striking out ``the sum of 
     $10,000,000'' and all that follows through ``to enable the 
     Secretary of the Interior'' and inserting in lieu thereof 
     ``$4,000,000 for each of fiscal years 1998 through 2003, to 
     enable the Secretary of the Interior''; and
       (2) in subsection (b), by striking out ``the sum of 
     $12,000,000'' and all that follows through ``to enable the 
     Secretary of Agriculture'' and inserting in lieu thereof 
     ``$5,000,000 for each of fiscal years 1998 through 2003, to 
     enable the Secretary of Agriculture''.

                  Amendment to H.R. 1119, as Reported

                  Offered by Mr. Saxton of New Jersey

              (Amdt #29 in Part 2 of House Report 105-137)

       Strike out section 2839 (page 434, line 9, through page 
     435, line 3) and insert in lieu thereof the following new 
     section:

     SEC. 2839. LAND CONVEYANCES, FORT DIX, NEW JERSEY.

       (a) Conveyances Authorized.--(1) The Secretary of the Army 
     may convey, without consideration, to the Borough of 
     Wrightstown, New Jersey (in this section referred to as the 
     ``Borough''), all right, title, and interest of the United 
     States in and to a parcel of real property (including 
     improvements thereon) consisting of approximately

[[Page H4207]]

     39.69 acres located at Fort Dix, New Jersey, for the purpose 
     of permitting the Borough to develop the parcel for economic 
     purposes.
       (2) The Secretary may convey, without consideration, to the 
     New Hanover Board of Education (in this section referred to 
     as the ``Board''), all right, title, and interest of the 
     United States in and to an additional parcel of real property 
     (including improvements thereon) at Fort Dix consisting of 
     approximately five acres for the purpose of permitting the 
     Board to develop the parcel for educational purposes.
       (b) Description of Property.--The exact acreage and legal 
     description of the real property to be conveyed under 
     subsection (a) shall be determined by surveys satisfactory to 
     the Secretary. The cost of the survey in connection with the 
     conveyance under subsection (a)(1) shall be borne by the 
     Borough, and the cost of the survey in connection with the 
     conveyance under subsection (a)(2) shall be borne by the 
     Board.
       (c) Additional Terms and Conditions.--The Secretary may 
     require such additional terms and conditions in connection 
     with the conveyances under subsection (a) as the Secretary 
     considers appropriate to protect the interests of the United 
     States.

                  Amendment to H.R. 1119, as Reported

                   Offered by Mr. Sisisky of Virginia

              (Amdt #30 in Part 2 of House Report 105-137)

       At the end of title VII (page 288, after line 21), insert 
     the following new section:

     SEC. 747. COMPTROLLER GENERAL STUDY OF REQUIREMENT FOR 
                   MILITARY MEDICAL FACILITIES IN NATIONAL CAPITAL 
                   REGION.

       (a) Study Required.--The Comptroller General shall conduct 
     a study to evaluate the requirement for Army, Navy, and Air 
     Force medical facilities in the National Capital Region (as 
     defined in section 2674(f)(2) of title 10, United States 
     Code). The study shall--
       (1) specifically address requirements with respect to 
     geography, facilities, integrated residencies, and medical 
     environments; and
       (2) provide specific recommendations with respect to how 
     medical and health care provided by these facilities may be 
     better coordinated to more efficiently serve, throughout the 
     National Capital Region, members of the Armed Forces on 
     active duty and covered beneficiaries under chapter 55 of 
     title 10, United States Code.
       (b) Submission of Report.--Not later than six months after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, the Comptroller 
     General shall submit to Congress and the Secretary of Defense 
     a report containing the results of the study required by 
     subsection (a).

    Modification to the Amendment Offered by Mr. Skelton of Missouri

              (Amdt #31 in Part 2 of House Report 105-137)

       The amendment as modified is as follows:
       At the end of subtitle D of title X (page 327, after line 
     6), insert the following new section:

     SEC. 1043. REPORT ON ANTI-TERRORISM ACTIVITIES.

       Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a 
     report, in classified and unclassified form, describing--
       (1) the programs designed to carry out anti-terrorism 
     activities of the Department of Defense;
       (2) any deficiencies in those programs; and
       (3) any actions taken by the Secretary to improve 
     implementation of such programs.

                  Amendment to H.R. 1119, as Reported

                   Offered by Mr. Skelton of Missouri

              (Amdt #32 in Part 2 of House Report 105-137)

       At the end of title V (page 204, after line 16), insert the 
     following new section:

     SEC. 572. COMMUNITY COLLEGE OF THE AIR FORCE.

       (a) Limited Expansion.--Paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of 
     section 9315 of title 10, United States Code, is amended to 
     read as follows:
       ``(1) prescribe programs of higher education for enlisted 
     members described in subsection (d) designed to improve the 
     technical, managerial, and related skills of those members 
     and to prepare them for military jobs which require the use 
     of those skills; and ''.
       (b) Eligible Members.--Such section is further amended by 
     adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(d) Subsection (a)(1) applies to the following members:
       ``(1) Enlisted members of the Air Force.
       ``(2) Enlisted members of other armed forces attending Air 
     Force training schools whose jobs are closely related to Air 
     Force jobs.
       ``(3) Enlisted members of other armed forces who are 
     serving as instructors at Air Force training schools.''.
       (c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsections (a) 
     and (b) shall apply with respect to enrollments in the 
     Community College of the Air Force after March 31, 1996.

    Modification to the Amendment Offered by Mr. Skelton of Missouri

              (Amdt #33 in Part 2 of House Report 105-137)

       The amendment as modified is as follows:
       At the end of title X (page 360, after line 8), insert the 
     following new section:

     SEC. 1060. OVERSIGHT OF COUNTER-TERRORISM AND ANTI-TERRORISM 
                   PROGRAMS AND ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED STATES.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 120 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Office of 
     Management and Budget shall--
       (1) establish a Government-wide reporting system with 
     respect to the budget and expenditure of funds by executive 
     departments and agencies for the purpose of carrying out 
     counter-terrorism and anti-terrorism programs and activities; 
     and
       (2) collect information on--
       (A) the budget and expenditure of funds by executive 
     departments and agencies during fiscal years 1995 through 
     1997 for purposes of carrying out counter-terrorism and anti-
     terrorism programs and activities; and
       (B) the specific programs and activities for which such 
     funds were expended.
       (b) Report Requirement.--Not later than March 1st of each 
     year, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget 
     shall submit to the President and to Congress a report, in 
     classified and unclassified form, describing, for each 
     executive department and agency and for the executive branch 
     as whole--
       (1) the amounts proposed to be expended directly for 
     counter-terrorism and anti-terrorism programs and activities 
     for the fiscal year beginning in the calendar year in which 
     the report is submitted;
       (2) the amounts proposed to be expended directly for 
     counter-terrorism and anti-terrorism programs and activities 
     for the fiscal year in which the report is submitted and the 
     amounts that have already been expended for such programs and 
     activities for that fiscal year;
       (3) the amounts proposed to be expended directly and the 
     amounts actually expended directly for counter-terrorism and 
     anti-terrorism programs and activities for the three fiscal 
     years preceding the fiscal year in which the report is 
     submitted; and
       (4) the specific counter-terrorism and anti-terrorism 
     programs and activities being implemented, any priorities 
     with respect to such programs and activities, and whether 
     there has been any duplication of efforts in implementing 
     such programs and activities.

                         Amendment to H.R. 1119

                Offered by Mr. Spratt of South Carolina

              (Amdt #36 in Part 2 of House Report 105-137)

       At the end of title VIII (page 303, after line 2), insert 
     the following new section:

     SEC. 8__. EXPANSION OF PERSONNEL ELIGIBLE TO PARTICIPATE IN 
                   DEMONSTRATION PROJECT RELATING TO ACQUISITION 
                   WORKFORCE.

       (a) Amendment to Purpose of Project.--Section 4308(a) of 
     the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 
     (Public Law 104-106; 10 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended by 
     adding before the period at the end the following: ``and 
     supporting personnel assigned to work directly with the 
     acquisition workforce''.
       (b) Amendment to Eligible Workforce.--Section 4308(b)(3)(A) 
     of such Act is amended by inserting before the semicolon the 
     following: ``or involves a team of personnel more than half 
     of which consists of members of the acquisition workforce and 
     the remainder of which consists of supporting personnel 
     assigned to work directly with the acquisition workforce''.
       (c) Commencement of Project.--Section 4308(b)(3)(C) of such 
     Act, as redesignated by subsection (b)(2), is amended by 
     striking out ``this Act'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``the 
     National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998''.
       (d) Limitation on Number of Participants.--Section 4308 of 
     such Act is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(d) Limitation on Number of Participants.--The total 
     number of persons who may participate in the demonstration 
     project under this section may not exceed the number that is 
     equal to the total number of persons who are members of the 
     acquisition workforce.''.

                  Amendment to H.R. 1119, as Reported

                  Offered by Mr. Thune of South Dakota

               (Amdt #37 Part 2 of House Report 105-137)

       At the end of part III of subtitle D of title XXVIII (page 
     439, after line 6) add the following new section:

     SEC. 2864. LAND CONVEYANCE, ELLSWORTH AIR FORCE BASE, SOUTH 
                   DAKOTA.

       (a) Conveyance Required.--The Secretary of the Air Force 
     may convey, without consideration, to the Greater Box Elder 
     Area Economic Development Corporation, Box Elder, South 
     Dakota (in this section referred to as the ``Corporation''), 
     all right, title, and interest of the United States in and to 
     the parcels of real property located at Ellsworth Air Force 
     Base, South Dakota, referred to in subsection (b).
       (b) Covered Property.--(1) Subject to paragraph (2), the 
     real property referred to in subsection (a) is the following:
       (A) A parcel of real property, together with any 
     improvements thereon, consisting of approximately 53.32 acres 
     and comprising the Skyway Military Family Housing Area.
       (B) A parcel of real property, together with any 
     improvements thereon, consisting of approximately 137.56 
     acres and comprising the Renal Heights Military Family 
     Housing Area.
       (C) A parcel of real property, together with any 
     improvements thereon, consisting of approximately 14.92 acres 
     and comprising the East Nike Military Family Housing Area.
       (D) A parcel of real property, together with any 
     improvements thereon, consisting of approximately 14.69 acres 
     and comprising the South Nike Military Family Housing Area.
       (E) A parcel of real property, together with any 
     improvements thereon, consisting of approximately 14.85 acres 
     and comprising the West Nike Military Family Housing Area.

[[Page H4208]]

       (2) The real property referred to in subsection (a) does 
     not include the portion of real property referred to in 
     paragraph (1)(B) that the Secretary determines to be required 
     for the construction of an access road between the main gate 
     of Ellsworth Air Force Base and an interchange on Interstate 
     Route 90 located in the vicinity of mile marker 67 in South 
     Dakota.
       (c) Conditions of Conveyance.--The conveyance of the real 
     property referred to in subsection (b) shall be subject to 
     the following conditions:
       (1) That the Corporation, and any person or entity to which 
     the Corporation transfers the property, comply in the use of 
     the property with the applicable provisions of the Ellsworth 
     Air Force Base Air Installation Compatible Use Zone Study.
       (2) That the Corporation convey a portion of the real 
     property referred to in paragraph (1)(A) of that subsection, 
     together with any improvements thereon, consisting of 
     approximately 20 acres to the Douglas School District, South 
     Dakota, for use for education purposes.
       (d) Reversionary Interest.--If the Secretary determines 
     that any portion of the real property conveyed under 
     subsection (a) is not being utilized in accordance with the 
     applicable provision of subsection (c), all right, title, and 
     interest in and to that portion of the real property shall 
     revert to the United States, and the United States shall have 
     the right of immediate entry thereon.
       (e) Legal Description.--The exact acreage and legal 
     description of the property conveyed under subsection (a) 
     shall be determined by a survey satisfactory to the 
     Secretary. The cost of the survey shall be borne by the 
     Corporation.
       (f) Additional Terms and Conditions.--The Secretary may 
     require such additional terms and conditions in connection 
     with the conveyance under subsection (a) as the Secretary 
     considers appropriate to protect the interests of the United 
     States.

                  Amendment to H.R. 1119, as Reported

                    Offered by Mr. Traficant of Ohio

              (Amdt #38 in Part 2 of House Report 105-137)

       At the end of subtitle A of title VIII (page 299, after 
     line 16) add the following new section:

     SEC. 810. AUDIT OF PROCUREMENT OF GOODS BY MILITARY 
                   INSTALLATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES.

       (a) Audit Requirement.--Not later than September 30, 1998, 
     the Inspector General of the Department of Defense shall 
     perform a random audit of the procurement of goods by 
     military installations during fiscal years 1996 and 1997 to 
     determine the extent to which such installations procured 
     goods made in a country other than the United States during 
     those fiscal years.
       (b) Definition.--For purposes of this section, the term 
     ``random audit of the procurement of goods by military 
     installations''--
       (1) means an audit of the procurement of goods (not 
     including goods obtained from the Defense Logistics Agency) 
     by not less than four and not more than twelve military 
     installations in the United States;
       (2) shall include an audit of the procurement of goods by a 
     military installation of each of the Army, Navy, Air Force, 
     and Marine Corps.
       (c) Report.--Not later than October 31, 1998, the Inspector 
     General of the Department of Defense shall submit to Congress 
     a report on the results of the audit performed under 
     subsection (a).

     Modification to the Amendment Offered by Mr. Traficant of Ohio

              (Amdt #39 in Part 2 of House Report 105-137)

       The amendment as modified is as follows:
       At the end of title VIII (page 303, after line 2), insert 
     the following new section:

     SEC. __. TIME FOR SUBMISSION OF ANNUAL REPORT RELATING TO BUY 
                   AMERICAN ACT.

       Section 827 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104-201; 41 U.S.C. 10b-3) is 
     amended by striking out ``120 days'' and inserting in lieu 
     thereof ``60 days''.

                  Amendment to H.R. 1119, as Reported

                    Offered by Mr. Wamp of Tennessee

              (Amdt #40 in Part 2 of House Report 105-137)

       At the end of subtitle E of title X (page 360, after line 
     8), insert the following new section:

     SEC. 1060. ARMAMENT RETOOLING AND MANUFACTURING SUPPORT 
                   INITIATIVE.

       (a) Expansion of Purposes of Initiative.--Section 193(b) of 
     the Armament Retooling and Manufacturing Support Act of 1992 
     (subtitle H of title I of Public Law 102-484; 10 U.S.C. 2501 
     note) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
     paragraph:
       ``(10) To allow for the use of ammunition manufacturing 
     facilities by other entities for the purpose of 
     modernization, development, and restoration of the 
     facilities.''.
       (b) Authority to Enter Into Agreements.--Section 194(a) of 
     such Act is amended--
       (1) by striking out ``and'' at the end of paragraph (1);
       (2) by striking out the period at the end of paragraph (2) 
     and inserting in lieu thereof ``; and''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(3) to enter into agreements (which may include 
     contracts, leases, or other arrangements for a period of not 
     more than 99 years) with other entities with respect to the 
     ammunition manufacturing facility, or a part of such 
     facility.''.
       (c) Reporting Requirement.--Not later than January 1, 1998, 
     the Secretary of the Army shall submit to Congress a report 
     on progress with respect to the implementation of the 
     amendments made to the Armament Retooling and Manufacturing 
     Support Act of 1992 by this section.

  Modification to the Amendment Offered by Mr. Weldon of Pennsylvania

             (Amdt in order under sec. 8(d) of H. Res. 169)

       The amendment as modified is as follows:
       At the end of title XII (page 379, after line 19), insert 
     the following new section:

     SEC. __. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON NEED FOR RUSSIAN OPENNESS ON 
                   THE YAMANTAU MOUNTAIN PROJECT.

       (a) Findings.--Congress finds as follows:
       (1) The United States and Russia have been working in the 
     post-Cold War era to establish a new strategic relationship 
     based on cooperation and openness between the two nations.
       (2) This effort to establish a new strategic relationship 
     has resulted in the conclusion or agreement in principle on a 
     number of far-reaching agreements, including START I, II, and 
     III, a revision in the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, 
     and a series of other agreements (such as the Comprehensive 
     Test Ban Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention), 
     designed to further reduce bilateral threats and limit the 
     proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
       (3) These far-reaching agreements were based on the 
     understanding between the United States and Russia that there 
     would be a good faith effort on both sides to comply with the 
     letter and spirit of the agreements, that both sides would 
     end their Cold War competition, and that neither side would 
     seek to gain or maintain unilateral strategic advantage over 
     the other.
       (4) Reports indicate that Russia has been pursuing 
     construction of a massive underground facility of unknown 
     purpose at Yamantau Mountain and the city of Mezhgorye 
     (formerly the settlements of Beloretsk-15 and Beloretsk-16) 
     that is designed to survive a nuclear war and appears to 
     exceed reasonable defense requirements.
       (5) The Yamantau Mountain project does not appear to be 
     consistent with the lowering of strategic threats, openness, 
     and cooperation that is the basis of the post-Cold War 
     strategic partnership between the United States and Russia.
       (6) Russia appears to have engaged in a campaign to 
     deliberately conceal and mislead the United States about the 
     purpose of the Yamantau Mountain project, as shown by the 
     following:
       (A) General and Bashkortostan, People's Deputy Leonid 
     Akimovich Tsirkunov, commandant of Beloretsk-15 and 
     Beloretsk-16, stated in 1991 and 1992 that the purpose of the 
     construction there was to build a mining and ore-processing 
     complex, but later claimed that it was an underground 
     warehouse for food and clothing.
       (B) M.Z. Shakiorov, a former communist official in the 
     region, alleged in 1992 that the Yamantau Mountain facility 
     was to become a shelter for the Russian national leadership 
     in case of nuclear war.
       (C) Sources of the Segodnya newspaper in 1996 claimed that 
     the Yamantau Mountain project was associated with the so-
     called ``Dead Hand'' nuclear retaliatory command and control 
     system for strategic missiles.
       (D) Then Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces 
     General Igor Sergeyev denied that the facility was associated 
     with nuclear forces.
       (E) R. Zhukov, a Deputy in the State Assembly, in 1996 
     claimed that the Yamantau Mountain facility belonged to 
     ``atomic scientists'' and posed a serious environmental 
     hazard.
       (F) Russia's 1997 federal budget lists the project as a 
     closed territory containing installations of the Ministry of 
     Defense, while First Deputy Defense Minister Andrey Kokoshin 
     recently stated that the Ministry of Defense has nothing to 
     do with the project.
       (7) Continued cooperation and progress on forging a new 
     strategic relationship between the United States and Russia 
     requires that both nations make transparent to one another 
     major projects underway or plans under consideration that 
     could alter the strategic balance sought in arms control 
     agreements or otherwise be construed by the other side as an 
     important new potential threat.
       (8) The United States has allowed senior Russian military 
     and government officials to have access to key strategic 
     facilities of the United States by providing tours of the 
     North American Air Defense (NORAD) command at Cheyenne 
     Mountain and the United States Strategic Command (STRACOM) 
     headquarters in Omaha, Nebraska, among other sites, and by 
     providing extensive briefings on the operations of those 
     facilities.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--In light of the findings in 
     subsection (a), it is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the Russian government should provide to the United 
     States a written explanation on the principal and secondary 
     purposes of the Yamantau Mountain project, specifically 
     identifying the intended end user and explaining the heavy 
     investment in that project;
       (2) the Russian government should allow a United States 
     delegation, including officials of the executive branch, 
     Members of Congress, and United States experts on underground 
     facilities, to have access to the

[[Page H4209]]

     Yamantau Mountain project to inspect the facility and all 
     rail-served buildings in the southern and northern 
     settlements located near Yamantau; and
       (3) the Russian government should direct senior officials 
     responsible for the Yamantau Mountain project to explain to 
     such a United States delegation the purpose and operational 
     concept of all completed and planned underground facilities 
     at Yamantau Mountain in sufficient detail (including through 
     the use of drawings and diagrams) to support a high-
     confidence judgment by the United States delegation that the 
     design is consistent with the official explanations.

  Mr. SPENCE (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous 
consent that the modifications be considered as read and printed in the 
Record.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
South Carolina?
  There was no objection.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from South Carolina 
[Mr. Spence] and the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] each will 
control 10 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence].
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
Idaho [Mrs. Chenoweth] for the purpose of a colloquy.
  Mrs. CHENOWETH. Mr. Chairman, I rise to engage the chairman of the 
Committee on National Security in a colloquy. Our soldiers need 
dependable, high resolution flat panel technology in order to display 
the rapidly growing quantity of battlefield information. These displays 
are an essential interface between man and machine to permit rapid, 
efficient transfer of information. Without adequate displays, the 
objective of digitization will never be achieved.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Mrs. CHENOWETH. I yield to the gentleman from South Carolina.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, the gentlewoman is correct.
  Mrs. CHENOWETH. Mr. Chairman, H.R. 1119 provides funding to continue 
the development of field emission, full color, high resolution flat 
panel display technology for military applications. It also provides 
funding to the Army for integration of that technology into the Abrams 
tank and other Army ground combat vehicles. The Armed Services 
recognize that this technology holds the promise of providing 
significantly improved displays that are less expensive than current 
military models. As the committee report noted, ``Field emission flat 
panel display technology is of increasing importance as the Army 
incorporates digitization technology into its fleet of vehicles. The 
committee strongly supports development of this technology.
  I firmly believe that it is critical for us to provide funding for 
this technology that will allow development to be completed and will 
permit testing of these displays for the Abrams tank in fiscal year 
1999. I would urge the distinguished gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. 
Spence] to help ensure that this program is appropriately funded during 
the conference process.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman from Idaho [Mrs. 
Chenoweth] for her observations and agree that this technology is of 
great importance to the success of defense modernization. I will 
continue to work to ensure that the appropriate level of funding is 
provided for these efforts.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to my distinguished 
colleague, the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. Skelton].
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I at this time wish to discuss very 
briefly amendments 32, 32 and 33. The first: In an effort to collect, 
evaluate, and assess the efforts of the U.S. Government to combat 
international terrorism, the amendment requires the director of the 
Office of Management and Budget to submit to Congress an appropriate 
report regarding the programs and funding levels throughout the Federal 
system. The full report, due no later than 120 days from the date of 
enactment, should assess the amount of duplication or gaps in the 
overall effort. The amendment would also establish an annual reporting 
requirement.
  Regarding the second amendment, it is aimed at ensuring the safety 
and security of our personnel. It directs the Secretary of Defense to 
report to Congress about achievements and findings to date regarding 
our effort to protect our forces abroad and our anti-terrorism 
initiatives therefor.
  My third amendment deals with the authority of granting degrees to 
individuals participating in the programs of the community college of 
the Air Force. With this language, all participants can receive an 
associate degree.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania [Mr. Weldon].
  (Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania asked and was given permission to revise 
and extend his remarks.)
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I simply want to rise to 
commend the full committee chairman and the ranking member for this en 
bloc amendment. There are a number of very significant and important 
items that are covered. I would like to comment on a number of them, 
but we do not have the time. But I would like to single out one that 
was accepted through a bipartisan agreement on the floor, and that 
deals with a project in the Ural Mountains in Russia.
  Mr. Chairman, as most of my colleagues know, I take great effort at 
working with the Russian Government and, in fact, under some serious 
pressure, voted against two recent amendments, one which was just voted 
on, that I felt went too far with Russia; and proactively, my goal is 
to foster a better relationship with the Russian Government and the 
Russian military and the Russian people.
  However, Mr. Chairman, it has come to my attention over the past 5 
years that a major project is underway in the Ural Mountains that we 
need to have more transparency on. This project is one that has been 
very secretive. There have been hundreds of millions, if not billions, 
of dollars spent mining out a huge operation in Yamantau Mountain, 
formerly known as Beleretz 15 and 16.
  As recently as a month ago, I was in Moscow and met with the Minister 
of Natural Resources, Orlov; the Minister of Atomic Energy, Mikhaylov; 
the Deputy Defense Minister, Mikoshin; and number two Chief of the 
General Staff, General Melov. And I expressed to them our concern about 
what is happening in this project.
  They all encouraged me to proceed to President Yeltsin to get more 
transparency on this initiative. I have since written to him and asked 
for him to allow a bipartisan delegation to visit this site to better 
understand what Russia is, in fact, accomplishing.
  One of the amendments in this en bloc series which I introduced, in 
fact, calls for Russia to be more transparent. As a sense of the House 
resolution, it says that we need to understand more clearly what Russia 
is doing in Yamantau Mountain to make sure it is not a destabilizing 
project and one that will not upset the balance of our relationship.
  So I thank both the chairman and ranking member for accepting this 
amendment and the spirit that I bring to the floor of one of 
cooperation with Russia. I hope that Russia will respond positively and 
allow our people and our leaders to better understand what their 
ultimate objectives are at Yamantau Mountain.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to my distinguished 
colleague, the gentleman from Samoa [Mr. Faleomavaega].
  (Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
his remarks.)
  Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Chairman, I certainly want to commend the 
gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence], the chairman of the 
Committee on National Security, and my good friend, the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Dellums], the ranking Democrat, for their support and 
endorsement of this Amendment No. 9.
  I also want to thank my good friend, the chairman of the Subcommittee 
on Military Personnel of the Committee on National Security, the 
gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Buyer], and the ranking Democrat of that 
subcommittee, the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. Taylor] for their 
endorsement and bipartisan support of this amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, American Samoa over the years has established a very 
active Junior Officer Reserve Training Corps program among our high 
schools. Many thousands of high school students have had the 
opportunity to experience a facet of military training early enough in 
their lives to enable them to make informed decisions on whether to 
pursue the armed services as a career.

[[Page H4210]]

 Thousands of American Samoans have gone through the junior ROTC 
program in Samoa, and some of these have gone on to a senior ROTC 
program in the United States and then on to become excellent military 
officers.
  Mr. Chairman, most of my colleagues know that the U.S. territories 
have consistently had very high rates of enlistment in our Armed 
Forces. I know of at least 10 Samoans who should achieve the rank of E-
9, command sergeant majors, the highest enlisted rank in all of our 
armed services. I am also very aware of a couple recipients of the 
Silver Star for valor and bravery in the Korean and Vietnam conflicts.
  Mr. Chairman, my amendment is very simple. It directs the Secretary 
of Defense to study again the issue of making U.S. nationals. We have 
the distinction of being the only people under the American flag that 
are classified as U.S. nationals. It means that we owe permanent 
allegiance to the United States but we are neither citizens nor aliens.
  Congress has not yet established a law to allow us to become U.S. 
citizens. I do not know when, if ever, that is going to happen, Mr. 
Chairman. But at this point, this time, this amendment just simply 
allows the Secretary of Defense to study the issue again, making U.S. 
nationals eligible for the senior ROTC program, and then issuing a 
report and recommendation to the Congress. I thank both the chairman 
and the senior ranking member for allowing me to speak on this issue.
  Mr. Chairman, as most of my colleagues know, the U.S. territories 
have consistently had very high rates of enlistment in our armed 
forces, and many of these service members have served with distinction 
over a period of decades including in all of our major conflicts since 
World War I.
  I know of at least ten Samoans from American Samoa who have achieved 
the rank of E-9, the highest enlisted rank in either the Army, Navy, 
Air Force, or Marine Corps. I am also aware of a couple of recipients 
of the Silver Star for valor and bravery in the Korean and Vietnam 
conflicts.
  Mr. Chairman, among those who have served with distinction from the 
Island of Guam is retired Gen. Ben Blaz, who received his commission in 
the U.S. Army upon graduation from the ROTC program at Notre Dame, and 
rose to the rank of Brigadier General. General Blaz also served as 
Guam's delegate to this House from 1985-1992.
  Mr. Chairman, until 1996 the residents of all the insular areas were 
eligible to participate in the Senior ROTC program, but in that year a 
judge advocate in the U.S. Army issued an opinion that resulted in U.S. 
nationals no longer being considered as eligible for scholarships in 
the program. This determination is based on statutes which appear to 
limit eligibility to U.S. citizens. Persons born in American Samoa 
whose parents are not U.S. citizens are given U.S. national status by 
our government, and American Samoans are the only persons given this 
status. Persons born in all the other U.S. insular areas are U.S. 
citizens. I believe that the status of U.S. nationals was not 
considered when the laws governing the ROTC program were drafted.
  This amendment would direct the Secretary of Defense to study the 
issue of again making U.S. nationals eligible for the Senior ROTC 
program and then issue a report, with recommendations to Congress 
within 180 days.
  Mr. Chairman, this is a compromise from my original amendment which 
would have changed the law to make it clear that U.S. nationals are 
eligible to participate in the Senior ROTC program.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania [Mr. Gekas].
  (Mr. GEKAS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman for yielding. It is 
with gratitude to the chairman and to the ranking member for inclusion 
of my specific amendment in the en bloc amendments that I rise on this 
occasion.
  Fort Indiantown Gap, in Pennsylvania, has an ongoing academic complex 
program whereby about 4,000 soldiers are trained and educated every 
year in every aspect of our military defense. There is an authorization 
that ends on September 30 for completion of the barracks complex to 
house these individuals who receive this special training.
  What my amendment does, and which the chairman and the ranking member 
have graciously accepted, would extend the authorization to permit the 
completion of the barracks complex, thus ensuring that the trainees 
will have the adequate billeting space and quality to pursue the 
studies.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Ohio [Mr. Strickland], my distinguished colleague.
  Mr. STRICKLAND. Mr. Chairman, I rise to engage the chairman of the 
Committee on National Security in a colloquy.
  Mr. Chairman, our military vehicles need dependable, high-powered 
economical engines to support the increasing requirements for mobility 
on the modern digitized battlefield.
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. STRICKLAND. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, as the chairman of the 
Subcommittee on Research and Development of the Committee on National 
Security, I agree with the gentleman.
  Mr. STRICKLAND. H.R. 1119 provides funding to support a unified 
effort by academic, commercial, and governmental entities administered 
by the National Automobile Center to develop and assess promising 
alternative vehicle propulsion technologies that provide innovative 
improvement for military applications.
  The Army has recognized that Giesel technology holds the promise of 
significantly improved propulsion. I firmly believe it is critical for 
us to provide funding for this technology that will allow development 
to be completed and will permit testing of these engines.
  I would urge that an appropriate portion of these funds be used for 
further development of the Giesel.
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. STRICKLAND. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. I thank the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. 
Strickland] for his observations and for his leadership and agree that 
improved engines are of great importance to the success of defense 
modernization. And I promise that I will continue to work to ensure 
that appropriate level of funding is provided for such efforts in the 
future.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania [Mr. Fox].
  Mr. FOX of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman of the 
Committee on National Security, Mr. Spence, and also the gentleman from 
California, Mr. Dellums, for their leadership in bringing this 
important defense authorization bill to the floor.
  I also would like to say a few words on behalf of my amendments that 
I have included in the manager's en bloc amendments. My first amendment 
would call for the POW/MIA flag to be flown in all Departments of 
Veterans Affairs medical centers. This flag, as my colleagues know, 
serves as a reminder. We have yet to receive a full accounting of our 
all of our Nation's prisoner-of-war and missing-in-action soldiers. 
There are currently 2,123 Americans still unaccounted for from the 
Vietnam War. The flag also represents our commitment to obtaining that 
full accounting of the whereabouts of our missing soldiers.

                              {time}  2315

  I believe that we owe it not only to them but to our veterans who did 
return home safely, to reaffirm that commitment. The POW/MIA flag 
already flies above the VA Medical Center in Coatesville, PA. I believe 
that it has a positive impact on the veterans who are treated there. I 
am proud to fly the flag outside my own office here on Capitol Hill.
  The second amendment, Mr. Chairman, would extend veterans preference 
points to reservists who served on active duty during Operation Desert 
Storm. There are many fine men and women who were a large part of the 
success of the overall operation that did not receive veterans 
preference points because they were not in the theater of operation 
through no fault of their own. To exclude them from the benefits of 
service is an injustice, and this amendment will address that in a 
positive way. There is precedence, I would remind my colleagues, for 
this extension from the Vietnam era.
  In the 102d Congress, this measure was introduced by Representative 
Tim Penny, and we are proud to move forward on this legislation to make 
sure that it becomes accomplished.

[[Page H4211]]

  I want to thank the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Mica] and the 
gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Buyer] for their assistance with this 
particular amendment. I believe it is in the best interests of our 
veterans.
  I want to again thank the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence], 
the chairman, and the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] for all 
their work for our House and for this defense authorization bill which 
is definitely in the public interest and in the interest of defense in 
our country.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Texas [Mr. Brady], a new Member of this body.
  Mr. BRADY. Mr. Chairman, should America further weaken its national 
defense strategy by deploying our military to guard rain forests and 
endangered species in foreign countries as the State Department 
recently proposed? The answer is clearly no. At a time when our defense 
forces are being reduced, when we lack the resources to protect our 
service men and women from terrorist attacks abroad, as our military 
bases close while those remaining face shortages in everything from 
base housing to training ammunition, at a time when our armed forces 
are called upon to keep peace throughout the world and to help fight 
the war on international drug trafficking, we cannot afford to divert 
our precious military resources for frivolous environmental crusades in 
foreign countries.
  The environment is important, but the unique mission of America's 
armed forces, first and foremost, must always be military readiness 
dedicated to protect the freedom and security of our Nation. The 
amendment by the gentleman from California [Mr. Pombo] and myself 
included in the amendments en bloc preserves that priority. I thank the 
chairman and the ranking member for its inclusion and I urge its 
passage.
  Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding 
and for including my amendment as part of his en bloc amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, my amendment closes an unintended loophole in the Oil 
Pollution Act of 1990 big enough to sail an oil tanker through. After 
the Valdez oil spill, Congress passed comprehensive oil spill 
legislation requiring that single-hull tankers, based on their age and 
tonnage, be phased out of operation in U.S. waters. That law required 
the construction of new environmentally safe double-hulled tankers. 
Since enactment of the double-hull requirement, some ship owners and 
operators have searched for ways to get around this existing 
requirement.
  One method being used to extend the life of a single-hull tanker is 
to adjust the vessel's gross tonnage allowing it to fall under a lower 
size category and be able to operate past its scheduled phase-out date. 
For example, some vessel owners have had their vessels remeasured to 
exclude certain spaces originally included in the vessels existing 
measurement--such as water ballast tanks, certain machinery spaces, and 
spacing between frames of the hull. Once a vessel is measured by a 
classification society, that measurement is submitted to the Department 
of Transportation for a new tonnage certificate.
  My amendment requires that an existing tank vessel's gross tonnage is 
that listed on its tonnage certificate as of July 1, 1997, for purposes 
of the double-hull phase-out date. This amendment would uphold the 
integrity of the double-hull law, protect our environment, and ensure 
that those owners who have complied with the law by building doubled-
hulled tankers are not placed at a competitive disadvantage.
  I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
  Ms. McCARTHY. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of the amendment 
to the Defense Authorization bill which I am offering with Mr. 
Hastings, Mr. Crapo, Mr. Skaggs, and Mr. Hall, and which was included 
in the set of en bloc amendments from National Security Committee 
Chairman Spence. The Hastings amendment will reinstate the funds which 
were cut for the operation of the Department of Energy's Office for 
Worker and Community Transition. This amendment will restore much of 
the funding requested by the President, while requiring the Department 
of Defense to employ a private contractor to examine the impact of the 
program and to suggest changes which will make the program more 
efficient. The funding from the program will come from excess 
administrative funds which the Secretary will set aside for this use 
instead of being taken from military procurement.
  This essential program provides workers who have been displaced by 
military downsizing with the training that they will need to make the 
transition to the private sector. In Kansas City, Allied Signal has 
downsized early 3,000 positions in the span of the last few years and 
later this year will be required to lay off up to 700 additional 
workers. Those who will lose their jobs are more than just statistics, 
they are men and women with families who have dutifully served our 
Nation.
  The men and women who work at the Kansas City plant in my district 
ensure that the United States utilizes the most advanced technology on 
the planet. They are a highly skilled, award-winning, quality 
workforce. The quality assurance program consistently ranks the Kansas 
City plant at the top of the Department of Energy's operation. Years of 
training and investment have helped produce the quality and experience 
that exists there, and it would be wasteful to ignore the valuable 
contributions that this special workforce could make. In these ever-
changing economic times, we must recognize the opportunities to direct 
our human resources through a smooth transition to the most productive 
and appropriate use. Not only am I confident that their skills could be 
used elsewhere within the Department, but feel certain that, with the 
proper assistance, they will be a productive part of the private sector 
economy in my District, and to the Nation as well.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this important 
amendment. We must carefully prioritize our funding decisions and guard 
against sacrificing these individuals in our quest to achieve a budget 
target.
  Mr. CRAPO. Mr. Chairman, today, I rise in support of Worker and 
Community Transition Program language contained in the en bloc 
amendment. The amendment would change the language pertaining to the 
Worker and Community Transition program in the National Defense 
Authorization Act for fiscal year 1998. The amendment restores $44 
million to this program, keeping a commitment to help the workers and 
communities who sacrificed to produce our nuclear arsenal during the 
cold war.
  Mr. Chairman, the Worker and Community Transition Program, commonly 
called 3161, provides former Department of Energy nuclear weapons 
production workers preference for new Department of Energy cleanup 
jobs. It is important to recognize the contribution that these workers 
have made in defeating our enemies during the cold war and provide them 
with job preference protection during the transition of the Department 
of Energy mission from bomb-making to nuclear waste cleanup.
  Over the last 5 years, the Department of Energy has reduced its prime 
contractor work force by more than 40,000 employees, from about 150,000 
to less than 110,000. These reductions save taxpayers approximately 
$2.5 billion each year. While this is good, we must not forget the 
human impact that restructuring is having on real people.
  The Worker and Community Transition Program has assisted 
approximately 15,000 workers directly affected by changes in the 
nuclear weapons production mission. In addition, the program has been 
very helpful in assisting communities, including my home town of Idaho 
Falls, in reducing their economic dependence on Department of Energy 
work by moving toward a more diversified economic base.
  In its current form, the National Defense Authorization Act for 
fiscal year 1998 would reduce the Worker and Community Transition 
Program by nearly $50 million from the President's request. The bill 
would also terminate the program effective September 1999, and would 
also prohibit the use of worker and community transition funds for 
local economic impact assistance.
  It is upon this last provision that I want to focus the remainder of 
my remarks. Under the landmark nuclear waste agreement between the 
State of Idaho and the Department of Energy, $30 million dollars is to 
be spent for community transition purposes. These funds have in the 
past come from the worker and community transition program by way of 
payment from the Department of Energy to the State of Idaho. This money 
is currently being paid to the State of Idaho in annual installments of 
$6 million. The Department of Energy is contractually obligated to make 
these payments. Both the Governor of the State of Idaho and I expect 
the Department of Energy to continue making these payments--either 
through the 3161 funds or by other means. If the Department of Energy 
decides to continue making these payments through 3161, the language 
contained in H.R. 1119 must be changed to reflect the Worker and 
Community Transition language contained in this amendment.

  Mr. Chairman, since the Department of Energy has not clarified their 
intent as to which budget area they intend to make these payments 
through, I ask your support for this amendment which simply provides 
another avenue by which the Department of Energy can meet its 
contractual agreements.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support the workers and the 
communities who

[[Page H4212]]

helped the United States win the cold war by supporting this amendment.
  Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the en bloc amendment 
which includes my amendment relating to the Comanche helicopter 
program. This should have been included in the report accompanying the 
bill, but the language did not fit neatly within the parameters of one 
subcommittee since it involves procurement, R&D, and National Guard 
issues.
  By way of background, the Army's Comanche program has been 
restructured four times over the past 10 years purely for budgetary 
considerations. As a result of pushing the program off to the right, 
the development of the T-800/801 engine has outpaced that of the 
airframe. This production gap will give the Army a unique opportunity 
to initiate a number of risk reduction and cost avoidance initiatives. 
By placing the Comanche engine into Army Guard Huey's (UH-1's), the 
Army can validate logistics support and operational data of the engine. 
This effort will also sustain the T-800/801 industrial base until the 
Comanche comes on line, which is estimated to save $107 million. The 
second feature of this effort is that it provides the National Guard 
with the ability to procure a light utility helicopter [LUH] that is 
far superior to the current Huey's in range, payload, and performance.
  My amendment is very straight forward and involves no additional 
funding; it merely states support of the Army's efforts to minimize 
costs and technical risks of the very important Comanche program.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I have no further requests for time, and I 
yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I have no further requests for time, and I 
yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendments en bloc offered by 
the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence].
  The amendments en bloc were agreed to.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.
  The motion was agreed to.
  Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. 
Taylor of North Carolina) having assumed the chair, Mr. Young of 
Florida, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of 
the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration 
the bill (H.R. 1119) to authorize appropriations for fiscal years 1998 
and 1999 for military activities of the Department of Defense, to 
prescribe military personnel strengths for fiscal years 1998 and 1999, 
and for other purposes, had come to no resolution thereon.

                          ____________________