[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 89 (Monday, June 23, 1997)]
[House]
[Pages H4150-H4155]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




        NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 169 and rule 
XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House 
on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill, 
H.R. 1119.

                              {time}  1319


                     In the Committee of the Whole

  Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole 
House

[[Page H4151]]

on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill 
(H.R. 1119) to authorize appropriations for fiscal years 1998 and 1999 
for military activities of the Department of Defense, to prescribe 
military personnel strengths for fiscal years 1998 and 1999, and for 
other purposes, with Mr. Young of Florida in the chair.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The CHAIRMAN. When the Committee of the Whole rose on Friday, June 
20, 1997, amendment No. 43, printed in section 8(e) of House Resolution 
169, offered by the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Traficant] had been 
disposed of.
  Pursuant to section 5 of House Resolution 169, it is now in order to 
consider amendment No. 15, printed in part 2 of House Report 105-137, 
as modified by section 8(b) of House Resolution 169.


         Amendment No. 15 Offered by Mr. Frank of Massachusetts

  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 15 offered by Mr. Frank of Massachusetts:
       At the end of title XII (page 379, after line 19), insert 
     the following new section:

     SEC. 1205. LIMITATION ON PAYMENTS FOR COST OF NATO EXPANSION.

       (a) The amount spent by the United States as its share of 
     the total cost to North Atlantic Treaty Organization member 
     nations of the admission of new member nations to the North 
     American Treaty Organization may not exceed 10 percent of the 
     cost of expansion or a total of $2,000,000,000, whichever is 
     less, for fiscal years 1998 through 2010.
       (b) If at any time during the period specified in 
     subsection (a), the United States' share of the total cost of 
     expanding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization exceeds 10 
     percent, no further United States funds may be expended for 
     the costs of such expansion until that percentage is reduced 
     to below 10 percent.

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Massachusetts 
[Mr. Frank] and a Member opposed, each will control 10 minutes. The 
gentleman from Arizona [Mr. Stump] will be recognized in opposition.
  The Chair recognizes gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Frank].
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 2 minutes 
and 30 seconds.
  Mr. Chairman, I offer this on behalf of my colleague, the gentleman 
from Connecticut [Mr. Shays] and the gentleman from California [Mr. 
Condit]. We are about to vote a budget deal, some of us will vote no 
but it will pass. It will severely constrain spending, including 
defense spending. We can differ over how much defense spending ought to 
be, but we all acknowledge that we are about to adopt in this budget 
resolution a binding constraint that will mean far less for the 
national security part of this budget than many Members think. Given 
that, it is essential that we not spend money unwisely. One way to 
spend unwisely is to spend money which instead should be spent by our 
wealthy allies in Western Europe. I believe America has been 
insufficiently active in the international front in many ways. But one 
area where we have erred on the other side is in Western Europe, where 
we have allowed Germany and France and Norway and Belgium and Denmark 
and many other now quite prosperous nations to do less than they 
should. NATO expansion is a test of this. NATO expansion will cost 
money. I am not talking now about the money that nations will have to 
spend on their own military equipment. We are talking about what NATO 
itself will have to spend on telecommunications and in other ways.
  We believe, those of us who have offered this amendment, the 
gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. Shays], the gentleman from California 
[Mr. Condit] and myself, that it is unfair for the American taxpayers 
to continue to pay disproportionately in Western Europe, particularly 
if had we have adopted a budget agreement which leaves many Members 
convinced that defense itself will have too little. I do not agree with 
that. I would like to be able to free up money for other purposes, but 
we certainly do not want our defense dollars spent unnecessarily. The 
administration has said, the Clinton administration, that the cost to 
the United States of NATO expansion over the next 12 years will be a 
total of $2 billion. I take them at their word.
  This amendment takes what the administration has told us NATO 
expansion will cost, $2 billion, and makes that a cap. It does say and 
the administration is proposing that we spend about 7 or 8 percent. I 
go them one better. The amendment says that, if costs are considerably 
less than we expect, that could happen, although it rarely does, we 
would cap our contribution at 10 percent. So I have an amendment here, 
along with the gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. Shays] and the gentleman 
from California [Mr. Condit], which conserves American defense spending 
for purposes that we may feel necessary by taking the President at his 
word and saying we will spend a maximum of $2 billion on NATO 
expansion, or 10 percent, the higher percentage that he says, if that 
should be less than $2 billion.
  Finally, for those who say what if there is an unforeseen emergency, 
that is why we have a Congress, people can come back to us. This does 
not say you can never have another penny, it says you cannot have a 
blank check.
  Mr. STUMP. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the 
gentlewoman from Missouri [Ms. Danner].
  Ms. DANNER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Frank amendment.
  As Europe melds together economically through the European Union, I 
believe they need to meld together militarily and accept more 
responsibility for their own defense. The United States cannot afford 
to lead the effort both financially and militarily on a continent that 
has the resources, and I believe the responsibility, to accept this 
burden themselves.
  According to a recent article in the Wall Street Journal, the 
Congressional Budget Office estimates that admitting the three former 
Warsaw Pact nations could ultimately cost the United States of America 
as much as $150 billion, I repeat that, $150 billion over 10 years, at 
a time when the recently passed budget resolution calls for cuts in 
Medicare spending of $115 billion, Medicaid cuts of $13.5 billion, and 
cuts in the student loan program of $1.8 billion.
  When, at the same time, Social Security is said to be in jeopardy, 
how can we justify providing billions of U.S. dollars to protect 
foreign nations from a potential, not actual, a potential threat?
  We must not forget the original purpose of NATO, which was to provide 
for the collective security in the European theater in a time of 
Communist threat and cold war tensions. To force the U.S. taxpayer to 
foot the bill for a new NATO is illogical and, in addition, in the 
words of Henry Kissinger, a dilution of the traditional NATO purposes.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums], extremely knowledgeable and 
thoughtful ranking minority member of this committee.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I thank my colleague for his generosity.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment offered by my 
distinguished colleague, the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Frank]. 
I think it is a meritorious amendment and his remarks are very poignant 
and very much to the point. I would like to simply make a few brief 
remarks in support of the amendment.
  First, Mr. Chairman, I am sure that you are aware the United States 
provides disproportionate support for NATO in many capacities, making 
available naval forces as well as communications, transportation and 
logistics capabilities, and strategic nuclear forces that we are all 
aware of. As a result, it pays a substantially larger portion of its 
GDP on its military account than our European allies. Several of our 
European allies are wealthy nations and can contribute more to the 
burdens of the alliance than they currently do.
  Second, new members of NATO should be expected to contribute along 
the terms of existing Members. And if they are going to be members, it 
seems to me across the board of responsibilities they ought to be able 
to contribute. And it seems to me that that is important in terms of 
their financial capability as well as military, political and foreign 
policy.

[[Page H4152]]

  Third, the amounts contained in the amendment reflect the 
administration's current estimates of the probable U.S. share. The 
amendment would establish that in law for a period through the year 
2010, after which a review can be made of the continuing 
appropriateness of that level of commitment/restraint.
  Finally, Mr. Chairman, the legislative initiatives have in the past 
provided important leverage to the U.S. Government in negotiations with 
NATO partners on burdensharing arrangements, and on numerous occasions 
we in this body have voted to give our Government that kind of 
leverage. The gentleman from Massachusetts simply provides us with one 
additional opportunity to do it. I rise in enthusiastic support.
  Mr. STUMP. Mr. Chairman, I include a statement by the chairman of the 
committee for the Record.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I too am concerned about the costs of NATO 
expansion and have serious doubts about the estimates advanced by the 
Clinton administration. While I have some doubts about the practicality 
of this amendment as written, I look forward to working with all 
Members who have concerns about the numerous implications of NATO 
expansion.
  As my colleagues may be aware, Mr. Dellums and I wrote a letter to 
the President, as yet unanswered, and published a jointly authored 
editorial highlighting these concerns.
  Both the letter and editorial take cost as an important factor in 
NATO expansion, but secondary to questions of national security and 
military strategy. I believe as many others do that NATO is perhaps the 
most successful alliance in history, and I am concerned that the 
administration's focus on the process of NATO expansion diverts 
attention from understanding the purpose of an expanded alliance.
  Personally, I am a strong supporter of NATO, and inclined to support 
its expansion, for moral, military, and strategic reasons. However, too 
many fundamental questions remain unanswered about the implications for 
United States national security strategy, force structure, defense 
budgets and relations with Russia, and other states.
  For example: In addition to military criteria such as equipment 
interoperability, the administration has stressed other factors such as 
``adherence to market democracy'' as necessary for admission to NATO. 
While opening European markets may be a worthy U.S. policy objective, 
it is hardly a traditional security consideration and could pose 
obstacles to admission that actually prove unsettling to European 
stability.
  There are also questions of treaty commitments. The heart of NATO's 
charter is article V, which was interpreted through the cold war to 
mandate the use of armed force to defend NATO members. In fact, the 
actual language of article V is ambiguous, and thus, perhaps requires 
the United States and our current and future alliance partners to come 
to a mutual understanding of what article V means in this changed 
security environment.
  There are calculations of military force structure and capabilities, 
as well. Considering reductions in U.S. defense budgets and military 
force structure on the one hand and the expansion of security 
commitments that would flow from enlarging NATO on the other, how 
prudent is it for the United States to commit to these expanded 
security guarantees?
  I could go on at length about the serious political, strategic, and 
military issues raised by the prospect of NATO expansion. Certainly, 
with U.S. defense budgets in their 13th consecutive year of decline, 
and with no end to defense cuts in sight, the cost of NATO expansion is 
a significant concern, but just one of many.
  Mr. STUMP. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of 
my time.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I too am concerned about the costs of NATO 
expansion and have serious doubts about the estimates advanced by the 
Clinton administration. While I have some doubts about the practicality 
of this amendment as written, I look forward to working with all 
Members who have concerns about the numerous implications of NATO 
expansion.
  As my colleagues may be aware, Mr. Dellums and I share a number of 
concerns over the process and purpose of NATO expansion. Recently, we 
wrote a joint letter to the President, as yet unanswered, and published 
a jointly authored editorial highlighting these concerns. I ask that 
the letter and copy of the editorial be submitted for the record and 
printed immediately following my remarks in the Congressional Record.
  Both the letter and editorial take cost as an important factor in 
NATO expansion, but secondary to questions of national security and 
military strategy. I believe as many others do that NATO is perhaps the 
most successful alliance in history, and I am concerned that the 
administration's focus on the process of NATO expansion diverts 
attention from understanding the purpose of an expanded alliance.
  Personally, I am a strong supporter of NATO, and inclined to support 
its expansion, for moral, military, and strategic reasons. However, too 
many fundamental questions remain unanswered about the implications for 
United States national security strategy, force structure, defense 
budgets, and relations with Russia and other states. For example:
  In addition to military criteria such as equipment interoperability, 
the administration has stressed other factors such as ``adherence to 
market democracy'' as necessary for admission to NATO. While opening 
European markets may be a worthy U.S. policy objective, it is hardly a 
traditional security consideration and could pose obstacles to 
admission that actually prove unsettling to European stability.
  There are also questions of treaty commitments. The heart of NATO's 
charter is article V, which was interpreted through the cold war to 
mandate the use of armed force to defend NATO members. In fact, the 
actual language of article V is ambiguous, and thus, perhaps requires 
the United States and our current and future alliance partners to come 
to a mutual understanding of what article V means in this changed 
security environment.
  There are calculations of military force structure and capabilities, 
as well. Considering reductions in U.S. defense budgets and military 
force structure on the one hand and the expansion of security 
commitments that would flow from enlarging NATO on the other, how 
prudent is it for the United States to commit to these expanded 
security guarantees?
  I could go on at length about the serious political, strategic, and 
military issues raised by the prospect of NATO expansion. Certainly, 
with U.S. defense budgets in their 13th consecutive year of decline, 
and with no end to defense cuts in sight, the cost of NATO expansion is 
a significant concern, but just one of many.


                               Committee on National Security,

                                   Washington, DC, April 25, 1997.
     The Honorable William J. Clinton,
     President, The White House,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. President: Recent statements by Administration 
     officials indicate that the United States will propose the 
     expansion of NATO to include several central European states 
     by 1999 at the upcoming NATO Ministerial meeting in July 
     1997.
       We are strong supporters of NATO and are inclined to 
     support its expansion. We think there is a strong moral case 
     to be made for expanding the alliance and there are 
     compelling geopolitical reasons in favor of alliance 
     enlargement as well. Americans have long recognized the 
     importance of a peaceful Europe to the United States, a 
     condition that serves the aforementioned U.S. national 
     interests.
       However, we believe that the purpose of the alliance is as 
     important as the process of expansion. We are concerned that 
     thus far, the Administration has failed to explain in much 
     detail what a fully expanded NATO entails in terms of its 
     function, structure and membership. There remain a number of 
     important unanswered questions about the implications of such 
     a course on U.S. national security strategy, force structure, 
     defense budgets, and relations with Russia and other states. 
     Understanding the answers to these questions is central to 
     understanding the far reaching consequences of NATO 
     expansion.
       As the House National Security Committee will increasingly 
     focus on this important matter in the months ahead, we would 
     appreciate written answers, classified and unclassified as 
     required, to the following questions:


                                strategy

       1. Will an expanded NATO continue to play its traditional 
     role in protecting the security interests of the United 
     States and our allies? What risks to those interests exist 
     because of expansion plans? How do the benefits of NATO 
     expansion outweigh the risks? How do you envision a fully-
     expanded NATO? Describe its function, structure, and 
     membership?
       2. Identify the various states seeking NATO membership and 
     provide your perspective on their reasons for seeking 
     membership. Does fear of a resurgent Russia play a part? What 
     do you believe they hope to gain by joining NATO? With 
     reference to each prospective member, please explain whether 
     their candidacy is supported by the current members of the 
     alliance. If there are differences of opinion among current 
     NATO members regarding the candidacies of prospective 
     members, please identify those areas where differences exist, 
     and which member countries have concerns.
       3. What military, geostrategic, or other benefits might new 
     NATO members bring to the alliance? What might be the 
     liabilities associated with their membership?
       4. The current strategy for NATO expansion is a high-
     profile, protracted process, requiring many years to 
     implement. How long will it take to complete this process, 
     and what indices will show that it is completed? How many 
     intermediate stages of expansion do you envision, and which 
     states are likely to become NATO members at these stages?

[[Page H4153]]

     Were alternative strategies that would speed the process 
     rejected? If the expansion process were interrupted prior to 
     completion, would NATO remain strategically viable at each 
     stage of expansion? What measures factor in that judgment?
       5. The Administration's February 1997 Report to the 
     Congress On the Enlargement of NATO describes the process of 
     NATO enlargement as part of a broader strategy to adapt the 
     alliance to the post-Cold War security environment, which 
     includes a willingness to conduct out-of-area peacekeeping-
     type operations. To what degree are prospective NATO members 
     willing and able to participate in peacekeeping operations, 
     including those that are ``out of area''? Does the United 
     States intend to seek significant participation in such 
     operations by newly-admitted NATO member states? Is such 
     participation a viable substitute for American involvement in 
     such peace-keeping like operations?
       6. The Administration's report to Congress also concludes 
     that failing to enlarge NATO would lead to feelings of 
     ``isolation and vulnerability'' among prospective members, 
     would be ``destabilizing,'' and ``would encourage nationalist 
     and disruptive forces throughout Europe.'' On what evidence 
     are these conclusions based? Please identify the specific 
     nationalistic and disruptive forces of concern.


                          Membership Criteria

       1. What criteria have been established to determine which 
     states are ready to be integrated into the formal NATO 
     security structure? What are the relative weights as between 
     political, economic and military reform in making a judgment 
     on eligibility for membership? Will current members be 
     expected to meet these criteria for continued membership?
       2. To what degree is economic integration with the European 
     Community a prerequisite to NATO membership? Why is this, or 
     why is this not, important?
       3. Which states are the most likely candidates for NATO 
     membership and why? Are former Soviet republics, like Ukraine 
     and the Baltic states, or even Russia itself, possible 
     candidates for NATO admission? If we seek to avoid a new 
     European division, can we afford to proceed with enlargement 
     without a fully developed view as to our ultimate goal for 
     enlargement?
       4. There have been reports that some prospective NATO 
     member states have sold arms to so-called rogue regimes like 
     Iran. How does this affect their prospects for membership? Is 
     the halting of such sales or arms deliveries a prerequisite 
     for alliance membership? Does a discussion of these issues 
     create a climate to help reduce proliferation of technology 
     capable of aiding programs for weapons of mass destruction or 
     advanced conventional weapons by current members?


                           treaty commitments

       1. What exactly will U.S. treaty obligations be to new NATO 
     members? What types of assurances, if any, have been 
     discussed with prospective members regarding the U.S. 
     commitment to their security?
       2. Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty states that, in 
     response to an armed attack, a NATO member ``will assist the 
     Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith individually 
     and in concert with the other Parties, such actions as it 
     deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore 
     and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.'' What 
     is the Administration's interpretation of Article V? Does it 
     mandate the use of U.S. armed force to defend other NATO 
     members? What representations have been made by the 
     Administration to prospective members regarding the meaning 
     of Article V? Would the interpretation of Article V differ 
     for new NATO members?


                Force Structure and Military Capability

       1. Will the United States and its NATO allies have the 
     military wherewithal to honor the security guarantees implied 
     by Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty for new NATO 
     members located in central and eastern Europe?
       2. The Administration's Report to the Congress On the 
     Enlargement of NATO declares that the United States will 
     ``extend solemn security guarantees to additional nations,'' 
     but that ``there will be no need for additional U.S. 
     forces.'' Considering on-going cuts in the defense budget and 
     U.S. military force structure on the one hand and the 
     expansion of security commitments that would flow from 
     expanding NATO on the other, can the U.S. prudently commit to 
     these expanded security guarantees? How? And at what cost to 
     the U.S. national military strategy?
       3. Have the United States and NATO developed contingency 
     plans for the defense of new NATO members under various 
     scenarios, including a resurgent Russia? What forces and 
     operational capabilities would be needed to satisfy the most 
     demanding of these scenarios, including nuclear scenarios?
       4. Under an expanded NATO, will the U.S. ``nuclear 
     umbrella'' extend to new members in central and eastern 
     Europe? Since the United States has reportedly pledged not to 
     deploy tactical nuclear weapons on the territories of these 
     new NATO members, does this mean that any nuclear guarantees 
     extended to these states must be satisfied by U.S. strategic 
     nuclear weapons? Will the nuclear forces of other NATO states 
     provide similar extended deterrence to new members? Has there 
     been any discussion regarding withdrawal of tactical nuclear 
     weapons from the theater as an element to calm possible 
     Russian concerns?
       5. It has been reported that the defense of new NATO member 
     states will be based on the principle of rapidly deploying 
     other NATO forces to those countries in the event of 
     conflict, rather than pre-deploying substantial force 
     enhancements in-country. It has further been reported that 
     this strategy was chosen as a result of Russian concerns over 
     NATO encroachment on their borders and Congressional concerns 
     over the cost to the United States of expansion. Are these 
     reports accurate? More generally, please explain the 
     rationale for preferring rapid deployment capabilities to 
     pre-positioning.


                                funding

       1. What are the underlying assumptions that resulted in the 
     Administration's cost estimate for NATO expansion and how 
     credible do you believe those assumptions are for the long 
     term? In particular, please identify the number of countries, 
     the types of activities, and the assumed level of threat on 
     which the estimates are based. Also, please supply a similar 
     analysis based upon your projections for a fully expanded 
     NATO, and for any intermediate steps envisioned for the 
     expansion process.
       2. Will other NATO countries share in the costs of an 
     expanded NATO and how will costs be apportioned among them?
       3. What arrangements are in place or being negotiated to 
     ensure that the new financial commitments from NATO members 
     are kept? Who will pay these costs in the event new members 
     or current members are unable to keep their commitments to do 
     so?
       4. How and why does the Administration's cost estimate for 
     NATO expansion significantly differ from the estimates 
     prepared by the Rand Corporation and the Congressional Budget 
     Office?
       5. What will be the source of the U.S. funding for NATO 
     expansion? What costs will be apportioned to the 050 budget 
     function as opposed to the 150 budget function?


                         relations with russia

       1. How do you anticipate Russia will react to an expanded 
     NATO? How does the Administration weigh the likelihood that 
     Russia will renege on its commitments to abide by the CFE, 
     INF, ABM, and START treaties, forward deploy nuclear weapons, 
     invade the Baltic states, or accelerate the formation of 
     alliances of its own, perhaps with China?
       2. Will NATO expansion aggravate Russian threat perceptions 
     and increase the possibility of nuclear miscalculation? What 
     assurances have been given by the Administration to Russia in 
     order to ameliorate Russia's concerns over expansion? Has the 
     United States pledged not to deploy nuclear weapons on the 
     territory of new NATO members? What guarantees have the 
     Russians sought regarding NATO expansion and which have been 
     agreed to by the Administration? Will the Russians have a 
     veto over any NATO decision? What procedures will be put in 
     place to give Russia a voice in NATO deliberations and the 
     alliance decision-making process, including decisions on 
     peacekeeping? What confidence building measures, if any, will 
     be implemented to lessen Russian concerns and insecurities?
       3. Russian statements indicate that Russia may feel 
     isolated and vulnerable if NATO expands, and may revert to a 
     more nationalistic security posture. Does the Administration 
     share this view? If so, does the Administration judge the 
     security risks of an insecure, more nationalistic Russia to 
     be less than those of an insecure eastern Europe if NATO 
     fails to expand?
       4. Has the United States promised Russia that the Baltic 
     countries would not be allowed into NATO for the foreseeable 
     future? Will there be any U.S. security commitment to the 
     Baltic states? If so, what form will it take? If not, why 
     not?
       5. There have been reports that the United States will seek 
     to alleviate Russian concerns over NATO expansion by agreeing 
     to significant reductions in the ceilings on NATO 
     conventional arms imposed by the Conventional Forces in 
     Europe (CFE) Treaty or by freezing the level of NATO military 
     forces deployed near Russia. Are these reports accurate? What 
     constraints will be imposed on the military force levels of 
     new NATO members? Does the Administration plan to seek 
     comparable constraints on forces deployed in Ukraine, 
     Belarus, and the Russian region of Kaliningrad?
       6. How does the Administration see Russia's relations with 
     an expanded NATO? How does the Administration plan to 
     integrate Russia into a unified European security structure 
     and what is the timeline for this integration? Will the 
     Partnership for Peace program remain the primary vehicle for 
     accomplishing this objective? Can the Administration envision 
     Russian NATO membership in the future, assuming all 
     conditions for membership are met? If so, would more explicit 
     recognition of this possibility ease Russian concerns with 
     current plans for enlarging NATO?
       7. What is the nature of the proposed NATO-Russia Charter? 
     The Joint Statement signed by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin 
     at Helsinki notes there should be ``consultation, 
     coordination and, to the maximum extent possible where 
     appropriate, joint decision-making and action on security 
     issues of common concern.'' Can the Russians insist on 
     participating in NATO discussions on any issue of concern? 
     Does this give Russia a veto power over NATO decisions? At a 
     minimum, would the NATO-Russian Charter complicate the NATO 
     decision-making process in ways detrimental to the alliance, 
     especially

[[Page H4154]]

     if there existed a lack of common purpose between NATO and 
     Russia?
       8. Doesn't a separate NATO-Russia forum undermine the 
     effectiveness of the existing NATO Council? Because Russia 
     will apparently be able to participate in NATO decisions 
     before new members are admitted, is the Administration 
     concerned whether the NATO-Russian forum might unfairly 
     penalize prospective members by giving greater voice to 
     Russian concerns earlier in the process?


                   relations with other nato members

       1. What reservations have been expressed, if any, by the 
     current NATO states regarding the expansion of the alliance? 
     Are there differences of opinion regarding which states 
     should be included in an expanded NATO and/or the timeframe 
     for their inclusion? If so, please identify the specific 
     positions of the individual member countries.
       2. What unresolved tensions or rivalries might new NATO 
     members bring into the alliance that could cause fractures 
     within NATO, as exist now between Greece and Turkey? Might 
     these tensions or rivalries lead to potential American 
     military involvement in intra-alliance hostilities? Does the 
     Administration prefer for purposes of European stability to 
     seek to resolve such conflicts within the security 
     architecture of the NATO alliance? If so, would similar 
     tensions (e.g., Baltic-Russian problems) be better resolved 
     in this context as well?
       We appreciate your prompt attention to these important 
     questions and ask that answers be provided not later than May 
     30, 1997.
           Sincerely,
     Floyd D. Spence,
                                                         Chairman.
     Ron Dellums,
     Ranking Minority Member.
                                  ____


               [From the Washington Times, May 29, 1997]

                     Is A Bigger NATO Also Better?

               (By Floyd D. Spence and Ronald V. Dellums)

       In just a few months, the Clinton administration is set to 
     commit the United States to the expansion of NATO, and 
     consequently expand America's role in guaranteeing stability 
     and security in Europe.
       We are strong supporters of NATO and are inclined to 
     support its expansion. We think there is a strong moral case 
     to be made for expansion and find compelling geopolitical 
     reasons in favor of alliance enlargement as well. From the 
     nation's founding, Americans have long recognized the 
     importance to this country of a peaceful Europe. Since its 
     founding, the NATO alliance has been the primary vehicle for 
     protecting our own national interests on the continent.
       However, we believe that NATO's fundamental purpose, even 
     in the post-Cold War world, is more important than the 
     process of expansion. We are concerned that the discussion to 
     date of expansion has failed to illuminate the purpose, 
     function, structure and membership of an expanded NATO. To 
     us, it makes little sense to embark upon such an ambitious 
     endeavor without first having a better understanding of where 
     we want to go and the obstacles likely to be encountered.
       We are troubled by the number of important questions that 
     have not been publicly addressed concerning the implications 
     of expansion on U.S. national security strategy, military 
     force structure, defense budgets, and relations with Russia 
     and other states. The administration and the Congress owe it 
     to all Americans to explain as fully as possible the far-
     reaching consequences of NATO expansion and to set forth a 
     vision of a fully expanded Atlantic alliance.
       We believe that at least seven basic sets of questions must 
     be addressed more thoroughly. The first, and most basic, 
     concerns the role that the alliance will play in U.S. 
     national security strategy. Will an expanded NATO continue in 
     its traditional role as a defensive military alliance? The 
     administration, in its recent report to Congress on the costs 
     of NATO expansion, speaks of ``broader adaption of NATO'' for 
     the purpose of ``evolution of a peaceful, undivided and 
     democratic Europe.'' What, exactly, does that mean, 
     especially if expansion is accomplished one step at a time?
       A second set of questions revolve around the criteria for 
     membership in the alliance. For example, in addition to 
     military criteria such as equipment interoperability, the 
     administration has stressed other factors such as ``adherence 
     to market democracy'' as necessary for admission to NATO. 
     While open European markets may be a worthy U.S. policy 
     objective, it is hardly a traditional security consideration 
     and could pose obstacles to admission that actually prove 
     unsettling to European stability.
       Third, there are questions of treaty commitments. The heart 
     of NATO's charter is Article V, which was interpreted through 
     the Cold War to mandate the use of armed force to defend NATO 
     members. In fact, the actual language of Article V is 
     ambiguous, and thus, perhaps requires the United States and 
     our current and future alliance partners to come to a mutual 
     understanding of what Article V means in this changed 
     security environment.
       A fourth set of questions involves calculations of military 
     force structure and capabilities, and applies to the United 
     States as well as to any alliance partner, current or 
     prospective.
       Considering reductions in U.S. defense budgets and military 
     force structure on the one hand and the expansion of security 
     commitments that would flow from enlarging NATO on the other, 
     how prudent is it for the U.S. to commit to these expanded 
     security guarantees? Considering the similar reductions that 
     have occurred in the military budgets and forces of our NATO 
     partners, how do they intend to support expanded security 
     commitments? And under an expanded NATO, will the U.S. 
     ``nuclear umbrella'' extend to new members in central and 
     eastern Europe? Since the U.S. has reportedly pledged not to 
     deploy tactical nuclear weapons on the territories of these 
     new NATO members, would this mean that any nuclear guarantees 
     extended to these states must be satisfied by U.S. strategic 
     nuclear weapons?
       Funding questions raise a fifth category of uncertainties. 
     The administration's recent report on the costs of NATO 
     expansion was based upon very optimistic political 
     assumptions about the likelihood of conflict in Europe, and 
     only calculated the costs of expansion based upon the 
     admission to the alliance of three nations, probably Poland, 
     Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Even if the cost estimates 
     are accurate, a more fully expanded NATO will surely come at 
     a much higher price tag. However, cost studies done by the 
     Congressional Budget Office and Rand Corporation have used 
     more conservative assumptions and projected much higher costs 
     than has the administration.
       Sixth, how will Russia react to an expanded NATO? The 
     process of expansion promises to be a protracted one, quite 
     possibly extending over decades. If the current Russian 
     attitude toward expansion persists, NATO expansion will 
     become a permanent source of tension in already complex 
     U.S.-Russia relations. The projected NATO-Russia charter 
     is unlikely to permanently solve this problem.
       Finally, there is the matter of relations within the NATO 
     alliance itself. To date, the process of expansion has been 
     driven almost exclusively by the United States. We need to 
     know, for example, if our current allies have differences of 
     opinion regarding which states should be included in an 
     expanded NATO or the timeframe for their inclusion. What 
     unresolved tensions or rivalries might new members bring into 
     NATO that could cause fractures within the alliance, as exist 
     now between Greece and Turkey? Will these tensions or 
     rivalries lead to potential American military involvement, 
     crisis management, or even intra-alliance hostilities, or 
     will they be stabilized in the context of alliance 
     management?
       These questions raise profound issues of U.S. national 
     security and defense policy, provide insight into the grave 
     commitment that the expansion of NATO entails, and underscore 
     the need for a more thorough airing of the issue and a frank 
     assessment of the attendant risks. The Atlantic Alliance 
     remains the cornerstone of U.S. policy toward Europe, and has 
     been responsible for one of the most peaceful periods in 
     European history. On many matters of national security policy 
     we hold widely divergent political views, but we have a 
     common recognition of the continuing value and future 
     potential of NATO. It should be possible to reach a common 
     understanding of the purpose of the alliance in a vastly 
     changed Europe, and the best paths to achieve that purpose 
     without needlessly redividing Europe. But the time to come to 
     grips with the serious implications of an expanded NATO is 
     now, not after the process of expansion is underway.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Frank].
  The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the ayes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote, and pending that, 
I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 169, further proceedings 
on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. 
Frank] will be postponed.
  The point of no quorum is considered withdrawn.

                              {time}  1330

  Mr. STUMP. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.
  The motion was agreed to.
  Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore [Mr. 
Hansen] having assumed the Chair, Mr. Young of Florida, Chairman of the 
Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that 
that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 1119) to 
authorize appropriations for fiscal years 1998 and 1999 for military 
activities of the Department of Defense, to prescribe military 
personnel strengths for fiscal years 1998 and 1999, and for other 
purposes, had come to no resolution thereon.

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