[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 89 (Monday, June 23, 1997)]
[House]
[Pages H4150-H4155]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 169 and rule
XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House
on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill,
H.R. 1119.
{time} 1319
In the Committee of the Whole
Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole
House
[[Page H4151]]
on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill
(H.R. 1119) to authorize appropriations for fiscal years 1998 and 1999
for military activities of the Department of Defense, to prescribe
military personnel strengths for fiscal years 1998 and 1999, and for
other purposes, with Mr. Young of Florida in the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The CHAIRMAN. When the Committee of the Whole rose on Friday, June
20, 1997, amendment No. 43, printed in section 8(e) of House Resolution
169, offered by the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Traficant] had been
disposed of.
Pursuant to section 5 of House Resolution 169, it is now in order to
consider amendment No. 15, printed in part 2 of House Report 105-137,
as modified by section 8(b) of House Resolution 169.
Amendment No. 15 Offered by Mr. Frank of Massachusetts
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 15 offered by Mr. Frank of Massachusetts:
At the end of title XII (page 379, after line 19), insert
the following new section:
SEC. 1205. LIMITATION ON PAYMENTS FOR COST OF NATO EXPANSION.
(a) The amount spent by the United States as its share of
the total cost to North Atlantic Treaty Organization member
nations of the admission of new member nations to the North
American Treaty Organization may not exceed 10 percent of the
cost of expansion or a total of $2,000,000,000, whichever is
less, for fiscal years 1998 through 2010.
(b) If at any time during the period specified in
subsection (a), the United States' share of the total cost of
expanding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization exceeds 10
percent, no further United States funds may be expended for
the costs of such expansion until that percentage is reduced
to below 10 percent.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Massachusetts
[Mr. Frank] and a Member opposed, each will control 10 minutes. The
gentleman from Arizona [Mr. Stump] will be recognized in opposition.
The Chair recognizes gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Frank].
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 2 minutes
and 30 seconds.
Mr. Chairman, I offer this on behalf of my colleague, the gentleman
from Connecticut [Mr. Shays] and the gentleman from California [Mr.
Condit]. We are about to vote a budget deal, some of us will vote no
but it will pass. It will severely constrain spending, including
defense spending. We can differ over how much defense spending ought to
be, but we all acknowledge that we are about to adopt in this budget
resolution a binding constraint that will mean far less for the
national security part of this budget than many Members think. Given
that, it is essential that we not spend money unwisely. One way to
spend unwisely is to spend money which instead should be spent by our
wealthy allies in Western Europe. I believe America has been
insufficiently active in the international front in many ways. But one
area where we have erred on the other side is in Western Europe, where
we have allowed Germany and France and Norway and Belgium and Denmark
and many other now quite prosperous nations to do less than they
should. NATO expansion is a test of this. NATO expansion will cost
money. I am not talking now about the money that nations will have to
spend on their own military equipment. We are talking about what NATO
itself will have to spend on telecommunications and in other ways.
We believe, those of us who have offered this amendment, the
gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. Shays], the gentleman from California
[Mr. Condit] and myself, that it is unfair for the American taxpayers
to continue to pay disproportionately in Western Europe, particularly
if had we have adopted a budget agreement which leaves many Members
convinced that defense itself will have too little. I do not agree with
that. I would like to be able to free up money for other purposes, but
we certainly do not want our defense dollars spent unnecessarily. The
administration has said, the Clinton administration, that the cost to
the United States of NATO expansion over the next 12 years will be a
total of $2 billion. I take them at their word.
This amendment takes what the administration has told us NATO
expansion will cost, $2 billion, and makes that a cap. It does say and
the administration is proposing that we spend about 7 or 8 percent. I
go them one better. The amendment says that, if costs are considerably
less than we expect, that could happen, although it rarely does, we
would cap our contribution at 10 percent. So I have an amendment here,
along with the gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. Shays] and the gentleman
from California [Mr. Condit], which conserves American defense spending
for purposes that we may feel necessary by taking the President at his
word and saying we will spend a maximum of $2 billion on NATO
expansion, or 10 percent, the higher percentage that he says, if that
should be less than $2 billion.
Finally, for those who say what if there is an unforeseen emergency,
that is why we have a Congress, people can come back to us. This does
not say you can never have another penny, it says you cannot have a
blank check.
Mr. STUMP. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the
gentlewoman from Missouri [Ms. Danner].
Ms. DANNER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Frank amendment.
As Europe melds together economically through the European Union, I
believe they need to meld together militarily and accept more
responsibility for their own defense. The United States cannot afford
to lead the effort both financially and militarily on a continent that
has the resources, and I believe the responsibility, to accept this
burden themselves.
According to a recent article in the Wall Street Journal, the
Congressional Budget Office estimates that admitting the three former
Warsaw Pact nations could ultimately cost the United States of America
as much as $150 billion, I repeat that, $150 billion over 10 years, at
a time when the recently passed budget resolution calls for cuts in
Medicare spending of $115 billion, Medicaid cuts of $13.5 billion, and
cuts in the student loan program of $1.8 billion.
When, at the same time, Social Security is said to be in jeopardy,
how can we justify providing billions of U.S. dollars to protect
foreign nations from a potential, not actual, a potential threat?
We must not forget the original purpose of NATO, which was to provide
for the collective security in the European theater in a time of
Communist threat and cold war tensions. To force the U.S. taxpayer to
foot the bill for a new NATO is illogical and, in addition, in the
words of Henry Kissinger, a dilution of the traditional NATO purposes.
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums], extremely knowledgeable and
thoughtful ranking minority member of this committee.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I thank my colleague for his generosity.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment offered by my
distinguished colleague, the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Frank].
I think it is a meritorious amendment and his remarks are very poignant
and very much to the point. I would like to simply make a few brief
remarks in support of the amendment.
First, Mr. Chairman, I am sure that you are aware the United States
provides disproportionate support for NATO in many capacities, making
available naval forces as well as communications, transportation and
logistics capabilities, and strategic nuclear forces that we are all
aware of. As a result, it pays a substantially larger portion of its
GDP on its military account than our European allies. Several of our
European allies are wealthy nations and can contribute more to the
burdens of the alliance than they currently do.
Second, new members of NATO should be expected to contribute along
the terms of existing Members. And if they are going to be members, it
seems to me across the board of responsibilities they ought to be able
to contribute. And it seems to me that that is important in terms of
their financial capability as well as military, political and foreign
policy.
[[Page H4152]]
Third, the amounts contained in the amendment reflect the
administration's current estimates of the probable U.S. share. The
amendment would establish that in law for a period through the year
2010, after which a review can be made of the continuing
appropriateness of that level of commitment/restraint.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, the legislative initiatives have in the past
provided important leverage to the U.S. Government in negotiations with
NATO partners on burdensharing arrangements, and on numerous occasions
we in this body have voted to give our Government that kind of
leverage. The gentleman from Massachusetts simply provides us with one
additional opportunity to do it. I rise in enthusiastic support.
Mr. STUMP. Mr. Chairman, I include a statement by the chairman of the
committee for the Record.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I too am concerned about the costs of NATO
expansion and have serious doubts about the estimates advanced by the
Clinton administration. While I have some doubts about the practicality
of this amendment as written, I look forward to working with all
Members who have concerns about the numerous implications of NATO
expansion.
As my colleagues may be aware, Mr. Dellums and I wrote a letter to
the President, as yet unanswered, and published a jointly authored
editorial highlighting these concerns.
Both the letter and editorial take cost as an important factor in
NATO expansion, but secondary to questions of national security and
military strategy. I believe as many others do that NATO is perhaps the
most successful alliance in history, and I am concerned that the
administration's focus on the process of NATO expansion diverts
attention from understanding the purpose of an expanded alliance.
Personally, I am a strong supporter of NATO, and inclined to support
its expansion, for moral, military, and strategic reasons. However, too
many fundamental questions remain unanswered about the implications for
United States national security strategy, force structure, defense
budgets and relations with Russia, and other states.
For example: In addition to military criteria such as equipment
interoperability, the administration has stressed other factors such as
``adherence to market democracy'' as necessary for admission to NATO.
While opening European markets may be a worthy U.S. policy objective,
it is hardly a traditional security consideration and could pose
obstacles to admission that actually prove unsettling to European
stability.
There are also questions of treaty commitments. The heart of NATO's
charter is article V, which was interpreted through the cold war to
mandate the use of armed force to defend NATO members. In fact, the
actual language of article V is ambiguous, and thus, perhaps requires
the United States and our current and future alliance partners to come
to a mutual understanding of what article V means in this changed
security environment.
There are calculations of military force structure and capabilities,
as well. Considering reductions in U.S. defense budgets and military
force structure on the one hand and the expansion of security
commitments that would flow from enlarging NATO on the other, how
prudent is it for the United States to commit to these expanded
security guarantees?
I could go on at length about the serious political, strategic, and
military issues raised by the prospect of NATO expansion. Certainly,
with U.S. defense budgets in their 13th consecutive year of decline,
and with no end to defense cuts in sight, the cost of NATO expansion is
a significant concern, but just one of many.
Mr. STUMP. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of
my time.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I too am concerned about the costs of NATO
expansion and have serious doubts about the estimates advanced by the
Clinton administration. While I have some doubts about the practicality
of this amendment as written, I look forward to working with all
Members who have concerns about the numerous implications of NATO
expansion.
As my colleagues may be aware, Mr. Dellums and I share a number of
concerns over the process and purpose of NATO expansion. Recently, we
wrote a joint letter to the President, as yet unanswered, and published
a jointly authored editorial highlighting these concerns. I ask that
the letter and copy of the editorial be submitted for the record and
printed immediately following my remarks in the Congressional Record.
Both the letter and editorial take cost as an important factor in
NATO expansion, but secondary to questions of national security and
military strategy. I believe as many others do that NATO is perhaps the
most successful alliance in history, and I am concerned that the
administration's focus on the process of NATO expansion diverts
attention from understanding the purpose of an expanded alliance.
Personally, I am a strong supporter of NATO, and inclined to support
its expansion, for moral, military, and strategic reasons. However, too
many fundamental questions remain unanswered about the implications for
United States national security strategy, force structure, defense
budgets, and relations with Russia and other states. For example:
In addition to military criteria such as equipment interoperability,
the administration has stressed other factors such as ``adherence to
market democracy'' as necessary for admission to NATO. While opening
European markets may be a worthy U.S. policy objective, it is hardly a
traditional security consideration and could pose obstacles to
admission that actually prove unsettling to European stability.
There are also questions of treaty commitments. The heart of NATO's
charter is article V, which was interpreted through the cold war to
mandate the use of armed force to defend NATO members. In fact, the
actual language of article V is ambiguous, and thus, perhaps requires
the United States and our current and future alliance partners to come
to a mutual understanding of what article V means in this changed
security environment.
There are calculations of military force structure and capabilities,
as well. Considering reductions in U.S. defense budgets and military
force structure on the one hand and the expansion of security
commitments that would flow from enlarging NATO on the other, how
prudent is it for the United States to commit to these expanded
security guarantees?
I could go on at length about the serious political, strategic, and
military issues raised by the prospect of NATO expansion. Certainly,
with U.S. defense budgets in their 13th consecutive year of decline,
and with no end to defense cuts in sight, the cost of NATO expansion is
a significant concern, but just one of many.
Committee on National Security,
Washington, DC, April 25, 1997.
The Honorable William J. Clinton,
President, The White House,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. President: Recent statements by Administration
officials indicate that the United States will propose the
expansion of NATO to include several central European states
by 1999 at the upcoming NATO Ministerial meeting in July
1997.
We are strong supporters of NATO and are inclined to
support its expansion. We think there is a strong moral case
to be made for expanding the alliance and there are
compelling geopolitical reasons in favor of alliance
enlargement as well. Americans have long recognized the
importance of a peaceful Europe to the United States, a
condition that serves the aforementioned U.S. national
interests.
However, we believe that the purpose of the alliance is as
important as the process of expansion. We are concerned that
thus far, the Administration has failed to explain in much
detail what a fully expanded NATO entails in terms of its
function, structure and membership. There remain a number of
important unanswered questions about the implications of such
a course on U.S. national security strategy, force structure,
defense budgets, and relations with Russia and other states.
Understanding the answers to these questions is central to
understanding the far reaching consequences of NATO
expansion.
As the House National Security Committee will increasingly
focus on this important matter in the months ahead, we would
appreciate written answers, classified and unclassified as
required, to the following questions:
strategy
1. Will an expanded NATO continue to play its traditional
role in protecting the security interests of the United
States and our allies? What risks to those interests exist
because of expansion plans? How do the benefits of NATO
expansion outweigh the risks? How do you envision a fully-
expanded NATO? Describe its function, structure, and
membership?
2. Identify the various states seeking NATO membership and
provide your perspective on their reasons for seeking
membership. Does fear of a resurgent Russia play a part? What
do you believe they hope to gain by joining NATO? With
reference to each prospective member, please explain whether
their candidacy is supported by the current members of the
alliance. If there are differences of opinion among current
NATO members regarding the candidacies of prospective
members, please identify those areas where differences exist,
and which member countries have concerns.
3. What military, geostrategic, or other benefits might new
NATO members bring to the alliance? What might be the
liabilities associated with their membership?
4. The current strategy for NATO expansion is a high-
profile, protracted process, requiring many years to
implement. How long will it take to complete this process,
and what indices will show that it is completed? How many
intermediate stages of expansion do you envision, and which
states are likely to become NATO members at these stages?
[[Page H4153]]
Were alternative strategies that would speed the process
rejected? If the expansion process were interrupted prior to
completion, would NATO remain strategically viable at each
stage of expansion? What measures factor in that judgment?
5. The Administration's February 1997 Report to the
Congress On the Enlargement of NATO describes the process of
NATO enlargement as part of a broader strategy to adapt the
alliance to the post-Cold War security environment, which
includes a willingness to conduct out-of-area peacekeeping-
type operations. To what degree are prospective NATO members
willing and able to participate in peacekeeping operations,
including those that are ``out of area''? Does the United
States intend to seek significant participation in such
operations by newly-admitted NATO member states? Is such
participation a viable substitute for American involvement in
such peace-keeping like operations?
6. The Administration's report to Congress also concludes
that failing to enlarge NATO would lead to feelings of
``isolation and vulnerability'' among prospective members,
would be ``destabilizing,'' and ``would encourage nationalist
and disruptive forces throughout Europe.'' On what evidence
are these conclusions based? Please identify the specific
nationalistic and disruptive forces of concern.
Membership Criteria
1. What criteria have been established to determine which
states are ready to be integrated into the formal NATO
security structure? What are the relative weights as between
political, economic and military reform in making a judgment
on eligibility for membership? Will current members be
expected to meet these criteria for continued membership?
2. To what degree is economic integration with the European
Community a prerequisite to NATO membership? Why is this, or
why is this not, important?
3. Which states are the most likely candidates for NATO
membership and why? Are former Soviet republics, like Ukraine
and the Baltic states, or even Russia itself, possible
candidates for NATO admission? If we seek to avoid a new
European division, can we afford to proceed with enlargement
without a fully developed view as to our ultimate goal for
enlargement?
4. There have been reports that some prospective NATO
member states have sold arms to so-called rogue regimes like
Iran. How does this affect their prospects for membership? Is
the halting of such sales or arms deliveries a prerequisite
for alliance membership? Does a discussion of these issues
create a climate to help reduce proliferation of technology
capable of aiding programs for weapons of mass destruction or
advanced conventional weapons by current members?
treaty commitments
1. What exactly will U.S. treaty obligations be to new NATO
members? What types of assurances, if any, have been
discussed with prospective members regarding the U.S.
commitment to their security?
2. Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty states that, in
response to an armed attack, a NATO member ``will assist the
Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith individually
and in concert with the other Parties, such actions as it
deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore
and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.'' What
is the Administration's interpretation of Article V? Does it
mandate the use of U.S. armed force to defend other NATO
members? What representations have been made by the
Administration to prospective members regarding the meaning
of Article V? Would the interpretation of Article V differ
for new NATO members?
Force Structure and Military Capability
1. Will the United States and its NATO allies have the
military wherewithal to honor the security guarantees implied
by Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty for new NATO
members located in central and eastern Europe?
2. The Administration's Report to the Congress On the
Enlargement of NATO declares that the United States will
``extend solemn security guarantees to additional nations,''
but that ``there will be no need for additional U.S.
forces.'' Considering on-going cuts in the defense budget and
U.S. military force structure on the one hand and the
expansion of security commitments that would flow from
expanding NATO on the other, can the U.S. prudently commit to
these expanded security guarantees? How? And at what cost to
the U.S. national military strategy?
3. Have the United States and NATO developed contingency
plans for the defense of new NATO members under various
scenarios, including a resurgent Russia? What forces and
operational capabilities would be needed to satisfy the most
demanding of these scenarios, including nuclear scenarios?
4. Under an expanded NATO, will the U.S. ``nuclear
umbrella'' extend to new members in central and eastern
Europe? Since the United States has reportedly pledged not to
deploy tactical nuclear weapons on the territories of these
new NATO members, does this mean that any nuclear guarantees
extended to these states must be satisfied by U.S. strategic
nuclear weapons? Will the nuclear forces of other NATO states
provide similar extended deterrence to new members? Has there
been any discussion regarding withdrawal of tactical nuclear
weapons from the theater as an element to calm possible
Russian concerns?
5. It has been reported that the defense of new NATO member
states will be based on the principle of rapidly deploying
other NATO forces to those countries in the event of
conflict, rather than pre-deploying substantial force
enhancements in-country. It has further been reported that
this strategy was chosen as a result of Russian concerns over
NATO encroachment on their borders and Congressional concerns
over the cost to the United States of expansion. Are these
reports accurate? More generally, please explain the
rationale for preferring rapid deployment capabilities to
pre-positioning.
funding
1. What are the underlying assumptions that resulted in the
Administration's cost estimate for NATO expansion and how
credible do you believe those assumptions are for the long
term? In particular, please identify the number of countries,
the types of activities, and the assumed level of threat on
which the estimates are based. Also, please supply a similar
analysis based upon your projections for a fully expanded
NATO, and for any intermediate steps envisioned for the
expansion process.
2. Will other NATO countries share in the costs of an
expanded NATO and how will costs be apportioned among them?
3. What arrangements are in place or being negotiated to
ensure that the new financial commitments from NATO members
are kept? Who will pay these costs in the event new members
or current members are unable to keep their commitments to do
so?
4. How and why does the Administration's cost estimate for
NATO expansion significantly differ from the estimates
prepared by the Rand Corporation and the Congressional Budget
Office?
5. What will be the source of the U.S. funding for NATO
expansion? What costs will be apportioned to the 050 budget
function as opposed to the 150 budget function?
relations with russia
1. How do you anticipate Russia will react to an expanded
NATO? How does the Administration weigh the likelihood that
Russia will renege on its commitments to abide by the CFE,
INF, ABM, and START treaties, forward deploy nuclear weapons,
invade the Baltic states, or accelerate the formation of
alliances of its own, perhaps with China?
2. Will NATO expansion aggravate Russian threat perceptions
and increase the possibility of nuclear miscalculation? What
assurances have been given by the Administration to Russia in
order to ameliorate Russia's concerns over expansion? Has the
United States pledged not to deploy nuclear weapons on the
territory of new NATO members? What guarantees have the
Russians sought regarding NATO expansion and which have been
agreed to by the Administration? Will the Russians have a
veto over any NATO decision? What procedures will be put in
place to give Russia a voice in NATO deliberations and the
alliance decision-making process, including decisions on
peacekeeping? What confidence building measures, if any, will
be implemented to lessen Russian concerns and insecurities?
3. Russian statements indicate that Russia may feel
isolated and vulnerable if NATO expands, and may revert to a
more nationalistic security posture. Does the Administration
share this view? If so, does the Administration judge the
security risks of an insecure, more nationalistic Russia to
be less than those of an insecure eastern Europe if NATO
fails to expand?
4. Has the United States promised Russia that the Baltic
countries would not be allowed into NATO for the foreseeable
future? Will there be any U.S. security commitment to the
Baltic states? If so, what form will it take? If not, why
not?
5. There have been reports that the United States will seek
to alleviate Russian concerns over NATO expansion by agreeing
to significant reductions in the ceilings on NATO
conventional arms imposed by the Conventional Forces in
Europe (CFE) Treaty or by freezing the level of NATO military
forces deployed near Russia. Are these reports accurate? What
constraints will be imposed on the military force levels of
new NATO members? Does the Administration plan to seek
comparable constraints on forces deployed in Ukraine,
Belarus, and the Russian region of Kaliningrad?
6. How does the Administration see Russia's relations with
an expanded NATO? How does the Administration plan to
integrate Russia into a unified European security structure
and what is the timeline for this integration? Will the
Partnership for Peace program remain the primary vehicle for
accomplishing this objective? Can the Administration envision
Russian NATO membership in the future, assuming all
conditions for membership are met? If so, would more explicit
recognition of this possibility ease Russian concerns with
current plans for enlarging NATO?
7. What is the nature of the proposed NATO-Russia Charter?
The Joint Statement signed by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin
at Helsinki notes there should be ``consultation,
coordination and, to the maximum extent possible where
appropriate, joint decision-making and action on security
issues of common concern.'' Can the Russians insist on
participating in NATO discussions on any issue of concern?
Does this give Russia a veto power over NATO decisions? At a
minimum, would the NATO-Russian Charter complicate the NATO
decision-making process in ways detrimental to the alliance,
especially
[[Page H4154]]
if there existed a lack of common purpose between NATO and
Russia?
8. Doesn't a separate NATO-Russia forum undermine the
effectiveness of the existing NATO Council? Because Russia
will apparently be able to participate in NATO decisions
before new members are admitted, is the Administration
concerned whether the NATO-Russian forum might unfairly
penalize prospective members by giving greater voice to
Russian concerns earlier in the process?
relations with other nato members
1. What reservations have been expressed, if any, by the
current NATO states regarding the expansion of the alliance?
Are there differences of opinion regarding which states
should be included in an expanded NATO and/or the timeframe
for their inclusion? If so, please identify the specific
positions of the individual member countries.
2. What unresolved tensions or rivalries might new NATO
members bring into the alliance that could cause fractures
within NATO, as exist now between Greece and Turkey? Might
these tensions or rivalries lead to potential American
military involvement in intra-alliance hostilities? Does the
Administration prefer for purposes of European stability to
seek to resolve such conflicts within the security
architecture of the NATO alliance? If so, would similar
tensions (e.g., Baltic-Russian problems) be better resolved
in this context as well?
We appreciate your prompt attention to these important
questions and ask that answers be provided not later than May
30, 1997.
Sincerely,
Floyd D. Spence,
Chairman.
Ron Dellums,
Ranking Minority Member.
____
[From the Washington Times, May 29, 1997]
Is A Bigger NATO Also Better?
(By Floyd D. Spence and Ronald V. Dellums)
In just a few months, the Clinton administration is set to
commit the United States to the expansion of NATO, and
consequently expand America's role in guaranteeing stability
and security in Europe.
We are strong supporters of NATO and are inclined to
support its expansion. We think there is a strong moral case
to be made for expansion and find compelling geopolitical
reasons in favor of alliance enlargement as well. From the
nation's founding, Americans have long recognized the
importance to this country of a peaceful Europe. Since its
founding, the NATO alliance has been the primary vehicle for
protecting our own national interests on the continent.
However, we believe that NATO's fundamental purpose, even
in the post-Cold War world, is more important than the
process of expansion. We are concerned that the discussion to
date of expansion has failed to illuminate the purpose,
function, structure and membership of an expanded NATO. To
us, it makes little sense to embark upon such an ambitious
endeavor without first having a better understanding of where
we want to go and the obstacles likely to be encountered.
We are troubled by the number of important questions that
have not been publicly addressed concerning the implications
of expansion on U.S. national security strategy, military
force structure, defense budgets, and relations with Russia
and other states. The administration and the Congress owe it
to all Americans to explain as fully as possible the far-
reaching consequences of NATO expansion and to set forth a
vision of a fully expanded Atlantic alliance.
We believe that at least seven basic sets of questions must
be addressed more thoroughly. The first, and most basic,
concerns the role that the alliance will play in U.S.
national security strategy. Will an expanded NATO continue in
its traditional role as a defensive military alliance? The
administration, in its recent report to Congress on the costs
of NATO expansion, speaks of ``broader adaption of NATO'' for
the purpose of ``evolution of a peaceful, undivided and
democratic Europe.'' What, exactly, does that mean,
especially if expansion is accomplished one step at a time?
A second set of questions revolve around the criteria for
membership in the alliance. For example, in addition to
military criteria such as equipment interoperability, the
administration has stressed other factors such as ``adherence
to market democracy'' as necessary for admission to NATO.
While open European markets may be a worthy U.S. policy
objective, it is hardly a traditional security consideration
and could pose obstacles to admission that actually prove
unsettling to European stability.
Third, there are questions of treaty commitments. The heart
of NATO's charter is Article V, which was interpreted through
the Cold War to mandate the use of armed force to defend NATO
members. In fact, the actual language of Article V is
ambiguous, and thus, perhaps requires the United States and
our current and future alliance partners to come to a mutual
understanding of what Article V means in this changed
security environment.
A fourth set of questions involves calculations of military
force structure and capabilities, and applies to the United
States as well as to any alliance partner, current or
prospective.
Considering reductions in U.S. defense budgets and military
force structure on the one hand and the expansion of security
commitments that would flow from enlarging NATO on the other,
how prudent is it for the U.S. to commit to these expanded
security guarantees? Considering the similar reductions that
have occurred in the military budgets and forces of our NATO
partners, how do they intend to support expanded security
commitments? And under an expanded NATO, will the U.S.
``nuclear umbrella'' extend to new members in central and
eastern Europe? Since the U.S. has reportedly pledged not to
deploy tactical nuclear weapons on the territories of these
new NATO members, would this mean that any nuclear guarantees
extended to these states must be satisfied by U.S. strategic
nuclear weapons?
Funding questions raise a fifth category of uncertainties.
The administration's recent report on the costs of NATO
expansion was based upon very optimistic political
assumptions about the likelihood of conflict in Europe, and
only calculated the costs of expansion based upon the
admission to the alliance of three nations, probably Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Even if the cost estimates
are accurate, a more fully expanded NATO will surely come at
a much higher price tag. However, cost studies done by the
Congressional Budget Office and Rand Corporation have used
more conservative assumptions and projected much higher costs
than has the administration.
Sixth, how will Russia react to an expanded NATO? The
process of expansion promises to be a protracted one, quite
possibly extending over decades. If the current Russian
attitude toward expansion persists, NATO expansion will
become a permanent source of tension in already complex
U.S.-Russia relations. The projected NATO-Russia charter
is unlikely to permanently solve this problem.
Finally, there is the matter of relations within the NATO
alliance itself. To date, the process of expansion has been
driven almost exclusively by the United States. We need to
know, for example, if our current allies have differences of
opinion regarding which states should be included in an
expanded NATO or the timeframe for their inclusion. What
unresolved tensions or rivalries might new members bring into
NATO that could cause fractures within the alliance, as exist
now between Greece and Turkey? Will these tensions or
rivalries lead to potential American military involvement,
crisis management, or even intra-alliance hostilities, or
will they be stabilized in the context of alliance
management?
These questions raise profound issues of U.S. national
security and defense policy, provide insight into the grave
commitment that the expansion of NATO entails, and underscore
the need for a more thorough airing of the issue and a frank
assessment of the attendant risks. The Atlantic Alliance
remains the cornerstone of U.S. policy toward Europe, and has
been responsible for one of the most peaceful periods in
European history. On many matters of national security policy
we hold widely divergent political views, but we have a
common recognition of the continuing value and future
potential of NATO. It should be possible to reach a common
understanding of the purpose of the alliance in a vastly
changed Europe, and the best paths to achieve that purpose
without needlessly redividing Europe. But the time to come to
grips with the serious implications of an expanded NATO is
now, not after the process of expansion is underway.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Frank].
The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the ayes
appeared to have it.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote, and pending that,
I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 169, further proceedings
on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr.
Frank] will be postponed.
The point of no quorum is considered withdrawn.
{time} 1330
Mr. STUMP. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.
The motion was agreed to.
Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore [Mr.
Hansen] having assumed the Chair, Mr. Young of Florida, Chairman of the
Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that
that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 1119) to
authorize appropriations for fiscal years 1998 and 1999 for military
activities of the Department of Defense, to prescribe military
personnel strengths for fiscal years 1998 and 1999, and for other
purposes, had come to no resolution thereon.
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