[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 87 (Friday, June 20, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Page S6039]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                   CHEMICAL WARFARE DEFENSE DOCTRINE

  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, one year ago tomorrow, on June 21, 1996, in 
a hastily called press conference, the Department of Defense revealed 
that United States troops may have been exposed to Iraqi chemical nerve 
and mustard agents as a result of the post-war demolition of an Iraqi 
ammunition storage depot at Kamisiyah, Iraq. By September 1996, the DOD 
estimate of the number of soldiers who may have been exposed had 
climbed to just over 20,000, and the DOD announced that studies were 
still under way that could push that number even higher. This 
announcement raised new fears that Iraqi chemical warfare agents may 
have played a role in causing the illness among United States and 
coalition veterans of the Persian gulf war that has come to be called 
gulf war syndrome, and it exposed flaws in the manner in which the 
Department of Defense tracked the locations and medical histories of 
units and individual troops. The Department of Defense and the 
Presidential Advisory Committee on gulf war illnesses have subsequently 
attempted to address this and many other possible causes of gulf war 
syndrome, as have a number of congressional committees. There is still 
considerable uncertainty and controversy surrounding this issue.
  As a result of that announcement, I offered an amendment to the 
Fiscal Year 1997 Department of Defense authorization bill to provide 
$10 million for independent scientific research into the possible 
relationship between chemical agent exposure, particularly to low 
levels of chemical agent exposure, and gulf war syndrome. My amendment 
was adopted without debate by the Senate and supported through the 
conference with the House, and I thank my colleagues for sharing in my 
concern that our veterans be provided with the independent medical 
research on this subject that had not previously existed. I am eager, 
as I know our sick veterans and their families are also, to learn the 
results of these studies.
  But, Mr. President, although efforts to improve medical records 
management techniques in order to better understand and treat future 
post-war illnesses among United States troops--efforts already 
undertaken by the Department of Defense--are a step in the right 
direction, I believe that the most effective course of action is to 
prevent the exposures from occurring. We must not settle for just 
closing the barn door after the horse has bolted. We must find out why 
the door failed to contain the horse, and fix it. In that regard, the 
effectiveness of current doctrine and technology is questionable. It is 
not certain that our chemical detectors will provide a sufficient 
warning for low levels of chemical agent, and it is not certain that 
our military doctrine and procedures are adequate to fully protect our 
troops in a scenario that is not immediately life-threatening. Nor is 
it certain that the military anticipates the synergistic effects of 
different factors, such as the administration of vaccines and anti-
chemical warfare agent drugs, in combination with the use of pesticides 
or exposure to other battlefield effluents, including chemical and 
biological agents.
  I am concerned that United States military doctrine has not changed 
to reflect these lessons learned from the gulf war experience and its 
aftermath. My concern is, I know, shared by many of my colleagues, who 
over the years have pursued these issues in hearings. Indeed, even the 
Special Assistant for gulf war illnesses at the Department of Defense 
has admitted in testimony before Congress that ``We [DOD] need to learn 
from our Gulf experience and make the necessary changes in policies, 
doctrine, and technology.''
  I am pleased, therefore, that two of my colleagues on the Armed 
Services Committee, Senator Levin and Senator Glenn, have joined me in 
requesting that the General Accounting Office [GAO] initiate an 
evaluation of this very issue. Both of these very able Senators have, 
over the last several years, questioned the ability of our military to 
fight and win on a chemical battlefield. We have asked the GAO to 
address the adequacy of current policies, procedures, and technologies 
to first adequately defend United States military forces against 
single, repeated, or sustained exposure to low levels of chemical 
warfare agent, and to second identify, prepare for, and defend against 
the possible adverse effects of chemical warfare agent exposure in 
combination with other compounds commonly found in the battlefield, 
including pesticides, oil and diesel exhaust, biological warfare 
agents, low level radiation, medically administered vaccines, and other 
occupational hazards.
  It is my hope that this study will lay the foundation upon which we 
might make effective and targeted adjustments in next year's Department 
of Defense authorization bill that will give our soldiers the ability 
and confidence to fight and win on a chemically contaminated 
battlefield.

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