[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 87 (Friday, June 20, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S6021-S6024]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




        NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998

  The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.
  Mr. GRAMS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota is recognized.


                           Amendment No. 420

  Mr. GRAMS. Madam President, I inquire of the business now before the 
Senate.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending question is on the Cochran 
amendment No. 420.
  Mr. GRAMS. Madam President, I rise this morning to strongly oppose 
the amendment by my colleague and friend from Mississippi, Mr. Cochran, 
first for jurisdictional reasons, and most importantly because it is a 
seriously, I believe, flawed policy.
  As chairman of the International Finance Subcommittee of the Senate 
Banking Committee, I object to the consideration of this matter, since 
it is within the jurisdiction of my subcommittee and the Committee on 
Banking. This is a very controversial issue and it should be heard and 
debated in the normal congressional process, by the proper committee of 
jurisdiction, not by a floor amendment with little opportunity for 
opponents to be heard. Many Members of this body may have already 
returned to their States and will not even have the opportunity to 
listen to the debate today.
  The Senate has not had an opportunity to have a full debate on export 
controls in the last few years. Members need the benefit of time to 
fully analyze changes in an area that can have such a negative impact 
on U.S. companies and on U.S. jobs.
  What really concerns me, Madam President, is that this amendment 
turns back the clock on technology. This amendment indicates it is 
directed at supercomputers, but computers at the 2,000-7,000 MTOPS 
level are not supercomputers, a point I will discuss later. The 
amendment reverses 2 years of effort to decontrol computers that are 
generally available. You will hear all sorts of talk today about how 
this amendment improves national security. But it does not. If the goal 
is to stop the sale of high performance computers to questionable end 
users in Russia, China, India, Pakistan, and Israel, it will stop the 
sale of United States computers to those end users--but it will not 
stop our allies from making those sales.
  It is true that there are two companies currently under investigation 
for alleged sale without license to a questionable end user. Those 
investigations are still pending and should be pursued, so it seems 
premature to, in effect, have the Congress find them guilty. Let us let 
the process work. If they are guilty, they will be penalized. The U.S. 
companies selling computers abroad at this level are few; they are 
reputable and they do care about selling to questionable end users. The 
investigations have also had a positive effect in that they have 
encouraged companies to seek more validated licenses for uncertain end 
users. I disagree with my colleagues who believe businesses care only 
about the almighty dollar, and not national security.
  This amendment will bring us back to the cold war days when export 
controls were required for computers sold in drug stores. A computer at 
2,000 MTOPS, which is the level we would control, is a low-end work 
station which is widely available all over the world. We would 
establish unilateral controls on any computer over this capability. Our 
companies would have to

[[Page S6022]]

obtain a validated license. Their competitors in other nations would 
not have that requirement. Therefore, European and Japanese companies 
would have a competitive edge in many, many computer sales in countries 
where it is important to establish a foothold as a reliable supplier to 
facilitate future sales. Licenses would be required for every sale 
above this limit, not just those to questionable end users. We want to 
expand markets in those countries, while protecting our national 
security interests, rather than handing them on a silver platter to our 
trading partners who will then be seen as reliable suppliers in the 
future.
  I know the argument will be that it is not hard to get an export 
license and that there are statutory deadlines on agency review of 
license applications. I can give you quite a list of companies--many of 
them smaller companies--which have come close to shutting down due to 
export license delays, even in recent years. We cannot return to this 
uncertainty and bureaucratic maze. Even the larger companies will see 
their expenses increase as they will have to hire more high-priced 
attorneys to facilitate many of the licenses through the process. 
Export licenses to these countries do not get approved in a couple of 
months. Many of them take many months and earn the U.S. the designation 
as an unreliable supplier. While we are pursuing regulatory reform in 
many areas, what we are doing here is reimposing regulations we 
eliminated 2 years ago.
  What is curious to me is an independent study commissioned in 1995 
for the Departments of Commerce and Defense which determined that 
computers could be decontrolled to the 7,000 MTOPS level without a 
negative impact on national security. The Departments of State, 
Defense, Commerce, the intelligence agencies, and ACDA all signed off 
on this report, and the decontrol was made at that time to 7,000 MTOPS. 
The determination was made because the 2,000-7,000 range, again, Madam 
President, was widely available throughout the world.
  But you have also heard that we are stopping the sale of 
supercomputers to tier 3 countries without a license. Again. Madam 
President, a 7,000 MTOPS computer is not a supercomputer. 
Supercomputers still need export licenses. I am told that the MTOPS for 
a supercomputer is in the 20,000 range and can go up to one million 
MTOPS--a far cry from 7,000.
  Let's look at the level the amendment seeks to control--2,000 MTOPS. 
This is a low-level work station computer. By 1998, personal computers 
will reach this level. Also, the alpha chip available next year will be 
1,000 MTOPS itself. So just two of those in a computer would qualify 
the computer for an export license. It is very difficult for me to 
justify that companies will have to jump through so many hoops just to 
sell fairly low-level computers. We are truly turning back the clock on 
technology.
  I have previously made the point that we are stabbing ourselves in 
the foot, since computer companies in other countries do not have these 
controls, and therefore our efforts are futile to say the least. There 
are four European companies which sell computers in the 2,000-7,000 
range as well as Japanese companies. We all know that they will be 
eager to make these sales.
  What is really ironic is that the Chinese themselves have now 
produced a computer at the 13,000 MTOPS level. They have surpassed the 
7,000 current limit the sponsor of this amendment is trying to roll 
back.
  One argument I have heard is that Japan also requires validated 
licenses for its sales. Yes, that is true, but Japan's validated 
license system has always been a rubber stamp operation. The entire 
process takes 24 hours, if that. Ours can take months. And I can show 
you some unhappy constituents who can verify that.
  Another question I have is whether it is good policy to codify export 
controls at certain levels rather than leaving them to regulation. Do 
we really want to be in a position to have to change the law each time 
we need to decontrol? Is the Congress really able to act as quickly and 
as often as needed to adjust to rapidly changing technology? I think 
not.
  Madam President, I plan to send a second degree amendment to the 
amendment by my colleague from Mississippi and in a moment will ask for 
its immediate consideration.
  But I again want to mention that this amendment would request the GAO 
to perform a study of the national security risks that would be 
involved with sales of computers in the 2,000-7,000 MTOPS range to 
military or nuclear end users in tier 3 countries. It would also 
analyze the foreign availability issue to determine whether controls at 
2,000 MTOPS and above would make any sense.
  Further, the amendment would require the Department of Commerce to 
publish in the Federal Register a list of end users which would require 
the filing of a validated license application, except when there is an 
administration finding that such publication would jeopardize sources 
and methods.
  Madam President, this is a sincere compromise in my position as 
subcommittee chairman of the committee of jurisdiction over this issue, 
which will help us decide whether there is a need to recontrol at the 
2,000 level. It is far too controversial to decide this question today, 
or by next Tuesday when we will vote.
  I believe Commerce should be asked to publish this list and to 
further seek ways to work with computer companies to determine whether 
other end users are questionable in order to alleviate some of the 
uncertainty that is out there.
  Madam President, let us not turn back the clock on technology. Let us 
make a rational national security decision that also take into account 
the best interests of our exporters--and the jobs that they represent.


                 Amendment No. 422 To Amendment No. 420

 (Purpose: To require the Comptroller General of the United States to 
conduct a study on the availability and potential risks relating to the 
                       sale of certain computers)

  Mr. GRAMS. So, Madam President, I send my second-degree amendment to 
the desk, and ask for the yeas and nays on the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The bill clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Minnesota [Mr. Grams] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 422 to amendment No. 420.

  Mr. GRAMS. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that further 
reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       In lieu of the matter proposed to be inserted, insert the 
     following:

     SEC.   . GAO STUDY ON CERTAIN COMPUTERS.

       (a) In General.--The Comptroller General of the United 
     States shall conduct a study of the national security risks 
     relating to the sale of computers with composite theoretical 
     performance of between 2,000 and 7,000 million theoretical 
     operations per second to end-users in Tier 3 countries. The 
     study shall also analyze any foreign availability of 
     computers described in the preceding sentence and the impact 
     of such sales on United States exporters.
       (b) Publication of End-User List.--The Secretary of 
     Commerce shall publish in the Federal Register a list of 
     military and nuclear end-users of the computers described in 
     subsection (a), except any end-user with respect to whom 
     there is an administrative finding that such publication 
     would jeopardize the user's sources and methods.
       (c) End-User Assistance to Exporters.--The Secretary of 
     Commerce shall establish a procedure by which exporters may 
     seek information on questionable end-users.
       (d) Definition of Tier 3 Country.--For purposes of this 
     section, the term ``Tier 3 country'' has the meaning given 
     such term in section 740.7 of title 15, Code of Federal 
     Regulations.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second for the Senator's 
request for a rollcall vote?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  Mr. COCHRAN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Enzi). The Senator from Mississippi is 
recognized.
  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I have listened carefully to the comments 
of my good friend from Minnesota in support of his second-degree 
amendment. I must say that the language of the amendment is appealing 
in some respects, particularly the suggestion that the General 
Accounting Office ought to be asked to conduct a review of this 
situation and the apparent risk to our national security caused by the 
export policies of this administration with respect to the sale of 
supercomputers and its technology to foreign purchasers.
  There is some question in my mind about the efficacy of the last part 
of

[[Page S6023]]

the amendment particularly, because in our hearings in the Governmental 
Affairs Committee the administration officials talked about the fact 
that the reason they did not publish and make available a list of end 
users or potential purchasers of these computers at this time was 
because of diplomatic considerations and the questions about whether it 
puts in jeopardy our intelligence-gathering capabilities and a number 
of other issues that concerned them enough so that they do not now make 
available this list even privately to exporters of supercomputers.
  So to require them to publish it in the Federal Register and to make 
it available to the general public is probably something that ought to 
be reconsidered and not approved by the Senate. They should not be 
compelled to do that. It seems to me that the reasons they gave in our 
hearing for not doing it even privately was enough and sufficient in my 
mind to raise questions about whether we should compel them to do it 
publicly.
  But looking back at the earlier complaints and the comments from my 
friend about the Cochran-Durbin amendment, let me say that this is not 
an effort on our part to roll back regulatory policy with respect to 
military end users. It is an effort to change the procedures and to put 
the onus and the responsibility for determining whether a sale is 
permissible or consistent with national security concerns on the 
administration rather than on the sellers of the computers.

  Computer companies do not have the capacity to make determinations on 
their own about the use to which the computers they are selling in the 
international market will be put, or the relationships between 
prospective purchasers and governments, particularly in the case of 
China or Russia. The U.S. Government, though, has the capacity, through 
its contacts worldwide, to do a much more reliable and accurate job of 
assessing whether or not someone would be a purchaser who would use 
these computers to enhance the lethalness of nuclear weapons or missile 
technology to put our own citizens at risk, the lives of Americans at 
risk, in a way that they would not otherwise be, but for the sale of 
our computer technology.
  So it is for that reason and that reason alone not to prevent the 
sale to legitimate purchasers who will use it for civilian or other 
appropriate purposes. It is in those situations where there is very 
real concern based on knowledge that we have about the potential 
harmful use--harmful to our own interests--that we ought to have the 
power, we ought to have the process reserved to the Federal Government 
to prohibit that sale in those selected situations.
  Right now the policy of our Government is to prohibit the sale of 
this category of computers if it is for the purpose of being used for a 
military use or sold to a military organization. It is prohibited under 
current law, under current regulations. So the suggestion that the 
Senator makes that we are imposing new restraint on trade in this 
amendment is not true insofar as it concerns the sales for military 
purposes.
  Current policy simply says to the exporters, if you know it is going 
to be used by a military organization, you cannot sell it--2,000 to 
7,000 MTOPS speed computers cannot be sold under current U.S. law and 
under current regulations. So this amendment that we are offering does 
not impose a new definition that restrains the sale of computers. It 
simply says that the Commerce Department is going to give you the OK. 
Once you tell us who you will sell it to, they will tell you whether it 
is permissible or not. That is all we are saying.
  The current policy is it is up to the exporter to decide whether this 
is a military end use or an end user. If they sell it to someone they 
knew was a military end user, they violate the law right now. The 
problem is a lot of exporters, the people in the business of 
manufacturing and marketing supercomputers, do not have the capacity to 
make this determination.
  Also, there are motivations that are different. They are in the 
business of making money. They are in the business of selling as many 
as they can. The stockholders of these companies want to see sales go 
up, and so when there is a close question--we are not questioning 
anybody's motives here today--but where there is a close question and 
you really do not know for sure, the temptation is to go on and make 
the sale, particularly if there is really no hard evidence there.
  Now, there have already been those cases where there is enough 
evidence that people have sold computers to end users who are military 
organizations or who are involved in nuclear weapons programs, that 
they are now under investigations by a Federal grand jury. This is 
serious business. That could have been prohibited, maybe, if you had 
the Commerce Department saying, ``OK, it is fine, go ahead and make 
this sale. Here is your license.'' Then the civilian marketer is off 
the hook. The Commerce Department makes the decision. That is the 
issue.
  Do we leave it up to the honor system that has been developed by the 
Clinton administration, which is not working--46, we thought it was 46, 
but it turned out to be 47 as a result of the hearing we held of new 
information of these computers that are in the hands of Chinese 
entities and we do not know what they are being used for. Or if our 
Government knows, they cannot tell us in a public hearing session. We 
have to go behind closed doors to find out what they really know.
  From what we can talk about right now, we know that this policy ought 
to be changed, and for the business of ``this is not the right place, 
this is not the right time,'' and the jurisdictional question--well, 
the Commerce Department has jurisdiction over commerce issues, the 
Banking Committee has some jurisdiction, our Governmental Affairs 
Committee has jurisdiction over compliance with nonproliferation treaty 
provisions. We are constantly monitoring the question of proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction in our committee, and we came upon this 
information through the exercise of our oversight responsibilities.
  It is a matter of some urgency, in our view, that this matter be 
addressed, and we think the U.S. Senate will agree with that. I think 
we have suggested a very modest but a very necessary first step in the 
process of reform of our policies over exporting computers. This 
administration came into office having made a promise to the computer 
industry that they were going to make some dramatic changes in the 
rules so that they could sell more computers in the international 
marketplace. That is fine. That is fine. But they have adopted a policy 
that is not working. It is not working to protect our national security 
interests, which is important. It is working in that it has helped sell 
a lot more computers and a lot of people have gotten rich under this 
new policy. I do not have a problem with that. No complaints are being 
made about that. But it was supposed to be a policy that both enhanced 
our ability to compete in the international computer market but at the 
same time protected our national security interests. It worked on the 
one hand, but it has failed on the other.

  We now see the Atomic Energy Minister in Russia, whose name is 
Mikhailov, bragging in a public forum about the new supercomputer 
technology they have bought from the United States that is 10 times 
more powerful and sophisticated than anything they have had before. 
This agency is in the business of modernizing the nuclear weapons that 
the Russians have.
  We have this Nunn-Lugar builddown program supposedly trying to 
dismantle these weapons of mass destruction, and we are very actively 
involved with the Russians in that regard. But at the same time, to be 
selling them the technology to make the weapons, they are more 
accurate, more lethal, capable of destroying potential adversaries like 
the United States, it seems we are working at cross-purposes with 
ourselves. We are trying to work to keep down the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, and here we are, in this instance, 
contributing to the proliferation of more lethal nuclear weapon 
systems. Certainly that is true in the case of Russia and China. We 
know that. We know that.
  So what do we do about it? Nothing? Have some hearings? Have the GAO 
spend another year looking at things? We agree GAO ought to look at 
this. We are asking them to do that, too. They have already begun some 
work at our request. I agree with the Senator

[[Page S6024]]

that we need to do more, but to just say the Senate should not act on 
this suggestion, this is a modest first step. It is not a suggestion 
for comprehensive reform at this time. We need more information. We 
need to do more work to decide on the details of a comprehensive, 
workable policy than is on the books now and administered by our 
Commerce Department.
  So, but for the provisions of the amendment offered by the Senator 
that I have suggested caused me some concern, I would like to be able 
to support the amendment so that we could then go on and vote to 
approve the amendment as amended, but I cannot do that at this point. I 
hope the Senate will not agree to the amendment.
  I know under the announcement that was made earlier today on behalf 
of the majority leader, there will be no votes on amendments today. 
They will be set aside and we will come to them later. So there will 
not be a vote today. Knowing that there will not be, I will not push 
the issue any further, except to suggest to the Senate that this is an 
issue that ought to be debated, considered carefully, and we ought to 
vote for this amendment that I have offered with the cosponsorship of 
Senator Durbin.
  Incidentally, I asked the other day, after we had described the 
amendment, that Senator Abraham be added as a cosponsor. I have now 
been asked to seek unanimous consent that Senator Lugar be added as a 
cosponsor. I make that request at this time, Mr. President.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                         Privilege of the Floor

  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Janice 
Nielsen, a legislative fellow with Senator Craig's office, be granted 
floor privileges during debate on S. 936, the Defense Authorization 
Act.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. GRAMS. Mr. President, I want to say I appreciate the remarks of 
my colleague from Mississippi, Senator Cochran. We hope to be able to 
work with him over the weekend and hope to come to an agreement and 
compromise with him by next week. Like he said, hopefully we can vote 
on this at that time.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. THURMOND. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call.
  Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that we may move 
from this quorum call into morning business for 20 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to calling off the quorum?
  Mr. LEVIN. I object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
  The clerk will continue to call the roll.
  The bill clerk continued the call of the roll.
  Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, making two separate requests, I ask 
unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Frist). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I can proceed 
for 20 minutes as in morning business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. INHOFE. Will the Senator yield for a unanimous-consent request?
  Mr. LEVIN. Reserving the right to object, would the Senator add to 
that, that following morning business that we go back into an automatic 
quorum call?
  Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that following my 
speech, if it ever begins, that we go back into the quorum call, and I 
also ask unanimous consent that, without losing the floor, I might 
yield to Senator Inhofe so that he might get a staff member on the 
floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________