[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 86 (Thursday, June 19, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5978-S5998]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




        NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998

  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I am very pleased to be able to ask 
unanimous consent that the Senate now turn to the consideration of 
Calendar No. 88, S. 936, the Department of Defense authorization bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk 
will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       A bill (S. 936) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 
     1998 for military activities of the Department of Defense, 
     for military construction, and for defense activities of the 
     Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for 
     such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other 
     purposes.

  The Senate proceeded to consider the bill.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, for the information of all Senators, then, 
the Senate is now considering the defense authorization bill. Several 
amendments are expected to be offered to the bill; therefore, votes can 
be expected throughout the remainder of the afternoon and into the 
night. We will have to get started and see what amendments are 
available, and then we will expect some votes, but we would like to get 
as much work done today as we can. And that could take us into the 
night.
  Also, I want to make clear that we do intend for the Senate to resume 
consideration of the bill on Friday. I do expect rollcall votes on 
amendments relative to the DOD bill, at least until the noon hour on 
Friday. But, again, that will depend on exactly what amendments are 
pending. We recognize Senators do have commitments to go back to their 
States tomorrow afternoon, and we will try to accommodate that.
  But I do think we need to get some work done on this important 
legislation. A lot of effort has gone into working out a way to be able 
to bring the DOD authorization bill to the floor. I think we can make 
some progress, and I encouraged the ranking member and the chairman to 
see right away if they could get some finite list of amendments that 
might want to be offered and be considered. Maybe we can get some 
understanding of when we could get a final vote on this legislation 
when we come back after the recess.
  Next week, we again do intend to bring up the reconciliation spending 
bill on Monday, as I discussed with the acting minority leader, and we 
hope to run off time on that bill on Monday. We will talk further about 
exactly what will happen on Monday. We will do that tomorrow probably 
just as we wrap up consideration of this bill, complete the spending 
reconciliation bill Tuesday afternoon or Wednesday, and then go to the 
tax bill on Thursday, and stay until we finish the tax cut bill.
  I do not know exactly how long that will take. We have a very 
bipartisan effort underway in the Finance Committee. The vote on the 
spending bill was 20 to 0, and we are working together right now on the 
tax cut provisions also. I expect it will be a bipartisan process and a 
bipartisan bill. It is possible it may not take that long, but it is 
very important legislation and we need to get it done, completed next 
week--both of those bills.
  Assuming we cannot complete the DOD authorization bill tomorrow 
because of some concerns, and at least one issue that may come up, I 
know the Democratic leader would want to be here for that, so we may 
not be able to take that up until after we come back from the recess.

  I want to thank the Members for their cooperation in getting this 
legislation before the Senate now. And I do want to announce that we 
will expect to complete action on it the week that we come back. 
Hopefully, it will not take all week, because we have a lot of other 
bills now that are ready for consideration. It will be the pending 
business when we come back--if we do not complete it tomorrow--when we 
come back from the recess.
  I hope Senators will come to the floor now and offer their 
amendments. Some Senators were inquiring, ``Why do we need to vote 
during the middle of the afternoon on Thursday?'' I would like to 
suggest we have votes the rest of the day into tonight, on Friday, and 
we be prepared next week to work long hours, Monday, Tuesday, 
Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday, to get our work done. Then we can go 
to the recess period and feel good about our production.
  Would the Senator from Kentucky have any comments?
  Mr. FORD. No comments, Mr. President. I appreciate the courtesy that 
the majority leader has shown me in the absence of the Democratic 
leader. I am trying to fill in as best I can, and hopefully we can be 
accommodating. And I am sure the majority leader will be accommodating 
to us. We both have to work together. I think Monday we can work out 
something that would be amenable to both sides. Hopefully, tomorrow we 
might look at the DOD authorization bill with amazement.
  Mr. LOTT. Yes.
  Mr. FORD. We hope we can do that, I am sure. But there is one 
amendment that we will have to wait until into July, so we are not 
going to finish. We could be very close. I hope we could find out how 
many amendments are out there and maybe get some kind of resolution to 
how many we might have.
  I will be glad to help the majority leader with that.
  Mr. LOTT. That would be very helpful, Mr. President.
  I thank Senator Ford.
  It is a pleasure for me to yield the floor to the chairman of the 
committee so we can begin the debate.

[[Page S5979]]

  Mr. THURMOND. Thank you very much.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I want to take a few minutes before the 
Senate begins consideration of the fiscal year 1998 Defense 
authorization bill to explain why the Armed Services Committee filed 
two separate Defense authorization bills.
  Yesterday, as most of you observed, there was objection to a consent 
request to take up S. 924, the bill the committee reported to the floor 
for consideration. This objection was based on a number of provisions 
involving public depots--specifically--Air Force Logistics Centers. 
Senator Inhofe, the chairman of the Readiness Subcommittee included 
these provisions in his subcommittee markup. They were approved by the 
subcommittee and the full committee in the markup and therefore were 
included in the bill which the committee voted unanimously to report to 
the floor.
  Senators from other States who did not agree to these provisions 
would not consent to S. 924 being considered by the Senate. I believe 
all Senators acted in the interests of their states and their 
perception of what was in the best interests of the Government. This 
issue affects a great many jobs in all of these States and is an 
important economic issue within each State.
  I want to commend Senator Inhofe for stepping forward and offering to 
strip these provisions out of the bill. The committee met yesterday 
and, at his request, reported out a bill that does not include the 
provisions that provided the basis for objection. Therefore, the Senate 
can proceed to consideration of the Defense authorization bill, now S. 
936. The committee did not publish a report to accompany S. 936 and 
deems Senate Report 105-29, minus sections 311, 312, and 313, as the 
report to accompany S. 936.
  I understand the importance of this issue to each of you. I want to 
especially thank and commend Senator Inhofe for his courageous and 
unselfish act in moving to remove the basis for objection so that this 
bill, which is so critical to our Armed Forces and our national 
security, can be considered by the Senate.
  I want to emphasize that all Senators reserve their rights to offer 
amendments on this issue on the floor while the bill is being 
considered. I understand that while the bill is on the floor, Senators 
and staff will continue to search for a solution to this very difficult 
issue.
  I want to thank all Senators for their consideration. We hear a lot 
of talk on this floor about the loss of comity in the Senate. I believe 
this is an indication of how Senators can act cooperatively on 
difficult issues. In this case, it took a courageous Senator, Senator 
Inhofe, to make the difference and I thank him again on behalf of the 
committee.
  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, first of all, let me thank the very 
distinguished chairman of our committee, Senator Thurmond, for the 
hours and hours that he put in and the way he ran the meetings. He was 
very fair and open. I appreciate personally very much his remarks that 
he just made. Thank you, Senator Thurmond.
  As chairman of the readiness subcommittee I want to thank Senator 
Robb who is the ranking minority member. We took care of a lot of the 
problems out there. I must say, Mr. President, that I think that our 
readiness is desperately underfunded. We did the very best we could in 
this bill with the resources we had but we are not going to be able to 
continue on the course we are on right now. We have problems.
  As I go around the Nation, and around the world, actually, and visit 
bases, I have been in bases in the State of Alabama, and throughout the 
Nation, as well as some of the foreign bases, and I can tell you we are 
in an OPTEMPO rate which is unacceptable. Our divorce rates are going 
up, our retention rates are going down, and we need to do a better job 
of funding not just readiness but modernization and quality of life. I 
am very concerned about quality of life. As I go around I find that 
some of these kids are working about double the normal tempo that we 
have found to be acceptable. While they can sustain it for a while, and 
while the troops can sustain it, the spouses cannot. There will come a 
point in time where they will have to have more time with their 
families and have a more civil type of existence. We cannot do that 
with the way this administration has not allocated the proper amount of 
money to keep our system going to meet the minimum expectations of the 
American people. That is, to be able to defend America on two regional 
fronts.
  Having said that, I say again that we did the very best that can be 
done, and in our readiness subcommittee we were able to reinstate money 
for flying hours. We are losing pilots on a daily basis to the 
airlines. So we will have to do a lot more than we have done, but we 
have done the very best that we can.
  Let me make one comment about the depot issue. I know it is a 
difficult issue. A few years ago when one of the House Members, 
Congressman Armey, I believe, originally came up with the whole idea of 
the Base Realignment and Closing Commission concept, which means we 
know we cannot reduce excess infrastructure by doing it through the 
normal political process because everybody is concerned about jobs in 
their States. So they appointed an independent commission to be totally 
free from political influence to make recommendations and they went 
through, with round one in 1991, in 1993 another round, in 1995 a third 
round, and in doing this there is hardly a Senator in this Chamber that 
did not have major installations that have closed in their States. 
Certainly the State of Alabama lost a major one, and there were two 
major installations in the very State from which our chairman comes 
from, South Carolina, and virtually all the other States. So, we all 
bit the bullet.
  However, it appears there is an effort now to disregard that and 
leave air logistic centers in California as well as in Texas open. 
While it is a difficult thing to go through we have to accept the fact, 
sooner or later, that you cannot have in the case of any specialty 
area, and specifically in this case, air logistic centers where you 
have five operating at 50 percent capacity. You cannot continue to do 
that. So they recommended closing two of them that they determined to 
be the least efficient of the five and transferring that workload to 
the remainder which would be around 75 to 80 percent capacity.
  That makes a lot of sense. According to the GAO, that would save $468 
million a year, and over 5 years, Mr. President, that is $2.34 billion. 
When I think about that and think about where those dollars are 
desperately needed in quality of life, in readiness, in force strength, 
in modernization, it breaks my heart to think we are maybe willing to 
just throw it away.
  So I did make the gesture that the chairman referred to and no one 
asked me to do it. I felt it was the right thing to do because we have 
to have an authorization bill. Under the rules of the Senate, it is 
very possible for one Senator to keep a bill from coming up. I did not 
want that to happen to Senator Thurmond's bill. I did not want that to 
happen to our defense establishment. So I pulled the objectionable 
portions of how we treat depot maintenance out of the bill, but at the 
same time I announced I have every intention of reestablishing language 
that will accomplish what we want to get accomplished, and that is to 
be able to save that money that the GAO states is at risk.
  So I do not know whether it will be an amendment on the floor by 
which I will try to do this or in conference but I think everyone 
understands clearly there will be an effort to reinstate language that 
we have had to take out.
  With that, I will say this is a good bill and I want to move forward 
with it. I want to get a chance to really consider these amendments, 
and I know there will be a lot of amendments.
  As the new chairman of the Readiness Subcommittee of the Armed 
Services Committee, I have a devoted a significant amount of time 
during the past few months traveling to military bases to discuss 
issues that impact the readiness of the Armed Forces and their ability 
to carry out assigned missions: European theater, including 
installations in England, Italy, Bosnia, Hungary; Camp Lejuene, NC; 
Fort Hood, TX; Corpus Christi Naval Base, Texas; Dyess Air Force Base; 
and Fort Drum.

[[Page S5980]]

  We have also received testimony from the Secretary of Defense, the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the service chiefs, the unified 
commander-in-chief, and several other high ranking military and 
civilian officials from the Department of Defense.
  While the administration claims to have provided strong support for 
training, maintenance, supplies and other essentials needed to keep 
U.S. Forces ready to fight and win decisively, its budget request 
reduced real funding for these areas by $1.4 billion.
  Nothing I've heard during my base visits has made me feel like we are 
as ready as the administration asserts.
  At each unit, maintenance personnel have resorted to cannibalizing 
good equipment to keep other equipment operating. These additional 
maintenance actions result in 12-hour average work days for our young 
troops--only because of a lack of good spares.
  If readiness truly remains the administration's highest priority, 
then I have to wonder about the shape of the other accounts--
modernization, quality of life, research and development--are they even 
more seriously underfunded?
  Military units and the personnel within them, are being overused and 
underfunded to the point that I am afraid we are returning to the days 
of the hollow force. And the military personnel with whom I've spoken 
agree.
  It is also apparent to me that our Forces are being stretched to the 
limit to support humanitarian and contingency operations such as the 
deployment of IFOR/SFOR in Bosnia.
  Our high OPTEMPO is particularly troubling, since it results in more 
than just time away from home for the troops--it results in more 
equipment wear and tear; higher than planned consumption of spares; and 
canceled training.
  At every base visited, I heard concerns about the quality of 
equipment.

       Our lack of spares has caused us to cannibalize perfectly 
     good engines to keep others operating, requiring my 
     maintenance troops to work even more hours to keep our planes 
     flying. Our normal work week is now 50--56 hours/week.--
     Lakenheath, AF Maintenance Officer.

  Letter to Senator Thurmond from a non-commissioned officer:

       We have old, worn out equipment that is difficult to 
     maintain because we cannot always get the parts needed to 
     repair them. It is the same way wherever we go; outdated, 
     broken equipment, a lack of spare parts, overworked and 
     underpaid GIs, resulting in an inability to perform our 
     mission.

  I do not question the fact that our military forces are the finest in 
the world. They are clearly performing their assigned missions superbly 
and they are capable of defeating any potential enemy of today.
  But what about tomorrow? If this trend continues, I am concerned 
about how long we can maintain the present pace of operations. I am not 
alone in my concerns--they were echoed by many of the military 
personnel I had the pleasure of meeting. One officer summed it up 
nicely when he said ``the storm clouds are on the horizon.''
  The Pentagon continues to omit these concerns from official reports 
we receive from the Committee--to the contrary, their reports reports 
indicate readiness levels are at an all time high. I find the 
remarkable discrepancy between what I see in the field and the official 
statements coming from the administration and the Pentagon very 
troubling. And I am concerned that unless we take the necessary steps 
to correct these problems now, our military capability will erode as we 
enter the 21st century.
  The most troubling challenge is the need for additional modernization 
funding, for lack of new procurement has dramatic affects across all 
the other accounts: As our military equipment ages, it requires 
increased maintenance and thus more operations and maintenance [O&M] 
funding; since additional funding is not available to increase the O&M 
accounts, dollars are often robbed from training accounts; 
unfortunately, as the equipment ages, the problem will only get worse, 
and we will find ourselves in a death spiral.
  The funding crisis is further aggravated by the continual deployment 
of forces to contingency operations such as Southern Watch and Provide 
Comfort. I have spoken many times, about the huge cost of these 
operations--between $6.5 and $8 billion for Bosnia alone--and the fact 
these expenditures will come at the expense of our defense budget.
  While dollars are the most obvious issue in defense, I suggest that 
what we often overlook is the huge burden we are placing on our people 
and our equipment. We are wearing out our equipment and pushing our 
people so hard they no longer have time to train.
  I heard comment after comment during my visits:

       The high OPTEMPO at which our personnel are operating is 
     definitely causing a strain on our people's families. 
     Ultimately, this strain also affects my pilots' job 
     performance.--Marine F--18 Squadron Commander.
       ``The number of days we fly to support Bosnia doesn't leave 
     us with enough time to train. The only areas where we get 
     training from our Bosnia missions is in reconnaissance and 
     close air support. The rest of our training areas are 
     suffering.''--Air Force F-16 Squadron Commander.
       ``Our average crew goes TDY 150--160 days per year--the Air 
     Force goal is 120 days. These excessive taskings are 
     straining my peoples' families as well as impacting the 
     ability of my crews to receive adequate training.''--Air 
     Force C--130 Squadron Commander.

  Clearly, there are situations when the deployment of the U.S. 
military is necessary to protect America's vital interests. 
Unfortunately, it appears the Clinton administration will continue to 
keep a very low threshold for determining the need to commit our 
forces.
  My friends, the United States cannot force its military to expend 
more resources than we are willing to provide and still expect it to 
remain a viable force for the future when it may be called upon to 
defend American interests. I am concerned, the committee is concerned, 
our military personnel are concerned, and the American people should be 
concerned. If we are to avoid losing our military edge, we must act 
decisively and begin providing the resources necessary to support the 
missions we continue to ask of our Armed Forces.
  Mr. COVERDELL. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. INHOFE. I am happy to yield to the Senator.
  Mr. COVERDELL. Senator, as I understand, you have been trying to 
facilitate this very important piece of legislation in conjunction with 
the distinguished chairman from South Carolina. I have been a vigorous 
supporter of your efforts to fulfill the BRAC recommendations to the 
Congress, the President, and the Nation, which called for there to be 
three logistic Air Force bases. Your efforts are to fulfill that 
recommendation, to make that aspect of the Base Realignment and Closure 
Commission fulfilled. It has been abrogated by the administration.
  Mr. INHOFE. That is correct.
  Mr. COVERDELL. And it is your intention, as I understand our 
conversations, to continue to pursue an appropriate conclusion to this 
avoidance of BRAC by the administration during the deliberations, the 
ongoing deliberations of the debate on the Department of Defense 
authorization?
  Mr. INHOFE. That is my intent.
  Mr. COVERDELL. The Senator from Oklahoma can be assured that he will 
have my undevoted attention to accomplishing this because not only have 
we lost half a billion dollars because the Base Realignment and Closure 
Commission was voided by the administration, we have lost the integrity 
of the discipline itself. It should never occur again in that form.
  I suspect there will be a debate on that on this bill. The Base 
Realignment and Closure Commission has been sullied because it was a 
strict discipline that the people, the citizens of the country had to 
live by, the Congress had to live by, could not amend, gave up its 
prerogatives to amend, could only vote up or down, and then we found 
the administration could void it for whatever reason. That means that 
system no longer is of sound integrity, so if it is ever visited again 
it will have to be in a form that includes the President--not just the 
people and the Congress.
  I assume the Senator from Oklahoma will agree with that.
  Mr. INHOFE. I do agree with that. I want to give my assurance to the 
Senator from Georgia I have been living with this problem for a long 
period of time. We need an ultimate solution. In the interim, we need 
to make sure the recommendations of the BRAC Commission--that we 
protect the integrity of that system and they be acted upon--that we go 
ahead and fulfill the

[[Page S5981]]

expectations. Again, it is not just the money involved here.
  I think about all of the Senators who had closures, and if we start 
making exceptions now I think it is very unfair to every Member of this 
Senate body who has had a closure to now say for political reasons we 
can take exceptions.
  I know it is controversial when you say this, but if you just read 
the statements that the President made in August of 1996 right before 
the election, saying we will make sure those jobs do not leave, so what 
does that mean? It means regardless of what they do, whether it is 
competition or anything else, if the jobs stay in those areas we will 
still have five air logistic centers, so you have the same problem 
operating at 50 percent capacity.
  Mr. COVERDELL. One last comment. It is my understanding that the 
total number of jobs in the two bases that BRAC asked be closed were 
33,000 at the time of the recommendation and today, almost 2 years 
later, it is 31,000.
  Mr. INHOFE. That is correct. In responding to the Senator from 
Georgia, we had a committee meeting on this with the GAO and we looked 
at how much that has cost so far. That has been 2 years ago. And still, 
almost the same number are there.
  Now, there are other problems that come in, as the junior Senator 
from Utah brought up yesterday, that we are having a flight of 
expertise out of these areas, getting into other occupations, and if we 
do not do something quickly we are not going to be able to ever solve 
this problem.
  I think for that reason we need to address this, address it in this 
bill. But again, to protect the bill so that we would have an 
authorization bill, I, personally, was willing, as you were willing, to 
take that out so we could come to the floor and take it up and work in 
a different work form--it may be the same form or a different form--but 
take it up as a floor amendment or in conference.
  Mr. COVERDELL. I thank the Senator from Oklahoma, and I yield the 
floor.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, national security remains the federal 
government's most important obligation to its citizens. The Committee 
on Armed Services recognizes its critical role within the Senate in 
carrying out the powers relating to national security which are granted 
to Congress in the Constitution. These include the power to: declare 
war; raise and support Armies; provide and maintain a Navy; make rules 
for the government and regulation of the Land and Naval Forces; provide 
for organizing, arming and disciplining the militia; give its advice 
and consent to treaties and to the nominations of officers of the 
United States.
  The members of the committee further understand the importance of the 
committee's jurisdiction within the Senate over matters relating to the 
common defense, the Department of Defense, the Military Departments, 
and the national security programs of the Department of Energy.
  The Armed Services Committee completed its markup last Thursday 
afternoon after 4 days of careful deliberation, voting unanimously to 
approve of the fiscal year 1998 defense authorization bill. I believe 
we have a good bill with a better balance between personnel quality of 
life programs, readiness, and modernization.
  The budget agreement reached this year represents a historic endeavor 
by the Congress and the President to reach a balanced budget by fiscal 
year 2002. While the budget agreement protects our military forces from 
unrealistic and unwise cuts, the committee remains concerned that the 
funding levels for defense may not provide sufficient funds to 
adequately sustain over time the personnel, quality of life, readiness, 
and modernization programs critical to our military services. The 
committee intends that the achievement of a balanced budget will not 
adversely affect the readiness and capabilities of our military forces 
and will endeavor, within the funds agreed upon for defense in the 
budget agreement, to ensure their essential readiness and capabilities. 
Changes in the world situation or threat, and adverse impacts from 
funding shortfalls on general readiness or on vital operational 
capabilities, are among the trends that might indicate a requirement 
for additional funds for defense. In such cases, the committee believes 
that national security requirements must take precedence over lesser 
priorities within the budget.
  In this bill, the committee worked to achieve a more appropriate 
balance between near-term and long-term readiness through investments 
in modernization, infrastructure, and research; maintenance of 
sufficient end-strengths at all grade levels and policies supporting 
the recruitment and retention of high quality personnel; fielding of 
the types and quantities of weapons systems and equipment needed to 
fight and win decisively with minimal risk to our troops; and ensuring 
an adequate, safe and reliable nuclear weapons capability.
  The committee worked to protect the quality of life of our military 
personnel and their families. Quality of life initiatives include 
provisions designed to provide equitable pay and benefits to military 
personnel, including a 2.8 percent pay raise to protect against 
inflation, and the restoration of appropriate levels of funding for the 
construction and maintenance of troop billets and military family 
housing.

  The committee remains concerned about military readiness. To ensure 
that U.S. Armed Forces remain the preeminent military power in the 
world, readiness requirements must be adequately funded.
  The committee is also concerned about the continuing migration of 
modernization funds to operations and maintenance accounts. We have 
consistently recommended a more robust, progressive modernization 
effort which will not only provide capabilities requisite for future 
military operations, but will lower future operational and maintenance 
costs as well.
  The committee has increased investment in the broad spectrum of 
research and development activities to ensure that U.S. military forces 
remain superior in technology to any potential adversary. We believe 
that effective development of advanced technologies will be a key 
factor in determining the victors on future battlefields. A program of 
stable, long-term investment in science and technology will remain 
vital to United States dominance of combat on land, at sea, in the air, 
and in space.
  The committee also directed a more detailed programming and budgeting 
process for the reserve components. The utilization and effectiveness 
of reserve component forces are dependent on proper funding to enhance 
their readiness and capabilities.
  Finally, the committee sought to accelerate the development and 
deployment of theater missile defense systems and to provide adequate 
funding for a national missile defense system to preserve the option to 
deploy such a system in fiscal year 2003. This bill also supports 
expeditious deployment of land and sea-based theater missile defense 
systems to protect United States and allied forces against the growing 
threat of cruise and ballistic missiles.
  The committee intends that, within the balanced budget agreement, we 
will provide adequately for our men and women in uniform to defend our 
Nation. The committee will continue to examine the adequacy of the 
funds we allocate to our national security. At the same time, we must 
search for ways to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of our 
defense establishment--especially in the support structure--so that we 
can achieve savings to devote to the cutting edge of our military 
combat forces.
  The national defense authorization bill for fiscal year 1998 reflects 
a bipartisan approach to our national security interests, and provides 
a clear basis and direction for U.S. national security policies and 
programs into the 21st century.
  Let me make it clear to my colleagues--we do not have much time to 
complete action on this bill. If you have amendments, please come to 
the floor and introduce your amendment now. Remember that if you are 
adding anything to this bill that requires additional funding, you must 
provide a legitimate offset.
  Mr. President, I want to close by thanking all the Senators on the 
committee and commend them for their hard work on this bill. All 18 
Senators on the committee voted for the bill.
  I also want to thank the staff on both sides and commend them for 
their hard

[[Page S5982]]

work on the bill. I also ask unanimous consent that a list of members 
of the Armed Services Committee staff be included at this point in the 
Record in recognition of their dedication and hard work.
  There being no objection, the list was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:


                 SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE STAFF

  Les Brownlee, David S. Lyles, Charlie Abell, Tricia L. Banks, John R. 
Barnes, June Borawski, Lucia Monica Chavez, Christine Kelley Cimko, 
Christine E. Cowart, Daniel J. Cox, Jr., Madelyn R. Creedon, Richard D. 
DeBobes, Marie Fabrizio Dickinson, Shawn H. Edwards, Jonathan L. 
Etherton, Pamela L. Farrell, Richard W. Fieldhouse, Cristina W. Fiori, 
Jan Gordon, Creighton Greene, Patrick ``PT'' Henry, Larry J. Hoag, 
Andrew W. Johnson, Melinda M. Koutsoumpas, Lawrence J. Lanzillotta, 
George W. Lauffer, Peter K. Levine, Paul M. Longsworth, Stephen L. 
Madey, Jr., Michael J. McCord, J. Reaves McLeod, John H. Miller, Ann M. 
Mittermeyer, Bert K. Mizusawa, Jennifer L. O'Keefe, Cindy Pearson, 
Sharen E. Reaves, Sarah J. Ritch, Moultrie D. Roberts, Steven C. 
Saulnier, Cord A. Sterling, Scott W. Stucky, Eric H. Thoemmes, Roslyne 
D. Turner, Amy M. Vanderwerff and Jennifer L. Wallace.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I believe we have a good bill and I urge 
all my colleagues to support it.


                         privilege of the floor

  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the privileges of the 
floor be granted to the following members of the Armed Services 
Committee staff during the pendency of S. 924, the national defense 
authorization bill for fiscal year 1998, for today, each day the 
measure is pending and for rollcall votes thereon:
  Les Brownlee, Charlie Abell, Tricia L. Banks, John R. Barnes, Lucia 
Monica Chavez, Christine Kelley Cimko, Christine E. Cowart, Daniel J. 
Cox, Jr., Madelyn R. Creedon, Richard D. DeBobes, Marie F. Dickinson, 
Shawn H. Edwards, Jonathan L. Etherton, Pamela L. Farrell, and Richard 
W. Fieldhouse.
  Cristina W. Fiori, Jan Gordon, Creighton Greene, Gary M. Hall, 
Patrick ``PT'' Henry, Larry J. Hoag, Andrew W. Johnson, Melinda M. 
Koutsoumpas, Lawrence J. Lanzillotta, George W. Lauffer, Peter K. 
Levine, Paul M. Longsworth, David L. Lyles, Stephen L. Madey, Jr., and 
Michael J. McCord.
  J. Reaves McLeod, John H. Miller, Ann M. Mittermeyer, Bert K. 
Mizusawa, Jennifer L. O'Keefe, Cindy Pearson, Sharen E. Reaves, Sarah 
J. Ritch, Moultrie D. Roberts, Steven C. Saulnier, Cord A. Sterling, 
Scott W. Stucky, Eric H. Thoemmes, Roslyne D. Turner, Amy M. 
Vanderwerff, and Jennifer L. Wallace.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I join the chairman of the Armed Services 
Committee in bringing S. 936, the national defense authorization bill, 
to the floor, and I want to congratulate the Senator from South 
Carolina for the extraordinary effort he has put in on this bill. He 
has really guided this bill through thick and thin, so that we are in a 
position where we can bring this bill to the floor. It is his 
commitment and his energy that he devotes to national defense that has 
made this possible. I congratulate him on that.
  I want to reiterate the comments of the chairman of the committee 
that we are here debating S. 936, which is the bill that was reported 
yesterday. Now, this bill is almost identical to S. 924, which was the 
version of the defense authorization bill that was reported earlier 
this week. The exception is that the bill before us does not contain 
certain provisions relative to depot maintenance that were in the 
earlier bill. That has been the subject of a number of colloquies here 
this afternoon.
  This bill meets the guidelines of the budget agreement and the fiscal 
year 1998 budget resolution. The members of the committee didn't agree 
on every provision; we never do, of course. There are several critical 
areas where I believe this bill needs to be improved. I will be working 
to make these improvements during the debate and during the conference. 
But despite the few disagreements that existed, there was--again, as 
this committee traditionally does--a very strong sense of 
bipartisanship and a spirit of cooperation that permeated the 
discussions and the markups. I want to join my friend, the chairman of 
the committee, in thanking all of the members of the committee and the 
staff for the hard work put up to get this bill to this point.
  The chairman has summarized major provisions of the bill, and I want 
to take a few moments to give my perspective on some of the key 
provisions.
  First, relative to the implementation of the quadrennial defense 
review recommendations, for the most part, this bill is consistent with 
the administration's defense policies and programs. The budget 
agreement this year demonstrated that there is a growing consensus 
between the President and the Congress over the level of defense 
spending for the next 5 years. It is not going to be possible, at these 
funding levels, to maintain today's force levels at their current 
readiness posture, provide the pay and the quality of life for our 
military members and their families that they deserve and that we are 
obligated to provide, and still to modernize our forces to meet 
possible future threats. We are not going to be able to do all that at 
the agreed-upon funding levels.
  In my view, our forces must continue to have the technological edge 
over any potential adversary. In order to modernize our forces, we are 
going to have to accept, in my judgment, a somewhat smaller force in 
the future. But there are encouraging indications that technology is 
going to allow a smaller force to have the same or even greater 
lethality and combat effectiveness as our forces have today.
  The recently completed quadrennial defense review begins to make some 
of the tradeoffs that we are going to need to make to be able to 
modernize our forces. In several important respects, this bill begins 
to implement the requested recommendations. For example, the bill 
reduces active duty personnel strength for the military services by 
36,000 below the current levels and reduces Reserve component strength 
16,000 below current levels.
  The bill supports a major Army initiative, which was recommended at 
the quadrennial defense review, by increasing funding by approximately 
$150 million for the Army's Force 21 initiative. Last April, I visited 
the Army's advanced war-fighting experiment at the National Training 
Center. I saw, firsthand, the tremendous potential of the advanced 
situational technologies the Army is developing in their Force 21 
initiative. The QDR recommended speeding up the fielding of these 
technologies, and the committee bill supports this important effort.
  I may say that a number of our colleagues visited the center as well. 
I know the Senator from Indiana, for instance, also visited the 
National Training Center, and he is the chairman of our subcommittee. 
He was also very deeply impressed by the potential of these 
technologies, and he is primarily instrumental, I would say, for the 
increased resources that we are devoting to this initiative. I have 
been happy to support that effort. I believe very strongly in them. But 
I want to give credit to Senator Coats for the energies he has shown in 
this regard.
  In order to be able to afford the modernization program for the 
military services outlined in the quadrennial defense review, it is 
important that the Congress and the Defense Department carefully limit 
weapons acquisition programs to only the levels necessary to meet the 
future requirements of the military services. In this regard, I am 
pleased that our committee included a provision prohibiting future 
production of B-2 bombers beyond the 21 currently planned for the Air 
Force. We don't need and we can't afford more B-2's.
  Finally, Mr. President, in this area, we have heard from a number of 
Senators this year expressing concern over the levels of procurement 
funding for the National Guard and Reserve components.
  The committee bill authorizes a total of $653 million above the 
budget request to buy equipment for National Guard and Reserve units. 
But now I want to turn to several areas of concern that I have with 
this bill.

[[Page S5983]]

  First, on base closures: I am disappointed that the committee could 
not agree on a process for future base closures in the Department of 
Defense. Although there was strong support in the committee for more 
base closures, the amendment to authorize two additional base closure 
rounds--one in 1999 and one in 2001--failed on a 9 to 9 tie vote. I 
believe that the case for closing more military bases is clear and 
compelling.
  From 1989 to 1997 the Department of Defense reduced total active duty 
military end strength by 32 percent. That figure is going to grow to 36 
percent by the year 2003, as a result of the quadrennial defense 
review. So we have cut the size of our forces by 36 percent as of the 
year 2003, and already by 32 percent.
  But even after the four base closure rounds, the domestic military 
base structure in the United States has been reduced by only 21 
percent. And therein lies the problem. We have more structure than we 
need in our bases. So both the QDR, quadrennial defense review of the 
Department of Defense, and the national defense panel of outside 
citizens that we have selected to review the QDR division--both the QDR 
and that outside defense panel--have concluded that further reductions 
in the DOD base structure are essential to free up money that we need 
to modernize our forces.
  Because we have to make some very difficult choices here, one of the 
critical choices is whether or not we are going to continue to keep 
excess structure when we are shorting modernization funding. And on 
June 5 the Armed Services Committee received a letter signed by all six 
members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The chairman, the vice chairman, 
the four service chiefs all signed one letter. It is rather unusual. 
But they did it in this case because of the strength of their views. 
And they urged us in this letter to ``strongly support further 
reductions in base structure proposed by the Secretary of Defense.''
  Mr. President, every dollar that we spend to keep open bases that we 
don't need is $1 that we can't spend on modernization programs that our 
military forces do need. And I know that closing bases is a painful 
process. I have been through it. We lost all three of our Strategic Air 
Command bases in Michigan. One of them that was closed recently was in 
the upper peninsula of Michigan which was the largest single employer 
in the upper peninsula in a rural area, and it was closed. We argued 
against it. We lost. So the largest employer in the upper peninsula of 
Michigan shut down. We are surviving. A lot of good people are putting 
their shoulder to the wheel and we are going to be able to pull 
through. Is there some short-term pain and stress? You bet. Is it 
essential that we go through this process to reduce excess structure? 
It is.
  Are there additional facilities in Michigan that might be addressed 
in future rounds of base closings? There are. And that has to make all 
of us worry. But we have really no choice. If we are serious about 
modernizing, about the need to modernize and to keep ahead of any 
potential adversary, and to make sure that our forces in the future 
have the best equipment that can possibly be developed and 
manufactured, we have to do what the Joint Chiefs have urged us to do 
in this 24-star letter; and that is to support further reductions in 
base closures which has closings which have been recommended by the 
Secretary of Defense. I don't see any other choice. The easy way is to 
not do it. But it is not the right thing to do, if we are going to 
maintain our qualitative technological edge. We just simply must 
continue to find a way to reduce our infrastructure costs. And, if that 
means that the next round of base closing we have to adjust it so that 
we don't run into the kind of argument that we have run into in the 
past round of base closings, if we have to put in the next round of 
base closing a provision that you can't privatize in place, for 
instance, without a specific recommendation to do that by BRAC, if that 
is what it is going to take, then so be it. But we have to continue 
down this road, if we are going to be true to the needs of our 
military.
  Secretary Cohen pointed out in his testimony on the quadrennial 
defense review that the choice is clear. We can maintain the current 
base structure and fail to meet our modernization goals, or we can 
reduce our base structure and achieve the savings that we need to pay 
for the modernization that we all agree is necessary.
  On the Air Force depot issue, there is no more contentious issue than 
this one. And I commend the Senators who permitted this process of 
bringing this bill to the floor to continue by removing the contentious 
provisions at this time. I commend them for it. In my view, the only 
way to resolve this issue is to have a fair competition, and determine 
the most cost-effective solution to redistribute the workload of these 
two depots, regardless of whether the result is privatization in place, 
privatization in some other location, or transfer to another Government 
depot.
  There are many that believe and I know that the White House 
politicized this one aspect of the base closure process when the DOD 
privatized in place the work of the two closing Air Force depots. But I 
think it would be just as bad for Congress to politicize the base 
closure process by attempting to legislate a particular outcome. I 
don't think we can legislate a particular outcome.
  I don't think we should. I think we should legislate a process which 
will guarantee that there be a full and fair competition. I tried that 
approach in committee. I didn't quite make it. But I think that is the 
best way to proceed.
  We have base-decision amendments on this bill, and, even if we do 
not, we are going to face this issue in conference because the House 
bill contains provisions that do address the issue. Ultimately we will 
have to reach a compromise I believe that is fair and equitable to all.
  On another subject, cooperative threat reduction programs: One of the 
most cost-effective and successful defense programs to reduce threats 
to our country and to enhance our national security is the cooperative 
threat reduction program that was started in 1991 by Senators Nunn and 
Lugar. The cooperative threat reduction program at the Department of 
Defense and its companion program at the Department of Energy have 
produced important results in reducing the threat of proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical, and 
biological weapons and their materials.
  In my view, the committee decision to reduce the budget request for 
these programs by $135 million was shortsighted. I would have preferred 
to see an increase in funding for these programs because they are a 
very cost-effective approach to the most serious national security 
threat that we face today. That is the threat from the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction. Of all the security threats that we face, 
that is probably the most serious one--weapons of mass destruction in 
the hands of terrorists, or terrorist states.
  This is a very modest investment in terms of defense budget, and it 
can significantly reduce the threat of proliferation by securing 
materials wherever they are--in this case Russia and some of the other 
former Soviet Union states. That is a real investment in our own 
security with a huge payoff.
  It doesn't take much of this plutonium or enriched uranium to leak--
to be transferred across the borders of these states to threaten us 
with massive destruction. About a hockey puck of plutonium can take 
care of one of our cities. That can be carried in one's pocket. That 
material literally can be carried in a pocket across a border. We need 
to secure that material; whatever it takes to secure it within reason.
  These are reasonable amounts of money. We are talking about a major 
investment in American security.
  So I think the decision to reduce the budget request for these 
programs, including security of nuclear material, was a mistake. And I 
know there is going to be a bipartisan effort to restore these funds 
for this important program. I hope that we will do so here on the 
floor.
  Mr. President, on another part of the bill, the committee authorized 
$345 million to begin incremental funding of the construction of the 
next Nimitz class nuclear aircraft carrier called CVN-77. It did so 
based on claims of cost savings by the shipbuilder. Those claims, it 
seems to me, can be made reasonably. Those are claims that have some 
foundation.
  Indeed, there was a report that we received. The Rand Corp. folks did 
a

[[Page S5984]]

study on this issue that said that the savings which were advertised 
here claimed by the shipbuilder can be achieved. It is possible. But 
what we failed to do in committee is to assure that the advertised and 
claimed savings would be achieved. We didn't adopt the safeguards to 
ensure that the taxpayers actually received the savings advertised by 
the shipbuilder on which this very unusual action is based.
  We do not incrementally fund aircraft carriers. We do not say, ``OK, 
we will put a couple hundred million dollars in this year, and a couple 
hundred million dollars in next year'', and so forth, because it makes 
it very difficult for us when it comes to negotiating the contract to 
purchase the aircraft carrier to have any bargaining leverage. We have 
already incrementally funded, bought pieces of it, obligated funds for 
it, and we have lost our bargaining leverage when it comes to the 
price. So what we have done traditionally is authorized the whole thing 
at once in order to make sure that we get the best deal when it comes 
time to negotiate the price.
  The Defense Department's current future years' defense program 
includes a total of $5.2 billion for the construction of the next 
aircraft carrier with what is called ``advanced procurement'' in the 
year 2000, and the balance of $4.5 billion in the year 2002. But 
earlier this year the shipbuilder came forward with a proposal, as I 
said, to incrementally fund this carrier beginning in this year's 
budget--the one that is in front of us--and continuing each year 
through 2002. According to the shipbuilder, this alternative funding 
proposal would save us $600 million in the cost of building the CVN-77. 
And this claim has been repeated many times in the last 2 months in 
some very highly visible advertising in the media.
  As I said, the normal method of funding major defense procurement 
funding programs is to provide full funding in one lump sum in the year 
in which the program is started.
  There have been certain exceptions and limited long-lead items which 
are funded through advanced procurement. And the reason for it is the 
one that I have given, which has to do with avoiding buy-ins--the 
situation in which it becomes more difficult to control total program 
costs in future and future cost growth.
  But the Rand Corp. did that study I referred to, and it substantiated 
that savings were really possible here if we incrementally fund it as 
proposed by the shipbuilders, and the Navy's own analysis subsequently 
confirmed that this savings could be achieved.
  So I am willing to support incremental funding as one Senator, but I 
am willing to do it only if this incremental funding approach assures 
us that the Government is going to receive the savings from this 
approach that had been promised by the contractor. And it is doable. We 
can do this. And I will be offering an amendment--and I hope there will 
be bipartisan support for this amendment--that will attempt to assure 
that this $600 million in advertised savings is, in fact, achieved in 
the purchase of this aircraft carrier. And we began, I think, to do 
this in a way which allows us to get the savings but also to assure the 
savings.
  Mr. President, just one or two other items. Section 1039 of this bill 
prohibits the General Accounting Office from undertaking any self-
initiated audits unless it can certify that it has completed all 
congressional requests. Since the General Accounting Office has 
hundreds of pending requests at any given time, this provision in 
effect is a total prohibition on any self-initiated work by the GAO.
  I hope that this provision will be deleted or modified because it 
could hamstring the GAO in its very important efforts to identify 
waste, fraud and abuse in Government programs. Already 80 percent of 
the GAO work is in response to the requests of committees and Members 
of the Congress. But some of the work that they do fulfills work that 
has been carried out by them in the waste, fraud and abuse area which 
they have self-initiated and which has been very, very important to the 
Congress in identifying waste, fraud and abuse--not just in the defense 
area, in any area. And this provision applies not just to defense. The 
provision in this defense bill applies Governmentwide.
  That is why the chairman of the Governmental Affairs Committee, 
Senator Thompson, and the ranking member of the Governmental Affairs 
Committee, Senator Glenn, both wrote a letter requesting sequential 
referral of this bill to Governmental Affairs so that they could have a 
look at this provision which is Governmentwide and would restrict the 
GAO. Sequential referral was not approved because, under the rules, the 
parliamentary rules, apparently in order for there to be sequential 
referral, a bill must have many more provisions in it relating to that 
second committee than this one provision. It has to predominantly 
belong within the jurisdiction of a second committee, and this bill 
obviously does not. This is one of a few provisions which touches the 
Governmental Affairs jurisdiction. But I do hope that we will be able 
to find a way to either delete or to modify this provision as it will 
hamstring the efforts of the GAO in doing some very important work.
  Finally, Mr. President, section 363 of this bill gives the Secretary 
of Defense the unprecedented authority unilaterally to stop for 30 days 
certain administrative actions of other Federal agencies. The Secretary 
would have this authority without regard to the valid health or safety 
concerns that may have motivated other agencies in taking their action. 
This automatic stay could cover rules and orders intended to protect 
the environment and safeguard work safety or preserve private property 
and many other conceivable administrative actions and orders. This 
action exceeds the jurisdiction of the Armed Services Committee. It 
creates the appearance of placing the Department of Defense above the 
law. For these reasons, I do not believe that it should have been 
included in the bill, and I hope we can find a way to correct it.
  Mr. President, I know there will be some vigorous debate on this 
bill, and I hope Senators will come to the floor and offer their 
amendments so that we can complete Senate action on the bill in a 
timely manner and in a fashion that the majority leader has announced, 
and then go to conference with the House.
  And, again, I want to commend my friend from South Carolina for his 
leadership on the committee and in making it possible for this bill to 
come to the floor. I yield the floor.
  Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I would like to take this opportunity to 
commend Senator Levin, the ranking member of this committee, for his 
fine cooperation, advice and assistance during the preparation of this 
bill. This cooperation on his part greatly enhanced the successful 
completion of the 1998 defense authorization legislation. We worked in 
a bipartisan manner for the benefit of our great Nation, and by doing 
this I think we have brought to the floor an excellent bill on behalf 
of our Nation.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, as we begin consideration of the Senate's 
version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998, 
I cannot help reflecting on the increasingly illogical nature of the 
process through which we have arrived at this point. By that I refer to 
the task of marking up yet another defense bill while budgets continue 
to decline in real terms, force structure continues to contract, and 
operational requirements continue to climb, while Members of Congress 
continue to waste considerable sums on projects of questionable merit.
  Let me say first that there is much in this bill that warrants our 
support, including an active duty pay raise, improvements in the way 
housing allowances for military personnel are calculated and applied, 
funding for tactical aviation modernization and missile defense 
programs, increased emphasis on defense against chemical and biological 
weapons, and much more.
  The bill includes, for example, a provision authorizing the 
Department of Defense to waive CHAMPUS deductibles and annual fees for 
service members and their families who are stationed in remote duty 
locations within the continental United States. These families, most of 
whom are junior enlisted personnel, are geographically separated from 
military treatment facilities and TRICARE Prime sites and now rely to a 
great degree on standard CHAMPUS for health care

[[Page S5985]]

services. The legislation also approves several survivor benefit plans 
that will alleviate much of the emotional anguish experienced by 
surviving spouses of military retirees.
  The committee also adopted an amendment that enhances aviation 
special pays. Compelling testimony from the service chiefs of the Navy, 
Air Force, and Marine Corps revealed that our Armed Forces are facing 
critical shortages of skilled aviators. It is clear that this provision 
will be crucial in retaining sufficient aviators to operate today's 
technically advanced aircraft. Any failure to address this issue would 
certainly have an enormous impact on future readiness.
  I was particularly pleased that the Armed Services Committee 
continued to focus on improving the system by which the services 
determine unit readiness levels. The Department of Defense is directed 
to continue its study of the merits of maintaining units at differing 
levels of readiness, depending upon actual deployability and the 
likelihood of each unit actually responding to a crisis. With budgets 
being as tight as they are while fiscally daunting modernization 
decisions are fast approaching, it is worth examining whether savings 
in the operations and maintenance accounts--the largest portion of the 
defense budget and the most difficult to track--can be identified and 
reallocated to high priority research and development and procurement 
programs.

  I recognize that there is already a considerable amount of tiering 
that occurs in the Navy simply by virtue of the deployment, training, 
and maintenance schedules it must follow in order to meet requirements. 
The Army and Air Force, however, may be a source of some savings if 
units whose deployability is highly contingent on air and sealift 
capabilities are permitted to relax their readiness levels to some 
degree. In fact, many Army personnel have expressed the sentiment that 
they would fare better if forced to perform fewer training exercises, 
which place a strain on people and equipment.
  I am not arguing that units should be permitted to atrophy; on the 
contrary, I would like to think that none of us would acquiesce in the 
implementation of policies that would place U.S. interests and military 
personnel at risk. It is a legitimate question, though, whether certain 
units must be retained at the highest readiness levels despite the 
improbability of deployment, given operational plans, and the time it 
would take for such units to deploy given available lift assets.
  One of the more significant actions taken by the committee involved 
termination of funding for the B-2 bomber, including of funds required 
to preserve that aircraft's industrial base. Opponents of the amendment 
to end the program once and for all argued that we need to maintain the 
ability to build more of these extremely technically complex aircraft 
in the event future contingencies require more stealth bombers. We 
already have enough strategic bombers in the inventory, however, and 
the Air Force has repeatedly testified that it does not want and cannot 
afford any more. Most important, the time it takes to build even one B-
2 precludes our being able to surge produce them in the event of a 
major deterioration in the international environment. Should a major 
regional contingency arise, it will be fought with the bombers on-
hand--not ones more than a year from being operational.
  Unfortunately, for all that is good in this bill, there is much that 
is wasteful. The manner in which shipbuilding and conversion dollars 
are allocated no longer bears any resemblance to actual military 
requirements and available resources, nor does it correspond to 
essential industrial base preservation concerns. Rational discourse on 
whether to incrementally fund a $5 billion aircraft carrier cannot 
occur without other shipbuilding interests demanding something for 
themselves. After all, what's another destroyer above and beyond the 
number requested and budgeted for? What's another LPD-class ship, or an 
AOE fast support ship, or another submarine? For the last several 
years, we have seen a dangerous trend whereby decisions on shipbuilding 
matters, more than any other--save for the depot issue--are predicated 
solely on parochial considerations. This situation has to stop.
  One of the more disappointing results of the Armed Services 
Committee's mark-up of this bill was the rejection of an amendment 
sponsored by Senators Robb, Levin, Coats, and myself that would have 
statutorily mandated the two base closure rounds called for in the 
Quadrennial Defense Review. There is a broad consensus that the Defense 
Department, even after the previous four rounds of such closings, 
continues to maintain considerably more infrastructure than it needs. 
The expenditures associated with maintaining these installations and 
facilities constitute a major drain on declining resources allocated 
for national defense. Rejection of the amendment represented a serious 
setback in the efforts of some of us at instilling greater discipline 
into the budgetary process.
  Mr. President, you can support the Reserve component of our total 
force without acquiescing in the thorough hemorrhaging of scarce 
military construction dollars for National Guard projects. The total 
military construction budget request for projects located inside the 
United States was $2 billion, not including another $2 billion for base 
closure activities. The request for National Guard and Reserve 
construction projects was $172 million. Of the 87 military construction 
projects added to the administration's request, 46--more than half--are 
for the National Guard and Reserve. The Senate bill includes over $900 
million in National Guard and Reserve procurement items, the House 
version $700 million.
  As I have already noted, the bill includes an ample supply of pork-
barrel projects, including continued funding of High Frequency Active 
Auroral Research Program, or HAARP. This project, while certainly 
interesting from a purely theoretical perspective, is thoroughly 
lacking in merit and does not belong in a defense spending bill. Nor do 
additional dollars for the National Oceanographic Partnership Program. 
The Navy, out of whose budget this project is funded, derives no 
tangible return on its investment. This nondefense program may deserve 
to be funded in another area of the Federal budget, but it does not 
belong in this bill. Individually, projects like these are a serious 
waste of taxpayer dollars. Collectively, they constitute a serious 
drain on the resources needed to ensure future military readiness.
  In short, Mr. President, it is regrettable that the propensity of 
Members to continue to add pork as though it were still the early 
1980's remains as strong as ever.


                           Amendment No. 417

(Purpose: To strike section 3138, relating to a prohibition on recovery 
    of certain additional costs for environmental response actions 
  associated with the Formerly Utilized Site Remedial Action Project 
 program, and to require a report on the remediation activities of the 
                         Department of Energy)

  Mr. LAUTENBERG addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I have an amendment that I send to the 
desk and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from New Jersey [Mr. Lautenberg], for himself 
     and Mr. Torricelli, proposes an amendment numbered 417.

  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading 
of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:
       Strike out section 3138 and insert in lieu thereof the 
     following:

     SEC. 3138. REPORT ON REMEDIATION ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT 
                   OF ENERGY.

       The Secretary of Energy shall submit to Congress a report 
     on the remediation activities of the Department of Energy.

  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, first let me say to the distinguished 
chairman of the Armed Services Committee and the ranking member that I 
commend them for a job well done. I am very much aware of the 
complications that one has in the defense authorization bill. It is a 
large sum of money, a very complicated piece of legislation. It has 
research funds and it has operational money. It is quite a job, and I 
commend the both of them for moving this rapidly and getting this bill 
to the floor.
  Mr. President, I have an amendment that would strike a section, 
section

[[Page S5986]]

3138 of this bill because this section prevents the Department of 
Energy from recovering any cleanup costs at sites under DOE's Formerly 
Utilized Site Remedial Action Project program other than the costs 
already covered in a written, legally binding agreement with the party 
involved in the site.
  To put it more simply, this section would strike the Department of 
Energy's ability to recover costs already covered in a previous 
agreement with a party involved in the site.
  As a practical matter, Mr. President, it would absolve W.R. Grace 
Company of millions of dollars of responsibility for toxic pollution 
costs by their actions. The effect of this provision from the analysis 
that we have conducted so far is to grant a special exemption from 
Superfund law to one company. The Superfund law, a law which I am proud 
to have helped author, embodies the principle that polluters should pay 
for the damage they do, and in this case W.R. Grace should pay for the 
cleanup of the mess that it created.
  The deal was an unacceptable slap in the face to American taxpayers 
and the residents of Wayne, NJ, my home State. As a matter of fact, I 
lived in this community for some time. The residents of Wayne Township 
have been living with this problem for such a long period of time, and 
why this amendment is so outrageous is something that I want to 
explain.
  A pile of approximately 15,000 cubic yards of potentially radioactive 
material has already been removed by the Department of Energy, and the 
Department of Energy says that there are still about 70,000 cubic yards 
more still buried at the Wayne site, and it is still deciding how to 
clean up the part that is on the surface and below. The Department of 
Energy estimates the entire cleanup may cost $120 million. The major 
contaminant in this soil is a contaminant called thorium, highly 
radioactive material. It is known to cause cancer and has a half life, 
Mr. President, that is far longer than perhaps this Earth can endure. 
It is 14 billion years. In other words, this stuff stays hot for that 
long a period of time.
  This deadly waste was the result of industrial activity going on 
since 1948, almost 50 years ago. The contamination may affect the 
drinking water of 51,000 New Jersey residents resulting in untold 
harmful health consequences. The W.R. Grace company owned the property 
and contributed to this huge pile of waste. The Grace company signed an 
agreement with the Federal Government in which it promised to 
contribute to the cleanup, and then they went on to pay a tiny fraction 
of the ultimate cleanup cost for this site when they deeded over the 
property to the Government. They paid $800,000 as a down payment on 
$120 million. That does not sound like a very serious downpayment to 
me. But the agreement also said that the Federal Government maintained 
the right to come after W.R. Grace under other laws to remedy the 
threats caused by their pollution despite again the agreement they had 
signed. But nothing happened for many years.
  In 1995, I urged in a letter to the Department of Energy to expedite 
the cleanup by negotiating with W.R. Grace, the responsible party, the 
polluter, to pay its share. Those negotiations began shortly 
thereafter. Over the last year, I have been assured a number of times 
by the Energy and Justice Departments that progress was being made. And 
for over 1 year now W.R. Grace has been engaged in a discussion with 
the Department of Justice, which I believe was in good faith, to 
determine what share Grace would pay for contributing so much to this 
mess.

  Now I read the language in this bill and find that it effectively 
wipes out all of the progress that has been made, wipes out all of the 
obligation that W.R. Grace would have. This language takes away the 
Department of Energy's legal rights under the Superfund polluter pays 
liability system. It abrogates a legal commitment signed by Grace.
  Mr. President, this puts the burden squarely on the American taxpayer 
instead of the polluters. Further, it will delay the cleanup and could 
poison the drinking water of the people of Wayne and the State of New 
Jersey. The Department of Energy, Mr. President, has limited cleanup 
dollars and numerous sites across the country under a program that is 
called FUSRAP, the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program. 
These are the sites of industrial activity that may have contributed at 
one point to our Nation's defense. That does not mean they have a 
license to pollute thereafter. They have a responsibility.
  Without an infusion of cleanup funds from the parties responsible for 
the mess in Wayne, there will be years of delay in this cleanup, years 
when the radioactive waste will continue to blight a community, years 
for that plume to migrate, to reach the drinking water source for that 
town.
  Mr. President, the Senator from New Hampshire, Mr. Smith, and I 
worked together on the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee 
and together we are trying to rewrite the Superfund law which is soon 
to expire. We worked together in good faith, and I believe we have 
narrowed the differences on many issues affecting Superfund. I hope 
that we are going to be able to produce a bill later this year with 
both our names as cosponsors of that legislation.
  However, as far as the provision in this bill that deals with the 
Department of Energy cleanup at the site in Wayne, I oppose it 
strenuously. As the Senator from New Hampshire expressed to me, he had 
no scheme in mind to mitigate the obligation that W.R. Grace has to do 
the cleanup. That was an effect apparently unintended by the Senator 
from New Hampshire, but we have to deal in reality not the intent. W.R. 
Grace must stand up to their obligation. The reality is that the 
provision in this bill would not only slow down the Wayne cleanup 
program, but it would also transfer its costs from the responsible 
party to the taxpayer. We are not going to stand for that, Mr. 
President.

  So I urge the adoption of my amendment and urge my colleagues to 
support it.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the amendment? The 
Senator from New Hampshire.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, the amendment of the 
Senator from New Jersey addresses a provision, section 3138, in the 
defense bill which relates to something called Formerly Utilized Sites 
Remedial Action Program [FUSRAP]. I just want to give a little 
background as to how and why the language the Senator is concerned 
about appeared in the legislation and also to indicate what its intent 
was and to discuss specifically his amendment.
  Earlier this year it came to the attention of the Armed Services 
Committee this program, the so-called FUSRAP program, was not getting 
the sites cleaned up as quickly or as efficiently as it could. Of 
course, as all of us know who work on the Superfund issue, that is true 
of many, many Superfund sites around the country as well as these 
particular FUSRAP sites. So the committee felt we wanted to do 
something to expedite the cleanups, to get it done quicker, to respond 
to the concerns raised by Members who were not on our committee--that 
is the Armed Services Committee--and in some cases were not even on the 
Environment and Public Works Committee. In order to try to respond to 
those concerns, the Armed Services Committee unanimously adopted this 
language. It was hoped it would speed up the cleanup of these sites and 
provide an incentive for parties that were responsible for the 
contamination of these sites to come to the table, negotiate their 
liability allocations with DOE, and to contribute an appropriate amount 
to the cleanup costs--not to give anybody a sweetheart deal, not to 
remove people from the hook, so to speak, but rather to bring people to 
the table to pay their appropriate share of the cleanup costs. That was 
the goal and the objective of the language.
  I might say, unfortunately, sometimes these disputes manage to make 
their way to the floor because they are not resolved before we get 
here. Had this Senator had some knowledge of concerns raised by members 
of the committee or other Members of the Senate prior to this time, we 
might have been able to address those concerns. But as I indicated 
earlier, it passed unanimously in the Armed Services Committee. There 
was absolutely no discussion of it in the committee. So it is 
unfortunate that we

[[Page S5987]]

have to deal with it here, but, be that as it may, that is what we will 
do.
  The language included in the section would have limited DOE's ability 
to seek cost recoveries against some private parties. That is true. 
That is what Senator Lautenberg just said. But in no way would it have 
limited the similar powers, the collateral powers that the EPA and the 
Department of Justice has to obtain these recoveries, get these dollars 
recovered. So, given the fact that DOE may have some level of 
responsibility for liability at these sites, we on the committee 
believed it was an inappropriate conflict of interest for them to have 
control for recovering costs against private parties. So, by leveling 
the playing field, we believed it would be more likely that private 
parties would settle their liability at the site, and, given the fact 
that EPA and DOJ would still have enforcement authority, we knew no 
party would be let off the hook. That was the intention.
  I believe in my own heart, as I read the language, that the language 
supports that intention. But I can understand there may be differences 
of opinion in terms of how you interpret it. There have been some 
concerns raised that we tried to address a single-party site here, to 
give somebody specific relief. That could not be further from the 
truth. I think the facts speak for themselves. This was a generic 
amendment. I might say the topic at hand here is the so-called FUSRAP 
sites, that is the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Project.
  In a DOE Office of Environmental Restoration pamphlet that is dated 
April 1995, there are 46 FUSRAP sites, of varying degrees. I think it 
may be the case that the site in New Jersey could be singled out here 
as possibly being helped in one way or another by his provision. 
However, there are 46 sites, so I think the committee is on record 
here, being very clear that the intention here was to deal with 46 
FUSRAP sites to try to expedite the cleanup. They are in States all 
across the United States.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a section of this 
pamphlet listing those 46 FUSRAP sites be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                         Site Name and Location


                                missouri

     Latty Avenue Properties--Hazelwood
     St. Louis Airport Site (SLAPS)--St. Louis
     SLAPS (Vicinity Properties)--Hazelwood and Berkeley
     St. Louis Downtown Site (SLDS)--St. Louis


                               new jersey

     DuPont & Company--Deepwater
     Maywood--Maywood/Rochelle Park
     Middlesex Sampling Plant--Middlesex
     New Brunswick Laboratory--New Brunswick
     Wayne Interim Storage Site--Wayne


                                new york

     Ashland 1--Tonawanda
     Ashland 2--Tonawanda
     Linde Air Products--Tonawanda
     Seaway Industrial Park--Tonawanda
     Bliss & Laughlin Steel--Buffalo
     Colonie--Colonie
     Niagara Falls Storage Site--Lewiston/Youngstown/Niagara Falls


                                  ohio

     Associate Aircraft--Fairfield
     B&T Metals--Columbus
     Baker Brothers--Toledo
     Luckey--Luckey
     Painesville--Painesville


                              Other Sites

     Madison--Madison, IL
     W.R. Grace & Company--Curtis Bay, MD
     Chapman Valve--Indian Orchard, MA
     Shpack Landfill--Norton/Attleboro, MA
     Ventron--Beverly, MA
     General Motors--Adrian, MI
     CE Site--Windsor, CT


                           cleanup completed

     Acid/Pueblo Canyons--Los Alamos, NM
     Alba Craft--Oxford, OH
     Albany Research Center--Albany, OR
     Aliquippa Forge--Aliquippa, PA
     Baker & Williams Warehouses--New York, NY
     Bayo Canyon--Los Alamos, NM
     Chupadera Mesa--White Sands Missile Range, NM
     Elza Gate--Oak Ridge, TN
     Granite City Steel--Granite City, IL
     HHM Safe Co.--Hamilton, OH
     National Guard Armory--Chicago, IL
     Kellex/Pierpont--Jersey City, NJ
     Middlesex Municipal Landfill--Middlesex/Piscataway, NJ
     Niagara Falls Storage Site Vicinity Properties--Lewiston, NY
     Seymour Specialty Wire--Seymour, CT
     C.H. Schnoor--Springdale, PA
     University of California--Berkeley, CA
     University of Chicago--Chicago, IL
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. So that was the intention here and the 
point I wanted to make regarding these sites.
  Let me also say, because this is kind of a technical term--the so-
called FUSRAP sites is a little hard to understand. We have a lot of 
acronyms here. I know it is difficult for people to comprehend some of 
these, but this program was initiated in 1974 by the Atomic Energy 
Commission under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. They have 7 or 8 major 
objectives. I will just briefly highlight those.
  One is to find and evaluate sites that supported the Manhattan 
Engineer District/Atomic Energy Commission's early atomic energy 
program and to determine whether these sites needed cleanup or control.
  Second, to clean up or control these sites so that they meet current 
DOE guidelines.
  Third, to dispose of or stabilize waste in an environmentally 
acceptable way.
  Fourth, to complete all work so the DOE complies with the appropriate 
Federal laws and regulations and State and local environmental and land 
use requirements.
  Fifth, to certify the sites for appropriate future use.
  These sites are owned by either the Department of Energy, local 
governments, private corporations or private citizens or a combination 
thereof.
  Again, the goal here was to try to craft something that would 
expedite these 46 FUSRAP sites, some with problems more serious in 
nature than others. Obviously the site the Senator from New Jersey is 
talking about is much more serious than some of the others. But the 
idea was to bring these parties to the table in a fair and equitable 
way, being certain that those PRPs that had put money on the table, had 
offered money on the table, would be encouraged to provide not only 
that money but more. That way, we could get a fair settlement so the 
taxpayers would be saved dollars and at the same time we would 
accomplish the goal of cleaning up these sites.
  In a moment I am going to offer a second-degree perfecting amendment 
to the amendment of the Senator from New Jersey. Before I do that, I 
just want to say that I understand the concerns of the Senator. He has 
been very cooperative. We have talked about this at great length in the 
past few days to try to come to an understanding of what my intent was 
and what he believes the result to be. We may not be 100 percent in 
agreement here, but I think we can resolve this with this second-degree 
amendment which I believe addresses the concerns of the Senator and at 
the same time will lead us to accomplishing the cleanup goal that we 
want to achieve.
  I do not want to preclude the Senator's debate. I would be happy to 
withhold offering the second-degree if the Senator wants to speak on 
this amendment? I will withhold that amendment and I will yield the 
floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I just want to respond to my 
colleague. I do not object to the Senator's second degree amendment. If 
it is passed into law, DOE is going to have to report to Congress next 
year on the number of sites of this category, the FUSRAP program, on 
the cost of cleanup, the numbers of sites where private parties are 
involved, and on the progress DOE has made in pursuing them for a 
cleanup costs.
  We want to do these sort of things. This reporting requirement is 
certainly a step in the right direction. DOE at last will be required 
to step up its efforts to make the private sector pay for the pollution 
it caused. It's only fair. The private sector profited enormously from 
participating in DOE's efforts to build the Nation's nuclear arsenal. 
The company, however, should not escape liability for the mess they 
created as they did that.
  These former DOE sites, Department of Energy sites, contain some of 
the Nation's most dangerous and pernicious pollution problems. Their 
radioactive legacy--it is incredible--will endure for thousands if not 
millions of years. This stuff, unfortunately, creates the energy supply 
as well as the hazard for this period of time. DOE has been shamefully 
slow and their reluctance to bring W.R. Grace into the cleanup efforts 
is inexplicable. In fact,

[[Page S5988]]

DOE did not begin to go after Grace as a responsible party until I 
started urging them to do so, now over 2 years ago.

  Sadly enough, Wayne is not the only New Jersey site being managed by 
the Department of Energy under the FUSRAP program. New Jersey has five 
of these sites, including another thorium site which threatens 
residents of Maywood, Rochelle Park and Lodi. Like the Wayne citizens, 
these residents, too, have been waiting patiently for lots of years to 
see that their particular site is cleaned up.
  This report should prove helpful in encouraging faster cleanup at 
these sites. I support the amendment and I note the presence of my 
colleague from New Jersey on the floor, who has worked closely with me 
on matters affecting the communities, these communities that have these 
radioactive sites.
  I am pleased to see him and to note that we worked together on these 
things. I assume the Senator from New Jersey wants to make some 
comments. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Abraham). The Senator from New Jersey.
  Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. President, I want to identify myself with the 
remarks of my colleague, Senator Lautenberg, and I join with him in 
offering this amendment today. What we have before us is a classic case 
of adding insult to injury. The people of various communities in New 
Jersey have lived for 40 and 50 years with the problem of thorium. The 
stories are long and often involved, but the thorium is clearly 
dangerous in the case of Maywood and the thorium in Wayne. They are all 
the result of wartime production, the production of lanterns and bomb 
sights and other war material that required a low level of radiation.
  In an extraordinary story of success of the U.S. Government, in the 
case of Maywood all the thorium involving residential communities has 
now been removed. Now we are beginning to do the same in the community 
of Wayne. But it is not enough that the people of Wayne have the 
thorium removed. The question remains who will pay the bill? This was 
not an operation of the U.S. Government. This was not a question where 
the Government was operating the facility and it was left for the 
residents. This is a profitmaking corporation that had public and 
private contracts, earned money on the site, left it polluted, and the 
taxpayers are now left with the bill.
  To date, $50 million has been spent. It is estimated the final cost 
could be as high as $120 million to remove 100,000 cubic yards of waste 
material.
  Mr. President, only several months ago, I, as Senator Lautenberg, in 
concern that as we began to make progress in the removal of this 
thorium, wanted to know the progress and who was going to pay the bill. 
We pressed the Department of Energy to seek legal recourse in 
recovering costs and assuring future contributions.
  I, too, met with the W.R. Grace Corp., and I was very pleased after 
those meetings to receive this letter, as Congressman Pascrell, who 
represents this district, received this correspondence and claimed ``we 
are entered into good faith negotiations with the Department of Energy 
in an effort to fairly resolve this matter.''
  The letter from the Grace Corp. concluded:

       Grace has acted in good faith and desires to achieve an 
     amicable resolution to this problem.

  Only to discover in this legislation a prohibition in section (a) and 
(b):

       The Department of Energy may not recover from a party 
     described in subsection (b) any costs of response actions for 
     actual or threatened release of hazardous substances that 
     occurred before reenactment of the act.

  The net result would be that all of our efforts to ensure the 
Department of Energy uses all legal recourse and continues in good-
faith negotiations, that the private parties that profited by these 
operations also bear the cost of removal of the thorium contamination, 
would have been lost and the taxpayers would be left with the entire 
cost, $120 million.
  Mr. President, I am very pleased Senator Lautenberg and I have the 
chance today to strike this provision, and I am very pleased that 
Senator Smith, in his secondary amendment, will simply seek good-faith 
efforts in negotiations to resolve this matter. But let the record be 
clear to the Department of Energy, a good-faith resolution is nothing 
less than the Federal policy of polluter pays prevails.
  We fully expect the Department of Energy to seek those parties who 
profited and that they pay. We cannot allow an enormous environmental 
potential success to be transferred and transformed into a failure. As 
the communities of Maywood have seen much of the thorium now leave, 
Wayne is witnessing the first departure of that same thorium. We intend 
to see it not only removed, but the taxpayers not be left with a legacy 
of debt.
  I am very pleased we have a chance to offer this amendment today, and 
I am glad Senator Smith is now joining us in having good-faith 
negotiations proceed. I urge my colleagues to support both efforts.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire.


                 Amendment No. 418 to Amendment No. 417

   (Purpose: To create a report for Congress regarding the Formerly 
                Utilized Sites Remedial Action program)

  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I think it would be 
appropriate at this time for me to offer the second-degree amendment, 
and then I believe we can get this matter resolved and go on to the 
next amendment.
  So I offer a second-degree amendment to Senator Lautenberg's 
amendment to strike section 3138 from the national defense 
authorization bill for fiscal year 1998. I send the amendment to the 
desk and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. Smith], for himself and 
     Mr. Lautenberg, proposes an amendment numbered 418 to 
     amendment No. 417.

  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent 
that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       In lieu of the language proposed to be inserted, insert the 
     following:

     SEC.   . REPORT ON REMEDIATION UNDER THE FORMERLY UTILIZED 
                   SITES REMEDIAL ACTION PROGRAM.

       Not later than March 1, 1998, the Secretary of Energy shall 
     submit to Congress a report containing the following 
     information regarding the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial 
     Action Program:
       (1) How many Formerly Utilized Sites remain to be 
     remediated, what portions of these remaining sites have 
     completed remediation (including any offsite contamination), 
     what portions of the sites remain to be remediated (including 
     any offsite contamination), what types of contaminants are 
     present at each site, and what are the projected timeframes 
     for completing remediation at each site.
       (2) What is the cost of the remaining response actions 
     necessary to address actual or threatened releases of 
     hazardous substances at each Formerly Utilized Site, 
     including any contamination that is present beyond the 
     perimeter of the facilities.
       (3) For each site, how much it will cost to remediate the 
     radioactive contamination, and how much will it cost to 
     remediate the non-radioactive contamination.
       (4) How many sites potentially involve private parties that 
     could be held responsible for remediation costs, including 
     remediation costs related to offsite contamination.
       (5) What type of agreements under the Formerly Utilized 
     Sites Remedial Action Program have been entered into with 
     private parties to resolve the level of liability for 
     remediation costs at these facilities, and to what extent 
     have these agreements been tied to a distinction between 
     radioactive and non-radioactive contamination present at 
     these sites.
       (6) What efforts have been undertaken by the Department to 
     ensure that the settlement agreements entered into with 
     private parties to resolve liability for remediation costs at 
     these facilities have been consistent on a program wide 
     basis.

  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I am going to take a 
couple of minutes, and then we will move on.
  This second-degree amendment would substitute a reporting requirement 
for the original section of section 3138 directed regarding cost 
recovery agreements at cleanup sites managed by DOE within the so-
called FUSRAP program.
  As you know, and as we indicated earlier, there had been some 
interest requested that limitations be placed on this Federal agency 
cost recovery from

[[Page S5989]]

potential responsible third parties. We were able to deal with those, 
and the Armed Services Committee does not have jurisdiction over these 
issues, but does have jurisdiction over defense-related cleanups of DOE 
sites. Section 3138 was intended to narrowly focus on concerns that 
were related to cost recovery of FUSRAP.
  Mr. President, basically, there are six provisions that are part of 
that report language. They are self-explanatory. This is an attempt to 
try to get a reasonable compromise to see to it that we save taxpayers 
dollars, at the same time to be fair and to get both parties to the 
table as quickly as possible.
  I yield the floor, Mr. President.
  Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, first, let me commend the Senators from New 
Jersey for this amendment and commend the Senator from New Hampshire 
for his support of it with a second-degree amendment.
  It is a good amendment. We support it.
  I ask unanimous consent that a letter from the Department of Energy, 
addressed to our chairman, dated June 19, strongly supporting, in 
effect, the amendment by stating their opposition to the provision, be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                         Department of Energy,

                                    Washington, DC, June 19, 1997.
     Hon. Chairman Strom Thurmond,
     Committee on Armed Services,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Thurmond: I am writing to express strong 
     opposition to a provision, section 3138, in S. 936, National 
     Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998, that would 
     prohibit the Department of Energy from recovering all legally 
     available response costs for certain actual or threatened 
     releases of hazardous substances at sites included in the 
     Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP). At 
     some FUSRAP sites, the application of this provision would be 
     inconsistent with the policy that the polluter should pay the 
     cost of addressing the pollution created.
       We strongly support removing this language and would be 
     pleased to report to the Congress on our current efforts 
     under the FUSRAP program.
           Sincerely,

                                                 Alvin L. Alm,

                                           Assistant Secretary for
                                         Environmental Management.

  Mr. LEVIN. I yield the floor.
  Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, we support the amendment. I suggest a 
voice vote.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there is no further debate, the question is 
on agreeing to the second-degree amendment No. 418.
  The amendment (No. 418) was agreed to.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the 
vote by which the amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. LEVIN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there is no further debate, the question is 
on agreeing to amendment No. 417, as amended.
  The amendment (No. 417 ), as amended, was agreed to.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the 
vote by which the amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. LEVIN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California.


                           Amendment No. 419

(Purpose: To prohibit the distribution of certain information relating 
  to explosives, destructive devices, and weapons of mass destruction)

  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from California [Mrs. Feinstein], for herself 
     and Mr. Biden, proposes an amendment numbered 419.

  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the 
reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:
       At the end of subtitle E of title X, add the following:

     SEC. 1074. CRIMINAL PROHIBITION ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF 
                   CERTAIN INFORMATION RELATING TO EXPLOSIVES, 
                   DESTRUCTIVE DEVICES, AND WEAPONS OF MASS 
                   DESTRUCTION.

       (a) Unlawful Conduct.--Section 842 of title 18, United 
     States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(l) Distribution of Information Relating to Explosives, 
     Destructive Devices, and Weapons of Mass Destruction.--
       ``(1) Definitions.--In this subsection--
       ``(A) the term `destructive device' has the same meaning as 
     in section 921(a)(4);
       ``(B) the term `explosive' has the same meaning as in 
     section 844(j); and
       ``(C) the term `weapon of mass destruction' has the same 
     meaning as in section 2332a(c)(2).
       ``(2) Prohibition.--It shall be unlawful for any person--
       ``(A) to teach or demonstrate the making or use of an 
     explosive, a destructive device, or a weapon of mass 
     destruction, or to distribute by any means information 
     pertaining to, in whole or in part, the manufacture or use of 
     an explosive, destructive device, or weapon of mass 
     destruction, with the intention that the teaching, 
     demonstration, or information be used for, or in furtherance 
     of, an activity that constitutes a Federal criminal offense 
     or a State or local criminal offense affecting interstate 
     commerce; or
       ``(B) to teach or demonstrate to any person the making or 
     use of an explosive, a destructive device, or a weapon of 
     mass destruction, or to distribute to any person, by any 
     means, information pertaining to, in whole or in part, the 
     manufacture or use of an explosive, destructive device, or 
     weapon of mass destruction, knowing that such person intends 
     to use the teaching, demonstration, or information for, or in 
     furtherance of, an activity that constitutes a Federal 
     criminal offense or a State or local criminal offense 
     affecting interstate commerce.''.
       (b) Penalties.--Section 844 of title 18, United States 
     Code, is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a), by striking ``person who violates 
     subsections'' and inserting the following: ``person who--
       ``(1) violations subsections'';
       (2) by striking the period at the end and inserting ``; 
     and''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(2) violates subsection (l)(2) of section 842 of this 
     chapter, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more 
     than 20 years, or both.''; and
       (2) in subsection (j), by striking ``and (i)'' and 
     inserting ``(i), and (l)''.

  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I send this amendment to the desk on 
behalf of Senator Biden and myself.
  For 3 years, Senator Biden and I have sent an amendment to the desk 
which would prohibit the teaching of bomb making. Twice it passed this 
body by unanimous consent, and twice in conference the amendment was 
taken out.
  Last year, when we made this amendment and this body graciously and, 
I believe, wisely accepted it, it was replaced in conference with the 
proviso that the Department of Justice would do a report to see whether 
this amendment was well advised and would stand a constitutional test.
  On April 29 of this year, the Department of Justice published a 
report, and that report was entitled, ``Report on the Availability of 
Bomb Making Information, The Extent to Which Its Dissemination is 
Controlled by Federal Law, and the Extent to Which Such Dissemination 
May be Subject to Regulation Consistent with the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution.''
  The bottom line of the report is that the Department of Justice 
agrees that it would be appropriate and beneficial to adopt further 
legislation to address the problem of teaching bomb making directly, if 
that can be accomplished in a manner that does not impermissibly 
restrict the wholly legitimate publication and teaching of such 
information or otherwise violate the first amendment.
  In other words, the question presented by this is, when does the 
first amendment end and when does conspiracy to commit a felony begin?
  So the language in the amendment that we submit to this body today 
has been reworked, strengthened and approved by the Department of 
Justice. I would like to briefly read it. The language is as follows:

       It shall be unlawful for any person--
       (A) to teach or demonstrate the making or use of an 
     explosive, a destructive device, or a weapon of mass 
     destruction, or to distribute by any means information 
     pertaining to, in whole or in part, the manufacture or use

[[Page S5990]]

     of an explosive, destructive device, or weapon of mass 
     destruction, with the intention that the teaching, 
     demonstration, or information be used for, or in furtherance 
     of, an activity that constitutes a Federal criminal offense 
     or a State or local criminal offense affecting interstate 
     commerce . . .

  Then there is an alternative:

       or (b) to teach or demonstrate to any person the making or 
     use of an explosive, a destructive device, or a weapon of 
     mass destruction . . . knowing that such person intends to 
     use the teaching, demonstration, or information for, or in 
     furtherance of, an activity that constitutes a Federal 
     criminal offense or a State or local criminal offense 
     affecting interstate commerce.

  The penalty for violating this law would be a fine of $250,000 or a 
maximum of 20 years in prison, or both.
  Mr. President, according to terrorism expert, Neil Livingston, there 
are more than 1,600 so-called mayhem-manuals in circulation. I outlined 
some examples of what I am talking about.
  I will never forget, Mr. President, and you are a member of the 
Judiciary Committee--I don't believe you were on the committee at the 
time--but when a document entitled ``The Terrorist's Handbook'' was 
circulated, I believe at that time Senator Kennedy and I couldn't 
believe it. So I went back to my office and asked my staff to download 
what is called ``The Terrorist's Handbook.'' The cover of ``The 
Terrorist's Handbook'' reads something like this:

       Stuff you are not supposed to know about.
       Whether you are planning to blow up the World Trade Center, 
     or merely explode a few small devices on the White House 
     lawn, the Terrorist's Handbook is an invaluable guide to 
     having a good time. Where else can you get such wonderful 
     ideas about how to use up all that extra ammonium triiodide 
     left over from last year's revolution?
  And then this handbook, which I have in my hand, goes on to tell 
people how to break into a building, how to pick a lock, how to break 
into a chem lab in a college, how to look like a student. It produces 
techniques for picking locks. It goes on and tells you what useful 
household chemicals you should use. And then it goes on to explain, 
with specificity, how to make a light-bulb bomb, a book bomb, a phone 
bomb, and it goes on and on and on.
  Mr. President, there is no legal, legitimate use for a phone bomb, 
for a book bomb, for a baby-food bomb, all of which are described in 
this handbook. When it is put in this context, the context of 
criminality, it is my belief that the person who puts this up on the 
Internet becomes a conspirator in the ability to commit a major crime 
in the United States.
  An interesting thing that we have found is that individuals who have 
committed these crimes have actually had at least some of these 
publications in their home when they were arrested.
  According to the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, the following 
publications were found among Timothy McVeigh's possessions: ``Homemade 
C-4, A Recipe for Survival.'' My staff just went over to the Library of 
Congress and tried to take out a copy of this. Incidentally, it is 
missing from the library.
  ``Ragnar's Big Book of Homemade Weapons and Improvised Explosives.''
  So we know that materials on the Internet are used by terrorists to 
commit terrorist acts. We also know that the number of explosive 
devices now being found are increasing. Authorities have stated that 
the rise is attributable to a rise in Internet use. This is certainly 
true in Los Angeles County. During the first half of 1996, these 
numbers of explosive devices have increased dramatically; 178 were 
found compared to 86 total in 1995.
  Responses by the Los Angeles Police Department to reports of 
suspected bombs have shot up more than 35 percent from 1994 to 1995. 
The LAPD found 41 explosives in 1995, more than double the number 3 
years ago. And it goes on and on and on.
  One thing is also very interesting. Not only are terrorists using 
this, but children are using this.
  Not too long ago there was a cartoon in a newspaper. It really 
describes what is happening. A mother is on the telephone saying to a 
friend, ``* * * history, astronomy, science, Bobby is learning so much 
on the Internet * * *'' And there is Bobby sitting by his computer, and 
what Bobby is doing here is putting a timer on six sticks of dynamite 
looking at the Internet and following the recipe. Of course what that 
leads to is something like this:

       Three Boys used Internet to Plot School Bombing, Police 
     Say.

  That is the New York Times.
  Something like this:

       Internet Cited for Surge in Bomb Reports.
       Police and sheriffs officials say Web sites provide 
     youngsters with information on making explosives.

  Yesterday, June 18, the Fort Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel reported on the 
pending trial of 15-year-olds Burke DeCesare and Adam Walker, who were 
charged with planting a bomb in their Catholic school. They are eighth 
graders. They live in the Bayview neighborhood. They broke into Saint 
Coleman Catholic School in Pompano Beach around 2 a.m. on February 24, 
1996. They planted a gasoline bomb in the ceiling of classroom 116.
  Bomb experts from the Broward Sheriff's Office said the device, made 
with gasoline, was wired to explode at the flick of a light switch. 
This is taught--the recipe for this is in one of these manuals. The 
boys told police they got the instructions to build the bomb from the 
Internet.
  Nine days ago, on June 10, 1997, the Cleveland Dispatch reported the 
arrest of a North Side 15-year-old who built a homemade bomb with 
information he gathered from the Internet. The Columbus Fire Division 
bomb squad was required to remove devices from the kitchen and the 
basement of the parents' homes. Neighbors, who lived within 500 feet of 
the home, were evacuated for 2 hours.
  Columbus police reported that one device consisted of a quart Mason 
jar containing lighter fluid and Styrofoam, with an M-90 inserted into 
the Mason jar cap which served as an igniter. This young man told his 
parents he learned to make the bomb on the Internet.
  Last month, the Los Angeles Times reported that two 14-year-old boys 
were arrested in Yorba Linda, CA, after crafting eight pipe bombs and 
detonating one of them. The bomb caused a fire, charring 400 feet of 
land behind a home on Grandview Avenue. After admitting they sparked 
the fire with the bomb, the boys told investigators they had seven more 
bombs inside the house. The bombs were fashioned with information from 
the Internet.
  In May of this year, the Baltimore Sun reported that two teenagers in 
Finland face charges over an explosion from Finland's second ``Internet 
bomb'' in a week. Sixty people were evacuated. And it goes on and on 
and on.
  In Orange County, police say teenagers may have used the Internet to 
help construct acid-filled bottle bombs in Mission Viejo and Huntington 
Beach, one of which burned a 5-year-old boy when he found it on a 
school playground.
  According to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, between 
1992 and 1995, 15 juveniles were killed and 366 injured in the United 
States while making explosive devices. Most of this comes right off of 
the Internet.

  The Justice Department, on a single Web site, obtained the titles to 
over 110 different bombmaking texts.
  The point here is that this material is now so easy to get. When it 
is put in something like a terrorist handbook and you are told what to 
use, how to steal it, how to dress like a college student, how to break 
into a chem lab, how to use cardboard to stuff in the lock so you can 
come back at night, how to go home and how to go into your kitchen and 
make one of these bombs, and then how to go out and explode it wherever 
you want--there is no legitimate legal use for this information.
  There is only a criminal purpose for this information. There is no 
legal use for a baby food bomb, for a phone bomb, for a book bomb. You 
do not blow up a tree stump if you are a farmer in the field with one 
of these. There is no legal use. So I am hopeful--I know that we are 
into the third year of this amendment--that it will in fact survive a 
conference committee. I understand that both sides are willing to 
accept the amendment.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a summary of the 
Department of Justice report be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

[[Page S5991]]

 Summary of the Report on the Availability of Bombmaking Information, 
The Extent to Which its Dissemination is Controlled by Federal Law, and 
  the Extent to Which Such Dissemination May be Subject to Regulation 
      Consistent with the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution

              (Prepared by the U.S. Department of Justice)


                        Introduction and Summary

       In section 709(a) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
     Penalty Act of 1996 [``the AEDPA''], Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 
     Stat. 1214, 1297 (1996), Congress provided that, in 
     consultation with such other officials and individuals as she 
     considers appropriate, the Attorney General shall conduct a 
     study concerning--
       (1) the extent to which there is available to the public 
     material in any medium (including print, electronic, or film) 
     that provides instruction on how to make bombs, destructive 
     devices, or weapons of mass destruction;
       (2) the extent to which information gained from such 
     material has been used in incidents of domestic or 
     international terrorism;
       (3) the likelihood that such information may be used in 
     future incidents of terrorism;
       (4) the application of Federal laws in effect on the date 
     of enactment of this Act to such material;
       (5) the need and utility, if any, for additional laws 
     relating to such material; and
       (6) an assessment of the extent to which the first 
     amendment protects such material and its private and 
     commercial distribution.
     Section 709(b) of the AEDPA, in turn, requires the Attorney 
     General to submit to the Congress a report containing the 
     results of the study, and to make that report available to 
     the public.
       Following enactment of the AEDPA, a committee was 
     established within the Department of Justice [``the DOJ 
     Committee''], comprised of departmental attorneys as well as 
     law enforcement officials of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation and the Treasury Department's Bureau of 
     Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. The committee members divided 
     responsibility for undertaking the tasks mandated by section 
     709. Some members canvassed reference sources, including the 
     Internet, to determine the facility with which information 
     relating to the manufacture of bombs, destructive devices and 
     other weapons of mass destruction could be obtained. Criminal 
     investigators reviewed their files to determine the extent to 
     which such published information was likely to have been used 
     by persons known to have manufactured bombs and destructive 
     devices for criminal purposes. And legal experts within the 
     Department of Justice reviewed extant federal criminal law 
     and judicial precedent to assess the extent to which the 
     dissemination of bombmaking information is now restricted by 
     federal law, and the extent to which it may be restricted, 
     consistent with constitutional principles. This Report 
     summarizes the results of these efforts.
       As explained in this Report, the DOJ committee has 
     determined that anyone interested in manufacturing a bomb, 
     dangerous weapon, or a weapon of mass destruction can easily 
     obtain detailed instructions from readily accessible sources, 
     such as legitimate reference books, the so-called underground 
     press, and the Internet. Circumstantial evidence suggests 
     that, in a number of crimes involving the employment of 
     such weapons and devices, defendants have relied upon such 
     material in manufacturing and using such items. Law 
     enforcement agencies believe that, because the 
     availability of bombmaking information is becoming 
     increasingly widespread (over the Internet and from other 
     sources), such published instructions will continue to 
     play a significant role in aiding those intent upon 
     committing future acts of terrorism and violence.
       While current federal laws--such as those prohibiting 
     conspiracy, solicitation, aiding and abetting, providing 
     material support for terrorist activities, and unlawfully 
     furthering civil disorders--may, in some instances, proscribe 
     the dissemination of bombmaking information, no extant 
     federal statute provides a satisfactory basis for prosecution 
     in certain classes of cases that Senators Feinstein and Biden 
     have identified as particularly troublesome. Senator 
     Feinstein introduced legislation during the last Congress in 
     an attempt to fill this gap. The Department of Justice agrees 
     that it would be appropriate and beneficial to adopt further 
     legislation to address this problem directly, if that can be 
     accomplished in a manner that does not impermissibly restrict 
     the wholly legitimate publication and teaching of such 
     information, or otherwise violate the First Amendment.
       The First Amendment would impose substantial constraints on 
     any attempt to proscribe indiscriminately the dissemination 
     of bombmaking information. The government generally may not, 
     except in rare circumstances, punish persons either for 
     advocating lawless action or for disseminating truthful 
     information--including information that would be dangerous if 
     used--that such persons have obtained lawfully. However, the 
     constitutional analysis is quite different where the 
     government punishes speech that is an integral part of a 
     transaction involving conduct the government otherwise is 
     empowered to prohibit; such ``speech acts''--for instance, 
     many cases of inchoate crimes such as aiding and abetting and 
     conspiracy--may be proscribed without much, if any, concern 
     about the First Amendment, since it is merely incidental that 
     such ``conduct'' takes the form of speech.
       Accordingly, we have concluded that Senator Feinstein's 
     proposal can withstand constitutional muster in most, if not 
     all, of its possible applications, if such legislation is 
     slightly modified in several respects that we propose at the 
     conclusion of this Report. As modified, the proposed 
     legislation would be likely to maximize the ability of the 
     Federal Government--consistent with free speech protections--
     to reach cases where an individual disseminates information 
     on how to manufacture or use explosives or weapons of mass 
     destruction either (i) with the intent that the information 
     be used to facilitate criminal conduct, or (ii) with the 
     knowledge that a particular recipient of the information 
     intends to use it in furtherance of criminal activity.

  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I conclude my statement simply with 
this. This amendment has been put into this bill once before. It has 
been put into the terrorism bill once. It has been passed by this body 
twice. It has been reworked to withstand a first amendment challenge. I 
am hopeful, with the history of what is happening in this country, that 
Americans all across this land will say there is no first amendment 
right to be a conspirator and teach someone how to make a bomb to blow 
someone else up. So I am hopeful that this year it might survive a 
conference.
  I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
  Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. We are checking with one Senator who we understand may 
wish to be heard on this amendment. I just want to notify the Senate of 
that. I see, though, the chairman is on his feet, so I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, we have no objection to the amendment.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending 
amendment be set aside.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                           Amendment No. 420

   (Purpose: To require a license to export computers with composite 
    theoretical performance equal to or greater than 2,000 million 
                   theoretical operations per second)

  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk for 
myself and Mr. Durbin.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Mississippi [Mr. Cochran], for himself and 
     Mr. Durbin, proposes an amendment numbered 420.

  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further 
reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:
       At the end of subtitle E of title X, add the following:

     SEC. . SUPERCOMPUTER EXPORT CONTROL.

       (a) Export Licensing Without Regard to End-Use and End-
     User.--
       (1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     law, effective upon the date of enactment of this Act, 
     computers described in paragraph (2) shall only be exported 
     to a Computer Tier 3 country pursuant to an export license 
     issued by the Secretary of Commerce.
       (2) Computers described.--A computer described in this 
     paragraph is a computer with a composite theoretical 
     performance equal to or greater than 2,000 million 
     theoretical operations per second.
       (b) Limitation on Reexport.--It is the sense of the Senate 
     that Congress should enact legislation to require that any 
     computer described in subsection (a)(2) that is exported to a 
     Computer Tier 1 or Computer Tier 2 country shall only be 
     reexported to a Computer Tier 3 country (or, in the case of a 
     computer exported to a Computer Tier 3 country pursuant to 
     subsection (a), reexported to another Computer Tier 3 
     country) pursuant to an export license approved by the 
     Secretary of Commerce and that the preceding requirement be 
     included as a provision in the contract of sale of any such 
     computer to a Computer Tier 1, Computer Tier 2, or Computer 
     Tier 3 country.
       (3) Computer Tiers Defined.--In this section, the terms 
     ``Computer Tier 1'', ``Computer Tier 2'', and ``Computer Tier 
     3'' have

[[Page S5992]]

     the meanings given such terms in section 740.7 of title 15, 
     Code of Federal Regulations.

  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, on the 11th of June, my Subcommittee on 
International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services of the 
Committee on Governmental Affairs held a hearing on the subject of 
proliferation and U.S. dual-use export controls. The hearing focused 
almost entirely on the subject of U.S. exports of high-performance 
computers, also known as supercomputers.
  In preparing for and conducting this hearing, we learned that the 
administration's policy on supercomputers, which are an integral 
component for developing, producing and maintaining nuclear weapons, 
ballistic missiles, and practically all advanced weapon systems, could 
put American lives and interests at risk.
  I am offering this amendment as a necessary first step to staunch the 
flow of American-made supercomputers to countries and places they 
should not be going.
  On October 6, 1995, President Clinton announced a new export control 
policy for supercomputers which decontrolled supercomputer exports to a 
great extent. He said that he had ``decided to eliminate controls on 
the exports of all computers to countries in North America, most of 
Europe, and parts of Asia.'' Continuing further, ``For the former 
Soviet Union, China, and a number of other countries, we will focus our 
controls on computers intended for military end uses or users, while 
easing them on the export of computers to civilian customers.''
  There is, of course, a delicate balance that must be struck between 
presenting U.S. national security by controlling dual-use exports and 
promoting exports. We must be careful not to place American 
manufacturers in a position where they cannot export goods that other 
countries are exporting, though, of course, our national security 
interests dictate that some goods cannot be sold to some countries no 
matter how irresponsibly other countries behave. For example, the 
willingness of some Western European countries to work with Libya to 
construct a chemical weapons complex does not justify the involvement 
of United States companies in similar ventures.
  President Clinton's October 6, 1995, announcement liberalizing U.S. 
export controls on supercomputers established four country tiers to 
guide American exporters, at the same time eliminating restrictions on 
the export of computers capable of less than 2,000 million theoretical 
operations per second-- this is referred to as an MTOPS--for all except 
tier 4 countries, it is unrestricted if the computers are capable of 
less than 2,000 MTOPS. Whether it makes sense to decontrol computers 
capable of up to that level is one of the issues which should be 
studied more extensively. I will ask the General Accounting Office to 
do so.
  Country tier 1, consisting primarily of NATO allies, effectively 
establishes a license-free zone for U.S. high-performance computer 
exports. Computers of unlimited capacity under this policy can be 
exported to any tier 1 country without regard to the identity of the 
end user or the intended end use.
  The policy for country tier 2, which includes countries such as South 
Korea, Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic, allows unlicensed 
exports to any country within this tier of computers capable up to 
10,000 million theoretical operations per second. And the policy 
continues the virtual embargo against those nations--the terrorist 
nations such as Iran, Iraq, Syria, and North Korea--that comprise 
country tier 4. There are many deficiencies in this new policy, Mr. 
President.
  Our amendment addresses what we consider to be the most significant 
deficiency in need of immediate attention. It is a problem specific to 
the part of the policy pertaining to country tier 3 which I want to 
describe now. The policy announced by President Clinton for tier 3 
countries, which include Russia, China, and some others, is based 
entirely upon the questions of who the end user will be and for what 
end use the supercomputer is intended. End use and end user are the 
critical factors for tier 3 exports.
  The tier 3 policy requires an export license to be granted by the 
Department of Commerce under only two circumstances: First, if the 
computer to be exported is capable of 2,000 MTOPS and is going to a 
military end use or end user; and second, if the computer to be 
exported is capable of 7,000 MTOPS and is going to a civilian end use 
and end user. This policy requires no export license for manufacturers 
who want to sell supercomputers capable between 2,000 and 7,000 MTOPS 
to buyers in tier 3 countries when there is to be a civilian end use 
and end user. It is the exporter--not the Department of Commerce, not 
the U.S. Government--who is given the latitude under the policy for 
determining whether the purchaser's representations are accurate, that 
it is not a military end user and will not use the supercomputer for a 
military purpose.
  The Clinton administration policy further requires American exporters 
to act on the honor system, policing themselves and deciding themselves 
whether or not the end user is going to be a military entity or will be 
putting the supercomputer to a military use.
  Unfortunately, some companies have already been tempted to take a 
chance. Maybe they were not sure; maybe they were tempted by the 
profits of the transaction. Whatever the motivations and the 
understandings or lack of information, or for whatever the reason, we 
have known that some transactions have involved the sale of 
supercomputers, without objection from our Department of Commerce or 
our Federal Government to those who may be putting computers to a 
military use, or maybe military entities themselves.
  We know now, for example, based on statements from the Russian 
Minister of Atomic Energy and from United States Government officials, 
that there are at least five American supercomputers in two of Russia's 
nuclear weapons labs: Chelyabinsk-70 and Arzamas-16. Minister Mikhailov 
of the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy has not been reluctant to 
proclaim what these high-performance computers will be used for, and he 
said in a speech in January they will be used to simulate nuclear 
explosions, and that the computers are, in his words, ``10 times faster 
than any previously available in Russia.''
  Four of the five supercomputers we are aware of publicly in Russia's 
nuclear weapons labs came from Silicon Graphics, a company in 
California, I think. According to the CEO, Edward McCracken, it was his 
company's understanding that the computers were for environmental and 
ecological purposes. It may be that Silicon Graphics was unable to 
determine whether a Russian nuclear weapons lab was going to be the 
military end user or if its supercomputers would be put to a military 
end use. But it seems from the statements made by the Atomic Energy 
Minister in Russia that they certainly are available to them for those 
purposes.
  We also know at least 47 high-performance computers have been 
exported without licenses to the People's Republic of China. One of the 
computers sold also by Silicon Graphics is now operating in the Chinese 
Academy of Sciences. The Chinese Academy of Sciences is a key 
participant in military research and development, and works on 
everything from the DF-5 ICBM--which, incidentally, is capable of 
reaching the United States--to uranium enrichment for nuclear weapons. 
There can be no question about the Chinese Academy of Science's status 
as a military end- user.
  According to the Department, its new Silicon Graphic Power Challenge 
XL supercomputer provides it with computational power previously 
unknown, which is available to all the major scientific and 
technological institutes across China. We can only hope that some of 
these institutes in China are using the supercomputer's technology for 
peaceful purposes, but we cannot help but suspect that some may be a 
part of the weapons development program in China, which is on a fast 
track to modernize their nuclear weapons system and capabilities and 
their missile technologies and all the rest.
  At our recent hearing, we had the benefit of testimony from the Under 
Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration, William Reinsch, who 
said that the Clinton administration doesn't know if any of the 
supercomputers in China or Russia are being used for weapons-related 
activities, but the Commerce Department is in a difficult position. You 
have to appreciate how difficult it must be to have the responsibility 
for both promoting exports

[[Page S5993]]

and controlling exports, and that is the dilemma that this Department 
is in. But we have to realize that nuclear weapons labs are potential 
end users and have been shown already by the evidence before our 
committee that they have obtained American supercomputers and they may 
be put to a military end use.
  In 1986, the Department of Energy published an unclassified report 
entitled, ``The Need for Supercomputers in Nuclear Weapons Design.'' 
The report's conclusion included this statement: ``The use of high-
speed computers and mathematical models to simulate complex physical 
processes has been and continues to be the cornerstone of the nuclear 
weapons design program.'' These computers continue to be important to 
the design and production of nuclear weapons and other types of weapons 
of mass destruction and delivery systems.
  I do not see how we can tolerate the continuation of a policy that 
makes it easier for Russia and China to modernize their nuclear weapons 
and delivery systems. We ought not to be in the business of helping 
them to improve the quality of our weapons, their technology, their 
delivery systems, particularly when there is evidence of proliferation 
from those countries to other countries.
  This amendment, I want to point out, does not include a comprehensive 
revision of our export control policy. It is targeted to one specific 
part of the policy. We hope that with the findings that are obtained 
from the General Accounting Office study and our further studies in our 
subcommittee, which is reviewing this entire issue and proliferation 
problems generally, that we will be able to come up with and work with 
the administration and hopefully develop a consensus agreement on a 
modification of our export policy.
  We think the time is here, it is now, when we need to stop the 
unrestricted flow of these supercomputers to potential users all around 
the world that can threaten our Nation's security and put at risk 
American citizens. It is not like some other country has these systems 
available for sale on the market. They do not. We are the state-of-the-
art producer of the supercomputers. Japan has the capacity to produce 
supercomputers as well, but their export policy is more restrictive now 
than ours is. So we are the culprit, if we are putting in the hand of 
military end users and military weapon system producers in other 
countries technologies that are superior to what they have now and that 
can be used to make more lethal their nuclear weapons and their missile 
systems. We are putting in jeopardy the lives of our own citizens.
  I am hopeful that this amendment, in concert with other efforts that 
we are making, will help improve our capacity to monitor these exports 
and require license in those situations where we think this export 
might present a proliferation problem, because we know from previous 
experience in Russia and China, as well, private companies have 
demonstrated that they do not have the adequate restraints to make 
determinations about where and how their exports are distributed into 
other country's hands. We know that transshipments are occurring. We 
also know that it is difficult to verify in a country like China what 
the private company that may be the purchaser of a supercomputer really 
intends to do with it once they have it. It is difficult to get access, 
to get information, and so a private company has a very difficult time 
developing an information base on which it can really make a conclusion 
about the end use or the end user. That is another reason to change 
this policy. The Commerce Department is going to have to do a better 
job of compiling information about those who are in the market 
worldwide for these supercomputers and making this information 
available to our exporters and the companies that have these 
supercomputers for sale.
  Mr. President, I encourage the Senate to look very carefully at this 
proposal. I hope that the amendment will be agreed to. Senator Durbin 
and I were involved in questioning witnesses before our subcommittee 
just recently on this subject, and we are convinced that this is a 
policy that has to be changed, and the time to change it is right now.
  Our amendment does not in any way change the policy President Clinton 
announced in October 1995, though it is my judgment that the entire 
policy is in need of serious evaluation and revision, and I will also 
be asking the General Accounting Office to assist me in this 
evaluation. Our amendment requires the Department of Commerce, in 
concert with other parts of the executive branch, to determine whether 
an entity in a tier 3 country is a military or civilian end-user, and 
whether the end-use will be for a military or civilian purpose. By 
their exports to Russian and Chinese nuclear weapons labs, private 
companies have demonstrated that they do not do an adequate job of 
making this determination. Government has the resources and information 
available to make the best determination possible, and should step in 
to ensure that America's national security is not being compromised for 
sake of a more profitable quarter.
  In a country like the People's Republic of China, how can any private 
company have the resources to determine whether an end-user is military 
or civilian?
  Some suggest that the process can be left unchanged, but that the 
Commerce Department can do a better job of helping industry make the 
proper end-use and end-user determination by publishing a list of end-
users to which high performance computer exports are prohibited. I 
disagree with this suggestion. Any published list would necessarily be 
incomplete, for a complete list would compromise U.S. intelligence 
sources and methods. Any published list would also serve as a marketing 
tool for the world's proliferators, making their job of finding 
specific clients easier. And, any published list would be only too easy 
to manipulate by both the purchaser and the exporter who may not be 
willing to operate under the honor system. If, for example, 
Chelyabinsk-70 is on the list of prohibited locations, does that mean 
that a Chelyabinsk-71, not on the list, can receive U.S. exports of 
high performance computers? What's to stop an exporter like Silicon 
Graphics from accepting the convenient suggestion that, ``yes, 
Chelyabinsk-70 does nuclear weapons work, but at Chelyabinsk-71 we 
conduct only environmental research.''
  Publishing a list could reduce, but not eliminate, the problem we 
face, though in so doing other serious problems would be created. 
Congress needs to change the current process so the Government--with 
the most access to information with which to make the most informed 
determination of military end-use and end-user--makes the decision on 
whether to ship these computers to countries who are modernizing their 
weapons and delivery systems and engaged in proliferation of these 
technologies. America should not be participating in the qualitative 
upgrade of Russian and Chinese proliferant activities.
  The Commerce Department maintains that President Clinton's 
supercomputer export control policy is working. Commerce continues to 
make this claim despite the fact that the administration's policy has 
allowed American supercomputers to be shipped to Russia's and China's 
nuclear weapons complexes, and who knows where else. If this policy is 
working, what would a policy that wasn't working look like? Would there 
be more supercomputers in Russia and China, or would we know absolutely 
that our supercomputers were in Iran, North Korea, or other terrorist 
states?
  The cold war's end does not decrease the need for the continued 
safeguarding of sensitive American dual-use technology. While there may 
no longer be a single, overarching enemy of the United States, there is 
little doubt that many rogue states, and perhaps others, have interests 
clearly contrary to those of the United States. Helping these nations--
or helping other nations to help these nations--to acquire sensitive 
dual-use technology capable of threatening American lives and interests 
makes no sense.
  I thank Senator Durbin for his work with me on this issue, and look 
forward to continuing to work with him to get to the bottom of this 
problem. I encourage all of my colleagues to support this amendment.
  Mr. DURBIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bennett). The Senator from Illinois is 
recognized.

[[Page S5994]]

                         Privilege of the Floor

  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, first, I ask unanimous consent that the 
privilege of the floor be granted to Lamelle Rawlins during the 
pendency of this debate.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I am pleased to join my colleague from 
Mississippi, Senator Cochran, as a cosponsor of this important 
amendment. I think anyone who had attended our hearing within the last 
2 weeks on this issue would have been shocked at what they learned. We 
have expanded opportunities for the purchase of some of the most 
valuable technology in the world. It is technology developed in the 
United States, which has no parallel anywhere else in the world, and we 
are selling it. The fact that we are selling it is nothing new. The 
United States has done that for years. But this technology is so 
important and sensitive that the people who buy it automatically 
acquire a capacity, a capability that they have never had in their 
history. In other words, our expertise, our knowledge, our 
technological skill is being sold.
  What makes this particularly important is that this very technology 
has the capacity to give to the purchasing country the skills and 
abilities that they have never had before to develop things that are 
very positive, on one hand, but also potentially very negative. I was 
reminded of a quotation that is attributed to Mr. Lenin in the early 
days of his establishment of the Soviet republics. He said that it was 
his belief that ``a capitalist would sell you the rope that you would 
use to hang him.'' I thought about that over and over, as we discussed 
this question of selling these computers to countries like China and 
Russia, which have the capacity to allow them to develop extraordinary 
military capability.
  Recent news accounts about sales of supercomputers to Russian nuclear 
weapons labs and the Chinese Academy of Sciences--in apparent 
circumvention of United States export control regulations--have raised 
troubling questions about the control that the United States exercises 
over supercomputer exports.
  China has purchased at least 46 United States supercomputers. Of 
these, 32 are one particular model that is faster than two-thirds of 
the classified computer systems available to our own Department of 
Defense, including the United States Naval Underwater Weapons Center, 
United States Army TACOM, and United States Air Force/National Test 
Facility.
  The Commerce Department and the Justice Department are investigating 
the unlicensed sale--unlicensed sale--of four over-2000 MTOPS computers 
to the Russian nuclear weapons facility Chelyabinsk-70.
  The computers recently sold are 10 times more powerful than anything 
Russia ever had before, and we sold it to them.
  There is ample room for mistakes and confusion in the current dual-
use export control system for supercomputers.
  According to a New York Times article on February 25 of this year, in 
an effort to circumvent United States export controls, Russia's nuclear 
weapons establishment obtained a powerful IBM supercomputer through a 
European middleman and said they planned to use it to simulate nuclear 
tests.
  I was on this floor 2 weeks ago giving a speech about a test ban, 
recalling the speech given by President Kennedy before American 
University in 1963. I came to the floor with Senator Harkin and said it 
is time for us to have a comprehensive nuclear test ban, moving toward 
the day when there are no nuclear weapons threatening this world. In 
the world we live in today, you don't need to detonate a nuclear 
weapon. If you have a supercomputer, which can simulate that 
detonation, you can derive the same information--or a lot of it--
through this model and through this technology. These are the very same 
computers and capabilities that we are selling.
  The Nation's export controls for supercomputers ``amount to a kind of 
honor system,'' according to one U.S. official quoted in the Wall 
Street Journal. Companies that have doubt about a customer's activities 
are expected to call the U.S. Government for advice.

  Think about that. You have a computer company and you have a sale 
worth millions of dollars and you don't know whether it is going to be 
used for a peaceful purpose or a military purpose. Well, the honor 
system says it is time to call the Department of Commerce and check it 
out and see if they have any records or classified information. They 
may not share the information with you, but they may tell you there is 
some concern. But it is an honor system. There is nothing built into 
the law to guarantee this kind of surveillance, this kind of 
supervision.
  Companies may fail to obtain licenses to sell supercomputers ordered 
for civilian purposes, such as weather forecasting or air pollution 
studies or natural resources prospecting and development, but these 
computers end up in places which do design work for nuclear weapons 
programs--not a civilian use. Companies may knowingly ignore licensing 
requirements or, alternatively, companies may unwittingly fail to 
recognize a suspect end-user.
  The first step toward better export controls is better communication. 
Increased accountability and interaction between industry and the 
Federal Government called for by this amendment will help facilitate 
that interchange.
  Even William Reinsch, the Undersecretary for Export Administration 
for the Commerce Department, quoted by Senator Cochran with whom I 
share the sponsorship of this amendment, testified at the Governmental 
Affairs subcommittee hearing last week, agreed that better 
communication is essential. He invited and encouraged companies to 
consult with the Commerce Department when faced with challenging sales 
decisions.
  The current system for supercomputer exports involves controls on 
high-power computer exports set forth in Federal regulations that 
divide the countries of the world into various categories, or tiers.
  The licensing policies vary depending on which category the country 
falls into. There are countries for which no export license is 
required--tier 1--some countries for which licenses are required for 
extraordinarily high performance machines--tier 2--some for which 
licenses are required, depending on whether the end-use is military 
rather than civilian--tier 3--and countries for which sales are totally 
banned--tier 4.
  The tier 3 countries include India, Pakistan, all of the Middle East/
Maghreb, the former Soviet Union, China, Vietnam, and the rest of 
Eastern Europe.
  Under current rules, export licenses are required to export or re-
export computers with a composite theoretical performance, known as 
CTP, greater than 2000 MTOPS to military end-users and end-uses and to 
nuclear, chemical, biological, or missile end-users and end-uses in 
tier 3 countries.
  However, for civilian end-users or end-uses that don't fall into a 
military or proliferation category, licenses are not required for 
export or re-export of computers under 7000 MTOPS to these countries.
  What this means is that for many sales, no Government oversight or 
decisionmaking takes place at the front end if the exporter determines 
that he is selling to a company that portrays itself as a civilian user 
because no license is required.
  Because of the differences in the licensing rules that apply to 
exports for military and proliferation uses than those governing sales 
for civilian use, the U.S. Government plays no upfront role in 
determining whether the end-use of a supercomputer under 7000 MTOPS 
sold to a buyer in a tier 3 country is indeed to be used for a civilian 
purpose.
  I know this is involved, I know that it is complicated. Let me try to 
cut to the bottom line. If a company in the United States seeks to sell 
a supercomputer, one of great capacity, and the end-user, the company 
that is buying in another country, says this is strictly for a civilian 
purpose, it is not going to be used for anything of a military 
capacity, there are virtually no controls on that sale; nor is there 
much of anything done to track that sale, once it is made, as to where 
that computer actually ends up.

  The responsibility is all on the shoulders of the manufacturer or 
exporter to make the determination on whether or not a license is 
needed, whether or not the computer might be used for military 
purposes. Exporters run the risk

[[Page S5995]]

of relying on assurances of the purchasers or their own intelligence 
information about end-use, rather than the resources of the Government. 
Either intentionally or inadvertently, exporters have made sales to 
destinations for which a license should have been obtained, because of 
end-use, but was not.
  The Cochran-Durbin amendment would require that all U.S. exports of 
supercomputers above 2,000 million theoretical operations per second--a 
measure of the computer's speed--to a tier 3 country be licensed by the 
Commerce Department.
  The presently more lenient requirements for civilian end-use sales in 
this category would be made identical to stricter ones applicable to 
sales for military proliferation purposes.
  The amendment would shift responsibility from industry to the 
Government for deciding the propriety and conditions of the sales.
  By subjecting all such sales above 2,000 MTOPS to licensing 
requirements, the United States may be able to prevent the uncontrolled 
flow of technology for unauthorized use or diversion to purchasers in 
countries who may have vastly different interests than those of the 
United States.
  Civilian sales of supercomputers above 2,000 MTOPS to purchasers in 
tier 3 countries would be reviewed and approved by the Commerce 
Department, using the same standards used in licensing military and 
proliferation sales to these countries.
  In addition, the amendment expresses the sense of the Senate that 
Congress should enact legislation requiring that any computer exceeding 
2,000 MTOPS exported to a tier 1 or tier 2 country shall only be 
reexported to a tier 3 country, or reexported by a tier 3 country to 
another tier 3 country, pursuant to an export license approved by the 
Secretary of Commerce.
  We are trying to track these computers, once sold, and determine 
where they are going to end up. We are saying to those countries, whom 
we consider to be our allies and friends, that we are going to ask you 
to bear responsibility for the end-use of the computer. We don't want 
you to be a conduit for the sale of a computer to a country where the 
United States suspects it may be used for military purposes.
  The sense of the Senate would call for legislation that would require 
any reexport to a tier 3 country would have to be done under U.S. 
export license. This amendment is clearly necessary. I urge my 
colleagues to join Senator Cochran and myself. If you had listened to 
the testimony, as we did, you would have discovered, as I did, that 
there has been a dramatic increase in technology and expertise in this 
field. It is estimated that every 9 months to a year most of the 
computers that we are talking about become obsolete and move on to 
higher standards.
  The United States is where these computers are made and the country 
from which they are sold. As we are concerned about the proliferation 
of those items that can be used for the construction of nuclear, 
biological, and chemical weapons, we should also be concerned about the 
potential that we are selling technology that can also be used for 
proliferation of military weaponry. If we are truly seeking a peaceful 
world--and we are--the United States should take care not to sell that 
technology which allows another country to develop weapons of 
destruction.
  I think the Cochran-Durbin amendment strikes an appropriate balance. 
It brings our Government into the decision process. It protects those 
exporters in the United States who truly are trying to do the right 
thing and sell for civilian use. But it gives them a backup, and it 
leaves some assurance that will be another party investigating when it 
comes to sales of a suspect nature.
  This amendment is an important step toward addressing some of the 
growing concerns about U.S. export control policies governing sales of 
dual-use technology and whether those policies may be permitting access 
to sophisticated American technology to aid in the buildup of nuclear 
weapons capability of other countries.
  Recall the words of Mr. Lenin: ``A capitalist will sell you the rope 
that you will use to hang him.''
  Let's not have that occur. Not in the name of free trade and good 
commerce should we forget our responsibility to national and world 
security. I believe the Cochran-Durbin amendment is a sensible and 
responsible way to bring some order to what is becoming a very chaotic 
situation.
  I urge my colleagues to join Senator Cochran and me in support of 
this amendment.
  I yield the remainder of my time.
  Mr. COCHRAN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.
  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I commend the distinguished Senator from 
Illinois for the great force of his argument and for the clarity of his 
statement in support of this proposal.
  I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Michigan [Mr. Abraham] 
be added as a cosponsor to the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Enzi). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, on behalf of the chairman and 
distinguished ranking member present here, I wish to inform Senators 
that there will be a vote at 7:15 tonight on the amendment by the 
senior Senator from California [Mrs. Feinstein]. Essentially, this vote 
is a legislative measure to criminalize, under Federal laws, the 
willful disclosure of technology and other information that would 
enable an individual or individuals to make--manufacture a bomb.
  The time between now and 7:15 will be equally divided between myself 
and the distinguished ranking member. Hopefully, within that time we 
can accommodate the distinguished colleague from Virginia, also. But, 
just a few words about the amendment to advise Senators with regard to 
the subject of the vote.
  It is entitled, ``Distribution of Information Relating to Explosives, 
Destructive Devices, and Weapons of Mass Destruction.''

       Definitions.--In this subsection--
       (A) the term ``destructive device'' has the same meaning as 
     [another section of the code];
       (B) the term ``explosive'' [same meaning].

  These terms are defined within the code, the existing code.

       (C) the term ``weapon of mass destruction'' has the same 
     meaning as in [another part of the code].
       Prohibition.--It shall be unlawful for any person--
       (A) to teach or demonstrate the making of an explosive, a 
     destructive device, or a weapon of mass destruction, or to 
     distribute by any means information pertaining to, in whole 
     or in part, the manufacture or use of an explosive, 
     destructive device, or weapon of mass destruction, with the 
     intention that the teaching, demonstration, or information be 
     used for, or in furtherance of, an activity that constitutes 
     a Federal criminal offense or a State or local criminal 
     offense affecting interstate commerce; or
       (B) to teach or demonstrate to any person the making or use 
     of an explosive, a destructive device, or a weapon of mass 
     destruction, or to distribute to any person, by any means, 
     information pertaining to, in whole or in part, the 
     manufacture or use of an explosive, destructive device, or 
     weapon of mass destruction, knowing that such person intends 
     to use the teaching, demonstration, or information for, or in 
     furtherance of, an activity that constitutes a Federal 
     criminal offense or a State or local criminal offense 
     affecting interstate commerce.
  And the penalties are then recited.
  Mr President, I yield to my distinguished colleague.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator form Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that of the time 
remaining between now and 7:15, that 5 minutes be allocated to Senator 
Robb and that----
  Mr. WARNER. To be charged equally, Mr. President, to both sides.
  Mr. LEVIN. That would be great, and 3 minutes be allocated to Senator 
Feinstein.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is the Senator also asking we return to the 
Feinstein amendment?
  Mr. LEVIN. I ask unanimous consent that we return to the Feinstein 
amendment immediately after the Senator from Virginia has completed his 
5 minutes.

[[Page S5996]]

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. ROBB. Thank you, Mr. President.
  The defense authorization bill before us today does a pretty 
responsible job of providing adequate funding for personnel readiness, 
quality of life and modernization.
  It also makes a concerted effort to accommodate many of the 
recommendations of the Quadrennial Defense Review. I remain concerned, 
however, as do many colleagues on the Armed Services Committee, that we 
will face a serious funding shortfall in just a very few years as we 
try to replace and modernize aging vehicles, ships, and aircraft that 
will be exiting the inventory in droves just after the turn of the 
century.
  By accelerating some of the funding for major procurement items in 
this authorization, we help head off this funding crisis at least to a 
small degree.
  As a ranking member of the Readiness Subcommittee, I compliment the 
chairman, Senator Inhofe, for his diligence in supporting U.S. military 
readiness.
  I am pleased the bill funds many of the high-priority readiness 
increases requested by the service chiefs in the operations and 
maintenance accounts, as well as the ammunition accounts. Military 
construction is well funded, but all adds were subjected to the strict 
criteria established in the Senate years ago to ensure we only fund 
projects truly needed by the military.
  The bill does not go far enough, however, in my judgment, in taking 
on the issue of excess infrastructure. One of the best ways we can pay 
for future modernization is through reducing the Department of 
Defense's large ``tail'' of infrastructure and support, which is taking 
away critical funding for the ``teeth''--our warfighting troops and 
equipment that will fight the next war.
  The best place to reduce tail is to cut more bases. An effort to 
authorize a new base closure round failed in a tie vote in committee, 
but in spite of its political unpopularity, I hope the full Senate 
will, for the good of the Nation's defense, support a new BRAC round.
  We have reduced force structure by over 30 percent since 1989, but 
four rounds of base closures have yielded an infrastructure reduction 
of only 21 percent. Reductions enacted so far will yield, in the long 
term, over $5 billion a year.
  To gain additional, badly needed savings, the only responsible course 
of action, in my judgment, is to begin reducing additional excess right 
away. Although I certainly understand the reservations of those Members 
who are concerned about the integrity of the BRAC process, in light of 
the attempts to privatize in place the work at Kelly and McClellan Air 
Force depots, I hope once those issues are resolved, those Members will 
support a new BRAC round as well.
  The depot issue remains a difficult one, to say the least. My view is 
that we must significantly reduce the excess capacity at the air 
logistic centers, that the spirit of the BRAC was to reduce roughly two 
ALC's worth of capacity, and that the BRAC did allow for some level of 
privatization of work at Kelly and McClellan.
  But in no way did the BRAC intend to privatize in place excess 
capacity. Preserving that excess capacity will cost hundreds of 
millions of dollars, and we simply cannot afford this kind of waste 
anymore.
  I applaud my counterpart on the Readiness Subcommittee, Senator 
Inhofe, for his willingness to strike the controversial depot 
maintenance sections of the original bill that threatened to prevent us 
from proceeding to consider this bill.

  Mr. President, there are other ways to save money so that we can 
properly fund modernization.
  One is to invest in new technologies that promise to deliver more 
lethality for less cost.
  This bill aggressively funds the Army's efforts to ensure battlefield 
dominance through better intelligence, communications and smart 
weapons. It adds significant funds for the Navy's impressive 
information Technology 21 initiative, which will enable the warfighter 
to exchange all types of information on a single desktop computer, 
shorten decision time lines and better utilize information for combat.
  I will be addressing another technology, smart card technology, that 
promises to save millions in an amendment later on in our consideration 
of this bill.
  The bill also sensibly allows a new approach for funding the next 
carrier, the CVN-77.
  By letting the contractor maintain a steady supplier and workforce 
base through early funding in fiscal year 1998 for construction in 
2002, the taxpayers stand to save over $600 million on this program 
alone. By authorizing an innovative teaming arrangement for the new 
attack submarine, we achieve additional savings over a noncompeted, 
sole-source procurement while preserving two nuclear-capable shipyards.
  Let me offer one other area the bill addresses that could lead to 
billions in savings without undue risks to military capability. We 
generally assume that any money for force modernization must come from 
force structure cuts, end-strength cuts or infrastructure cuts.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
  Mr. ROBB. I ask unanimous consent for 1 additional minute.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. ROBB. Mr. President, we generally assume that there are no 
prospects for savings in readiness. The reality is that we maintain 
most of our active force units at very high levels of readiness at 
considerable expense, when, in fact, we could relax readiness levels 
for certain units, especially those not slated to go into combat early. 
Senator McCain included language in this and last year's bill requiring 
an evaluation of a concept he refers to as ``tiered readiness'' where 
four tiers of readiness are established for our units based on their 
likely time of deployment to battle.
  I have included language in this bill asking for an estimate of 
savings from a related concept I refer to as ``cyclical readiness.'' It 
would involve alternating a high state of readiness between units, 
where the units at the high state of readiness would be slated for a 
first major theater war, and the other lower readiness units would be 
available for a second theater.
  The services tell us that their operational and personnel tempos are 
too high to relax the readiness of any units. I have come to the 
conclusion that much of that problem is self-inflicted through 
excessive training and contingency requirements.
  I have included another provision in this bill that requires a look 
at how much of the demands on our troops are, in fact, self-inflicted.
  The reality is that come October, our largest overseas contingency 
commitment will be about a third of an Army division in Bosnia.
  In my judgment, we don't need to maintain all ten active Army 
divisions at a high state of readiness, and I believe we need to take a 
hard look at this matter.
  With that, Mr. President, I look forward to our continued 
consideration of this bill and yield the floor.
  Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask for 1 minute charged to the time of 
the chairman.
  I just wish to say what a valuable contribution to the work of the 
Armed Services Committee from my distinguished colleague from Virginia. 
We work together as a team on behalf of our Nation but, obviously, 
caring for the specific needs of our State which are directly related 
to national security.
  We are fortunate in Virginia to have a very significant concentration 
of activities relating to national security, and I know of no one 
better qualified than my distinguished colleague to work together as a 
partner in fulfilling our obligations to country and State.
  Mr. ROBB. Mr. President, I thank my senior colleague.


                           amendment no. 419

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise in support of the Feinstein-Biden 
anti-bomb-making amendment. The bill would make it a Federal crime to 
teach someone how to use or make a bomb if you know or intend that it 
will be used to commit a crime.
  As my colleagues know, I fought to pass nearly identical legislation 
last

[[Page S5997]]

year. Senator Feinstein and I tried several times to have it enacted as 
part of my anti-terrorism initiatives. The bill passed the Senate on 
two occasions, but unfortunately, it was rejected by the House both 
times.
  Critics of the bill claimed that it was unnecessary, 
unconstitutional, and would outlaw legitimate business uses of 
explosives.
  To respond to these claims, we asked the Justice Department to 
examine each of these questions. The report supports Senator Feinstein 
and my position on each and every criticism.
  So now that we have cleared away the basis for some of the 
opposition, I hope we can quickly enact this important legislation. And 
let me tell you why.
  I think most Americans would be absolutely shocked if they knew what 
kind of criminal information is making its way over the Internet. This 
information is easily accessible. It's proliferating by leaps and 
bounds.
  Let me give just one example. A guy named ``War-Master'' sent this 
message out over the Internet about how to build a baby food bomb. Here 
is how his message goes:

       These simple, powerful bombs are not very well known even 
     though all the material can be easily obtained by anyone 
     (including minors). These things are so [expletive deleted] 
     powerful that they can destroy a car. The explosion can 
     actually twist and mangle the frame. They are extremely 
     deadly and can very easily kill you and blow the side of the 
     house out if you mess up while building it. Here's how they 
     work.

  And then the message goes into explicit detail about how to fill a 
baby food jar with gunpowder and how to detonate it. The message 
observes that the explosion shatters the glass jar, sending pieces of 
razor sharp glass in all directions. The message continues with even 
more deadly advice:

       Tape nails to the side of the thing. Sharpened jacks (those 
     little things with all the pointy sides) also work well.

  As a result, the message concludes:

       If the explosion doesn't get 'em then the glass will. If 
     the glass don't get 'em then the nails will.

  I am not making this up. And this is only one small example.
  Mr. President, we hear about this happening time and time again: A 
bomb goes off. People are killed. A criminal is apprehended. And we 
learn that the criminal followed--to the letter--someone else's 
instructions on how to make a bomb and how to make it kill people.
  Indeed, the Justice Department report indicates that numerous 
notorious terrorists--including the World Trade Center bombers and the 
murderers of a Federal judge--have been found in possession of bomb-
making manuals and internet bomb-making information.

  And there is another situation that we are hearing about more and 
more frequently. We read about it in our local papers across the 
country. These bomb-making instructions are having an ever increasing 
impact on children.
  In Austin, TX, a boy lost most of one hand and part of the other 
after following bomb-making instructions he found on the internet. This 
boy once had plans to serve in the Marines. But that dream is now gone.
  And in Massachusetts, several boys--in separate incidents throughout 
the State--were maimed when they tried to mix batches of napalm on 
their kitchen stoves. These experiments were direct results of kids 
finding a bomb-making recipe on the internet.
  And what is even worse is that some of these instructions are geared 
toward kids. They tell kids that all the ingredients they need are 
right in their parents' kitchen or laundry cabinets.
  These stories illustrate what can happen when the literally millions 
of kids today sit in front of their computer and type ``explosive'' on 
their keyboard. In minutes, they can have instructions for making all 
sorts of explosive devices they never knew even existed.
  I know that some say that going after people who only help other 
people make bombs is not the way to go. They say that bomb-making 
instructions are protected by the first amendment. And I agree--to a 
point.
  I take a backseat to no one when it comes to the first amendment. I 
have always argued that we must take great care when we legislate about 
any constitutional right--paticularly our most cherished right of free 
speech.
  But let's not forget the obvious. It is illegal to make a bomb. And 
there is no right under the first amendment to help someone commit an 
illegal act.
  Our bill says you have no right to provide a bomb-making recipe to 
someone if you know that person has plans to destroy property or 
innocent lives. You have no right to help someone blow up a building.
  The Justice Department has concluded that our legislation--with some 
minor modifications which we have incorporated into this bill--is 
entirely consistent with the first amendment.
  I am glad that the Senate voted last year to join Senator Feinstein 
and me in making this type of behavior a crime. I hope this time 
around, we can pass this legislation through the full Congress and send 
it on to the President so he can sign it into law.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the amendment has been cleared on this 
side. I commend my good friend from California for her amendment. It is 
carefully worded. It has been cleared on this side, and I believe that 
there are 2 minutes allocated to the Senator from California under the 
unanimous-consent agreement and that the remainder of the time is to be 
divided as indicated.


                         Privilege of the Floor

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Dr. Kim 
Hamlett, who works on the Veterans' Affairs staff, be allowed the 
privilege of the floor during the time of consideration of the Defense 
Authorization Act and the conference report thereto.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LEVIN. I yield the floor.
  Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, the Feinstein amendment is primarily a 
judicial amendment, but it is a very worthy amendment, and I intend to 
support it.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from 
California.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. President, I thank the chairman and the ranking member for their 
comments, and I thank all the Members for their support of this 
amendment.
  Essentially, this is the third year that I have submitted this 
amendment. It has been put on the terrorism bill and on this bill in 
prior times. It was removed in conference. Part of the terrorism bill 
asks the Department of Justice to take a look at the situation that 
exists out there with respect to the teaching of bombmaking and the 
knowledge and intent that such teaching will be used for a criminal 
purpose. In fact, the Department of Justice has submitted a report 
indicating that they believe that the amendment is necessary and will 
stand a constitutional test, and they have, in fact, approved the 
drafting of this amendment. I believe it is important and timely. I 
believe it will stand a constitutional test. I am just delighted that 
it has been cleared on both sides. I thank the Chair, and I yield the 
floor.
  Mr. BENNETT. Will the Senator yield for a question?
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I will be most happy to yield to the distinguished 
Senator.
  Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, I was present at a hearing on the issue 
of terrorism and raised the question of domestic terrorism, 
specifically in terms of information that is put on the Internet by 
groups that are opposed to fur farming; that is, opposed to the raising 
of animals for their fur. On the Internet, these groups describe how to 
build a bomb for the purpose of destroying a fur farm.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The remaining time is under the control of the 
Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. BENNETT. It was my understanding the Senator from Michigan 
yielded to the Senator from California.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California had 2 minutes.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I yield the remainder of my time to the 
Senator from California. She can yield to the Senator.
  Mr. BENNETT. I will finish my question. This group opposed to fur 
farming put on the Internet a description of how to build a bomb to 
blow up, say, a mink farm. They did say in their Internet thing, make 
sure no animal, including a human, is present in the building when you 
blow it up.

[[Page S5998]]

  I ask the Senator from California if, in her opinion, her amendment 
would make that kind of information on the Internet subject to Federal 
prosecution?
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I thank the distinguished Senator. My answer is I 
believe it would if the individual had the knowledge that any attempt 
would be used for criminal purpose, which this would be. The answer to 
the question is yes.
  Mr. BENNETT. I thank the Senator.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I thank the Senator from Utah very much.
  Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to amendment No. 
419. The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk called the roll.
  Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. 
Helms] is necessarily absent.
  Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. 
Daschle], the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. Bingaman], the Senator from 
Iowa [Mr. Harkin], the Senator from Hawaii [Mr. Inouye], and the 
Senator from Maryland [Ms. Mikulski] are necessarily absent.
  I also announce that the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. Daschle] is 
absent due to a death in the family.
  I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Iowa 
[Mr. Harkin] would vote ``aye''.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 94, nays 0, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 110 Leg.]

                                YEAS--94

     Abraham
     Akaka
     Allard
     Ashcroft
     Baucus
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bond
     Boxer
     Breaux
     Brownback
     Bryan
     Bumpers
     Burns
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Cleland
     Coats
     Cochran
     Collins
     Conrad
     Coverdell
     Craig
     D'Amato
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Enzi
     Faircloth
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Frist
     Glenn
     Gorton
     Graham
     Gramm
     Grams
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Hatch
     Hollings
     Hutchinson
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Jeffords
     Johnson
     Kempthorne
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Kyl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     McCain
     McConnell
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nickles
     Reed
     Reid
     Robb
     Roberts
     Rockefeller
     Roth
     Santorum
     Sarbanes
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith (NH)
     Smith (OR)
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thurmond
     Torricelli
     Warner
     Wellstone
     Wyden

                             NOT VOTING--6

     Bingaman
     Daschle
     Harkin
     Helms
     Inouye
     Mikulski
  The amendment (No. 419) was agreed to.
  Mr. FORD. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. THURMOND. I move to lay it on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. THURMOND. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, first of all, I would like to announce there 
will be no further rollcall votes tonight. We have been working to make 
sure that the Members that we need to have here tomorrow, if necessary, 
on the Finance Committee and also the Budget Committee members are here 
so we can complete our work on the tax cut provision of reconciliation, 
so that the Budget Committee can meet tomorrow morning to package both 
the reconciliation spending provision and the tax cut bill. We are now 
satisfied we will be able to have Members here for that, even though we 
do not have recorded votes scheduled.
  For the information of all Senators, the Senate will resume 
consideration of the DOD authorization bill. However, I have been 
assured that amendments will be offered. Therefore, votes will not 
occur during Friday's session.
  The point I am making here is that we will be in session. We will 
continue to work on the DOD bill. We will have amendments that will be 
offered, but because of the request of a number of Senators, and the 
agreement we have been able to work out, we will not have to have votes 
during Friday's session.
  As all Members know, the Senate will begin reconciliation on Monday. 
It is my understanding that Members will offer amendments to the 
reconciliation bill. Again, with a lot of requests from the Members and 
with the assurance and the cooperation in a number of ways, which I 
will not enumerate now, the votes that are required as a result of 
amendments being offered Monday will be stacked to occur on Tuesday, at 
9:30 a.m. Therefore, no votes will occur on Monday.
  Committees are expected to act in the morning on the tax 
reconciliation package. We will be in session tomorrow with some 
morning business time that we will have identified later, and the 
Department of Defense authorization bill will continue to be 
considered. We will be in session on Monday on the reconciliation bill, 
with amendments to be offered. But the next recorded votes will occur 
and be stacked--more than one, hopefully, and at least a couple, but 
maybe even more--to occur at 9:30 on Tuesday.
  Mr. President, does the Senator from Kentucky wish to add anything?
  Mr. FORD. Mr. President, we have been working back and forth all day. 
I think the water is calm. So, on Monday, we will debate 
reconciliation. There will be amendments offered. Votes will be stacked 
until 9:30 on Tuesday, and there will be votes--a minimum of four, 
probably, back to back.
  Mr. LOTT. I appreciate that. That was an important component of us 
getting this agreement, to guarantee that we are, in fact, getting work 
done and making progress on the reconciliation bill.
  Mr. FORD. I can guarantee the majority leader this. If we are here 
and alive, you will have at least two amendments from our side that we 
will vote on on Tuesday morning.
  Mr. LOTT. We will have two from our side.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending question is the Cochran amendment 
No. 420.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                         Privilege of the Floor

  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the 
following three members of the Senator Kyl's staff be granted floor 
privileges during the consideration of the national defense 
authorization bill: Paul Iarrobino, John Rood, and David Stephens.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________