[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 82 (Thursday, June 12, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5590-S5594]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                      NATO ENLARGEMENT AFTER PARIS

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, having recently returned from Paris and the 
signing of the NATO-Russia charter, I rise today to discuss what is one 
of the most important foreign policy questions facing the United 
States--and facing this body: The enlargement of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization to include several new democracies of Central 
Europe.
  Mr. President, I know that what I have just said will at first seem 
counterintuitive to many Americans. Why is NATO enlargement so 
important? After all, the Soviet Union is but a bad memory, communism 
in Europe lives on in stunted form only in Serbia and Belarus, and no 
military threat in Europe is in sight.
  Moreover, some will correctly point out, the Pacific Rim has become 
the world's premier area for economic growth, and Latin America, while 
also a prime opportunity for trade and investment, is vitally important 
to the United States because of problems like illegal immigration and 
drug trafficking.
  So why are we bothering with Europe, much less tinkering with a 
hugely successful alliance like NATO?
  Mr. President, these are legitimate questions that must be answered. 
I would submit, first of all, without minimizing the importance of Asia 
and Latin America, that Europe remains a vital area of interest for the 
United States for political, strategic, economic, and cultural reasons. 
A sizable percentage of the world's democracies are in Europe, and the 
continent remains a major global economic player and partner of the 
United States.
  The European union, composed of 15 vibrant free-market democracies, 
has embarked upon an ambitious program to create an ever closer union 
with greater political, economic, and social integration. Most of 
Central and Eastern Europe has gone through several free elections, and 
democracy is putting down firm roots.
  In economic terms, the European union, with a combined population a 
third larger than ours, has a combined gross domestic product that 
exceeds ours. While the United States has a larger--and, I might add, 
less balanced--trading relationship with Asia than with Europe, we 
invest far more in Europe.
  Several new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe have highly 
educated work forces, already boast rapidly expanding economies, and 
already attract considerable American investment.
  Moreover, most Americans trace their cultural roots to Europe, and 
millions retain personal ties to it. By any geopolitical standard, it 
would be a catastrophe for U.S. interests if instability would alter 
the current situation in Europe.
  How might that instability occur? Well, no one believes that the 
Russian

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army is poised to pour through the Fulda Gap in Germany--NATO's horror 
scenario for 45 years. The Russian army is in such pitiful shape that 
it could not even reconquer little Chechnya, a part of the Russian 
federation.
  No, the threats to stability in Europe have changed, but they are, if 
anything, even more real than those of the cold war. We all know what 
they are. They are ethnic and religious hatred as horrifyingly shown in 
the hundreds of thousands killed, raped, made homeless, or otherwise 
brutalized in Bosnia.
  They are the well-organized forces of international crime, whose 
tentacles extend from Moscow and Palermo to New York and Los Angeles.
  True--but some might ask why the Europeans can't take care of their 
own problems? Mr. President, life is not fair. Unfortunately, the 
history of the 20th century has demonstrated that the United States 
must play a leading role in organizing the security of Europe. In World 
War I, in World War II, and lately in Bosnia and Herzegovina, without 
American leadership the countries of Europe have been unable to resolve 
their differences peacefully.
  While American idealism has certainly played a role in our various 
interventions to rescue Europe, enlightened self-interest has been the 
dominant motive. Put simply: It is in the vital interest of the United 
States that stability be preserved in Europe.
  How does that translate into 1997 terms? It means that we must lead 
the Europeans to create what is called in current policy jargon a new 
security architecture to guarantee stability to the areas most 
vulnerable to disruption.
  To no one's surprise, I am talking about Central and Eastern Europe, 
where Newly Independent States are striving to create and solidify 
political democracy and free markets. It is a difficult process, which 
if not put into a larger framework could spin out of control.
  It is in this context that the enlargement of NATO must be seen. 
During the cold war, NATO provided the security umbrella under which 
former enemies like France and Germany were able to cooperate and build 
highly successful free societies.
  It was the framework in which former pariahs like Germany, Italy, and 
Spain could be reintegrated into democratic Europe. And it was NATO 
that kept the feud between Greece and Turkey from escalating to 
warfare.
  The enlargement of NATO can now serve to move the zone of stability 
eastward to central Europe and thereby both prevent ethnic conflicts 
from escalating and forestall a scramble for new bilateral and 
multilateral pacts along the lines of the 1930's from occurring.
  For if NATO were not to enlarge, the countries between Germany and 
Russia would inevitably seek other means to protect themselves. The 
question for today is not ``enlarge NATO or remain the same.'' The 
status quo is simply not an option.
  In fact, we already have clear evidence of how NATO can act as a 
stabilizing influence in the region. Two years ago, NATO listed 
friendly relations with neighbors as one of the core criteria for 
joining the alliance. Merely the possibility of attaining membership 
rapidly induced centuries-old enemies like Hungary and Romania to bury 
the hatchet, conclude a treaty of friendship, and even begin intensive 
military cooperation. The same is true to a lesser extent between 
Hungary and Slovakia.
  Italy and Slovenia have settled a long-festering property dispute. 
The Czech Republic and Germany have formally come to terms with the 
Nazis' war-time atrocities and with Czechoslovakia's post-war expulsion 
of 3 million sudeten Germans. I submit that none of these highly 
encouraging developments would have occurred without the carrot of 
admission to NATO having been offered.
  Mr. President, there is one additional argument for NATO enlargement: 
The moral one. For 40 years the United States loudly proclaimed its 
solidarity with the captive nations of Central and Eastern Europe who 
were under the heel of Communist oppressors. Now that most of them have 
cast off their shackles, it is our responsibility to live up to our 
pledges to readmit them into the West through NATO and the European 
Union when they are fully qualified.
  Let me be precise in my policy formulation. I believe it would be in 
our national interest for NATO to extend invitations to final 
negotiations for membership at its July summit in Madrid to Poland, the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia.
  All of these countries have fulfilled the basic criteria for NATO 
membership--Political democracy, free-market economy, civilian control 
of the military, peaceful relations with neighbors, and a commitment to 
NATO principles and Trans-Atlantic security.
  In each of these countries democracy and free-market capitalism are 
on sound footings. All four are able to assume the political, military, 
and financial responsibilities of membership.
  Mr. President, this morning the administration announced that it will 
only support the candidacies at Madrid of Poland, the Czech Republic, 
and Hungary. I regret the omission of Slovenia from this list, but I 
recognize the political realities--especially among the current 
European members of NATO--that argued for this decision.
  After my discussions last night with the President and his advisers, 
I am convinced that Slovenia will be the No. 1 candidate for membership 
in the second round of NATO enlargement--and in a short time.
  For me, the logic of enlargement is inescapable. But because the 
issue is complex and remote from the daily lives of most Americans, I 
also believe that it is critically important immediately to initiate a 
national debate on NATO enlargement.
  No foreign policy, no matter how well-formulated, can be sustained 
without the informed consent of the American people, which is why we 
need to launch a national debate to explore the costs, obligations, and 
benefits to the United States of NATO enlargement. I have asked 
Chairman Helms to hold hearings in the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee; I believe they will be an essential part of this debate.
  Meetings in non-governmental forums across the country are likewise 
essential if our people are to understand the profound importance of 
the issue before us.
  I believe that when they have examined the facts, the American people 
will support us in our effort to enlarge the alliance and build the new 
European security architecture.
  For 40 years after World War II, NATO bound together the democracies 
of Western Europe and North America in a military alliance to counter 
the threat of Soviet communism. The statesmen who crafted the 
Washington treaty of 1949 bequeathed their successors an alliance of 
unparalleled effectiveness, one that deterred aggression for four 
decades until its adversary collapsed from internal weakness.
  Ironically, within the fruits of NATO's success lie the seeds of its 
possible demise. Alliances are formed to fight wars or to deter them. 
Once the adversary is gone, unless they adapt to meet changing threats, 
they lose their reason for being. My good friend from Indiana, Senator 
Lugar, recognized this fact when he said that NATO must ``go out of 
area or go out of business,'' and I wholeheartedly agree with him. For 
this reason too, the status quo is simply not an option.
  Enlargement must be accompanied by a redefinition of NATO's mission. 
The Alliance's primary mission as outlined in article 5 of the 
Washington Treaty of April 4, 1949, remains the same: Treating an 
attack on one member as an attack on all and responding through the use 
of armed force if necessary. Now, in the current post-cold-war 
situation, non-article 5 missions like peacekeeping, sometimes in 
cooperation with non-NATO powers have become possible.
  The SFOR joint effort in Bosnia and Herzegovina with Russia and 
several other non-NATO countries is an excellent example.
  But what about our erstwhile adversary, Russia? Many ask whether 
enlarging NATO will not rekindle the cold war and strengthen the hand 
of hostile nationalists and communists in Russia. Again, this is not 
only a legitimate question to ask, but a necessary one.
  Mr. President, I firmly believe that NATO enlargement need not 
adversely affect United States relations with Russia. I came to this 
conclusion on a

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trip to Moscow and several central European capitals earlier this 
spring. My observations are contained in greater detail in a Foreign 
Relations Committee report that I wrote entitled: ``Meeting the 
challenges of a Post-Cold War World: NATO Enlargement and U.S.-Russia 
Relations.''
  Although few Russians are fond of NATO enlargement, policymakers in 
Moscow have accepted it. Moreover, no Russian politician whom I met--
from communist leader Zyuganov, to liberal leader Yavlinsky, to the 
nationalist General Lebed--believed that NATO enlargement constitutes a 
security threat to Russia.
  In fact, nearly all politicians and experts whom I met understood the 
non-aggressiveness implicit in NATO's ``three no's" --the Alliance's 
declarations of having no reason, intention, or plan in the current and 
foreseeable security environment permanently to station nuclear weapons 
or substantial combat forces of current members on the territory of new 
members.
  Rather, the Kremlin's public opposition to enlargement is largely a 
psychological question connected with the loss of empire, wounded 
pride, and--most importantly--an uncertainty about Russia's place in 
the world of the 21st century.
  As part of this uncertainty, most Russian leaders are worried about 
their country's being marginalized, and as a result they are eager to 
move forward with its bilateral relationship with the United States.
  Mr. President, let us not kid ourselves. Never is a long time, and 
Russia's current weakened condition is sure to improve. We must 
continue to engage Russia politically, militarily, and economically.
  The Clinton administration, together with our NATO allies, has 
already begun to do so. As I mentioned earlier, 2 weeks ago in Paris, 
the heads of government of the 16 NATO members and President Yeltsin 
signed the so-called ``Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation 
and Security Between NATO and the Russian Federation.'' President 
Clinton asked me to accompany him to represent the United States at the 
signing ceremony.
  Time does not permit me to go into detail about this lengthy 
document, except to say that it is a good start at binding Russia 
closer to the West and soothing its bruised feelings, without giving 
Moscow a decision-making role in NATO's core structures.
  It creates a new body called the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, 
which will serve as a forum for consultation on matters such as 
peacekeeping operations, conflict prevention, and combatting terrorism.
  But let me reemphasize to my colleagues that the Alliance will not in 
any way be subordinated to the NATO-Russia Joint Council.
  When NATO members gather to discuss alliance policy, no outside 
country will have any right or privilege to prevent NATO from doing 
what is best for its member states. And no outside country will have 
any say in whether new countries are admitted to NATO.
  Its purely consultative mandate, however, does not mean that the 
Joint Council cannot evolve into a truly valuable mechanism for 
promoting mutual trust.
  As Russian officials better understand that NATO is not the rapacious 
caricature of Soviet propaganda, but rather a defensive alliance and 
force for security and stability in Europe, their animosity toward the 
organization may dissipate.
  And by working together in the Joint Council, Russia can prove that 
it is a responsible partner for the West.
  Through this mechanism and others, over time Moscow can come to 
realize that the enlargement of NATO by moving the zone of stability 
eastward to Central Europe will increase Russia's own security.
  One problem, however, requires immediate attention. There needs to be 
a mechanism by which the countries invited at Madrid can participate in 
NATO before their full accession to membership.
  I would suggest in this regard making the candidates observers to the 
North Atlantic Council.
  I am pleased that the chairman of the Subcommittee on European 
Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, my friend from Oregon, 
Senator Smith, plans to hold a hearing on the NATO-Russia Founding Act 
to examine these issues in detail.
  Mr. President, it is also essential that arms control agreements with 
Russia be ratified and expanded. Of special importance is getting the 
State Duma to ratify the START II Treaty and then, together with the 
United States, to move on to further reductions in START III. Despite 
recent press commentaries, I do not believe that the NATO-Russia 
Founding Act or NATO enlargement will substantially affect START II's 
ratification prospects in the Duma.
  Moreover, as the NATO-Russia Founding Act recognizes, the treaty on 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe [C.F.E.] must be adapted to reflect 
the changed environment. The overwhelming Senate ratification last 
month of the C.F.E. Flank document, together with its approval by the 
other twenty-nine states parties to the C.F.E. Treaty, augurs well for 
the C.F.E. adaptation negotiations.
  In addition, it is vitally important that the United States continue 
its economic engagement with Russia, not through massive infusions of 
money, which Moscow, especially if it cleans up its corruption, does 
not need, but more through broadened investment and trade, expanded 
grassroots partnerships, and some targeted technical assistance.
  Significantly, not a single senior official in Warsaw, Prague, 
Budapest, or Ljubljana whom I met wanted to isolate Russia from the 
West.
  In order for NATO enlargement to proceed, both our current allies and 
the candidate countries invited to join at the Madrid Summit next month 
must agree to shoulder their fair share of financial costs and all 
mutual obligations. An agreement on sharing these costs is essential 
not only to enlargement, but to the continued viability of NATO itself.
  The candidates for membership in NATO must assume the financial 
burden of making their armed forces interoperable with those of NATO 
members, in addition to meeting the costs of modernizing their 
militaries, which they must undertake in any event.
  Other obligations are political and military, such as agreeing to 
come to the aid of allies, as described in article 5; allowing basing 
of NATO troops on their territory, if necessary; and allowing 
overflights of NATO aircraft, if necessary.
  The February 1997 Pentagon study on NATO proposed a distribution of 
direct costs of enlargement whereby 15 percent would be assumed by the 
United States, 35 percent by the new members, and 50 percent by the 
other current members of NATO.
  Calculating these ratios begins with the estimate that about 40 
percent of direct enlargement enhancements could be nationally funded, 
and 60 percent common funded.
  Estimated direct costs of enlargement total between $9 and $12 
billion over 12 years, through 2009. Let me point out to my colleagues 
that it is only these direct costs that the United States would help 
pay for. Additional costs not directly related to enlargement will have 
to be paid for by our current allies and our new allies.
  The central European countries must modernize their militaries--a 
cost they will incur whether or not they join NATO. Those costs are 
estimated at $10 to $13 billion through 2009. And the responsibilty for 
bearing these costs rests solely with the governments of the four 
leading candidates.
  Another pivotal issue is that our current allies must develop power 
projection capabilities, which the United States achieved in the 
1980's, if they are to contribute to the new missions of the alliance.
  While these capabilities will allow them to help defend new members, 
they are necessary even if NATO were not to enlarge. As a result, these 
costs of $8 to $10 billion over 12 years are, likewise, not a direct 
cost of enlargement, but they are essential to the future of NATO, and 
they must be borne alone by our current allies.
  The expected U.S. contribution of $150 to $200 million per year for 
10 years, although a small fraction of our total defense budget, is 
nonetheless not trivial, given our mandate to balance the U.S. Federal 
budget by the year 2002.
  Mr. President, prospective new NATO members must keep that basic 
political fact of life in mind, lest they get

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the erroneous impression that their accession to the alliance would be 
a painless, free ride.
  The candidate countries must make the financial means available if 
they expect current members to ratify their accession to membership. As 
I told one Polish military official, ``If you want to fly first class, 
you have to buy a first class ticket.'' They must realize that freedom 
isn't free, and security isn't cheap.
  Having given this warning, I fear that the 50 percent share of direct 
enlargement costs allocated to the Western European NATO partners and 
Canada may, in fact, be politically more difficult than the 35 percent 
allocated to the new members, particularly after our current allies pay 
for their power projection enhancements.
  One of the complicating factors is that the 11 European NATO members 
who are also members of the European Union are currently engaged in 
painful budget cutting in order to meet the Maastricht convergence 
criteria for Economic and Monetary Union [E.M.U.] on January 1, 1999. 
Those who qualify may be held to rigid fiscal discipline thereafter, if 
a stability pact is enforced without ``political'' criteria.
  Resentment against this belt-tightening played a key role in the 
defeat of President Chirac's conservative coalition in the French 
elections on June 1st.
  As a politician, I empathize with the challenge our European friends 
face. But we all have to make difficult choices, and if our European 
allies want continued American involvement in their security, they must 
step up to the plate.
  In order for NATO to remain a vibrant organization with the United 
States continuing to play a lead role, the non-U.S. members must assume 
their fair share of direct enlargement costs and for developing power 
projection capabilities.
  To do otherwise would cast the United States in the role of ``the 
good gendarme of Europe''--a role that neither the American people, nor 
the Senate of the United States, would accept.
  Mr. President, there is one more dark cloud looming on the horizon of 
European-American relations. I fear that a coincidence of events in the 
late spring of 1998 may make Senate ratification of NATO enlargement 
problematical. Just when the Senate is likely to be voting on amending 
the Washington Treaty to accept new members, American ground forces 
will be completing their withdrawal from Bosnia.
  As it now stands, our European NATO allies will follow suit, 
repeating an ``in together, out together'' mantra, despite a United 
States offer to make air, naval, communications, and intelligence 
assets available to a European-led follow-on force, with an American 
Rapid Reaction Force on standby alert ``over the horizon'' in Hungary 
or Italy.
  Many of my colleagues, mindful of the repeated calls by some European 
NATO members, led by France, for more European leadership in the 
alliance and a sturdier ``European pillar'' within NATO, may see in the 
european refusal to maintain troops in Bosnia evidence of inequitable 
burden-sharing or--worse still--may question the worth of NATO 
altogether.
  Therefore, I believe that our European NATO partners, especially 
France and the United Kingdom, should reconsider their unwillingness to 
lead a post-SFOR ground force in Bosnia after mid-1998.
  Mr. President, international organizations other than NATO also have 
meaningful security components and should be encouraged to intensify 
their efforts.
  The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [O.S.C.E.], 
which during the past few years has undertaken conflict-prevention, 
crisis management, and electoral missions in Nagorno-Karabakh, 
Abkhazia, Chechnya, Bosnia, and Albania, will likely continue to grow 
in importance. The United States is playing an increasingly important 
role in the O.S.C.E. And should continue to do so.
  The European Union also plays a profound role in stabilizing the 
continent. The E.U.'s immense economic clout has made it vital to the 
development of central and Eastern Europe, and it is therefore 
virtually inconceivable that even a non-NATO E.U. member state would be 
the object of aggression.
  The E.U. hopes some day to create a common foreign and security 
policy, and in the recent past France concentrated on giving the E.U. 
an independent military dimension through the Western European Union 
[W.E.U.].
  Two events in the 1990's have altered this development. First, the 
gulf war revealed how far the U.S. was ahead of Europe in military 
technology. Second, NATO endorsed a European security and defense 
identity within the alliance, which would allow European members to 
carry out contingency operations under W.E.U. political control and 
strategic direction.
  As a result, Paris reconsidered and now intends to re-enter NATO's 
integrated command. Its demand, however, for European control of the 
southern command in Naples--a nonstarter idea, totally rejected by the 
United States--is complicating the issue.
  There is, though, a sub-surface tension between NATO and the E.U. 
from the early 1990's the E.U. firmly proclaimed that NATO enlargement 
had to precede E.U. expansion [the accession 2 years ago of Austria, 
Finland, and Sweden excepted]. Some observers have feared that the E.U. 
has used NATO enlargement as a pretext for postponing the admission of 
qualified central and Eastern European countries.
  Now that NATO has set a 1999 date for completion of its first round 
of enlargement, the E.U. should move ahead with its own expansion. A 
first-round target date of 2002 has been cited and should be met.
  In the meantime, as President Clinton advocated 2 weeks ago in the 
Hague, western governments and private enterprise should cooperate on 
investment mechanisms to assist the economies of the new democracies to 
move rapidly forward.
  Public opinion polls in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary 
reveal that, to a greater or lesser degree, the citizenries are unclear 
about the mutual military obligations that NATO membership entails.
  With these data in mind, I have personally urged the three national 
governments quickly to embark upon public education campaigns so that 
invitations to join NATO in Madrid in July will not catch their 
populations off guard and unaware of the action their governments are 
proposing.
  The process of NATO enlargement must not lead to the drawing of new 
lines through Europe. In order to prevent such a development, NATO must 
make unmistakably clear that the first round of enlargement is not the 
last, but rather the beginning of an ongoing process.
  Moreover, NATO should take steps to strengthen and deepen ties with 
candidate countries that do not receive invitations at Madrid, in 
preparation for their joining the alliance at a future date. The newly 
created Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, an enhanced partnership for 
peace program, and bilateral agreements should all be used to 
underscore the ongoing nature of the NATO enlargement process.
  To sum up, NATO is necessarily transforming itself from an alliance 
that defended its members against the Soviet threat into an alliance 
that allows democracies to maintain stability in Western Europe and 
that extends that zone of stability to central and Eastern Europe to 
deter conflicts and prevent crises from escalating.
  An enlarged NATO will allow the new, free-market democracies of 
Central Europe to undertake their share of the burden of the common 
defense of their continent. It will allow them to cooperate with one 
another and with neighboring alliance members. And, contrary to what 
many critics have argued, it will allow them to save money in providing 
for their defense.
  There will continue to be other institutions essential for European 
security affiliated with NATO such as the new Euro-Atlantic Partnership 
Council to enable closer cooperation between NATO and nonalliance 
countries in the partnership for peace.
  There will be a joint commission between NATO and Ukraine similar to 
the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. And there continue to be 
fundamentally important organizations like the European Union and the 
O.S.C.E., all of which I discussed earlier.
  By combining NATO enlargement with a formalized relationship with 
Russia in the new permanent joint

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council, the United States and its allies can take advantage of the 
historic opportunity presented by the end of the cold war and lay the 
foundation for long-term European security.
  I believe it is squarely in our national interest to do so, and in 
the coming year as the Senate prepares to exercise its constitutional 
responsibility of ratifying or rejecting the accession protocols to the 
Washington Treaty, I will continue to speak out on the course of NATO 
enlargement.
  I thank the Chair and yield the floor.

                          ____________________